Nye Understanding Interdependence

8/10/2019 Nye Understanding Interdependence

1/9

1

Understanding Interdependence - by

Joseph Nye

Nye, Joseph. Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation. New York: Pearson, 2013, 261-274.

Power and Globalization Liberals sometimes suggest that globalization means peace and cooperation,

but unfortunately it is not that simple. Struggles over power go on, even in a globalized world. Because

the coalitions are more complex and different forms of power are used, the conflicts are often like

playing chess on several boards at the same time. Conflicts in the twenty- first century involve both guns

and butter. The Chinese leader Mao Zedong once said that power grows out of the barrel of a gun. After

the oil crisis of 1973, the world was reminded that power can also grow out of a barrel of oilas we

shall see shortly.

THE CONCEPT OF INTERDEPENDENCEInterdependence is often a fuzzy term used in a variety of conflicting ways, like other political words

such as nationalism, imperialism, and globalization . ( Indeed, as we have seen, globalization is the

subset of interdependence that occurs at global distances.) Leaders and analysts have different motives

when they use political words. The leader wants as many people marching behind his or her banner as

possible. Political leaders blur meanings and try to create a connotation of a common good: We are all

in the same boat together; there-fore, we must cooperate; therefore, follow me. The analyst, on the

other hand, makes distinctions to understand the world better. He or she distinguishes questions of

good and bad from more and less. The analyst may note that the boat we are all in may be heading for

one persons port but not anothers, or that one person is doing all the rowing while another steers or

has a free ride. As an analytical word, interdependence refers to situations in which actors or events in

different parts of a system affect each other. Simply put, interdependence means mutual dependence.

Such a situation is neither good nor bad in itself, and there can be more or less of it. In personal

relations, interdependence is summed up by the marriage vow in which each partner is interdependent

with another for richer, for poorer, for better, or for worse. And interdependence among countries

sometimes means richer, sometimes poorer, sometimes for better, sometimes for worse. In the

eighteenth century, Jean- Jacques Rousseau pointed out that along with interdependence comes friction

and conflict. His solution was isolation and separation. But this is seldom possible in a globalized

world. When countries try isolation, as with the cases of North Korea and Myanmar ( formerly Burma), it

comes at enormous economic cost. It is not easy for countries to divorce the rest of the world.

Sources of Interdependence

Four distinctions illuminate the dimensions of interdependence: its sources, benefits, relative costs, and

symmetry. Interdependence can originate in physical ( natural) or social ( economic, political, or

perceptual) phenomena. Both are usually present at the same time. The distinction helps clarify the

degree of choice in situations of reciprocal or mutual dependence.


2/9

2

Military interdependence is the mutual dependence that arises from military competition. There is a

physical aspect in the weaponry, especially dramatic since the development of nuclear weapons and the

resulting possibility of mutually assured destruction. However, an important element of perception is

also involved in interdependence, and a change in perception or policy can reduce the intensity of the

military interdependence. As we saw in Chapter 5 , Americans lost little sleep over the existence of

British nuclear weapons during the Cold War because there was no perception that those weapons

would ever detonate on American soil. Similarly, Westerners slept a bit easier in the late 1980s after

Gorbachev announced his new thinking in Soviet foreign policy. It was not so much the number of

Soviet weapons that made the difference, but the change in the perception of Soviet hostility or intent.

Indeed, American public anxiety about the Soviet nuclear arsenal virtually evaporated after the final

collapse of the Soviet Union, despite the fact that at the twentieth centurys close thousands of poorly

guarded Soviet warheads seemed potentially to be at risk of falling into the hands of terrorists or

rogue states such as Iran and North Korea.

Generally speaking, economic interdependence is similar to military interdependence in that it is the

stuff of traditional international politics and has significant social, especially perceptual, aspects.Economic interdependence involves policy choices about values and costs. For example, in the early

1970s there was concern that the worlds population was outstripping global food supplies. Many

countries were buying American grain, which in turn drove up the price of food in American

supermarkets. A loaf of bread cost more in the United States because the Indian monsoons failed and

because the Soviet Union mishandled its harvest. In 1973, in an effort to prevent price rises at home, the

United States decided to stop exporting soybeans to Japan. As a result, Japan invested in soybean

production in Brazil. A few years later, when supply and demand were better equilibrated, U. S. farmers

greatly regretted that embargo because the Japanese were buying their soybeans from a cheaper

source in Brazil. Similarly, in 2008, as rich countries devoted more cropland to producing ethanol fuel,

food prices rose globally. Social choices as well as physical shortages affect economic interdependence

in the long run. It is always worth considering the long- term perspective when making short-term

choices.

Ecological interdependence

Interdependence forces us to understand that todays challenges represent not just a dilemma

for us [ in our own country], but a shared dilemma for everybody. The environment brings that

into a very tangible focus: theres no such thing as a stable climate for one country or one

continent unless the climate is stable for everybody. Climate security is a global public good.

John Ashton, UK Special Representative for Climate Change, September 27, 2006.

Benefits of Interdependence

The benefits of interdependence are sometimes expressed as zero- sum and nonzero- sum. In a zero-

sum situation, your loss is my gain and vice versa. In a positive- sum situation, we both gain; in a

negative- sum situation, we both lose. Dividing a pie is zero- sum, baking a larger pie is positive- sum,

and drop-ping it on the floor is negative- sum. Both zero- sum and nonzero- sum aspects are present in

mutual dependence.


3/9

3

Some liberal economists tend to think of interdependence only in terms of joint gain, that is, positive-

sum situations in which everyone benefits and everyone is better off. Failure to pay attention to the

inequality of benefits and the conflicts that arise over the distribution of relative gains causes such

analysts to miss the political aspects of interdependence. Both sides can gain from tradefor example,

if Japan and South Korea trade computers and smart phonesbut how will the gains from trade be

distributed? Even if Japan and South Korea are both better off, is Japan a lot better off and South Korea

only a little better off, or vice versa? The distribution of benefitswho gets how much of the joint

gainis a zero- sum situation in which one sides gain is the others loss. The result is that there is

almost always some political conflict in economic interdependence. Even when there is a larger pie,

people can fight over who gets the biggest slices.

Some liberal analysts mistakenly think that as globalization makes the world more interdependent,

cooperation will replace competition. Their reason is that interdependence creates joint benefits, and

those joint benefits encourage cooperation. That is true, but economic interdependence can also be

used as a weaponwitness the use of trade sanctions against Serbia, Iraq, and Libya. Indeed, economic

interdependence can be more usable than force in some cases because it may have more subtlegradations. And in some circumstances, states are less interested in their absolute gain from

interdependence than in how the relatively greater gains of their rivals might be used to hurt them.

Some analysts believe that traditional world politics was always zero- sum. But that is misleading about

the past. Traditional international politics could be positive- sum, depending on the actors intentions. It

made a difference, for example, whether Bismarck or Hitler was in charge in Germany. If one party

sought aggrandizement, as Hitler did, then politics was indeed zero- sumone sides gain was anothers

loss. But if all parties wanted stability, there could be joint gain in the balance of power. Conversely, the

politics of economic globalization has competitive zero- sum aspects as well as cooperative positive-sum

aspects.

In the politics of interdependence, the distinction between what is domes-tic and what is foreign

becomes blurred. For example, the soybean situation mentioned earlier involved the domestic issue of

controlling inflation at home, as well as American relations with Japan and Brazil. In the late 1990s, on

the other hand, an Asian financial crisis depressed world commodity prices, which helped the American

economy continue to grow without encountering inflationary pressures. In 2005, when U. S. secretary of

the treasury John Snow visited China, he pleaded with the Chinese to increase consumer credit because

the United States saw it as going directly tothe thing we have most on our mindsthe global

imbalances. Chinese leaders replied that the Americans need to get their own house in order by

reducing their fiscal deficits. Were Snow and his Chinese counterparts commenting on domestic or

foreign policy?

Or, to take another example, after Irans 1979 revolution curtailed oil production, the American

government urged citizens to cut their energy consumption by driving 55 miles per hour and turning

down thermostats. Was that a domestic or a foreign policy issue? Some social scientists have taken to

calling such issues intermesticinternational and domestic at the same time.


4/9

4

Interdependence also affects domestic politics in a different way. In 1890, a French politician concerned

with relative economic gains pursued a policy of holding Germany back. Today a policy of slowing

economic growth in Germany is not good for France. Economic interdependence between France and

Germany means that the best predictor of whether France is better off economically is when Germany is

growing economically. Now with the two countries sharing a common currency, it is in the self- interest

of the French politicians that Germany does well economically and vice versa. The classical balance- of-

power theory, which predicts that one country will act only to keep the other down lest the other gain

preponderance, is not valid. In economic interdependence, states are interested in absolute gains as

well as gains relative to other states.

Costs of Interdependence

The costs of interdependence can involve short- run sensitivity or long- term vulnerability. Sensitivity

refers to the amount and pace of the effects of dependence; that is, how quickly does change in one

part of the system bring about change in another part? For example, in 1987, the New York stock market

crashed suddenly because of foreigners anxieties about U. S. interest rates and what might happen to

the price of bonds and stocks. It all happened very quickly; the market was extremely sensitive to thewithdrawal of foreign funds. In 1998, weakness in emerging markets in Asia had a contagious effect that

undercut geographically distant emerging markets in Russia and Brazil. In 2008, the mortgage finance

problem in the United States affected housing prices in other countries and eventually helped to trigger

a global recession in 2009.

A high level of sensitivity, however, is not the same as a high level of vulnerability. Vulnerability refers to

the relative costs of changing the structure of a system of interdependence. It is the cost of escaping

from the system or of changing the rules of the game. The less vulnerable of two countries is not

necessarily the less sensitive, but the one for whom adjustment is less costly. During the 1973 oil crisis,

the United States depended on imported energy for only about 16 percent of its total energy uses. Onthe other hand, in 1973 Japan depended about 95 percent on imported energy. The United States was

sensitive to the Arab oil boycott insofar as prices shot up in 1973, but it was not as vulnerable as Japan

was. In 1998, the United States was sensitive but not vulnerable to East Asian economic conditions. The

financial crisis there cut half a percent off the U. S. growth rate, but with a booming economy the United

States could afford it. Indonesia, on the other hand, was both sensitive and vulnerable to changes in

global trade and investment patterns. Its economy suffered severely and that, in turn, led to internal

political conflict and a change of government.

Vulnerability is a matter of degree. When the shah of Iran was overthrown in 1979, Iranian oil

production was disrupted at a time when demand was high and markets were already tight. The loss of

Irans oil caused the total amount of oil on the world markets to drop by about 5 percent. Markets were

sensitive, and shortages of supply caused a rapid increase in oil prices. But Americans could reduce 5

percent of their energy consumption simply by turning down their thermostats and by driving on the

highways at 55 rather than 60 miles per hour. It appears that the United States was sensitive but not

very vulnerable if it could avoid damage by making such simple adjustments.


5/9

5

Vulnerability, however, depends on more than aggregate measures. It also depends on whether a

society is capable of responding quickly to change. For example, the United States was less adept at

responding to changes in the oil markets than Japan. Furthermore, private actors, large corporations,

and speculators may each look at a market situation and decide to hoard supplies because they think

shortages are going to grow worse. Their actions will drive the price even higher because it will make the

shortages greater and put more demand on the market. Thus, degrees of vulnerability are not quite as

simple as they first look.

Vulnerability also depends on whether substitutes are available and whether there are diverse sources

of supply. In 1970, Lester Brown of the World Watch Institute expressed alarm about the increasing

dependence of the United States on imported raw materials, and therefore its vulnerability.

Of thirteen basic industrial raw materials, the United States was dependent on imports for nearly 90

percent of aluminum, chromium, manganese, and nickel. He predicted that by 1985 the United States

would be dependent on imports in ten of the basic thirteen. He thought this would lead to a dramatic

increase in U. S. vulnerability as well as a drastic increase in strength for the less developed countries

that produced those raw materials.

But in the 1980s, raw materials prices went down, not up. What happened to his prediction? In judging

vulnerability, Brown failed to consider the alternative sources of raw materials and the diversity of

sources of supply that prevented producers from jacking up prices artificially. Moreover, technology

improves. Yesterdays waste may become a new resource, and miniaturization reduces inputs.

Companies now mine discarded tailings because new technology has made it possible to extract copper

from ore that was considered depleted waste years ago. Todays reduced use of copper is also due to

the introduction of fiber- optic cables made from silicon, whose basic origin is sand. Far less copper was

required to manufacture a state- of- the- art computer in 2010 than in 1980, because it is so much

smaller and lighter. Thus projections of U. S. vulnerability to shortages of raw materials were inaccurate

because technology and alternatives were not adequately considered.

Some analysts refer to advanced economies today as information- based in the sense that computers,

communications, and the Internet are becoming dominant factors in economic growth. Such economies

are sometimes called lightweight economies because the value of information embedded in products

is often far greater than the value of the raw materials involved. Such changes further depreciate the

value of raw materials in world politics. One of the few exceptions is oil, which still plays a significant

role in most advanced economies, particularly for transportation. This in turn contributes to the

strategic significance of the Persian Gulf, where a large portion of the worlds currently known oil

reserves are located.

Sensitivity interdependence

We had begun to forget the danger of contagion and the speed with which [ a financial crisis]

takes place when it does occur. The current developments which began in a relatively minor

segment of the financial market, the sub- prime mortgage segment [ in the United States in


6/9

6

2007], have spread far and wide across continents. Rakesh Mohan, Deputy Governor, Reserve

Bank of India, September 20, 2007.

Symmetry of Interdependence

Symmetry refers to situations of relatively balanced versus unbalanced dependence. Being less

dependent can be a source of power. If two parties are interdependent but one is less dependent thanthe other, the less dependent party has a source of power as long as both value the interdependent

relationship. Manipulating the asymmetries of interdependence can be a source of power in

international politics. Analysts who say that interdependence occurs only in situations of equal

dependence define away the most interesting political behavior. Such perfect symmetry is quite rare; so

are cases of complete imbalance in which one side is totally dependent and the other is not dependent

at all. Asymmetry is at the heart of the politics of interdependence.

Asymmetry often varies according to different issues. In the 1980s, when President Reagan cut taxes

and raised expenditures, the United States became dependent on imported Japanese capital to balance

its federal government budget. Some argued that this gave Japan tremendous power over the United

States. But the other side of the coin was that Japan would hurt itself as well as the United States if it

stopped lending to the United States. Japanese investors who already had large stakes in the United

States would have found their investments devalued by the damage done to the American economy if

Japan suddenly stopped lending. Moreover, Japans economy was a little more than half the size of the

American economy, and that meant that the Japanese needed the American market for their exports far

more than vice versa ( although both needed each other, and both benefited from the

interdependence). A similar relationship has developed today between the United States and China.

America accepts Chinese imports, and China holds American dollars and bonds, in effect making a loan

to the United States. While China could threaten to sell its holdings of dollars and damage the American

economy, a weakened American economy would mean a smaller market for Chinese exports, and theAmerican government might respond with tariffs against Chinese goods. Neither side is in a hurry to

break the symmetry of their vulnerability interdependence. In 2010, some Chinese generals suggested a

massive sale of dollars to punish the United States for its arms sales to Taiwan, but top leaders refused.

They knew that if China tried to bring the United States to its knees by dumping dollars, it would bring

itself to its knees as well.

Moreover, security was often linked to other issues in the U. S.- Japanese relationship. After World War

II, Japan followed the policy of a trading state and did not develop a large military capability or acquire

nuclear weapons. It relied on the American security guarantee to balance the power of the Soviet Union

and China in the East Asian region. Thus when a dispute seemed to be developing between the United

States and Japan over trade in 1990, the Japanese made concessions to prevent weakening the overall

security relationship.

When there is asymmetry of interdependence in different issue areas, a state may try to link or unlink

issues. If each issue could be thought of as a separate poker game, and all poker games were played

simultaneously, one state might have most of the chips at one table and another state might have most

of the chips at another table. Depending on a states interests and position, it might want to keep the


7/9

7

games separate or create linkages between the tables. Therefore, much of the political conflict over

interdependence involves the creation or prevention of linkage. States want to manipulate

interdependence in areas in which they are strong and avoid being manipulated in areas in which they

are relatively weak. Economic sanctions are often an example of such linkage. For example, in 1996 the

United States threatened sanctions against foreign companies that invested in Iran, but when faced with

European threats of retaliation through other linkages, the United States backed down.

By setting agendas and defining issue areas, international institutions often set the rules for the trade-

offs in interdependent relationships. States try to use international institutions to set the rules that

affect the transfer of chips among tables. Ironically, international institutions can benefit the weaker

players by keeping some of the conflicts in which the poorer states are relatively better endowed

separated from the military table, where strong states dominate. The danger remains, however, that

some players will be strong enough to overturn one or more of the tables. With separate institutions for

money, shipping, pollution, and trade, if the militarily strong players are beaten too badly, there is a

danger they may try to kick over the other tables. Yet when the United States and Europe were beaten

at the oil table in 1973, they did not use their preponderant military force to kick over the oil tablebecause, as we will see later, a complex web of linkages held them back.

The largest state does not always win in the manipulation of economic interdependence. If a smaller or

weaker state has a greater concern about an issue, it may do quite well. For instance, because the

United States accounts for roughly three- quarters of Canadas foreign trade while Canada accounts for

about one- quarter of U. S. foreign trade, Canada is more dependent on the United States than vice

versa. Nonetheless, Canada often prevailed in a number of disputes with the United States because

Canada was willing to threaten retaliatory actions such as tariffs and restrictions that deterred the

United States. The Canadians would have suffered much more than the United States if their actions had

led to a full dispute, but Canada felt it was better to risk occasional retaliation than to agree to rules thatwould always make it lose. Indeed, when it came to setting rules, the fact that Canada had more to lose

meant that it was motivated to negotiate more effectively and often came away from the bargaining

table with the better end of the deal. Deterrence via manipulation of economic interdependence is

somewhat like nuclear deterrence in that it rests on a capability for effective damage and credible

intentions. Small states can often use their greater intensity and greater credibility to overcome their

relative vulnerability in asymmetrical interdependence.

A natural outgrowth of rising interdependence is the proliferation of trade pacts. The European Union is

the most sophisticated of these agreements and requires its member states to relax not just some

economic sovereignty, but political sovereignty as well. In 1994, the United States, Mexico, and Canada

ratified the North American Free Trade Agreement ( NAFTA). For Mexico and Canada, NAFTA was

appealing because it bound their economies more tightly to the larger U. S. economy and, in so doing,

increased their access to U. S. markets and their ability to export their products to the United States. For

the United States, NAFTA expanded the realm of U. S. exports and made it easier for U. S. companies to

do business in Canada and Mexico.


8/9

8

Regional pacts such as NAFTA may increase interdependence and lessen the asymmetry in a

relationship. By agreeing to intertwine its economy with that of Mexico, the United States assumed

some of the liabilities of the Mexican economy along with the benefits of easier access. When the value

of the Mexican peso plummeted, the Clinton administration rushed in early 1995 to shore up the

flagging currency and assembled a multibillion- dollar aid package. At a time when the U. S. Congress

was deadlocked over increased domestic spending for services such as health care, the administration

saw little choice but to rescue the peso. With greater interdependence, even strong countries can find

them-selves sensitive to economic developments beyond their borders. In 1997, when Southeast Asia

suffered its financial crisis, the United States was less vulnerable than in the Mexican case and

responded primarily through multilateral institutions. Nevertheless, fears of an economic domino effect

in which collapse of some developing economies would undermine confidence in others meant that the

United States and other advanced economies could not continue to stand idly by.

The global political and economic system is more complicated and complex than before. More sectors,

more states, more issues, and more private actors are involved in interdependent relationships. It is

increasingly unrealistic to analyze world politics as occurring solely among a group of large states, solidas billiard balls, bouncing off each other in a balance of power.

Realism and Complex Interdependence

What would the world look like if realism were wrong about some of its fundamental propositions?

Realism holds that states are the only significant actors; that military force is their dominant instrument;

and that power ( or security) is their dominant goal. What if states were not the only significant actors

if transnational actors working across state boundaries were also major players? What if force were not

the only significant instrumentif economic manipulation and the use of international institutions were

dominant? What if welfare, rather than security, were the primary goal? Such an antirealist world could

be characterized as a situation of complex interdependence. Social scientists call complex inter-dependence an ideal type. It is an imaginary concept that does not perfectly describe the real world;

but then, as we have seen, neither does realism. Imagining a world in a condition of complex

interdependence allows us to imagine a different type of global politicsone in which the liberal

paradigm would presumably perform much better.

In fact, both realism and complex interdependence represent ideal types. The real world lies somewhere

between the two. We can ask where certain country relationships fit on a spectrum between a

Hobbesian state of nature and a condition of complex interdependence. The Middle East is closer to the

realist end of the spectrum, but relations between the United States and Canada and relations between

France and Germany today come much closer to the complex interdependence end of the spectrum.

Different politics and different forms of the power struggle occur depending on where on the spectrum

a particular relationship between a set of countries is located. In fact, countries can change their

position on the spectrum. During the Cold War, the U. S.- Soviet relationship was clearly near the realist

end of the spectrum, but with the end of the Cold War, the Russia- U. S. relationship moved closer to the

center between realism and complex interdependence.


9/9

Nye Understanding Interdependence

Documents

Transcript of Nye Understanding Interdependence