nuclear doctrines · 2020. 10. 30. · as Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer and others believed in...

may 2017

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around the worldnuclear doctrines

1May 2017 Defence AnD security Alert

Nuclear doctrines, the world over, are a direct reflection of a nations’ sense of self, threat perceptions

and the limitations of its scientific and technical expertise. Nations pursue nuclear weapons because of threats, real or imagined, a perceived role in global matters, and in the case of North Korea, simply to play spoiler in the order of things. Since nuclear weapons are regarded as the last resort of war, being the ultimate destructive capability built by mankind, it is vital to understand various doctrines around the world.

Breaking the atom became the ultimate goal of war once it’s infinite capabilities became apparent to the military machine. Both sides of the World War II pursued the goal, leaving the Americans as the successful side, and the sole users, before the war ended. Thankfully, they’ve been the only users since. But since there is no guarantee that another won’t use such weapons, some nations pursue the development of nuclear capability as a mission.

India is surrounded by two such, and is in fact the only country

that has un-demarcated borders with nuclear capable neighbours. This is the prime mover of India’s nuclear doctrine and a perfect reflection of its regionalistic approach to foreign, security and nuclear policies. Any larger vision would have seen India grow out of this approach long back, when there was an opportunity.

That opportunity, alas, was lost in the 1960s when India decided to stay away from developing nuclear weapons, even though the writing was on the wall that seats were booked on the table depending on capabilities. Despite its then backward programme, China detonated a device in 1964 only so as to be recorded as capable, and gain membership. Once the doors were closed, and which had been announced in advance, India joined the chorus of those claiming membership was discriminatory. Too little and too late.

So when India decided to bulldoze its way by a strangely named peaceful nuclear explosion, the pun wasn’t lost on anyone. Sanctions were slapped and which stayed for decades. In 1998, it was finally decided to do

DSA iSAS much yourS,

as it is ours!

away with the hypocrisy, explode credible devices and claim them as such. Sanctions were still imposed, but by then India had entered a new era and couldn’t be bulldozed anymore.

India is still in the new era and hence, its nuclear weapons doctrine must also reflect this reality. Baggage of the old, preachy and reactive, era must be jettisoned for a thoroughly contemporary model. There is no reason to stick by old principals, once they serve no purpose. One of the myths India needs to throw out is that security and foreign policies are bipartisan affairs. How can they be when the practitioners come from different perceptions of self and nation? This is true the world over too. So, the other hallowed theme of no first use must also be re-assessed. There is no reason to wait for destruction, in order to destroy later. Wishful thinking, for it may not be possible at all.

Manvendra Singh

editor’s note

The word ‘nuclear’ in itself has an ominous ring around it. The first and only use of atomic bombs was against the Japanese in World War II in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It has left an indelible stigma on the conscience of mankind that such a usage must never ever be allowed again. As I am writing this, the current scenario being created by North Korea on the usage of nuclear bombs is very disturbing for nations across the globe. Its bragging bravado and past instances of reckless behaviour have put the world on the edge.

The making of nuclear weapons and its presence in a State have had political ramifications. We all know about the US invasion of Iraq on the pretext that Baghdad was developing hostile and prohibited weapons of mass destruction programs. In India, the word has acquired an indepth familiarity largely because of the intense debate and far-reaching effect of the Indo-US deal on the civilian uses of the atom. One is not sure whether America and the rest of those who have acquired nuclear weapons technology are really serious about the Nuclear Non-proliferation they speak so glibly about but make no move towards nuclear disarmament that could rid the world of the threat of self-destruction.

The world might be witnessing a déjà vu of what happened in Iraq due to the US invasions as similar accusations have been concocted for Iran as it is being condemned for converting its nuclear power facilities to bomb-making factories.

But one thing is very evident: India is the only country with a proven record of using the atomic energy for peaceful purposes. India’s first Atomic Energy Act was passed and Atomic Energy Commission was set up in 1948 and India’s first nuclear reactor Apsara was commissioned in 1958. At present, we have 17 nuclear reactors in operation and six under construction.

The Institute of Nuclear Medicine and Allied Sciences (INMAS) is one of its kind which is dedicated to the usage of nuclear technology to cure many ailments and is continuously conducting research in the use of the atom and isotopes in the medical field.

India believes in peace and therefore, has always attempted to steer the world towards the peaceful usage of the atom in the interest of humanity.

Jai Hind!

Nuclear WeapoNs: The Dark ForboDing

Pawan Agrawal

2 May 2017 dsalert.org @dsalert

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Defence and Security Alert is printed, published and owned by Pawan Agrawal and printed at Archana Advertising Pvt Ltd C-78 okhla Industrial Area Phase-1, New Delhi-110020 and published at 4/19, Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi (India). editor: Manvendra Singh

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contents

An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine

Deterrence In Emerging World Order Prof Tej Pratap Singh

Variations On A MAD PhilosophyDr Rajiv Nayan

Past, Present And FutureDr BB Singh

Doctrinal Feature Of ‘Unacceptable Damage’Manisha Chaurasiya

Asymmetry A Guarantee Against AnnihilationAnu Sharma

INS Arihant Completes The CircleSaloni Salil

Make Nuclear Doctrine Assertive - For PeaceRavi Kumar Gupta

Deterrence, Yes…But, Defence?Dr Navniit Gandhi

The Battlefields Of Imphal: The Second World War And North East India

04

12

19

26

32

39

44

52

57

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nuclear doctrines UTOPIA CALLED ‘NUCLEAR FREE WORLD’

The Neo-realists such as Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer and others believed in the permanence of bipolar

global structure and reiterated the critical role of nuclear deterrence in the maintenance of global peace, security and stability. However, much against their expectations, the bipolar world order collapsed paving the way for the emergence of a unipolar world. How long this unipolarity shall sustain itself is a critical question. With the rise and

fall of nations, global order changes quickly and the changes assume such intensity, proportions and forms that they are difficult to fathom. The rise of China and the shifting of centrality of global power from Euro-Atlantic to Asia-Pacific has provoked many critics to write the obituary of unipolar global order and hail the emergence of Asian century. The G-7 is likely to be replaced by the E-7 (Emerging 7-Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Turkey and Indonesia). By the next decade, the E-7 GDP will be larger than that of the G-7.

DeTerrence In emergIngWorld orderNuclear weapons cannot be disinvented and so any effort for a nuclear free world will not succeed. Nuclear weapons can be controlled and managed but cannot be eliminated. Instead of nuclear disarmament, which is a utopian goal and unrealistic; realists support nuclear arms control, which can effectively manage nuclear arms race and strengthen nuclear deterrence.


President Donald Trump’s ascent to power in the US; his isolationist and aggressive right-wing nationalist foreign and protectionist economic policies; rejection of multi-lateralism in trade and services; and his regime’s embrace of bilateralism and Brexit in Europe have hastened the process of dismantling globalisation and the emergence of a new world order. However, this emerging order is still in a nascent stage and yet to take a concrete shape. Analysts are of the opinion that the period of the US pre-eminence or Pax-

Americana is over and in the words of Fareed Zakaria, ‘Post-American world’ has dawned. However, in this emerging global order, the central and critical role of nuclear deterrence remains intact. Deterrence: Effective Means Of Survival Deterrence is an effective means for ensuring peace, security and stability and has been in use since a long period of time in human history. Deterrence is a psychological game based on cost-benefit analysis of war.

PrOfESSOr TEj PraTaP Singh

The writer is a professor in the Dept. of Political Science, Banaras Hindu

University, Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh. He has been the Visiting Fellow to the

Central European University, Budapest, Charles

Wallace Visiting Fellow to Cambridge University, Shastri Visiting Fellow to Centre for International Governance Innovation

(CIGI), Waterloo, Canada and Salzburg Global

Seminar Fellow. He is also holding an administrative position of Coordinator, Centre for the Study of

Social Exclusion and Inclusive Policy, Banaras

Hindu University.


If the cost of war is heavy and benefits very little, then nations will avoid war. Nations arm themselves to deter war by making the cost of invasion very heavy. Deterrence is the basis of armament. Disarmament can destabilise and weaken deterrence. Stronger nations will be tempted to invade the weaker as cost of war is reduced and prospect of benefits much higher. Arms control, however, unlike disarmament strengthens deterrence, as it aims at balanced reductions or controlled armament, thus strengthening deterrence rather than weakening it.

Conventional deterrence based on conventional weapons ensures balance of power and nuclear deterrence based on nuclear weapons triggers balance of terror. In the case of conventional weapons, rough estimate of cost is possible but in the case of nuclear weapons, cost calculation is impossible as indiscriminate use of nuclear weapons will obliterate the distinction between victors and vanquished. In all out nuclear war or mutually assured destruction (MAD), no one will survive to enjoy the fruits of victory. Advent of nuclear weapons has made the cost of war prohibitive, thereby strengthening deterrence. In comparison to conventional deterrence, nuclear deterrence is more credible and reliable as any failure of nuclear deterrence will be disastrous to the warring nations and the whole world. Nuclear

radiation will not respect national sovereignty or national boundaries and will kill people indiscriminately. In nuclear war, cost-benefit analysis is not possible and thus making war a truly irrational act. In nuclear era, the Clausewitzian description of war as a rational act and continuation of politics through other means has become obsolete. It is precisely because of this reason nuclear deterrence has not failed till this date. Even a tiny North Korea, a rogue state in the words of the US, has taken the whole world to ransom by virtue of its possession of small nuclear arsenal. For nations, nuclear weapons are ultimate weapons for security and survival. Analysts argue that if Gaddafi of Libya had not dismantled its secret nuclear weapon programme under the supervision of the IAEA, probably the US would not have dared to intervene in Libya and accomplished its mission of regime change. Possession of nuclear weapon by North Korea desist the US to undertake any Iraq or Libya type of misadventure for regime change. It is because of this reason; Israel has not acceded to the NPT and is believed to be in possession of credible nuclear deterrent. Iran also wants to acquire nuclear weapons for the same reason. Theoretical PerspectiveRealists strongly argue for nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. They credit nuclear deterrence for peace during the Cold War. For the first time in the world history, two great powers competed fiercely for world domination and their hostility and competition for supremacy was terminated without resorting to war. Realists support nuclear proliferation as it will strengthen deterrence and rule out any possibility of war

In an all out nuclear war or mutually assured destruction

(MAD), no one will survive to enjoy the fruits of victory



Liberals oppose nuclear weapons and deterrence based on it. They agree that nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented but it definitely can be delegitimised as has been done in the case of biological and chemical weapons. All deterrence theories are dangerous and nuclear deterrence is most dangerous. There is no guarantee that since nuclear weapon was not used during the Cold War bipolar world and so it will not be used in post-cold war unipolar or multipolar world. The safest way is a ‘nuclear weapon free world’. Liberal institutionalists argue for institutionalisation and norms construction to create a nuclear non-proliferation regime to disallow and delegitimise the use of nuclear weapons. It will eventually pave the way for nuclear weapon free world. indian CaseIndia is a significant factor in the global nuclear debate. Along with Pakistan and Israel, India has been labelled by the western critics as elephant (Gareth Evans), outlier (Michael Krepon) and hold

GAM-63 RASCAL, the supersonic air-to-surface missile of USAFand compel the hostile nations

to resolve their dispute through peaceful means. Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented and so any effort for nuclear free world will not succeed. Nuclear weapons can be controlled and managed but cannot be eliminated. Instead of nuclear disarmament, which is a utopian goal and unrealistic; realists support nuclear arms control, which can effectively manage nuclear arms race and strengthen nuclear deterrence. Kenneth Waltz supports total proliferation and argues, the proliferation of nuclear weapons will rule out the possibility of war breaking out between and among nations to settle their disputes. John Mearsheimer supports selective proliferation and argues for nuclearisation of India. Mearsheimer urges the US to support India’s nuclear weapon programme in its own strategic interests. Sooner or later, Mearsheimer argues, the US has to contain China and no US containment policy against China can succeed without India.


out States. All three along with North Korea and Iran are treated as rogue States in nuclear debate, which are contradicting the global consensus on nuclear proliferation. Gareth Evans, former Australian Foreign Minister, who headed the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation described India, Pakistan and Israel as the three elephants, which have to be brought into global nuclear non-proliferation architecture for its success. The words like elephant, outlier and hold out States in the nuclear debate show the colonial mind-set of these western scholars. They treat nuclear weapons to be legitimate and safe in the hands of the P-5 but illegitimate and dangerous in the hands of the rest of the world. For these western critics, the P-5 are responsible possessors of nuclear weapons but the same cannot be said about the remaining world. India supports the idea of nuclear weapons-free world and advocates comprehensive nuclear disarmament without any distinction between NWS (Nuclear Weapon States) and NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapon States). India, however, is opposed to discriminatory nuclear non-proliferation regime created by the western powers to prevent the NNWS from acquiring nuclear weapon technology. India has denigrated it as nuclear apartheid which justifies nuclear weapons in the hands of the NWS and opposes its acquisition by the NNWS. India, however, on its own without any treaty obligation, has observed global norms against nuclear proliferation and unlike Pakistan has never transferred nuclear technology to other countries. International

community appreciated the clean non-proliferation record of India and the US signed civil nuclear agreement with India to allow it to access nuclear technology and bring India into non-proliferation regime as a responsible stakeholder. The IAEA, NSG granted waiver to India to facilitate the signing of the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement. The Indo-US nuclear agreement paved the way for similar civil nuclear agreement with many other countries such as Japan, Australia, etc. with nuclear technology and fissile material. These civil nuclear agreements facilitated India to become member of export control regime created by the NSG, MTCR, Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. India has already become a member of the MTCR and in the near future is likely to get the membership of the NSG. India has successfully breached the technology denial regime crafted by the western countries to prevent threshold countries like India to acquire nuclear technology. future Of nukes and DeterrenceFormer President Barack Obama in the beginning of his first term in 2009, in his famous speech at Prague pledged to work for a nuclear free world but he himself expressed the misgiving that this goal is not going to be achieved in his lifetime but expressed the hope that probably in his children’s lifetime the goal of nuclear weapon free world will be achieved. However, the way nations are overtly and covertly pursuing the nuclear technology, nuclear free world seems to be a utopian goal. North Korea is threatening the region and the world with its frequent nuclear and missile tests.


A Terminal High Altitude Area Defence interceptor being fired during an exercise in 2013 by the US


Though under the leadership of the former US President Obama, Iran has signed nuclear agreement and agreed not to enrich uranium and observe global nuclear norms as the NNWS. But the new US President Donald Trump, egged by Israel and Saudi Arabia, is threatening to abrogate nuclear agreement and re-impose sanctions against Iran. If Iran goes nuclear, it will have a cascading effect and the whole of the Middle East and North Africa will be nuclearised. Saudi Arabia, who treats itself as leader of Sunni world cannot tolerate Shia Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. If Saudi Arabia and Iran go nuclear then Turkey and Egypt who boast of themselves to be great civilisational States cannot be far behind as nuclear weapons are more a prestige weapon rather than a weapon of war.

Cascading regional EffectLikewise, if North Korea becomes a full-fledged nuclear weapon State with reliable delivery system, it will have a dynamo effect. Japan and South Korea, who have well developed civilian nuclear programmes, will acquire nuclear weapons. Unlike Iran, Japan and South Korea have nuclear capability and these two countries only need political decision to go nuclear. With the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan and South Korea, whole of East Asia will be nuclearised as China already is a nuclear weapon State. Iran and North Korea are posing greatest threat to non-proliferation regime. Nuclear programme of these two countries if not restrained by the international community will lead to nuclearisation of East Asia and West Asia and will add to already nuclearised South Asia.

In nuclear age, proactive action or pre-emptive strike is dangerous for peace and security


The US deployment of missile interceptors THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) in South Korea and Japan against the potential threat posed by nuclear North Korea is being resisted by China as it will weaken its nuclear deterrent by undermining its second strike capability. It will lead to acquisition of more nuclear weapons and missiles to strengthen the Chinese deterrent. Similarly, the proposed US deployment of nuclear defence shield in East Europe is being opposed by Russia as it will weaken its nuclear deterrent. All these global developments are not conducive to the goal of nuclear free world and are threatening existing global order created in the post-cold war and post-bipolar world. Deterrence Useful Nuclear deterrence, since its inception in the post-Second World War period has proved its utility. It has prevented war between nuclear adversaries. Its mere possession has made its holder responsible, which has been proven by the Cuban missile crisis in 1963 and the Kargil war in 1998, when the antagonists took all the precautions not to escalate the crisis, which could have led to a nuclear war. It is because of this reason, the realists repose faith in nuclear deterrence for the maintenance of global peace, security and stability. However, unrestricted proliferation of nuclear weapons might destabilise the global order and threaten peace and security. Balanced but lesser nuclear weapons are better for nuclear deterrence. Second or retaliatory strike is the essence of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear weapon States must not

strive to undermine or weaken the retaliatory capability of their adversaries. In nuclear age, proactive action or pre-emptive strike is dangerous for peace and security. Pre-emptive nuclear strike is indicative of failure of nuclear deterrence. To prevent pre-emptive strike and to save nuclear deterrence from failing, adversaries in nuclear deterrence must have credible reactive or retaliatory second strike capability. Any weakening of retaliatory nuclear capability will


In emerging global order, non-State actors are a greater threat to security, than State actors


lead to nuclear war. Deployment of missile interceptors by the US in Europe and East Asia and its nuclear missile defence system at home is aimed at undermining mutual vulnerability, which is the essence of nuclear deterrence. Therefore, the US should respect nuclear deterrence and abandon its policy of pre-eminence and invulnerability. In the larger interests of global peace, security and stability, the US must give up its Nuclear Missile Defence (NMD) programme and accept the

mutual nuclear vulnerability, the basis of nuclear deterrence.

Threat from non-State actorsIn the emerging global order, non-State actors are a greater threat to security, than the State actors. If terror outfits somehow manage to get fissile material, they might fabricate a crude nuclear device, which has been popularly described as a dirty bomb. Nuclear renaissance in the wake of rising global concerns about global warming, generated by unrestricted emission of greenhouse gases, rising energy prices and ever growing energy demands have led to proliferation of civil nuclear energy and resultant spread of fissile material. The relatively easy availability of nuclear isotopes used in medical sciences to cure cancer has generated the possibility of non-State actors getting access to fissile material to fabricate dirty bombs. International community is seized with this issue and Nuclear Security Summits have been organised to address the menace of dirty bombs. International community has to come together to prevent any misuse of nuclear energy. The NWS must commit themselves to no-first use. Early conclusion of FMCT (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty), ratification of CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) and further reduction of strategic weapons by the US and Russia, who still have more than two thousand nuclear warheads will not only strengthen nuclear deterrence but also bring peace, security and stability in emerging global order. Besides these efforts, a serious rethinking in the attitude of nations would go a long way in addressing the issue at hand.

Former US Secretary of State John Kerry at the first working session of the G-7 Ministerial meeting with colleagues from Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Britain at the Grand Prince Hotel in Hiroshima, Japan on 10 April 2016


Variations onA MAD PhilosoPhyThe ‘No First Use’ has outlived its utility. India may have a non-aggressive doctrine but it is useful and effective for its security. It can replace ‘No First Use with a better formulation. A strong signal accompanied with the required action needs to go to Pakistan to stop nuclear blackmail. The time to call the nuclear bluff has come.

nuclear doctrines COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

nuclear doctrines, which are supposed to delineate the principles or guidelines for the use

of nuclear forces by the nuclear weapons countries in accordance with their respective national objectives, have been evolving. New countries joining at different nuclear ages and new security situations emerging in the world provide dynamics to the nuclear doctrines. Although the United States (US), the first nuclear weapon country has been experimenting most with the doctrine, other countries too have been forced to adjust their nuclear doctrines to the changing strategic environment. The nuclear doctrines of the nuclear weapons countries are varied not only in terms of content and orientation but also in terms of the size and the designation. What some countries mean a nuclear doctrine, others may call it a strategy. At times, the phrase-nuclear doctrine is meant as a kind of manual spelling out all the details of the operational aspect of the nuclear weapon. The strategic community may debate the shape of the doctrine, but it has to accept what a State offers. The rest is left for interpretation. Nuclear Doctrine Of RussiaThe Russian nuclear doctrine is very much dependent on the quality and size of not only its nuclear weapons but also its conventional weapons. When Russia succeeded the Soviet

Union, it had to make adjustments to the new reality. It kept releasing documents announcing the contours of its nuclear doctrine. Some of its documents are considered quite relevant in giving a new direction to its nuclear doctrine. Time to time, it has defined its threats. Some of the threats remain old but some are, of course, new.

The US, for Russia, is no longer an ideological rival, though it does not share the perception of belonging to the same camp notwithstanding Trump’s musings. Like the Western block Russia has also started talking about preventing proliferation and addressing the challenge posed by terrorists in its military doctrine. The nuclear doctrine constitutes an important segment of the Russian military doctrine. In recent years, in fact, the Crimea episode has threatened the revival of a new Cold War. Russia gave a new thrust to its nuclear preparedness. Russia has put a new emphasis on modernising its nuclear weapons. In the expanded meeting of the

Russian Defence Ministry Board on 22 December

2016, a Russian

DR Rajiv NayaN

The writer is a Senior Research Associate at the

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi since 1993, where he specialises in export control, non-proliferation and arms control. He was a Visiting Research Fellow at Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, where he

published his monograph Non-proliferation Issues

in South Asia.


government official stated, “Our nuclear triad, which is vital for maintaining strategic parity, has been maintained in the required state. I would like to say that the share of modern weapons in our nuclear forces nearly reached 60 per cent of total armaments.” In the same meeting, in which President Putin was also present, it was stated that ‘the combat capability

of strategic nuclear forces would be augmented in terms of missile complexes to counter the existing and the future Ballistic Missile Defence systems. Russia, the successor of the Soviet Union, has reversed its ‘no first use’ policy. For years, it has been considered following the doctrine of nuclear ‘de-escalation of aggression’

The United States is the backbone of NATO



in a significant role of nuclear weapons for itself and its allies. For a long period, the US had the policy of nuclear warfighting. However, now it has started seeing deterrence as the sole purpose for its nuclear arsenals. It does not have no first use policy. It is modernising its nuclear arsenals and like Russia, it is reducing the size of its nuclear arsenals. Interestingly, in the American doctrine, the use of nuclear weapons is permitted even when it is attacked with Biological and Chemical Weapons.

France is a member of NATO. Yet, it has a policy of maintaining independent nuclear deterrence. France maintains that ‘the time of the nuclear deterrent is not a thing of the past’. It considers it as a defensive, not offensive strategy. France sees its role in deterring aggression of any form, thwarting blackmail, ensuring ‘freedom of action and decision’, strengthening European defence and so on. But France is not a participant of NATO nuclear planning mechanisms. Its nuclear deterrence is now based only on sea-based and air-based forces. It has discarded the land based dimension of its nuclear force structure. It has a policy of no-use ‘against non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT which comply with their international non-proliferation commitments in terms of weapons of mass destruction’.

It is widely believed that Pakistan basically uses nuclear weapons as a terror shield and for blackmailing its neighbours

under which it apparently has a limited nuclear strike doctrine if it is faced with the survival issue because of the conventional attack. Now, it has strengthened its conventional forces, so, it is believed that it would not rely on this doctrine. It has the doctrine of not attacking non-nuclear weapons countries who have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, it is not applicable to nuclear umbrella holding countries or countries, which are in alliance with nuclear weapons countries. Russia supports both deterrence and arms control. The US and NaTO PolicyAfter the demise of the Soviet Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) struggled to justify the rationale of its nuclear arsenals and programme. The current NATO nuclear doctrine is based on NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept like Active Engagement, Modern Defence and the 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review. The NATO maintains that the fundamental objective of the NATO nuclear forces is nuclear deterrence. The deterrence has been explained as “an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities”. The use of Ballistic Missile Defence finds a place in the NATO nuclear doctrine. The NATO documents list all the threats such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation, the Crimean crisis has become a new rallying point for its members. The US is the backbone of NATO. Its nuclear arsenals have been the source of security of its members for a long period. The US, despite talking about nuclear disarmament and arms control, ardently believes


The United Kingdom (UK) is another nuclear weapons member of NATO. The UK finds its position similar to that of France. It admits that, “During the Cold War, we faced an existential threat from a State adversary through largely predictable military or nuclear means. We no longer face such predictable threats. The adversaries we face will change and diversify as enemies seek means of threat or attack which are cheaper, more easily accessible and less attributable than conventional warfare.”

The UK needs its nuclear deterrence to counter three-tier security threats, including international terrorism. The UK nuclear deterrence is based on five principles. These are: preventing attack, minimum deterrence, the first use of nuclear weapons, collective security through NATO for the Euro-Atlantic area and separately controlled but mutually supporting nuclear forces. The UK emphasises that its nuclear command and control are always under the political control. india’s Neighbourhood MilieuThe Indian strategic community regards West Asia as its strategic neighbourhood and West Asia has Israel as an acknowledged nuclear weapon country. Israel does not admit its nuclear weapons. As a result, it has not pronounced its nuclear weapons doctrine. India also maintains that East Asia is in its extended neighbourhood. Any

development in East Asia affects security of India. China has its reach in Southern as well as in East Asia. North Korea is another nuclear weapon country of the region. Unlike Israel, it has declared its nuclear weapons but like Israel, it has not coherently and sensibly presented its nuclear doctrine. Its provocative statements should not be considered its nuclear doctrine. China was the first nuclear weapon country of Asia within India’s neighbourhood. After becoming nuclear, it announced a no first use policy and no use against non-nuclear weapons countries. However, it is believed in some quarters that China’s no-first use and no use against non-nuclear weapons countries policies are only for non-nuclear umbrella holding NPT countries. China maintains deliberate ambiguity in this regard. China also has the doctrine of credible minimum deterrence but it is qualitatively, and presumably quantitatively, increasing its nuclear arsenals. Quite significantly, China was the first nuclear weapon country that did not announce the size of its nuclear force structure. All the nuclear weapon countries after China followed the Chinese approach of not making the size of their nuclear weapons public. Pakistan is another nuclear weapon country in India’s neighbourhood. It loudly pronounces its Nuclear FIRST USE policy. Pakistan has a policy of credible nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis nuclear weapons and conventional weapons superiority of its adversary. It is widely believed that Pakistan basically uses nuclear weapons as a terror shield and for blackmailing its neighbours. It maintains that it

China also has the doctrine of credible minimum deterrence

but it is qualitatively, and presumably quantitatively,

increasing its nuclear arsenals



the ultimate analysis, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is deceptive and brazenly contradictory.

Need For Revision in india’s PostureIndia, too, has nuclear doctrine ever since it went nuclear, though officially it announced the doctrine in 2003 through 4 January press release. The 2003 press release made it clear that what was being released was merely summary of the India’s nuclear doctrine. The summary of

Pakistan is another nuclear weapon country in India’s neighbourhood after Chinawill use nuclear weapons only in a

situation when it feels its survival is endangered. Pakistan also upholds the principle of no-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons countries. Since 2011, it has been underscoring the role of battlefield nuclear weapon, but quite interestingly, it puts tactical weapons in the framework of full spectrum deterrence. It has short range to medium and intermediate range missile in its system. In


the nuclear doctrine highlighted the following aspects:• a credible minimum deterrent• No First Use• Non-use of nuclear weapons

against non-nuclear weapon States

• Massive retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere

• To inflict unacceptable damage in its massive retaliation

• Control of the civilian political leadership over nuclear weapon and its use

• Two tiered command and control operating through the Nuclear Command Authority

However, the release also mentioned that India will be free to retaliate with nuclear weapons if chemical and biological weapons are used against it. The same release informed appointment of a Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Forces Command ‘to manage and administer all Strategic Forces’. After reviewing the situation, the Indian government erected an alternative chains of command and control structure. Besides, it underlines the positive role India would play in non-proliferation, arms control and nuclear disarmament.

Quite importantly, the release made it clear that there is a provision for review in the nuclear doctrine. In recent years, Pakistan terror strikes and its subsequent use of nuclear shield to prevent any corrective measures against terror strikes have created a strong force in India asking to review and revise the Indian nuclear doctrine. Some argue that a country’s nuclear doctrine is not revised every day. Admittedly, the nuclear doctrine cannot be revised on a daily basis but as discussed, the nuclear doctrines of all the major powers including Russia and the US have been evolving and changing on the basis of their threat perception and capabilities. India has done the review of its doctrine in the past and it should do the same in the future as well: reviewing and revision of the doctrine are necessary to meet the security challenges, especially the nuclear terror shield of Pakistan.

Should India revise its No-first Use doctrine? No First Use has outlived its utility. India should shed the bad habit of using Western or American terms to formulate its policy or doctrine. India may have a non-aggressive doctrine but useful and effective for its security. It can replace No First Use with a better formulation. The time to call the nuclear bluff has come. The Prime Minister should spell out a national security strategy in which nuclear strategy or doctrine should find an adequate place. The document must demonstrate originality. Photocopying doctrine will reduce India to a joke which in turn will continue to spell disaster for its national security.



Past, PresentAnd FutureViolation of the US Hyde Act of 2006 may lead to total collapse of the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation which actually is the very foundation of the NSG waiver allowing India to enter into nuclear trade internationally.

nuclear doctrines INDIAN MILIEU

the first indication of India not being averse to acquiring nuclear weapons comes from the statement of

Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal

Nehru on 15 April 1948 when the Parliament passed the Atomic Energy Act 1948, establishing the Atomic Energy Commission with Dr Homi Bhabha as its Chairman. Nehru said: “We must develop this atomic energy

(Left to right) At the opening of the International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: Max Petitpierre, President of the Swiss Confederation, UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, Dr Homi J Bhabha of India, President of the Conference and Prof Walter G Whitman from the United States, Conference Secretary General.

Dr BB Singh

The author is a practicing lawyer and a retired scientist formerly with Department

of Atomic Energy, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), Mumbai

and United Nations, International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA), Vienna.



quite apart from war - indeed, I think we must develop it for the purpose of using it for peaceful purposes... Of course, if we are compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments of any of us will stop the nation from using it that way.”

Acute AwarenessIndia’s interest in developing nuclear explosive devices is also reflected in an interesting incidence of 1960 described at http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaOrigin.html as follows: “In 1960 Kenneth Nichols, a former US Army engineer who played significant roles in the Manhattan Project, represented Westinghouse in discussions on power plant construction (in India) . In a meeting with Nehru and Bhabha, Nichols relates that Nehru turned to Bhabha and asked: “Can you develop an atomic bomb?” Bhabha assured him that he could and in reply to Nehru’s next question about time, he estimated that he would need about a year to do it. ... He concluded by saying to Bhabha “Well, don’t do it until I tell you to.”

PnEs integral Part Of ProgrammeIndeed, India has always supported the policy of non-proliferation and development of nuclear energy mainly for power generation but it has been silently working also for peaceful uses of nuclear explosions (PNEs). Dr Bhabha projected in 1962 that India would be generating 20,000 MW electrical energy from nuclear reactors before 1987. His successor Dr Vikram Sarabhai increased this in 1971 to 43,500 MW by the year 2000. In 1991,

Dr PK Iyengar reduced it to 20,000 MW by 2020 which was retained in 1992 and 2005 by Dr Chidambaram and Dr Kakodkar respectively. But it is a matter of concern that with only three years short from the target date the nuclear power production has reached just 6,750 MW. It cannot be ascribed to financial constraints or any dearth of intellectual manpower. India had enough of both of these. Also, it is not because India was facing global sanctions since the prediction has been made post-1974 when sanctions were in force. It must be presumed that India had pursued multi-dimensional nuclear activities including development of nuclear explosive devices one of which was tested in 1974.

The raison d’etreThe reasons for India’s 1974 nuclear explosion are many. India had suffered great humiliation in the Sino-India war in October 1962. The Chinese nuclear explosion at Lop Nur in November 1964 could have also triggered India’s interest. While India had declined to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferatin Treaty (NPT) that became operational in 1970, China became its member and joined the elite group of the five nuclear weapon States. Since India and China were once the two great civilisations in the ancient past it was natural for India to compete and regain its past glory. In fact,

The NFT pledge is one of the major conditions for the NSG waiver granted to India that allows purchase of nuclear fuel for its power reactors


Dr Raja Ramanna who was the chief architect of the 1974 nuclear device did mention so as: “There was never a discussion among us over whether we shouldn’t make the bomb. How to do it, was more important. For us it was a matter of prestige that would justify our ancient past. The question of deterrence came much later. Also, as Indian scientists, we were keen to

show our Western counterparts, who thought little of us those days, that we too could do it.”

Regaining the prestige came with a price. Following the 1974 explosion, several meetings were held in London during 1975 and 1978 where Canada, France, the UK and USA, Japan, the Soviet Union and

Entergy’s Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC) seen from across the Hudson River


Western Germany discussed how to curtail India’s nuclear ambition. This ‘London Group’ resolved that to ensure a better non-proliferation, nuclear trade should be pursued with stricter conditions to non-weapon States like India. Global sanctions were soon imposed on India. This group now known as ‘Nuclear Suppliers Group’ (NSG) comprising of 48 States controls international trade in nuclear and non-nuclear materials, equipment and technologies for reactors.

no ‘Deterrence’ intentIndia claimed that its 1974 test was a peaceful nuclear experiment (PNE). Hence, India did not formulate any Nuclear Doctrine unlike China which announced its “No First Use” (NFU) policy soon after its first nuclear test in 1964. The Chinese, thus, made it clear that their device was a nuclear weapon. Despite India’s firm policy for peaceful uses of nuclear energy including explosive devices, it was denied the opportunity of international cooperation in

nuclear field. Nonetheless, India had refrained from conducting any further tests for the next 24 years till May 1998.

In the meantime, on 19 December 1994, the United Nations General Assembly had sought the opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of threat and use of nuclear weapons. The Court was divided and with the casting vote of the President (Chief Justice) it concluded on 8 July 1996 that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law. However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake”.


NPT Nuclear Weapon States (China, France, Russia, UK, USA)Non-NPT Nuclear Weapon States (India, North Korea, Pakistan)Undeclared Nuclear Weapon States (Israel)NATO nuclear weapons sharing states (Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Turkey)States formerly possessing nuclear weapons (Belarus, Kazakstan, Ukraine, South Africa)

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Global Map


The threat or use of nuclear weapons under certain

exceptional circumstances would be acceptable under the

International Humanitarian Law (Geneva Convention-IV 1949) to

which India is a signatory

right Of Self-defence Judge Fleischhauer in particular opined separately as “...the right to self-defense would be severely curtailed if for a State, victim of an attack with nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons or otherwise constituting a deadly menace for its very existence, nuclear weapons were totally ruled out as an ultimate legal option”[1].

One may therefore conclude that the threat or use of nuclear weapons under certain exceptional circumstances would be acceptable under the International Humanitarian Law (Geneva Convention-IV 1949) to which India is a signatory. Whether this also could have been a contributory factor for India to conduct its May 1998 series of nuclear tests is a matter of conjecture.

Credible Minimum Deterrence Soon after 1998 tests, India drafted its Nuclear Doctrine of credible minimum deterrence on 17 August 1998 that was approved

by the Cabinet on 4 January 2003[2]. The five main features of the Doctrine are: (i) A posture of ‘No First Use’ (NFU), that nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere; (ii) In the event of major attack against India or Indian forces anywhere by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliation with nuclear weapons; (iii) Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership through the nuclear command authority, (iv) Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage; and (v) India should step up efforts in research and development to keep up with technological advances in this field.

Pitfall Of no First UseThe NFU policy is generally appropriate for a country having a superior conventional defence capability than its adversary. China’s NFU declaration after its first nuclear

1 http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ files/95/7497.pdf 2 (http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/ 04012003/ r0401200 33.html.)

Replace Image


test in 1964 is understandable. But India’s NFU policy is difficult to justify when it is facing two nuclear enemies one of which (China) also possesses strong conventional defence capability. In addition, while an effective retaliatory attack is logistically possible in China’s current political system, in a democratic India, this may not be since the decision to retaliate would require a longer reaction time during which international diplomatic pressures would force India to observe restraint.

Furthermore, the concept of massive retaliation causing damage unacceptability is suggestive of threat to civilian population and civil industrial establishments of the enemy. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its advisory opinion has specifically cautioned against it: “...the cardinal principles contained in the texts constituting the fabric of humanitarian law...aims at the protection of the civilian population and civilian objects and...States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets”. Hence, the massive retaliation envisaged in India’s Nuclear Doctrine-2003 is violative of the International Humanitarian Law as well as against Indian ethos, culture and morality.

“Massive retaliation” Flawed DoctrineHistorically, the massive retaliation policy targeting counter-value and soft targets was adopted in 1949-50 by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies facing the huge conventional Soviet forces. But it was abandoned in 1967

fearing mutual destruction when the Soviets also acquired nuclear weapons. The NATO allies then adopted the strategy of “flexible response” which states: “...to use nuclear weapons first if its initial response to a conventional attack did not prove adequate to containing the aggressor, and to deliberately escalate to general nuclear war, if necessary.”[3] The massive retaliation policy of India will also have very serious additional socio-political consequences particularly in case of Pakistan where almost every citizen has a relative or sympathiser

in India. It is therefore, no surprise that India’s Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, though claiming it as his personal view said on 10 November 2016, “Why a lot of people say that India has No First Use policy. Why should I bind myself…I should say I am a responsible nuclear power and I will not use it irresponsibly...And as an individual, I get a feeling sometime why do I say that I am not going to use it first.”

India’s nuclear doctrine also emphasises research and development that is essential for quality assurance of stockpiles, verification of new designs and for evaluating their performance. Nuclear tests then become necessary. It is to be remembered that the USA had conducted a minimum of about

The massive retaliation envisaged in India’s Nuclear Doctrine-2003 is violative of the International Humanitarian Law


3 https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999 _07-08/jmja99


six tests for every new weapon design; France on the average twenty-two tests per design; the UK and China conducted respectively eleven and seven tests per weapon design. India has however declared a voluntary moratorium of No Further Test (NFT) after conducting one test each for its five types of nuclear devices.

The NFT pledge by India has become the most important for India’s civil nuclear activities. It is one of the major conditions for the NSG waiver granted to India that allows purchase of nuclear fuel for its power reactors. It is a legal commitment in India’s bilateral nuclear agreements with other countries. Nonetheless, surprisingly a definition of “nuclear test” has not been even attempted anywhere. On the contrary, in the documents submitted to the US Senate requesting ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), it is mentioned that “the United States decided that a formal definition of nuclear explosion was unnecessary and would be problematic”.

Tests MoratoriumHowever, India ought to be cautious and cannot conduct a nuclear test beyond one pound of TNT (Trinitrotoluene) yield without jeopardising its nuclear power programme. This restriction is engrained in the India specific US legislation ‘The Hyde Act 2006’ that has enabled the US President to initiate civil nuclear cooperation with India. The Section 106 of the Act that deals with inoperability and waiver of the enablement states: “A determination and any waiver u/s 104 shall cease to be effective if

the President determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive after the date of the enactment of this title.’’ The Section 110(10) of the Act defines a nuclear explosion

(for India): “...any device designed to produce an instantaneous release of an amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear material that is greater than the amount of energy that would be released from the detonation of one pound of TNT.” Needless to emphasise that violation of the Act may lead to total collapse of the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation which actually is the very foundation of the NSG waiver allowing India to enter into nuclear trade internationally.

The way ahead seems rough, tough and risky.

India’s nuclear doctrine also emphasises research and development

Former US President George Bush and India’s former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh exchanging pleasantries in New Delhi on 2 March 2006


The objective of a nuclear doctrine is to clarify the utility and the purpose served by the acquisition and maintenance of

nuclear weapons to a State. India through both 1999 and 2003 version of its nuclear doctrine has pledged punitive and massive retaliation, respectively, in response to a first strike. Adding to that the country has also promised unacceptable damage to be inflicted on the aggressor initiating a nuclear war. The paper tests the viability of such a deterrence posture and also the meaning of “unacceptable” therein.

A nuclear doctrine saves a State with nuclear weapons from aimlessness, misperceptions and misconstructions in regard to its strategies and behaviour. At the Indian Nuclear Tests in 1998, the country revealed its nuclear weapon capability; the same was followed by a well-crafted nuclear doctrine for the country.

DocTrinal FeaTure oF‘Unacceptable Damage’The health of nuclear deterrence is dependent on the conviction and resolution of the promised. The pledge to cause punitive or massive damage in the second strike is only in response of a first nuclear strike launched by the adversary.

The Indian nuclear doctrine is also a blueprint, unlike the case of two Indian neighbours; India decided to have an articulated and written nuclear doctrine[1]. It provided a credible deterrence to the country. The initial document was called the Draft Nuclear Doctrine[2] which came out the very next year of India declaring itself a nuclear weapon State later followed by a formal, detailed and coherent document issued by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) in 2003 known as the Indian Nuclear Doctrine.

Evolution Of Indian Doctrine Among several noteworthy features of the doctrine, one carries a promise of nuclear retaliation in response to a nuclear attack by an aggressor. It mentions punitive or massive retaliation to inflict unacceptable damages to the adversary. Both the 1999 and the 2003 documents clearly reinforce nuclear deterrence in varied proportions. The draft

nuclear doctrines ADVANCE WARNING

1 Manpreet Sethi, Nuclear Strategy: India’s March Towards Credible Deterrence, (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2009), pp. 119.

2 Ministry of External Affairs, Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine, accessed on 29 October, 2016. Available at: http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18916/Draft+Report+of+National+ Security+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+ Nuclear+Doctrine


ManIsha ChaurasIya

The writer is a PhD research scholar at

Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament, Jawaharlal

Nehru University, New Delhi


nuclear doctrine of 1999 states that, “any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor”. India’s nuclear doctrine 2003, the detailed and more formal version of the previous document states that, “nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage”. The change in terminology in both the 1999 and the 2003 doctrines was not just formal but substantial. The latter document was much deeper and broader in scope. With massive retaliation, there was also a replacement of the word nuclear with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Another addition was that the latter added the clause that, “in the event of a major attack against India or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear

weapons”[3]. This particular clause clearly reflects the potential threat caused by the fresh introduction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) by Pakistan in its nuclear arsenal. This particular technology was inherently destabilising in nature as it degrades nuclear weapons as war fighting weapons assuming space for several rounds of nuclear exchanges in warfare. The massive retaliation designed to inflict unacceptable damages therefore joins the whole formula of the Indian nuclear doctrine like a jigsaw puzzle. At the surface level, it appears that the pledge to retaliate massively hints towards disproportionate and barbaric a response to a first strike, which could be even through small nuclear weapons but an in-depth analysis of the promise of ‘unacceptable damage’ and punitive and massive retaliation suggests that it is much more than that. It is a unique

3 Prime Minister’s Office, Cabinet Committee On Security Reviews Progress In Operationalizing India’s Nuclear Doctrine, 2003. Accessed on 22 March, 2017, available at: http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html

India decided to have a written and documented nuclear doctrine which served its deterence policy

The NFU reflects

responsible behaviour.

It also reduces the chances of accidental

use



the doctrine ought not to bind itself with specifications regarding the timing and specific targets of retaliation. Devastating of cities or population centres, major natural resources, killing of non-combatants, disabling the nuclear command and control of the aggressor are various options available while planning a massive second strike in retaliation. Unacceptable damage averts the trap of quantifying the retaliation expected from India in any of these terms and allows the country to carefully analyse the kind of damage that could be unacceptable to the aggressor. More than the hypothetical response in case of a nuclear first strike, the purpose of the doctrine is to strengthen nuclear deterrence which it does very aptly. In simplest terms by declaring well in advance about a punitive unacceptable damage India would cause in retaliation to a nuclear first strike, it places the ball in the other actor’s court. Through the doctrine

even much prior to a war or war-like hostilities the country has firmly in advance forwarded its intent with nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are political and not war fighting weapons in the Indian nuclear policy. Thus, through unacceptable damage the doctrine seriously warns the adversary regarding the consequences of nuclear adventurism and also cements the nuclear deterrence.

Massive retaliation apart from pledging annihilation also strengthens the health of the nuclear deterrence in a unique way

way of the Indian nuclear doctrine to ensure strategic stability within the South Asian neighbourhood. It invites and inculcates a sensible and non-reckless behaviour from the adversary. Massive retaliation apart from pledging annihilation also strengthens the health of the nuclear deterrence in a unique way. By negating proportional response to nuclear attacks, it straightaway discourages nuclear war fighting as a viable activity. The overall idea actually harbours peace instead of war. Expecting rationality From adversaryThe word “unacceptable” damage with massive retaliation connotes some damage which is going to be intolerable and insufferable to the other. Massive retaliation in a second strike in response to a first strike hints towards a credible promise of devastation unacceptable to the adversary. Without explicitly mentioning the counter value or counter force attack, the doctrine aptly keeps the option open on time and space regarding the retaliation. The doctrine thus, doesn’t promise an immediate and proportionate response to encourage active war fighting with nuclear weapons. The following three sources of knowledge support this feature of the Indian nuclear doctrine: (a) subjectivity of international political circumstances and different levels of “unacceptable” of different countries, (b) the Cold War lessons and the introduction of destabilising Tactical Nuclear Weapons in the international politics, and (c) the experiences of India with its neighbours in conventional wars. All these sources suggest that ‘one shoe does not fit all’ and therefore


Indian nuclear PostureIndia’s nuclear posture and policy have broadly been responsible marked by restraint. Analysis of its feature of massive retaliation through unacceptable damages to the aggressor is also a part of a large formulation. Apart from it, the Indian nuclear doctrine has some other salient features. It has clinched to the nuclear No First Use (NFU) in its policy. The NFU reflects responsible behaviour. It also reduces the chances of accidental use as the country has not remained on a hair-trigger alert. Under an NFU, a State also keeps its nuclear arsenal in a de-mated condition with a necessary control by the civilian leadership. Apart from this, the Indian nuclear posture has also responsibly undertaken a credible minimum deterrence approach where averting a mad arms race the country has moved towards minimum to ensure nuclear deterrence. Soon, after the first and till date only nuclear weapons tests by India in the summer of 1998, it moved to a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing.

The doctrine provided the country with necessary ‘direction on important subsidiary issues pertaining to force posture, concept of operations and weapon deployment’[4] and the feature of massive retaliation or punitive retaliation therein is based on the concept of deterrence by punishment. Nuclear expert Ashley Tellis states that, “doctrine by itself does not determine the outcome of any power-political rivalries, (but) it can condition how States or groups respond to provocation or opportunities.”[5]

EvaluationThe health of nuclear deterrence is dependent on the conviction and resolution of the promised. The pledge to cause punitive or massive damage in the second strike is only in response of a first nuclear strike launched by the adversary. The “unacceptable” damage thus at a surface appears destabilising and disproportionate but a deeper analysis reveals that it actually welcomes stability and nuclear deterrence.

4 Manpreet Sethi, 2009, pp. 121.

5 Ashley Tellis, “India’s Emerging Nuclear Doctrine: Exemplifying the Lessons of the Nuclear Revolution”, accessed on 1 November, 2016. Available at: http://www.mdcbowen.org/p2/ww3/i_nuke_doctrine.pdf


In this photo, members of

the Manhattan Project are

seen hoisting the plutonium

bomb atop a 100-foot firing

tower on 15 July 1945.

It was a day before the bomb was

detonated in the Trinity Test


Asymmetry A GuArAnteeAgAinst AnnihilAtionTo maintain the peace and stability in the region, Israel should make its nuclear arsenal public in order to curb nuclear proliferation in the region. Many analysts have suggested that in order to achieve this, Israel’s denuclearisation should come first to achieve peace.

nuclear doctrines ISRAELI MANTRA

After facing the drastic effects of the holocaust in 1945, human race had made various

efforts to avoid nuclear calamity especially by enforcing a standoff based on the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and an international agreement against

nuclear proliferation. But by the end of the 20th century, several nuclear powers had joined the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council in acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet, deterrence became a word commonly used in international system to defend the State’s rights to acquire nuclear weapons. All the States of the world with nuclear weapons say


Anu ShArmA

The writer is a Research Associate at the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS),

New Delhi.

that the purpose of acquiring nuclear weapons is for deterrence.

Israeli rationaleIn the last few decades, various countries (Libya and Iran abandoned their nuclear weapons programmes under international pressure) in West Asia have intensified their efforts towards acquiring nuclear

weapons. Israel remains an ‘undeclared nuclear weapons State’. It started its nuclear programme in the 1950s. It is also the only State in the region in possession of nuclear weapons. However, Israeli nuclear programme was always shrouded in secrecy and is still tagged as the “bomb in the basement” philosophy. Israel has always cited its hostile Arab neighbours along with the Iranian threat of eliminating Israel as a major reason for its pursuit and acquiring of nuclear weapons. A vigorous preoccupation with security issues has always characterised the Israeli approach to international affairs. Israel had fought a lot of wars with its regional neighbours in order to protect its existence which was in a way responsible for the initial doctrinal debate on the

use of military power. It led to the decision to acquire nuclear weapons and the ambiguous posture to go with it.[1] Israel’s decision to pursue the bomb was also motivated almost entirely by its perceived conventional integrity vis-à-vis Arab neighbours. Although these neighbours did not possess nuclear weapons, Israeli leaders calculated that acquiring a nuclear weapon was the surest way to negate this incoherent conventional imbalance and thereby ensure Jewish State’s survival.[2]

Iran DefangedWith the successful completion of the nuclear deal between P5+1 countries and Iran in Vienna in July 2015, there has arisen a need for Israel to forge a more comprehensive

Nuclear weapons are to be used to ensure Israel’s survival

1 https://www.idsa-india.org/an-mar00-6.html2 http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/why-countries-build-nuclear-weapons-in-the-21st-century/


and conspicuous strategic nuclear doctrine where attention is directed towards all still-plausible nuclear enemies. However, till now Israel’s nuclear programme and policy related to it is still shrouded in “ambiguity” or “opacity”. Israel had never officially denied nor admitted to having nuclear weapons leaving ambiguity whether its means to create, will not disclose or will not make first use of the nuclear weapons. Israel’s policy of ambiguity was developed for two reasons, one to avoid the penalties in the US and international system if it develops nuclear weapons; and second, Israel also received a certain degree of international criticism and they continued demands that it sign the NPT. Third, it also reduced Arab motivations to “go nuclear”. While Arab leaders most probably know that Israel has an actual nuclear capability, they were reluctant to get involved in a nuclear arms race with Israel.[3]

Strategic PegBehind doctrinal decisions that States have to make – especially in relation to nuclear weapons – are two basic questions: (a) At the substantive level, what kind of role it envisages for nuclear weapons in meeting the country’s most important security challenges; and (b) with how much clarity and specificity, or conversely ambiguity, should the doctrine be expressed.[4] Well thought out nuclear doctrines are ideally founded on a strong conception about the role, purposes and limitations of nuclear weapons to fit into the pursuit of that State’s grand strategy. The potential for nuclear instability is the greatest when a doctrine reflects either a lack of strategic thought or some kind of

strategic drift in conceptualising how nuclear weapons feature in country’s grand strategy or where there is a clear mismatch between the security challenge faced by a State and the kind of role it assigns to nuclear weapons. Geographic considerations also could motivate States in the region to forward deploy nuclear forces even if their delivery systems already allow them to use nuclear weapons virtually anywhere in the world.[5]

However, this ambiguity relating to nuclear weapons ended to a certain extent when the US made a declaration about Israeli nuclear weapons and shared details about its nuclear programme in early 2015. It is believed that Israel started developing a nuclear weapons programme since the mid-1950s and its nuclear policy had been related to its relationship with its Arab

neighbours. It includes policies of deterrence to prevent conventional attacks or those with the weapons of mass destruction, as well as the “Samson option”[6] of nuclear use following the outbreak of the war in order to ensure the survival of the State. At the time of expanding existential peril with Egypt and Iran continuously opposing Israeli nuclear programme, Israel is yet to make any policy disclosures about its nuclear deterrence.

The official raison d’etre is to convince the Arabs that the conflict can only be solved at a political and not at an existential level

3 http://www.e-ir.info/2012/11/26/israels-posture-of-nuclear-ambiguity/4 http://www.tvpaul.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/INTA92_1_01_ShankarPaul.pdf5 Neil Narang, Erik Gartzlec & Matthew Kroenig (ed.), Non-proliferation policy and nuclear posture: causes and consequences for the spread of nuclear weapons ,Routledge publications, p. 51.6 The Samson option refers to a hypothetical situation in which Israeli conventional forces are defeated and the very existence of Israel is threatened.



underpinning Of DeterrenceIn order to answer the question regarding the nuclear doctrine, we first need to define what is a nuclear doctrine. Nuclear doctrine in theory is a concept of military strategy that promotes the deterrence by guaranteeing an immediate “massive retaliation” to an aggressive attack against the State. Nuclear doctrine and strategy developed during the Cold War period as a consequence of continuing political struggle between the US and the USSR. Deterrence was of extreme importance in creating an impression of military strength upon a potential adversary that it would have no chance of victory in war. This gave birth to what was known as a mad arms race between

the superpowers including Britain, France and China. Their pursuit of nuclear weapon programmes was for the attainment of a great power status besides, acquiring a credible deterrence. Their action did not make any significant contribution towards the process of the evolution of nuclear doctrine and by and large, followed the American concept of employing it.[7] Israel, on the contrary, had a distinct consideration in retaining and potentially using its nuclear arsenal – as a security guarantee against conventionally powerful and hostile Arab neighbours.

Ambit Of Israeli DeterrenceDespite the secrecy surrounding it, some fundamental features of

Children rescued from Nazi concentration camps in Europe seen arriving at the Atlit detention camp near Haifa, Israel in 1945

7 http://www.defencejournal.com/apr99/evolution-nuclear.htm


Israel’s nuclear policy are quite clear. The underlining basis of its nuclear arsenal is to deter any conventional or non-conventional Arab nuclear or chemical or biological attack. Built into this strategy is a clear and specific resolve to use the nuclear arsenal as weapons of ‘last resort’. This ‘last resort’ option also has another aspect to it – deterrence and actual use. Deterrence is also a two-fold concept – deterrence against the initiation of war and deterrence in mid-war ie threats to use nuclear weapons against attacking Arab States, if the war is not terminated immediately. Thus, nuclear weapons are to be used in order to ensure Israel’s survival, rooted in its anxiety over another Jewish holocaust. And it is this fear of the occurrence of another Jewish holocaust which forms the basis of Israeli’s doctrine of last resort.

Israeli n-TestsFrom 2010-2014, Israel conducted a series of tests, code-named Green Field, mostly in the Negev Desert, where 20 detonations were tested in order to assess how such explosions would affect the country if it were to be attacked by crude radioactive weapons. In the early 2015, the United States declassified a 1987 Department of Defence document detailing Israel’s nuclear programme in great depth. According to the report, Israel uses its nuclear weapons in somewhat subtler ways. The report states that the possession of nuclear weapons can be a powerful lever to maintain the status quo, or to tilt certain events in Israeli’s advantage.[8] Additionally, this arsenal could also be used to protect the so-called moderate Arab States from internal insurrection, or to

intervene in any probable inter-Arab warfare.[9] Another important reason for developing nuclear weapons could be to compel the United States and other western powers to continue their support to Israel, even when the situation is countering their interests in the region.

The probable Israeli nuclear doctrine also dictates that any kind of unconventional attack on Israel would require non-conventional weapons to counter it. Many Israeli leaders have warned that any missile attack against Israel would result in a nuclear escalation – an unthinkable but a last resort – a strong possibility.[10]

Effect On The hinterlandIsraeli nuclear weapons have a profound impact on the politics and posturing of the West Asian nations. Israel’s insistence on the independent use of its nuclear weapons could possibly become the foundation for Israel’s grand strategy in the region. However, in the present scenario, Iran’s nuclear ambitions are the primary concern for the architects of Israel’s nuclear policy. Also, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by any Arab State in the region will be considered a direct threat to Israel’s existence. However, it is Israel’s nuclear arsenal that – whether in transparency or opacity – has increased the urgency amongst the Arab States vying to acquire nuclear weapons. Israel’s posture of ambiguity has “allowed” Egypt and other Arab States to tolerate Israel’s actual capability and thus, increase internal pressure to try and build up their own nuclear capabilities. Theoretically, nuclear deployments are more likely to occur to allies than non-allies. Having a share increases the likelihood that

8 https://www.thenation.com/article/its-official-pentagon-finally-admitted-israel-has-nuclear-weapons-too/9 http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/policy/israeli-nuclear-policy/steinbach_israeli_program.pdf10 Ibid.



The Russian president, Putin’s speech at the Plenary

Session of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly

two States will arrange a nuclear deployment to protect the host from possible aggression (in this case the US and Israel). Also, the support for the power projection model was found in certain cases. So, various Arab States might try to acquire nuclear weapons in order to project themselves as more powerful States in the region and counter Israel’s existing powerful status.

In order to maintain the peace and stability in the region, Israel should make its nuclear arsenal public in

order to curb nuclear proliferation in the region. Many analysts have suggested that in order to achieve this Israel’s denuclearisation should come first to achieve peace.[11]

As mentioned above, Israel’s strategy to acquire nuclear weapons and prevent other Arab States from acquiring it, lies in the context of guaranteeing the survival of the Jewish State. The official raison d’-etre for Israel’s nuclear option is to convince the Arabs that the conflict in West Asia can only be 11 Ibid.


solved at a political and not at an existential level. Israel’s history and Israeli analysts suggest that the concern about threats to the existence of Israel would always be present and this would be taken as justification for the permanent retention of the nuclear arsenal – continuance of the status quo. In the present circumstances, Israel’s bombs will remain in the ‘basement’ and the establishment will keep repeating that they would not be the first to ‘introduce’ nuclear weapons in West Asia.

Double StandardsIn a way, Israel’s nuclear programme and its exposure to the world would highlight major points, such as:• It would bring the world’s focus

to the single most destabilising factor in the West Asian region and make other States

to seek a deterrent for their own protection;

• It can expose the double-standards of the United States and other western powers who have condemned the States of Iran and Syria for acquiring weapons of mass destruction and on the other hand protecting and enabling Israel; and

• Acknowledging Israel’s nuclear programme would focus international public attention on the necessity of nuclear weapons free zone in West Asia. All said and done, Israel will definitely not give up its nuclear weapons, but there is an earnest stipulation to make its nuclear programme and doctrinal strategy related to it known to the international community in order to stop the proliferation of the same in the West Asian region.

Israel is believed to have tested dirty bombs in the Negev Desert



INS ArIhANtCompletes the CirCleSurvivability and endurance potential of nuclear submarines is a significant advantage and these vessels can lurk in ocean depths for months and within striking range of the adversary, creating a virtually indestructible arm of deterrence.

nuclear doctrines INDIA’S NUCLEAR TRIAD

Saloni Salil

The writer is a Geopolitics and Security Analyst. She

has been associated as Global Security Analyst with

IndraStra Global, US and as a Researcher, South Asia

Desk, Wikistrat, US. She is a designated Visiting Fellow in the Indian Ocean Research

Programme at Future Directions International,

Australia. She is also included as a contributor in Asia Pacific Security

Magazine, Australia. She has also authored a monograph titled “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea: Role

of United States and India”. Her research areas include the Indian Ocean Region, South China Sea and the

Indo-Pacific Studies. She has been currently contributing

to the growing discourse on the concept of Indo-

Pacific and the major power intentions in the region.


Nuclear weapons are critical for deterrence. They equip countries with the ability to deter an adversary

from using nuclear weapons against their homeland and also prevent a war from escalating to a full-scale war furthering threats of a nuclear attack. The aim of having a nuclear triad is to be able to absorb the first strike and retaliate with a second strike imposing mutually assured destruction. Thus, the aim of this

paper is to make a modest attempt to discuss the need for a nuclear triad, India’s nuclear triad capability and the recently inducted INS Arihant that completed India’s quest to become a nuclear triad power.

india’s Threat PerceptionsThe growing proximity between China and Pakistan, an accelerated

engagement between Russia and China and the joint military exercise between Pakistan and Russia is something India is wary of. Also on the pretext of a rising threat of Islamic State in Afghanistan and over all stability in the war-torn country, a seamless comfort between Russia-China-Pakistan on the matter seems to be brewing that can converge into a military and strategic alliance in the future that we need to be watchful about.

These events indicate a not so ideal geopolitical situation for India as all the above-mentioned countries are not only crowding India on its northern borders but also are nuclear capable (Russia and China de-facto and Pakistan de-jure nuclear power) and two of which ie Russia and China are nuclear triad powers. It is therefore, no surprise that given India’s geographical location and a not-so-friendly neighbourhood that India secures itself with a strong nuclear force. Although India envisaged for itself a “minimum credible nuclear deterrence” and a “no-first use” policy (as opposed to the fact that Pakistan has no clear nuclear doctrine and has never

nuclear doctrines INDIA’S NUCLEAR TRIAD

India believes in the ideals of a nuclear weapon free world, but till that happens, we need

to stay guarded


1 Suhasini Krishnan, “INS ARIHANT DeQoded: The Final Piece in India’s Nulcear Triad”, The Quint, October 18, 2016, available at https://www.thequint.com/explainers/2016/10/18/ins-arihant-decoded-final-piece-in-indias-nuclear-triad-indian-navy-russia-narendra-modi-submarine-sunil-lanba-vice-admiral2 Ajey Lele and Parveen Bhardwaj, “India’s Nuclear Triad A Net Assessment”, IDSA Occassional Paper No. 31, available at http://www.idsa.in/system/files/OP_IndiasNuclearTriad.pdf3 Gurmeet Kanwal, “India’s Nuclear Force Structure 2025”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 30, 2016, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-s-nuclear-force-structure-2025-pub-63988 IndiasNuclearTriad.pdf

nuclear weapon. The triad provides the potency to the country which has been under a nuclear attack to respond swiftly by nuclear means. Such a system essentially increases the deterrence potential of the State’s nuclear forces”[2].

india’s Maritime Dimension“India follows a policy of deterrence by punishment, which uses a counter -value targeting strategy aimed at inflicting unacceptable damage not a counterforce strategy aimed at destroying the adversary’s nuclear forces”[3]. It becomes imperative that we revisit India’s triad and the strides it has made in achieving it.

India’s land leg of its nuclear triad comprises of – Prithvi missiles, AGNI missiles and the recently tested AGNI V missile which is an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile, other than these, there are cruise missiles like Brahmos (with India’s entry into Missile Technology Control Regime, India can now scale up and develop a new generation of Brahmos Missile with greater range and precision). India’s air based weapon system includes – Jaguar, MiG-29K, Sukhoi-30 and Mirage 2000s.

However, the most important of all the three – the Sea based Nuclear Architecture – is considered to be the most reliable which, also explains why INS Arihant – a nuclear submarine becomes so important, because nuclear submarines are powered by nuclear reactors and do not need to surface to recharge their batteries. These submarines are different from the diesel submarines as they have a nuclear propulsion they don’t require air to burn their fuel enabling them to remain

accepted a “no-first use” policy) and therefore, for survivability, it was imperative that India builds a second strike capability to ensure credible deterrence.

Thereby, accomplishing its goal, in October 2016, India successfully joined the elite club of nuclear triad powers that completed its road to achieving a nuclear triad by inducting INS Arihant (a nuclear submarine with a capability to carry nuclear tipped ballistic missiles) and became the sixth nation in the world to do so.

What is nuclear Triad?Nuclear triad is a capability that allows countries to launch nuclear weapons from three stations ie air, land and sea. “The idea of a triad is that each wing of nuclear defence is powerful enough to stand on its own. Any one strike on the country, therefore, cannot destroy all three wings of the triad. If for instance, one or even two of the wings are destroyed, the third can launch a retaliatory strike”[1].

“Nuclear Triad essentially has three major components – the strategic bombers, Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) for the purpose of delivering a


underwater for longer durations and hence are hard to detect. Thus, nuclear submarines are made such t

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