U.S. NAVY NWP 3-15

U.S. MARINE CORPS MCWP 3-3.1.2

MINE WARFARE

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYOFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND

HEADQUARTERS U.S. MARINE CORPS

1 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

PCN 143 000008 000411LP0004120

3 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

August 1996

PUBLICATION NOTICE

1. NWP 3-15/MCWP 3-3.1.2 MINE WARFARE, is available in the Naval Warfare PublicationsLibrary. It is effective upon receipt.

2. Summary: NWP 3-15/MCWP 3-3.1.2 contains information on Mine Warfare for the battle groupor squadron commander and staff. It is intended to bridge the gap between NDP 3, Naval Opera-tions, and the NWP 3-15 (formerly NWP 27 series) Mine Warfare publications.

5 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

ROUTING

Naval Warfare Publications Custodian

Naval warfare publications must be made readilyavailable to all users and other interested personnelwithin the U.S. Navy.

Note to Naval Warfare Publications Custodian

This notice should be duplicated for routing to cognizant personnel in accordance with NWP 1-01.

Mine Warfare

CONTENTS

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CHAPTER 1 — GENERAL CONCEPTS

1.1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1

1.2 KEY DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11.2.1 Mine Warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-21.2.2 Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-21.2.3 Mine Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

1.3 MINE WARFARE FORCE ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-21.3.1 Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-21.3.2 Mine Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-31.3.3 Naval Reserve Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

1.4 NATO/ALLIED COALITION AND COOPERATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-61.4.1 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-61.4.2 Non-NATO Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-61.4.3 Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-71.4.4 Support Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

1.5 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF MIW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-71.5.1 Hague Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-71.5.2 Other Legal Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

1.6 MINE WARFARE/POLITICAL INTERFACE (Intelligence and Warnings). . . . . . . . . . 1-81.6.1 Threat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-81.6.2 Movement of Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-81.6.3 Delay Arming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

1.7 MINE WARFARE INTERFACE WITH OTHER WARFARE SPECIALTIES . . . . . . . . 1-81.7.1 Mine Warfare Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-81.7.2 Strike Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-91.7.3 Special Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-91.7.4 Surface Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-91.7.5 Antisubmarine Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-91.7.6 Antiair Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-91.7.7 Amphibious Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-91.7.8 Maritime Interdiction Operations/Law Enforcement Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-101.7.9 Salvage Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-101.7.10 Command and Control Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-101.7.11 Fleet Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10

1.8 MINE WARFARE/JOINT INTERFACE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-101.8.1 Army - Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10

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1.8.2 Air Force - Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-111.8.3 Marine Corps - Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-111.8.4 Coast Guard - Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11

1.9 RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-111.9.1 Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-121.9.2 NATO/Allied ROE Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-121.9.3 ROE Interface with Warfare Specialties Supporting Mine Warfare Forces. . . . . . . . . . . 1-12

CHAPTER 2 — MINING

2.1 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MINING OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . 2-12.1.1 Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12.1.2 Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

2.2 MINE CLASSIFICATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22.2.1 Final Position in the Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22.2.2 Method of Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-32.2.3 Method of Actuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4

2.3 COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURE FEATURES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-52.3.1 Ship Counter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-52.3.2 Probability Actuator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-62.3.3 Delay Arm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-62.3.4 Delay Rise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-62.3.5 Interlook Dormant Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-62.3.6 Intercount Dormant Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-62.3.7 Live Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-62.3.8 Dummy Mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-62.3.9 Obstructers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-62.3.10 Anechoic Coating/Camouflage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-62.3.11 Nonsympathetic Detonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-72.3.12 Antisweeper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-72.3.13 Antirecovery, Self-Destruct, and Antistripping Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7

2.4 MINE DAMAGE TO SHIPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-72.4.1 Contact Mine Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-72.4.2 Noncontact Mine Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7

2.5 U.S. NAVY/ALLIED MINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-92.5.1 U.S. Navy Service Mines and Mine Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-92.5.2 Exercise and Training Mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-112.5.3 Future Mine Potentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-112.5.4 Mine Storage, Preparation, and Transportation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-112.5.5 Minefield Planning Process/Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-122.5.6 Computer Programs in Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14

2.6 U.S./ALLIED MINELAYING ASSETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-152.6.1 Air Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15

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2.6.2 Submarine Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-162.6.3 Surface Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16

2.7 IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENT ON MINING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-172.7.1 Water Depth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-172.7.2 Winds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-172.7.3 Seas and Swells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-172.7.4 Sea Ice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-172.7.5 Tides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-172.7.6 Currents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-172.7.7 Seawater Temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-172.7.8 Water Transparency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-172.7.9 Marine Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-172.7.10 Bottom Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-182.7.11 Magnetic Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18

CHAPTER 3 — MINE COUNTERMEASURES

3.1 GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

3.2 OFFENSIVE MINE COUNTERMEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13.2.1 Offensive Mine Countermeasures by Strike Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13.2.2 Mining as an Offensive MINE COUNTERMEASURES Tactic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

3.3 DEFENSIVE MINE COUNTERMEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3

3.4 PASSIVE MINE COUNTERMEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-33.4.1 Locating the Threat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-33.4.2 Localizing the Threat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-33.4.3 Reducing the Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

3.5 ACTIVE MINE COUNTERMEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-53.5.1 Mine Hunting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-53.5.2 Mechanical Minesweeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-73.5.3 Influence Minesweeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-93.5.4 Mine Neutralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-143.5.5 Mine Exploitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-153.5.6 Brute Force Mine Clearance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-15

3.6 INTEGRATED MINE COUNTERMEASURES OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-16

3.7 COMBINED MINE COUNTERMEASURES OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-163.7.1 Primary NATO/Allied Mine Countermeasures Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-173.7.2 Other Mine Countermeasures Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-19

3.8 AMPHIBIOUS MINE COUNTERMEASURES OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-21

3.9 SUBMARINE MINE COUNTERMEASURES OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22

3.10 RIVERINE MINE COUNTERMEASURES OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22

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3.11 DEPLOYMENT OF MINE COUNTERMEASURES FORCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-233.11.1 Surface Mine Countermeasures Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-233.11.2 Airborne Mine Countermeasures Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-243.11.3 Underwater Mine Countermeasures Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-253.11.4 Mine Countermeasures Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-37

3.12 INTERFACE WITH THE ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-283.12.1 General/Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-283.12.2 Environmental Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-283.12.3 Environmental Effects on Mine Warfare Weapons, Systems, and Decisions . . . . . . . . . 3-283.12.4 Environmental Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-32

3.13 MINE COUNTERMEASURES FORCE COMMAND AND CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . 3-343.13.1 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-343.13.2 Mine Countermeasures Staff Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-353.13.3 The Mine Countermeasures Command Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-353.13.4 Mine Warfare C4I Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-363.13.5 Mine Countermeasures Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-363.13.6 Mine Countermeasures Exercises. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-373.13.7 Mine Countermeasures Exercise Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-37

CHAPTER 4 — MINE COUNTERMEASURES FOR NON-MINE COUNTERMEASURES SHIPS

4.1 CONCEPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14.1.1 Detect and Avoid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14.1.2 Use of the Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14.1.3 Organic Mine Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14.1.4 In-Stride Mine Countermeasures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

4.2 SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-24.2.1 Battle Group Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-24.2.2 Moored or Drifting Mine Self-Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-24.2.3 Electromagnetic Self-Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-34.2.4 Acoustic Self-Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-44.2.5 Seismic Self-Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-44.2.6 Pressure Self-Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

4.3 TACTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-54.3.1 Ship’s Self-Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-54.3.2 Drifting/Contact Mine Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-54.3.3 Moored Mine Tactics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-54.3.4 Magnetic Mine Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-64.3.5 Acoustic/Seismic Mine Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-64.3.6 Pressure Mine Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-64.3.7 Group’s Self-Protection Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-74.3.8 Preplanned Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-74.3.9 Mine Disposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

4.4 PASSIVE MINE COUNTERMEASURES FOR SUBMARINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8

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APPENDIX A — MINE WARFARE TERMINOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

APPENDIX B — MINE WARFARE PROGRAM AND SUPPORT ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . B-1

APPENDIX C — MINE WARFARE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1

APPENDIX D — U.S. MINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1

APPENDIX E — MINE WARFARE REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-1

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Index-1

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

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CHAPTER 1 — GENERAL CONCEPTS

Figure 1-1 Mine Storage and Preparation Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3Figure 1-2 Mine Countermeasures Operational Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5

CHAPTER 2 — MINING

Figure 2-1 Environmental Considerations in Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18

CHAPTER 3 — MINE COUNTERMEASURES

Figure 3-1 Mine Countermeasures Family Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2Figure 3-2 Localization of Threat by Q-Route . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4Figure 3-3 AN/SQQ-32 Minehunting Sonar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8Figure 3-4 MH-53E with AN/AQS-14 Sonar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8Figure 3-5 AN/SLQ-38 Mechanical Sweep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10Figure 3-6 A/N37-U Controlled Depth Sweep/AN/SLQ-53 Single Ship

Deep Sweep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-11Figure 3-7 AN/SLQ-37 Combination Influence Sweep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-12Figure 3-8 MH-53E with Mk-105 Magnetic Minesweeping System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13Figure 3-9 Other Mine Countermeasures Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-20Figure 3-10 Environmental Considerations in Mine Countermeasures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-29

CHAPTER 4 — MINE COUNTERMEASURES FOR NON-MINECOUNTERMEASURES SHIPS

Figure 4-1 U.S. Navy Magnetic Silencing Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4

APPENDIX B — MINE WARFARE PROGRAM AND SUPPORTORGANIZATION

Figure B-1 Mine Warfare Program Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-2

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ORIGINAL 14

List of Acronyms/Abbreviations

A

AAW. Antiair warfare

ACMPM. Analytic Countered Minefield PlanningModel

ADCON. Administrative control

AFV. Armored fighting vehicle

AG. Armament groups

AHP. Allied navigation publication

AIMD. Aircraft intermediate maintenance department

AMC. Air Mobility Command

AMCM. Airborne mine countermeasures

AMW. Amphibious Warfare

AOA. Amphibious operations area

ARG. Amphibious ready group

ASD. Area Search Detachment

ASUW. Antisurface warfare

ASW. Antisubmarine warfare

ASWC. Antisubmarine warfare commander

ATF. Amphibious task force

ATP. Allied tactical publication

B

BF. Battle force

BFTT. Battle force tactical training

BT. Bathythermograph

C

CAPTOR. EnCAPsulated TORpedo

CATF. Commander amphibious task force

CCM. Counter countermeasure

CD-ROM. Compact disc-read only memory

CIC. Combat information center

CINC. Commander in chief

CINCLANT FLT. Commander in chief, U.S. Atlanticfleet

CINCPACFLT. Commander in chief U.S. Pacific fleet.

CINCUSNAVEUR. Commander in chief U.S. Navalforces, Europe

CLF. Commander landing force

CMPM. Countered minefield planning model

COASTSYSTA. coastal systems stations

COMINEWARCOM. Commander, Mine WarfareCommand

COMOMAG. Commander Mobile Mine AssemblyGroup

COMSUBDEVRON. Commander, Submarine De-velopment Squadron

COMUSMARDEZLANT. Commander, U.S. MaritimeDefense Zone, Atlantic

COMUSMARDEZPAC. Commander, U.S. MaritimeDefense Zone, Pacific

CONUS. Continental United States

COOP. Craft of opportunity

CRRC. Combat rubber raiding craft

CTDA. Commander’s Tactical Decision Aid

CUDIX. Common user digital information exchange

CV. Aircraft carrier

15 ORIGINAL

CVBG. Aircraft carrier battle group

CWC. Composite warfare commander

C2W. Command and control warfare

C4I. Command, control, communications, computers,and intelligence

D

DAMA. Demand assigned multiple access

DEA. Defense exchange agreement

DELTAC. Delivery tactic

DEU. Diver evaluation unit

DIA. Defense Intelligence Agency

DMS. Deep moored sweep

DST. Destructor

E

EMI. Electromagnetic interference

ENWGS. Enhanced naval wargaming system

EOD. Explosive ordnance disposal

EODMCM. Explosive ordnance disposal minecountermeasures

EODMU. Explosive ordnance disposal mobile unit

ET. Exercise and training

F

FADL. Fly away diving locker

FAMP. Forward area minefield planner

FARC. Fly away recompression chamber

FASCAM. Family of scatterable mines

FLTCINC. Fleet commander in chief

FMWC. Fleet Mine Warfare Center

FPB. Fast patrol boat

FSMTP. Fleet service mine test program

FSU. Fleet support unit

G

GPS. Global positioning system

GRP. Glass reinforced plastic

H

HF. High frequency

I

ICDP. Intercount dormant period

IDMS. Improved deep moored sweep

IEG. Information exchange groups

ILDP. Interlook dormant period

IOC. Initial operational capability

ISIC. Immediate senior in command

IWDM. Intermediate water depth mine

J

JMCIS. Joint Maritime Command InformationSystem

L

LCAC. Landing craft air cushion

LOS. Line of sight

LP. Live period

LSM. Littoral sea mine

LSS. Life support skid

M

MARDEZ. Maritime defense zone

MCAC. Multipurpose craft air cushion

MCD. Mobile communications detachment

ORIGINAL 16

MCCDC. Marine Corps Combat DevelopmentCommand

MCM. Mine countermeasures

MCMTA. MCM tasking authority

MCMV. Mine countermeasures vehicle

MCS. Mine countermeasures command and supportship

MDA. Mine danger area

MEDAL. Mine Warfare Environmental DecisionAids Library

MEDEVAC. Medical evacuation

MFPF. Minefield planning folder

MHC. Mine hunter coastal

MICFAC. Mobile integrated command facility

MIO/LEO. Maritime interdiction operations/lawenforcement operations

MILC. Minelike contact

MILVAN. Military owned demountable container

MIUW. Mobile inshore underwater warfare

MIW. Mine warfare

MIWC. Mine warfare coordinator

MMF. Mobile maintenance facility

MMS. Marine mammal system

MNS. Mine neutralization system

MNV. Mine neutralization vehicle

MOE. Measure of effectiveness

MOGAS. Motor gasoline

MOMAG. Mobile mine assembly group

MOP. Magnetic orange pipe

MPA. Maritime patrol aircraft

MPO. Minefield performance objective

MPSRON. Maritime Pre-positioning Squadron

MRCI. Mine warfare readiness certificationinspection

MRN. Mine reference number

MSB. Minesweeper boat

MSC. Minesweeper coastal

MSF. Magnetic silencing facility

MSI. Min sweeper inshore

MSO. Minesweeper ocean

MSS. Mine search squadron

MSU. Mine search unit

MWES. Mine warfare environmental survey

MWWP. Mine warfare working party

N

NATO. North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVIPO. Navy International Programs Office

NAVOCEANO. Naval Oceanographic Office

NAVSPECWAR. Navy Special Warfare Command

NCA. National Command Authorities

NDC. Naval Doctrine Command

NMIC. National Maritime Intelligence Center

NOD. Night observation device

NOMBO. Nonminelike bottom object

NRF. Naval Reserve Force

NSAP. Navy Science Assistance Program

NSW. Navy special warfare

NTIC. Navy Tactical Information Compendium

NUWC. Naval Underwater Warfare Center

17 ORIGINAL

O

OCD. Ordnance clearance detachment

ONR. Office of Naval Research

OOD. Officer of the deck

OPAREA. Operations area

OPCON. Operational control

OPDEC. Operational deception

OPLAN. Operation plan

OPSEC. Operations security

OPTASK. Operational tasking message

OPTEVFOR. Operational Test and Evaluation Force

OTC. Officer in tactical command

OTCIXS. Officer in tactical command informationexchange system

P

PAC. Probability actuation circuit

PEO MINEWAR. Program Executive Officer, MineWarfare

PERSTEMPO. Personnel tempo of operations

PG. Project group

PINS. Precise Integrated Navigation System

PMO. Program management office

PMS. Planned maintenance system

PMT. Performance Monitoring Team

R

RDT&E. Research, development, test and evaluation

RECO. Remote control

RHIB. Rigid hull inflatable boat

ROE. Rules of engagement

RO/RO. Roll on/roll off

ROV. Remotely operated vehicle

RSP. Render safe procedure

S

SACLANT. Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic

SAM. Self-propelled acoustic magnetic vehicle

SAR. Search and rescue

SATCOM. Satellite communications

SEAL. Sea air land (Navy Special Warfare forcenickname)

SIMA. Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity

SLMM. Submarine launched mobile mine

SLOC. Sea line of communication

SMCM. Surface mine countermeasures

SMCMV. Surface mine countermeasures vehicle

SOA. Speed of advance

STW. Strike warfare

STWC. Strike warfare commander

SUW. Surface warfare

SW. Shallow water

SWDG. Surface warfare development group

SWMCM. Shallow-water mine countermeasures

SZ. Surf zone

T

TACMEMO. Tactical memorandum

TARLOC. Target localization

TAMPS. Tactical aircraft mission planning system

TARPS. Tactical air reconnaissance pod system

TDD. Target detecting device

ORIGINAL 18

TGO. Tactical group ORESTES

TLAM. Tomahawk land attack missile

TPFDD. Time Phased Force Deployment Data

TPFDL. Time Phased Force Deployment List

U

UBA. Underwater breathing apparatus

UEP. Underwater electric potential

UHF. Ultra high frequency

UMCM. Underwater mine countermeasures

UMPM. Uncountered minefield planning model

V

VDS. Variable depth sonar

VEMS. Versatile exercise mine system

VHF. Very high frequency

VLCC. Very large crude carrier

VMFI. Visual mine firing indicator

VSW. Very shallow water

19 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

PREFACE

NWP 3-15/MCWP 3-3.1.2 Mine Warfare, has beenbrought into existence to give a broad command over-view of Mine Warfare and to provide a link to otherdocuments critical to the understanding and planningprocesses.

Throughout this publication, references to otherpublications imply the effective edition.

Report any page shortage by letter to Commander,Navy Warfare Development Command.

ORDERING DATA

Order a new publication or change, as appropriate,through the Navy Supply System.

Changes to the distribution and allowance lists (to addor delete your command from the distribution list, or tomodify the number of copies of a publication that you re-ceive) must be made in accordance with NTTP 1-01.

RECOMMENDED CHANGES

Recommended changes to this publication may besubmitted at any time using the accompanying formatfor routine changes.

Atlantic and Pacific fleet units and stations and allother units and CONUS shore activities submit recom-mendations to:

COMMANDER MINE WARFARE COMMAND325 FIFTH STREET SECORPUS CHRISTI TX 78419-5032

U.S. Marine Corps Unit submit recommendationsto:

COMMANDING GENERAL (WF06)MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENTCOMMANDQUANTICO VA 22134-5001

In addition, forward two copies of all recommenda-tions to:

COMMANDERNAVWARDEVCOM686 CUSHING RDNEWPORT RI 02841-1207

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CHAPTER 1

General Concepts

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This publication has been brought into existence togive a broad command overview of Mine Warfare andto provide a link to other documents critical to the un-derstanding and planning processes. Its ultimate pur-pose, therefore, is to play a supporting role in keepingthe Mine Warfare lessons learned truly learned. It maythereby aid in the avoidance of such unfortunate tacti-cal situations as befell USS PRINCETON (CG 59),USS TRIPOLI (LPH 10), and USS SAMUEL B. ROB-ERTS (FFG 58). In future naval engagements with anenemy, especially in joint littoral warfare, mines arecertain to play an important role. It is imperative tominimize the potential loss of human life and warshipsand to enhance the smooth integration, coordination,and effectiveness of the mine warfighting element tosupport overall military force and political objectives.

Since the invention of the Bushnell Keg in 1776,mine warfare has been an important element of navalwarfare. The use of mines and countermeasures tomines has figured significantly in every major armedconflict and nearly every regional conflict in which theUnited States has been involved since the Revolution-ary War. Mine warfare has been increasingly importantand effective since World War I. Mines presently onthe world arms markets are relatively inexpensive, easyto procure, reliable and effective, and difficult for intel-ligence agencies to track. The mine, as a weapon sys-tem, has an extremely favorable investment return (costof mine to cost of damage ratio) for the miner.

Despite the logic and effectiveness of maintainingthe mine element of war at sea on an even footing withthe other naval warfighting specialties, throughout itshistory, the U.S. Navy has devoted proportionallyfewer resources to mine warfare. As a result, despite theemergence of the U.S. Navy as the world’s premiermaritime power whose individual warfighting capabili-ties generally are superior to those of other navies, itsmine countermeasure capabilities have lagged behind.

The old adage that those who will not learn the les-sons of history are doomed to repeat them has persis-tently applied to the mine warfare aspect of the U.S.Navy. North Arabian Gulf operations of the U.S. Navyin Desert Storm contain some bitter experiences, in-cluding the mission-aborting mine strikes to two majorwarships, as well as the controversy over the decisionnot to land U.S. Marines in Kuwait. Despite the unfor-tunate nature of the initial Desert Storm experience andthe need to recapture expertise in MCM, the U.S. Navyand Allied navies did have substantial success in coun-tering the nearly 1,300 naval mines deployed by theIraqis and emerged victorious in the MCM element ofDesert Storm warfighting as in the other aspects of thatwar.

This positive conclusion to the mine clearance cam-paign in the North Arabian Gulf was because of the un-paralleled material and logistics support from theDepartment of the Navy’s shore establishment and thecooperation of many allied nations in the coalition ef-fort. In addition to national support and multinationalcooperation, the enabling elements of this success werethe ability of the American Bluejacket to learn andadapt quickly, combined with good tactical commandin the fields. Of special note is that as the course of themine clearance campaign progressed, the Naval Com-ponent Command leadership came to understand, ap-preciate, and support the complex warfighting nature ofmine clearance operations.

1.2 KEY DEFINITIONS

Mine warfare uses many terms that, although theymay appear in other warfare areas, carry different ormore specific definitions when applied to mine war-fare. Additionally, there are terms used by Allied minewarfare forces that seem similar to U.S. terms but thatdiffer to some extent. Allied or coalition force opera-tions can be far more difficult when the forces and com-manders are not able to communicate freely because ofthe misunderstandings caused by different terminology.Therefore, it is important for the commander to becomefamiliar with the various terms that may be employedwhen discussing and planning mine warfare operations.

1-1 ORIGINAL

Appendix A contains terminology used in mine warfarethat is not defined in Joint Pub 1-02 or NWP 1-02.

1.2.1 Mine Warfare. MIW is defined as the strategicand tactical use of sea mines and their countermeasures.It includes all available offensive, defensive, and protec-tive measures for both laying and countering sea mines.As such, it encompasses the fields of designing, produc-ing, and laying mines, as well as the parallel efforts ofdesigning, producing, and operating all forms of MCMequipment to combat the enemy’s mining campaign.

1.2.2 Mining. Mining is one of the two distinct sub-divisions of mine warfare. Mining operations are usedto support the broad task of establishing and maintain-ing control of essential sea areas, and they embrace allmethods whereby naval mines are used to inflict dam-age on enemy shipping and/or hinder, disrupt, and denyenemy sea operations. Mines may be employed eitheroffensively or defensively to restrict the movement ofsurface ships, submarines, and underwater systems andpersonnel. Mines can be used alone to deny free access toand from ports, harbors, and rivers, as well as movementthrough SLOCs, and they can be used as a force multiplierto augment other military assets to reduce the enemy sur-face and submarine threat. A mining campaign is intendedto inflict damage on enemy ships that challenge the mine-field, thereby having an adverse effect on their defense,offensive operations, and logistics support efforts, but itcan also force the enemy into conducting a heavy MCMeffort that may exceed the magnitude of the mining opera-tion itself. Enemy ships kept at their base or deterred intransit by mining may be rendered as ineffective for theimmediate war efforts as if they were otherwise sunk ordestroyed. Further, delays in shipping may be as costly tothe enemy as actual losses. The threat posed by a mine-field may be real or it may only be perceived, but miningdoes have a significant psychological impact on the en-emy by forcing him to combat an unseen force.

1.2.3 Mine Countermeasures. MCM is the otherdistinct subdivision of mine warfare, and it includes alloffensive and defensive measures for countering amine threat, including the prevention of enemyminelaying. MCM is considered to be any action that istaken to counter the effectiveness of and/or reduce theprobability of damage to surface ships or submarinesfrom underwater mines.

1.3 MINE WARFARE FORCE ORGANIZATION

This section describes the operating forces for miningand MCM in the U.S. Navy. However, as the Service isdownsized, this organization will undergo a process ofconsolidation and change that may result in variation

from the organization as described. Complementary tothe following description of operating forces, Appen-dix B provides a discussion of the program manage-ment organization responsible for establishment ofrequirements, budget, and program plans associatedwith staffing, training, and maintenance for MIW ships,aircraft, and systems. Appendix B also describes thetraining and technical support organization, which per-forms a critical role in enabling MIW forces to operatesuccessfully.

CINCLANTFLT is the administrative and opera-tional commander for the MIW forces. When MCMsupport is required by other fleet commanders,CINCLANTFLT directs COMINEWARCOM to pro-vide forces as necessary.

CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT, and CINCUS-NAVEUR each have operational control over mobilemine assembly group units or detachments and themine stocks located in their areas of responsibility.

COMINEWARCOM is responsible to CINCLANT-FLT for the training, tactics, interoperability, and readi-ness of MIW forces. These forces are required to beprepared to deploy on short notice with sufficient forcelevels and capabilities to support two major regionalcontingency operations in any combatant commander’sarea of responsibility.

COMINEWARCOM is also assigned as technicaladviser to CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT, CINCUS-NAVEUR, and SACLANT and provides technical ad-vice to NATO and Allied countries when directed.

1.3.1 Mining. The COMINEWARCOM Staff con-ducts minefield planning and prepares MFPF as re-quested by naval component commanders. MFPF maycontain numerous possible minefields that a com-mander may select according to the intended purpose ofthe minelaying operation.

COMINEWARCOM also advises naval componentcommanders on the requirements for prepositioned minestocks to execute approved MFPF and recommends re-distribution of mine stocks as necessary when new plansare developed or variations in the stockpile occur.

Tactical minefield planners are those personnel onnumbered fleet staffs, battle group staffs, and air wingstaffs who may tailor plans from a MFPF to fit the spe-cific mission needs of a commander or may generatenew minefield plans where no appropriate plan is avail-able in a MFPF. These personnel are not dedicated plan-ners, but they have been trained by attending necessary

ORIGINAL 1-2

courses at the Fleet Mine Warfare Training Center andthey perform planning as a collateral duty.

COMOMAG is under the operational and adminis-trative control of COMINEWARCOM but also reportsfor additional duty to CINCLANTFLT, CINCPAC-FLT, and CINCUSNAVEUR. COMOMAG is respon-sible for maintaining the highest standards of minematerial readiness and, when directed by the appropri-ate war plan execution authority, assembling and com-pleting final preparation of service mines.

In performance of this mission, COMOMAG main-tains permanently staffed Mobile Mine Assemblygroup units and detachments at mine storage sitesaround the world (see Figure 1-1) who monitor readi-ness of mine stocks, prepare mines for shipment, andconduct assembly and final preparation of mines. Mo-bile teams from these sites are capable of rapid deploy-ment to afloat units or other mine sites when necessaryto support mining operations. CINCLANTFLT,CINCPACFLT, and CINCUSNAVEUR have opera-tional control of the MOMAG units and detachments intheir area of operations, whereas administrative controlbelongs to COMOMAG.

There are no dedicated mining assets in the U.S.Navy. (A limited capability for surface laying of minesis described in Chapter 2.) A minelaying mission is as-signed to several types of Navy aircraft and some sub-marines. Some Air Force B-52s are also capable of

mine laying. For a breakdown of aircraft and submarinetypes and capabilities, refer to Chapter 2.

A limited mine recovery capability exists inCharleston, SC, under the command of EOD MobileUnit Six. This capability is specifically intended to sup-port recovery of exercise and training mines at theCharleston OPAREA Mine Range. This range is one ofonly two locations on the east coast where minelayingtraining and certification can be performed. The otherlocation is in the Puerto Rico OPAREA, where recov-ery is supported by assets from the Naval Station, Roo-sevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, augmented by EODdetachments from EODGRU TWO. In the PacificFleet, ET mine location, scoring, and recovery servicesare provided at the Pacific Missile Test Center Rangeby detachments assigned to EODMU THREE. Detach-ment Point Mugu has primary responsibility and is aug-mented by a Mk 5 MMS detachment. In addition to thelocation and tethering for recovery of ET mines config-ured for MMS, the Mk 5 MMS detachment has the ca-pability to conduct similar missions to a depth of 500feet at remote sites throughout the Pacific. Configura-tion for the Mk 5 MMS involves designated attachmentpoints and installed 9-kHz and 37-kHz pingers. Surfacecraft support and actual mine shape recovery are con-ducted by contracted services.

1.3.2 MCM. The COMINEWARCOM Staff con-ducts MCM force deployment planning, MCM opera-tions planning and analysis, and exercise planning and

1-3 ORIGINAL

CINCUSNAVEURLondon, UK

OPERATIONAL CONTROL

ADMIN CONTROL

MOMAG UNIT 12Misawa, Japan

MOMAG UNIT 11Charleston, SC

MOMAG UNIT 3Earle, NJ

COMOMAGCHARLESTON, SC

MOMAG UNIT 14Yorktown, VA

MOMAG UNIT 15Kingsville, TX

MOMAG UNIT 5Sigonella, Italy

CINCLANTFLTNorfolk, VA

MOMAG UNIT 8Guam

MOMAG UNIT 1Seal Beach, CA

CINCPACFLTPearl Harbor, HI

MOMAG Det 7Barbers Pt, HI

MOMAG UNIT 10Kadena, Okinawa

Figure 1-1. Mine Storage and Preparation

analysis. Staff intelligence personnel monitor the col-lection and analysis of intelligence on MEW capabili-ties throughout the world. Staff requirements personnelconduct liaison with type and operational commandersand with supporting organizations to determine un-filled operational needs and prepare mission need state-ments for unfilled requirements.

Operations personnel, in addition to planning opera-tions and exercises, review tactics and doctrine seekingto maximize integration of MIW forces into fleet opera-tions and maximize the effectiveness of MCM forces.

As shown in Figure 1-2, Commander, Regional Sup-port Group Ingleside (additional duty of COMINE-WARCOM) is assigned administrative control oversurface MCM forces, including SIMA Ingleside.COMNAVSURFLANT is the type commander for sur-face MCM units, performing all type commander du-ties except for scheduling. The COMINEWARCOMStaff Operations Officer maintains scheduling author-ity of MCM forces.

COMCMRON ONE is responsible for planning andexecuting MCM exercises and operations as directed byCOMINEWARCOM. COMCMRON ONE focuses onMCM planning for the Pacific theater, although opera-tional assignment may be to any theater. COMCMRONONE is assigned operational control of MCM 1 Classand MHC 51 Class ships as necessary for intermediate oradvanced training and for participation in exercises orreal world operations. COMCMRON ONE also has op-erational control over Helicopter MCM Squadron Fif-teen (HM-15) and west coast EODMCM detachments(see Figure 1-2). Administrative control of HM-15 is as-signed to COMNAVAIRPAC. Administrative controlof west coast EODMCM detachments is assigned to theparent EOD Mobile Unit under COMEODGRU ONE.

COMCMRON TWO has the same responsibilitiesas COMCMRON ONE with a focus on the Atlantic andMediterranean theaters and is assigned operationalcontrol of HM-14, east coast EODMCM detachments,and MCM or MHC ships as necessary. Administrativecontrol of HM-14 is assigned to COMNAVAIRLANT,and administrative control of EODMCM detachmentsremains with their parent EOD Mobile Unit underCOMEODGRU TWO.

COMINEWARCOM, under COMNAVSURF-LANT, has administrative control over all MHC andMCM class ships and operational control over allMCM and MHC class ships that have not been assignedto one of the other squadrons.

MCM assets that have completed all basic phasetraining requirements may be assigned to COMSEC-ONDFLT or COMTHIRDFLT for participation in fleetlevel exercises or support of the numbered fleet com-mander’s operational requirements. This assignmentwill usually be made as an integrated task unit includ-ing an MCM squadron commander.

EOD is a critical aspect of modern MCM forces.EODMCM detachments are specially trained andequipped with nonmagnetic, low-acoustic signatureequipment that permits them to approach influencemines safely and perform identification, destruction, orrender-safe and recovery operations.

In the Atlantic Fleet, six EOD detachments areassigned to EODMU SIX, and two MCM detachmentsare assigned to EODMU EIGHT. Additionally, there isone EOD MMS detachment with a mine recovery mis-sion (Mk 5) assigned to EODMU SIX. Administra-tive/operational control of the EODMCM detachmentsat EODMU EIGHT remain with EODMU EIGHT, un-der COMEODGRU TWO (ADCON) and CINCUS-NAVEUR (OPCON). Other Atlantic Fleet EODMCMand EOD MMS detachments ADCON remain withtheir parent mobile units, and OPCON is assigned toCOMINEWARCOM. In the Pacific Fleet, two EOD-MCM detachments each are assigned to EODMUELEVEN and EODMU FIVE, and three EODMCMdetachments are assigned to EODMU THREE. Addi-tionally, there are two EOD MMS detachments (Mk 4 andMk 7) with MCM missions assigned to EODMU THREE.Administrative/operational control of the EODMCM de-tachments at EODMU FIVE remain with EODMU FIVE,under COMEODGRU ONE (ADCON) and CTF-76(OPCON). Other Pacific Fleet EODMCM and EOD MMSdetachments ADCON remain with their parent mobileunits and OPCON is assigned to COMINEWARCOM.

NSW forces are responsible for conducting MCM inthe VSW/SZ) regions in support of amphibious opera-tions. NSW forces are not routinely included within theMCM force chain of command. When an ATF is assem-bled, the NSW forces assigned to the CATF will includeSEAL teams capable of conducting the VSW/SZ MCMmission. SEAL teams maintain one platoon trained inconducting VSW/SZ MCM and capable of integratingwith other team members to execute the MCM mission.

The Commanders, MARDEZ Atlantic and Pacific areresponsible for MIW planning within the MARDEZ.MARDEZ sector and subsector commanders participatein preparation of MIW plans and monitor MCM opera-tions but do not have permanently assigned MIW assets.In wartime, COMSECONDFLT or COMTHIRDFLT

ORIGINAL 1-4

1-5 ORIGINAL

REGSUPPGRU INGLESIDE*COMINEWARCOM

COMNAVSURFLANT

MCM 1 (NRF)MCM 2 (NRF)MCM 3MCM 4MCM 5MCM 6MCM 7MCM 8MCM 9MCM 10MCM 11MCM 12MCM 13MCM 14

MHC 51MHC 52 (NRF)MHC 53 (NRF)MHC 54 (NRF)MHC 55 (NRF)MHC 56 (NRF)MHC 57 (NRF)MHC 58 (NRF)MHC 59 (NRF)MHC 60 (NRF)MHC 61 (NRF)MHC 62 (NRF)

SIMAINGLESIDE

MCS 12(NRF)

MINESEARCH-RON 1 (NRF)

SAMDET

CINCLANTFLT CINCPACFLT

(MCM SUPPORTAS REQUIRED)

COMINEWARCOM

COMCMRON 1 COMCMRON 2

SHIPSAS ASSIGNED

**HELMINERON 15

***EODMU 33 MCM DETS2 MMS DET

***EODMU 113 MCM DETS

***EODMU 66 MCM DETS

**HELMINERON 14

*

*****

COMINEWARCOM reports to CINCLANTFLT but also serves asCOMREGSUPPGRU Ingleside. SMCM scheduling authority isCOMINEWARCOM N3.ADCON for HM-14 and HM-15 is COMNAVAIRLANT/PACADCON for EOD Dets is COMEODGRU 1 or 2 via parent EODMU

SHIPSAS ASSIGNED

OPERATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE

Figure 1-2. MCM Operational Forces

will delegate control of mining or MCM forces as nec-essary (and if available) to support the MARDEZcommanders.

1.3.3 Naval Reserve Forces. NRFs have playedan important role in MIW for many years. From theearly 1970s until the end of the 1980s, the majority ofthe SMCM force was assigned to the NRF. Due largelyto the role of mines in the Iran-Iraq War and OperationEarnest Will, as the MCM 1 Class ships replacedMSOs, they have remained in the active force. TheMHC 51 Class was designated to be commissioned inthe active force and transfer after 1 year to NRF statusto maintain an active-reserve mix. As of October 1994,the planned active-reserve mix of ships is 10 active to 4NRF MCM 1 Class ships and 1 active to 11 NRF MHC51 Class ships. Additionally, the MCS 12 will be as-signed to NRF status when conversion is complete.

The Naval Reserve also plays a role in the AMCMand EODMCM force. HM-14 and HM-15 each have areserve component of pilots and maintenance person-nel. Of the 12 aircraft assigned to each squadron, 6 be-long to the active squadron and 6 belong to the NRForganization. NRF EOD forces are composed of fourreserve units: EODMU TEN and EODMU TWELVEunder COMEODGRU TWO, and EODMU SEVENand EODMU SEVENTEEN under COMEODGRUONE. Each reserve unit trains and provides administra-tive support for three different types of detachment:OCDs are fully qualified in diving and demolition pro-cedures and are trained to locate, identify, and disposeof sea mines. ASDs use side-scan sonar systems to lo-cate minelike objects underwater. MCDs provide fullymobile communications capability in support of fleetoperations and exercises.

Another Naval Reserve program that supports MIWis the MSS and MSU. The MSS is an administrativestaff consisting of reservists on active duty (TARs) whomanage the staffing and training of MSUs. Along withother missions, an MSU trains in the operation ofside-scan sonar systems for mine hunting alongQ-routes or in harbor approaches where small craft canoperate. The craft used by these units may be Navy as-sets or commercial assets contracted for the purpose.This program replaced the COOP in 1994.

Naval Reserve units are also used to augment thecommand and control structure for MIW. COMINE-WARCOM has a reserve staff detachment available foraugmentation when needed, and NRF Mine DivisionStaffs have supported Mine Squadron Staffs. As thearmed forces are reduced in size, the NRF staff struc-ture is also expected to be reduced.

1.4 NATO/ALLIED COALITION ANDCOOPERATION

In almost any foreseeable MIW operation of signifi-cance, U.S. Navy MIW forces can expect to be operatingside by side with NATO and/or other Allied forces. Suchcoalition type operations could even include MCMforces of the former Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact.

1.4.1 Operations. Each of the NATO/Allied MIWservices brings its own strengths into combined opera-tions. Whenever multinational forces operate together,many different types of MIW vessels with varying sys-tems and degrees of readiness will be encountered.These may include sweepers, surface drones, hunters,divers, AMCM helicopters, remote underwater vehi-cles, hull-mounted and variable depth sonars, side-scansonars, underwater vehicles with ahead-looking sonars,and utility helicopters. (For a brief description ofNATO/Allied MCM assets, see paragraph 3.7.1.) If theoperation is being conducted as a NATO operation,NATO doctrine, procedures, command structure, andcommunications techniques will be used. In situationssuch as the 1987-88 Operation Earnest Will in the PersianGulf, several nations’ MCM forces (all of whom weremembers of NATO) were operating in the same area witha common mission, but not under a combined commandstructure. The forces used NATO procedures and doctrineand resolved potential conflicts by close communicationsbetween all nations concerned. Future multinationalMCM operations may include Partnership for Peace na-vies or Allies from the Pacific theater who are not mem-bers of NATO. MCM doctrine is currently beingdeveloped in NATO that takes into account operationswith almost any free world navy. As more exercises andreal world operations that include multinational forces oc-cur, fewer interoperability problems can be expected.

1.4.2 Non-NATO Operations. COMINEWARCOMhas made recommendations to the Navy InternationalPrograms Office (IPO-10) on how to sanitize the NWP3-15 (formerly NWP 27) series of MIW publications forrelease to foreign nations. The sanitization instructionsare written at three different levels: NATO plus Japanand Australia, Allied nations, and Third World nations.NAVIPO does not automatically provide these sanitizedpublications to foreign navies. A foreign governmentmust ask for the publications and must pay for them.Therefore, a battle group commander who wishes to uti-lize these sanitized NWP 3-15 series publications to con-duct Mine Warfare operations with a foreign navy mustensure that the foreign navy requests the publicationsfrom NAVIPO (IPO 10) or that the Battle Group Com-mander makes the request. In many cases, the actualsanitization has not been done by NAVIPO. In that

ORIGINAL 1-6

case, the battle group commander may receive in-struction from NAVIPO on how to sanitize the spe-cific publications.

1.4.3 Doctrine. NATO MIW doctrine is delineatedin ATP 6 and ATP 24. This is the doctrine that all NATOnavies, including the U.S. Navy, will follow duringNATO operations or exercises. Almost every NATO na-tion has a national annex to ATP 24 that may contain vari-ations in the standard doctrine or specifics on nationalsystems not released to all nations. U.S. national doctrineis very similar in many ways to the NATO doctrine. Theonly variations in doctrine may stem from differences inforce capabilities (e.g., availability of AMCM forces) ordifferent geographically driven missions. The NWP 3-15series is the primary doctrine for U.S. Navy MCM andmining forces. The U.S. MCM Commander must be pre-pared to operate exclusively within NATO doctrine andprocedures and to explain to NATO counterparts whenU.S. Navy forces will deviate or operate apart from theNATO doctrine because of national concerns. This sameprocedure is currently followed by other NATO navieswhen national concerns become paramount.

1.4.4 Support Organizations. Within the NATOorganization there are working groups, planninggroups, IEGs, PGs, and AGs. Written agreementswhich foster cooperative development of MIW tech-niques, tactics, and systems focus the combined knowl-edge of the participants on the shortcomings of existingMine Warfare systems and capabilities.

The bilateral (Belgium/The Netherlands) Mine War-fare School (Eguermin) at Oostende, Belgium, func-tions as a center for NATO MIW training. Eguermin isused by U.S. forces as well and is closely linked withU.S. MIW training facilities.

The MWWP was established to initiate, develop,and process proposals for military standardization, in-cluding tactics, tactical instructions, and procedures inthe field of MIW. The MWWP brings Mine Warfareparticipants together annually to discuss issues of com-mon concern in mining, MCM, training, equipment,support, command, control, and communications. Thishas been a key component of the successes achieved byNATO MIW forces, although each may have beenworking under specific national directives. Currently,the MWWP is organized with three panels: opera-tional/tactical, technical, and exercise evaluation.

DEAs generally are bilateral diplomatic toolswhereby agreement is made to exchange certain data formutual military purposes. Unlike general agreements,the DEAs are negotiated between countries or groups of

countries for specific types of information. There arefew general DEAs in existence. Frequently, newly ob-tained data and information can be exchanged rapidlywhen a DEA is in place.

1.5 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OFMINE WARFARE

1.5.1 Hague Convention. The Hague Convention(VIII) of 1907 probably had more of a legal impact onMIW than any other forum. The attendees at this con-vention placed international restrictions on the use ofdrifting mines, established various guidelines that af-fected automatic contact mines, and set forth require-ments for the incorporation of sterilization and/orself-destruct features in mines. The following specificprovisions were laid down by this Hague Convention:

1. Armed, unanchored mines must have a maxi-mum life of 1 hour.

2. Armed, anchored mines must become unarmedif they break free from their moorings.

3. Mines must be designed to become harmlessshould they miss their target.

4. It is illegal to mine solely against commercialshipping.

5. Neutral nations are not to be interfered with, andthe safe transit of neutral shipping must beensured.

6. Mines must be removed by the planting force atthe conclusion of hostilities.

The specific international laws set forth during theHague Convention remain in effect today; however,they have not been always been adhered to by all na-tions, and world events have seen major deviationsfrom these principles. Although the United States didnot ratify the Hague Convention, we have alwaysabided by its restrictions and principles.

1.5.2 Other Legal Aspects. Both offensive anddefensive mining operations are considered to be actsof war. The intent of these mining operations is to in-flict damage to or restrict the transit of enemy shipping.Protective mining conducted within a nation’s own wa-ters is not considered an act of war as long as the neces-sary notifications to shipping are made through theappropriate channels.

The Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1972 prohibitedthe use of mass destruction weapons that are attached to

1-7 ORIGINAL

the ocean floor beyond a 12-mile coastal zone. Thistreaty applies to the use of nuclear warheads in eitherbottom or moored mines since they are designed to re-main in place after they are armed. U.S. policy on theemployment of naval mines is addressed in chapter 9 ofNWP 1-14 (formerly NWP 9), and in chapter 1 ofNWP 3-15.5 (formerly NWP 27-4).

1.6 MINE WARFARE/POLITICAL INTERFACE(INTELLIGENCE AND WARNINGS)

History is well endowed with peacetime, wartime,and low-intensity conflict MIW incidents ranging fromthreat alone to large-scale mining campaigns. Appen-dix C provides a synopsis of MIW history to illustratethe place of MIW in overall military-politicalperspective.

The intelligence data available plays a crucial role indetermining the effectiveness of mining and MCMplanning and operations. Without knowledge of poten-tial mining events or the MCM capability of a potentialenemy, mining and MCM planners are likely to prepareineffective plans that may place delivery assets, MCMassets, or transiting commercial and naval ships at risk.Mining and MCM planning are based on a significantnumber of assumptions even in the best of situations;therefore every effort should be made to reduce theseassumptions and protect the expenditure of critical re-sources. All information and data requested by a plan-ning staff should be made available to the maximumextent possible and as quickly as possible.

1.6.1 Threat. To the miner, knowledge of the threatmeans knowing what the minelayer must face in perform-ing his mission and knowing what MCM forces may beused to counter the minefield. To the MCM planner,knowledge of the threat means knowing what types ofmines were available to or used by the layer, as well as theavailable operating selections of those mines. U.S. MCMforces have no defensive ability against other threats.

The MCM commander must be able to brief militaryand political authorities on the MIW threat so that theycan balance the final risks and goals against the realizationof that threat. No threat can be discounted as insignificantto the MCM force or the transiting assets. Even primitiveweapons can bring havoc and mission- abort situations tomodern forces. The threat is always the explosive capabil-ity of the weapon without regard for the packaging.

1.6.2 Movement of Forces. An essential elementof intelligence information in MIW is movement offorces. Consider the miner: movement of certain of hisforces may indicate pending or imminent deployment of

mines. If mines and the laying forces are not collocated,the miner must plan the logistic support and timing toget the mines to the minelayer, and this time can be ex-ploited by the opposition if movement is detected.

MCM forces are typically slow transiters who re-quire significant support to remain at sea. They are notcommonly found with a battle group unless an MCMaction is planned. Therefore, the movement of MCMforces may be an indicator of a planned amphibiouslanding or SLOC choke point penetration.

Political will must be exercised on either side inthese cases. Forward deployment of MCM forces maybe sufficient to determine or complicate and thwart amining plan. Early movement by miners may be suffi-cient to permit national authorities to justify offensiveMCM against vessels at sea or shore facilities.

1.6.3 Delay Arming. Delay arming features allowthe miner to conduct operations and leave the area priorto the arming of weapons. This can permit actions to beconducted prior to the acknowledged beginning of hos-tilities or operations. The threat may exist long before itis recognized by conventional forces because the minerdetermines when the threat becomes valid. Addi-tionally, arming delays can and will complicate opera-tions for the MCM forces because environmentalfactors and operational factors can then require arecommitment of critical assets to an area otherwise be-lieved to be safe. Delay arming cannot be discounted inany operational scenario until proof exists that no suchfeatures were used by the opposing force.

Recent history has emphasized that the threat may beoutside of international law or convention, hence thesaying “ a mine in the water has no loyalty.”

1.7 MINE WARFARE INTERFACE WITHOTHER WARFARE SPECIALTIES

1.7.1 Mine Warfare Coordinator. To improvethe interface between MIW and other warfare special-ties, a MIWC was added to the CWC’s organization.Following are the roles of the MIWC:

1. To act as the single point of contact for MIW

2. To provide recommendations to the CWC andother warfare commanders and coordinators

3. To provide guidance on how MIW operations fitinto theater operations of the fleet commander.

The MIWC shall also perform the following tasks:

ORIGINAL 1-8

1. Make recommendations to assist in establishingforce disposition in the presence of a mine threat

2. Coordinate requests for all nonorganic miningand MCM support

3. Evaluate the implications of enemy mine war-fare operations and recommend appropriateMCM operations

4. Coordinate with the ASWC on all defensiveminefield planning matters

5. Coordinate the employment of tactical air assetsin mining with the STWC

6. Ensure that mining operations are conducted inaccordance with international law

7. Designate MDAs

8. Maintain the status of all force MIW capabilities

9. Coordinate obtaining oceanographic support formining operations.

The MIWC maintains an OPTASK MIW Supple-ment to communicate general procedures and instruc-tions to other forces inside and outside the CWCorganization as necessary.

1.7.2 Strike Warfare. STW capable aircraft are akey element in many mining plans. The MIWC pro-vides recommendations to the CWC for employment ofstrike assets to conduct mining that will support CWCobjectives. If approved, the minelaying planning andexecution are then carried out by the STWC and StrikeOperations Department on board the CV.

STW assets are also employed in conducting offensiveMCM. Reconnaissance conducted by tactical aircraft mayidentify movement of mine assets or minelayers, indicat-ing mining is imminent. The MIWC monitors intelligencedata and provides offensive MCM targeting recommen-dations to the STW and CWC early in the conflict.

1.7.3 Special Operations. Special operationsforces are involved in both offensive and defensiveMCM. In certain situations, special operations forcesmay be chosen to conduct raids to cripple or destroy op-position force mine storage sites and mine stocks. Theirability to conduct small-scale raids with accuracy andlimited collateral damage may be preferred in somecases over tactical air strikes or TLAM strikes. In thedefensive MCM role, NSW forces conduct beach recon-

naissance in advance of an amphibious landing to de-termine whether a mine threat is present. When minesare encountered, the NSW force is responsible for mineclearance in the very shallow water and surf zones.NSW forces work together with EODMCM, AMCM,and SMCM forces to develop coordinated tactics forconducting MCM in support of amphibious operations.

1.7.4 Surface Warfare. MCM forces interface withASUW forces in several ways. In situations where nolarge deck MCM command ship is available, a surfacecombatant may serve as the flagship for the MCM com-mander and provide support to surface MCMVs. Largerships (e.g. CGs) are well equipped as command plat-forms and can accommodate the MCM Commander’sstaff. ASUW forces can provide protection from variousthreats to MCM forces, as well as some logistic support.They also may be tasked to provide ASUW helicoptersto transport EOD forces and conduct spotting for minescut by mechanical sweep operations or drifting mines.MCM forces conduct reconnaissance of ASUW ship op-erating areas when mining is suspected and, if necessary,clear operating areas for ASUW ships to conduct patroloperations or fire support operations.

1.7.5 Antisubmarine Warfare. ASW forces mayemploy protective minefields (laid by air assets) as barri-ers to assist in controlling the submarine threat. The CAP-TOR mine can be used alone or in conjunction with othermines in this role. ASW forces will support the MCMforce by maintaining reconnaissance in their area of oper-ations for minelaying assets or the existence of mine-fields. Some ASW sonars can also be employed for minedetection and avoidance. They permit the ASW ship tooperate with an increased degree of safety in waters wherethe mine threat has not been determined, allowing the shipto detect moored mines and avoid transiting through amined area. The ASW ship’s helicopter can supportMCM forces by providing transportation to EODMCMforces and conducting aerial surveillance.

1.7.6 Antiair Warfare. The interface between MIWforces and AAW forces is limited to the protection roleAAW ships and aircraft perform. MCM forces, both sur-face and air, are not equipped for self-defense. If anyhostile air threat exists, it is necessary for AAW forces tobe assigned to counter that threat and permit MCMforces to operate. Considering the small size of theMCM force, even the loss of one ship or helicopter canbe critical to completion of the MCM mission.

1.7.7 Amphibious Warfare. MCM forces havehistorically operated in close support of amphibious op-erations when conducting an opposed landing. The mineis one of the cheapest weapons that can be employed

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against an invading sea force, and the presence ofmines without a sufficient capability to counter themcan result in significant losses to the AMW force orcancellation of landing operations.

Early, detailed requirements should be provided bythe supported commander for amphibious operations(e.g., CATF) to the MCM Commander to facilitateplanning. MCM considerations include the size of theAOA in comparison to the available MCM assets, slowMCM ship transit times to the AOA, the rate of MCMoperations required to meet established deadlines, andrequirements to protect MCM operations against hos-tile threats (including the use of OPSEC and OPDEC).Enemy observation of friendly MCM operations maycompromise tactical surprise. In addition to conven-tional MCM forces, NSW forces are employed in am-phibious operations to locate, destroy, and/or neutralizeenemy barriers, obstacles, or minefields placed in or onthe shallow water approaches to the landing beaches.

Large-deck, aviation-capable amphibious ships arefrequently assigned to embark and support MCM forcesof all types. Although Marine forces are displaced, theLPH and LPD have both been used extensively as MCMsupport ships, with the MCM commander, AMCM heli-copters, and EODMCM detachments embarked and pro-viding logistic support to surface MCM vessels.

During MCM operations in support of amphibiousoperations the CLF will also supply assets to be used inthe shallow water/surf zone MCM effort, such as com-bat engineers, tank plows, bulldozers, etc.

1.7.8 Maritime Interdiction Operations/LawEnforcement Operations. MIO/LEO forces arelikely targets for mining and should remain alert for in-dications of mine laying. The use of passive MCM ex-plained in Chapter 4 should be reviewed and employedwhere appropriate. When inspecting transiting mer-chants, it is important to note any cargo and handling orpacking equipment that might have been used in trans-porting or laying mines. If mining has occurred or is ex-pected, MIO/LEO forces should be supported by MCMforces to establish safe operating areas, anchorages,and transit lanes.

1.7.9 Salvage Forces. Salvage forces not engagedin salvage operations may be called on to support MCMforces by providing an operating platform forEODMCM divers. Any salvage vessels that have an in-stalled recompression chamber will be considered forsupport to EOD divers who may require emergencyrecompression. If an MCS is present and has an installedrecompression chamber, it may also be used to supportsalvage forces. MCM forces are frequently called on to

assist in initial location of aircraft, boats, or other assetsthat have been lost so that salvage forces can conductrecovery operations. The minehunting sonars on MCM1 and MHC 51 Class ships and the side-scan sonar usedby AMCM are excellent for locating bottom objects,and the AN/SLQ-48 MNS can be used to make positiveidentification on objects much deeper than divers canoperate.

1.7.10 Command and Control Warfare. C2Wis essentially an employer of MIW forces. The threat ofmining or the ready availability of MCM forces can beused to influence an enemy’s command and control.Placing a CV into position has significant impact on theenemy’s decision-making because of the STW capabil-ity resident within the CV, including mining. In the samemanner, deployment of MCM forces or prepositioningof MCM forces in a theater reduces the potential impactof opposition mining and may result in a decision not tocommit a hostile mining action. Additionally, C2W mayplay a part in the defense of minelaying forces by provid-ing both early warning against opposition forces andcover by jamming air defenses. For the MCM mission,the primary interface is via the information flow fromC2W sensors, which might indicate mining in progress.This information is normally channeled through the in-telligence community for analysis and then passed to thetheater or battle group commander as an indicator of theneed for MCM effort.

1.7.11 Fleet Exercises. MCM forces are integratedwith battle group training exercises whenever possible.For inport training exercises, participation may be limitedto MCM squadron staff members, either on-scene or froma remote location. During fleet exercises, MCM forcesmay participate in the scenario by transiting to the exer-cise operation area or by establishing a scripted geo-graphic area near the MCMV homeport of Ingleside, TX.The MCM staff can conduct exercises in this area andtransmit information with coordinates converted to matchthe geography of the fleet exercise area. Since MCM op-erations frequently occur out of sight of the battle group,this type of participation saves fuel and transit time with-out sacrificing significant aspects of the interface betweenthe MCM and the battle group.

1.8 MINE WARFARE/JOINT INTERFACE

1.8.1 Army-Navy. The Army is responsible forconducting most mine development, minefield planning,and MCM on land, although the Marines share some re-sponsibility. The Navy responsibility ends at the land-ward limit of the craft landing zone along sea shores, butextends inland where waters are navigable from the sea.Where navigation is no longer possible by seagoingvessels, Navy responsibility ends. However, when a

ORIGINAL 1-10

mining situation exists, the Joint Force Commanderwill be primarily concerned with capability, not respon-sibility. If Navy assets are capable of conducting MCMin a waterway where Army craft need to navigate, it islikely they will be directed to clear the mines. Theriverine MIW operations in Vietnam are a primeexample.

The Army has a tremendous amount of material thathas to be moved to support overseas operations such asOperation Desert Storm. The majority of this materialmust be moved by sealift ships belonging or under con-tract to MSC. To support the rapid buildup of forcesnormally desired in an overseas conflict, the loading,transit, and unloading of these ships must follow a tightschedule. A mining threat either in CONUS, atchokepoints along the SLOCs, or at the offload port candelay or completely halt the movement of material.U.S. Navy MCM forces (and MCM forces from NATOor Allied nations if involved) will be tasked by the JointForce Commander to clear channels and anchoragesand to maintain them to permit the free flow of traffic.EODMCM forces may also be tasked to clear and assistin maintaining safe harbors for off-loading of shipping.

1.8.2 Air Force-Navy. The Air Force plays two im-portant roles in supporting MIW forces (in addition topotentially supporting offensive MCM). The first roleplayed by Air Force assets is the laying of mines byB-52 aircraft. The B-52 can carry the largest mine loadof any U.S. aircraft and can deliver mines at long dis-tances from CONUS or other bases. B-52s may play acritical role in accomplishing mining plans directed forexecution by joint commands.

The second is the Air Mobility Command’s supportof deployment of AMCM and EODMCM forces and thecontinuing delivery of critical repair parts via AMC air-craft. Even in a situation where all MCM forces deployby surface lift, rapid delivery of critical repair parts iscrucial to maintain MCM force readiness for operations.

1.8.3 Marine Corps-Navy. The interface of MarineCorps assets and MCM forces is to some extent the sameas that described for its interface with the Army. Rapiddeployment of USMC forces other than those alreadyembarked on amphibious shipping is accomplished byairlift of the personnel to a location where they can beunited with equipment stored on MPSRON ships. In thesame manner as MSC shipping carrying Army material,the MPSRON ships must be provided clear channels,safe anchorages, and harbors in which to unload theirmaterial. In some situations the MPSRON ships will jointhe amphibious ships and be supported by MCM forcesto establish a landing beach and move assets ashore.

1.8.4 Coast Guard-Navy. During peacetime, theCoast Guard is part of the Department of Transporta-tion and yet maintains a significant degree of interfacewith the Navy through the MARDEZ organization. TheCommanders, MARDEZ Atlantic and Pacific are CoastGuard Admirals, and there are Coast Guard officers onmany Navy staffs to maintain the MARDEZ structureand interface with the Navy. These officers usually aregraduates of MIW training courses. As the MARDEZmission expands into deployable port control andcoastal shipping management and control, the interfacewith Navy MCM commands will increase.

Coast Guard assets are frequently involved in exer-cises where mining and MCM are included. Liaisonwith the local Coast Guard captain of the port is neces-sary for loading or unloading exercise mines at CoastGuard bases or commercial docks. Establishment of ex-ercise minefields in areas that are not regular NavyOPAREAs requires coordination with the local CoastGuard command.

In the past, when the mission to conduct route sur-veys in all U.S. ports was active, a Coast Guard officerwas assigned to the COMINEWARCOM staff to facili-tate cooperation between Coast Guard assets and Navysurvey teams. Coast Guard buoy tenders have been andmay be used to conduct survey operations in a numberof scenarios using portable side-scan sonar equipment.They could also be used again if the route survey mis-sion were to be reactivated.

In wartime, when the Coast Guard operates underthe Department of the Navy, route survey and supportof MCM forces conducting operations in CONUS willlikely be supported to a major degree by Coast Guardassets.

1.9 RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

ROE are directive guidance that authorize and delin-eate the circumstances and limitations on the use offorce. ROE are generally mission-oriented and actionspecific. ROE promulgated by the Theater Commanderare based on guidance provided by the NCA throughthe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This guidancereflects political, legal, operational, and diplomatic fac-tors that may restrict combat operations. ROE are re-quired throughout the operational continuum to ensurecompliance with the laws of war and NCA guidance.Combatant commander pre- and post-hostility ROEand OPLAN ROE should address authority to place ob-stacles and mines, including the FASCAM. FollowingNCA release of these elements for operations, ROEshould address their employment by U.S. forces and the

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prevention, denial, or countering of their employmentby the enemy.

1.9.1 Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance operationsto identify potential mine storage sites, minelayer move-ments, and restriction of traffic within national waterspresent circumstances that require special ROE. Forunits conducting reconnaissance in international wa-ters, ROE will define the permissible conduct of theunit upon encountering forces of a hostile or neutral na-tion. The execution of MCM reconnaissance operationsmay require the MCM force to operate in proximity toor inside an adversary’s territorial waters. ROE will beused to specify the permissible conduct of both theMCM force and protective forces.

1.9.2 NATO/Allied Rules of Engagement Inter-face. When control of a U.S. mining or MCM force orasset is assigned to a NATO commander, it must con-form to ROE established by the NATO command struc-ture. However, there may be occasions when U.S.forces will operate with or in support of NATO orAllied country forces, but control will not be passed to theNATO command. In this situation, the U.S. forces mustconform to U.S. ROE until otherwise directed by the U.S.command authority. Ideally, in a combined or coalition

force operation or exercise, all forces will operate underthe same ROE. When this is not the case, lines of com-munication must be established to permit the speedyresolution of issues that arise concerning conflict be-tween intended operations and ROE. The most impor-tant aspect of coalition operations is that the alliesunderstand U.S. ROE and that the U.S. commanderknows the ROE of other nations to employ all availableassets effectively.

1.9.3 Rules of Engagement Interface with War-fare Specialties Supporting Forces. As forcesfrom different branches of a command structure are as-signed to work in supporting roles without a change incontrolling authority, conflicts in ROE may arise.Mining or MCM forces may not be issued a relaxationof ROE that is approved for protecting C2W, specialoperations, or STW forces. Considerable confusion canresult when two units operating together have differentROE and are not aware of the situational differences.For this reason, it is important to keep supporting andsupported units advised of any changes in ROE. It maybe necessary to review and compare ROE when newforces are assigned and when missions are changed.

ORIGINAL 1-12

CHAPTER 2

Mining

2.1 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGESOF MINING OPERATIONS

2.1.1 Advantages. Mining operations are distin-guished from other naval operations in that mine-fields can inflict major, long-term damage on enemyshipping while allowing little or no chance for retal-iatory action against the minelaying forces. Mines liein wait for their target. Mining permits enemy ship-ping to be attacked without the necessity for a directconfrontation between the delivery vehicle and thetarget ship. Since the delivery vehicle does not haveto directly engage or even locate the target ship, thesmallest minelayer may indirectly destroy the mostpowerful capital ships, merchantmen, or enemy sub-marines. Minefields are also unique in that they pro-vide the laying forces with the possibility of settingup a preemptive defense in which the aggressor musttake full responsibility for any casualties that itsuffers.

The mine may also offer the advantage of covertnessand surprise, with the first indication of its presence be-ing a detonation. Even if it is not covert, mining will of-fer the advantage of concealment because a properlyplanted mine provides no visible warning of danger andits exact location is undetermined. Moreover, an armedmine operates 24 hours a day. From the time the mine isarmed until it is countered or its useful life expires andit becomes sterilized, a mine will continuously threatenenemy ships with no need to retire for logistics supportor any other purpose.

Mines, when used in conjunction with other forces,can serve as a force multiplier. A well-laid minefieldcan be used to perform a variety of functions that wouldotherwise occupy patrol or other combat forces, thusfreeing those forces for use in other warfare operations.For example, mines can be used to reduce the numberof vessels that are required to execute an effective navalblockade.

Early offensive mining may disrupt an enemy’s warplans more effectively than any other naval weapon.Mining also offers numerous complementary actions,

such as the overloading and disruption of the enemy’stransport and logistics systems caused by the mine-field’s interruption of normal port activity. The funnel-ing of supplies, or the storing of large concentrations ofsupplies in a few ports, will cause those supplies to bemore susceptible to attack by other warfare forces.

One of the most widely recognized advantages ofmining, but perhaps the one most difficult to quantify,is the psychological effect that a minefield has. The en-emy’s perception of the danger that is posed by a mine-field has a large psychological impact on the forces thatmust transit through it. While this is a real factor and adefinite advantage that is unique to a mine, it must berecognized that the psychological threat is the threatperceived by the enemy, not by the minelayer, and thatthis perception may vary from nation to nation and cul-ture to culture.

The mine may also be the only weapon of navalwarfare that offers an apparent ability to alter geogra-phy. An area that has been mined or one that has beendeclared to have been mined must be avoided by transitingforces as if it were land.

Implicit in all these advantages is the fact that themine may be very effective if its use is only simulatedor threatened. That is, its actual detonation may not be asignificant factor in its effectiveness.

2.1.2 Disadvantages. The primary weakness of amine is that it is a passive weapon that must wait for atarget instead of seeking it out and attacking it, and oncelaid, a mine recognizes no friends. Unless proper precau-tions are maintained, a mine can threaten friendly as wellas enemy ships. Also, a mine is stationary once it hasbeen planted, which provides the enemy with an oppor-tunity to detect the minefield and then either avoid it orcounter it with MCM operations. Additionally, expo-sure to sea water for long periods of time can cause themine to become materially degraded through either bio-logical fouling and/or corrosion, and the temperature ofthe water can adversely affect the life of the mine’s bat-teries. Another environmentally related disadvantage

2-1 ORIGINAL

of mining is that there are water depth restrictions onwhere mines can be laid.

2.2 MINE CLASSIFICATION

Naval Mines are typically classified in three ways:

1. By their final position in the water

2. By their method of delivery

3. By their method of actuation.

2.2.1 Final Position in the Water. When classi-fied according to the position they assume in the waterafter they have been laid, mines fall into three primarycategories.

1. Bottom/ground mines

2. Moored mines

3. Drifting mines.

2.2.1.1 Bottom/Ground Mines. Bottom mines arenonbuoyant weapons. When planted, the mine case is incontact with the sea bed and it is held in place by its ownweight. In areas with a soft bottom, these mines may becompletely or partially embedded in the sea bed, inwhich case they would be referred to as buried mines. Amine case that is resting on the bottom and not buried isreferred to as a proud mine. Bottom mines are alsocalled ground mines.

The nonbuoyant case of a bottom mine allows for theuse of a much larger explosive charge than that of abuoyant mine case. This larger explosive charge pro-vides the mine with a larger damage distance and en-ables a single mine to cover a larger volume of water.However, bottom mines must be planted in waterdepths where the target ships will be damaged by theexplosion. The depth at which a specific bottom minecan be effective against a specific surface target is de-pendent upon the shock resistance of the target, as wellas the amount