MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIEDE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

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MEMORANDUMOFCONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The PresidentDr. Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant

to the President for National SecurityAffairs

General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., DeputySpecial Assistant to the President forNational Security Affairs

Nguyen Phu Duc, Special Advisor toPresident Thieu

Tran Kim Phuong, Ambassadorto theUnited States

TIME & DATE: 3:05 P.M. to 5:10 P.M.November 29, 1972

PLACE: The Oval Office

Following an initial greeting andpress photographic coverage, PresidentNixon welcomed Mr. Duc to Washington for a frank exchangeof viewsbetweenhimself and President Thieu’s personal representative. ThePresident pointed out that, as Dr. Kissinger had stated, the negotiationswith the North Vietnamesein search of a negotiatedsettlement of theconflict in SoutheastAsia were at a critical point. It was important thatthe U. S. andSouthVietnam now go forward as allies. For four years,President Nixon had carried the minority view against thousandsof demonstrators here at the White House itself, against a strong and at timesmajority consensusin the Congressand against a wave of popular opinionwhich favored conclusion of the conflict. The President had continued thefight both politically andmilitarily for the right of the people of SouthVietnam to be free of the threat of an imposed government, but also toachieve other peripheral goals, including the return of U. S. prisoners ofwar. However, both SouthVietnam and the United Stateswere at a

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critical juncture. The President was therefore anxious to have PresidentThieu’s current views. He would meet with Dr. Kissinger in Florida onSaturdaymorning preparatory to the meeting on December 4 in Paris, ameeting which would be the last meeting.

It was recognized that there were differences betweenWashingtonandSaigon, the President continued. It was recognizedthat the interests ofboth countries diverged in some particulars and that on the SouthVietnameseside the problem was most difficult. Therefore, a frank talk wasimportant. But then both sides should agreeto agree. Disagreementprovided dividends only to Hanoi and to the left wing of the United States.Expressions of betrayal from Saigonthat Dr. Kissinger had beenexceeding his instructions must stop, or it would destroy all that both nations hadworked for. It was essential that the United States retain public supportfor South Vietnam. It was fine to speak frankly when we were in an intimatecontext, but it was disastrous to air disagreementstbio ugh the radio andthe media. PresidentNixon had stood personally for Saigon and forPresident Thieu. The consensusof the Americai press was against SouthVietnam. Therefore, criticism from Saigon only helped Saigontsenemiesin the United States. It would be helpful to have Mr. Duc’s views so thatthey could be consideredas instructions were preparedfor Dr. Kissinger.

Mr.Duc statedthat he wished to convey the warm greetings of PresidentThieu and the people of SouthVietnam and to emphasizetheir gratitudefor all Presidenthad done. Vietnamization hadbrought South Vietnam toa position of greater strength than ever before. When the enemy offensivewas launchedon March 30, the SouthVietnamese proved the successofVietnamization. Now, it was clear that a crucial stagehadbeen reached.The enemy apparently wished to settle. President Thieu bad askedthatMr. Duc explain the whys and wherefors of his position. President Thieudid not believe Mr. Kissinger went beyond PresidentNixon’s instructions.President Thieu and Mr. Duc did not accept the press attacks on Dr.Kissinger. From Paris, Mr. Duc wired Saigon expressing his distressat these reports, andSaigon had assuredMr. Duc that the Governmentwasnot the source of theseattacks. The reporting of these attacks on SaigonRadio was not an expression of the South VietnameseGovernmentbut rathera reporting of the flow of news.

PresidentNixon said he was sure Mr. Duc was cognizant of the attitudeof the U. S. press reports in Saigon. Most were unfriendly, and it wasessential that they not be provided with ammunition. Many wanted

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PresidentThieu to fail. The fact was that many had predicted thisfailure for years, as had many on the left in the United States. PresidentNixon was surprised that President Thieu hadnot made a clear statementthat he had confidence in President Nixon. This very fact provided theleft with weaponsthey could use against us. Whether it was Dr. Kissingeror GeneralHaig, the outcome was the same. Privately, there could bedifferences; publicly there must be none.

Mr.Duc said that the sequenceof events was launchedwith Radio Hanoi’shaving gone public. Then, Saigon could not remain silent. It was necessary to prepare the people of South Vietnam. So it was not the intentionto go public but rather a necessity.

ThePresident statedthat it was evident that Saigonhad done well in preparing for the ceasefire. This he welcomed. But if the impression wascreatedthat Hanoi hadwon andwas gaining more from the settlement,then it posedthe United States with great problems. Certainly, PresidentThieu had proven his great public relations sensein the past. It was important that he not be negative or defensive at this time. It was the President’s task to go to the U. S. Congressto get the bullets but he would notbe able to do so if the attacks continue.

Mr.Duc stated that the Saigon free press would play the field despite theGovernment’s best efforts. He had been sent to WashingtonbecausePresident Thieu wanted PresidentNixon to have his position fully. Hewanted PresidentNixon to have the reasonsfor these positions. For thatreason, he carried a letter from President Thieu andwas preparedtoanswer whatever questions the Presidentmight have with respect to theletter.

[The President read the 23-page double spacedletter from PresidentThieu,at Tab A, marking key portions of it with his fountain pen. I

ThePresident remarked that President Thieu’s letter set forth his viewswith clarity and force, and that it neededno elaboration since it wastotally consistent with the views given by Mr. Duc to Dr. Kissinger inParis. Much of it PresidentNixon agreedwith. No one was more suspicious of the Communists. The President bad known the misery thathas been imposed on the people of North Vietnam. He observedit firsthand in 1956. The traffic in this respect badbeen all one way. The

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Communists claimed they were liberators. We knew they were toughnegotiators andhad been intransigent on their troops in the South, aswell as now on the political prisoners. During the negotiations, Dr.Kissinger had beenequally intransigent on the political prisoner issue.

It was evident that President Thieu was worried about the politicalsettlement. But President Nixon had been especially concerned thatPresident Thieu should not portray it as a coalition in disguise.Certainly, President Thieu understoodthat the principle of unanimitydeprived it of that reality. In their proposal of October 8, Hanoiabandonedits demandfor President Thieu’s replacement. When onelooked carefully at the meaning of the Council, it had no effect on theGovernmentof South Vietnam. President Nixon personally insisted onthis kind of a settlement even though the joint U.S. -GVN proposals ofJanuaryhad agreed that President Thieu should stepdown. This optionhad beendiscarded. In addition, the Commission meant nothing withoutthe agreementof both sides. While there was some psychological impact,in reality with the continued U.S. aid -- military andpolitical -- and,most importantly, with firm Presidential assurances, theproblem wasmanageable.

PresidentNixon continued that he had three or four important pointsto make. When General Haig came to Saigon or when Dr. Kissingercame, they spoke directly for President Nixon. Words they spoke werePresidentNixon’s words. When Dr. Kissinger went to Paris next week,he would be pronouncing President Nixon’s words. Written instructionsfor each of these sessionswere prepared by the President. Daily cableswere exchanged. So it was not GeneralHaig or Dr. Kissinger butPresident Nixon. Even next week during the last negotiating session,Dr. Kissinger would be told directly. It was recognized that PresidentThieu did not agree with all aspectsof the draft Agreement. PresidentNixon, on the other hand, did. President Thieu’s views would now becarefully considered. And on Saturday morning, PresidentNixon wouldissue his final instructions and Dr. Kissinger would travel to Paris withcomplete instructions and complete authority to settle. Dr. Kissingerwould be instructed to meet with the South VietnameseDelegation aftereach meeting in Paris. It was the United States goal to make the bestagreementthat could be made - - one which would achieve our goals andinsure what had beenfought for and justify the suffering of the people ofSouth Vietnam.

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Nevertheless, the picture was clear that both were at critical points.The United Stateswished the war put to an end, while President Thieuappearedto want it to continue until North Vietnam surrenderedorwithdraw. Indeed, President Thieu may be correct, but PresidentNixoncould not order such action since it would only be an idel gesture.

He had met with key leaders in the U.S. legislature, and on January 3d,when they reconvened, if there was no settlement within ten days, fundswould be cut off. The reasonwas clear. President Nixon had set forththree conditions when launching the actions of May 8: the requirement ofa ceasefire, the return of U. S. prisoners of war, and provisions whichwould enable the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future andnot have a coalition government imposed upon them against their will. Eachof the conservative legislative leaders consulted by President Nixon said thatif the agreementarrived at in Paris achieved thesegoals and Saigon refusedto go along, then President Nixon would have no choice. The AmericanPresidenthad great power, but his Congresscontrols the purse strings.It may not even be a Presidential wish. Certainly, there was no desireto have such an outcome imposed, but it would occur. If the threeconditions were met by Hanoi, then Congresswould believe our objectiveswere achieved. Everyone knew that Hanoi broke the 1954 Accords.

The United Statesmust get the best agreement it can, and it wouldcertainly try. But if Saigon did not support the agreementthen theUnited Stateswould not even have the power to police the agreement.More important than any other factor was not the language of anAgreement or a piece of paper but the United States commitment toenforce the Agreement. That commitment was being made at this meeting.If Saigonaccepted the Agreement, the United States would then be justifiedin asking for continued funds. As Mr. Duc was aware, the United Stateshad shipped in vast amounts of additional military supplies. Thus, asatisfactory agreementwould enable us to go to the Congressand provideadequatemilitary and economic aid in the future.

Further, the United Stateswould maintain military assetsin Thailand,offshore and in other adjacent locations, which would insure its abilityto react if Hanoi violated the Agreement. The President of the UnitedStates would then be able to stand firmly with President Thieu, and sayso publicly , and from a united front against all potential enemies.

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Finally, the completion of an agreementwould insure United Statesinfluence at the highest level with Moscow and Peking to guaranteeHanoi’s living up to the Agreement.

Thus, with continued military and economic power, anda credible U.S.threat to resume military operations without hesitation, should a violationoccur, the prospectswere optimum. Hanoi knew that the United Stateshad not beenhesitant in the past. The key was mutual trust betweenPresident Nixon and President Thieu. There would be no hesitation on theUnited States side.

President Thieu always had the option of course of holding to the provisionsof his letter. Naturally, he would like to see the languageof the draft improved,but South Vietnam’s security was basedon what the United States could dobased on political realities. Should President Thieu decide to go his ownway and continue to insist on unmanageablechanges, then he would deprivethe United Statesof what it must have. PresidentNixon could try to requestsupport from the Congressbut it would fail. Friendly Senate leaders,including Stennis, Goldwater, RepresentativeFord, etc. who had alwayssupported the President’s policy, would bolt. CongressmanFord advisedthe President that if the Congressbelieved Saigon was refusing to go along,a CongressionalResolution offering U.S. POWs for total U.S. withdrawaland a cutoff of aid would passthe House by 2 to 1. This was a temperamentof the U.S. legislature.

Thus, the time had come to deal with reality - - what could and could not bedone. Without U.S. aid, Saigon could not survive. Saigonhad the optionof saying it would not go along. The United States did not want that, butwithout U.S. funds Saigon would bethrough. President Thieu must see itfrom our perspective. There was complete sympathywith the SouthVietnamesepeople. President Nixon personally observeda child with onearm shot off and a secondseemedto be amputated. He rememberedthis.No one could be more strongly behind the survival of the GVN. What mustbe faced is that if there was no settlement next week, by January 3d or moreprecisely within a week beyond, both Saigon and the United States were finished.Saigon had no veto option. No one here would understandthe languagedifficulties given current attitudes.

President Thieu had suggesteda meeting betweenhimself and President Nixon.There was no need. When the meeting did occur, it must be for the purposeof showing unity in keeping the peaceafter the settlement, or at least afterboth parties agree to a settlement. Then President Nixon could say publiclythat whoever violated the Agreement would risk unacceptableconsequences.

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Dr.Kissinger addedthat in this context the United Stateswould be ableto muster the necessarysupport to enforce the Agreement.

PresidentNixon continued that some were demanding that the United Statesjust get out. This had been rejected. In a cold-blooded way Congressnowmade it essentialto proceed with the Agreement. It could be done, and itcould succeed, but President Thieu must say that he had confidence inPresident Nixon. With that kind of a statnent U.S. support was assured.Funds could be acquired and the Agreement could be forcefully and crediblypoliced.

This was a most frank and forthright exchangeof views. Indeed, if Hanoiknew these realities it would be impossible to get them to negotiate. Theserealities had crystallized, not becausethe United Stateshad moved too fast,but in fact, it had managedto stay just one step aheadof the sheriff.Dr. Kissinger’s visits to Paris helped in this process. But if at this pointno agreementwas reached, in view of all of the above, then Washingtonand Saigonhad failed. President Thieu must understandthis reality.Exchangesof letters were no longer adequate.

The fact was, the President stressed, that President Thieu and PresidentNixon were of the samemind in wanting to prevent the collapse of SouthVietnam. Communists did not respect paper. They understoodbombsand mines and the U.S. ‘s resolve. President Nixon frequently referredto this issue in terms of hardware and software. President Johnson stoppedbombing in 1968 and it was a grave mistake. Now the situation was different.Hanoi had observed U.S. actions in Cambodiaand Laos, and the bombingandmining on May 8th. The credibility of our resolve had beenestablished.The American people recognized that if the President supported theAgreement they would have to do the same. Why did Korea survive today?Partially becauseof U.S. aid, but primarily becauseNorth Korea knew thatif they violated the DMZ a violent reaction would ensue. The situation wasthe samein Vietnam. If North Vietnam infiltrated again they would run amortal risk.

Mr.Duc replied that for the agreementto succeedin South Vietnam theGVN must show it as a victory -- one which could be explained to thepeople of South Vietnam. President Thieu had two major points - - theissue of North Vietnamese troops in the South, and the terms of thepolitical settlement. Concerning the enemy inthe South this was a very,

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if not the most, important point. It was primarily a matter of principle.South Vietnam had fought an invasion. Hanoi had no right to send itstroops into the South. If there was no privision clearly mentioned, thenthere was a locak of reciprocities, and South Vietnamesemilitary andpopular morale will be ruined. It was essential for the political strugglethat would follow. Secondly, following the settlement there would be apolitical contest. With the North Vietnamese in the South, the peoplecould not expresstheir choice in freedom.

PresidentNixonstated that the fact is, however, that the timing of anelection was up to the people and up to President Thieu. Dr.Kissingeraddedthat this is a fact. Without a North Vietnamesewithdrawal, therewas no reasonto risk the political solution.

PresidentNixonaddedthat he knew the Communists well, and if theyviolated the Agreement, the U.S. would back Saigon. Dr. Kissingernotedthat he has observed President Nixon carefully. He has always reactedstrongly to Communist threats. On May 8, only one key adviser was infavor of the action that was taken. How could PresidentNixon now, afterall the sacrifices that had beenmade, permit Hanoi to overrun South Vietnam?

PresidentNixon stated that it won’t be necessaryto haggle over proof. Thesimple fact was that if Hanoi reinforced, the U.S. would react.

Dr.Kissinger statedthat the United States will maintain an IntelligenceGroup in Thailand to monitor this problem carefully, with some representationalso in Saigon.

ThePresident stated that he had no confidence in the U. N. and the InternationalControl Commission or any other vehicle which might try to police. Theproblem was to watch unilaterally and to react in the face of violation.

Dr.Kissinger stated that perhaps 5, 000 could sneak in but a sizeable forcecould not. If a resupply effort built up, it would be known by the UnitedStates. For example, a report of 87 tanks moving down the trail was wellknown today; if there was a serious threat developing, the United Stateswould know.

PresidentNixon said the United Stateswould keep its best people in theremaining contingent. Dr. Kissinger added that NSA would do the same.

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Mr.Duc stated that if the United Stateshad to retaliate, then it would befar simpler if there were something specific in the Agreement which theUnited States could invoke to justify the action. In 1955, the United Stateshad a document it could use.

ThePresident statedhe was aware of this and that the document might beweak in some areas but there was plenty of- justification.

Dr.Kissinger pointed out that there were specific prohibitions, includingviolation of the DMZ clause, violation of the neutrality of CambodiaandLaos, violation of the ceasefire and the prohibition of reinforcement. Allof this would insure adequatepublic support.

PresidentNixonpointed out that, in addition, the United Stateswas in closetouch with the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

Mr.Duc statedthat the simple problem was that Hanoi wished to make thepoint that they had a right to be in South Vietnam. That was why Saigonwanted to get some word which would establish the principle that they hadno right. In wording it need not be abrasive such as in the ManilaProclamation but something about non-SouthVietnamesetroops. Also,Saigonwated something on the principle that armed forces of each statemust remain within their borders. This was a political matter for Saigon.It was essential for South Vietnam’s confidence andmorale - - not aspecific reference by name to North Vietnamesetroops but some form inwhich it could be covered indirectly.

Dr.Kissinger stated that the United Stateshad religiously presentedallof Saigon’s requestedchanges -- about 69 of them. Over three hours oftough negotiating was spent on the issue of forces within national boundaries.Hanoi insisted on maintaining that they had no forces in the South, andwhile this is a complete lie, it did deprive Hanoi of any pretext of claiminga right to be there.

Ninety-eight percent of the negotiating time last week in Paris was focusedon this issue, and the United Stateshad only the alternative now of aclause which would disclaim the right to use force. But the simple factwas that the statementwould mean nothing except in a psychological sense.

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ThePresident stated that this was precisely why this is necessarytoseparatehardware from software. Hardware was steel and bombs.This was far preferable to a paper war. Saigon’s point was a good one,but in reality the United Stateswould interpret the Agreement in thisway in any event, andwhen President Thieu and President Nixon met, themessagewould be sentdirectly to the North through strong public statements. It would also be quite evident to the world andmost importantly tothe people of South Vietnam. However, if the meeting occurred beforeSaigonand Washington agreedand there was to be another haggling session,we would have a repeat of past summit failures in other areas. Leadersmust not attend summits unless they knew beforehandthat they wouldsucceed, so the meeting should be after agreementbetweenSaigon andWashington.

President Thieu’s letter had been read carefully, but he must understandnow that when Congressreturned funds would be cut off. Unless of coursethe Communists reneged on what they had thus far indicated they wouldagree to, i.e., Thieu’s remaining in power, releasing prisoners of war,ceasefire, and a political process to be determined by the people ofSouth Vietnam. If there was a violation, the United Stateswould reactand the Congresswould support this action. But if the talks broke downbecauseWashingtonand Saigon failed to proceedtogether, then bothwould be responsible for a Communist takeover. This was the finalreality.

Americans and South Vietnamesehad died together. A commitment hadjust been given to President Thieu -- economic, military -- and acommitment to resumethe bombing of there was a violation. This couldnot be delivered if Congressobservedthat President Thieu failed tocooperate. We now faced a situation that even if the Pre. dent wishedto continue, it could not be done. The funds would be cut off by January 13th.This would not be tragic for President Nixon personally but all that Saigonand Washingtonhad fought for would go down the drain. All of Saigon’sfriends in the United Stateswho were patient and supportive in the pastwould lose. This is a fact that could not be changed. Hard reality wassuch that President Thieu must understandthis. The President of theUnited States was putting everything on the line, but he must have publicsupport.

Dr.Kissinger addedthat up to now Hanoi’s unreasonablenesswas theUnited States’s best ally.

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Mr.Duc stated that the most serious problem remained the NorthVietnamesetroops in the South. ThePresident said that perhaps somelanguageto help this could be tried. Dr. Kissingeragreedthat he woulddo so, noting that he would work with Mr. Duc to go over the final changes.

PresidentNixonrepeatedthat Dr. Kissinger always spoke for PresidentNixon. He was aware of the President’s thinking and spoke for him. Hewas definitely going to negotiate the agreementjust as the Presidenthimselfwould do.

Mr.Duc reiterated that Saigonmust have some basis for saying that Hanoihad no right to be in the South, even though they might stay for a time.Also, the CNCR must not have governmental functions.

President Nixon observedthat the Department of State had wanted to flushPresident Thieu, and the Presidenthad refused. This agreement retainedthe President in office. Foreign policy, domestic policy, remained in hishands.

Dr.Kissinger statedthat the CNCR must not be discussedas an organizationwith political power for, in fact, it hadnone.

President Nixon agreed, reiterating that he would portray it publicly asnot a coalition government, as lacking any structure of power. The UnitedStates lawyers have looked at this most carefully. If Washington andSaigoncould stay together, then no one could claim otherwise. Finally, thePresidenthad agreed to see President Thieu to reflect joint determination toseek peacewithin the framework of the agreement.

Mr.Ducstatedthat President Thieu did not agree to the terminology usedto describe the CNCR but, more importantly, its three components.

President Nixon pointed out that this problem would be explained in theUnited States. Saigon would then have an outpouring of support, especiallyif the American people could feel proud of the Agreement. President Thieuwas President Nixon’s personal friend and ally. Therefore, he must speakpositively. The United States could not insist that Hanoi surrender. Atthe sametime, the United Statesmust strengthenSaigon - - its Army, NavyandAir Force and its economy. With this kind of support, Saigonwould bethe strongest power in the area. The North VietnameseArmy fought well

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becauseit is Vietnamese. Saigon could do the same. The United Stateswished to help; President Nixon wished to remain its friend, but ifSaigon refused to go along, the Congresswould prevail. The UnitedStateshad lost two Senate seats which were formerly friendly. Withouta settlement, there must be trouble.

Dr. Kissinger andMr. Duc now must work out the final Agreement in sucha way that Saigonand Washington could remain friends and allies. It wasjust that simple. Four years ago, there might have beenother options.At that time, however, we did not surrender. We could not do the samenow.

Dr.Kissinger observed that the United Stateshad received an official protestfrom the Soviets becauseof the President’s threat given during the lastParis talks.

Mr.Duc said that President Thieu asked him to raise the fact that Hanoiseemedto put us in a defensive position by raising contentious referencesimplying Saigon was a satellite of the United States. President Thieu suggestedthat the negotiation should now be divided: Let the United Stateshandle themilitary issues and allow South Vietnam to negotiate on the political.

President Nixonreplied that it was too late, that we had long since passedthat point. Next week, the United States was going to negotiate hard toreach that agreement. Dr. Kissinger would fill Mr. Duc in on details.Hanoi was tough at the last session, but they knew the war was going to besettled. It would be impossible to change the strategy now. The fact wasthat the political outcome is up to Saigon. This was a major componentoftheAgreement. Now was the time for the two Presidents to stand behindthe Agreement publicly. Then President Nixon could go to the Congressand to the country. This would provide the necessarysupport to enforcethe Agreement and to provide the necessaryeconomic andmaterial help.Just as President Thieu had his problem, President Nixon must set thestagewith public opinion in the United States. If Saigon said no, therewould be no Congressionalor popular support. Mr. Duc should sit downwith Mr. Kissinger now and work out a solution. The decision had beenmade. There should be no illusions. The total withdrawal of NorthVietnamese forces was out of the question.

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Mr.Duc statedthat the question was how to sell such a solution to theVietnamese people. There must be some reference to North Vietnamese

withdrawal. There must be some referenceto North Vietnamesewithdrawal.There must be no inference that the CNCR is a coalition. In this context,the three componentsand the description of the structure were important.

ThePresidentasked Mr. Duc to work with Dr. Kissinger, and Dr.Içissingerstated that he would do this within realistic limits.

As the meeting concluded, PresidentNixon questionedMr. Duc’s commentson the Chinese Communists. He pointed out that United States influencein Peking was greater, not less, becauseof the normalization process.This was very evident from events since that time.

The meeting adjourned.

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