7/29/2019 Occena

1/20

Occena vs. Commission on Elections

[GR 56350, 2 April 1981]; also Gonzales vs. National Treasurer [GR 56404]

En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 8 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 on official leave

Facts:The prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions

proposing constitutional amendments, assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena andRamon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional

Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of

these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling

to the contrary notwithstanding.

Issue:Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa

resolutions and the present petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively.

Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the

dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and

mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then

concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution

being considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said

that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17 January1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme

Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only

entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter

of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that.

What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a

negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme

Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of

coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what

was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this

character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court

has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated

barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least tencases may be cited.

LAMBINO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006

(CARPIO, J.)

Requirements for Initiative Petition

Constitutional Amendment vs. Constitutional Revision

Tests to determine whether amendment or revision

FACTS:

The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change

the 1987 Constitution and then filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for

ratification under Sec. 5(b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735. The proposed changes under the

petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of

government. COMELEC did not give it due course for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions

to amend the Constitution, pursuant to Santiago v. Comelec ruling

ISSUES:

7/29/2019 Occena

2/20

Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision

Whether or not the initiative petition is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement on direct

proposal by the people

RULING:

Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct proposal by people

Sec.2, Art. XVII...is the governing provision that allows a peoples initiative to propose

amendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that the

petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the

framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt relevant

American jurisprudence on peoples initiat ive; and (b) in particular, the people must first seethe full text of

the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on

petition containing such full text.

The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a

petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two

essential elements must be present.

2 elements of initiative

1. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or

representative can sign on their behalf.

2.Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is

first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a

petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or

attached to it. If so attached, the petition must stated the fact of such

attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had

seen the full text of theproposed amendments before not after signing.

Moreover, an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that

which is proposed and failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.

In the case of the Lambino Groups petition, theres not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the

proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the

proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people

approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary system of government.

The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are

asked to sign the signature sheet. This omission is fatal.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people

the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a

gigantic fraud on the people. Thats why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be directly

proposed by the people x x x in a petition - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains

the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nations fund amental law,

the writing of the text of the proposed

7/29/2019 Occena

3/20

amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of

attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.

The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision through

initiatives article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution.

The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode isthrough a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a peoples initiative.

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to any amendment to, or

revision of, this Constitution. In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third m ode, applies only

to amendments to this Constitution. This distinction was intentional as shown by the deliberations of the

Constitutional Commission. A peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment

of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can

propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.

Does the Lambino Groups initiative constitute a revision of the Constitution?

Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-

Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one

chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere

amendment.

Amendment vs. Revision

Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a

constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the

constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances.

There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the

constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the

other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without

altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the

constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended. Where the

proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other

section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision.

For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18years to 15 years is an amendment and not a

revision.

Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100% to 60% is an

amendment and not a

revision.Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election

to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.

The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of theConstitution

other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not alsoaffect the structure of

government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches.

7/29/2019 Occena

4/20

However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a

single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example,

the substitution of the word republican with monarchic or

theocratic in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure

of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specificchange will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions,

as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-

balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.

Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a

constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a

revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered

principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize

deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake

revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow peoples initiatives, which do not have fixed &identifiable

deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments & not revisions.

Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary

The Facts:

Sequence of events that lead to the filing of the Plebiscite then

Ratification Cases.

The Plebiscite Case

On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended

by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose

amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines.

Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No.6132, approved

on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said

Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to

perform its functions on June 1, 1971.

While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued

Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.

On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of

the Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of thePhilippines issued

Presidential Decree No. 73, "submitting tote Filipino people for ratification or rejection the

Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention,

and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection

of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.

On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on elections, the

Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents

from implementing Presidential Decree No.73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court,"

upon the grounds, interalia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law

because the calling ... of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same,

7/29/2019 Occena

5/20

the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the

appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in

Congress ...," and there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution

set

for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being

no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof."

On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects

of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed

Constitution.

On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the

ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken

until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite

scheduled to be held

on January 15, 1978, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order No. 20, moreover,

"suspended in the meantime" the "order of December 17,1972, temporarily suspending theeffects of Proclamation No. 1081 forpurposes of free and open debate on the proposed

Constitution."

Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the

Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for

neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or

announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled

to

meet in regular session on January 22, 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential

Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite

and appropriate funds therefore, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view

of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation with,

among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it

more imperative to defer its final action on these cases.

"In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. " L-35948 filed an "urgent motion,"

praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973."

The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring

the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said "urgent motion" and

"manifestation," "not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973." Prior thereto, or on January

15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a

"supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents,

praying:

"... that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on

Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roo;

the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National

Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies,

subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such

7/29/2019 Occena

6/20

task, from collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials

concerned, the so-called Citizens' Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they

were supposed to have met during the period comprised between January 10 and January 15,

1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion."

On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in

said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file "file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M.,

Tuesday, January 16, 1973," and setting the motion for hearing "on January 17, 1973, at 9:30

a.m." While the case was being heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of

Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he

(the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the writer)a copy of Proclamation No. 1102,

which had just been signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall

and announced

to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith

was still going on and the public there present that the President had, according to information

conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning. Thereupon, the writer read Proclamation No. 1102 which is of the following

tenor: ____________________________

"BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

"PROCLAMATION NO. 1102

"ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE

CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.

"WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one

Constitutional Convention is subject to ratification by the Filipino people;

"WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in

districts/wards in chartered cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31,

1972, composed of all persons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least sixmonths, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list

of Citizen Assembly members kept by the barrio, district or ward secretary;

"WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the base of

citizen participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to

express their views on important national issues;

"WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential Decree No.

86-A, dated January 5, 1973, the following questions were posed before the Citizens

Assemblies or Barangays: Do you approve of the New Constitution? Do you still want a

plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?

"WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty-one

(14,976,561) members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies)voted for the adoption of the

proposed Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine

(743,869) who voted for its rejection; while on the question as to whether or not the people

would

still like a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million two hundred

ninety-eight thousand eight hundred fourteen(14,298,814) answered that there was no need for

7/29/2019 Occena

7/20

a plebiscite and that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a

vote in a plebiscite:

"WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five(95) per cent of the

members of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution, the

Katipunan ng Mga Barangay has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should

already be deemed ratified by the Filipino people;

"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the

powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution

proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been

ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the

Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby

come into effect.

"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of

the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.

"Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord,

nineteen hundred and seventy-three.

(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

(

"President of the Philippines

"By the President:

"ALEJANDRO MELCHOR"

"Executive Secretary"

The Ratification Case

On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the Executive Secretary and

the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents "and their

subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found in

the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935. The petition therein, filed by Josue Javellana, as a

"Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter and as "a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all

citizens and voters

similarly situated," was amended on or about January 24, 1973. After reciting in substance the facts set

forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases,Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the

immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the

latter "are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon

the ground: "that the

President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create

the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to approve the proposed Constitution ...";

"that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed

7/29/2019 Occena

8/20

Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence

null and void."

The Issue:

1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justifiable, or political and therefore

non-justifiable, question?

2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention beenratified validly

(with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to theapplicable constitutional and

statutory provisions?

3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid

ratification) by the people? (Acquiesced - "permission" given by silence or passiveness.

Acceptance or agreement by keeping quiet or by not making objections.)

4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?

5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?

The Resolution:

Summary:

The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when the crucial

question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court (Justices

Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar,Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition.

Concepcion, together

Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grant the relief being sought, thus upholding

the 1973 Constitution.

Details:

1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-

justiciable, question?

On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal,Zaldivar, Castro,

Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity

of Proclamation No. 1102 presents ajusticiable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and

Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second

question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that inasmuch as it is claimed there has been

approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually

been such

an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's

will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not

Article XV of the 1935Constitution been complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or

three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and "beyond the ambit of judicial

inquiry."

2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with

substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory

provisions?

On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal,Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,

Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the

7/29/2019 Occena

9/20

1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the

1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in anelection or plebiscite held

in accordance with law and participated in only byqualified and duly registered voters.

Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the1973 Constitution has been

validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding

the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in

the manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements

thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that

factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the

1973

Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am

constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be

deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of

them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after

all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has beenconstitutionally ratified."

Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their

view there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid

ratification.

3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by

the people?

On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed

Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court.

Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the

people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution."Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free

expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the

Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law.

Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions

to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, anew Constitution once accepted

acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage

prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has

elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the

freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law." 88

Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on thequestion. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that

"Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle

restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people

have accepted the Constitution."

4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?

7/29/2019 Occena

10/20

On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro,

Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and

Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final

analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations

other than judicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this Court, 90 are relevant and

unavoidable." 91Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando,Teehankee

and myself voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.

5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?

On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force:

Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonioand Esguerra hold that

it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof;

Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast

no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state

with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and

Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution

proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not

enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.

ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal,Castro, Barredo,

Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices

Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being

the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered

in force and effect.

It is so ordered.

Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections Case Digest (Consti-

1)

Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections[GR L-44640, 12 October 1976]; also Guzman vs. Comelec [GR L-44684], and Gonzales vs.Commission on Elections [GR L-44714]En Banc, Martin (J): 1 concurs in result, 4 concur in separate opinions, 2 dissent in separateopinions, 2 filed separate opinionsFacts:On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991calling for a national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays")to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement,the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for theexercise by the President of his present powers. 20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the

President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree 1031, amending the previousPresidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing forthe manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable tothe national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991. On the same date of 22September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions to hesubmitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites inits "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim

7/29/2019 Occena

11/20

National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru aconstitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitteddirectly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The Commission on Electionswas vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 NationalReferendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad,father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin

the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite onOctober 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofaras they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofaras it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct theReferendum-Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They contend that under the 1935 and1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituentpower to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. On 30 September 1976, anotheraction for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by VicenteM. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power topropose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expresslyconferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Still

another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5 October 1976 by RaulM. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714, to restrain theimplementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite ofOctober 16.Issue:Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of theConstitution.Held:Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Anyamendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upona vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National

Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, bya majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to theelectorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this

Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shallbe held not later than three months a after the approval of such amendment or revision." In thepresent period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisionsis conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "Theinterim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majorityvote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall takeeffect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two periodscontemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period oftransition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the(1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by aConstitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National

Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the

electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the NationalAssembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all theMembers of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. TheCourt in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested withthat prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National

Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determinationof the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with theprevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the

7/29/2019 Occena

12/20

Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact thatunder the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convenethe interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interimNational Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people votedagainst the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the

Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening ofthe interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposedquestion of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated,because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention,who were deemed automatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against itsinclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it.In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendmentto a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating whenengaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it bythe fundamental charter itself. In thePhilippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the TransitoryProvisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the

legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of theConstitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made betweenconstitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction,however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of anyproposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or disapproveapplies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do withproposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSCase digest (Consti-1)

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971

FACTS:

The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent Commission on Elections "from

undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional

amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the

Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to

Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent

implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law

for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines. The Constitutional Convention of 1971

came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its

capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to proposeamendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress

held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention

were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof,

Republic Act 6132.

ISSUE:

7/29/2019 Occena

13/20

Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a

plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment/s.

HELD:

The Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the people ina single "election" or plebiscite. We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of

submitting the same for ratification of the people onNovember 8, 1971 is not authorized by

Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent

Comelec in that direction are null and void.

lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention

called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution,". The same provision

also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution

when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are

submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many

"elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the

same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says

"an election" which means only one.

The petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention

of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for

the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent

Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The

respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional

Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said organic

resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision

immediately executory. No costs

SUMULONG vs. COMELEC Case DigestSUMULONG vs. COMELEC73 P.R. 288, 1942

Facts: Under the authority of Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657, Comelec adopted aresolution providing for the appointment of election inspectors to be proposed by the political partiesand persons named therein. Petitioner, Juan Sumulong, President of the political party Pagkakaisang Bayan, claims the exclusive right to propose the appointment of such inspectors. He contendsthat the resolution of the Comelec, by giving the so-called rebel candidate or free-zone faction of theNationalista Party the right to propose one election inspector for each of the precincts in each of the53 legislative districts, contravenes Section 5 of the Commonwealth Act No. 657. He argues thatunder that section the Nationalista Party has the right to propose one, and only one inspector foreach precinct, and that the resolution has the effect of giving that party two inspectors in each andevery precinct within those legislative districts. Petitioner maintains that the discretion given bySection 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657 to the Comelec in the Choice of election inspectors is notabsolute, but limited by the provision of the Act that the majority party shall have the right to proposeonly one inspector.

Issue: Whether or not the Comelec, in giving the so-called rebel candidates and free-zone factionsof the Nationalista Party the right to propose election inspectors, has acted within the limits of thediscretion granted to it by law.

7/29/2019 Occena

14/20

Held: The present case is not an appropriate case for review by the Supreme Court. The Comelec isa constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme ofgovernment. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that willinsure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created free, orderly, and honestelections. The Supreme Court may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these areclearly illegal / constitute grave abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. The Comelec

because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derivedfrom actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous positionto decide complex political questions. Due regard to the independent character of the Commission,as ordained in the Constitution requires that the power of the Supreme Court to review the acts ofthat body should, as a general proposition, be used sparingly, but firmly in appropriate cases.

Civil Liberties Union vs ExecutiveSecretaryOn 25 July 1987, Cory issued EO 284 which allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries

and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to theirprimary positions subject to limitations set therein. The CLU excepted this EO averring that such law is

unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission

that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Art 7 other than those provided in the Constitution; CLU avers that by

virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, the only exceptions against holding

any other office or employmentin Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The

Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the

Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article

8.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD: Sec 13, Art 7 provides:

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants

shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their

tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate

in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege

granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-

owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the

conduct of their office.

It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the

Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in

the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with

respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as

required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers)

asexamples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all

appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the

constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding thereof. In the light of the construction

7/29/2019 Occena

15/20

given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is

unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries

or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the

government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold

multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the

1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution

itself.

Manila Prince Hotel vs GSISPursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS decided to sell 30-51% of

theManilaHotel Corporation. Two bidders participated, MPH and Malaysian Firm Renong Berhad. MPHs

bid was at P41.58/per share while RBs bid was at P44.00/share. RB was the highest bidder hence it was

logically considered as the winning bidder but is yet to be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH matches

RBs bid and invoked the Filipino First policy enshrined under par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987

Constitution**, but GSIS refused to accept. In turn MPH filed a TRO to avoid the

perfection/consummation of the sale to RB.

RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH arguing among others that:

1. Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution needs an implementing law because it is merely a

statement of principleand policy(not self-executing);

2. Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under national patrimony.

ISSUE: Whether or not RB should be admitted as the highest bidder and hence be proclaimed as

thelegitbuyer of shares.

HELD: No. MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This is in light of the

Filipino First Policy.

Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self executing. The Constitution is the fundamental,

paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. Patrimony in its plain and ordinary meaning pertains to

heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to thenatural

resourcesofthe Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources,

but also to the cultural heritageof the Filipinos. It also refers to our intelligence in

arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and

other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people. Note that, for more than 8

decades (9 now) Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations

of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our

struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.

Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos which not only pertains to individuals but to

corporations as well and other juridical entities/personalities. The term qualified Filipinos simply means

that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good,

7/29/2019 Occena

16/20

because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and

preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such

an indiscriminate preference would be counter productive and inimical to the common good.

In the granting of economic rights,privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a

qualifiedforeignerand a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.

**Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the

national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least

sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may

prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the

formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and

patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction

and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.Bayan v. Zamora G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000

FACTS :

On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a military bases agreement

which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by the US military

personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the US

entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond

to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels and aircraft.

In 1991, with the expiration of RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military exercises between

the two countries were held in abeyance. However, the defence and security relationship continued

pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty. On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed,

among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Negotiations by both

panels on VFA led to a consolitdated draft text and a series of conferences. Eventually, President Fidel V.

Ramos approved the VFA.

On October 5, 1998 President Joseph E. Estrada ratified the VFA thru respondent Secretary of Foreign

Affairs. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting thru Executive Secretary Zamora officially transmitted to

the Senate, the Instrument of Ratification, letter of the President and the VFA for approval. It was approved

by the Senate by a 2/3 vote of its members. On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an

exchange of notes between Secretary Siazon and US Ambassador Hubbard.

7/29/2019 Occena

17/20

The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions under which US

Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. Hence this petition for certiorari

and prohibition, assailing the constitutionality of the VFA and imputing grave abuse of discretion to

respondents in ratifying the agreement.

ISSUE : Whether or not the VFA is unconstitutional.

RULING :

Petition is dismissed.

The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on

treaties or international agreements. Sec. 21 Art. VII, which respondent invokes, reads: No treaty or

international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the Members

of the Senate. Sec. 25 Art. XVIII provides : After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the RP

and the US concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the

Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in and when the Congress so requires, ratified by a

majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a

treaty by the Senateby the other contracting state.

The first cited provision applies to any form of treaties and international agreements in general with a

wide variety of subject matter. All treaties and international agreements entered into by the Philippines,

regardless of subject matter, coverage or particular designation requires the concurrence of the Senate to

be valid and effective.

In contrast, the second cited provision applies to treaties which involve presence of foreign military bases,

troops and facilities in the Philippines. Both constitutional provisions share some common ground. The

fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Sec. 21 Art. VII, and that Senate extended its

concurrence under the same provision is immaterial.

Undoubtedly, Sec. 25 Art. XVIII which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases and

troops should apply in the instant case. Hence, for VFA to be constitutional it must sufficiently meet the

following requisites :

a) it must be under a treaty

7/29/2019 Occena

18/20

b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate, and when so required by Congress, ratified by a

majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum

c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State

There is no dispute in the presence of the first two requisites. The third requisite implies that the other

contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. Moreover, it is inconsequential

whether the US treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an

executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. They are equally binding obligations upon nations.

Therefore, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the constitution.

The court also finds that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the executive department as

to their power to ratify the VFA.

Paras v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)

FACTS:

A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall

election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that underSec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall

shall take place within one year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one

year immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election

was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.

ISSUE:

W/N the SK election is a local election.

HELD:

No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be

considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to

subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par.

(b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the

phrase regular local election to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will

never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court

assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should

be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless,

inoperative or nugatory.

Paras v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)

FACTS:

7/29/2019 Occena

19/20

A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall

election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that underSec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall

shall take place within one year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one

year immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election

was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.

ISSUE:

W/N the SK election is a local election.

HELD:

No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be

considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to

subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par.

(b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the

phrase regular local election to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will

never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Courtassumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should

be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless,

inoperative or nugatory.

De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council GR No. 191002, March 17, 2010

Facts: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,

2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

Even before the event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal

dilemmas. This dilemma is rooted in consideration of Section 15, Art VII ofthe Constitution prohibiting the President or Acting President from making

appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential

election and up to the end of his term, except when temporary appointments

to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service

or endanger public safety. However, Section 4 (1), Art VIII of the Constitution

also provides that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90

days from occurrence. The question leads to who should appoint the next

Chief Justice and may the JBC resume the process of screening candidates

should the incumbent president not prohibited to do so. May a mandamus lieto compel the submission of JBCs nominees to the president? This issue at

hand truly is impressed with transcendental importance to the Nation. A lot

of petitions were received by the court from a mandamus to prohibitions. We

limit our discussion with GR 191002 for brevity.

7/29/2019 Occena

20/20

Issues: Whether or not the case at bar is an actual controversy.

Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to file said petition.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held the case being premature because the Judicial

and Bar Council has until May 17, 2010 at the least within which to submit thelist of nominees to the President to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory

retirement of Chief Justice Puno. The petitioner here asserts his right as citizen

filing the petition on behalf of the public who are directly affected by the issue

of the appointment. The question raised before the court is in fact of

transcendental importance. The court dispels all doubt to remove any obstacle

or obstruction to the resolution of the essential issue squarely presented.

Standing is a peculiar concept to constitutional law because in some cases,

suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the

operation of law or any other government act but by concerned citizens,

taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. The court

dismissed the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in GR 191002 and GR

191149 and the petition for mandamus in GR no. 191057 for being premature;

dismissal of the petitions for prohibition in GR 191032 and GR 191342 for lack

of merit; and grants the in AM No. 10-2-5-SC and accordingly directs the JBC

to: resume proceedings for the nomination of candidates, prepare short list of

nominees for the said position, submit to the incumbent President the short

list of nominees, and to continue proceedings for the nomination ofcandidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President

the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this

decision.