NOVEMBER 99 FSM - Air Force Safety Center

U N I T E D S T A T E S A I R F O R C E

M A G A Z I N E

NOVEMBER 1999

NOVEMBER 1999, VOL 55, NO 11AIR FORCE RECURRING PUBLICATION 91-1

THE ISSUE:

4 When One Second Does Count: T-38 EjectionSeat PerformanceJust as the aircraft is undergoing major upgrades, so must the ejection seat.

9 “You Lost An Aircraft How?””...I heard an explosion...and looked over in time to seePockets ejecting from his plane about a quarter mileaway...”

U N I T E D S T A T E S A I R F O R C E

M A G A Z I N E

12 PerspectiveI thought I understood “Safety is an Attitude.” Then I got perspective.

15 Ice, Snow, And 10 BelowMore cold and crummy weather tips for aviators.

16 MRT Means “Hit The Flightline Running!”Why MRT Program graduates work smarter AND safer.

20 “Gear Up...I Smell Gas!”“The IN, the flightcrew’s most experienced flier, hadnever experienced such strong fuel fumes in the cockpit...”

22 Lower Back Pain And The USAF FlightcrewThe facts, and some sound advice, from an aviator who’sbeen there.

26 Class A Mishap Summary

28 Maintenance MattersHercules Wasn’t So Mighty After All...And more

30 Ops TopicsCalibrated Fingernails, Ten Percent Don’t Get The Word...And more

Cover photo by SrA Jeffrey Allen

NOVEMBER 1999 ● FLYING SAFETY 3

FSMGENERAL MICHAEL E. RYANChief of Staff, USAF

MAJ GEN FRANCIS C. GIDEON, JR.Chief of Safety, USAF

LT COL J. PAUL LANEChief, Safety Education and Media DivisionEditor-in-ChiefDSN 246-0922

JERRY ROODManaging EditorDSN 246-0950

CMSGT MIKE BAKERMaintenance/Technical EditorDSN 246-0972

DAVE RIDERElectronic Design DirectorDSN 246-0932

MSGT PERRY J. HEIMERPhotojournalistDSN 246-0986

Air Force Safety Center web page: http://www-afsc.saia.af.mil/Flying Safety Safety Magazine on line:http://www-afsc.saia.af.mil/magazine/htdocs/fsmfirst.htm

Commercial Prefix (505) 846-XXXXE-Mail — [email protected]

24 hour fax: DSN 246-0931Commercial: 505-846-0931

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE —THE CHIEF OF SAFETY, USAF

PURPOSE — Flying Safety is published monthly to pro-mote aircraft mishap prevention. Facts, testimony, andconclusions of aircraft mishaps printed herein may notbe construed as incriminating under Article 31 of theUniform Code of Military Justice. The contents of thismagazine are not directive and should not be con-strued as instructions, technical orders, or directivesunless so stated. SUBSCRIPTIONS — For sale by theSuperintendent of Documents, PO Box 371954,Pittsburgh PA 15250-7954; $30 CONUS, $40 foreignper year. REPRINTS — Air Force organizations mayreprint articles from Flying Safety without furtherauthorization. Non-Air Force organizations must advisethe Editor of the intended use of the material prior toreprinting. Such action will ensure complete accuracyof material amended in light of most recent develop-ments. DISTRIBUTION — One copy for each three aircrewmembers and one copy for each six direct aircrew sup-port and maintenance personnel.

POSTAL INFORMATION — Flying Safety (ISSN 00279-9308) is published monthly by HQ AFSC/SEMM, 9700“G” Avenue, S.E., Kirtland AFB NM 87117-5670.Periodicals postage paid at Albuquerque NM and addi-tional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send addresschanges to Flying Safety, 9700 “G” Avenue, S.E.,Kirtland AFB NM 87117-5670.

CONTRIBUTIONS — Contributions are welcome as arecomments and criticism. The editor reserves the right tomake any editorial changes in manuscripts which hebelieves will improve the material without altering theintended meaning.

FSMSpin City

Courtesy ASRS Callback, Mar 99

A pilot practicing aerobatics over a private pasture learned whyair show performers don’t attempt some maneuvers:

I was using a base of 1,500 feet AGL while I performedadvanced aerobatic maneuvers. I had worked all night the nightbefore and was somewhat tired. I had misjudged a couple ofmaneuvers…and realizing this, added 200 feet to my base…Ientered a hovering maneuver at 1,700 feet AGL. I pulled the noseup to a 60-degree-or-so angle with full power and used the rud-der to keep it straight…A popular air show performer performsthis maneuver and then rudders the aircraft in a small turning cir-cle to the right. I have done this maneuver many times. This time,I decided to do a left-hand turn.

There is a reason the popular air show performer turns right.The aircraft suddenly broke into a left-hand flat spin. I pulled thepower, put in full right rudder and released the stick…The rudderhad no effectiveness. I pushed the stick all the way forward whichonly resulted in a cross-over spin to inverted. By this time, I wasgetting very low. It finally came out of the spin at about a 45-degree inverted nose-down angle. Due to my lack of altitude, Icontinued a delicate, buffeting 45-degree push to level inverted.I had only 100 to 200 feet before I became a statistic.

I figure that I lost 1,500 feet in only four rotations. Somebotched maneuvers require more than the 1,500 feet minimummandated by the FAA. That altitude is the bottom, and I need atleast double that for any new maneuvers. I am sure my lack ofsleep affected my judgment, and I feel that I am lucky to have sur-vived…

We’re also glad that our reporter survived his ordeal and waswilling to share this experience with others.

The Color of CautionCourtesy ASRS Callback, Jan 99

Perhaps the most commonly misread piece of paper is the air-craft checklist. This report of a checklist incident was submitted byan air carrier captain.

We were taxiing out for takeoff. The Second Officer read thetaxi checklist and the First Officer responded. One item is flaps[looking for a green light]. This was responded to correctly. Priorto takeoff, the same challenge was answered again. An FAA in-spector on our jumpseat stopped the checklist at this time andtold us the light was not green, but amber. We returned to thegate. The flight was delayed for 24 hours for a flap problem.

All three crewmembers missed this call. The amber light is asso-ciated with landing, not takeoff. This problem could have causeda very interesting takeoff.

This incident could have been avoided by more careful consid-eration of each individual checklist item, rather than rote re-sponses to the familiar pre-takeoff agenda.

4 FLYING SAFETY ● NOVEMBER 1999

The countdown concludes, “five, four,three, two, one,” and rockets light up the sky near St.George, Utah. It is 13 May 1999, and this countdown isfor a T-38 ejection seat test conducted at the HurricaneMesa Test Track (HMTT), a sled-testing facility managedand operated by Universal Propulsion Company(UPCO), part of B.F. Goodrich. It’s the fifth T-38 ejectionseat test conducted since January 1999, and the tenthsince 1997, to gather acceleration and load data to quan-tify the risk of ejecting extreme-size crewmembers in theT-38 seat.

Extreme-size crewmembers are those outside the orig-inal design limits of the T-38 seat, which in the 1950s, ac-cording to the Anthropometry of Flying Personnel, was132 to 201 pounds. The T-38 seat was upgraded in the1970s to increase its performance and reliability. It waslater requalified for crewmembers who weigh from 140to 211 pounds, the newer size limits.

AFI 48-123, Medical Examination and Standards,which governs allowable crewmember size, was recent-ly changed so people who weigh from 103 to 245 poundsmay be allowed to operate ejection seat equipped air-craft. This new “range" is considerably different from

the 140-211 pounds that had been the guideline previ-ously. 140-211 pounds equated to 5th-95th percentilemales; 103-245 pounds equates to 5th percentile females(5 percent of women are smaller), and 245 pounds rep-resents 98th percentile males (98 percent of men aresmaller). For ejection safety, size and weight do matter.

Some Congressional members have lobbied to expandthe anthropometric range of crewmembers flying fight-er and bomber aircraft to those who weigh as little 103pounds. A lightweight occupant provides many chal-lenges to ejection seat designers, especially coupled withthe probability this same seat must be capable of ejectinga 245-pound person also. These “challenges” are evengreater when the T-38 is the aircraft. This is due to themechanical operation of the seat and the age of the seatsubsystems.

All prospective fighter and bomber crewmembersmust transition through the T-38 en route to their desti-nation aircraft. This 1950s-era ejection seat is one of theslowest, least forgiving seats in operation today; howev-er, used within its design limits, it still provides a safemeans to eject. The dilemma is: Do we maintain theseat’s current performance, and therefore limit crewsize, or do we pursue seat replacement or upgrade? Theanswer depends on how the USAF plans to work withthe expanded crewmember anthropometric range.

Approximately 80 percent of female crewmembers

PERRY NELSON311 HSW/YACLBrooks AFB, Texas

All photos courtesy the author

When One Second Does Count: T-38 Ejection Seat Performance


weigh between 115 and 135 pounds, and 4 percent ofmale crewmembers weigh greater than 211 pounds.Granting waivers and allowing people outside the de-sign limit for weight and overall size places them at ahigher and unnecessary risk. This is especially truewhen approaching the extreme ends, which is generallyconsidered less than 115 pounds or greater than 230pounds.

The current T-38 seat was designed, built, tested, andplaced in service by the Northrop Corporation, design-ers and builders of the T-38 and F-5 aircraft. The T-38 hasbeen—and will continue to be—the mainstay of theUSAF pilot training program. It has been a great and ca-pable aircraft. And, due in large part to the visionaryleaders at SA-ALC/LF (Proven Aircraft Directorate) andHQ AETC, the T-38 will continue to be a great trainerdue to upgrades in the avionics systems, a propulsionmodernization program, and wing replacement pro-grams. Each of these major modification programs willensure the T-38 is capable and maintainable until itsplanned departure from the USAF inventory in the year2025, possibly the year 2040.

While the avionics, engines, and wings are being mod-ernized into the 2000 era, the seat remains 1950s vintage.The 1950s seat technology, coupled with a tremendousexpansion of crew anthropometric ranges, spells dangerfor ejecting crewmembers.

While no one ever plans to eject, the simple truth isejections do occur. With the tremendous improvementsin escape systems technology, ejecting has become lesshazardous today than ever before. The ejection successrate is also the highest it has ever been for USAF aircraft.For our current USAF fighter, bomber, and attack air-craft—excluding the B-52 (another 1950s vintage seat)—the overall success rate is almost 92 percent. Comparedto a success rate of 87 percent in 1980, we have come along way. Our major injury rate has also improved, withthe Advanced Concept Ejection Seat II (ACES II) seatshaving fewer major injuries than any previous seat.

The increase in successful ejections is due to three veryimportant factors—all of which must occur to increasecrew safety. First, crewmembers must “pull the handle”with sufficient time remaining for the escape system towork properly. The greatest system in the world isworthless if the crews fail to attempt ejection or eject toolate.

The second factor is the maintainers. These are folkswho strive every day to ensure crew safety is first andforemost. We, the USAF, are blessed to have tremendousfolks in our egress, survival equipment, and life supportshops. These are the people who equip the “crew dogs”for flight and ensure their safety, whether the seat andsurvival equipment are brand new or, literally, 50 yearsold.

The final link in the equation for success rests with es-cape system designers and technical specialists. It’s ourjob to equip the crew with the best possible equipment—and constantly strive to improve this equipment. It wasthe goal of improving ejection safety in the T-38 that

stirred my interest in seat performance.Currently, the overall success rate for the T-38 is 83.6

percent, not even close to the 91.8 percent of the ACES IIwe have in modern USAF fighter, bomber, and attackaircraft. But even the ACES II is undergoing a major up-grade program. The ACES II Cooperative ModificationProgram (CMP) is a joint effort between the USAF andthe Japanese Air Self Defense Force to increase the capa-bility of ACES II seats. Crew accommodations (especial-ly for small-statured crewmembers), stability improve-ments, and limb restraints additions are the three targetareas of the CMP. The latter two improvements will ben-efit all-size crewmembers and are crucial to further re-ducing major injuries from high-speed ejections. The to-tal cost of the preproduction phase of this effort is closeto $40 million. The possible retrofit cost for seat modifi-cation parts and kits could be an additional $70 mil-lion—and this is for a seat with a 91.8 percent successrate and one of the lowest major injury rates ever. Nowwhat about the T-38 “Talon”?

As mentioned previously, there are ongoing upgradeswith three major aircraft systems (avionics, wings, andpropulsion systems). Nothing definite has been plannedfor the seats—as of right now. The first step in launchinga seat upgrade program (similar to ACES II) or a seat re-placement program, is to quantify the risk of ejectingcrewmembers. This is where the sled tests at HurricaneMesa come into play.

Engineering-type folks and computer-simulation ex-perts can predict how the seat will perform under spe-cific conditions, but the true test remains ejection-seattesting. We must have sled tests to validate the comput-er simulations and verify the seat’s performance. Afterall, we’re talking about the last means of survival for ouraircrews.

Engineering analysis and computer simulations showthe 103-pound crewmember will experience a muchfaster and higher acceleration index along the spine thana person who weighs 140 pounds. Similarly, the lighterejecting mass (seat and crewmember) will yaw at amuch higher rate than one who weighs 140 pounds. Thecombination of spinal compression (catapult accelera-tion), yaw, and deceleration of the seat/crewmember

Currently, the overall successrate for the T-38 is 83.6 per-cent, not even close to the91.8 percent of the ACES II wehave in modern USAF fighter,bomber, and attack aircraft.

Currently, the overall successrate for the T-38 is 83.6 per-cent, not even close to the91.8 percent of the ACES II wehave in modern USAF fighter,bomber, and attack aircraft.

continued on next page


mass (from the drogue chute and wind blast) combine toprovide an equation to measure risk.

These three forces combine together to form what istermed the Multi-Axial Dynamic Response Criteria(MDRC). MDRC is fairly new and came about due to ad-vances in manikins. No longer are they just rubber cov-ering metal joints. Now they are highly instrumentedalong every plausible body section. We can measurespinal compression, deceleration forces, yaw rates, neckloads, chest loads—you want it measured, the expertswho work with the manikins will make it happen. To-day’s manikins move like a human and record data bet-ter than any person or computer. The manikins evencome in a variety of sizes—103-pound LOIS (“LightestOccupant In Service”) up to ADAM (“Advanced De-signed Anthropometric Manikin”), and the “JPATs-Large” (Joint Primary Aircraft Trainer) that weighs up to245 pounds.

In 1997, a total of five seats were fired using LOIS atdifferent airspeeds. The goal was to ascertain the risk tocrewmembers and compare actual sled-test data withengineering/computer simulations. In 1999, an addi-tional five tests have been conducted using LOIS, in-cluding the 13 May 1999 test. The results clearly indicatethe T-38 seat is not safe for someone as light as 103pounds.

A synopsis of the test runs indicates a small-staturedperson does have a higher MDRC than what is consid-ered safe. The upper limit of a safe MDRC is 1.0. A 1.0MDRC represents a 5 percent chance of major injury tothe ejecting crewmember, which is the highest accept-able limit. The goal of today’s escape system specialist isto reduce the MDRC for all ejection seats to less than, orequal to 1.0. During the high-speed test runs, the peakMDRC reached 1.4 with the LOIS manikin. A total ofthree test runs at 500+ KEAS (knots estimated air speed)validated the computer simulations and proved theMDRC of 1.4 was an accurate figure.

An MDRC of 1.4 means the crewmember will have ap-proximately an 80 percent chance of major injury. A 140-pound crewmember ejecting under similar conditionswill have approximately a 1.2 MDRC. The progression

Major Injury Definition

◆ Five Days Hospitalization◆ Five Minutes Unconsciousness◆ Bone Fracture◆ Moderate/Severe Laceration◆ Internal Organ Injury◆ Third Degree Burns

of risk is not linear when calculating MDRC. The risk ofinjuring increases exponentially as the MDRC value in-creases. An MDRC of 1.0 equates to 5 percent risk, 1.2equates to approximately 50 percent risk, while anMDRC of 1.4 results in a near 80 percent chance or riskof a major, possibly career-ending injury.

If a small-stature T-38 crewmember was forced to ejectat airspeeds greater than 500 KEAS, the risk assessmentcould be similar to playing roulette with a six-shot pistolloaded with three bullets. The hazard is severe, and theprobability of a mishap is medium to high. Newer seats,such as those produced by Martin-Baker, and the ACESII upgraded with the enhanced drogue, can lower theMDRC to 1.0 or below. ACES preliminary tests indicate,with the enhanced drogue, an MDRC of 1.0 is attainablefor the ACES II. So the technology is there to bring thelighter/smaller-sized crewmembers into an acceptablerisk. Even the K-36 3.5A, an American version of theRussian K-36 seat, will reduce the MDRC to acceptablelimits. But can these same seats that reduce risk for light-weight crewmembers be used for the 245-pound AirForce Academy “zoomie” star tailback?

Computer simulations and engineering analysis ledescape system experts to believe the T-38 seat wouldperform better with the heavy-weight crewmembersthan it did with LOIS. The two tests conducted to dateprove that theory was wrong. The peak MDRC for the245-pound manikin ejecting at 500+ KEAS was 1.6.Again, not acceptable by today’s standards for crewsafety.

The catapult acceleration was lower (which is good)with the 245-pound manikin; however, the largermanikin has a considerable amount of “leg” extendingbelow the seat. The combination of thigh, calves, andfeet acted like a sail and caused the seat to pitch forwardapproximately 50 degrees. Also, the larger manikin’s leftfoot contacted, though slightly, the canopy bow, therebycausing the boot to act as a rudder and yaw the seat leftabout 60 degrees. This did not occur with LOIS.

Even though the T-38 has a drogue chute attached tothe seat in four places to counter pitch and yaw, thedrogue is very slow to deploy and stabilize the seat. Bythe time the T-38 drogue did fully inflate, the seat had


pitched forward and experienced considerable yaw. Theresulting effect of the drogue “snapped” the seat verticaland corrected the yaw. However the violent “snap-back,” as it is called, created abnormally high neck loadson the large manikin. Therefore, the MDRC was extremeand not acceptable.

The MDRC of the 211-pound manikin, which is theupper weight limit that the T-38 was designed and qual-ified for, was calculated to be approximately 1.3 duringtests from the 1970s upgrade program. This 1.3 is con-siderably less than the 1999 measured value of 1.6 butstill above the 1.0 limit. Though very critical in measur-ing injury potential, it’s important to point out MDRC isjust one element of risk with the T-38 seat.

The T-38 seat is classified as a second-generation ejec-tion seat. First-generation seats are those which pro-pelled the pilot out of the aircraft. It was then up to thecrewmember to separate from the seat and deploy theirparachute. Third-generation seats are those similar tothe ACES II and the Naval Aircrew Common EjectionSeat (NACES). These third-generation seats have vari-able operating modes based on altitude and airspeed.They also have pitch stabilization rockets, plus para-chutes that are ballistically deployed off the seat. The re-sult is a fully inflated parachute in as little as 2 secondsfor airspeeds less than 250 KEAS.

Second-generation seats, such as the T-38, F-5, and B-52, utilize back-automatic parachutes that rely on air-flow to deploy and inflate the parachute. This is a slowprocess and takes as long as 2 to 3 seconds to fully in-flate, and this time is after seat/crewmember separa-tion—which requires an additional 1 to 1.5 seconds. To-tal time for a full parachute: approximately 4 secondsafter the seat is fired.

Consider the mission of the T-38, which is to train stu-dent pilots. Where do most emergencies occur? Andwhere is crewmember risk the greatest? The answer forboth questions is traffic pattern work. Takeoffs and land-ings pose the greatest risk to the crewmembers. Low al-titude and adverse attitude can quickly turn a routineapproach into a dangerous, life-threatening scenario.When this occurs, 4 seconds is an eternity. It is trafficpattern work, or other low-altitude sorties, where an im-

proved ejection seat will save T-38 crewmembers’ lives.T-38 ejection statistics reveal there have been 184 ejec-

tion attempts since 1971, with 34 being unsuccessful. Ofthe Class A mishaps, approximately 44 were in the traf-fic pattern or close to the destination runway. Of these 44mishaps, 24 initiated ejection, and only 8 were success-ful. The overwhelming reason for the fatalities is ejectingtoo late—”out of the envelope” as it’s called. Of the un-successful ejections, statistics indicate as many as an ad-ditional nine may have survived had a third-generationseat been available. Of the 34 fatalities overall for T-38aircraft, it’s quite possible a third-generation seat mayhave saved 17 lives. Of course, it’s difficult to verify howmany lives a third-generation seat would have saved,but these figures are realistic when altitude, attitude,and airspeed are considered.

Besides having a more restrictive ejection envelopethan modern ejection seats, the T-38 system has severalother factors that limit its capability and increase the riskof injury. The drogue parachute, seat/crewmember sep-aration system, back-automatic parachute, very narrowcenter of gravity limits, and pitch stabilization are sever-al areas that need to be addressed. Advances in technol-ogy make improvements possible in each of these areas.

The drogue parachute requires an average of 1.5 sec-onds to inflate and stabilize the seat at 150 KEAS. Above150 KEAS, inflation occurs at approximately 1.0 second.This is much too slow; however, it was the best that ear-ly 1970s technology had to offer. With the drogue re-quiring over a second to inflate, the seat, in most all ofthe previous 2 years of testing, began to yaw and pitchin an uncontrolled manner. The resulting “snap-back” ofthe seat/crewmember mass is largely responsible for thehigh MDRC rates. Studies based on the EnhancedDrogue Program, which is part of the ACES II upgrade,indicate complete inflation and seat stabilization can beachieved in approximately 0.4 seconds. Regardless ofwhich seat is considered, a saving of 0.7 seconds in thefree-flight portion of the ejection sequence will signifi-cantly reduce yaw and pitch and lower overall MDRCvalues.

Seat/crewmember separation is a second area to im-prove. The current T-38 seat uses a rotary actuatorthat retracts a strap positioned in the seat’s bucket. Asthis strap is drawn taut, it pushes the crewmember outof the seat. As seat/crewmember separation occurs, theparachute is armed for deployment. This type of systemworks well in separating the crewmember from the seat;however, it doesn’t control body position. Hence, thecrewmember can tumble, roll, or flail—or all of these atthe same time. The point is, seat separation is not “con-trolled,” and the random tumbling and flailing cancause serious injury during ejection.

The effects are even greater on smaller staturedcrewmembers because there is less muscle tissue on a110-pound person than on someone who weighs 200pounds. To provide the best protection, there needs to bebetter body position and control during the seat separa-tion phase of ejection.



The back-automatic (BA) parachute has been in exis-tence since people first began jumping out of balloonsand airplanes. For the most part, the BA series chuteshave performed very well. There are two areas where BAchutes can cause problems with ejection. First, BA-styleparachutes are slow to inflate. Depending on airspeedand crewmember body position upon pack opening, thetime from pack opening to full parachute can range from2 to 3 seconds, possibly more. Compare 2 to 3 sec-onds to 0.8 to 1.5 seconds for ballistically de-ployed parachutes, and the advantage isclearly seen. Ballistically deployedparachutes open faster and moreconsistently than aerodynamicallydeployed BA-style chutes.

The second area where BA-styled parachutes can causeproblems is during parachutepack opening. Several in-stances have occurredwhere the parachute hasentangled the crewmem-ber/manikin or the para-chute has become entan-gled in itself. This is aserious problem, thoughrare, and is due to thetumbling crewmemberplus the manner inwhich the spring-loaded parachute de-ploys. The combinationof a tumbling crewmem-ber and random para-chute opening can bedeadly.

The center of gravity(CG) of the ejecting massand pitch stabilization aretwo other important areasthat are related to each oth-er. The CKU-7 rocket cata-pult on the T-38 seat generatessufficient force to cleanly ejectsomeone as light as 103 pounds,or as heavy as 245 pounds. Theproblem is not the catapult; it iscontrolling the trajectory of theseat/crewmember that’s difficult.

For optimum ejection trajectory, the CGof the ejected mass must not be greater than0.8 inches tangentially above or below the catapultthrust line. If CG is too far forward (below optimum), theseat will pitch forward. If CG is too far aft (above opti-mum), the seat could pitch aft. A forward-pitching seatreduces upward trajectory, which is critical for BA-styleparachutes to achieve full opening. Conversely, an aft-pitching seat may go higher, or it could tumble aft. Test-ing is required to accurately determine the outcome. In

the T-38, unlike many newer seats, there is no method tocontrol pitch. The seat’s performance with a personweighing between 140 and 211 pounds was proven to beacceptable for pitch and overall performance.

The testing in 1997 was aimed at the LOIS; in 1999,both LOIS and JPATS-Large were evaluated. The effectsof CG are still under evaluation. Two additional sledshots in 1999 will help quantify how critical CG is on the

T-38 seat. We know the effects of seat CG at 500KEAS is minimal because at high airspeeds,

wind blast and wind drag (e.g., lower tor-so acting like a sail on JPATS-Large)

have a greater effect on seat perfor-mance. These additional tests will

help ascertain the effects on pitchstabilization at lower airspeeds.

The T-38 will remain in ser-vice at least until the year2025. It will do so with majorupgrades that enable this jettrainer to do its missionbetter than ever before.But the fact remains weneed a better ejection seatto protect the crewmem-bers who fly this wonderaircraft. Just as the air-craft is undergoing amajor upgrade, so mustthe ejection seat whosesole purpose is to pro-tect our sons anddaughters who current-ly fly and will continueto operate this aircraftinto the next century.

NASA has already se-lected a new seat for their

T-38 aircraft. If we contin-ue to use the current seat,

those crewmembers below140 pounds and above 211

pounds—especially those atthe extreme edge of 103 and

245 pounds—will be at risk. Noejection is risk-free, but our job is

to make sure the risk is as low aspossible.

For high-speed ejections, it’s al-ways best to trade airspeed for altitude—

if time permits. The injury risk at 250 knots issignificantly less than at 450 KEAS. The higher the

airspeed, the greater risk for major injury in any aircraft.Especially for traffic pattern work, 1 second is an eter-

nity. And saving one second during the ejection se-quence can be a life-or-death decision, especially withthe T-38 seat.

Fly smart. Eject safe.


MAJ KURT J. SALADANA (CAF)HQ AFSC/SEFF

“YOU LOST AN AIRCRAFT HOW?”

“YOU LOST AN AIRCRAFT HOW?”


It was just a normal trainingmission. The unit was in the middle of inter-cept training, and everyone on the morningslate was doing 1 v 1, high aspect, 30-milesetups. Boring! At least on the last run bothVipers were all-up fighters at 3-9 passage.“Pockets” was the interceptor for the lastpass, and although he’d have angles, I was-n’t going to be a grape. I came out of blowerat the merge, pulled to max corner keepingPockets at the top of the canopy, then relitthe AB. That’s when all hell broke loose! Ifelt the plane shake, saw the annunciatorpanel light up like a Christmas tree, and wassuddenly pinned to the canopy. Betty wassaying something, but she was stepped onby Pockets: “Kongo, the tail just blew offyour aircraft! Eject! Eject! Eject!—ABAN-DON YOUR AIRCRAFT! YOU LOST YOURTAIL!” The plane felt like it was tumbling,and I fought to get my back straight as Ireached for the handle.

The next thing I knew, I was looking up ata beautiful white canopy. I remember think-ing it looked iridescent against the bluebackground of the sky. All the training in thehanging harness kicked in, and I wentthrough the after-ejection procedures with-out even thinking about them. Lookingdown and to the south, I saw my plane,trailing smoke, hit the ground and was im-pressed by the black mushroom that roseover the explosion. I looked slightly abovethe horizon and saw Pockets about a halfmile away doing lazy circles around me. Iimagined all of the things he was doing: call-ing the MAYDAY, passing on the lat-long,telling the world I had a good chute, andmost likely talking to the next set of Vipersscheduled to enter the area after we fin-ished. They’d pick up SARCAP from himand would likely stay overhead until a res-cue chopper showed up.

I wasn’t too worried about the landing.The real estate under the range was mostlysand with a little bit of scrub here and there,but no cactus or rocks to speak of. Headingtowards a reasonably flat, barren stretch, Ichecked to see if the wind was affecting meand reviewed landing technique. It sureseemed to be taking a long time to reach theground. As I concentrated on the earth, Iheard an explosion off to my left and lookedover in time to see Pockets ejecting from hisplane about a quarter mile away and still


parameters. More often than not, the initialSARCAP is a member of the mishap forma-tion. This isn’t the best choice because, eventhough pilots are always supposed to beprofessional and detached, in real life thereis going to be some sort of impact from themishap. This is obvious from reviewedHUD tapes.

In recent mishaps, we’ve seen fighter andattack aircraft get below 500 AGL and/orslower than 130 knots without noticingradar altimeter or stall warnings. We’ve alsoseen the pilot of an aircraft badly damagedin a midair start to set up as SARCAP eventhough there were other aircraft in the im-mediate area. The pilot involved didn’t evenconsider performing a controllability check.These aren’t inexperienced people we’retalking about here. For the most part, theyare senior pilots with over 2,000 hours ontype.

A recent SIB president who wanted to givespecial recognition to two pilots who flewSARCAP following a Class A mishap high-lights just how poorly SARCAP is beingflown. The Board president insisted theSARCAP’s outstanding performance be in-cluded as a mishap finding. Eventually hewas convinced to describe their actions inthe narrative of the formal report and high-light their performance on a separate slidewhen he briefed the commander. Whenasked just what the SARCAP did that was sooutstanding, the Board president answered,“They didn’t screw it up.” In other words,they did their job the way they were sup-posed to.

Salary is the reward for doing your jobcorrectly. Medals and commendations aresupposed to be for doing more than is re-quired. If we’re giving pilots medals forrisking their lives flying in peacetime SAR-CAP, we’re doing something wrong. FlyingSARCAP shouldn’t be any more dangerousthan flying an IFR holding pattern.

The need to fly SARCAP isn’t going to goaway. While it isn’t normal for aircraft tocrash, it happens. How do we make flyingSARCAP safer? There are several things wecan do. Review wing policy and regulationsregarding SARCAP. Discuss it on safetydays and, if possible, practice it. If you usetechnique books, make up a how-to page forSARCAP. Nobody is advocating building asyllabus mission around SARCAP, but itcould certainly be piggybacked on anotherexercise.

From experience, it appears commonsense is lacking when we’re suddenly faced

above the horizon. The Viper rolled rightand got bigger. I don’t know how close itcame, but I remember closing my eyes andpulling up on the risers as far as I could.

When I realized I was still alive, I openedmy eyes just in time to see Pockets’ plane hitthe ground smack in the middle of my LZ. Igrabbed the right riser, pulled for all I wasworth, and ended up hitting the groundhard with the fireball at my back and mylegs spinning like a cartoon character thatjust went off a cliff. I had the chute off inmid-run and didn’t stop until I could nolonger feel the heat on the back of my neck.

The way my luck was running, I won-dered what could go wrong next and wasanswered by Pockets’ shout, “Look out!” Inretrospect, I doubt if he would have landedon me, but it would have been close. Afterwe confirmed neither of us was seriouslyhurt, I asked him why he was a fellowpedestrian. It seems he had a flight controlproblem. For no reason, his plane departedcontrolled flight and, realizing he was belowthe min recovery altitude, he ejected.

The ensuing investigations revealed myplane had an uncontained engine failurethat ruptured some fuel lines, which ignitedand, in turn, blew off my tail. I was told Iwas lucky I didn’t break my back or myneck. What happened to Pockets’ plane?Well, he fixated on me, got low and slow,didn’t hear the warnings until it was toolate, and departed his aircraft. He’s a goodpilot and made a mistake, so he’s still flying.But you can imagine how he feels. Oh, andhe has a new call sign.

The previous account never happened.That’s not completely true—the first parthappened in various iterations to differentaircraft many times over the years, and asthey say in the movies, only the names havebeen changed to protect the innocent. How-ever, there is nothing in the Safety Centerdatabase about losing a plane during SAR-CAP. This has been more good luck thangood management.

It seems incredible that any pilot couldcome close to losing his own plane whileperforming SARCAP, yet they come closeappallingly often. Don’t believe it? SafetyInvestigation Boards (SIBs) for Class Amishaps transcribe recorded communica-tions for the formal report. This is done tosee if Search and Rescue worked asplanned/advertised and to see if it can beimproved. Because modern fighters haveHUD tapes, as SIBs transcribe transmis-sions, they get to watch the SARCAP’s flight

When I realized I

was still alive, I

opened my

eyes just in time

to see Pockets

plane hit the

ground smack

in the middle of

my LZ. I

grabbed the

right riser, pulled

for all I was

worth, and end-

ed up hitting the

ground hard

with the fireball

at my back and

my legs spin-

ning like a car-

toon character

that just went off

a cliff.


with flying SARCAP. While we can’t teachor enforce common sense, the following areworth consideration:

1. Whether they’re damaged or not, for-mation members who survive a mishap areinvolved. The pilot’s routine is broken, andthat means his/her habit pattern is disrupt-ed. Anyone involved in safety knows this iswhen mishaps often occur. Once relief isavailable, the other aircraft involved shouldRTB via the most normal routing and ap-proach possible, i.e., without trying to up-date a currency.

2. The new SARCAP should be assignedas required. The only reason to have highand low CAPs is if radio relay is required. Ifit isn’t, the extra aircraft is simply a commjammer and more work for ATC.

3. If the wing has a policy to determinewho will be the CAP if more than one air-craft is available, use it. For example, is thehigh fuel aircraft the best choice or is themost experienced individual? There havebeen cases where policy had a lead-qualifiedpilot flying CAP, but another more senior pi-lot took it over without actually stating hewas now the SARCAP. Very few things aremore confusing than two leads trying tolead the same exercise at the same time.

4. Give the On-Scene-Commander (OSC)authority to whoever is best qualified, thenfollow their direction. If it’s a single shipSARCAP, then he/she is the OSC. If the sit-uation dictates high-low SARCAP, the highCAP usually takes command. It isn’t unusu-al to be working with airborne weapons

control. If there’s an E-3 on scene, they arelikely the best able to coordinate all airborneaspects of the search and rescue effort.

5. There is no reason to go low or slowwhen flying SARCAP. Looking for a chute isgood, but trying to get close enough andslow enough to see what’s happening on theground serves little purpose. Ask the PJs ifanything a SARCAP passes on is going tochange their reaction time or their proce-dures. Don’t go lower than good airmanshipor regs permit. If you’ve got the option, setaltitude hold on the autopilot and reset yourradalt to reflect the selected altitude. Like-wise, if you’ve got it, set mach hold or air-speed hold.

There’s no doubt that someone readingthis is going to say, “It’s just another safetypuke mouthing off. In combat, if I lose mylead or my wingy, I’m going to follow themdown and give them top cover.” Nobody’ssaying this is wrong, but some thought bet-ter be given to the idea before action is tak-en. You aren’t going to do anybody but theenemy any favors by getting into small armsrange and then flying below maneuverabili-ty speed. And you probably aren’t going tomake ground troops do more than flinch ifyou try strafing at an untried angle and 200or more knots slow.

We lose enough people and aircraft everyyear for reasons we can’t prevent. Let’s notadd to the mishap rates by losing control ofa perfectly good aircraft doing something assimple as peacetime SARCAP.

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION

The United States Postal Service requires all publications publish a state-ment of ownership, management and circulation.

Title of Publication — Flying SafetyUSPS Publication No. — 02799308Frequency of Issue — MonthlyLocation of Office of Publication —

HQ AFSC/SEMM9700 “G” Avenue S.E., Ste 282AKirtland AFB NM 87117-5670

Publisher — U.S. Air ForceEditor — Lt Col J. Paul LaneOwner — United States Air ForceTotal no. copies printed — 17,600No. copies distributed — 17,350No. copies not distributed – 250Total copes distributed and not distributed — 17,600

Salary is the re-

ward for doing

your job cor-

rectly. Medals

and commen-

dations are sup-

posed to be for

doing more

than is required.

If we re giving

pilots medals for

risking their lives

flying in peace-

time SARCAP,

we re doing

something

wrong. Flying

SARCAP should-

n t be any more

dangerous than

flying an IFR

holding pattern.


return to military flying comes with a wholenew perspective. It is indeed illuminating.

What we do each and every time we flyplaces each of us at far greater risk thanmost commercial flying. And commercialflying, as the occasional headline will attest,is by no means a risk-free operation.

First PerspectiveConsider what we do for a living, Engine-

out work, windmill taxi starts, no-flap oper-ations, rejected takeoff operations; low-lev-els and airdrops flown day and night, onNVGs, in formation, in the mountains, in theweather, lights-out and comm-out; maxi-mum effort takeoffs and assault landings ondirt strips with reduced stall margins andcritical acceleration, deceleration, and direc-

J. T. RAGMAN

Commercial flying is like ice-skating.Military flying is like hockey—ice-skatingand so much more.

Perspective can be a remarkablyilluminating concept. My 10-year militaryflight experience, followed by a 9-year hia-tus in the airline business, and my recent re-turn to military flying, bring to mind onethought in particular—everything is indeedrelative. Terms and concepts such as “risk”and “safe” and “margin for error” havemeaning only in relative terms.

During my military flight experience, Iwas a serious adherent to the “Safety is anAttitude” mindset. However, my mindsetlacked perspective. I had known only oneform of aviation—military aviation. With 9years of the airline world under my belt, my

USAF Photo by SrA Jeffrey Allen


tional control issues. As an added consider-ation, we do all of the above with in-flightinstruction, unqualified, noncurrent, andnonproficient crewmembers in one or morecrew positions.

Consider even the most basic instrumentoperations: full procedure turns, nonpreci-sion approaches, and in particular, NDB ap-proaches. An NTSB fact: Depending uponthe definition of nonprecision approach, 60to 86 percent of all controlled-flight-into-ter-rain accidents by commercial aircraft be-tween 1988 and 1997 occurred during non-precision approaches. I can count on fingersand toes the number of nonprecision ap-proaches I have flown in 9 years of airlineflying, yet we do them with great frequencyin military aviation.

All of the above operations involve re-duced margins for error, reduced recoverytimes, and greater risk. With very few ex-ceptions, airlines do none of the above onanything remotely resembling a routine ba-sis. Indeed, I would be hard pressed to findanything in the above discussion that I haveever done in a commercial aircraft. The onlyitems listed above that I have ever done in asimulator have been the engine-out work,rejected takeoffs, and varied simulated in-flight emergencies. They’ve been accom-plished in a simulator for a very good rea-son—risk and margin for error. In militaryaviation, we do them routinely in flight.

All of the above operations involve rou-tine, constant and competing demandsupon our ability to focus on “Job One”—fly-ing the aircraft. All of the above operationsinvolve numerous tasks essential to the mis-sion, but peripheral to the task of flying theaircraft. In the airline business, flying theaircraft is the only mission.

In the military, we fly the aircraft while ac-complishing the mission, conducting in-flight instruction in formation, in the moun-tains, in the weather—and we do so whilemonitoring the Radar Warning Receiver(RWR) gear, the Missile Warning System(MWS) gear, while outfitted in the aircrewchemical warfare ensemble. Risk. Marginfor error. Perspective.

One young and very insightful passengerdescribed the difference between commer-cial flying and military flying far better thanI. She used a sports analogy: Commercialflying is like ice-skating; military flying islike hockey—ice-skating and so much more.

Second PerspectiveWhat we do, and what the airlines don’t

do, takes on added significance when weconsider what the airlines have, and whatwe don’t have.

System Redundancy. In the airline busi-ness, lose all electrics—tap the hydraulic-driven generator. Lose all hydraulics—de-ploy the ram air turbine. Lose normalbrakes—select alternate or reserve, emer-gency or accumulator.

In congested environments, the airlineshave had TCAS for many years. In themountains, they are fielding the enhancedGPWS. If approaching a stall, the airliner’sstick shaker will provide an alert, and theleading edge slats will automatically deployto provide the added edge through the stall.

Concerned with wind shear? The airlineshave predictive wind shear alert systemsand reactive wind shear flight director com-mands. Distracted on taxi-out? The takeoffconfiguration warning system has savedmore than one airline crew. Operating in achallenging environment? The airlines pro-vide their crews with engine-out betweenBogota and Quito, engine-out departures forLas Vegas or Tegucigalpa, and decompres-sion escape routes through the Andes.

The list of added safety features goes onand on and on, far beyond the few examplesmentioned here—far too numerous to list.Not necessarily so with our military avia-tion operations.

Third PerspectiveIn the military, we are all part-timers. Air-

line types are full-timers. The “part-time” la-bel applies most clearly to the Guard andReserve; however, my recollection of activeduty suggests many an active-duty aviatoris indeed a “part-time” aviator. We all haveour additional duties and our ancillarytraining requirements. We, in the military,might fly 2 to 5 hours per week while work-ing a 40- to 50-hour work-week. Our airlinepeer will fly 15 to 20 hours per week and gohome afterwards. How do you spell “mar-gin for error”? “Full-time” or “part-time”?

The “part-time” perspective takes onadded significance when I reflect upon allthat we’re required to know—the basics ofaviation, plus airdrops, airlands, formation,tactics, threats, defensive systems, and onand on and on. So much to know—and sogreat a reason to know it. Again, look at thethings we do each and every time we fly, ourexposure to risk and our reduced marginsfor error. Our lives depend upon knowingall there is to know.

There are, however, “up-sides” to the mil-

What we do

each and every

time we fly

places each of

us at far greater

risk than most

commercial

flying. And

commercial

flying, as the

occasional

headline will

attest, is by no

means a

risk-free

operation.



itary versus commercial perspective.■ First, and foremost, we have a crew. A

crew chief, a loadmaster, an engineer, a nav-igator, and two pilots—each an authority inhis/her particular field, each a glance or in-terphone call away, each ready to providethe needed answer right now. A commercialcrew has two or three pilots. The answer toany load question, any systems or perfor-mance question, any navigational question,may be available on the other end of alengthy, scratchy, intermittent HF phonepatch.

■ Second, we have a chain of commandwhich, from the top on down, emphasizesthrough word and deed the preeminent roleof safety in our flight operations. The chain-of-command emphasis enables each andevery crewmember to make the right call.Accomplishing the mission safely is our mo-tive.

■ Third, while the 40- to 50-hour work-week can be a burden on the one hand, itcan be a safety blessing on the other hand.For 8 to 10 hours each day, the knowledge,expertise, and answers to our questions areonly as far away as the nearest instructor—down the hall or across the room. Once thatairline instructor blocks in at the gate, he orshe is on his or her way home. No answersuntil your next sim-check.

Final ThoughtsAm I alarmed as a consequence of this

new-found perspective through which Inow view military aviation? Not at all. Onthe contrary, the emotion is one of gratitudefor the added perspective. I am reminded ofa quote from my not-too-distant past:“Man’s flight through life is sustained by thepower of his knowledge.” The military-to-commercial, back-to-military experience hasprovided me with a perspective I had previ-ously lacked. That perspective is a form ofknowledge. That knowledge makes me asafer crewmember. It can make you a safercrewmember as well. That knowledge canhelp sustain both of us in flight.

(“J. T. Ragman” is a pen name. The authoris a C-130 pilot in the Air Force Reserve.He’s also a Boeing 757 pilot for a major air-line. While his words apply most directly tothe C-130 community, his thoughts, andthe lessons therein, apply equally to allfighter, tanker, transport, rescue, recon-naissance, and bomber aircraft—Air Force,Army, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard.)

I am reminded of a quote from my not-too-distant past:

“Man’s flight through lifeis sustained by the

power of his knowledge.”

US

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eim

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ty in mind. Go very slow; if you can’t see the lines, youmay have to stop and get a tow. Sloping taxiways areparticularly dangerous when slick.

For a clean airplane, takeoff normally doesn’t producetrouble; however, standing water, slush, and snow cancause inlet icing problems for some aircraft. Heat may benecessary. Consult your Dash One.

During cruise, a major consideration is clear air turbu-lence. The jet stream has moved south and frequently isvery intense. You should concentrate on conditions

ahead, including destination and alternate weather,icing conditions, runway condition, and

fuel state in case you have to hold.One problem reported sever-al times last winter was

holding or descent earlyinto icing conditions. Ic-

ing can be serious attemperatures be-

tween 0 ° a n d- 8 ° C in cumuli-form clouds andfreezing precipi-tation. Remem-ber the rule:Heat before ice,not vice versa.

In winter, ex-pect more low

visibility ap-proaches. You may

have to go around.Don’t hesitate. It’s far

better to make amissed approach than to

try to salvage a bad one.With low viz and snow-cov-

ered landscape, illusions are pos-sible. If it doesn’t look right, it might

not be right. Landings on snow-covered over-runs can result in some nasty surprises.

Landings can be a real adventure in conditions likethese: slick runway, snow-covered overruns, bermsplaced beside the runway by snow plows, strong cross-winds, and low visibility approaches. This is the time foryour best instrument flying—on speed, on glideslope. Anice, firm touchdown—a grease job may start the birdhydroplaning. Remember the rubber and oil deposits onthe far end will be slick, so get your speed down in thebest part of the runway.

What this all adds up to is an alert crew that plansahead and is prepared for contingencies. This crew hasan aircraft commander who knows his, the crew’s, andthe aircraft’s capabilities—and never exceeds them.

This article is certainly not all inclusive; its purpose isto get your attention. Remember how it was last winter.If you’re a new guy on the winter block, learn from theold heads. They can save you a dented bird and maybeyour life.

During final approach, ice accumulated on thewings and left engine of a CT-39. The pilot in-creased speed to compensate for the aerodynam-

ic effects, but the right wing stalled when the aircraftwas about 10 feet above the runway. The wing tip struckthe ground and was damaged.

Ice on the wings is just one of the annoyances of win-ter, but an important one. No crew, of course, wouldtake off with a load of ice. But it has happened. Frostor snow may be removed, but there’s noguarantee that the aircraft won’tpick up more if fuel is loaded af-ter the wings have beencleaned. The fuel maymelt ice and snow, but italso may cause con-densation on thewing surface andsubsequent freez-ing.

Blowing snowcan create ice.Heat from air-craft ahead, or adifferential int e m p e r a t u r efrom a lighted orprotected ramp toa cold, windy run-way may turn snowor water into ice. Theaircraft may leave theramp clean, but engineblast from another aircraftmay blow almost invisible par-ticles of snow onto the surfaces ofthe aircraft behind it. The result may beflight control difficulties from ice formed byfreezing of snow or water. Another problem is that snowor ice on wings may adversely affect their aerodynamicproperties, lengthening takeoff, or even making it im-possible for the aircraft to get off in the runway lengthavailable.

Slush picked up during taxiing can freeze and causegear, flap, or engine inlet icing. Another danger resultsfrom frequent applications of high thrust to “breakaway.” The blast may throw ice and snow that can causedamage and injuries, so check six before you boost thepower.

Taxi as if you have a load of eggs. Here’s a scenario forone reason why. You start to taxi, up comes the power,and you begin to move. It’s kinda dark, and snow andslush make the taxi lines hard to see. You overshoot aturn and try to correct. Even though you’re movingslowly, the bird slides sideways. If you’re not lucky, youmay go off the pavement, hit a light standard, a fire cart,some AGE, or another airplane. Just keep that possibili-


Aerospace Safety, Nov 80

Ice,Snow,and

10 BelowOfficial USAF Photo by MSgt Rich Moran


“Ratta-tatta-tat!”—a Germanfighter spirals down in flames. The sky isfilled with World War I biplanes twistingand turning in a great swirling dogfight.Then the scene changes. Back at a British airbase, a couple of aircraft fitters labor over aworn-out fighter.

“I’d like to make a bonfire out of thewhole blinkin'’ lot of ‘em—that’s all they’regood for,” one fitter says to the other as hebegins removing a propeller.

The second fitter answers, “No, not eventhat! They’ve been shot up so much theyain’t worth the blinkin’ petrol to set ‘emafire.”

About that time, the maintenance sergeantstrolls up to the airplane, overhearing theconversation.

“Hold on, my lad! That’s the King’s prop-erty you’re talking about!” he growls.

“I know, sergeant, but look!”“I’ve looked. So has everyone else. What

about it?”“Well, what about it?” asks the exasperat-

ed fitter, standing next to the batteredengine.

“No mucking about—mend it and shutyour mouth!”

Keeping airplanes in the air has changed alot since the movie “Dawn Patrol” por-trayed life at a World War I British air basein France. Gone are the fabric-covered andwire-braced biplane fighter, the clatter oftheir rotary engines replaced by the roar ofmodern jets. Gone also is the “no muckingabout—mend it and shut your mouth”approach to those who must keep them fly-ing. But that doesn’t mean today’s youngcrew chiefs don’t have a challenging job—they do. However, now they’ve got some-thing the old-timers didn’t have to help getthem ready. It’s called “Mission ReadyTechnician” (MRT) training.

Capt Daniel Runyon commands the 362ndTraining Squadron’s fighter training flight atSheppard AFB, Texas. There, he overseesMRT training for F-15, F-16 and A-10 crewchiefs. He’ll tell you the MRT program is anidea whose time had come, driven by therapid-fire ops tempo of today’s Air Force.

“We realized the Air Force’s operationalcommands were deploying so much thatthey didn’t have the time to train newly

BOB VAN ELSBERGManaging EditorRoad & Rec

MRTMeans

‘Hit the Flightline

Running!’

Means ‘Hit the Flightline

Running!’

US

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Pho

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arrived crew chiefs the way they wantedto.” That training, he explained, also hadput “a huge burden on the commands”when new crew chiefs arrived fresh fromtheir training at Sheppard. “We realizedthere was a better way to do business. Wecould do a lot of the student training andcertification the commands were doing.”

That, however, meant changing the waythe Air Force trained its crew chiefs. Gonewas the strictly academic approach,replaced by one that added hands-onknowledge and flightline experience.

Runyon explained, “What we’ve done istaken the days the operational units used inthe past to train a new crew chief—days thatwere, in essence, lost to the unit—and usedthem here at Sheppard and at our(deployed) MRT training locations.” Theresult, he explained, is a new crew chief whois less of a training burden for the opera-tional unit and can contribute more on arriv-ing. And the feedback they’ve been gettingfrom the operational units has been positive.“They are much happier with what they aregetting than what they previously got.”

What they’re getting, he explained, ismuch more than they used to get from arecently graduated student crew chief.

“Overall, the students are brought to acertified 3-level,” Runyon said. “They aretaught how to do tasks on airframes such asinspections and wheel and tire removal.These are basic crew chief tasks that I, as anaircraft maintenance officer, want a new 3-level to be able to do.”

One person who can speak directly to thatis 17-year veteran C-130 crew chief TSgtKevin LaVergne. A C-130 MRT instructorsince the program’s inception, he began hiscareer as a product of the “old style” crewchief training. He vividly remembers theshortcomings of that system.

“The way we used to do on-the-job train-ing on the flightline was very sporadic,” hesaid. “You might get a couple of hours oftraining this day, an hour the next, thenmaybe no training at all for the next threedays because of operational commitments.”

However, MRT has changed all that.“Now, we’ve taken all of that time and

condensed it into a solid, jam-packed 65 to71 days of training so that it flows better,”LaVergne explained. “The students havebetter continuity—they remember thingsbetter. They can pick up and rememberwhat you talked about yesterday, today. Youjust didn’t get that in the field. It used totake us almost a year to get a 3-level up and

running because the training was so spo-radic.”

There are currently MRT crew chief pro-grams for the F-15, F-16, A-10, C-141, C-130and H-53 helicopter. Varying in length andwith flightline training done at differentbases, the basic concepts are the same,Runyon said. He explained the crew chiefs'’training starts with a 23-day fundamentalscourse.

“They’re taught ‘lefty-loosey’ and ‘righty-tighty’,” he said. “They’re taught ‘this is asafety wire, and here’s how not to get itstuck in your finger.’ They’re introduced totechnical orders and safety procedures. Webasically teach them to speak ‘crew chief’ sothat everyone is brought to the same level.”

After completing the fundamentalscourse, students enter the MRT course forthe airframe they’ll be working on. Here’swhere the hands-on training begins—wherebook learning and classroom lecture blend

(Top) TSgt Ricardo Cisnerosuses a large-screen monitorto show his students com-puter simulations of howvarious aircraft componentswork.

(Right) Airman JessicaScheib practices removingand re-installing an F-16nosewheel assembly as partof her MRT training.

Official USAF Photos by Robert VanElsberg



with wrench-turning to produce experience.“We take them out to the flightline and

teach them tasks such as wheel and tireremoval and installation, fuel and liquidoxygen (LOX) servicing, towing proceduresand ground-handling tasks,” LaVergne said.“Basically, it’s everything apprentice techni-cians will need to know during the first sixmonths they’re on the flightline.”

What might a typical day be like for afledgling C-130 crew chief in MRT training?LaVergne offered the following description.

“Probably the day they like best is the daywe talk about engines and props,” he said.“It starts out as a four-hour lecture in themorning where we talk about all of the dif-ferent systems and subsystems of theengines and props. We break it all down forthe students so that they can see all of thecomponents. Then we’ll take them over toour engine shop. There, they’ll see an enginehung on a plane, taken off an airplane andpieced out in different pieces. Then we’llexplain what each piece does so they’ll get agood visual understanding of what we’reteaching them. We’ll teach them the basictasks they would do on those engines orprops—things such as propeller oil servic-ing and checking the starter fluids.Throughout the process they’re also learn-ing to use the technical data that goes withthat engine.”

Safety is also stressed, he added, explain-ing the students are taught Air ForceOccupational Safety and Health standardsand how to work around the C-130’s

engines without being injured or killed.However, it’s not just the “heavies”—the

C-130s and C-141s—that have benefitedfrom MRT training. Air Combat Commandopted to ensure all its fighter crew chiefs getMRT training, backing up that decision byproviding 13-year veteran F-16 crew chiefTSgt Ricardo Cisneros to teach the new F-16crew chiefs. Like LaVergne, Cisneros startshis students off in the classroom, taking fulladvantage of computer simulations to showhis students the components they will workon and how they function.

“I can click the mouse on a picture andshow the flight controls moving or thespeed brakes opening up,” he explained.“Instead of me showing them a picture andgoing up (to the front of the classroom) andwaving my hands, I can show them actualfootage of someone marshalling an aircraft.”

There’s more. The first time Cisneros sawan F-16 was on the flightline at his first oper-ational unit. Now he can take his studentsinto a hangar housing several F-16s for prac-tical, hands-on experience. Block Four,which focuses on the F-16’s landing gear,includes some of the classes’ most challeng-ing days, according to Cisneros.

“We’ll go to the hangar floor and watch alanding gear operational check—which thestudents seem to enjoy,” he said. After ashow-and-tell session, the students try theirhand at removing and installing tires andbrakes, and also bleeding the F-16’s brakesystem. “Once we feel they’re ready, we’llwatch them do the job. For instance, duringthe landing gear operational check we’ll lis-ten in on the headset. As long as they’re notmaking any safety violations, we’ll just lis-ten in. When we feel they’re ready to do iton their own, we'll certify them. It’s a ‘go’ or‘no-go.’”

Did he say certify? Yes. Certification is onereason MRT-trained crew chiefs are muchdifferent from their predecessors, accordingto Cisneros. He explained that during their71 days of follow-on training at Sheppard heteaches them 158 different tasks and certifiesthem on 63. Later on, during their 20 days of“hot” training launching aircraft at LukeAFB AZ, they’re certified on 19 more tasks.This, Cisneros explained, is a big improve-ment over the way he was trained more thana decade ago.

“I remember when I came through,” hesaid. “I went through the fundamentalscourse and then out to the flightline. Peopleexpected me to know a lot more than Iknew... It took me a whole year before I was

Official USAF Photo by Robert VanElsberg

Airman Rick Palmerperforms a brakeinspection on an F-16 during his MRTinstruction. Prior tothe MRT program,new crew chiefs hadto wait until theyarrived at their firstassignment to getpractical experiencemaintaining theiraircraft.


at the level the students are at when theyleave Luke.”

And it’s not just teaching the studentsmore, it’s also establishing a level of consis-tency in what each student learns and cando. That consistency was often absent in theold days, according to LaVergne.

“One thing I remember very clearly aftertraining here in 1982 and going to the fieldwas that every new person on the flightlinehad a different trainer,” he said. “They alltaught differently and they all taught differ-ent things—so you had a group of appren-tice technicians who weren’t all trained tothe same level. If a new crew chief went out-side of his familiar work environment, hemight not know what to do,” LaVergne said.“One of the great benefits of what we donow is that all of the instructors teach fromthe same lesson plan. The field is getting a‘like-trained’ student. No matter where thatstudent goes, they’ve all got the same levelof training. So you don’t have to bring oneguy up 10 yards more than another guy.”

The program is not static; it can change toallow improvements in the curriculum. Infact, Runyon explained, there is a mecha-nism in place designed to keep the trainingfrom stagnating.

“We get what we call ‘GraduateAssessment Surveys’ back from supervisorsof our graduates,” he said. “They rate us onthree questions and tell us if they like whatthey’re getting from us. For instance, doesthe graduate conform to military standards?Is he able to do what he is certified on? Theyalso tell us whether or not they think the cer-tification tasks their MAJCOMs haverequested are what they really need.”

The MAJCOMs are major players in theMRT program, Runyon said, explainingthey decide what the training will includeand which tasks will be certified.

“We have what are called Utilization andTraining Workshops (UT&Ws) approximate-ly once every three years,” he said. TheMAJCOM functional managers come in andwe talk about the course, then vote onwhether or not we want to add anything ortake anything out of the course.”

The instructors—all experienced crewchiefs—have the freedom to mold the courseas they teach it, according to Runyon. Heexplained, “The MAJCOMs tell us what totrain, and we figure out the best way to pro-vide that training...the instructors are thecourse writers.”

As effective as MRT has proven for thosewho’ve gone through the program, it’s

unlikely MRT will be available for all crewchiefs. Runyon explained there is a costtrade-off—a break-even point that makes ituneconomical to institute MRT for all of theAir Force’s aircraft. Some aircraft, such asthe C-9 Nightingale, are not present in largeenough numbers to justify the cost to theMAJCOMs. Still, Runyon believes the pro-gram has a lasting future, one that willevolve as older aircraft, such as the C-141,are retired, and new aircraft, such as the F-22, come on line. And whatever the changes,he believes MRT is a valuable tool to help anever-shrinking and often-deployed AirForce meet its missions worldwide.

“I think we’re providing the Air Forcewith more capability—with somebodywho’s now more quickly deployable andwho’s more usable when he reports to theflightline,” he said. “Yes, he needs supervi-sion—someone to watch him—because eachflightline is a different environment. But heis a much better ‘package’ than ever before,thanks to MRT.”


over the radios. The mission navigator took overthe navigation duties and backed up the co. Theextra pilot got out the Dash One and looked upthe procedures for fuel fumes on the flight deck.The instructor nav continued looking for theleak. I got out of the seat to help the IN determinethe severity of the leak. The in-flight mainte-nance technician came forward to help and no-ticed that the fumes were also noticeable behindthe flight deck bulkhead. Collectively, we deter-mined that the smell was JP-8 and that fumeswere coming from behind the nav station—thatdark tangled mess of power cords and coolingfans. With that, the flightcrew came to a consen-sus that this was definitely a problem. We turnedon the navigator’s fan and opened the sextantport to help dissipate the smell.

The instructor nav asked if any work had beendone on the AR manifold before the flight. Noone on the crew knew, so he called 95 RS Ops onCommand Post frequency to tell them of our sit-uation and have them ask maintenance if theyknew of a possible fuel vapor source. However,95 RS Ops relayed that maintenance had no ex-planation for the fumes.

By this time, we were at MC6 and had reachedour final altitude of FL 290. The fumes hadn’t dis-sipated over the 20 minutes we had been air-borne. The IN, the flightcrew’s most experiencedflier, had never experienced such strong fuelfumes in the cockpit and was clearly concerned.The rest of the flightcrew keyed off of his con-cern, agreeing that the situation was seriousenough to warrant a return to Mildenhall to getthe spare jet. We planned to dump gas over wa-ter in the fuel dumping “wash area” and land.

I got back in the seat and relayed our wishes to,by this time, Dutch Mil. The IN radioed 95 RSOps and Mildenhall Command Post to tell themof our intentions. The extra pilot read from theDash One the procedures to follow for smokeand fume elimination and for a fuel leak. We in-creased the cabin altitude to 10,000 feet and therate of change to Max to ventilate the aircraft.

“Gear—Up,” said the copilot.“I smell gas!” said the nav.The flight was an RC-135V sortie scheduled

round robin out of RAF Mildenhall, U.K. It wassupposed to last 13.5 hours in support of Opera-tion Joint Guardian. The flightcrew consisted ofmyself, an instructor pilot acting as the pilot incommand, two dual-seat qualified aircraft com-manders (one acting as the copilot, one in theauxiliary crew seat), an instructor nav, and a mis-sion navigator. In addition, there were 20crewmembers on board to perform the recon-naissance mission. The scheduled takeoff was0315L with a planned landing time of 1645L.

Immediately after the gear was raised, the in-structor nav (IN) smelled fuel. The smell wasconfirmed by the mission nav shortly thereafter.At that time, the fuel vapors were not detectedanywhere else in the aircraft. We were cleared byLakenheath Departure to climb to FL 230 and di-rect MC6. The pilot in the right seat was doingthe takeoff and continued the initial climboutwhile I did the after takeoff-climb checklist andtalked on the radios.

As this checklist was accomplished, the navi-gators looked for a fuel leak in the air refuelingmanifold. The manifold runs from the receiverreceptacle in the center of the aircraft above thenav station, aft and down the right side of the air-craft behind the nav station. Due to the locationof this plumbing, the portion that runs behindthe nav station is not visible. The IN checked thevisible portion of the manifold and was unable tofind a leak.

The after takeoff-climb checklist was completepassing through about 10,000 feet on climboutand about 25 miles from the field. Just like webrief in mission planning, I delegated duties toperform while the problem was investigated.The copilot continued flying the plane and took

CAPT MARK A. HOPSONRAF Mildenhall

USAF Photo by SrA Greg L. Davis


To limit the number of possible ignitionsources, we turned off nonessential electricalequipment including Electric Stab Trim, HF ra-dios, two UHF/VHF radios, TACANs, DopplerNav Systems, Lower Strobe, Lower IFF antenna,and Copilot’s Instrument Power from Normal toEmergency. The flightcrew went on oxygen andadvised the rest of the crewmembers to do thesame.

Going on oxygen caused communication prob-lems on the flight deck. The RC-135 has a hot micsystem that allows the pilots and navs to talk toeach other without using interphone. So, whenwe went on oxygen, each of us could hear ourown breathing plus the breathing of the otherfour crewmembers on the flight deck. This was acommunications hindrance that we were forcedto overcome.

On the way to the fuel dump area, we declaredan emergency. We passed the appropriate infor-mation to London Mil and the copilot actuallygot to set 7700 in the Mode 3 (I was jealous). Westill planned to fly to the wash area and dumpgas over water and then direct Mildenhall. Thatplan changed several minutes outside of thedump area when the situation got more serious.

The navs discovered puddled fuel on the navtable. We began dumping immediately. We need-ed to dump about 55,000 pounds of fuel to getdown to a landing gross weight of 210,000. So wecontinued to the fuel dumping point and outover water. I wagged that if we dumped about30,000 pounds over water, we could then turn di-rect Mildenhall while still dumping. I hoped tofinish the dump before leaving 10,000 feet to giveus plenty of time to set up for the approach andlanding.

We dumped the first 30,000 pounds and turneddirect Mildenhall. The pilots had the TACANsoff, so we relied on the mission nav to get usthere. During the descent, we discussed what wewould do after landing. This discussion was dif-ficult considering the multiple distractions on theflight deck: five crewmembers breathing over hotmic, Command Post and 95 RS Ops calling on theradio, fans running. Oh yeah, and the smell ofgas. Despite these difficulties, we came to a deci-sion. We obviously wanted to get off the jetquickly, but we also wanted to taxi clear so wewould have a runway to take off on with thespare aircraft. So we decided to land, open the pi-lot and copilot windows on rollout to vent theaircraft, taxi clear, and egress the aircraft.

As we continued descending into Mildenhall,we continued dumping gas. We told London Milwhat we were doing, and they were very helpful.The dump went smoothly until the aircraft’s abil-ity to dump gas from the body tanks exceeded itsability to drain gas to the body tanks. This issomething I should have considered. As a result,we didn’t finish the dump as quickly as planned,and I wasn’t able to take control of the aircraft

until final approach. Fortunately, the copilot flewa really nice en route descent and set up the jetfor an autopilot coupled approach.

The approach and landing was easy. When Itook control of the aircraft, we had just intercept-ed glide path for the ILS, we were configured forlanding, and the autopilot had the jet trimmed. Iused the manual trim wheel some during the ap-proach because the electric trim was cut out. Wemeant to minimize our radio and interphonetransmissions to avoid a possible spark, but habitpatterns were difficult to quell. The copilot and Ieach zippered a call from tower, pressing thepress-to-talk switch an extra four times. But wedid land uneventfully to an airfield crowdedwith the fire response vehicles. We opened thepilot’s windows, slowing through about 90knots, and this very quickly ventilated the air-craft.

We taxied clear and ran the Ground Evacua-tion Checklist. The copilot got to pull the fireswitches (I was again jealous). Unbelievably, theladder would not extend down the crew entryhatch despite both navigators’ best attempts. Soall 25 of us went down the rope and ran awaywith no broken ankles.

We had to wait about 30 minutes before the firechief would clear us on the jet to get our gear. Butwe got our stuff, bag-dragged to the spare, tookoff about an hour and a half after landing, andflew an 11.2-hour sortie.

Maintenance found that there was indeed aleak in the air refueling manifold. Needless tosay, I’m pretty happy we didn’t blow up. We ac-tually did some things well, and CRM was thekey. The copilot had the not-so-glorious job ofsimply flying the plane. The mission nav wassolely responsible for navigation. They were fo-cused on the job at hand, avoided the numerousdistractions, and performed their assigned dutiesflawlessly. We also took advantage of the extracrewmembers on board. The IN was our primaryinvestigator, we relied on his experience flyingRC-135s, and we took it to heart when he ex-pressed his concern about the situation. The extrapilot took over Dash One duties and spoon fedus the procedures to follow.

During mission planning, we always brief howwe will delegate duties during emergencies.Having briefed this what seems like hundreds oftimes, it was easy in the jet to take control of thesituation and tell each crewmember what to do.One pilot was always actively flying the plane.One navigator was always backing up the pilotflying and doing the navigation. The extracrewmembers were utilized to help take care ofthe problem. The mission was a success—wedidn’t fly the plane into the ground, we took careof the emergency to the best of our ability, andwe landed safely to fly another, well, the sameday.

My back had bothered me forover 10 years, since I was about 25 years old.It was just a minor but deep pain. It felt likeI should be able to crack it or stretch it out. Iwas very active, lifting weights, running

marathons, and racingbicycles. It was like atoothache that wouldnever go away. Fearingsome negative diagnosisand a potential ground-ing (horror stories andurban legends abound),I never told the flightsurgeon about the prob-lem. In retrospect, it wasgetting worse. I was con-stantly in some form ofdiscomfort, but I gotused to it.

Then after one verylong flight, I was espe-cially stiff. The nextmorning, I awoke inagony. Pain shot downmy leg (sciatica) and intomy toes. It was so in-tense I couldn’t sitdown. So I had to go tothe flight surgeon. And

yes, I was grounded. It’s been a long but nottoo painful story. I’ve learned a lot, and thebiggest thing is that most people with backpain, or a herniated disk like I have, getwaivers to continue flying. Despite the hor-rible pain, most lower back problems re-solve in a month or two.

There isn’t a lot of emphasis on backhealth in the flying community. Lower backpain is the No. 1 cause of disability for thoseunder 45 in the United States. Low backproblems are the No. 2 reason for visits toprimary care physicians. Various estimatesof the total societal cost of back pain in theU.S. range from $20-50 billion annually.1

Because you don’t suffer from lower back


pain yet doesn’t mean you won’t. Eventual-ly, most people will experience back pain.There are preventive measures you can taketo prolong your back health and reduce thechances of a disk herniation.

Many times a backache is simply a case ofstrained muscles. This can occur after thefirst softball game of the year or the first rak-ing of leaves in the fall. Persistent back paincan be an indicator of a bulging or herniateddisk.

There are very rare cases of more severeback problems; for instance, tumors that re-quire immediate hospitalization and/orsurgery. There are rare infections that cancause pressure on the spinal nerves. All ofthese rare causes may be preceded by a lossof bladder or bowel control depending onthe extent of the nerve damage. So if youever get that symptom, go to the hospitalright away. The most likely cause for severeback pain and sciatica is a bulging or herni-ated disk.

Back injury is cumulative, much like hear-ing loss. Excess weight, poor posture, andineffective or nonexistent exercise programsall contribute to a long-term deterioration ofthe intervertebral disks and eventually toback pain or severe disk herniation resultingin shooting pain down the buttocks and leg(sciatica).

So, let’s look at the physiology of the disksand herniation, the waiver policy for fliers,and some methods and resources for pre-vention of cumulative and debilitating backpain.

Anatomy of Spinal Disks and HerniationIf you have never experienced a damaged

spinal disk, I can assure you, it’s a signifi-cant life event. The pain is excruciating, andevery movement makes it worse. Like mostpain, it’s a valuable warning signal. If heed-ed, it’s possible to fully recover and mini-mize future damage. If ignored, seriouslyphysical and neurological damage can re-sult.

When you hear someone speak of aslipped disk, you may picture a wobblystack of disks with one sticking out of place.

MAJ BILL WALKOWIAKHQ AFSC/SEFF

LOWER BACK PAIN AND THE USAF FLIGHTCREW

The authorsherniated disk,L-5/S-1

Figure 1


This isn’t exactly how it works. Interverte-bral disks are actually flexible pads tightlyfixed between the vertebrae. Each is a flat,circular capsule roughly an inch in diameterand about 1/4-inch thick. The outer mem-brane is called the annulus fibrosis. It’sstrong and resilient, made of crisscrossing fi-brous layers like a Kevlar road tire. The in-ner nucleus is called the nucleus pulposus.It’s a gelatinous substance which can belikened to a balloon that changes shapewhen compressed, but returns to its originalshape when pressure is reduced.

Disks are always under some pressuredue to gravity acting on the body, and thepara-vertebral muscles continuously con-tract to maintain posture. When balanced inthe correct posture, the disks are under theleast amount of mechanical stress2. Thedisks are embedded between the vertebraeand held in place by the ligaments connect-ing the spinal bones and by the surroundingsheaths of muscle. There’s little if any roomfor them to slip. The vertebrae turn andmove along facet joints. These facet jointsstick out like arched wings on each side ofthe vertebrae and keep them from bendingand twisting enough to damage the spinalcord, the bundle of nerves running throughthe center of each bone.

A study was done in the early 1960s tomap the intra-disk pressure in various bodypositions3. A seated person is under themost pressure, especially when leaning for-ward. It was further determined that poor(slouching) posture (in flexion, or bendingforward) further increases the disk pressure.

The disk is sometimes described as ashock absorber for the spine, which makes itsound more flexible than it really is. Whilethe disks separate the vertebrae and keepthem from rubbing together, they are farfrom pneumatic or springlike. When you area child, they are fluid-filled sacs, but theybegin to solidify as part of the aging process.In early adulthood, the blood supply to thedisks has stopped, the soft inner material be-gins to harden, and the disk is less elastic. Inmiddle-aged adults, the disks are tough andunyielding, with a consistency of hard rub-ber4.

Under stress, it’s possible for the innermaterial to swell and herniate, pushingthrough the tough outer membrane of thedisk. The entire disk becomes distorted. Ei-ther this bulge or actual inner disk materialpushes on surrounding nerves, causingpain. By far, the most common area for thisto happen is the lumbar region, L-4, L-5, or

L-5, S-1 (mine). See figure 1. When it occurshere, the pain comes mostly from pressureon the nerves that combine to form the sci-atic nerve, running down the buttocks andthe outside of your leg to your toes.

Not all herniated disks press on nerves;therefore, it’s possible for a person to havedeformed disks without any discomfort. Arecent study examined the disks of men whohad never had back pain. Of the men be-tween 20 and 39 years old, 35 percent hadabnormal disk scans. In the men over 60years old, 57percent haddisks that werediagnosed as ab-normal5.

Sometimes it’sa matter of luckwhether or notyour disk abnor-malities willpress on thenerves and re-sult in pain.There are exer-cises which canstrengthen thegirdle of mus-cles which help support the spine. And yourmother was right—”sit up straight” really isimportant. Poor posture dramatically in-creases pressures on your spinal disks.

Typically, a herniated disk is preceded byan episode of low back pain or a long histo-ry of intermittent episodes of low back pain.However, when the nucleus actually herni-ates out through the annulus and compress-es the spinal nerve, then the pain typicallychanges from back pain to sciatica6.

Aeromedical Waiver ConsiderationsWhether you are a fighter pilot, navigator,

or loadmaster, your career and some of yourpay depend on your health, and therefore,your medical flight clearance. Most of usavoid the flight surgeon for fear of beinggrounded. A visit to the flight surgeon is avoluntary exposure to an authority able totake away our ability to fly. Of course, fromthe medical perspective, they have a respon-sibility to ensure a crewmember is fit to fly.Nevertheless, if you have consistent backpain, you are increasing your distractionsfrom flight duties, making a mishap morelikely. There’s help available.

One aspect of military health care is thefact that you often see a different physicianevery time. If that happens to you, it’s im-

Many times a

backache is

simply a case of

strained mus-

cles. This can

occur after the

first softball

game of the

year or the first

raking of leaves

in the fall. Persis-

tent back pain

can be an indi-

cator of a

bulging or herni-

ated disk.



portant to be very knowledgeable aboutyour condition and previous diagnosis toprevent continual reevaluations. Educateyourself before you take any course of ac-tion. You arm yourself with knowledge be-fore buying a car or house, before picking acollege. Why not before making major deci-sions affecting your health? See the refer-ence list at the end of this article for re-sources and websites with moreinformation.

Of course, I was a typical crewmemberavoiding the flight surgeon about my backfor years. I went to a chiropractor a fewtimes with no apparent help. I had massagea few times. It felt great, but it didn’t helpmy back. In fact, the deep tissue massage Ihad once really hurt, and I was more un-comfortable for a couple of days afterwards.But the day I woke up after my herniationand I couldn’t even sit down for the pain, Ineeded medical help. Had I been moreproactive or sought intervention earlier, Imight have prevented that big episode. Withproper medical and physical therapy ad-vice, as well as a huge motivation to gethealthy, I’ve been pain-free for over a year.

So what are the rules? What is groundingand waiverable? AFI 48-123, Medical Exami-nation and Standards, outlines what willground you and how to get a waiver. Thehighlights for back pain/herniated disksare:

■ Herniation of nucleus pulposus, whensymptoms and associated objectivefindings are of such a degree as to re-quire repeated hospitalization or fre-quent absences from duty.

■ Recurrent disabling low back pain dueto any cause.

■ History of frank, herniated nucleus pul-posus, or history of surgery orchemonuclyosis for that condition.

For a waiver to continue flying duty, yourlocal flight surgeon will prepare the paper-work. Usually, after about 3 months withoutsymptoms, you can get a waiver physicalexam. The general guidelines say that thecondition:

■ May not pose a risk of sudden incapac-itation.

■ Poses minimal potential for subtle per-formance decrement, particularly withregard to the higher senses.

■ Be resolved or be stable and be expect-ed to remain so under the stresses of theaviation environment.

■ If the possibility of progression or re-currence exists, the first symptoms orsigns must be easily detectable and notpose a risk to the individual or the safe-ty of others.

■ Cannot require exotic tests, regular in-vasive procedures, or frequent absencesto monitor for stability or progression.

■ Must be compatible with the perfor-mance of sustained flying operations inaustere environments.

It’s not necessary to get a specialist con-sultation for the waiver, but I was told that itwould help. I got an x-ray (an obsolete andunnecessary procedure for this condition)and a simple reflex walk-on-your-heels testfrom an orthopedic surgeon. The waiver Igot was unrestricted and will be reviewed in3 years. However, most waivers will proba-bly be for nonejection seat aircraft (i.e., IIA).If you are interested in your odds of obtain-ing a waiver, consider the following: TheUSAF aircrew waiver files show 343 mem-bers with a diagnosed herniated disk. Over95 percent received waivers. The less specif-ic condition of “back pain” lists 128 ratedcrewmembers with the condition, all but 30receiving waivers. And finally, 111 of 118with surgically fused vertebral disks re-ceived waivers.

Preventing Back Pain and HerniatedDisks

First, to prevent lower back pain and apossible herniated disk, you need to be

Intradiscal PressureRelative to Standing

220

150140

185

275

10075

25

Postion of Body


smart about your activities and lifestyle. Apoor posture, which puts a lot of stress onthe disks, leads to a cumulative degenera-tion beyond the normal changes due to ag-ing. Sit up straight; use lumbar support be-fore your back starts to hurt. If you fly longmissions in heavy aircraft, get up often andstretch. I mean, if possible get up every 30 to45 minutes on a long flight. If your aircrafthas poor lumbar support, use a back roll.This can be a rolled up jacket, or I’ve evenused a handful of approach plate books inthe past. Do not add material like back rollsto ejection seats (or stroking seats on heli-copters) without proper approval so as notto interfere with seat operation.

If you have a beer belly, get rid of it. A fatbelly creates enormous stress on the lowerback. You probably didn’t have that gut 10years ago, so get smart and lose it. Regularaerobic exercise is proven to reduce backpain. The more exercise one gets, the less re-ported back pain exists7.

Begin and maintain a strength-trainingprogram. Probably the most misunderstoodarea of health that I’ve seen is resistance(weight) training. We, Air Force flightcrew,lead relatively sedentary lives at work.Weight training, when done correctly, addsstrength and reduces fatigue. It strengthensbone and prevents bone loss and muscle de-terioration due to aging. Many people in-crease their risk for injury by lifting weightsthat are too heavy and with poor form. MostAir Force base gyms have no guidance easi-ly available for proper technique. I recom-mend each member seek a certified person-al trainer, as I did, at least to get started. Thebenefits are enormous, and you decrease therisks for injury significantly. Most peoplewill analyze the purchase of a home or auto-mobile “ad nauseum,” but never considerinvesting a couple hundred bucks to ensuretheir fitness and health.

Finally, the traditional back school adviceof “lifting with your legs,” “keep the weightclose to your body,” “avoid bending andtwisting,” etc., is still true today. Unfortu-nately, real life means that you’ll occasional-ly stumble and twist. You’ll have to reachinto the trunk of your car to take out thelawn mower or a bag of fertilizer. Prevent-ing back injury is a matter of preventingthose cumulative stresses which breakdown the intra-disk material. Preventingback problems begins with keeping yourbody weight down, doing weight-bearing(especially back extension) exercise, and aer-obics.

Now, what if you have already sufferedand are continuing to suffer back pain? If it’smild, the above steps will help and eventu-ally reduce the pain. If you are doing an ac-tivity that increases your back pain, like aback extension exercise on the Nautilus atthe gym, stop it immediately! You don’tneed to further irritate your injury. I see peo-ple working their backs extra hard to try toget rid of the back pain. It doesn’t work thatway, folks. If it hurts, your body is tellingyou something. STOP!

If you want good info on diagnosing yourpain, there’s an excellent website:http://www.cyberspine.com/index. html.This is the Canadian Back Institute’s guideto diagnosing and treating back pain. Lessuser friendly, but very informative, is theU.S. government-run site:http://text.nlm.nih.gov.

Remember: If you have any associatedproblem with bladder or sphincter control,seek medical help immediately. A good backand overall strength and aerobic trainingprogram does wonders. I’ve been on such aprogram for almost 2 years and have neverfelt better. I’m literally pain-free and a lothealthier than I used to be. So take care ofyour back, and you can avoid the wholeproblem. Fly safe!

1Agency for Health Care Policy and Research(AHCPR). National Institute of Health (NIH), ClinicalPractice Guidelines, Executive Summary, p.2.http://text.nlm. nih.gov2Hayashi, Biomechanics of Lower Back Pain and In-tervertebral Disk Degeneration, pg 1.http://www.twics.com/~hayashi/ movie/movie.htm3Nachemson A, Morris JM: In vivo measurements ofintradiscal pressure. Journal of Bone/Joint Surgery,1964; 46: 1077-1092http://www.sma.org/smj/96oct1.htm4On Health Network Company, Copyright 1999,h t t p : / / o n h e a l t h . c o m / c h 1 / r e s o u r c e /conditions/item,301.asp5Wheeless’ Textbook of Orthopaedics. Abnormal mag-netic resonance scans, Dept. of Orthopaedic Surgery,George Washington University Medical Center, Mar1990; 72(3): 403-8. http://www.medmedia.com/6Guide to Spinal Disorders-Herniated Disc, 1998, TheJoint Section of Spine and Peripheral Nerves of theAmerican Association of Neurological Surgeons.http://www.neurosurgery.org/pubpages/patres/her-niatedbroch.html7Kuritzky, Louis M.D. and White, Jacqueline, ThePhysician and Sportsmedicine: Low Back Pain: Consid-er Extension Education; Vol 25-No.1 - Jan 97. the Mc-Graw-Hill Companies. http://www.physsportsmed.com/issues/1997/01jan/kuritzky.htm

If you have a

beer belly, get

rid of it. A fat

belly creates

enormous stress

on the lower

back. You prob-

ably didn t have

that gut 10

years ago, so

get smart and

lose it. Regular

aerobic exercise

is proven to re-

duce back

pain. The more

exercise one

gets, the less re-

ported back

pain exists.


FY99 Flight Mishaps (Oct 98 - Sept 99) FY98 Flight Mishaps (Oct 97 - Sept 98)29 Class A Mishaps 24 Class A Mishaps9 Fatalities 18 Fatalities

24 Aircraft Destroyed 20 Aircraft Destroyed

Class A Mishaps FY99

6 Oct ✶ An airman suffered a serious back injury during a helicopter training exer-cise.

21 Oct ♣ An F-15E crashed during a SATN training mission killing both crewmembers.22 Oct ♣ Two F-16Cs collided shortly after departure. One F -16 was destroyed and

the other F-16 recovered uneventfully.29 Oct A C-9A’s No. 2 engine failed and caught fire shortly after a touch-and-go.9 Nov ♣ An F-16CG crashed during a day BFM training sortie, killing the pilot.

17 Nov ♣ An F-16C experienced engine failure and crashed during a day training sor-tie.

19 Nov ♣ An F-16CJ experienced loss of thrust shortly after takeoff and crashed.4 Dec ♣ An F-16D experienced engine failure 25 minutes into flight and crashed.

15 Dec ♣ An F-16C on a day training sortie experienced loss of thrust on RTB andcrashed.

29 Dec An OA-10A’s No. 1 engine throttle cable failed during flight. The pilot haddifficulty landing, the aircraft departed the prepared surface, and all threegear collapsed.

7 Jan ♣ An F-16DG experienced an engine malfunction shortly after gear retractionand crashed.

13 Jan ♣ A KC-135E crashed northwest of the departure end of the runway. All fourcrewmembers were fatally injured.

20 Jan ♣ An OA-10A entered an uncommanded, nose-low attitude. Unable to returnthe aircraft to controlled flight, the pilot ejected, and the aircraft wasdestroyed.

21 Jan ♣ An F-16CJ conducting low-level tactical navigation struck trees on a ridge-line. The engine failed, and the aircraft was destroyed on impact with theground.

28 Jan ♣♣ Two F-15Cs were flying a Dissimilar Tactical Intercept Training sortie againsta three-ship of F-16Cs. The two F-15s collided during the first intercept andwere destroyed.

3 Feb ♣ An F-16C on a training mission had an engine malfunction. The pilot ejectedafter an in-flight fire developed, and the aircraft was destroyed on impactwith the ground.

24 Feb ♣✶ An RQ-1A UAV departed controlled flight, crashed, and was destroyed.17 Mar On climbout, a U-2S canopy shattered, FOD’ing the engine and damaging the

vertical stab. The pilot RTB’d and made a safe landing.


18 Mar An F-16C suffered major damage on landing.26 Mar ♣ An F-16C on a day training sortie suffered loss of thrust, crashed, and was

destroyed.29 Mar ♣✶ An RQ-4A Global Hawk UAV crashed and was destroyed.30 Mar A U-2S experienced loss of hydraulic pressure and suffered major damage on

landing.7 Apr ♣✶ A KC-135R sustained major fuselage damage. (Ground Mishap)

10 Apr An AMRAAM and No. 1 launcher were liberated from an F-16CJ during flight.18 Apr ♣✶ An RQ-1K UAV crashed and was destroyed. 26 Apr ♣ An F-16DG experienced a landing gear malfunction while attempting to land.

The pilot executed a successful go-around and proceeded to the controlledbailout area, where both pilots ejected. The aircraft was destroyed onimpact with the ground.

19 May An F-117A sustained a fuselage fire on takeoff roll. Takeoff was successfullyaborted.

2 Jun ♣ An MH-53J conducting an exfil mission crashed in the LZ. One crewmemberwas killed.

15 Jun ♣♣ An F-15C and an F-15D crashed while on a local training mission.18 Jun ♣ An F-16DG crashed while on a local training mission.1 Jul ♣ An F-16C, part of a four-ship SAT sortie, struck the ground during the low-

level portion of the mission. The pilot was fatally injured.12 Jul ♣ An F-16C crashed while on a local training mission.11 Aug ♣ Two F-16Cs collided during the landing phase. The pilot of one F-16 success-

fully ejected, while the other F-16 recovered safely.19 Aug ♣ Two F-15As collided during a BFM sortie. One pilot safely ejected. The other

F-15A made it back to base.

❏ A “Class A Mishap” is defined as one where there is loss of life, injury result-ing in permanent total disability, destruction of an AF aircraft, and/or proper-ty damage/loss exceeding $1 million dollars.

❏ These Class A mishap descriptions have been sanitized to protect privilege.❏ ”♣” denotes a destroyed aircraft.❏ “✶” denotes a Class A mishap that is of the “non-rate producer” variety. Per

AFI 91-204 criteria, only those mishaps categorized as “Flight Mishaps” areused in determining overall Flight Mishap Rates. Non-rate producers includethe Class A “Flight-Related,” “Flight-Unmanned Vehicle,” and “Ground”mishaps that are shown here for information purposes.

❏ Unless otherwise stated, all crewmembers successfully ejected/ egressed fromtheir aircraft.

❏ Flight, ground, and weapons safety statistics are updated daily and may beviewed at the following web address by “.gov” and “.mil” users:http://www-afsc.saia.af.mil/AFSC/RDBMS/Flight/stats/index.html.

❏ Current as of 20 Sept 99.


U-2 Aircraft Pins Airman In FirstRound!

One of the best ways to avoid aback injury is to use proper liftingtechniques. Another very importantconsideration is knowing howmuch weight you’re lifting. Whichbrings us to the following mishapwhere, apparently, no one took thatvariable into account... Two main-tainers were assisting two othermaintainers in lifting a U-2’s rightwing in order to remove the wingstand. Three maintainers positionedthemselves underneath the wing

near the wingtip and lifted up withtheir backs, allowing the fourthmaintainer to remove the wingstand. Once the stand was removed,the trio under the wing realized thatit was too heavy for them to supportand two of them quickly moved outfrom under, leaving their coworkerto hold the wing solo. Did we men-tion that the left wing containedonly 20 gallons of fuel, while theright wing contained 650 gallons?The weight of the right wing and itsfuel forced the solo maintainer intoa “squat” position with his shoul-ders firmly in contact with his

knees, and he remained pinned thatway until his coworkers and otherscould lift the wing and rescue him.Fortunately, his injury was confinedto a strained back and he was onlyon quarters for one day. We stronglysuspect trust in his coworkers suf-fered some strain, too. And al-though we can’t confirm this either,we do suspect that included amonghis thoughts while he was pinned,was the line “With friends likethese, who needs enemies?!?!”

Hercules Wasn’t So MightyAfter All…

The C-130 Hercules was undergo-ing a #2 Minor Isochronal (ISO) in-spection. One of the ISO-cardeditems is to R&R the hydraulic boostpack filters, which requires fully de-pleting hydraulic pressure. Oncefinished, standard practice at thisunit to verify integrity of the hy-draulic systems is to use a hydraulicmule for power-on pressure checks,op checks, and bleeds. These taskswere routinely completed beforepushing an aircraft out of the ISOhangar.

Due to limited hangar space, ISOaircraft were restricted to a maxi-mum 30-day stay in the hangar, andon those occasions when hydraulicsystem checks couldn’t be complet-ed in the ISO hangar, they weredone on the ramp during post-ISOengine runs. Typically, most mainte-nance actions were completed with-

in this 30-day window, and therehad been very few problems return-ing aircraft to MC status.

This Herc was an exception. Be-cause of scheduling conflicts, hy-draulic system checks couldn’t bedone before it left the hangar, norcould they be done on the flightline,since all four engines were “hightimers” and removed for depotoverhaul. With no replacement en-gines immediately available, the air-craft was projected for extendeddown-time, placed low on the prior-ity list, and system checks put onhold. As a result, it sat parked out-side for more than 31/2 months with“zero” booster and utility hydraulicsystems pressure.

Under normal circumstances withproperly serviced hydraulic sys-tems, “snubbers” installed at eachend of the booster cylinders providesnubbing (damping) action to therudder, preventing uncommandedcontrol surface movements (seewhere this is leading?). It never reg-

istered with anyone that this Herc’shydraulic systems weren’t properlyserviced and snubber damping was-n’t available, even though several C-130 Job Guides have “Cautions”warning of wind damage to flightcontrol surfaces if booster and utili-ty hydraulic systems aren’t properlyserviced. T.O. 1C-130H-2-27JG-00-1includes the statement “…If thebooster and utility hydraulic sys-tems are properly serviced, normalwind gusts will not damage theflight controls.”

At some time during the 31/2

months that the aircraft was sittingidly on the ramp as an unfinishedISO bird and a CANN bird, windgusts ranging from 25 to 46 knots re-sulted in grounding damage tosome primary flight control sur-faces. Accordingly, the Herc spentsome additional time on the ramp.Remember: Regular “care and feed-ing” of all aircraft—including thosethat are idle—is a must.


Ten-Ton Pallet Pins Airman InSecond Round!

An aerial porter was helpingtransfer two pallets, weighing20,000 pounds each, from a 60K K-Loader to a rollerized flatbed trailer.The first pallet had been transferredto the flatbed without incident, andthe aerial port troop stood with hisright foot on the pallet’s edge await-ing transfer of the second pallet. As

the second pallet was pushed fromthe K-Loader onto the flatbed, itsweight caused the trailer to dropslightly and his right foot slippedoff the edge of the first pallet. Thefirst pallet rolled over the top of hisfoot and the edge of the second pal-let finished the job of trapping hisfoot entirely. With the help of hisbuddies, he was able to extricate hisfoot from the trapped boot and tak-en to the hospital, where he was di-

agnosed with a fractured foot. (Bethe could have told the doctor thatwithout the aid of an X-Ray!) Justproves once again that accidents canhappen when you least expectthem, but because this troop waswearing proper footgear, he’ll re-gain use of his foot. That’s whythey’re called safety shoes. Are youwearing yours?

“I Knew I Shoulda Listened toThat Little Voice Inside MyHead!!!”

The engine had been R&R’d for anoil leak. The leak was suspected tobe in the area of the No. 1 bearing.JEIM disassembled the engine asnecessary to replace the No. 1 bear-ing carbon seal, then reassembled itand towed it to Test Cell for leakand functional checks. Test Cell didthe required engine prep, intake andexhaust (I&E) inspections, and pro-ceeded with operational checks.During the course of the first hour,the engine was started up and shutdown three times in order to per-form minor servicing. Everythingwas fine until 10 minutes into thefourth run, when the Test Cell oper-ator noticed a puff of white smokefollowed by a few sparks comingfrom the tailpipe. The Test Cell op-erator shut down the engine, did anI&E inspection, and found damageto the first and second stage fan ar-eas. The engine was impounded,and an investigation was launchedto determine the extent of damageand learn why it had happened.

After a complete teardown, JEIMgave investigators an evaluation inde rigueur good news-bad newsfashion. The good news: Damage tothe LPT and augmentor could be re-paired locally. The bad news: Exten-sive compressor and fan damagewould require depot-level repair.Then the really bad news: All of thehavoc wreaked inside the now-ENMC engine was self-inflicted.Price tag for the repair placed thismishap in the Class A category.

Investigation revealed that all ofthe required FOD (foreign object de-bris) inspections, in-process inspec-tions (IPI), and supervisory inspec-tions had been performed anddocumented in accordance with di-rectives during each step of repairand reassembly. Investigation alsorevealed that Test Cell had per-formed I&Es before and after eachof the three runs prior to the ill-fat-ed fourth run. The mystery of howthe foreign object damage (FOD) hadbeen done to the engine was discov-ered during a look-back on how theengine teardown and buildup wasaccomplished.

One shift had disassembled the

No. 1 bearing area and put attachinghardware in parts bags. A secondshift replaced the No. 1 bearing car-bon seal and reassembled the sealsupport area. It was during this re-assembly stage that a single piece ofattaching hardware was discoveredmissing. The buildup team wasfaced with some choices: (a) Deter-mining whether or not the attachinghardware had originally been onhand and placed in the parts bag; (b)Initiating lost tool/hardware proce-dures; or (c) Doing neither of theabove. The team chose option “c”and simply got a replacement pieceof attaching hardware from benchstock. Despite all of the FOD, IPI,supervisory, and I&E inspections,and the three previous Test Cellruns, something had been over-looked. And the rest is history.

When you’re confronted withsimilar choices in the future—andyou will be—we hope you’ll choosethe path of “better safe than sorry.”We’re willing to bet that this unithas beefed up its missing tool/hard-ware policies and now places lotsand lots of emphasis on better com-munication.

30 FLYING SAFETY ● NOVEMBER 1999 ✩ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1998-673-366/43062

A Hot Pattern

Okay, quick! What’s No. 1 on your list of things you’drather not have to do on the downwind leg of your traf-fic pattern? How about this answer from a C-130 crew.

After more than an hour of flight, the C-130 enteredthe VFR traffic pattern for some work on landings. Onceestablished on downwind, the interphones began tobuzz (literally), and smoke began to fill the cockpit. Sureenough, where there’s smoke, there’s fire, and it wascoming from the essential AC bus panel.

The crew donned oxygen masks and then went towork. The engineer set the air-conditioning to “vent”and started to open the panel. The loadmaster used firstone and then a second fire bottle to put out the fire. Theengineer then shut off all generators, and the pilots flewan uneventful electrical power-out approach and a suc-cessful landing.

All in a day’s work, right? Yes…when the crew hashad a good briefing, works together as a team, thechecklist procedures are followed, and flightcrew disci-pline is maintained.

Ten Percent Don’t Get the Word

Why is it there’s always somebody who doesn’t seemto get the word? Recently, an enlisted aircrew memberwith a mild cold decided to—”self-medicate.”

Three days prior to a scheduled flight, the crewmem-ber admitted the cold was real. But darn! The clinic isclosed. Time to try an over-the-counter brand of an anti-histamine. The next day, the crewmember joined a dead-head crew to reach the staging base. During the descent,the crewmember got behind clearing the ears and final-ly resorted to a nasal spray to help. An hour after land-ing, the ears finally cleared. No sense in seeing a flightsurgeon now.

Not until very sharp pain returned to the ears did thecrewmember finally seek a flight surgeon. The flight docprescribed the obvious—DNIF for 10 days. And for the10 percent who still haven’t got the word, “Don’t selfmedicate. Period.”

Abort!! Abort!! Abort!!

Did you ever notice how the tone of your voice riseswhen you have to call for an abort of the takeoff? It’sprobably related to some Doppler effect of the humanemotions as they interact with the larynx. Most of thetime, this rise in pitch is limited to your voice, and notyour actions. Most of the time…

During the takeoff roll of a routine training flight, thepilot noticed a nose compartment door beginning toopen. There was still time to abort, so the pilot immedi-ately began max braking.

Although the aircraft was slowing, the pilot’s emo-tions had shifted into high gear. Maximum braking wasbegun with the throttles still at “military” power.

When the jet began to skid due to the overly aggres-sive braking, the pilot failed to release brakes and even-tually began to drift off the right edge of the runway. Tostop the drift, the nosewheel steering was engaged (withthe rudder pedal deflected full left), and the aircraftswerved sharply back onto the runway. The aircraft con-tinued across the runway until stopping 6 feet off the leftedge. Sometime, in a cloud of dust, the throttles werebrought to idle and eventually cut off during the groundegress.

Of course, aborts are not to be taken lightly. But youshould review the procedures often enough to makeyour next abort a “routine” maneuver, not a comedy oferrors.

Calibrated Fingernails

How much Avgas does it take for your Cessna 152 tomake a 21/2-hour local flight? You’re planning to do sometouch-and-go’s at three separate airfields before return-ing home. Therefore, the first thing you do is remove thefuel caps and look inside.

In preparation for a recent flight, one pilot did justthat. Unfortunately, the fuel was not up to the top, so thepilot inserted a finger into the tank as far as possible.The fuel just barely wet the fingernail (call it about 1.5

A Good Plan Is Better Than Good Inten-tions

Time after time, pilots go over the emergency proce-dures which may be needed on the upcoming flight.Usually, they are never needed, but every once in awhile, the briefing pays off.

Prior to a recent helicopter mission, the crew briefedas usual, to include the possibility of jettisoning the ex-ternal fuel tanks in an emergency. Arriving over thepickup site, they calculated all the performance factorsfor hovering 25 feet above the rocky creek bottom.

They stabilized at 50 feet and then began to descend to25 feet. When they attempted to level off, the helicopterlacked power, and the crew began a go-around towardthe canyon wall. As briefed, the tanks were dropped,and the helicopter flew out of the canyon without anyfurther problems.

Now, aircraft needing to drop the external stores toimprove performance during an emergency situationare not limited to the rotor wings. However routine themission briefing for emergency procedures may be-come, it still provides a good plan before you need a goodidea.

inches below the rim). In the pilot’s opinion, the aircraftwas fully fueled.

Well, you all know the story about opinions. Now forthe facts. One and one-half inches measured on a cali-brated dipstick indicates the tank is missing 3.5 gallons(times two tanks, remember). The manufacturer has cal-culated there is 1.5 gallons of unusable fuel on board.Two gallons of fuel were used for start, taxi, and takeoff.A “topped off” Cessna 152 should have 26 gallons. Soonce underway, the pilot actually had 15.5 gallons forthe trip.

The trip was flight-planned for 2 hours (the fuel need-ed for 30 minutes of touch-and-go’s was not included).Due to a modified, bigger engine, the actual fuel con-sumption of this aircraft over the last 100 hours was 6.1gallons of fuel per hour. For the mathematically in-clined, the pilot had barely more than 2.5 hours of fuelon board.

As things will happen, the pilot deviated off theplanned course in an attempt to follow a nondirectionalbeacon (particularly well named in this case) and addedanother 20 minutes to the route.

Two hours and 30 minutes into the flight, the enginesputtered. Five minutes later, the engine quit. Oneminute later, the aircraft landed in a cornfield. Weeks lat-er, the pilot is still wondering how much time was savedby not getting a calibrated dipstick or by not topping offthe tanks.


❊

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Official USAF Photo from FSM archives

Official USAF Photo by MSgt Rich Moran

NOVEMBER 99 FSM - Air Force Safety Center

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