Coverage of the election campaign in mass media

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 2014 - UKRAINE

Preliminary media monitoring report

Kyiv, October14, 2014 – The Association ”SpilnyiProstir”/Equal Access Committee, an independent, non-profit organization dedicated to freedom of expression and the media, has conducted systematic monitoring of media coverage of the 26 October parliamentary elections. The Association seeks to evaluate the monitored media’s performance in providing objective and balanced coverage of the contestants and their platforms so the citizens of Ukraine can make well-informed choices at the ballot box. The main objective of the project is to inform the public about the conduct of media during the pre-election campaign and to initiate a discussion about the objectivity and quality of the media reporting.

In addition, to the media monitoring, the Association has also been implementing synergetic projects on voters’ awareness, enhancement of standards’ and quality of communication aimed at development of democracy and strengthening of informational society in Ukraine - thanks to the support from the Council of Europe, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the US Embassy in Ukraine.

The project’s findings are not intended to support any one candidate or political party, but the integrity of the media environment as a whole during the campaign season. The findings have been compiled in four monitoring reports about the media’s behavior during the election campaign and have been disseminated to the public, media, civil society, political parties, and international community.On September 15, Association ”Spilnyi Prostir”/Equal Access Committee commenced the monitoring of 8 national and 45 regional TV channels; 6 national and 76 regional newspapers, 4 national and 68 regional Internet web sites; and also 3 national radio stations.

The first monitoring report covered the period 15 September – 10 October and the second monitoring report covered the period 15 September – 21 October - both reports can be found at:: http://prostir-monitor.org/foto/mtree/2014/10/REPORT_SEPTEMBER_english.compressed.pdf. Following is the summary of the main monitoring findings covering the period 15 September – 26 October:The final report that will include recommendation swill be published on November 13, 2014.

Main findings

The media environment in the run-up to the elections continued to be affected by the on-going crisis between Ukraine and Russia, with journalists facing intimidation and harass-ment including killings, abductions, threats, physical and verbal attacks.

The media as a whole nevertheless provided voters with a diverse range of information about electoral contestants and other relevant political subjects based on which voters could make a more informed choice. However, voters could form an objective view of the campaign only if they followed several media outlets.

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There were a few improvements in comparison with the 2012 parliamentary elections, such as the debates between contestants on the First National Channel. These debates en-abled candidates to convey their messages to the electorate and allowed voters to form opinions of the candidates.

Similar to previous elections, the media devoted a significant coverage to the activities of the authorities, many of whom were candidates in the elections. Unlike in 2012, however, this coverage was mainly neutral and there was no apparent attempt, apart from a few exceptions, to use such official coverage to support any one candidate. Moreover, some monitored media (particularly newspapers) criticized state authorities, particularly Prime Minister Yatsenyuk.

Despite the diverse media environment, most outlets remain under strong influence from their owners and political patrons. For election coverage, this meant that a number of me-dia outlets were under some influence from candidates and political parties. Some mon-itored outlets more or less openly showed their sympathies towards particular political subjects.

The enduring monopolization of the media market by several powerful groups and media tycoons is a potential threat to media diversity, resulting in a general lack of in-depth and analytical coverage as well as of investigative reporting that could help the voters to bet-ter assess the qualities and programs of electoral contestants.

While there were fewer cases of paid-for coverage in comparison with the 2012 elections, this practice continues to negatively influence the media environment. The amount of paid-for coverage gradually increased closer to the election day.These positive or negative materials (produced to either promote or discredit candidates, depending on their rela-tionship to a channel’s owner, were mainly observed on Inter, TRK Ukraine and 1 +1.

In addition, the qualitative analysis revealed other cases where media did not follow the principles of journalistic standards. In connection with the coverage of the anti-terrorist operation, the monitoring team observed that at times the adherence to journalistic stan-dards was substituted journalists openly expressing their patriotism.

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National television

The monitoring results indicated that TV broadcasters mainly focused on the events related to the anti-terrorist operation, foreign policy issues, the state of economy, etc. At the same time, however, the amount of information related to the elections significantly increased in the run up to the election day.

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In contrast to the 2012 parliamentary elections, the main national channels offered a diverse range of views and generally did not blacklisted any politicians or independent experts from their coverage.

A share of election content from the general amount of information (%)(indescending order)

Inter 34%TRC“Ukraina” 33%ICTV 27%TVi 24%1+1 16%Pershyi natsionalnyi/FirstNational 15%STB 15%5-jkanal/5thchannel 14%

DIRECT SPEECH Inter STB TVi TRC “Ukraina”

1+1 Pershyi

natsionalnyi/FirstNational

5-j kanal/5thchannel

ICTV

Petro Poroshenko (President)

1429 658 577 492 1541 671 859 978

ArseniyYatsenyukЯценюк (Prime-Minister + Government)

432 642 1952 3279 2123 1543 1545 1861

OleksandrTurchinov (Speaker)

44 146 76 39 876 69 284 106

“Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc”

3218 129 1564 2453 802 663 389 2176

“Narodnyi front”/“Popular Front”

646 121 706 1588 1483 105 167 904

“Batkivschyna” 2457 63 743 1605 32 121 319 1395“Radykalnapartiya”/”Radical party”

2611 0 16 416 97 44 16 37

“Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc”

4078 43 30 4477 56 0 69 1921

“Hromadyanskaposytsiya”/”Civic position””

1387 21 36 243 29 0 0 81

“Svoboda”/”Freedom” 736 12 1066 632 14 92 157 268CPU 10 41 0 361 6 0 0 21Samopomich”/”Self-help”

11 82 30 344 39 24 0 93

“SylnaUkraina”/”Strong Ukraine”

1559 0 0 0 224 0 0 1086

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In general, TV channels presented positions of various parties. In addition, TV channels attempted to provided a certain balance as there was generally no information programs which would only feature one political party.

On television channels it was traced the plots with features of paid materials. Their number increased especially in the mid-October - two or three weeks before the election. However, the paid materials were not too much - their share declined in favor of so-called “corporate jeans” caused by the interests of the TV owners.

Three channels took part most actively in the media wars: Inter, TRC “Ukraina” and 1 +1. The confrontation between the current governor Ihor Kolomoiskyi on the one hand (he owns 1 + 1) and the politicians and businessmen Dmytro Firtash, Serhiy Lyovochkin (the owners of Inter) and Rinat Akhmetov (the owner of TRC “Ukraina”) on the other hand.

The owners of the channels influence over the editorial policy and use the media to their advantages - both in business interests (the activity of mining industry combines, hidden advertising of “Pryvat bank”, Odessa Port Plant, the resort “Bukovel”, etc.) and in political interests (positive representation of “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc”, black PR campaign against “Radykalna partiya”/”Radical party”, tough criticism of the Government and the party “Narodnyi front”/“Popular Front”), and in image interests (humanitarian aid of the Rinat Akhmetov Fund).

The mass use of administrative resources and the posts during the election campaign can not be traced. The authorities run in the elections not as one team, but at least as two political parties - the presidential party “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc” and the party of the Prime-Minister “Narodnyi front”/“Popular Front”. This makes it impossible to use the vertical of executive power in one direction as it was in 2012, when the Government of Mykola Azarov headed into election from the Parties of Regions. Therefore, the use of posts for representing the positions of political parties was not widespread. Mostly the opponents used the activities of the Government and the President for criticism of their political parties. The amount of messages where the President acted as an agitator for his party - 1% of the total amount of political information. The government officials campaigned for their party (most members of the Government are running from “Narodnyi front”/“Popular Front”)– 2,4%.

As to the sympathies and antipathies of the TV channels, Inter, TRC “Ukraina” and 1 + 1 showed clearly such sympathies and antipathies to political parties. Other TV channels showed their preferences not so obviously. The notion “sympathy” supposes the editorial policy of the channel, system support of political party but not “jeans”.

Also the experts states that there were problems with access of information about political power. The early parliamentary elections are being held after Maidan and Revolution of Dignity. It was created three new political parties - the pro-presidential party “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc”, the party “Narodnyi front”/“Popular Front” headed by the Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc” to which a part of members of the Party of Regions was included (the Party of Regions which was the largest parliamentary party in 2012decided not to run for the parliament).Among the new, non-parliamentary parties –“Samopomich”/”Self-help” of the Lviv Mayor Andriy Sadovyi and “Hromadyanska posytsiya”/”Civic position” of Anatolyi Hrytsenko. To the parties’ lists besides the politicians, the military commanders, the activists of Maidanand journalists were included. The top five included not politicians, but the persons who were not still associated with the parties. In the media the experts, counselors of top officials and public figures began to appear actively. TV channels did not indicate often their political affiliation which was one of the main features of this election campaign when it was very difficult to the audience to understand who represented one or another party.

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However, the experts state that practically none political power represented the election programs on TV. The President Petro Poroshenko represented “The Strategy 2020”, which was considered by the experts as the election program. However, the information about this program was overall and not quite clear. Other policy initiatives had populist nature and television media did not accentuate them and did not analyze their feasibility. Regarding the quantitative representation, the monitoring results for the entire campaign show that the television highlights the elections actively, but not quite in balanced way. In particular, the position of Government (27%) and the President (18%) wasrepresented most actively.

There were 4 leaders among the political parties, whose positions were represented most actively, namely “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc” (11.1%), “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc”(10.2%), “Batkivschyna” (7.5%), “Narodnyi front”/“Popular Front”(5.8%).

Minimum information was about CPU (1%), “Samopomich”/”Self-help” (1.5%) and “Hromadyanska posytsiya”/”Civic position” (1.7%).“Radykalna partiya”/”Radical party” was devoted 4,7% of ether time,“Svoboda”/”Freedom”- 2,8% and “SylnaUkraina”/”Strong Ukraine”"- 3,3% relatively.The President and the Government received the most information in positive tone. Among the political parties - “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc” (96% of positive information about the “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc”was covered by two news channels - Inter and TRC“Ukraina”) and “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc”.The Government was criticized most actively. Among the political parties “Radykalnapartiya”/”Radical party” received most negative information (96% of negative information was represented by 1 + 1), “Narodnyi front”/“Popular Front”and “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc”.The Government and the President were represented most actively in neutral tone. Among the parties - “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc”, “Batkivschyna” and “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc”. The representatives of the Government, “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc”and “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc”received the most of direct speech; CPU and “Samopomich”/”Self-help”received the least of direct speechrelatively on television news.

Inter and TRC “Ukraina” were the most balanced channels according to quantitative figures. Although their editorial policy can not be considered as impartial– here one can trace the sympathies and antipathies to certain political forces. The relative balance can be traced on the channel ICTV.

Inter–the most of political forces are represented actively. Most critics is given to the Government, most positive information is represented about “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc”.

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TRC “Ukraina”- the most of political forces are represented actively. The advantage is given to “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc”.

1 +1 - almost the same amount of information (and the most) –about the Government and the President. Among the parties - “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc”.The largest amount of negative information - about “Radykalna partiya”/”Radical party”. This political party is actively criticized only by 1 +1 - 96% of all negative content about Oleh Lyashkoon the television media was represented by this channel.

“Pershyinatsionalnyi”/”First National” - more than 43% of political information is about the Government, more 24% - about the President. “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc” is the leader among the parties.

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TVi- the most information is about the Government, 42%. Relatively in balanced tone–about “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc”, “Batkivschyna”, “Svoboda”/”Freedom” and “Narodnyi front”/“Popular Front”. The rest of political forces was covered passively.

ICTV–covered the election campaign in a quite balanced way. The most information was about the Government - but compared to other channels, this amount is less - 23.5%.Among the parties “Batkivschyna”,“Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc” and “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc” were highlighted most actively and relatively in balanced manner.

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5-j kanal/5thchannel - with a clear predominance of information about the Government (almost 38%) and the President (25%).The parties were covered less actively, but relatively in balanced manner.

STB - the most information was about the Government (35%) and the President (almost 38%). The parties were covered passively, but relatively in balanced manner.

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National press

The national press covered the election actively and in quite balanced manner. The share of election content in total amount of materials - 12%.In the newspapers “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc” is represented most actively - (12.5%), also “Batkivschyna” (9%), “Sylna Ukraina”/”Strong Ukraine”- (7.7%), “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc” (7.4%) and “Narodnyi front”/“Popular Front” (7.2%) were also represented actively.The least of information was about “Samopomich”/”Self-help” (0.3%) and “Hromadyanska posytsiya”/”Civic position”(1.4%) were covered. The information about the parties was represented mainly in neutral tone, and only “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc” and “Narodnyi front”/“Popular Front” were covered actively in negative tone (almost as much as in neutral tone). The most positive information was devoted to “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc” but he is also the leader of negative information. “Batkivschyna” and “SylnaUkraina”/”Strong Ukraine” became the leaders in neutral tone.

The President, Prime Minister and the Government were mainly covered in terms of their official activity, the speaker was mentioned occasionally. Only during the last week their activities as the party members were highlighted - mostly in negative tone. The indicators of the President and the Government are almost identical (18.1% and 19.2%). Much negative information was covered about them - as much as neutral and positive information together. Their activities are the basis of anti-agitation campaigns of almost all parties which caused the high negative indexes.

A share of election content from the general amount of information (%)

1. “Vesti”– 7%. 2. “Hazetapo-ukrainski” – 17%.3. “Dzerkalotyzhnya” – 13%.4. “Kommentarii” – 12%.5. “Segodnya” – 9%.6. “Faktyikommentarii”– 11%.

In general it can be concluded that it would be difficult for the voter to understand the information of various media, if he/her decided to use only newspapers. There are several reasons for this: 1.the election campaign was going against the backdrop of hostilities. The situation in the east of the country, the armed conflict and the presence of an external enemy left their marks on the campaign. The figure of the President as a Commander in Chief and division of the parties as “parties of peace” and “parties ofwar” cause the lack of discussion on the issues of development of the country. Often the topic of war, decisions on making the ceasefire and resolving the situation became crucial. This topic was also used by the parties for propaganda instead of developing and representing of their platforms. The question is mainly about termination or continuation of active hostilities, restoration of damaged regions, criticism of Defense Minister and Commander in Chief. The active coverage of the events in Donbas has often manipulative effect of “psychological shock”.

2. Inequality of the campaign. Some weeks were devoted only to the President within his official duties in connection with his active foreign visits and peace settlement in the Donbass region. During these weeks the topic of election was almost absent, or was present only due to anti-agitation - adoption of the law by Verkhovn Rada initiated by the President “On a special status of the Donbass regions” and delay of implementation of association with the EU which became the key newsworthy information for “jeans” materials of all competing parties.

3. Anti-agitation. None political force represented the detailed program of its party, so the newspapers had no material for analysis in order to provide the reader with necessary information to make conscious choice. Some attempts of analyze of the existing program materials were

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uninformative. The party built their messages not on the agitation, but on anti-agitation against the President or the Government.

4. Difficulty in identifying of the candidates. The presence in the lists of the combats of volunteer battalions, journalists and experts blurred the boundaries of identification of the candidates. The media don not often say that this or that activist is in the party lists. A striking example is DmytroTymchukas a military expert (“Narodnyi front”/“Popular Front”) or OleksandrChernenko as an expert on elections (“Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc”), Anton Heraschenko as an advisor of Arsen Avakov. Only during the last weeks, some advisers were marked as the candidates (Irina Heraschenko, Olha Bohomolets - “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc”).

5. “Jeans”. Around 60% of all electoral content was hidden advertising materials. Although namely due to “jeans” almost all political partieswere represented in the press, as they did not make their own newsworthy information. The leaders of “jeans”are“SylnaUkraina”/”Strong Ukraine”, “Batkivschyna” and “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc” which caused their strong performance. In the recent weeks, the “jeans” of “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc” and “Narodnyi front”/“Popular Front”appeared which increased significantly their neutral and positive figures as before they had beenmainly represented in negative tone. “Jeans” materials of “Radykalnapartiya”/”Radical party”,“Svoboda”/“Freedom” and CPU appeared less, but regularly. It should be noted the creative idea of “jeans” material was represented by “SylnaUkraina”/”Strong Ukraine” when in the newspapers it was posted the promotional material on how the migrants and residents of the Crimea could vote and the informational support of the party on this issue.

Main trends of the election campaign in separate newspapers:

1.“Segodnya”, “Kommentarii”, “Hazetapo-ukrainski”, “Dzerkalotyzhnya” devoted the most qualitative attention to the elections. There were the author’s materials, voter’s education, qualitative analysis of the party lists, investigations on individual representativesof the parties, experts’ comments.

2.“Faktyikommentarii” became the leader of “jeans” in relation to election content (80%). Except of the paid materials practically the newspapers did not represent its own political content. The authors’ materials related mainly to the topics of hostilities, stories from the front.

3. “Vesti” is the most manipulative edition. The newspaper used actively the manipulations with photos, titles, effects of repetition and “psychological shock”, forcing negativity surrounding the elections, “half-truths”, misrepresentation, “false compliments”, “humiliation”, direct or indirect attacks on political powers.

4. Impact of the newspapers’ owners on editorial policy is clearly perceptible in the newspapers “Segodnya” and “Fakty I kommentarii”(through active coverage of the charities of Rinat Akhmetov and Viktor Pinchuk, a sharp increase in coverage of the activity of “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc” in positive and neutral tone in “Segodnya” during the recent weeks)

Sympathies and antipathies of the newspapers:

1.“Vesti” - an active criticism of the President and the Government, the Prime Minister; antipathy to “Narodnyi front”/“Popular Front”and “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc”through the prism of the President and the Prime Minister.

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2. “Hazetapo-ukrainski” – is a very subjective newspaper besides the “jeans”. The persistent sympathy for the certain political parties have not been identified. It allows to cover both openly positive and frankly negative assessments. It was traced a considerable criticism of the President because of the laws “On the special status of the Donbas region” and the presence of his son in the lists, but there was also positive information.

3. “Dzerkalo tyzhnya”. Fostering the negative image of the President as Commander in Chief, criticism of the Government. None sympathy to any political parties have been identified - the election were in whole highlighted not much.

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4.“Kommentarii”. Neutrality or situational commitment to Petro Poroshenko as an official, criticism as the party member. Antipathy to “Radykalna partiya”/”Radical party”,“Svoboda”/”Freedom”, personally to Yulia Tymoshenko (“Batkivschyna”).

5.“Segodnya”. Sympathy to “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc” because of impact of the newspaper’s owner on its editorial policy. Most neutrality, situational commitment and criticism of Petro Poroshenko.

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6.“Fakty I kommentarii”. It was not traced any sympathies of the newspaper. The criticism of the President as the official (mainly because of the law “On the special status of the Donbas region).

 InternetThroughout the whole monitoring period the national online media covered the pre-election

process very passively and relatively not in a balanced way. The events related to the situation in the east and the problems with gas supplies became certainly one of the reasons of the lack of on-line media’s attention to the parliamentary elections. There were the favorites among the political parties, that were provided with the most attention, and some parties that were mentioned in the context of news on exit polls.

The share of election content among the general amount of news was less than a half. Most of the coverage in Internet was neutral, the least coverage - positive. Imbalance in representing of political actors, particularly in amount and tone, makes it possible to conclude that the on-line media provided them with the lack access to the media.

The online media paid more attention to the actions and statements of the politicians, and the political analysis of their programs was almost ignored.

The representatives of the Government, together with the President were often represented as the performers of their duties than as the agitators.

The most materials were devoted to the party “Batkivschyna” and “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc”. Instead, the voters received the least information about “Hromadyanska posytsiya”/”Civic position”” and Samopomich”/”Self-help”.

Petro Poroshenko as the President received most criticism and sympathies in negative and positive tone of the news.

The party “Batkivschyna” was often represented in the context of the news concerning NadiyaSavchenko who is the first number in it selection party list. The President and the Prime-Minister of the country were highlighted in the context of the news related to settlement of the conflict with Russia.

The leaders of political forces were often their speakers.

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National Radio

A share of election content from the general amount of information (%)(indescending order)

“Era FM” 8 %UR1 6 %Radio “Vesti” 4 %

The national radio stations covered the election campaign relatively in not balanced way and not actively. A share of election content in total amount of the news was about 6%. Most of the information was covered in neutral tone, the least of information was covered in negative tone.

If in early September the election information was covered in the context of social research on voters’ sympathies, the parties’ congresses, instructive information about the work of the CEC and the holding of the elections in the troubled regions, by the end of September then it was traced the increase of use of media manipulations and the amount of materials with the features of paid materials.

It should be noted that in the most cases of announcement of sociological data the media did not follow the professional standards and did not represent, for example, the number of respondents or statistical error.

The most of airtime was devoted to Petro Poroshenko and Arseniy Yatsenyuk as the officials. They became also the leaders in amounts of sync. The officials were represented mainly as the performers of their duties. Petro Poroshenko was covered as the agitator on the radio “Vesti” (the program dated from September 25, 2014) in the context of the press conference which he had held. In particular, an expert Vitaliy Balabal said: “The main message was that my party is running into elections and it will do all that I promise”. There were covered also the party members Oleksandr Turchynov and Arsen Avakovin the plot of UR1 related to their visits to Mariupol. (It creates a positive image of the politicians, though the specific statements were not presented, which gives us the reason to believe that this information is not newsworthy).

It was paid much more airtime to the party “Batkivschyna” than to other parties: mainly in the context of the case Nadiya Savchenko and the parliamentary work of the party. The most information about this party was covered in positive and neutral tone.

Petro Poroshenko as the party member and the President was mentioned most often in negative tone and also “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc”, “Narodnyi front”/“Popular Front”, “Radykalna partiya”/”Radical party” of Oleh Lyashko, “Batkivschyna”.

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Regional mass media

Regional Television

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The television channels of the western regions provided the larger share of the content namely to the participants of parliamentary elections, not to the top officials. For the entire duration of the campaign almost the same amount in positive tone was received by: “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc”(13.6%), the independent candidates to majority constituencies (13.3%), “Svoboda”/”Freedom” (13.2%) and “Narodnyi front”/“Popular Front” (12,2%). The rest contestants were represented significantly in more passive manner. There was much less of negative information, mainly to the address of “Batkivschyna”, “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc”, “Svoboda”/”Freedom” and also the candidates to majority constituencies.

In the southern regions the officials did not also dominate in election content being represented in minimal amount. Through out the whole campaign there was the total advantage of “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc” (52.45%); then there were “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc (15.4%), the candidates to majority constituencies (7.7%) and “Narodnyi front”/“Popular Front” (4.4%). The rest of contestants were represented more passively. As to the negative information, it was minimum and only to the address of “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc”.

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In the north during the entire campaign there was the total advantage of Petro Poroshenko as the President (36.1%). Among the election contestants “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc” (16.9%), the candidates to majority constituencies (14.9%) and “Batkivschyna” (13%) were covered most actively. Negative information was represented mostly towards “Batkivschyna”, the candidates to majority constituencies, “Narodnyi front”/“Popular Front”, as well as Arseniy Yatseniuk as the Prime Minister.

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In the east throughout the campaign ArseniyYatsenyuk (50%) and Petro Poroshenko (41%) were represented as the top officials and the executors of their duties. A share of electoral content was as follows: CPU (50.7%), “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc”(20%), “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc”(16.3) and “Batkivschyna” (13%). The most amount of negative information was devoted to the address of Arseniy Yatseniuk as the Prime Minister and among the parties –to “Batkivschyna”.

In the center Petro Poroshenko (26.2%), the candidates to majority constituencies (25.2%) and Arseniy Yatsenyuk (11.4%)received the most attention of the regional channels. As for the parties, “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc” (8.5%), “Batkivschyna” (7.6%) and “Narodnyi front”/“Popular Front” (6.8%) were represented most actively. The most amount of negative information was addressed to the President and the Prime Minister, and also to the candidates to majority constituencies and “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc”.

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Regional pressIn the western press the officials were represented not much actively, and among the

contestants there were almost on par the candidates to majority constituencies (18.2%), “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc” and “Batkivschyna”(15.8% for each party relatively), and “Narodnyi front”/“Popular Front”(10%). The subjects of monitoring were represented mostly in positive and neutral tone. The most amount of negative information was addressed to “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc”, “Narodnyi front”/“Popular Front” and also to the top officials.

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In the south, “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc” (26.4%) and the candidates to majority constituencies (23.8%) were represented almost at the same level. “Batkivschyna”(10.2%) and “Sylna Ukraina”/”Strong Ukraine” (8.8%) were covered a little bit passively. Others contestants were represented more passively. The positive tone was dominant. Neutral and negative information was minimum to the address of “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc”, “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc” and also the Prime Minister and the President.

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In the north the top officials did not dominate in the election content being represented fairly in a modest way. The candidates to majority constituentcieswere represented actively. Among the parties “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc” (29.9%) and “Batkivschyna”(16.5) received the most attention of the regional press. The information was mostly in positive and neutral tone, there was minimum of negative information.

In the east the candidates to majority constituencies(37.5%), Petro Poroshenko as the President (22.4%) and “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc”(14.9%) were represented most

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actively. The information was represented mostly in positive and neutral tone, there was minimum of negative information - to the address of Arseniy Yatseniuk as the Prime Minister.

In the center the candidates to majority constituencies(22.4%) were represented most actively, and among the parties - “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc” (14.6%) and “Batkivschyna”(9.8%). The top officials were represented much modestly–Petro Poroshenko (8.8%), ArseniyYatsenyuk (8.1%).

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Regional Internet

In the west during the entire campaign the Internet sites represented at the comparable levels “Batkivschyna”(13.5%), “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc”(13.3%), “Narodnyi front”/“Popular Front”(12.9%) and Petro Poroshenko as the President (12.5%). The information was covered mainly in neutral and positive tone, but there was also sufficiently negative information almost towards all contestants.

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In the south “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc”(18.5%), the candidates to majority constituencies(18.2%), Petro Poroshenko as the President (16.7%) and “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc”(13.1%) were represented almost at the comparable levels. The information prevailed mainly in positive and neutral tone, though it was noticeable a part of negative information.

In the north the candidates to majority constituencies(25.4%) were represented most actively. “Batkivschyna” (11.3%),“Narodnyi front”/“Popular Front”(11%), “SylnaUkraina”/”Strong Ukraine”, Radical Party (8.3%), “Hromadyanska posytsiya”/”Civic position” (6.2%) received relatively the same amount of information. Information was covered mainly in neutral and positive tone, there was minimum of negative information, but practically to the address of all subjects.

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In the east, “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc”(24.1%), “SylnaUkraina”/”Strong Ukraine” (18.9%), Petro Poroshenko as the President, the candidates to majority constituencies(15.7) and Arseniy Yatsenyuk as the Prime Minister were represented relatively at the same level. Information was covered mainly in neutral and positive tone, but also there was negative information- mainly to the address of the candidates to majority constituencies and the Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk,the President Petro Poroshenko and “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc” .

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In the center the candidates to majority constituencies (19%), “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc”(14%), “Oposytsiinyi Bloc”/“Opposition Bloc”(13.8%) were represented relatively at the same level. Information was covered mainly in neutral and positive tone, but also there was negative information almost towards all subjects.

ConclusionThe preliminary results of media monitoring reveals wide differences in the way political

subjects are portrayed. The results of whole media monitoring indicate that not all media follow the

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same standards of balance and fairness. Some monitored outlets more or less openly showed their sympathies towards particular political parties. This is due to the fact that the editorial policy of media is still determined by the interest of owners and not the interests of the readers or viewers.

News reports were mainly driven by activities of politicians - journalists themselves usually did not try to dwell on problems, single them out. There was an apparent lack of investigative approach, and conversely reports were sometimes limited to superficial coverage. Voters would benefit from a more analytical and in-depth coverage that could help them to better analyze and assess the qualities and platforms of electoral contestants. The use of such a format as the National Debate attracted the interest of the voters. That’s why the media need to be more proactive in setting the formats of their election-related reporting and their general coverage of elections to better facilitate the exchange of opinions, public debate, investigation and commentary that would offer the public fully informed, analyzed and assessed views of persons seeking elected office.

The final results of media monitoring and final media monitoring reportwill be announced on November 13, 2014.

Public monitoring of election coverage in mass media is held by the NGOs Association “SpilnyiProstir”/Equal Access Committee under the support of a joint project of the Council of Europe and the European Union “Strengthening Information Society in Ukraine”. This project is funded by the European Union and the Council of Europe and implemented by the Council of Europe.The objective of project is to strengthen the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms through greater freedom, diversity and pluralism in the media; an open, inclusive, sustainable, people-centred and human rights-based approach to the Internet on the principles of an effective system of protection of individuals with regard to their right to privacy and right to control their personal data.The detailed information about the project - http://www.coe.int/uk/web/kyiv/41.