Nuclear Force Modernizations: Russia, China, and the ... · Fourth SS-27 unit (42 Missile...

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Hans M. Kristensen Director, Nuclear Information Project

Federation of American Scientists Phone: 202-454-4695

Email: [email protected]

Presentation to Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Policy and Security

School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs George Mason University, Fairfax, VA

February 9, 2016

Nuclear Force Modernizations: Russia, China, and the United States

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NuclearArsenals:InventoriesMorethan125,000warheadsproducedsince1945

Peakof64,500stockpiledwarheadsin1986(70,300ifincludingreBredwarheads)

• USstockpilepeakedearly(1967)• Russianstockpilepeakedlate(1986)

EnormousreducBonssince1986peak:

• ~54,000warheadstockpilereducBon• ~47,000+warheadsdismantled

~10,000warheadsinstockpiles(~15,000ifcounBngreBredwarheadsawaiBngdismantlement)

USandRussiapossess90%ofglobalinventory(94%ifcounBngreBredwarheads);eachhasmorethan45mesmorewarheadsthanrestofworldcombined;15Bmesmorethanthird-largeststockpile(France)

Decreasing:US,Russia,Britain,France

Increasing:China,Pakistan,India

IsraelrelaBvelysteady;NorthKoreatrying

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

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NuclearArsenals:Inventories


Es5matedWorldwideNuclearWarheadInventories2016Country Deployed Stockpiled Re5red Inventory

Russia 1,780 4,500 3,000 ~7,500

UnitedStates 2,070 4,670 2,300 ~7,000

France 240 300 300

China 260 low 260

Britain 120 215 low 215

Pakistan 110-130 110-130

India 100-120 100-120

Israel 80 80

NorthKorea ? ?

Total ~4,210 ~10,250 ~5,300 ~15,580

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NuclearArsenals:Trends Withmorethan90%ofworldinventory,USandRussiahavespecialresponsibilitytoreduce

ReducBonofdeployedstrategicwarheadsfromsome23,000in1989to3,500in2015(NewSTARTcounts3,185)

Readinesslevelofremainingstrategicforcesishigh:about1,800warheadsonpromptalert

Noofficialde-alerBng,butsignificantreducBonofoverallalertnumbers:heavybombersde-alerted,USICBMsandSLBMsdownloaded,non-strategicforcesde-alerted

Trend:paceofreduc5onisslowing

UScutonly396warheadsin2010-2014,comparedwith3,457warheadscutin2005-2009

RussiacutanesBmated1,100warheadsin2010-2014,comparedwith2,600in2005-2009

InsteadofconBnuingpaceorincreasingreducBons,USandRussianstockpilesappeartobelevelingoutforthelonghaul;newemphasisonmodernizaBon

NewiniBaBvesneededtopreventstallingofarmscontrol

Note:reBred,butsBllintact,warheadsawaiBngdismantlementarenotshown


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NuclearArsenals:Non-Strategic•  U.S.andRussiancombinedstockpilesofnon-strategic

nuclearwarheadsreducedbyroughly90percentsince1991.Neithersidehasdisclosedactualnumbers

•  Russia:twopublicdeclaraBons:2005:Russian“non-strategicnuclearforces”havebeenreduced“byfourBmes”since1991.

2010:“theRussianarsenalofnon-strategicnuclearweaponsisreducedfourBmes[75%]*incomparisonwiththeUSSRarsenal.”Allareincentralstorage

*Note:PNIdeclaraBonsdonotaddupto75%

•  UnitedStates:twopublicdeclaraBons:2010:"ThenumberofU.S.non-strategicnuclearweaponsdeclinedbyapproximately90percentfromSeptember30,1991toSeptember30,2009.”

2014:"ThenumberofU.S.non-strategicnuclearweaponshasdeclinedbyapproximately90percentsinceSeptember30,1991.”

~180USB61bombsforward-deployedinEurope

•  Some2,500warheadsremainassignedtonon-strategicforces(Russia~2,000;UnitedStates~500)

•  SeveralthousandsaddiBonalreBred,butsBllrelaBvelyintact,warheadsinstorageareawaiBngdismantlement

•  StockpileswilllikelyconBnuetodeclineinnextdecadewithorwithoutarmscontrolagreements


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NuclearArsenals:RussiaGradualphase-outofsoviet-erasystemsandparBalreplacementwith“new”systemsbyearly-mid2020s.

Replacementbegantwodecadesago.

DiverseNuclearForces

Strategic

ICBM:3typesbeingreplacedby2in6versions

SLBM:2typesbeingplacedby1

Bombers:2typesbeingreplacedby1

Non-Strategic

Navy:SLCM,SAM,ASWmissiles,torpedoes,depthbombs

AirForce:cruisemissile,bombs

Army:short-rangeballisBcmissiles,intermediate-rangecruisemissile

Defense:ballisBcmissiledefense,air-defense,coastaldefense

OldSystem

NewSystem MIRV FirstDeployed

SS-18 Sarmat(RS-28) Yes 2020-2025?

SS-19 SS-27Mod1(TopolM)SS-27Mod2(RS-24)

NoYes

20972014

SS-25 SS-27Mod1(Topol-M)SS-27Mod2(RS-24)SS-27Mod3(RS-26)SS-27Mod4(Rail)

NoYesYesYes

200620102016?2020?

SS-N-18SS-N-23

SS-N-32(Bulava)SS-N-32(Bulava)

YesYes

2016-2018?2020-2030?

Tu-95MSTu-160

PAK-DAPAK-DA

2020-2030?2020-2030?


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ICBM•  SS-27Mod2(mobile):replacingSS-25satNovosibirsk,Tagil,Yoshkar-Ola•  SS-27Mod2(silo):replacingSS-19satKozelsk•  SS-27Mod2(rail):plannedbutuncertain•  RS-26(compactSS-27):toreplaceSS-25satIrkutskandVypolzovo•  RS-28(Sarmat):toreplaceSS-28satDombarovskyandUzhur

SSBN/SLBM•  SS-N-23SLBMlife-extension(Sineva/Layner)inDeltaIVSSBN•  BoreiSSBN:8planned(possibly10-12)•  SS-N-32(Bulava):fielding

Bombers•  UpgradesofsomeTu-160(Blackjack)andTu-95(Bear)•  Newbomber(PAKPA)indevelopment•  ALCM(Kh-102)indevelopment

TacBcal•  Tu-22M(Backfire)upgradeunderway•  Su-34(Fullback)fielding•  Yasen(Sverodvinsk)SSGNfielding•  SLCM(SS-N-30,Kalibr)fielding•  GLCMtest-launched;notdeployed•  SSM(SS-26,Iskander)fielding•  SAM(S-400/SA-21)fielding(nuclear?)•  ABM(A-135)upgradeplanned

NuclearArsenals:Russia


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NuclearArsenals:Russia(ICBM)


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ThirdSS-27unit(39GuardsMissileDivision).

Firstregimentwith9SS-27Mod2(RS-24)placedon“experimentalcombatduty”in2013;secondin2014;thirdin2015.

SatelliteimagesshowupgradeofregimentbaseandmediaphotosshowSS-27Mod2launchers.

RemainingSS-25sarebeingphasedout.

SS-27 Mod 2 TEL under camouflage (top) and upgrade of first of several regiment bases.



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FourthSS-27unit(42MissileDivision).

Partoffirstregimentwith6SS-27Mod2(RS-24)placedon“experimentalcombatduty”in2013;secondregimentin2014;thirdin2015.

SatelliteimagesshowcompletereconstrucBonofregimentbase(bopom)with9TELgaragesfor3SS-27Mod2bapalions,aswellasupgradeofwarheadstorageandnewlyarrivedcamouflagedvehiclesatsupplybase.

RemainingSS-25sbeingphasedout.

Construction of SS-27 Mod 2 base (bottom); camouflaged vehicles at supply base (top left); upgrade to warhead storage (top right). Image: 2 Jun 2014



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FirhSS-27unit(28GuardsMissileDivision).

Deploymentoffirstregimentwith10SS-27Mod2(RS-24)underway.First4becameoperaBonalinDecember2014;firstregimentdonein2015.

Newsmediaphotosshowupgradeofsilos.

Plannednumbersareunknown,buttherewere60SS-19sin2006and60SS-27sweredeployedatTaBshchevo.

PreviouslywithSS-19(possiblyallgone).

Upgrade to SS-27 Mod 2 at Kozelsk missile field in 2012 (bottom) and 2013 (top).



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ModernizaBonfromDeltatoBorei:

6DeltaIV,eachwith16SS-N-23(SinevamodificaBon)

WilllikelybereplacedbyBoreiSSBNinlate-2020s

2-3DeltaIII,eachwith16SS-N-18

BeingreplacedbyBorei,starBngin2015

8Borei(planned),eachwith16SS-N-32(Bulava)Russia’sSSBNfleetisbasedatYagelnaya(Gadzhiyevo)ontheKolaPeninsulaintheBarentsSea(top)andRybachiyontheKamchatkaPeninsulainthePacific.

ABoreiSSBNcapturedintheKolaBayon20July2014withtheaircrarcarrierAdmiralKuznetsov.

NuclearArsenals:Russia(SSBN)


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WeaponsSystem Missiles(2014)

Warheads(2014)

Missiles(2024)

Warheads(2024)

SS-N-18 48* 144 0 0

SS-N-23(Sineva) 96** 384 32 128

SS-N-32(Bulava) - - 112*** 672

Total 144 528 144 800

*ItispossiblethatonlytwoDeltaIIIswith32SS-N-18sareoperaBonal.**NotallsixDeltaIVsareoperaBonalanygivenBme;normally1-2boatsareinoverhaul.***Assume7of8plannedBoreiSSBNshaveenteredservice.

Implica5onsofmoderniza5on:

SSBNfleetwillremainrelaBvelystablearound8-10operaBonalSSBNs.

SLBMsstableatsome144missiles.

Significantincreaseinwarheadscapacityfrom528to800.

NuclearArsenals:Russia(SSBN)


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Anewsubsonic,low-observablelong-rangebomber(PAK-DA)isunderdevelopment.ATupolevdesignapparentlywasselectedin2013.Expecteddeploymentinthemid-2020storeplace:

Tu-95MS(Bear):roughly60lerofwhichperhaps50areoperaBonal.CarriesAS-15BALCMandbombs.BeingupgradedtoincreaseconvenBonalcapability.

Tu-160(Blackjack):roughly15lerofwhichperhaps13areoperaBonal.CarriesAS-15AALCMandbombs.UpgradetoincreaseconvenBonalcapability.ReproducBonannounced.

Su-22M3(Backfire):Intermediate-rangebutsomeBmesconsideredstrategic.CarriesAS-4ALCMandbombs.BeingupgradedtoincreaseconvenBonalcapability.

PAK-DAbomber(subsonic,stealthy)

AnewnuclearALCM(Kh-102)hasbeenunderdevelopmentforsomeBme,possiblytoreplacetheagingAS-15ontheTu-95MSandTu-160bombers.

NuclearArsenals:Russia(Bombers)


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NuclearArsenals:Russia(Trend)•  Despitewidespreadclaimsbysome,Russia’snuclear

modernizaBonnot(yet)a“build-up”.

•  RussiaisalreadysignificantlybelowtheNewSTARTtreatylimitofdeployedlaunchers(about200fewerthanUSA).

•  Phase-outofSoviet-eraweaponsandreplacementwithnewersystemsonaless-than-one-for-one-basisconBnuestoshrinktheforcestructure.

•  YetreducBonislevelingoutandaneyetosustainingalargeforcefortheforeseeablefuture.


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•  WidelydispersedforcesinfourServices:tacBcalairforce,navy,defense,andarmy(seemap)

•  Warheadsnotonbasesbutincentralstorage

NuclearArsenals:Russia(Tac5cal)


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WeaponsSystem Remarks

AirForce

AS-4ALCM 1967:47yearsold.ForTu-22M3

Bombs ForTu-22M3,Su-24M,Su-34

Navy

SS-N-9(Malakhit) 1969:45yearsold.Forships.

SS-N-12(Bazalt) 1976:38yearsold.Forsubs.

SS-N-15(Vyuga) 1969:47yearsold.Forsubs/ships.

SS-N-16(Vodopad) 1981:33yearsold.Forsubs.

SS-N-19(Granit) 1980:34yearsold.Forships.

SS-N-21(Granat) 1987:27yearsold.Forsubs.

SS-N-22(Moskit) 1981:22yearsold.Forships.

SS-N-30(Kalibr) (2015).Forsubs.ReplacingSS-N-21?

Torpedoes(550/650mm) Forsubs.

DepthBombs ForASWaircrarandhelicopters.

Army

SS-21(Tochka) 1981:33yearsold.

SS-26(Iskander-K) 2005:ReplacingSS-21.

Defense

S-300/A-135/coastal Nuclearstatusofnewersystemsuncertain.

LargeleroverwarheadinventoryofalmostenBrelySoviet-eraweapons.

Reducedbyatleast75%since1991.

MostesBmatesvaryfrom1,800to2,000warheads.DODmenBonsunofficialesBmatesof2,000-4,000.

Allwarheadsincentralstorage;notwith/ondeliveryvehicles.

Ofcurrentforce,onlythreetypesarebeingmodernized.Futureplansareunknown.

“The general purpose forces – to include dual-use nonstrategic nuclear forces – will continue to acquire new equipment for the near-term, but deliveries will be small and largely consist of modernized Soviet-era weapons.”

US Defense Intelligence Agency, 2013



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Nuclear-capableS-300air-defenseunitsmovedintoCrimeashortlyarerinvasioninMarch2014(above).

Nuclear-capableforceshavebeenattheRussianBlackSeaFleetinCrimeafordecades:submarines,ships,navalaircrar(right).



SS-N-12SLCMloadingonSlavacruiser(above)andSS-N-22SLCMloadingonDergachcorvepe(below)

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Becausetheyaredual-capable,non-strategicnuclearforcesarequicklydrawnintoconflicts.

OverthepastthreeyearsRussianexercises“includesimulatednuclearapacksonNATOAllies(eg,ZAPAD)andonpartners(eg,March2013simulatedapacksonSweden)…”

NATOSecretaryGeneralAnnualReport2015



National-level storage site on Kola Peninsula includes three tunnels to underground warhead storage bays inside multi-layered fence perimeter. A separate storage bunker is located about 1 km from main site. Entire complex spans 3.1 km.

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NuclearArsenals:Russia(Storage)


•  NavyandAirForcenuclearstoragesitesaresmallerandclosertobases,oronbases

•  ThenavystoragesiteatShchukozeronearSeverodvinskontheKolaPeninsulaisonly0.5kmlongwithoneigloo(right)

•  TheairforcesiteatShatalovo(farright)nearBelarusis1.3kmlongwithtwoigloo(farright)

•  Thesesmallersitesareprobablyseparatefromthe“central”storagesitesmanagedbythe12thMainDirectoratewhereRussiasaysallitstacBcalnuclearwarheadsarestored

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Upgrade of apparent nuclear weapons storage site in Kaliningrad (near Chkalovsk). Clearing and improvement of perimeter, weapons igloos

Image: September 22, 2002

Image: June 26, 2010

Image:July25,2012

One of three igloos has quadruple fence typical of nuclear weapons storage storage facilities

But does it contain nuclear weapons? Use visit to clarify nuclear status?

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•  Someairbaseshavenuclearremoteweaponstoragesite.Example:ShaykovkaAirBasenearBelarus(ler)

•  Tu-22M3BackfiredbomberswithAS-4Kitchenair-launchedcruisemissiles

•  Between2007and2009,thebase’snuclearweaponstoragesitewasupgradedwithnewperimeterandbuildings May 2007 July 2007

October 2009

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NuclearArsenals:China

ICBM / MRBM •  DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) fielding •  DF-5B (CSS-4 Mod 2) with MIRV •  DF-26 introduced •  New mobile ICBM test-launching •  Development of new mobile ICBM capable of

delivering MIRV

SSBN / SLBM •  Jin (Type-094) SSBN fielding (4-5 expected) •  JL-2 (CSS-N-14) SLBM in development •  Type-096 SSBN possibly in development

Cruise Missiles: •  ALCM (CJ-20 on H-6 bomber) in development* •  GLCM (DH-10/CJ-10) fielding**

Note: China is the only of the P-5 (NPT declared) nuclear-armed states that is increasing its nuclear arsenal.

* Listed in 2013 AFGSC briefing. ** Listed by NASIC as “conventional or nuclear,” the same designation as the Russian nuclear-capable AS-4 Kitchen ALCM.


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NuclearArsenals:China(ICBM)


ICBMmodernizaBonfromliquid-tosolid-fuelmoremobilelaunchers.

MIRVonsomesiloICBMs.

DF-A(topler),DF-31A(topright),DF-5B(below),DF-4A(right)

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USprojecBonsofChineseICBMstendtopredicttoomanytoosoon

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Approximately80nuclear(DF-21andDF-21A).

AlmostcompletelyreplacedDF-3A.

VasttrainingareainDelinghaandDaQaidam.

DF-21CandDF-21DconvenBonalversionsdeploying.

NuclearArsenals:China(MRBM)


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UpgradefromDF-3AtoDF-21MRBM.

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NuclearArsenals:China(SSBN)

Buildingclassof4-5JinSSBNsEachwith12JL-2.

Firstseenin2007oncommercialsatellitephotos.

4inservice,butJL-2notyetfullyoperaBonal.

All4saidtobebasedatSouthSeaFleet.

Bigunknown:willChinabegintodeploynuclearwarheadsonlaunchersinpeaceBme?


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ExpansionofHainansubmarinebase.

FirstJinSSBNpresencein2008.

BaseincludesdemagneBzaBonfacility,undergroundsubmarinepier,SLBMhandlingandtransportaBonsystem.



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FurtherupgradeofHainansubmarinebase.

MissileservicingfaciliBes.

Coveredrailtrackfromservicebuildingstobackentrancetoundergroundsubmarinebase.



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Submarinebasepartofsprawlingnavalinfrastructurethatpossiblyalsoincludesregionalnuclearweaponsstoragefacility.



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Importantnewcapability,but…

JinSSBNnoisycomparedwithRussianSSBNs.

TotargetUSA,aJinSSBNwouldhavetosailfarintoPacificorSeaofJapan.

Commandandcontrolcapabilityislimited.



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Stockpilepeakedin1967;deployedstrategicwarheadspeakedin1986.

Stockpileanddeployedstrategicwarheadshavenotchangedsignificantlysince2009.

ButunilateralreducBonsare“builtinto”currentmodernizaBonplan.

NuclearArsenals:USA


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NuclearArsenalsICBM

•  MinutemanIIIlife-extensioncompleBng•  Warheadfuzes/interoperablewarheadplanned•  GBSD(ICBMreplacement)indevelopment

SSBN/SLBM•  TridentIID5SLBMlife-extensiondevelopment•  SSBNreplacementdevelopment(12planned)•  W76-1warheadlife-extensiondeploying•  W88-1warheadlife-extensiondevelopment

Bombers•  UpgradeofB-2andB-52underway•  LRS-Bnext-generaBonbomberindevelopment•  B61-12guidedstandoffbombindevelopment•  LRSO(ALCM)replacementindevelopment

TacBcal•  F-35Anuclearcapabilityindevelopment•  B61-12guidedstandoffindevelopment

Infrastructure•  UraniumProcessingFacility(secondaries)construcBon•  PlutoniumproducBonfaciliBes(primaries)construcBon•  Warheadsurveillance/simulaBonfaciliBesupgrade

NuclearArsenals:USA


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DestrucBonofundergroundfaciliBesrequireground-orshallowsub-surfaceburststoensureshockwavecausesanundergroundfractureor“damagezone”.

Inasub-surfacebursttheshockwavemovingupwardistrappedbythesurfacematerialandreflecteddownwardwhereitreinforcestheoriginalchockwave.This“coupling”effectenablesanearth-penetratortodestroyundergroundtargets2-5Bmesdeeperthangroundburstweapons.

1kt:destroystoafew10sofmeters1MT:destroystoafew100sofmeters

B61-11droptestintofrozensoil


NuclearArsenals:USA

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Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide 39

Notjustabiggerbomb…

ThedestrucBveeffectofnuclearweaponsisunlikeanyothercreatedmyhumanbeings.

100%fissionof1kgPu-239orU-235canproduceanexplosionequivalenttomorethan18,000tonsofTNT.

DowntownHiroshimadaysarerairburstof13.5ktHEUgun-typebomb

(Above)ThemostpowerfulU.S.convenBonalbomb–theGBU-43/BMassiveOrdnanceAirBlast(MOAB)–hasanexplosiveyieldofapproximately0.011ktTNT,roughly30Bmeslessthanthelowestyieldse|ng(0.3kt)ontheB61nuclearbomb(below).TheB61-12weighs850lbs(385kg),nearlythirtyBmeslessthattheMOAB’s22,600lbs(10,300kg).

NuclearArsenals:USA

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(Very)Simplyspeaking,therearetwogeneraltypesofnuclearemploymentstrategies:

Counter-force:employsnuclearnuclearforces“todestroythemilitarycapabiliBesofanenemyorrenderthemimpotent.Typicalcounterforcetargetsinclude:bomberbases,ballis5cmissilesubmarinebases,intercon5nentalballis5cmissile(ISBM)silos,an5ballis5candairdefenseinstalla5ons,commandandcontrolcenters,andweaponsofmassdestruc5onstoragefacili5es.Generally,thenuclearforcesrequiredtoimplementacounter-forcetarge5ngstrategyarelargerandmoreaccuratethanthoserequiredtoimplementacounter-valuestrategy.Counter-valuetargetsgenerallytendtobeharder,moreprotected,moredifficulttofind,andmoremobilethancounter-valuetargets.”

Counter-value:directsthe“destrucBonorneutralizaBonofselectedenemymilitaryandmilitary-relatedtargetssuchasindustries,resources,and/orins5tu5onsthatcontributetotheabilityoftheenemytowagewar.Ingeneral,weaponsrequiredtoimplementthisstrategyneednotbeasnumerousnorasaccurateasthoserequiredtoimplementacounter-forcetarge5ngstrategybecausecounter-valuetargetstendtobesorerandlessprotectedthancounter-forcetargets.”

ObamaadministraBondidnotchangecounter-forcefocus:The2013NuclearEmploymentStrategy“requirestheUnitedStatestomaintainsignificantcounterforcecapabiliBesagainstpotenBaladversaries.Thenewguidancedoesnotrelyona‘counter-value’or‘minimumdeterrence’strategy.”


NuclearArsenals:USA(Strategy)

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Next10years:

$350billionformaintainingandmodernizingnuclearforcesandinfrastructure.

ComprehensivemodernizaBon:•  Allthreelegsofstrategictriad•  TacBcaldual-capableaircrar•  WarheadproducBoncomplex

ConsolidaBonandmodificaBonofwarheadtypes.

Somedelayshappening;moreexpected.

Extendingnucleardeterrentthrough2080.

NuclearArsenals:USA


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Allegedadvantages:

•  FewerwarheadtypespermitreducBonofhedge

•  Modifiedwarheadswithincreasedsafety,usecontrol,andperformancemargin

•  Fewerwarheadswillbecheapertomaintainanddeploy

Possiblerisks:

•  Modifiedwarheadsfurtherfromtesteddesigns;reliabilityissues?

•  Reducedstockpilediversity•  Complexandexpensiveprograms

pronetodelaysandcostoverruns•  Modifiedwarheads“new”?•  CostshighlyuncertainandesBmates

probablyunderrated

FundamentalquesBons:

•  Whyishedgingnecessaryformissilewarheadsbutnotbomberweapons?

•  WhymustUShedgewhenBritainandFrancedonot?

•  Whyis“deployed”warheadsthesameinthefuture?

3+2strategy:reducBonfrom12warheadversions(8basicdesigns)to5types:

3“Interoperable”or“adaptable”warheadsonICBMandSLBMIW-1(W78/W88-1),IW-2(W87/W88-1),IW-3(W76-1)

2non-interoperablewarheadsonbombersandfightersALCM(LRSO)withW80-1orW84B61-12guidedstandoffbomb

NuclearArsenals:USA


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•  180U.S.B61bombsscaperedin87undergroundvaultsunderneath87aircrarsheltersatsixbasesinfiveEuropeancountries:

•  AddiBonalbombsintheUnitedStatesforextendeddeterrencemissionselsewhere.

•  50FrenchASMPAcruisemissilesatthreebasesfor3squadrons(2airand1naval).

NuclearArsenals:USA(Tac5cal)


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UpgradeunderwayofWS3systematseven(sixacBve)basesinEurope

SecurityandinfrastructureupgradesunderwayatUSAFbaseatIncirlik,Turkey(50bombsstored)

Only110km(68miles)fromborderwithwar-tornSyria;InsideTurkeywithanarmedcivilwar

SimilarsecurityupgradeatUSAFbaseatAviano,Italy

NosimilarsecurityupgradesseenyetatnaBonalbasesinBelgium,Germany,Italy,Netherlands Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

NuclearArsenals:USA(Tac5cal)

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Both Russia and US/NATO are increasing/modifying operations of nuclear-capable forces May not be explicit nuclear signal, but is being seen as also a nuclear signal

Russia: Long-range bomber flights increasing closer to NATO countries; “snap” exercises increasing in frequency, size, visibility; explicit nuclear threats issued by officials

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Baltic Sea: Su-24 fighter-bomber intercept Baltic Sea: Tu-22M bombers

North Sea: Tu-95 bomber intercept Baltic Sea: SS-N-22 SLCM loading

Televised ICBM/SLBM launch

Luga: SS-26 return from Kaliningrad deployment

Operations


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Both Russia and US/NATO are increasing/modifying operations of nuclear-capable forces US/NATO: Long-range bombers integrated closer into EUCOM strike plans; exercises in Eastern Europe increasing in frequency, size, visibility; fighter-bomber rotational deployments and exercises in Baltic States, Poland, Sweden; first SSBN port visit to Europe in 25 years

F-16 deployments to Estonia, Poland, Sweden

B-52 over Latvia B-52, B-2 deployment to United Kingdom

B-52s over BALTOPS exercise SSBN visit to Scotland

Operations


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NuclearArsenals:France

SSBN/SLBM•  TNOwarheadonM51.2SLBM.•  M51.3SLBMdevelopment.

Bombers•  RafaleK3toreplaceMirage2000NatIstresAirBase.•  Next-generaBonALCMindevelopment.

Infrastructure•  MegajouleatCESTAdevelopment.•  Airix/EpurehydrodynamictestcenteratValducdevelopment(partlyJointFrench-UKwarheadsurveillancetesBngcenter).


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NuclearArsenals:Britain

SSBN/SLBM•  SSBN(Vanguardreplacement)indevelopment(3-4planned).•  SLBM(TridentIID5LE)indevelopment(USA).•  Mk4A/W76-1typewarheadfielding.

Infrastructure•  JointUK-FrenchwarheadsurveillancetesBngtechnologycenterdevelopment.


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NuclearArsenals:PakistanMRBM/SRBM

•  ShaheenIIIMRBM(Ha�-6)indevelopment•  ShaheenIIMRBM(Ha�-6)fielding•  NASRSRBM(Ha�-9)indevelopment•  AbdaliSRBM(Ha�-2)indevelopment*

CruiseMissiles•  GLCM(Babur/Ha�-7)indevelopment•  ALCM(Ra’ad/Ha�-8onMirage)indevelopment•  SLCM(navalversionofBabur)indevelopment?

Infrastructure•  Khushab-IVreactor#4construcBon•  Uraniumenrichmentfacilityupgrade

*ListedbyPakistaniISPRbutnotby2013NASICreport


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NuclearArsenals:Pakistan

Shaheen-IImobilelauncher.DetectedTELsfi|ngoutatNaBonalDefenseComplex.Notyetdeployedin2009,butprobablynowpartof110-130warheadesBmate.Extended-rangeShaheen-IIIindevelopment.


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51

NuclearArsenals:IndiaICBM/IRBM/MRBM

•  AgniVIICBMdevelopment(MIRV?)•  AgniVICBMindevelopment•  AgniIVIRBMindevelopment•  AgniIIIIRBMfielding

SSBN/SLBM•  ArihantSSBNdevelopment(3+expected).•  K-15/K-4SLBMdevelopment.•  DhanushSLBMfielding.

CruiseMissiles•  GLCM(Nirbhay)development*

Infrastructure•  OneplutoniumproducBonreactordeveloping.•  Breederreactors?

*Reportedbynewsmediabutnotlistedin2013NASICreport.


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NuclearArsenals:Israel

IRBM•  JerichoIIIIRBMdevelopment?

SSG/SLBM•  DolphinSSGfielding•  SLCM(PopeyeTurbo/Harpoon)rumored*

Bomber•  F-35AacquisiBon

*Reportedbynewsmediabutdeniedbyofficials.USpublicintelligencereportsomitreferencestoIsraelinuclearforces


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NuclearArsenals:NorthKorea

ICBM/IRBM/MRBM•  NoDongMRBMfielding•  MusudanIRBMindevelopment•  Hwasong-13(KN-08)ICBMindevelopment(fielding?)•  TaepoDong2SLV/ICBMindevelopment

SSBN/SLBM•  SSBN/SLBMinearlydevelopment•  FakedSLBMlaunch

CruiseMissiles•  KN-09coastaldefensecruisemissileindevelopment?**

Infrastructure•  YongbyonplutoniumproducBonreactorre-start•  UraniumenrichmentproducBonconstrucBon

Bigunknown:DoesNorthKoreahaveminiaturizedandweaponizedwarheadthatcanbedeliveredbyballisBcmissile?

*Despitethreeundergroundnucleartests,thereisnoknownpublicevidencethatNorthKoreahasminiaturizeditstestdevicessufficientlyfordeliverybyballisBcmissiles

**Listedby2013AFGSCbriefingbutnotin2013NASICreport.2014updateofAFGSCdoesnotlistKN-09


QUESTIONS?

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54Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

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