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Running Head: Guatemala

Guatemala: Slow Transition to Liberal

Democracy

Steve OConnor Drexel University

PSCI140Dr. Hunold


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I ntroduction

G uatemala has undergone significant changes since ending its 35-year civil war in

1996. After a military coop in 1954, G uatemala became an authoritarian society

governed by military rule, which resulted in over 200,000 deaths. Since the peace accord

in 1996, G uatemala has slowly begun its shift from authoritarian rule to a partly free

democratic society. G uatemala is currently in a state of flux; high government corruption,

human rights violations, and a huge gap in socioeconomic equality could prevent

G uatemala from becoming a completely free democracy. G uatemala still is not a free

democracy according to Freedom House (which measures political rights and civilliberties) and exhibits several signs of a semi-authoritarian government, but it does have

the opportunity to change towards a more democratic state. This paper will argue that

G uatemala has progressed from an authoritarian government towards a democratic

society and will examine current roadblocks to determine the likely success or failure of a

truly free democratic society in G uatemala. First, I will discuss how previous regimes

maintained control over G uatemala. Then, this paper will discuss the prospects for a

long-term transition to a liberal democracy defined by Robert Dahl. The next section will

analyze recent political changes that threaten the semi-authoritarian regime. Finally, I

will conclude with discussing the prospect for G uatemalas transition to democracy.

Semi-Authoritarian Regime of Dynamic Change

Ottaway argues that there are three types of semi-authoritarian regimes: semi-

authoritarian in equilibrium, semi-authoritarian in decay, and semi-authoritarian of

dynamic change (Ottaway, 2003, pg 20). Semi-authoritarian regimes in equilibrium are


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states that remain stagnant. Ottaway defines this regime as one that has persisted over

time and remains in control even with economic, political, and social changes (Ottaway,

2003, pgs 20-21). This type will remain stagnant unless there is a major event that

fractures the regime. In a regime of decay, power is slowly shifting away from a

polyarchal democracy and shifts towards the government. Ottaway argues this happens

because of the lack of economic growth and a lack of openness within political

institutions, the economy and civil society (Ottaway, 2003, pg 21). Semi-Authoritarian

regimes of dynamic change are states that have the opportunity for positive political

change and democratization (Ottaway, 2003, pg 22). Dynamic change regimes oftenrequire economic growth, free trade agreements, and developing relationships with the

international community (Ottaway, 2003, pg 23).

G uatemala is a semi-authoritarian regime of dynamic change moving towards

democracy. Since the 1954 CIA orchestrated coup of democratic reformer Jacobo

Arbenz, G uatemala has remained an authoritarian regime with military rule (with the

support of the economic elite) and deliberately failed to transition into a fully free liberal

democratic state. In the 1960s and 1970s, the military (consisting of right-wing

conservatives) began to forcefully suppress leftist reformers to maintain control. Even

though a democratically elected government was implemented in the 1980s, the military

and presidents participated in election fraud, limited political competition, and violently

repressed reform and oppositional movements (Ruhl, 2005, pgs. 56-57).

During the 1990s, amid strong international influence and increasing civilian

support, the military began to lose its stranglehold on the G uatemalan government (Ruhl,

2005, pgs. 55-56). The military influenced political and social policies, and its


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capabilities for violence seriously undermined G uatemalas efforts to attain a liberal

democracy. The failed military coup of President Jorge Serrano in 1993 demonstrated

the fundamental shift between military rule and the institution of a democratic

government. The 1996 Peace Accords officially ended the civil war and mandated a

reduction of the military missions, size, and budget (Ruhl, 2005, pgs. 56).

Marina Ottaway defines semi-authoritarian regimes as systems that deliberately

limit transfers of power and argues that these regimes:

Combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of some

formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of civil andpolitical liberties with illiberal or authoritarian traits (Ottaway, 2003, pgs 3,

14).

When the military instituted democratic elections in the 1980s, it hoped to gain

legitimacy and free ifself from G uatemalas economic problems, but intended to continue

its rule over the new president and his policies (Ruhl, 2005, pg 57). Also, democratic

institutions and civil liberties were almost non-existent, as evidenced by the judicial

systems reluctance to prosecute human rights violations committed by corrupt military

officers. Outwardly, G uatemala may have had some of the trappings of democracy, but

the authoritarian rule remained.

Although implementing a stable democracy has been challenging, with the 2007

election of G uatemalas first left-center president in almost 60 years, Alvaro Colom,

G uatemala currently has the opportunity to become a more stable, free democracy. What

remains to be seen is if President Colom is able to become the executive leader that


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strengthens his state towards democracy or a political figurehead who allows the military

to remain autonomous from civilian government rule.

The Beginning of Polyarchy

The military regime has lost a significant amount of power since the 1996 Accord

and signs suggest G uatemala will continue to move towards a liberal democracy. The

effects of the long-standing civil war such as citizens lack of trust in government and

democratic ideas, will prevent a quick transition and more likely lead to a transition that

will take time before a liberal democracy is implemented.Since the transition process will be slow, one could argue that G uatemala would be

a regime in equilibrium, but for the past 5 years it has exhibited conditions that more

closely resemble a regime of dynamic change. Although G uatemalas gross national

product ( G DP) ranks 134 th in the world, the G DP has increased over 50% from $18 to

$38 billion in the past five years (World Bank, 2009). The U.S. Central America Free

Trade Agreement (CAFTA) has led to increases in the foreign direct investment (FDI)

inflows from $591.6 million in 2006 to $802.8 million in 2008 (CAFTA, 2009). In 2008,

G uatemala and the United Nations began a joint operation called the International

Commission Against Impunity in G uatemala (CICI G ) to investigate and remove the

amount of organized crime (CICI G , 2009).

After the democratic liberalization, the country has remained in the category of

partially free according to Freedom House, but it has never been considered a totally

free state (Freedom House, 2009). G uatemalas political climate does seem to be in a

transition. President Coloms victory in 2008 was the first for his political party, the


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National Unity of Hope, and is the first left of center president in G uatemalas recent

history. Non-governmental agencies such the National Democratic Institution have been

working with the indigenous Mayan women to promote inclusion within the political

structure. The participation of this N G O and other actors led to the first Mayan woman

to run for President in G uatemalas history in 2007. The Peace Accords developed the

framework to begin reform that respects human rights, inclusive participation, and the

rule of law. G uatemala has begun to implement democratic institutions such as a

stronger judicial system that is free from political alliances, a police force with limited

corruption, and the inclusion of the indigenous population.Ronald Dahls concept of a polyarchal democracy requires five conditions that

must be met in order for democracy to be successful within transitional states (Dahl,

1998, pgs 84-90). These include effective participation, equality in voting, enlightened

understanding, control over the agenda, and inclusion of adults. These conditions enable

control of government by elected officials, free and fair elections, freedom of expression,

access to alternative information, freedom of association, and inclusive citizenship (Dahl,

1998, pgs 84-90). Since the 1996 Peace Accords, G uatemala has increased Dahls five

conditions of a polyarchal democracy to distance itself from a semi-authoritarian regime

of decay and equilibrium, but has yet to become a liberal democracy.

Regime Loss of Control

After the coup in 1954, a succession of military governments waged a repressive

counterinsurgency effort against leftist rural indigenous guerilla groups across

G uatemala, specifically targeting the G uatemalan Revolutionary National Unity group


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(G RNU) (Ruhl, 2005, pg 57). The guerilla groups threatened the right wing political

agenda of G uatemalan officials and challenged the regimes legitimacy. The military

responded with a disproportionate amount of force, targeting Mayan communities whom

the army claimed were guerilla sympathizers. Between the huge socioeconomic disparity

and the human rights violations that were committed for over 30 years, these factors

ultimately led to antimilitary sentiment and forced the military to establish a

democratically elected government to establish their legitimacy in 1985 (Ruhl, 2005, pg

57). The military intended to remain in control by retaining veto power of government

policy but this enabled the formation of political groups, oppositional press, and publicdiscussion about ongoing human rights violations and criminal activity by the military

(Ruhl, 2005, pg 26-30). Business groups sought international approval and joined the

politicians to add pressure to reduce the militarys role in political affairs. The

Coordinating Committee of Agriculture, Commercial, and Financial Association

(CCACFA) partnered with politicians to oppose president Jorge Serranos suspension of

the constitution in 1993 and the military lost its ability to intimidate politicians because of

the economic support the government received from the CCACFA (Ruhl, 2005, pg 28).

The military rule weakened and Serrano was removed from office, which allowed for the

1996 Peace Accords that developed the framework for a democratic society in

G uatemala.

The Peace Accords ended the civil war between the semi-authoritarian G uatemala

government and the guerilla groups, specifically the G RNP. The accords focused on four

major areas a.) strengthening civilian power and reducing the military role b.) human

rights, judicial reform, and the formation of the Commission Historical Clarification c.)


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rights of indigenous people d.) socioeconomic aspects and agrarian reforms (Accords of

the G uatemalan Peace Process, 1997, pg 37). Unfortunately, these have yet to

transcend into full government control, as the military and the conservatism it represents

remains autonomous from the rule of law (Ruhl, 2005, pg 46).

Current military and ex-military officers called grupos clandestinos have

continued to influence political matters (Deibert, 2008, pg 168). The 2003 WOLA report

argues that:

In G uatemala, the hidden powers specialize in connections that allow them

to carry out crimes involving state resourcesskimming and bribery atcustoms, corruption in the awarding of lucrative contracts, bribery and

kickbacks. At the same time they manipulate the justice system in order to

protect themselves from prosecution (WOLA, 2003, pg 6)

The 2007 WOLA report states the legislature, customs, and other state agencies have

been affected by organized crime and has led to the deterioration of state institutions and

the rule of law (WOLA, 2007, pg 7).

In Michael Deiberts Drugs vs. Democracy in G uatemala, he argues that the

Secretariat for Administrative Matters and Security was involved with the death of

Vinicio G omez, the Minister of Interior, in June 2008. Carlos Quintanilla, the SAAS,

was thought to be linked Ortega Menaldo who is the head of the military group Estado

Mayor Presidential (EMP) (Deibert, 2008, pg 170). The EMP supposedly disbanded in

2003, but has been accused of several political assassinations, including the

Constitutional Court President and other crimes such as drug trafficking. (Deibert, 2008,

pg 170). An argument between Quintanilla and G omez was thought to be the motive


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behind the assassination. G omez was planning to deploy anti-drug agents to the

G uatemala-Mexico border where the EMP is thought to smuggle drugs (Deibert, 2008, pg

168) and is widely suspected to have played a part in the Ministers death.

The political party G uatemalan Republican Front (FR G ) is also involved with

government corruption. Shortly after the 1996 Accords, Alfonso Portillo ran for

President and won the 1999 election under the FR G party (Deibert, 2008, pg 172). In

1993 Portillo, Ortega Menaldo, and Alfredo Molina were implicated for a corruption ring

involving a right-wing military group called the Liversaver G roup (Deibert, 2008, pg

172). Portillo continued relationships with organized crime during his presidency andcurrently faces corruption charges (Deibert, 2008, pg 172). The International

Commission Against Impunity (CICI G ) began in 2008 in order to investigate corruption,

organized crime, and violence because of the influence these groups have on G uatemalan

political parties. This corruption and the lack of a justice system that upholds the rule of

law significantly undermines the citizens views of democratic process and impedes the

process of social and economic development essential for stable democracy (USAID,

2005).

Since the FR G and other right leaning parties have been implicated in corruption

scandals, it has allowed leftist ideological parties the ability to gain more influence within

congress. In 1995, the New G uatemala Democratic Front, which was the only left

leaning political party in the congress, held only 8% of the congressional seats

(Parliamentary Chamber, 2008). As of the 2007 elections, center and left-leaning

politicians accounted for 68 of the 158 seats (43%) and had a 33% increase from the 2003

elections (Parliamentary Chamber, 2008). The right wing ideologies still dictate policies,


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but the increased popularity of the centrist and leftist parties present a challenge to the

status quo. The relationship between the FR G , the clandestine groups, and corruption

severely impacts their semi-authoritarian control and led to public, state, and international

scrutiny.

Over 82% of G uatemalan citizens perceive their government as corrupt which

tends to lower the legitimacy of political institutions and the need for transparency is

apparent (Donovan, 2008, pg 816). The foundation of the International Commission

Against Impunity (CICI G ) in 2007 hopes to dismantle the clandestine military groups and

the corruption within the government (Donovan, 2008, pg 818). The United Nations andG uatemalas joint effort resulted in an independent commission that is transparent and

eliminates the concern of widespread corruption, influence and intimidation (Donovan,

2008, pg 819). The CICI G has a substantial amount of power to request reports and

cooperation from State officials, empowers the commission to file criminal complaints

with the relevant authorities, and can join relevant criminal proceedings as a private

prosecutor (Donovan, 2008, pgs 818-820). In conjunction with all of these powers, the

CICI G is also authorized to enter directly into agreements with the Office of the Public

Prosecutor, the Supreme Court, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, the

National Civilian Police, and any other State institutions (Donovan, 2008, pgs 818-820).

The CICI G was introduced in December 2006 and was not ratified until a member

of the National Union of Hope party switched his vote to support the new commission in

August of 2007 (Donovan, 2008, pg 816). Although the CICI G specifically states it will

not investigate past human rights violations that occurred during the civil war, the

commission still faced severe opposition during its ratification. The G uatemalan


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Republican Front and the National Party for Advancement congressional political parties

continually stalled to delay the ratification. The year and a half delay from the initial bill

shows the reluctance of the FR G and other political parties. In Will Accountability

Prevail, Donovan argues that the resistance exhibits high levels of fear of investigating

current and future criminal behaviors and exhibits how embedded the corruption may be

within the G uatemalan congress (Donovan, 2008, pg 819).

In the past, the FR G was able to control political outcomes, but since reforms are

beginning to become established, the CICI G was implemented in spite of the reluctance

of the conservative political parties. With the backing of the several new left-leaningpolitical parties and other political elites, the CICI G is establishing itself as a fair and

transparent body that promotes the rule of law.

For example, the arrest of nine police officers and ex-military officials for the

murder of Rodrigo Rosenberg, a G uatemalan lawyer, was due to the involvement of the

CICI G . Rodrigo Rosenburg accused the government of corrupt business deals with the

Rural Development Bank and was shot three months later, which led demonstrations and

a call for President Colom to resign the presidency (Valladares, 2008). At the President

request, the CICI G and the F.B.I. found that former National Civil Police (PNC) officer

William G ilberto Santos, PNC officer Mario Luis Paz, and former soldier Edwin Idelmo

Lcentspez were part of a conspiracy to undermine the President because of recent social

and tax policies implemented by Colom (Valladares, 2008).

The CICI G , as shown above, has the ability to severally undercut the role of the

semi-authoritarian military regime. However, besides the concern that the CICI G would

meet reluctance from the traditional political parties, it also had the obstacle of the


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uncertainty that a new president may prevent the CICI G from being instituted (Donavan,

2008, pg 817). The election of President Colom, who supported the CICI G , along with

the external pressure from international states such as the United Nations, the European

Commission, and the United States, symbolized the importance in removing corruption

and promoting accountability and transparency (Donavan, 2008, pg 817).

Polyarchy: A Slow Road to Democracy

The transition from the semi-authoritarian government to a democracy, as defined

by Dahl, is slowly progressing (Dahl, 1998). AlthoughG

uatemala has not metprocedural minimum for polyarchy, the democratic elections that were implemented in

1985 coupled with the 1996 Peace Accords have drastically improved their ability to

become a democracy. As noted above, the five conditions are: effective participation,

equality in voting, enlightened understanding, control over the agenda, and inclusion of

adults (Dahl, 1998, pgs 84-90).

The G uatemalan government has more control of the state than it did in the 1990s.

Scholars debate whether G uatemala was a democracy, a semi-authoritarian regime, or an

authoritarian regime, but most seem to agree that the President Serranos failure to

suspend the constitution was the sign that a democratic transition was beginning (Jonas,

2000, pgs 18-20). This showed that the military was beginning to lose control of the

government. The first peace accord defined the militaries role in G uatemala defense of

G uatemalas borders and territorial integrity, along with reducing its budget and size, and

disassembling the counterinsurgency groups (Jonas, 2000, pg 16). This again expanded

the capacity for elected officials to govern. This accord also allowed for ideological


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Other positive aspects of the election include the grassroots organizations and 134 civic

committees that participated in the election, which had a 60% voter turnout (a 10%

increase from 2003) Azpuru, 2008, pgs 563-4).

The human rights violations that have been committed within G uatemala are

perhaps the most troubling concern for a strong foundation of polyarchy. Since 1950,

freedom of expression and inclusive citizenship has not been a fundamental right for

G uatemala citizens. The second accord focused on these human rights violations and

established a truth commission, which is important for the healing of the victims, the

punishment of the perpetrators, and prevention of violence (Ross, 2006, pgs 69-70). Theaccountability of past human rights violations is necessary for the empowerment of the

rule of law.

This led to the creation of the G uatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification

(CEH). Human rights activists and representatives from civil societies received the CEH

with disappointment because it lacked the authority to punish and promise reparations,

and was charged to investigate 35 years of violence in a relatively short period of time

(Ross, 2006, pgs 69-70). Even with the public disappointment, the CEH did uncover

many secrets that were the start of a social change. In February 1999, the CEH released

its report called M emor y of Sil ence that contained 3500 pages (Ross, 2006, pgs 79). The

report identified 600 massacres, declared the deaths genocide, and showed that the state

was responsible for 97% of the massacres (Ross, 2006, pgs 79).

Civil societies also began organizing, which resulted in three significant

movements: Recuperation of Historical Memory (REMHI), the exhumations of the make-

shift graves of the victims, and justice in the Myrna Mack case (Ross, 2006, pgs 75).


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REMHI was a Catholic mission to document survivors of the genocide to find truth and

promote forgiveness, and they collected over 2,000 survivor accounts (Ross, 2006, pgs

75). The REMHI, along with the Center for Legal Action on Human Rights, and the

G uatemalan Forensic Anthropology Team prepared evidence through the exhumations

and witness testimony to prepare cases against the military (Ross, 2006, pgs 75).

Because of the work of the REMHI, specifically the open talks about the genocide, the

demand for exhumations increased (Ross, 2006, pgs 75).

The assassination of Myra Mack, an anthropologist studying the effects of

displacement among the indigenous population, gained national and internationalattention. The G uatemalan justice system found no evidence of an assassination and

ruled that it was an act of random violence (Ross, 2006, pgs 75). It was later found that

four military officers assassinated Myra Mack and only one of the men was convicted.

He was member of the presidents security police force, and this event generated a

demand for judicial reform (Ross, 2006, pgs 75).

The CEH report, the REMHI, the exhumations, and the Myra Mack case allowed

G uatemalan citizens to begin their healing, but without accountably many feared human

rights violations would continue. Trust in institutions responsible for solving conflicts is a

prerequisite for civil resolution and surveys show that while trust is low (but increasing)

in G uatemala, it is significantly higher in the rural and indigenous regions (Azpuru, 2006,

pg 142, 145). The rise in national and international demand for human rights protections

and the civil society calling for judicial reforms were instrumental in the formation of the

CICI G .


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Conclusion

G uatemala has a long history of unrest. Since the end of the revolutionary era from

1944-1954, G uatemalan citizens have been dominated by an authoritarian regime. With

the 1985 constitution that allowed democratic elections, the regime changed to a semi-

authoritarian regime that was engaged in a civil war against reformers and allowed for a

political openness that furthered democratic ideas. The change continued and the Peace

Accords in 1996 ended the Civil War and the 2007 election shows that democratic

principles are beginning to take root.

Ottaway defines a semi authoritarian regime of equilibrium as a regime thatremains in control despite changes in the political, economic, and social sphere (Ottaway,

2003, pg 21). The old regime continues to influence the government and with the lack of

solidified democratic institutions, and one could argue that G uatemala would remain in

an equilibrium state. But, G uatemala does not meet this because the regime is continuing

to lose control of its influence. G uatemala has begun the process of instituting

democracy, but with the amount of conflict that has occurred, it may take some time

before G uatemala becomes a liberal democracy, but it is slowly progressing towards that

goal as trust, hope, and freedom begin to replace the negative effects of civil war.

Any transition in G uatemala will be slow. In the next ten years, G uatemala will

continue to improve the inclusion of their indigenous people, develop stronger

democratic institutions that promote the rule of law and transparency, remove the

majority of corruption from their government, and continue to move closer to Dahls

ideal of democracy.


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References:

Azpuru, Dinorah. (September, 2008). The 2007 Presidential and LegislativeElections in Guatemala. Electoral Studies , 27(3), 562-566.

Conciliation Resources. (2009). An International Review of Peace Initiatives,Negotiating Rights: The Guatemalan Peace Process. London, ConciliationResources.

Dahl, Robert A. (1998). On Democracy. Yale University Press.

Deibert, Michael. (Winter, 2008/09). Drugs vs. Democracy in Guatemala. World Policy Journal, 25(4), 167-175.

Donovan, Megan K. (2008). The International Commission Against Impunity inGuatemala: Will Accountability Prevail? Arizona Journal of International &

Comparative Law, 25(3), 779-824.

Freedom House. (2009). Freedom Around the World. Retrieved from:http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2009&country=7617

Guatemala Parliamentary Chambers. (2009). Guatemala Parliamentary Chamber:Congreso de la Republica. Retrieved from:http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2129_95.htm

International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala. (2009). InternationalCommission Against Impunity in Guatemala. Retrieved from:http://cicig.org/index.php?page=mandate

Jonas, Susanne. (Winter, 2000). Democratization through Peace: The Difficult Caseof Guatemala. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs , 42(4), 1-38.

Ottaway, Marina. (2003). Democracy Challenged: The Ride of Semi-Authoritarianism. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Peacock, Susan C. & Beltran, Adrianna. (2003). Hidden Powers in Post-Conflict Guatemala. Washington Office on Latin America, Washington D.C.

Ross, Amy. (January, 2006). The Creation and Conduct of the GuatemalanCommission for Historical Clarification. Geoforum , 37(1), 69-81.

Ruhl, Mark. (2005). The Guatemalan Military Since the Accords: The Fate of ReformUnder Arzu and Portillo . Latin American Politics & Society , 47(1), 55-85.


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United States-Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement. (2009).Guatemala. Retrieved from: www.caftaintelligencecenter.com

USAID. (2009). Guatemala. Retrieved from:http://www.usaid.gov/gt/country_plan.htm

World Bank. (2009). Guatemala Data Profile. Retrieved from:http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/GUATEMALAEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20904081~menuPK:328123~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:328117,00.html


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