Nuclear Politics in South Asia

Presentation Overview

History of Nuclear Weapons Programs (1947-1998)

Post-1998 Developments Similarities Discussion Issues Suggested Readings Q&A

Nuclear Weapons Development: 1947-98

1940s -1959

India 1948 – AEC created, Homi

Bhabha strongly supports creating a self-sufficient nuclear infrastructure

Building the nuclear infrastructure and creating a large pool of trained personnel

China’s development of nuclear weapons is acknowledged in internal discussions

Political establishment against nuclear weapons

Pakistan 1956 – Pakistan Atomic

Energy Commission (PAEC) created

Late 1950s – Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Minister for Fuel and Natural Resources, advocates the development of nuclear weapons

1960sIndia

1960s – increased nuclear assistance from foreign countries

1962 - Disastrous border war with China shifts opinion gradually in favor of nuclear weapons

1964 – China’s nuclear test further strengthens the pro-bomb lobby.

1965 – SNEPP initiated, Indo-Pak war (China’s support for Pakistan & U.S. refusal to supply arms)

1966 – SNEPP halted Late 1967 – new effort to

develop nuclear explosives initiated

1968-70 – India opposes the NPT

Pakistan Pakistan acquires and

begins operating Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor (PARR)

Mid-1960s – Bhutto’s request for building nuclear weapons is rejected by Gen. Ayub Khan

1964-65 – Pakistan takes notice of India’s reaction to China’s nuclear test

1965 – Indo-Pak war (U.S. refusal to supply arms)

Late 1960s - Bhutto writes Myth of Independence in which he advocates the development of nuclear weapons.

1970sIndia

1971 – Indo-Pak war 1972 – Approval given

for fabricating a nuclear explosive

1974 – India tests a nuclear explosive, dubbed as a PNE. Exact yield is still unclear (between 4 – 12 kilotons)

Post 1974 – further development of nuclear weapons is slowed down (halted??)

Pakistan 1971 – Indo-Pak war January 1972 – Bhutto

convenes a meeting of scientists and announces the decision to develop nuclear weapons

1973-77 – Pakistan tries to acquire reprocessing plants from France, but U.S. intervenes

1974 – A.Q. Khan, working in the Netherlands, offers his assistance

1975 – Pakistan starts acquiring equipment for uranium enrichment and other components of the nuclear fuel cycle

Pakistan shifts from a plutonium based nuclear arsenal to HEU based arsenal

1980sIndia

Early to mid 1980s – nuclear weapons development proceeds in fits and starts. 1974 design is improved

1982 – Additional nuclear tests planned but cancelled

1983 – India sanctions the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP)

1986-87 – Operation Brasstacks, first nuclear crisis

Pakistan Pakistan steadily makes

progress in its nuclear weapons program (enrichment facility operational, cold tests conducted, nuclear test-site built)

U.S. ignores Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program due to the Afghan war

1987 – Op. Brasstacks, A.Q. Khan delivers an implicit nuclear threat to an Indian journalist. Officially, a Pakistani minister delivers a similar nuclear threat

Late 1980s – Pakistan begins development of ballistic missiles

1990sIndia

1990 – crisis over Kashmir (second nuclear crisis)

1995 – NPT extended indefinitely

1995 – India prepares for nuclear test(s) but cancels after U.S. discovers test(s) preparations

1996 – CTBT opens for signature

May 1998 – India conducts 5 nuclear tests

Pakistan 1990 – crisis over

Kashmir (second nuclear crisis)

Pakistan acquires ballistic missile technology from North Korea

April 1998 – Pakistan tests the Ghauri ballistic missile

May 1998 – Pakistan conducts 6 nuclear tests

Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia

Indian nuclear tests: May 11 and 13, 1998

Diplomatic efforts to stop Pakistani tests Pakistan nuclear tests: May 28 & 30,

1998 Immediate economic sanctions on both

India and Pakistan

Post-1998 Developments

India Formulates a nuclear

doctrine – adopts a no-first use posture and a triad based on a minimum and survivable deterrent force

Constitutes a tri-service Strategic Rocket Command to manage land-based nuclear missiles

Creates a Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) to manage nuclear forces

1999 – Kargil conflict 2002 – Increased tensions

Pakistan Creates a National

Command Authority to manage nuclear forces

Formulates a nuclear doctrine, rejects no-first use of nuclear weapons. Official doctrine not released

1999 – Kargil conflict 2002 – Increased

tensions

Pakistan’s Ballistic Missile Systems

(Source: Arms Control Today)

System Status Range/Payload Source

Hatf-1 Operational 80-100 km/500 kg Domestic Production

Hatf-2 Tested/Development 190 km/500 kg Domestic/China

Hatf-3 (Ghaznavi) Tested/Development 280 km/500 kg Domestic/China

Tarmuk  Development  300 km/800 kg  Domestic/China

Haider-1 Development 350 km/? kg Domestic Production

Shaheen-1 Tested/Development 750 km/500 kg Domestic/China

Ghauri-1 (Nodong-1) Tested/Development 1,300+ km/700 kg Domestic/N. Korea

Ghauri-2 Tested/Development 2,300 km/700 kg Domestic/N. Korea

Shaheen-2 Development 2,500 km/1,000 kg Domestic/China

Ghauri-3Engine

Tested/Development3,000 km/? kg Domestic/N. Korea

India’s Ballistic Missile Systems

(Source: Arms Control Today)

System Status Range/Payload Source

Prithvi-1 Operational 150 km/1,000 kg Domestic Production

Prithvi-2 Operational 250 km/500 kg Domestic Production

Dhanush/ Prithvi-3 Tested/Development 350 km/1,000 kg Domestic Production

Agni-1 variant Tested/Development 725 km/~1,000 kg Domestic Production

Agni-1 Tested/Prototype Only 1,500 km/1,000 kg Domestic Production

Agni-2 Serial Production 2,000 km/1,000 kg Domestic Production

Agni-3 Development 3,000-5,500 km/? kg Domestic Production

Surya Development 5,500+ km/2,000 kg Domestic/Russia

Sagarika (SLBM) Development 350 km/500 kg Domestic/Russia

Indian Background

Tension with China 1974 “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE) Today: ~80-100 nuclear weapons Goal: regional stability

Pakistani Background

Nuclear weapons capability by 1989-1990 Today: ~90-110 nuclear weapons Goals: overcoming conventional

inferiority, keeping regional balance of power

Nuclear Hopes and Fears

Pakistan Army: better able to negotiate with India?

Fears of radical Islamic elements within Pakistan Army

Fear of nukes falling into terrorist hands

Similarities

Decision-making on nuclear weapons is highly personalized

Significant foreign assistance Due to export controls, both the countries

operated clandestine networks to procure nuclear equipment and materials

Scientific establishment given high degree of autonomy

Both the countries have not signed the NPT and the CTBT

Symbolism associated with nuclear weapons Anti-nuclear movement is not well developed Institutionalization of nuclear forces is less

advanced

Discussion Issues

Nuclear Stability Nuclear Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) Nuclear Command & Control

Trajectory of Weaponization Number of nuclear weapons – definite numbers

not available Delivery systems

Second-tier Proliferation Integrating India and Pakistan into the

Nonproliferation regime U.S. Nonproliferation policy toward S. Asia