Notes and References - Springer978-0-230-37276-4/1.pdf · Notes and References 1. The United States...

Notes and References

1. The United States and the Post-Cold-War International System

I. Morton Kaplan initially used the term 'tight bipolar system', but in a more specific sense than I am using the concept here. System and Process in International Politics (NY: Wiley, 1957).

2. Kenneth A. Oye, 'Beyond Postwar Order and New World Order: American Foreign Policy in Transition', in Oye et al., eds, Eagle in a New World: American Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era (NY: Harper Collins, 1992) p. 6.

3. John Gaddis, 'The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System', International Security, Spring 1986, pp: 100, 142.

4. Susan L. Woodward reinforces the point that the integrating function of the bipolar system affected both interbloc and intrabloc integration. Disintegration in Europe after 1989 occurred first in the Soviet bloc, then Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and finally, Czechoslovakia. Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 349. She states that 'The viability of the Yugoslav regime, in fact, depended on its former position and a policy of national independence and nonalignment tied to the organization of the cold war world' (p. 16).

5. 'The Clash of Civilizations,' Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993. 6. Michael Lind, 'In Defense of Liberal Nationalism', Foreign Affairs,

May /June 1994. 7. John Lewis Gaddis, 'Toward the Post-Cold-War World', Foreign Affairs,

Spring 1991, pp. 105-8. 8. The phrase is Zbigniew Brzezinski's in Out of Control: Global Turmoil

on the Eve of the 21st Century (NY: Collier Books, 1993) part I. James Goodby characterizes the new conflicts as driven by 'ethnic and nationalistic claims driven underground for decades by Communist repression ... ', 'Commonwealth and Concert: Organizing Principles of Post-Containment Order in Europe', The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1991, p. 87.

9. Brzezinski, Out of Control, Part IV, and Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order: Zones of Peace, Zones of Turmoil (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993) p. 190.

10. Singer and Wildavsky, The Real World Order, p. 195. I I. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change

and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (NY: Random House, 1987) especially pp. 514-40.

250

Notes and &ferences to pp. 8-15 251

12. Joseph S. Nyc, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (NY: Basic Books, 1990). See especially the preface to the paperback edition (1991) p. xi.

13. Atilio A. Boron, 'Toward a Post-Hegemonic Age? The End of Pax Americana', SecurityDialogue,June 1994.

14. As Nyc puts it, 'America is rich but acts poor. In real terms, GNP is more than twice what it was in 1960, but Americans spend much less of their GNP on international leadership'. Bound to Lead, p. 159.

15. Michael Mandelbaum, 'The Reluctance to Intervene', Foreign Policy, Summer 1994, pp. 14-16.

16. Earl C. Ravena! has long argued the case for limited US defense and foreign policy commitments, and did so even as the Cold War continued. See a relatively recent article, 'The Case for Adjustment', Foreign Policy, Winter 1990-1. On the other side of the debate, Edward N. Luttwak deplores the timidity of US policy and strongly argues for a more assertive stance. 'Where are the Great Powers? At Home with the Kids', Foreign Affairs, July/August 1994.

17. John E. Rielly, ed., American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995) p. 6; and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr, 'Back to the Womb? Isolationism's Renewed Threat',ForeignAffairs,July/August 1995, p. 7.

18. Alvin Z. Rubenstein, 'The New Moralists on a Road to Hell', Orbis, Spring 1996.

19. Joseph S. Nye, Jr, 'What New World Order?', Foreign Affairs, Spring 1992, especially pp. 83-4.

20. Ibid., p. 84. 21. Joshua Muravchik, The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to

Neo-Isolationism (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1996) p. 3. 22. Reprinted in Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Force in

the Post-Cold War World (Washington, DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994) Appendix H.

23. David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1995). That the problem with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) lay primarily with the national governments is suggested by the fact that critics have begun suggesting that the NATO implementation force, as did UNPROFOR, spends much of its time protecting itself. Washington Post, June 25, 1996, AI.

24. Richard N. Haass, 'Paradigm Lost', Foreign Affairs, January/February 1995, pp. 50-2.

2. What Should Policy Be? Guidelines for Intervention

I. Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Force in the Post-ColdWar World (Washington, DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994) pp. 6-7.

2. Ibid., Appendix C. 3. Ibid., p. 192. The term 'limited war' gained currency after the Korean

War. Louis J. Halle, The Elements of International Strategy: A Primer for

252 Notes and References to pp. 15-26

the Nuclear Age (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984) pp. 68-9.

4. Both former Secretary of Defense Les Asp in and former Secretary of State George Shultz have stressed the need for flexibility on this complex question. See Halle ibid., p. 184, for Aspin's remarks, and for Schultz, Farced Zakaria, 'A Framework for Interventionism in the Post-Cold War Era', in Arnold Kanter and Linton F. Brooks, eds, US Intervention Policy for the Post-Cold War World: New Challenges and New Responses (NY: W.W. Norton, 1994) pp. 185-6.

5. William Satire column, New York Times, January 7, 1993, A23. 6. New York Times, April 28, 1993, Al. 7. Colin Powell, My American journey (NY: Ballantine, 1995, 1996),

pp. 643-5; New York Times, October 8, 1992, A35; and 'US Forces: Challenges Ahead', Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/1993.

8. Secretary of Defense WilliamJ. Perry said that, 'In this post-Cold War era, we are even less likely to rely on all-out military force to give us overwhelming victory. We're more likely to use selective force to achieve limited objectives'. News Release, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 15 June 1994.

9. Richard N. Haass, 'Paradigm Lost', Foreign Affairs, January/February 1995, p. 56.

10. Quoted in Charles F. Hermann, Crisis in Foreign Policy: A Simulation Analysis (NY: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969) p. 176.

3. The Development of the War in Yugoslavia

1. Dusko Doder, 'Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds', Foreign Policy, Summer 1993, p. 5.

2. Alex N. Dragnich counts five empires that have wielded power in the Balkans, omitting only the Germans, whose influence grew during the twentieth century. Serbs and Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia (NY: Harcourt, Brace,Jovanovich, 1992) pp. xiii-xiv.

3. The quote is by Robert D. Kaplan. Rebecca West wrote 'I hate the corpses of empire; they stink like nothing else'. Both quotes are in Kaplan, Balkan Glwsts: A journey Through History (NY: Vintage, 1993) pp. xiv, 57.

4. Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, Jr., Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (NY: Columbia University Press, 1994) p. 72.

5. Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up, 1980-92 (NY: Verso, 1993) p. 191.

6. Susan L. Woodward stresses the relationship between reform and disintegration in Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), chapters 3 and 4. While most observers have stressed the relationship between Serbia and Croatia as essential to the integrity of Yugoslavia, she sees the Serbian-Slovenian nexus as key. See also Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, pp. xiii, 220.

Notes and References to pp. 27-33 253

7. Mihailo Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1994) pp. 148-51.

8. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 89, 91, 110. 9. Albert Wohlstetter, Wall Street]oumaquly 1, 1993, editorial page. The

autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina within Serbia was also an irritating grievance for the Serbs, and one to which they had tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a solution. See Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama, pp. 94-5.

10. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 96. 11. Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, p. 191. 12. Dusko Doder, 'Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds', Foreign Policy,

Summer 1993, pp. 12-3. A move to further differentiate between the Serb and Croat languages from what is really a single language was one of the ironies, or absurdities, springing from the Croatian nationalist movement. See also Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism: The Tmgic Death of Yugoslavia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994) p. 41.

13. Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (NY: TV Books, 1995, 1996) pp. 82-4.

14. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 172 and 216. 15. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 209. 16. Cohen quotes Izetbegovic saying, 'Bosnia has lasted 1,000 years. I do

not see any reason to break it up now. Bosnia is impossible to divide, because it is such a mixture of nationalities, just like the apartment bloc where I live.' Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia, first edition, (Boulder: Westview, 1993), p. 145. Speaking of the process by which an ethnic-based nation becomes independent, Susan L. Woodward points out that those governments which seize the initiative and succeed are 'far better prepared politically and economically than those for whom independence is a second-best choice or on whom independence is forced'. Unfortunately, given the way events unfolded in Yugoslavia, Bosnia falls more in the second category. Balkan Tragedy, p. 350. The Rieff quote is from David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1995) p. 131.

17. Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, second edition, (Boulder: Westview, 1995), p. 332.

18. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 118-28; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 83.

19. Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, Jr., Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (NY: Columbia University Press, 1994) pp. 210-12, 237, 265, 279.

20. Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 128-35. 21. Donia and Fine, Jr., Bosnia and Hercegovina, 211-12. See also the re

vealing quotes on the various Yugoslav leaders in Cohen, Broken Bonds, first edition, pp. 199-200; and Crno brn ja, The Yugoslav Drama, p. 146. This assessment of the various leaders was also concurred with by US Secretary of State, james A. Baker, III. See his The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), pp. 480-1.


22. Jeanne Kirkpatrick has argued this. Silber and Little argue that after the March meeting between Milosevic and Tudjman at Karadjordjevo where both leaders agreed that Yugoslavia was finished and concentrated on how to divide it up, Milosevic was already resigned to let Slovenia go. Yugoslavia, p. 144.

23. On US support for UNSC Resolution 713, s~e US Department of State Dispatch (hereafter DSD), September 30, 1991, p. 723.

24. Doder, 'New War, Old Hatreds', pp. 18-19; and Magas, TheDestmction of Yugoslavia, p. 347.

25. Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama, pp. 178-81; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 218, 231.

26. Robert A. Levine, 'If It's Worth Doing At All, is it Worth Doing Wrong? Yugoslavia and the Next Time', RAND Issue Paper, Santa Monica, August 1993, p. 3.

27. In a parallel with the Cold War debates on Soviet goals and strategies, Yugoslav specialists cannot agree on whether Milosevic was pursuing a Greater Serbia.

28. Warren Zimmermann, 'Nationalism in Bosnia', The Woodrow Wilwn Center Report, November 1994, p. 6.

29. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy. • [The focus on aggression] ignores the conditions that make such leaders [Siobodan Milosevic] possible and popular and therefore also ignores the policies necessary to end their rule'. See especially the introduction and pp. 13-17.

30. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 99. 31. V.P. Gagnon, Jr., 'Ethnic Nationalism and International conflict: The

Case of Serbia', International Security, Winter 1994, p. 132. 32. Ibid., pp. 140, 150, 133, 132, 158. 33. Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan

Politics in Transition, second edition (Boulder: Westview, 1995) pp. 247,329-33, 366-7 (n6).

34. Crnobr'1ia, The Yugoslav Drama, p. 154, 164. Alex N. Dragnich, a Yugoslav specialist, has argued that the government of Yugoslavia, not just Serbia, opposed the secession of the republics. But he conveniently forgets that the Serbs were instrumental in blocking numerous actions that might have contributed to a resolution of the crisis, including the economic and democratic reforms of Prime Minister Ante Markovic. Washington Post, September 25, 1994, C6.

35. The question raised by A.M. Rosenthal, NYT, December 23, 1994, A 35; and Sylvia Poggioli, 'Weekend Edition', National Public Radio, December 10, 1994. Raising the ante on those who support a democratic and multi-ethnic Bosnia, Flora Lewis suggests it may not be too late to apply the same formula to Yugoslavia as a whole and to reconstitute it as a state. 'Reassembling Yugoslavia,' Foreign Policy, Spring 1995.

36. A consistent and early critic of the propensity of American analysts to make Serbia the main culprit in Bosnian has been Alex N. Dragnich. The main flaw in his argument is that he fails to distinguish between the relatively democratic and flexible nature of the other republics and the authoritarian and expansionist nature of Serbian politics and


nationalism. All sides have had grievances, but the nature of the Serbian response was singular. See his 'The West's Mismanagement of the Yugoslav Crisis', World Affairs, Fall 1993.

37. Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, Jr., Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (NY: Columbia University Press, 1994 pp. 266-8); Cohen, Broken Bonds, second edition, pp. 279-81; Washington Post, February 6, 1995, A13. But as Stephen Schwartz points out, it is the Bosnians who were the true heirs to the multi-cultural legacy of Yugoslavia. 'In Defense of the Bosnian Republic;' World Affairs, Fall 1993. In contrast to the serious and perhaps naive Bosnian efforts at maintaining tolerance in an environment of violence, Milosevic's claim to carry the mantle of Yugoslavia certainly cannot include the multiethnic tradition.

4. The Nature of the War

1. New York Times, August 5, 1994, Al. 2. New York Times, November 28, 1994, AI. 3. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey:

1993-1994 (London: Brassey's, 1994) p. 100. 4. Ibid. 5. New York Times, AprilS, 1993, A3. 6. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey:

1994-95 (London: Oxford University Press, 1995) p. 101. 7. New York TirMS, October 11, 1993, Al. 8. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey:

1995-1996 (London: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 131. 9. Ibid., pp. 131-2.

10. David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1995) pp. 130-3.

11. New York Times, August 1, 1993, L5. 12. Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold

War(Washington, DC: Brookings Institutional, 1995) p. 270. 13. New York Times,January 23, 1994, Ll; Strategic Survey: 1994-95, p. 96-7. 14. Strategic Survey: 1995-1996, p. 129. 15. Strategic Survey: 1994-95, p. 97. 16. This discussion of the use of the enemy in group dynamics is borrowed

from David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagen, Enemies in Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), especially chapter 1.

17. See for instance Charles G. Boyd, 'Peace Principles', Foreign Affairs, November /December 1995, p. 153. 'Centuries of perceived victimization and the resulting paranoia have produced a very real Serb demand for self-determination that any successful peace agreement must accommodate.'

18. The Serbian goals, values, rationalizations and behavior documented by Norman Cigar are reminiscent of those documented by earlier writers on terrorist and totalitarian movements. See Cigar's Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of 'Ethnic Cleansing' (College Station, TX: Texas A&M

256 Notes and References top. 50

Press, 1995) Chapters 3-8. On the links between ethnic discrimination, aggression and terror, sec Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (NY: Meridian Books, 1958).

Serb responsibility for the worst of the mass killing is not limited to the early part of the war. After the fall of Srebrcnica, a large number of Muslim men who escaped were found and massacred. One investigating reporter put the number at 2000-3000, the largest massacre of the war and the worst in Europe since WW II. David Rohde, Christian Science Monitor Radio, Public Radio International, 16 November 1995. Sec also Washington Post, 3 November 1995, A23; 26 October 1995, AI. Croat advances in the summer of 1995 resulted in widespread refugee movements (ethnic cleansing) and plenty of brutality. Nothing on the scale of Serb activities, however, was reported. In late 1994, officials of the UN War Crimes Tribunal said that the Bosnian government was cooperating fully with them, even when the subjects of their investigations were Bosnian military personnel. Other human rights organizations reported similar cooperation. Most human rights monitors observed, however, that Bosnian Serb authorities impeded the War Crimes Tribunal by blocking its passage to Scrb-held areas. State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994, Report Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, February 1995, p. 762. Haris Hurem, a Sarajevo Muslim at one time a prisoner of the Serbs, recounted his views on the responsibility for the violence this way: 'Look, every side has its extremists. With the Serbs, it might be 40 per cent. With the Croats, maybe 15. With the Muslims, maybe 5. At least, that's how it looks to me. But those few extremists arc enough to get things started, and before it's over everybody's involved.' William Finnegan, 'Salt City: Letter from Tuzla', The New Yorker, 12 February 1996, p. 52.

Of the 285 entries of atrocities reported to the UN by the State Department, 18 were perpetrated by Muslims. James K. Bishop, a top State Department human rights official, privately challenged Secretary of State Christopher's public assertion that all sides share responsibility, stating that the Serbs were responsible for the overwhelming majority of the incidents. New York Times, 25 June 1993, A3. This ratio is typical of reports by other sources. For a report on the use of ethnic cleansing by the Croats and Muslims, see the New York Times, 21 April 1993, A1; and Bosnia-Hercegovina: Abuses lrj Bosnian Croat and Muslim Forces in Central and SOttthwestern Bosnia-Hercegovina (NY: Human Rights Watch, September 1993). On the barbarous and treacherous attitudes of Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic, sec Warren Zimmermann, 'The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia', Foreign Affairs, March/ Apri11995, especially pp. 4-5, 17-18.

19. Andrew Bell-Fialkoff defines ethnic cleansing as 'the expulsion of an "undesirable" population from a given territory due to religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic or ideological considerations, or a combination of these'. 'A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing', Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, p. 110. Enlightening discussions of the authoritarian political culture in Belgrade and Zagreb and of extremist


attitudes and murderous behavior on the individual level can be found in Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994) especially pp. 72-5; T.D. Allman, 'Serbia's Blood War', in Rabia Ali and Lawrence Lifschultz, eds, Why Bosnia? (Stony Creek, CT: Pamphleteer's Press, 1993) pp. 62-5; and Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (NY: Penguin, 1992) especially pp. 6-19.

20. David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1995) p. 187. The quoted phrase originally described Yugoslav military doctrine under Tito.

21. This account of the destruction of Vukovar relies heavily on Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 225-6. Later in the war, the State Department reported that 'Throughout 1994, the BSA [Bosnian Serb Army] continued to pound Bosnian populations [sic] centers with mortars and automatic weapons fire, causing the death of hundreds of civilians from January through October. The population centers most affected were Sarajevo, Gorazde, Mostar, Olovo, Tuzla, Visoko, Vares, and Breza. During the May offensive against Gorazde, Serbian shelling killed between 500 and 600 Bosnian civilians.' Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1994, p. 760. On Croat use of indiscriminate shelling in Knin in their 1995 offensives, see New York Times, 6August 1995, II.

22. New York Times, 18July 1992, AI. 23. Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, 'A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing', pp. 117-8. 24. One Serbian rapist told his victim that 'We'll make you have Serbian

babies who will be Christians'. DSD, 19 April 1993, p. 263. See also New York Times, 10January 1993, 7 December 1994, A12; and Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide (NY: Macmillan, 1993).

25. War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: Department Statement, US Report to the UN Security Council, DSD, 28 September 1992, pp. 732-5. This and a subsequent seven reports were submitted to the UN in fulfillment of UNSC Resolution 771 calling on organizations to submit information from the former Yugoslavia. These were defined as incidents relating to 'mass forcible expulsion and deportation of civilians, imprisonment and abuse of civilians in detention centres, deliberate attacks on noncombatants, hospitals and ambulances, impeding the delivery of food and medical supplies to the civilian population, and wanton devastation and destruction of property'. For corroborating evidence see Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide (NY: Macmillan, 1993). See also War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volumes I and II (NY: Human Rights Watch, 1992, 1993).

26. Roy Gutman's book, A Witness to Genocide, may be the best account of the camps, containing many first-hand recitations of the conditions and practices in the camps. See also Bell-Fialkoff, 'A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing', p. 119.

27. New York Times, 26january 1994, A9. 28. Gutman, A Witness to Genocide, pp. 20-3. 29. On the assault on Muslim culture, see ibid., especially pp. 77-83. 30. Washington Post, 23 August 1994, A13.


Part III Introduction

l. Stanley Hoffmann, ·~n Defense of Mother Teresa: Morality in Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs, March/ April 1996, especially pp. 172-4. This article is Hoffmann's answer to Michael Mandelbaum's criticism of Clinton's foreign policy, 'Foreign Policy as Social Work', Foreign Affairs,January/Fcbruary 1996.

2. The Commission on America's National Interests, made up of distinguished foreign affairs specialists, concluded that 'values and interests are less dichotomous poles apart, and more alternative expression of valuation.' America's National Interests, The Commission on America's Nationallnterest,July 1996.

3. For examples see Robert W. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). McElroy argues that there arc three factors that motivate leaders to attend to humanitarian concerns: an individual leader's conscience toward norms of international morality, domestic political pressures to assuage public concern about humanitarian issues, and international pressures for a nation to conform to the understood international standards of behavior. See especially pp. 39-53. During the Bush administration, only the second of these three factors was important in encouraging intervention in Bosnia; Clinton may have been persuaded by the first two, and even helped to mobilize American opinion in favor of intervention, but was stopped by the lack of international cooperation.

5. Security Interests and Other Interests

1. Among them was Lt. Gen. William E. Odom. See his Statement in Hearing before the Subcommittee on European Mfairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 18 February 1993 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993) pp. 69-77.

2. These themes are developed in Bernard Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia: A Strategy for American F01"eign Policy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969).

3. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey, 1993-1994 (London: Brassey's, 1994) p. 102.

4. Bismarck is said to have remarked that the Balkans were not worth the healthy bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier. But at the same time, apropos the next section of this chapter on the danger of a spreading war, he also stated prior to WW I that, 'if there is ever another war in Europe, it will come out of some damned silly thing in the Balkans'. The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, third edition (NY: Oxford University Press, 1979)p. 84.

5. Susan L. Woodward was one of the most vocal proponents of the view that 'maintaining the alliance was [the US's] vital national interest'. She deplored the fact that the US focused on humanitarian justifications for its actions in Bosnia instead of explaining the security interests which should have underlain a more vigorous involvement in


the former Yugoslavia. Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995) pp. 11, 324-5,398. See also Anthony Lewis, New York Times, 2June 1995, A29. Regarding the post-Dayton-Agreement use of NATO, Jim Hoagland argues that enforcement of the agreement could be a means of transforming NATO into one where the Europeans play a more important role. Washington Post, 7 December 1995, A23.

6. This is a concern raised by commentators with quite different perspectives on the international scene. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'NATO: Expand or Die?', New York Times, 28 December 1994, A15; Richard Perle, Wall Streetjourna~ 8 December 1994, A19; and William E. Odom, 'Invade, Don't Bomb', Wall Street]ourna~ 18 February 1994, A12.

7. See Odom, 'Invade, Don't Bomb', and Richard M. Nixon, Beyond Peace (NY: Random House, 1994) pp. 153-5. In the later stages of the conflict, some evidence of the effect of Western policy on the Muslim world became available: Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey have given tens of millions of dollars in arms and support to Muslim fighters, according to Western diplomats. Furthermore, 'In a sense, the war in Bosnia has become the Muslim world's Spanish Civil War. Videocassettes with gruesome footage of the fighting are hawked on street corners in Cairo, Riyadh, Istanbul and Tehran. The plight of the Bosnian Muslims is decried in mosques across the Muslim world as another move by the Christian West to crush a resurgent Islam.' New York Times, 28July 1995, A4.

8. This judgement coincides with that of William Perry, Secretary of Defense under the Clinton administration, who stated on 3 November 1994 that there are 'three basic categories in which our military forces are being used and will be used. The first is those where vital national interests are at stake; the second is where national interests are at stake but are not vital; and the third is where we have humanitarian interests.' Bosnia (along with Haiti) 'falls in the second category ... a national interest but not a vital interest'. Quoted in Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 519, n. 24. Secretary of State Christopher, on the other hand, has characterized the US interest in Bosnia as 'vital'. Alvin Z. Rublustein, 'The New Moralists on a Road to Hell', Orbis, Spring 1996, p. 293; and 'All Things Considered', Public Radio International, November 11, 1995.

9 For the arguments by Anthony Lake, see Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994) p. 144; for Peter Tarnoff, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 104th Congress, January 12, 1995, p. 5; for Margaret Thatcher, New York Times, May 4, 1994, A23; and for Charles Maynes, New York Times, July 27, 1994, A21.

10. This argument is based on Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights (Boulder: Westview, 1993), especially pp. 1-38. See also the range of arguments by scholars citing the increased shift toward concern with international human rights in Seyom Brown, International Relations in a Changing Global System: Toward a Theory of World Polity (Boulder: Westview, 1992) Chapter 6, especially pp. 113-15. Stanley Hoffmann


contends that we are increasingly experiencing 'the collision between man as a citizen of his national community and what could be called an incipient cosmopolitanism, or man as a world citizen'. See also Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1986) pp. 109-11. The framework for bringing peace to Bosnia recently signed in Dayton, Ohio, cites no less than 15 international conventions on human rights to be applied in BosniaHerzegovina. See 'Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina,' Annex I in Proximity Peace Talks, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, 1-21 November 1995.

A War Crimes Tribunal has been set up in The Hague to prosecute individuals guilty of war crimes in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. This tribunal is based on UN Security Council Resolution 827 which determined that the actions of such a tribunal would contribute to the restoration of peace and security. The organization Human Rights Watch had concluded by August 1992 that sufficient evidence existed against nine individuals to try them for war crimes, including Karadzic, Mladic and Milosevic. By December 1995, 56 individuals had been indicted by the Tribunal, but Milosevic was not among them.

Obvious contradictions exist between trying to negotiate a settlement to the war, while attempting to try the leaders who are doing the negotiating for war crimes. According a leader such as Milosevic legitimacy as a negotiator and head of state is obviously at cross purposes with trying, convicting and punishing him as a war criminal. As it has worked out so far, the tribunal has probably performed a useful service by starting a process that will attribute blame for the atrocities that have occurred in the former Yugoslavia to specific individuals and thus provide a sense of justice having been done. The legal proceeding and the charges against Karadzic and Mladic have also been useful in providing justification for removing them from the negotiations, thus ensuring progress on a settlement, and prohibiting Karadzic from having a formal role in the post election power arrangements. But he has continued to be influential since the countries that make up IFOR have refrained from arresting him. On the other hand, Milosevic's current role may give him a degree of immunity to the proceedings, or alternatively, if he were indicted, it would complicate the post-election arrangements. See also Christopher Greenwood, 'The International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia', International Affairs, October 1993; Theodor Meron, 'The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia', Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993; Warcrimes in BosniaHercegovina, Volume I, Human Rights Watch, August 1992, pp. 5-6; Washington Post, 18 December 1995, Al.

11. James E. Good by, 'Peacekeeping in the New Europe', The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1992, p. 154; and David C. Hendrickson, 'The Recovery oflnternationalism,' Foreign Affairs, September /October 1994, p. 32.

12. The uses of the Uniting for Peace Resolution are discussed in A. LeRoy Bennett, International Organizations: Principles and Issues, fourth edition (Englewood Cliffs, f\{J: Prentice Hall, 1988), pp. 142-3.

Notes and REferences to pp. 73-84 261

13. Philip Gourevitch, 'Letter from Rwanda: After the Genocide', The New Yorker, 18 December 1995, p. 78; New York Times, 17 May, AS and 26 May 1994, AI.

14. The World Bank Atlas, 1994 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1993). 15. The operation in Panama is summarized in Richard N. Haass,

Interuention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1994) pp. 30-1.

16. Philip Gourevitch, 'Letter from Rwanda: After the Genocide', pp. 91-2. Roger Winter, Director of the US Committee for Refugees, writes that if a 'fraction of the US troops who eventually joined the assistance effort had been deployed in a protection effort before the genocide began, or if the UN forces that were already there were authorized quickly to defend civilians instead of fleeing at the behest of the Security Council (led by the United States), much of the mass murder could have been prevented ... lacking was the will to take preventive action.' Washington Post, 23June 1995, A22.

6. The Foreign Policy Mood in the United States

1. Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (NY: Praeger, 1950) Chapter 4, especially pp. 69, 71-2, 79.

2. Ole R. Holsti, 'Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenge to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus', International Studies Quarterly, December 1992, pp. 439-41.

3. The term 'non-attitudes' was used by Phillip Converse to describe the lack of structure, consistency and coherence in foreign-policy opinion. Cited in ibid., p. 443.

4. I have relied extensively on Holsti's excellent summary of the changes in the way public opinion's impact on foreign policy is evaluated. Ibid.

5. John Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (NY: Wiley, 1973). 6. Holsti, 'Public Opinion and Foreign Policy', pp. 450-5. 7. Bert A. Rockman, 'Presidents, Opinion, and Institutional Leadership',

in David A. Deese, ed., The New Politics of American Foreign Policy (NY: StMartin's Press, 1994) p. 73.

8. Francis Fukuyama, The End of Hist01y and the Last Man (NY: Avon, 1992) p. 283.

9. John E. Rielly, ed., American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 1995 (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995) p. !!;Jeremy D. Rosner, 'The Know-Nothings Know Something,' Foreign Policy, Winter 1995-6, p. 124.

10. 'Introduction: From Foreign Policy to "Politics as Usual'", in Deese, The New Politics of American Foreign Policy, p. xv.

11. Ibid., p. xii. Evidence that the Gulf War was also that kind of war comes from EJ. Baumeister, Jr., managing editor of the Trenton Times: 'the American action in the Gulf did not generate long-lasting foreign-policy euphoria. Instead, nagging questions remain. ''The legacy of the Gulf War is that my neighbors are trying to forget," says Randi Orlando, a barber who lives in the Trenton suburb of Hamilton

262 Notes and &Jerences to pp. 84-90

Township and who opposed the war. "It rarely comes up. But when it does, they wonder, since Saddam Hussein is still alive, whether we really won it"'. 'Looking Homeward: Regional Views of Foreign Policy', Foreign Policy, Falll992, p. 39.

12. Bruce W. Jentleson, 'The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force', International Studies Quarterly, March 1992, pp. 49-50.

13. 'Looking Homeward', pp. 46, 53. On regional variation in foreignpolicy attitudes see also Peter Trubowitz, 'Sectionalism and American Foreign Policy: The Political Geography of Consensus and Conflict', International Studies Quarterly, June 1992.

14. William Schneider, 'The Old Politics and the New World Order', in Kenneth Oye et al., eds, Eagle in a New World Order: American Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era (NY: Harper Collins, 1992) pp. 42-3, 63.

15. See Godfrey Hodgson, 'The Establishment', Foreign Policy, Spring 1973.

16. Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, 'America and Bosnia', The National Interest, Fall 1993, p. 14. An early sample of Congressional debate on the war can be found in Congressional Record, 5 August 1992, PP: Sll509-10, 511575-81; 6 August, pp. Sll638-43; 7 August, pp. Sll861, Sll871-2; 10 August, pp. Sll991-S12060. Ideology and party were no more useful for predicting positions on the war as it wore on. A mid-1995 article was titled, 'GOP Hopefuls Are All Over the Map on Bosnia', Washington Post, june 7, 1995, A29.

17. Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, 'Arms and the People', Foreign Affairs, November/December 1994, p. 54.

18. George Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Poll: Public opinion 1992 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1993) p. 139; George Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1993 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1994) p. 42.

19. George Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1993, pp. 42, 41. 20. Kohut and Toth, 'Arms and the People,' pp. 54-5. 21. George Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1993, p. 95. 22. George Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1993, pp. 42, 96;

Kohut and Toth, 'Arms and the People,' p. 55. 23. George Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1993, pp. 43, 41,

96-7. 24. Ibid., pp. 41-4, 95-7. 25. The Gallup Poll Monthly, February 1994, p. 13. On Somalia, see New

York Times, October 6, 1993, A16; October 8, A34; and October 9, Ll. 26. Kohut and Toth, 'Arms and the People', p. 54. 27. Ibid. 28. George Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1993, p. 42; The

Gallup Poll Monthly, May 1993, pp. 11-13. The ambiguous and cautious attitude of the public was still evident in june 1995 when 34 per cent believed the US was too involved, 17 per cent not involved enough, and 43 per cent about right. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1995 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1996) p. 91.

29. A Washington Post poll, taken when the talks started, asked if citizens support sending '20 000 US troops to Bosnia as part of an international


peacekeeping force' and found 38 per cent in favor, and 56 per cent opposed. By almost identical numbers, 35 per cent believed that America's vital interests were at stake, while 56 per cent disagreed. Washington Post, 28 November 1995, Al. On peacekeeping versus peacemaking, see Kohut and Toth, 'Arms and the People', p. 47.

30. Stanley Greenberg, President Clinton's pollster, told the President that public opinion could be molded to fit the President's policy. Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994) p. 150.

7. American Perceptions: Civil War, Ethnic Hatred and Moral Responsibility

1. As a case in point, a prominent foreign policy scholar, William Hyland, referred to the war as a 'fight among gangsters'. See R.abia Ali and Lawrence Lifschultz, eds, Why Bosnia? Writings on the Balkan War· (Stony Creek, CT: Pamphleteer's Press, 1993) p. xviii. Such confusion also existed among the highest officials. President Bush's National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, reports that Bush would frequently react to news from Yugoslavia with the phrase: 'Tell me again what this is all about'. Washington Post, 3 December 1995, A34. It was also reported that one newly elected Congressman had trouble finding Bosnia on a map.

2. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'Moscow's Accomplice', Washington Post, 8 January 1995, c 7.

3. A point made by Mihailo Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama (Montreal: MeGill-Queen's University Press, 1994) p. 187.

4. But the legal nuances, both domestic and international, continue to intrigue many scholars. Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson question the legality of secession and the consistency of the US position in international law. The use of the term 'aggression' both by the US government and in this book to describe Serb behavior has legal implications. Nonetheless, it is unfortunate but true that international law is not sufficiently well established in the international system to be a reliable guide to policy once full scale hostilities break out. 'America and Bosnia', The National Interest, Fall 1993.

5. David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1995) pp. 68-9. One indicator of the role played by religion is an incident that happened years before the war began, cited by the sociologist Bogdan Denitch. When Denitch was pretesting a survey questionnaire that included the question, 'What is your religion?', the first respondent replied, 'What is yours?'. Denitch replied, 'I am an atheist', to which the interviewee shot back, 'I know all you damn intellectuals are atheists, but are you a Catholic, Orthodox, or Muslim atheist? I want to know your nationality!' Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994) p. 29.

6. Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, 'A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing', Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, pp. 117-18.


7. Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995) p. 18.

8. See Noel Malcolm's review of Robert D. Kaplan's book in 'Seeing Ghosts', The National Interest, Summer 1993; and Ivo Banac, 'The Fearful Asymmetry of War: The Causes and Consequences of Yugoslavia's Demise', Daedulus, Spring 1992, p. 143.

9. The Congress of Berlin in 1878 followed the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish War, ended the Ottoman occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and began the administration of the territory by Austria-Hungary.

10. Malcolm, 'Seeing Ghosts', p. 85; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia, second edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 327-33. Cohen's analysis complements Woodward's analysis, which emphasizes the contribution of the erosion of central government authority and individual security to the recent violence. Balkan Tragedy, see especially Chapters 1-3. The point on French and German violence is made by Flora Lewis, 'Reassembling Yugoslavia', Foreign Policy, Spring 1995, p. 135.

11. US Department of State Dispatch Supplement (DSDS), September 1992, p. 14. 12. New York Times, 10January 1993, IV, 4. 13. Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (NY:

Vintage Books, 1993). See comments from Noel Malcolm, 'Seeing Ghosts', and Fouad Ajami, 'In Europe's Shadows', The New Republic, 21 November 1994, especially p. 37.

14. As reported by Elizabeth Drew, Defense Secretary Aspin and the Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, were with the President as he related his impressions of the book. As he heard the President talk, Aspin thought, 'Holy shitl He's going south on "lift and strike"'. Asp in later told other high officials, 'We have a serious problem here. We're out there pushing a policy that the President's not comfortable with. He's not on board.' On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994) p. 157. A more cynical interpretation of Clinton's attempt to persuade the Europeans to adopt a firmer stance is Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson's view that the president may have been following Eisenhower's tactic of using the search for a consensus among allies and the Congress as a means of killing a plan for military action, a course allegedly followed by Eisenhower when pressed to intervene in 1954 in Indochina. 'America and Bosnia', p. 21.

15. Washington Post, 3 December 1995, A34. 16. New York Times, April 8, 1993, AI; May 8, L4; 19 May, AlO; and

25June A3. 17. See Chapter 4, note 18.

8. Vietnam and the Debate on Intervention in Bosnia

1. Useful sources on Vietnam include F.M. Kail, What Washington Said: Administration Rhetoric and the Vietnam War: 1949-1969 (NY: Harper


and Row, 1973); George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United States and Vietnam (NY: Delta, 1969); Theodore Draper, Abuse of Power (NY: Viking, 1967); and Donald S. Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi (NY: Pegasus, 1967).

2. One measure of sympathy for Bosnia was a vote by the UN General Assembly on 18 December 1992, by an overwhelming majority, to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia, to ask the Security Council to revoke Resolution 713, and to authorize 'all means possible' to preserve Bosnia's territorial integrity. Rabia Ali and Lawrence Lifschultz, eds, Why Bosnia? Writings on the Balkan War (Stony Creek, CT: The Pamphleteer's Press, 1993) p. xxviii.

3. Alex Roberto Hybel, How Leaders Reason: US Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990) especially pp. 5-8.

4. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) pp. 217, 220; Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) p. 3.

5. Khong, Analogies at War, p. 256. 6. Michael Roskin, 'From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: Shifting

Generational Paradigms and Foreign Policy', Political Science Quarterly, Fall 1974. The term paradigm was originally popularized by Thomas S. Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. also speaks of cycles in American foreign policy, but he sees policy oscillating between realism and idealism: The Cycles of American History (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1986).

7. Khong, Analogies at War, pp. 258-9. 8. Roskin, 'From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam', pp. 568-9. In a close parallel

with another war's end, 'Appeasement in the 1930s grew out of the belief that World War I could have been avoided by intelligent and conciliatory diplomacy'. Moreover, it is argued that the currently widely held perception, based on the experience of World War II, that Hitler could have been deterred by a strong stand by the Allies in the 1930s, is wrong, since 'Hitler preferred war to being contained'.Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 267, 223.

9. Roskin, 'From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam', pp. 575-6,581. 10. David Ri~ff argues that the difficulty the Germans had in Yugoslavia

during WW II was much exaggerated in the debate on intervention in Bosnia. Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1995) p. 154.

11. Jervis quotes Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing who find 'no examples ... of historical analogies producing a correct interpretation of a message'. Quoted in Perception and Misperception, p. 228.

12. John McCain, Wall Street]ourna~ 15 April1994, editorial page. 13. Since the argument was made earlier that there was no vital US security

interest at stake in Bosnia, it may be argued that this lessens the need to stop aggression and explains why decision-makers did not give stopping aggression a priority. But many also argued that there was no vital US


security interest at stake in Vietnam. But in that case, under the influence of a different paradigm, inteiVention still took place.

14. DSDS, September 1992, p. 13. The full quote is in Chapter 9, p. 163. 15. Public Papers of the President: George Bush, 7 August 1992, p. 1320; and

11 October 1992, p. 1799. The Vietnam analogy was so peiVasive that it was even used by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. He indicated that he would do as much as possible to contain UN inteiVention in Yugoslavia, since otherwise 'it would become a kind of Vietnam for the United Nations'. Quoted in Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia (Boulder, Co: Westview, 1993) p. 242.

16. Farced Zakaria, 'A Framework for InteiVentionism in the Post-Cold War Era', in Kanter and Brooks, eds, US lnteroention Policy for the Post-Cold War World: New Challenges and New Responses (NY: W.W. Norton, 1994) p. 192; and Richard Ned Lebow, 'Deterrence: A Political and Psychological Critique,' and other chapters and the conclusion in Paul C. Stern, et al., eds., Perspectives on Deterrence (NY: Oxford University Press, 1989). See also Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (NY: Columbia University Press, 1974) especially pp. 33-4, and Chapter 21. Zakaria's position is the opposite of the sentiments expressed by George Bush when asked if the inteiVention in the Persian Gulf war would lead to US involvement in other conflicts. 'No, I think because of what's happened we won't have to use US forces around the world. I think when we say something that is objectively correct -like don't take over a neighbor or you're going to bear some responsibility- people are going to listen. Because I think out of all this will be a new-found - let's put it this way: a reestablished credibility for the United States of America.' Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, The Imperial Temptation: The New Wm·ld Order and America's Purpose (NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992) p. 153.

17. New York Times, 25 July 1993, IV 1. Burns maintains that it was a Serb belief in the likelihood of escalation that brought the Serbs to the table at the London Conference in the summer of 1992, and to the table in Athens in April 1993. When they decided that the threat would not materialize, they resumed their offensive. For a discussion of Serb responsiveness to the assertiveness of individual UN commanders taking convoys through, see David Rieff, Slaughterhouse, especially pp. 168-9.

18. Public Papers of the President: George Bush, 8 July 1992, pp. 1101-2; 10 July 1992, p. 1106; and 7 August 1992, p. 1320.

19. ABC NEWS Shows #ABC-51, Peter Jennings Reporting, 'While Americans Watched: The Bosnian Tragedy', 17 March 1994, p. 4.

20. The obsession with credibility on both sides of the debate over Bosnia is remarkable. As the Clinton administration seemed to be preparing for more assertive military steps, Secretary of State Warren Christopher began to talk about the need to preseiVe American credibility, thus contradicting the Bush people who seemed to believe that the best way to maintain credibility was to do nothing. This consistent focus on credibility by both officials and commentators suggests a widespread belief that it is easier to defend a policy if you can assert

Notes and References to pp. 119-3 7 267

the long-term effect on credibility, rather than simply talking about the job that needs to be done at the present.

21. Serbian behavior during the siege of Gorazde supports the point. In spite of previously repeated NATO/US threats that were shown to be bluffs, when the NATO will stiffened as a result of the shelling of Gorazde, the threat of intervention was sufficiently credible to induce a Serbian retreat.

22. Quoted in David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (NY: Random House, 1972) p. 175.

23. Washington Post, 22 April 1994, p. I.

9. The Bush Administration: From Status Quo to Immobility

I. Sabrina Petra Ramet, 'The Yugoslav Crisis and the West: Avoiding 'Vietnam" and Blundering into "Abyssinia'", East European Politics and Society, Winter 1994, pp. 196-8.

2. A CIA report completed in November 1990 predicted the break-up of Yugoslavia.

3. David Gompert, 'How to Defeat Serbia', Foreign Affairs, July/August, 1994, p. 35.

4. Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 142-6; New York Times, March 18, 1996, A3. It was unclear, because of the conflicting responses to the questions, whether the Croats were in favor of being part of a reconstituted federation or confederation.

5. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 157; and Mihailo Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama (Montreal: MeGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), p. 157. See also the comments on the rigidity and authoritarian nature and negotiating style of Milosevic and Tudjman, as described by Bosnian president Izetbegovic and Macedonian President Gligorov. Izetbegovic's and Gligorov's assessments of each other and Sloven ian president Kucan's flexible approach and democratic values contrast favorably to their assessments of Milosevic and Tudjman. Cohen, Broken Bonds, first edition, pp. 199-200. .

6. Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Mfairs, Department of State Dispatch (DSD) 4 March 1991, pp. 152-3.

7. Public Papers of the President: George Bush, p. 483; Margaret Tutwiler, DSD, 3 June 1991, p. 395. Referring to Serbian blocking of federal constitutional amendments to further democratic reforms, Prime Minister Ante Markovic alleged the Yugoslav military, supporting the Serbs, acted in disregard of the civilian authorities. DSD, 1 July 1991, p 469.

8. New York Times, May 19, 1991, LlO and May 25, L5. 9. Sabrina Petra Ramet, 'The Yugoslav Crisis and the West', p. 199.

10. DSD, 1 July 1991, p. 468. Baker stated that, 'We want to see this problem resolved through negotiation and through dialogue and not through preemptive unilateral actions.' DSD, 1 July 1991, p. 468.


Baker's role during his visit to Belgrade has been seen as unclear and controversial. It was not clear whether an ambiguous message from Baker actually contributed to the decision of the army to intervene militarily, whether his advice not to intervene under any circumstances was simply ignored, or whether the leadership 'was given the nod by Baker behind the scenes to use force, but only if it became absolutely necessary'. See Lenard]. Cohen's account of the events surrounding Baker's visit, Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia, second edition (Boulder, Co: Westview, 1995) pp. 217-22. For Baker's own account, see his The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992 (NY: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995) pp. 478-83. But Ambassador Zimmermann argues convincingly that Baker did all it was possible to do to rein in the Serbs, short of actually threatening to use force. Warren Zimmermann, 'The Last Ambassador; a Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia,' Foreign Affairs, March-April, 1995, pp. 11-12.

11. Marc Weller, 'The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia', American Journal of International Law, July 1992, p. 589; and Ramet, 'The Yugoslav Crisis', pp. 197, 202. For the German defense of their decision to recognize, see 'Recognition of the Yugoslav Successor States', Position Paper of the German Foreign Ministry, Bonn, 10 March 1993.

12. Ramet, 'The Yugoslav Crisis', pp. 199-200; and New York Times, 4 July 1991, p. 7. In a statement that preceded Baker's, Deputy Secretary of State Eagle burger on June 30 had said in an interview that the United States supported 'sovereign republics' and the idea of a Yugoslav confederation. Susan L, Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995) p. 165. As David Owen points out, a serious effort to adjust the borders of the republics during the Croatia crisis might have helped prevent further war. Balkan Odyssey, (NY: Harcourt Brace, 1995) pp. 32-3.

13. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace 1989-1992, pp. 636-45; and Joshua Muravchik, The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1996), pp. 90-1. Owen is quoted on p. 91.

14. New York Times, July 6, 1991, L4. 15. Muravchik, The Imperative of American Leadership, p. 91. 16. Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold

War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 158-9; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia s Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, second edition (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), p. 235.

17. New York Times, July 6, 1991, L4. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 168. 18. New York Times, July 7, 1991, L6. 19. New York Times,July8, 1991, Al3. 20. Muravchik, The Imperative of American Leadership, p. 92. 21. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 174. 22. New York Times, November 5, 1991, A3 and November 6, Al6. 23. New York Times, August 30, 1991, A3. 24. Mihailo Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama (Montreal: MeGill-Queen's

Press, 1994), pp. 160-l.


25. New York Times, September 20, 1991, A6. 26. Muravchik, The Imperative of American Leadership, pp. 96-7. 27. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 165-9. 28. New York Times,January 16, 1991, AI; February 7, A3; February 22, L3;

and James Bjork and Allan E. Goodman, Yugoslavia, 1991-92: Could Dipromacy Have Prevented a Tragedy? (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Georgetown University, 1993) p. 8.

29. See Paula Franklin Lytle, 'US Policy Toward the Demise of Yugoslavia: The Virus of Nationalism', East European Politics and Society, Fall 1992, p. 315; and Ramet, 'The Yugoslav Crisis', p. 200. For statements by Secretary of State Baker and Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger on Serbian aggression and crimes, see DSD, 30 September 1991, p. 723; andDSD, 7 October 1991, p. 748.

30. Lytle, 'US Policy Toward the Demise of Yugoslavia', p. 313. 31. Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia

(Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1994) pp. 51-3. This otherwise fine and superbly written book takes a dark view of German motives and actions, alleging that the language and imagery used by much of the German press describing Serbian culture and history is racist. On Izetbegovic's statement see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 261; on Carrington's see Cohen, Broken Bonds, first edition, p. 234.

32. Ramet, 'The Yugoslav Crisis', p. 202. 33. Analysts surveying the events in Bosnia in late 1991 and early 1992

come to quite different conclusions on which side should be blamed for the war in Bosnia. Compare Cohen, Broken Bonds, second edition, pp. 241-5; Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of 'Ethnic Cleansing'. (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1995) Chapter 4; and RobertJ. Donia and John V.A. Fine, Jr., Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (NY: Columbia University Press, 1994) pp. 337-8.

34. New York Times, 16 January, p. A10. But there is also evidence that Milosevic's designs on Bosnia had little to do with democratic rights and much more to do with imperial designs. Cohen, Broken Bonds, second edition, p. 208.

35. Ramet, 'The Yugoslav Crisis', pp. 196-8. 36. Slovenia and Macedonia were commended in an EC study for their

observance of human rights. Furthermore, as the Germans themselves point out, recognition of Croatia may have contributed to pressure on the Serbs to agree to a ceasefire in Croatia. 'Recognition of the Yugoslav Successor States', p. 4. See also Stevan K. Pavlowitch, 'Who is "Balkanizing" Whom? The Misunderstandings Between the Debris of Yugoslavia and an Unprepared West', Daedalus, Spring 1994, p. 213.

37. Cohen, Broken Bonds, second edition, pp. 241-5. Some controversy has developed over the failure of the Muslims to accept the Lisbon plan, in light of the conflict that followed. It has also been suggested that the US was at fault for indicating doubts about the plan, a contention that then US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, has denied. See New York Times, 29 August 1993, LIO; and 30 September 1993, A24. Furthermore, the geographic questions and borders were not settled at Lisbon and it is questionable whether Karadzic was committed to


abiding by the Lisbon terms. See Paul Shoup, 'The Bosnian Crisis in 1992', in Sabrina Petra Ramet and Ljubisa S. Adamovich, eds, Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Sheltered Community (Boulder, Co: Westview, 1995) pp. 167-8, I71.

38. Cohen, Broken Bonds, second edition, pp. 242-4, 269. 39. Former Acting Secretary of State and former ambassador to Yugoslavia

Lawrence Eagleburger had believed that Yugoslavia would not disintegrate and that Milosevic was someone with whom the West could do business. He later admitted that he had 'misjudged Milosevic', even though he had had a long-time acquaintance with him and a 'well-tested working relationship'. Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia (Boulder, Co: Westview, I993). pp. 215-16, 221. Zimmerman maintains that Milosevic told him explicitly that 'you needn't worry about trouble in Bosnia. Serbs have no serious grievances in Bosnia; they're not being abused there. This is a big difference with Serbs in Croatia.' Warren Zimmermann, 'The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia', Foreign Affairs, March-Apri11995, pp. I7-I9.

40. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 212-7; New York Times, March 3, I992, A9; March 28, L4; April4, L3; April6, A12; AprilS, A10; and Apri122, A10.

41. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, pp. 639-42. 42. New York Times, May 13, AlO; May I5, Al. 43. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, pp. 645-8. 44. New York Times, May 25, 1992, Ll and May 31, Al. 45. Bjork and Goodman, Yugoslavia, 1991-1992, p. 11, and Stephen

Schwartz, 'In Defense of the Bosnian Republic, World Affairs, Fall 1993, pp. 84-5. American officials in Yugoslavia estimated Milosevic could have stopped 80 per cent of Serbian actions in Bosnia if he had wanted to. Jenonne R. Walker, Hearing, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 102nd Congress, second session, August 11, 1992, p. 70. See also the discussion in Muravchik, The Imperative of American Leadership, pp. I56-7.

46. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 648. 47. New York Times, july 5, I992, L6;June 29, A6; and August 7, Al. 48. New York Times,july 18, I992, L4. 49. New York Times, August 27, 1992, Al; August 28, A6. 50. The commentaries can be found in New York Times, May 29, I992, A29;

June 18, A27; August 3, A19; and August 6, A23. 51. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 635. 52. New York Times, October 22, I992, Al. 53. Monica Crowley, 'Nixon Unplugged', The New Yorker, july 29, 1996, p. 50. 54. New York Times, September 28, I992, AI; October 8, A35; and Colin

Powell, My Americanjoumey (NY: Ballantine Books, I995), pp. 543-5. In James Baker's view, the Pentagon, including Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, was deeply opposed to any military involvement in Bosnia. The Politics of Diplomacy, pp. 648-50.

55. New York Times, October 2, I992, AI; November I9, Al; and December I2, L7.


56. US Department of State Dispatch Supplement (DSDS), September 1992, p. 22. See Bosnia-Hercegovina: Abuses by Bosnian Croat and Muslim Forces in Central and Southwestern Bosnia-Hercegovina, New York, Helsinki Watch, September 1993 for documentation of Croatian and Muslim atrocities. On Croat atrocities later in the war, see Washington Post, December 23, 1995, A12.

57. DSDS, September 1992, p. 22. 58. Ibid., pp. 15, 26, 16. 59. DSDS, September 1992, pp. 1-3, 25; New York Times, 22 August 1992,

L3; DSflS, September 1992, pp. 30-1; DSDS, September 1992, p. 14. At a later date, and more specifically, Eagleburger stated: 'We must make it unmistakably clear that we will settle for nothing less than the restoration of the independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina with its territory undivided and intact, the return of all refugees to their homes and villages, ... and a day of reckoning for those found guilty of crimes against humanity'. DSD, 28 December 1992, p. 925.

60. DSDS, September 1992, pp. 12-13; DSD, 19 October 1992, p. 777. In fairness, one must note that the ceasefire agreement that ended the Croatian war has held, with occasional violations, until the summer of 1995. However, that came only after repeated failures. The New York Times reported that the ceasefire accord reached between Serbia and Croatia inJanuary 1991 was the fiftenth ceasefire negotiated since the conflict began in July. New York Times, 3 January 1991, p. AI.

61. DSDS, September 1992, pp. 7, 15. Remarks by Lawrence Eagleburger suggest considerable faith in

the power of sanctions and diplomatic penalties to force the Serbs to reverse course: 'The fact of the matter is that imperfect as the sanctions have been against the Serbs so far, it is clear they have made some real impact on the Serbian economy. The Serbs are looking at a winter that's going to be tough. If, in fact, those sanctions are really clamped down, there is ... substantial reason to believe that that's going to force real change in the attitudes of the Serbian Government and, hopefully, the Serbian people .. .', DSDS, September 1992, p. 13.

62. DSDS, September 1992, pp. 13-16, 25.

10. The Clinton Administration 1: Strategies and Obstacles

1. Humanitarian Intervention: Effectiveness of UN Operations in Bosnia (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, April 1994) especially pp. 4 and 12.

2. Ibid., pp. 3, 14. 3. David Rieff, in Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (NY:

Simon & Schuster, 1995), gives an elegant explanation of UN policy and behavior; see especially Chapters 6 and 7. For an alternate viewpoint, see James A. Schear, Washington Post, 21 March 1995, A 17. The Akashi quote is from Joshua Muravchik, The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Nco-Isolationism (Washington, DC: AEI Press,


1996), p. 117. The other quotes and examples are from the New York Times, January 23, 1994, Ll.

4. Rieff, Slanghterhouse, p. 175. As Rieff puts it, 'The Bosnian side ... had, as was once said of the Irish, the bad taste to be in earnest about the freedom of their country', p. 179.

5. I~id., p. 169; Hearing, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 103rd Congress, second session, December 1, 1994, p. 18.

6. Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 151; New York Times, 9January 1993, Ll. 7. Rieff, Slaughterhouse, pp. 166, 179 and 181; Hearing, Committee on

Armed Services, US Congress, 104th Congress, first session, 12January 1995, p. 18.

8. Humanitarian Interoention, pp. 37-8. 9. See Rieff on the extent to which the UN was doing the Serbs' work for

them, in Slaughterhouse, Chapters 6 and 7; New York Times, 11 August 1993, A15. See also Alan F. Fogelquist, 'Turning Points in Bosnia and the Region', in Zalmay M. Khalilzad, ed., Lessons From Bosnia, Rand Corporation Conference Proceedings, 1993, pp. 12-13.

10. Illustrative of the limits the presence of the UN troops put on the likelihood of bombing is this comment, after the killing of 68 people in Sarajevo in February 1994, by British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd. Mr Hurd was discussing the possibility of bombing Serb forces in retaliation: 'We have to take into account consequences for the humanitarian effort and the food supplies of Sarajevo. We have to take into account the effect on the UN forces there, how they would be protected. That's not to rule out the use of air power. It's been clear since August in principle we are willing to use it'. MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour, 7 February 1994, transcript, page 9.

11. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 18 February 1993 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993) pp. 7-21, 26-48; Sabrina Petra Ramet, 'The Yugoslav Crisis and the West: Avoiding ''Vietnam" and Blundering into "Abyssinia", East European Politics and Societies, Winter 1994, pp. 202-3.

12. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (NY: Harcourt Brace, 1995), pp. 13, 102, 282, 297, and 304.

13. John Newhouse, 'No Exit, No Entrance', The New Yorker, 28June 1993, pp. 46-8.

14. Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 149.

15. New York Times, April 29, 1993, AI; Drew, On the Edge, pp. 154-5. 16. Hearing, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 104th Congress,

first session, 12January 1995, pp. 19-20. In mid-September 1995, after a two-week bombing campaign, Secretary Perry indicated there had been problems finding the Serb guns. New York Times, 14 September, 1995, Al.

17. New York Times, 12 August, 1993, A22. 18. After one week of a large-scale offensive in western and central Bosnia by

Bosnian forces on 11 September, the Bosnian Serbs, 'severely weakened both psychologically and materially by the NATO air offensive,' were


forced out of 20 per cent of the territory under their control. Strategic Survey: 199.5-1996 (London: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 134.

19. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, pp. 257, 264-8. 20. James Gow, remarks at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC,

17 May 1994; Fogelquist, 'Turning Points in Bosnia and the Region', in Khalilzad, ed., Lessons From Bosnia, p. 11. Controversy erupted in Washington as it became publicized that the US bad turned a blind eye to Iranian arms flows across Croatia to Bosnia during the Clinton administration in violation of the arms embargo. Republican criticism smacks of campaign hypocrisy, however, since (1) many Republicans, including then Senator Bob Dole, favored getting arms to Bosnia, and (2) it was widely rumored at the time that the US was involved in just such an operation and confirmation should come as no surprise to anyone who was paying attention. In preparation for upcomng hearings on his confirmation as the new CIA Director, however, former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, who approved the policy, admitted that he should have informed the Congress about the policy. See Washington Post, 21 May 1996, A12; 2June, A12 and 15 December, A18.

21. In the summer of 1992, Lt. General Barry R. McCaffrey, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, estimated the number of troops in Bosnia constituting the Bosnian Serb Army and Serb irregulars at 70 000, Bosnian Muslim Defense forces at 50 000, and Bosnian Croat forces and Croatian Defense Forces at 50 000. The Muslims were the least well armed. Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 102nd Congress, second & session, August 11, 1992, p. 26-7. A 1994 report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies gives these estimates on military troops: Bosnian Serbs, 80 000; Bosnians, 110 000 plus reserves; and Bosnian Croats, 50 000. The Bosnian Serbs were estimated to have 330 tanks, the Bosnians 20, and the Bosnian Croats 50. The Bosnians had few artillery pieces to the Bosnian Serbs' 800, and the Bosnian Croats' 500. Washington Post, 26January 1996, A25.

22. Hearing, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 103rd Congress, second session, 23 June 1994, pp. 29, 43, 58, 62.

23. Hearing, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 104th Congress, first session, 12January 1995, pp. 26--7, 10.

24. Hearing, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 103rd Congress, second session, 23June, 1994, pp. 48, 33.

25. Hearing, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 103rd Congress, second session, 1 December, 1994, pp. 19-21.

26. Hearing, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 104th Congress, first session, 12January 1995, pp. 11-13; and New York Times, 5 May 1994, A27.

27. See remarks by Warren Zimmermann, Hearing, Committee on Foreign Mfairs, US House of Representatives, 1 03rd Congress, second session, 11 May 1994, pp. 22-3.

28. Hearing, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 103rd Congress, second session, 23June 1994, pp. 61, 65.

27 4 Notes and References to pp. 180-4

29. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on European Mfairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, first session, 18 February 1993, pp. 67-77. Other people mentioned similar troop numbers: Senator Lugar, 300 000; and Cedric Thornberry, Civil Commander of UNPROFOR in Croatia, 250 000 troops for five to ten years.

30. See Chapter 9. 31. Christopher Civiic argues that there were no grounds for British and

French fears, fueled by German unification in October 1990, that 'Yugoslavia's dissolution would open the way for Germany's entry into South-Eastern Europe as a dominant force and protector of a bloc of states ... made up of Austria, Croatia, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary'. According to Civiic, the reasons for German advocacy after July 1991 for recognition of Slovenia and Croatia had to do with German domestic pressure to stop the slaughter in Croatia, a cause championed by Die Welt and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 'Who's To Blame for the War in Ex-Yugoslavia?', World Affairs, Fall 1993, p. 77. A similar opinion is reached by Beverly Crawford, 'Explaining Defection from International cooperation: Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia,' World Politics, July 1996.

32. On the intervention force, see James B. Steinberg, 'Turning Points in Bosnia and the West', in Khalilzad, ed., Lessons From Bosnia, p. 6. On Kohl's positions, see Hamburg DPA, 23 July 1992, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report-Western Europe (FBIS, DR-~) 24 July 1992, p. 2; and Berlin DDP, 30 January 1993, in (FBIS, DR-WE) I February 1993, p. 13. For the Economist's statement, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 30 April, p. 4, in FBIS, DR-~ 3 May, pp. 16-17.

33. The Daily Telegraph, 30 April 1993, pp. 10, 18, in FBIS, DR-WE 3 May 1993, pp. 7-9.

34. One Western official said Croatian President Tudjman was accurately reflecting the views of many Western governments when he said Europe would not tolerate an Islamic state in its midst, and therefore division of Bosnia into Serb, Croat, and Muslim communities was inevitable. New York Times, 23 August 1992, A16, and 27 November 1994, IV: I; Ivo Banac, 'Separating History from Myth', in Ali and Lifschultz, ed., Why Bosnia?, p. 46. And a senior French diplomat said: 'Our interests are closer to the Serbs' than you think'. We worry more about the Muslims than about the Serbs. Please don't arouse the Serb nation. You will go away and leave us with a bigger problem.' John Newhouse 'No Exit, No Entrance', pp. 49-50.

35. Ramet, 'The Yugoslav Crisis and the West', p. 202; a British official said, 'The familiarity with the conflict on the ground, valley by valley and politician by politician, has given us perspective. You've [the US] not been involved word by word and table thump by table thump. We know all sides are to blame'. New York Times, 4 February 1993, A10.

36. See Newhouse, 'No Exit, No Entrance', p. 49; and Leslie Gelb, New York Times, 31 January 1993, IV, 17. President Clinton himself said 'The British and the French and the Russians never said to me flat


out they would never go along. They said they thought they could do better.' Foreign Policy Bulletin: The Documentary Record of United States ForeignPolicy,July/August 1993, p. 18.

37. New York Times, 15 Aprill993, A12. Lady Thatcher also suggested that the policy being followed in Bosnia could produce a world-wide Bosnian diaspora, with potential for terrorist activities.

38. Izvestia, 30 May 1992, p. 6 in FBIS, DR-~ 1 June 1992, p. 10. 39. On the opposition from the right, see Sovetskaya Rossiya, 17 December

1992, p. 3; FBIS, Daily Report-Central Asia (DR-CA) 6 January 1993, pp. 37-8; Pravda, 21 January 1993, p. 5, FBIS, DR-CA 3 February 1993, pp. 61-2; and Kommerant-Daily, 27 January 1993, p. 10, FBIS, DR-CA 3 February 1993, pp. 58-9. Yeltsin was constantly frustrated by pressure from the parliament on Bosnia; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 514, n. 67. The willingness of the Russian government to support the West to the extent it did on Bosnia may have been related to resentment that the Serbs gave their support to the 1991 coup against Gorbachev.

40. This analysis relies on Cohen, Broken Bonds, second edition, pp. 299-302,307-10.

41. Washington Post, 29 November 1995, A27. 42. William Schneider, 'Introduction: From Foreign Policy to "Politics as

Usual"' in David A. Deese, ed., The New Politics of American Foreign Policy (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

43. A discussion of these approaches is in Chapter 2, pp. 18-20. For more on the views of two representatives of these approaches, see Les Asp in, New York Times, I May 1993, L6; and Colin Powell, in Newhouse, 'No Exit, No Entrance', pp. 46-8. Powell's aides are reported to have told the Congress that lifting the arms embargo would make little difference to the prosecution of the war, but would lead to more 'chaos'. Of course, the shades of opinion in the Defense Department and the military services were complex, sometimes following bureaucratic lines. It appears that in general the Air Force had a more favorable view of what could be accomplished with air power at relatively low cost, whereas the ground services had less faith in the results of a modern high-tech air war.

44. New York Times, 29 April 1993, AI. 45. On Croat military activity, see New York Times, 11 May 1993, A8; 2 July

1993, A4; and Lawrence Freedman, 'Why the West Failed', Foreign Policy, Winter 1994-95.

11. The Clinton Administration II: The Agony of Decision

I. Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994) p. 139.

2. New York Times, 28January, 1993, A7; 31January, LlO; 3 February, A8; and 4January, A3. At the news conference where Izetbegovic made his appeal to Clinton, it was suggested he might meet again with Karadzic. They had met in January for the first time since the war began.


Izetbegovic switched from Serbo-Croatian into English and said, 'They forced me to sit at a table with a man who inspired all those terrible crimes. Despicable is not too strong a word'.

3. UNSC Document, S/25221, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,' 2 February 1993, pp. 5, 9; and David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (NY: Harcourt Brace, 1995) pp. 89-90.

4. Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (NY: 1V Books, 1995, 1996) p. 276. The Serb rejection of arrangements where they would live as a minority with another ethnic group in power, while at the same time refusing to grant equal rights to other minorities is frequently remarked upon. See Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia, first edition (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993) p. 125; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 192; and New York Times, 18July 1992, A1 for a Western diplomat's statement that 'From the start it was clear that the operating principle for the Milosevic Government was that whatever happened, Serbs could not live under or with any other people, though other people would have to live under Serbs'.

5. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 276-80, and New York Times, 4 February 1993, A10.

6. Many Bosnians resented the idea of having to live in an ethnically homogenous state, which was so contradictory to the premises underlying the Bosnian Government. New York Times, 7 March 1994, IV, 3. The Vance-Owen plan, setting up provinces based on ethnic composition, has the unfortunate effect of implying second class citizenship to those who don't identify with any ethnic group, notwithstanding the human rights guaranties. This presumably would include many of those with mixed marriages, those who identify themselves as Yugoslav, and members of minority groups other than Serb, Croat, or Muslim. As a young doctor in Sar.Yevo put it, 'We're neither Muslim, nor Croat, nor Serb .... Imagine asking people who they are and the only thing they can come up with is 'I'm a Croat' or 'I'm a Serb' or whatever'. Quoted in Rabia Ali and Lawrence Lifschultz, eds., Why Bosnia 7 Writings on the Balkan War (Stony Creek, CT: Pamphleteer's Press, 1993) p. xxxiii.

7. UNSC Document, S/25403, p. 5; and Chapter 4, footnote 30. 8. 'Invitation to War', Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, pp. 106-7. For a de

tailed analysis of all parties' reaction to the plan, see Cohen, Broken Bonds, first edition, pp. 247-8. The Bosnians finally accepted the plan partly because they (rightly) believed the Bosnian Serbs would reject it.

9. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995), pp.121, 130,105, 110and 174. ·

10. New York Times, 11 February 1993, A1; 11 February, A12; 1 March, Ap; 14 February, IV:13; 25 February, Ll9; and February 28, IV:l.

11. New York Times, 20 April1993, A9. 12. Drew, On the Edge, p. 146. The foregoing analysis relies heavily on

Chapter 10 of Drew's book. 13. Ibid., pp. 149-53; Colin Powell, My American journey (NY: Ballantine,

1995) pp. 561, 560. Powell notes that 'the discussions [meandered]


like graduate student bull sessions or the think-tank seminars in which many of my new colleagues had spent the last twelve years while their party was out of power'.

14. Contrast the attitude of Senator John McCain, an opponent of intervention. 'When you're sitting there at the dedication of the Holocaust Museum, and Elie Weisel correctly points out that this tragedy is ensuing and we're doing nothing, that brings enormous pressure to bear ... The question is what is viable. We cannot confuse a desire to do good with viable military options.' New York Times, 5 May 1993, A16.

15. New York Times, 7 May 1993, AI. 16. Bob Woodward, The Choice (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996) p. 261. I7. Drew, On the Edge, p. 150. IS. Ibid., pp. I50-5; New York Times, 29 April 1993, AI. I9. Drew, On the Edge, pp. 154-5; New York Times, 29 Apriii993, AI. 20. Drew, On the Edge, p. 155. 21. Ibid., pp. 155-6. 22. New York Times, 7 May 1993, A1; Foreign Policy Bulletin: The Documentary

Record of US Foreign Policy, July-August, 1993, p. 18. 23. Drew, On the Edge, pp. 159-63. 24. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, pp. 178-84. 25. New York Times, 7 May 1993, All and June 5, AI. 26. Drew, On the Edge, p. 162 and New York Times, 20 May 1993, Al2. 27. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, p. 178 and New York Times, 22 May 1993, L4.

According to testimony by Under secretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe and General Wesley K. Clark, Gorazde, Srebrenica and Zepa were never considered defensible. Moreover, in mid-1993, heavy arms held by the Bosnian government at Zepa and Srebrenica were put into UN weapons storage sites in return for Serb agreement not to attack. When the Serbs moved on these 'safe areas' in 1995, these arms could not be used and UNPROFOR had nowhere near the firepower needed to repulse the Serbs. Hearing, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 104th Congress, first session, 13July 1995, pp. 13-16.

28. New York Times, 5 June 1993, AI. 29. New York Times, 18 June 1993, AI and 18 June, AS. As if US Bosnia

policy were not confused enough, a controversy now developed over a letter Clinton sent to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, encouraging him to support lifting of the embargo at the 21 June meeting with his colleagues. This seemed to contradict passive American behavior on the issue, and American officials ended up downplaying the significance of the letter. New York Times, 23 June 1996, A6.

30. New York Times, 31July 1993, Ll. 31. Drew, On the Edge, p. 273. 32. Ibid. The Muslims were estimated to control 15 per cent or less of the

total area of Bosnia, the Serbs 70 per cent, and the Croats the balance. 33. The statements on relations with the allies are based on The New York

Times, 2 August 1993, A3 and 3 August Al. The bulk of the analysis is based on Drew, On the Edge, pp. 274-9.


34. Drew, On the Edge, p. 279. 35. UNSC document, S/26337/Add.1, 23 August 1993, pp. S-9, 5, 10.

Earlier, Vance and Owen explained why, in the formulation of the Vance-Owen plan, they had rejected principles for creating a confederation of 'three territorially-distinct states based on ethnic or confessional principles. Any plan to do so would involve incorporating a very large number of members of the other ethnic/ confessional group. Such a plan could achieve homogeneity and coherent boundaries only by a process of enforced population transfer ... Furthermore, a confederation formed of three such states would be inherently unstable, for at least two would surely forge immediate and stronger connections with neighbouring states of the former Yugoslavia than they would with the other two units of Bosnia and Herzegovina.' Quoted in Cohen, Broken Bonds, first edition, p. 259, n. 55.

36. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, p. 215. 37. These incidents are cited in Joshua Muravchik, The Imperative of

American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1996) pp. 116-17.

3S. New York Times, 3 October 1993, LIO. 39. This account relies on Cohen, Broken Bonds, second edition, pp.

295-7. Regarding the easing of sanctions, David Owen argues that two mistakes were made in the handling of Milosevic. The first was in failing to press for drastic economic sanctions (an embargo) in the early part of the war, primarily a European failing, and the US was reluctant to grant Milosevic relief from sanctions in order to get a deal once he began to limit his support to the Bosnian Serbs, in the spring of 1993. Balkan Odyssey, pp. 134, 303, and 322.

40. New York Times, 21 November 1993, L7. 41. New York Times, 25 November 1993, A6; 3 December, A6; and

1 December, AS. 42. New York Times, 14 June 1993, A15; 28 February 1993, IV:l5; 26

September, 1993, IV:15; and Owen, Balkan Tragedy, p. 232. 43. New York Times, 6January 1994, AS. 44. New York Times, 5 February 1994, A4; S February, AI; and 14 February,

AI. 45. New York Times, 11 February 1994, A1, 46. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 312-13 and New York Times, February

8, 1994, A14. 47. New York Times, 11 February, 1994, A7; 14 February, A1; and April 8,

A10. 48. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 321. 49. Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold

War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995) pp. 314-5. 50. See 'Framework Agreement Establishing a Federation in the Areas of

the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina', and 'Outline of a Preliminary Agreement for a Confederation Between the Republic of Croatia and the Federation', Department of State, Washington, DC, 1 March 1994. Throughout the conflict, the one important obstacle to deterring the Serbs has been the on-again off-again nature of the


Croat-Muslim alliance. If it could be solidified, the Serb military advantage would suffer greatly. For more background on the Croat-Bosnian conflict and the pressures on Tudjman prior to signing the February agreement, see Cohen, Broken Bonds, second edition, pp.275-81;297-9.

51. New York Times, 30 May 1994, L3. Susan L. Woodward critiques the role of sanctions in ending the war in Balkan Tragedy, pp. 289-94.

52. New York Times, 8June 1994, A16. 53. Washington Post, 6 July 1994, A6. 54. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 337. 55. Washington Post, 4July 1995, Al. The evidence contradicts the opinion

of some political and military leaders in Serbia that Milosevic sold out their cause by disowning the Bosnian Serbs. At most, the sellout was only partial. Cohen, Broken Bonds, second edition, p. 315

56. New York Times, 4 November 1994, A3 and 29 November, Al6. 57. Washington Post, 21 February 1995, AI. 58. Richard K.. Betts, 'The Delusion of Impartial Intervention,' Foreign

Affairs, November/December 1994, p. 21. 59. jonathan Clarke, 'Rhetoric Before Reality: Loose Lips Sink Ships,'

Foreign Affairs, September/October 1995, p. 6. 60. Jason Deparle, 'The Man Inside Bill Clinton's Foreign Policy,' New

York Times, 20 August 1995, VI:31. 61. Strategic Survey, 1993-4 (London: Brassey's, 1994) p. 99. 62. Muravchik, The Imperative of American Leadership, pp. 119-20. Muravchik

suggests French policy is fueled by little other than amour propre and has the primary objective of convincing Washington, Moscow and its European partners that France is a great power. By this standard, they certainly failed in Bosnia.

12. The Clinton Administration III: Reassertion of American Leadership

1. Joshua Muravchik, The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-/solationism (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1996) p. 110.

2. AgenceFrancaise Presse (AFP), 12July 1995 in FBIS, WE-DR, 12July 1995, p. 2.

3. Press Association (London) 15 July 1995 in FBIS, WE-DR 17 July 1995, pp. 4-7; Paris France-2 Television Network, 19 July 1995 in FBIS, WE-DR, 20July 1995, pp. 1-2.

4. Press Association (London) 15 July 1995 in FBIS, WE-DR, 17 July 1995, PP· 4-5.

5. Yasushi Akashi, the top UN official in Bosnia, angered the US by assuring Radovan Karadzic and the Bosnian Serbs that the new 12 500-soldier-strong Rapid Reaction Force would not take sides or act differently than UNPROFOR previously had. New York Times, 22June, A10 and 23June, 1995, A7.

6. Washington Post, 8 August 1995, A15. This policy, combined with the ethnic cleansing of the new Croat areas as Serb refugees fled, naturally

280 Notes and &ferences to pp. 223-30

led to criticism of Washington's acquiescense in the Croat offensive. A defense of the policy from an humanitarian perspective is that Croat atrocities against Serbs occurred, but not with the frequency that characterized many prior cases in the war. See New Ymk Times, 5 October 1995,Al5.

7. Washington Post, 11 August 1995, AI. 8. Washington Post, 27 July, AI and 2 August 1995, AI. 9. Richard Holbrooke, 'The Road to Sarajevo', The New Yorker, 21 and

28 October 1996, pp. 88-9. 10. Ibid., p. 99; Strategic Survey, 1995-1996 (London: Oxford University

Press, 1996) p. 134. 11. This summary relies on Proximity Peace Talks, Wright-Patterson

Air Force Base, Ohio, Dayton, OH, 1-21 November 1995; and Dayton Peace Agreement, US Department of State, Bureau of Public Mfairs, 24 November 1995. On the Russian role, see Washington Post, 29 November 1995, A27. The role the Russians are playing in this settlement parallels their roles in previous diplomacy. The West attempts to include them, primarily on Western terms, and the Russians have consented to cooperate.

12. Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, second edition (Boulder, Co: Westview, 1995), pp. 297-9. Silber and Little point out that the map that emerged from September's battles was remarkably similar to the divisions incorporated in the Dayton peace plan. Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (NY: TV Books, 1995, 1996) p. 363.

13. See Charles G. Boyd, 'Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth About Bosnia', Foreign Affairs, September/October 1995, pp. 30-1; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey, 1994-1995 (London: Oxford University Press, 1995) pp. 97-8.

14. The promises of the administration on this point are reinforced by the Congressional Resolution, sponsored by senators Robert Dole and john McCain, pledging support for the peacekeeping operation provided that the Bosnians are given sufficient training and arms to survive after IFOR withdraws. Senate joint Resolution 44, 29 December 1995, 104th Congress, First Session. Andrew Sullivan is wrong in suggesting that the arms limits for the region, set to go into effect if negotiated limits cannot be reached, preclude the arming of the Bosnians. The Bosnian government can never hope to match the combined military strength of Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs as Sullivan suggests. It would be a step forward if they could match the Bosnian Serbs alone, as specified in the agreement. New Republic, 25 December 1995, p. 6; Proximity Peace Talks, Annex 1-B, p. 4; New Ymk Times, 3 September 1996, A10.

15. Wall Streetjournal, 3 October 1996, Al4. 16. Samantha Power, 'Pale Imitation', The New Republic, 14 October 1996,

pp. 18-22. 17. Washington Post, 25 August 1996, A22; Financial Times, 13 September

1996, p. 3. 18. Washington Post, 30 August 1996; A subcommittee of the Organization

for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also recommended


postponement of the elections, but was overruled. National Public Radio, 'All Things Considered', I October I996; On the positive side, there are new signs of Serb cooperation with The Hague in apprehending suspects indicted for war crimes. Washington Post, 25 October 1996, A29.

19. International Herald Tribune, 11 September I996, p. 7. 20. Initialing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, US Department of State, Bureau

of Public Affairs, p. 4. 21. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 303-4. The political logic of this

process, leaving aside the international pressures for a settlement, is clarified by a New York Times account. Pre-war Sarajevo had a population of 450 000, with a dominant cosmopolitan culture that disdained ethnic distinctions, and with many couples in ethnically mixed marriages. The population in I995 was estimated at 280 000, with an estimated I 00 000 of those refugees from villages suffering under Serb ethnic cleansing and now moved into Sar~evo, bringing a very different culture with them. One sixty-year-old Muslim carpenter with two sons fighting on the front lines for the Bosnians, explained, 'We are not interested in these intellectuals who talk of living together. They have all left Bosnia. It is the poor who remain to fight. This country belongs to us now, not them.' New York Times, 28July I995, A4.

22. A position that Charles G. Boyd hints at in 'Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth About Bosnia'.

13. The Reluctant Superpower

1. Doris Kearns Goodwin, No Ordinary Time: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II (NY: Simon & Schuster, I994) especially Chapters I-3.

2. Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism; The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, I994) especially pp. I41-7.

3. David Rieff, 'American and the World', National Public Radio, 3I july 1995.

4. David Owen asserts that by the summer of I994 the UN troops were inhibiting a settlement and were no longer needed for humanitarian aid delivery. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (NY: Harcourt Brace, I995), p. 366.

5. Owen repeatedly makes the point that such threats need to be tied to specific demands, preferably implementation of a detailed blueprint for peace that is a result of the negotiating process. Ibid., p. I66.

6. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder, Co: Westview, I994) pp. 84,275.

7. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, p. 289. 8. Contrast the agony and indecision over intervention in Bosnia with

David McCullough's account of a key decision during the Truman administration, intervention in I950 in Korea:

282 Notes and &ferences to pp. 248

[Nobody present had] the least doubt that what was happening in Korea was being directed from Moscow. But then this was also the prevailing view in the country and the press .... That everyone at the table was in fundamental agreement became quickly clear, Truman's own obvious resolution having stiffened them all .... Recalling the evening, Truman would write that what impressed him most was the 'complete, almost unspoken acceptance on the part of everyone that whatever had to be done to meet this aggression had to be done. There was no suggestion from anyone that either the United Nations or the United States should back away from it.' (Truman [NY: Simon & Schuster, 1992] pp. 778-9.)

Index Abdic, Fikret

and collaboration with Serbs, 207 counterattack by, 48

air strikes authority for, 175 disadvantages of, 172-4 possible target, 172 US intelligence assessment, 173,

174 Akashi, Yasushi

assurances to Karadzic on Rapid Reaction Force, 279 (n 5)

blocked air strikes at Gorazda, 166

called Karadzic 'man of peace', 168

criticism of US policy, 166 Albanians

and boycott of elections, 135 in Kosovo, 33 measures taken against, 135

Albright, Madeleine favored strong reaction to

February 1994 incident, 212 presence at opening of embassy

in Sarajevo, 166 safe areas policy, 204 view in April1993 meeting, 200

allied policy, on keeping Yugoslavia together, 138

Almond, Gabriel, mood theory of foreign policy, 79-80

altruistic foreign policy, limits to, 237-8

American diplomatic offensive in Europe, 223

American leadership European view, 199 need for, 149, 199

American 'option', 130-1 arms embargo

British position on, 182 Clinton's view of, 200 Clinton threatens to lift, 216

Congressional threat to lift, 221 ineffectiveness of, 151 legality of, 178 official Bosnian position on, 177 Serb advantage from, 151 US ceased enforcement in

Adriatic, 216 US encouraged Germany to

support lifting, 277 (n 29) US position on, 177 US supports repeal resolution,

216 arms flow

from Danube side, 177 US acquiesence in leakage of

embargo, 176,273 (n 20) Aspin, Les

on Clinton and Balkan Ghosts, 103, 264 (n 14)

guidelines for public support of policy, 252 (n 4)

and informal style, 197 intervention guidelines, 18 views on Bosnia, 197

Atlanta]ournal- Constitution, foreign policy attitudes in Georgia, 84

atrocities and refugees increases in 1992, 155 responsibility for, 255-6 (n 8) State Department reports on,

53-6 Austrian-Hungarian Empire, 23

and Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 24

autonomous regions (Serbia), Kosovo and Vojvodina, 25

Babic, Milan, overthrow in Krajina, 142-3

Badinter Commission, on disintegration of Yugoslavia, 137

Baker,James A. III

283

account of US policy, 149 on European inaction, 149

284

Baker,James A. III (Cont.) need for US leadership, 149 no US stake in war, 189 US policy on breakup of

Yugoslavia, 136-8 visit to Belgrade, June 1991,

136-7, 267 (n 10) Yugoslavia more difficult than

Middle East, 155 Banac, Ivo, on pro-Serbian

sentiment in Europe, 183 Banja Luka

and ethnic cleansing, 57 and rail line, 45

Bartholemew, Reginald, US representative to negotiations, 196

Baumeister, EJ., on public attitudes, 261

Belgrade direct participation in Croatian

war, 140 and rail line, 45

Biden,Joseph, and position on Bosnia, 85, 187

Bihac attack on by Abdic ( 1995), 48 and Greater Serbia, 45 overrun by Bosnians, 48

bipolar international system, 3, 4, 250 (n 1)

Bohan, Mate, meeting with Karadzic, 30, 187

Bolton, John R., comparison of Serbs to Nazis, 161

bombing offensive ( 1995), incentives for and results of, 220-5

Bosnia-Herzegovina 1990 elections, 30 assault on Muslim culture, 57 became a republic, 24 cause abandoned by West, 209 causes of war, 36-41 constitutional issues in

independence,41-2 demise of cosmopolitan culture,

231,281 (n 21) extent of multiethnicity, 42-3

Index

growing ability to defend itself, 209

historical persistence, 24 independence recognized by

Serbia, 150 in desperate straits, 155 political and cultural uniqueness,

23· recognized by Federal Republic

ofYugoslavia(Serbia), 231 spread of war, 66 as Tito's problem, 25 traditional electoral patterns, 31 transfer ofJNA personnel, 35 Yugoslav orientation, 26

Bosnian government military comeback, 47 military tactics, 167 strategic objectives, 47-8

Bosnian legislators, views of Owen-Stoltenberg , 207-8

Bosnian Serb defeat, effect of Croatian offensive, 175

Bosnian war, Serbian role in, 150-1, 270 (n 45)

Bosnia quagmire, European view, 149

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros Bosnia as 'rich man's war', 73 rejection ofceasefire terms, 151

Boyd, Charles G., 255 (n 17) Brcko, determination of status, 225 Brioni agreement, 140 British policy, 218-19 Buchanan, Pat, foreign policy views,

9,10 Burns, john, Serbian interest in US

reaction, 117-18, 266 (n 17) Bush, President George

alleged similarity with Neville Chamberlain, 153

effect of Clinton campaign on policy, 158

failed Bosnia policy, 153 lack of knowledge of Yugoslavia,

263 (n 1) movement of carrier task force,

118 and policy guidelines, 16-17

Index 285

policy in Bosnia, 9, 10 and promotion of humanitarian

measures, 154 on US credibility and the Gulf

war, 266 (n 16) on Vietnam, 115-16 and Vietnam syndrome, 84

Carrington, Lord Peter and conflict with UN, 151 negotiation of ceasefire in

Croatia, 141 threat to suspend peace

conference if Serb violations continued, 141

Carter, former President, negotiated truce in Bosnia, 216-17

Chace, james, compares Warren Christopher's remarks to Chamberlain's, 209-10

Chechens, war with, 95 Chetniks, loyalty to Yugoslav

London government, 24 Chirac, French President, new

harder policy line, 221-2 Christopher, Warren

favored strong reaction to February 1994 incident, 212

guidelines for intervention, 17 May 1993 trip to Europe, 201-2 on rejecting Vance-Owen,

195-6 on security interests in Bosnia,

259 (n 8) switch to hawkish position, 205 urged Izetbegovic accept

Owen-Stoltenberg, 207 views on Bosnia, 197 view in April 1993 meeting, 200

Churchill, Winston, comparison to Christopher's remark, 218

Cigar, Norman, and views on genocide, 255 (n 18)

Civiic, Christopher, domestic pressures in Germany, 274 (n 31)

civil war, use of term justified nonintervention, 96-7

Clark, Wesley effect of lifting arms embargo,

178 on safe areas policy, 277 (n 27)

Clinton, President Bill and 'American option', 130 compared to Bush, 189 and 'European option', 130-1 influence of Balkan Ghosts, 103 influence of emotion in decision-

making, 198 policy in Bosnia, 11, 12, 198,

217-19 and White House decision

making, 197-8, 277 (13) Cohen, Roger, European fear of

Islam, 182 Cohen, William S.

advocated new approach to Bosnia, 217

Stockholm syndrome among UN soldiers, 169

Cohen, Lenardj. causes of war, 40-1 Izetbegovic's optimism on Bosnia,

253 (n 16) and Serb paranoia, 147

Cold War foreign policy, sense of urgency,61

Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), suspension of Yugoslavia, 148-9

conflict, nationalist, 6-7 and disintegration of Yugoslavia,

32-3 and Eagleburger's views, 102 influence on President, 104 as rationalization for policy,

104-6 types of nationalism, 36-7 see also ethnic hatred

Congressional leaders, meeting with President, 200

Congress of Berlin, 264 (n 9) Contact Group, formation of, 211 Contact Group plan

allies offered as basis for negotiation, 220-1

content of, 215

286 Index

Contact Group plan (Cont.) lifting sanctions key part of,

214 rejection by Bosnian Serbs, 216 rewarded cooperative Milosevic,

212 Crawford, Beverly, impact of

domestic pressures in Germany, 274 (n 31)

Croatia birth of modern state, 24 ceasefire in, 35 development of nationalism, 29 objectives in Bosnia, 46-7 political and cultural uniqueness,

23 poor military showing, 46 recognized by Federal Republic

ofYugoslavia (Serbia), 231 referendum in, 133-4 resisted Serbian version of

centralized Yugoslavia, 29 threatened to expel UN troops,

217 and war crimes, 46-7

Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), election o£1990, 31

Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ-BH), 1990 Bosnian elections, 31

Croatian offensive (1995) ethnic cleansing and number of

atrocities, 47, 279-80 (n 6) impact on Bosnian situation, 47,

222-3 Washington support for, 223

Croat military activities against Bosnian Muslims, 121, 187-8, 213

Groat-Muslim alliance, sporadic nature of, 278-9 (n 50)

Groat-Muslim Federation, see Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Groat-Muslim offensive and NATO bombing campaign, 224

Cyrillic alphabet, used by Serbs, 25

Dayton Agreement arming the Bosnians, 228-9, 280

(n 14) boundaries resemble disposition

of forces on the ground, 280 (n 12)

Contact Group plan was forerunner, 212, 213

elections held, 229 made possible by, 227-8 political cost of troop deployment,

170 provisions of agreement, 225-7 Russian participation in, 227, 280

(n 11) weaknesses of, 228

Dayton meeting, delay in, 224 Defense Department, and Vietnam

syndrome, 186-7 DeMicheli, Gianni, on US role in

crisis, 139 Denitch, Bogdan

analysis of German actions, 269 (n 31)

importance of religion il) Yugoslavia, 263 (n 5)

deterrence and effectiveness against Serbs, 117 and escalation, 121, 122, 123 generalized, 116-17 at Gorazde, 267 (n 21) key to deterring the Croats, 121 overrated, 116

diplomacy in Croatia, European role, 140-3

division between allies, US, 139-40 Doder, Dusko, increase in ethnic

tension in Croatia, 29 Dole, Robert

advocate of new approach to Bosnia, 217

called for postponement of elections, 230, 280-1 (n 18)

favored strong action, 187 position on Bosnia, 85

Donnelly, jack, on humanitarian intervention, 70-3, 259 (n 8)

Index 287 Dragnich, Alex N.

and constitutional issues, 254 (n 34)

as critic of US position, 254 (n 36) empires in Balkans, 252 (n 2)

Draskovic, Vuk on American handling of

Vance-Owen, 195 main rival and nationalist

opponent ofMilosevic, 31 Drew, Elizabeth

Clinton administration meetings in April, 1993, 200

return to status quo policy, 206 view on Christopher's actions in

Europe,201 Drina River, Thatcher recommends

bridges be bombed, 154 Dubrovnik, shelling of, 51

Eagleburger, Lawrence asked about George Kenney, 115 faith in effectiveness of sanctions,

271 (n 61) irrational, ethnic nature of war,

102 no middle ground on policy, 163 seconded Baker's noninterven

tionist position, 163 unwillingness to threaten Serbs,

118-19 on US policy and Vietnam, 115 worry about credibility, need for

follow-up action, 121 · economic blockade, Bush adminis

tration enforcement of in Adriatic, 158

economic recovery, obstacles to, 230 economic sanctions

effect on Milosevic, 172 European-US disagreement over,

214 impact of, 214-15

Economist, position on the war, 181 effect of 1995 NATO bombing

campaign, 174, 273 (n 18) empires, confluence in Yugoslavia,

23,252 (n 2)

ethnic cleansing, definition of, 256-7 (n 19)

ethnic fragmentation in Europe, 140

ethnic hatred Cohen, Lenard, on causes of, 101,

264 (n 10) historical comparison to Europe,

101 historical record in Yugoslavia,

101 Kaplan, Robert on, 103 Lockwood, William on, 101 Malcolm, Noel on, 101 Powell, Colin on, 158 South Mrican example, 98 used to rationalize policy, 104-6 US example, 98-9 Woodward, Susan, on, 100 see also conflict, nationalist

Eurocorps, opposed by US, 141 Europe

domestic mood, 180 pro-Serbian sentiment, 182-4,

274 (n 34) European Action Plan, 208 European Community

difficulty negotiating ceasefire, 1.51

handling of Croatia crisis, 138-41

lead in crisis, 138-9 support for unified Yugoslavia, 34

European opinion comparison to US, 181 French support of intervention

force, 181 'European option', 130-1 European policy, inadequacies of,

218 European positions in May 1993,

201-2 European trip, effect on

Christopher, 203 European Union, see European

Community European-US differences on the

war, xi

288 Index

extreme nationalism, dynamics of, 48-50

failure to intenrene effect on Eastern Europe, 67-8 effect on Muslim world, 67-8, 259

(n 7) effect on NATO, 66-7

February 1994 marketplace shelling and 51 Senators vote to lift arms

embargo, 212 Russia sent troops to Pale, 212 split in European positions, 212 televising of, 211 White House hesitated, 212

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, recognized by Bosnia and Croatia, 231

Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina emerged after ouster of Mate

Boban,213 implications for Serbs, 213 objectives and effect, 213 result of pressure from

Washington sanctioned principle of partition,

213 and signing of agreement, 188

foreign policy attitudes of Americans

discrepancies in, 85 on Gulf war, 261 (n 11) negative toward limited war, 83-4 post-Cold War, 82-3

foreign policy decision-making concepts, 110-13

Fowler, Wyche, vote on Gulf war, 84 French National Assembly, Clinton

address to, 215 French policy

call for protection of safe areas, 211

erratic, French-centered, 211, 218-19, 279 (n 62)

historical area of influence, 247 impact on rest of Europe, 222 and policy toward Rwanda, 247

Friedman, Thomas L., on public mood, 196

Fukuyama, Francis, and end of history, 82

Gagnon, VP,Jr. and causes of war, 39-40 and mobilization of extremists, 39

Ganic, Ejup, and government position on lift and strike, 177

gap between military and diplomatic situation, 156

Gelb, Leslie advocate of bombing, 154 on divorce between negotiation

and military reality, 210 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, viewed as

villain in war, 168 Gergen, David, favored strong

response to February 1994 shelling, 212

Germans in Yugoslavia (WWII), 265 (n 10)

German policy and passivity, 219 and support for Croatia, 181, 274

(n 31) Gompert, David, urged EC to lead,

133 Goodby,James, on nationalist

claims, 250 (n 8) Gorazde

many Muslims in, 45 no US defense of, 213 retains land corridor, 225

Gordon, Bernard, one power domination of area, 64, 258 (chap. 5, n 2)

Gore, Vice-President, views on Bosnia, 197

Government Accounting Office (GAO), report on UN activities, 169

Great Powers, security interests of, 153

Greater Serbia, 34, 44-5, 153 Greenberg, Stan

on molding public opinion, 263 (n 30)

on public opinion, 200 Gutman, Roy, 257 (n 26)

Index 289

Haass, Richard N., and foreign . policy guidelines, 14, 20

Hamilton, Lee, effect of lifting embargo, 178

Hendrickson, David on lift and strike, 264 (n 14) on US policy, 153

Hoagland,Jim, 259 (n 5) Hoffmann, Stanley, distinction

between interests and values, 62, 259-60 (n 10)

Holsti, Ole R., 261 (n 4) hostage taking

effect on policy, 217 release of, 221 of UNPROFOR personnel, 221

Hughes, Patrick, effect of lifting embargo, 178

humanitarian aid delivery and air drops, 196 became unnecessary, 239, 281

(n 4) evaluation of, 170, 272 ( n 9, I 0)

human rights and Carter administration, 71 and international covenants, 70-2 and international organizations,

71-2 and Reagan adminstration, 71

humiliation ofWest, 244-5 Hungarian minority, in Vojvodina,

25 Huntington, Samuel P., 6 Hurd, Douglas

on arms embargo, 182 prevented sending of UN peace

force to Croatia, 141 reaction to February 1994

shelling, 211 Hyland, William C.

characterization of war, 263 (n 1) position on Bosnia, 85

ideological hatred, 99 imperial rule, in Yugoslavia, 23 implementation of Dayton

agreement, 231 Implementation Force (IFOR),

limited role of, 230

intervention advantages of (1992), 156 arguments against, 242-3 cultural incentives for, 77 and decision-making process, 199 guidelines for, 14-20 legal basis for, 71-3 obstacles to, 157 of US, 5 would topple British government,

202 Izetbegovic, Alija

on Dayton Agreement, 231 electoral strategy, 32 imprisoned by Communists, 31 on meeting with Karadzic, 276

(n 2) naivety of, 30, 253 reason for rejection of

Owen-Stoltenberg, 207 no US help coming, 208 on Vance-Owen, 191 as villain in war, 168

Jensen, Kenneth on Cyrus Vance's lack of

influence, 149 on US irresolution in Bosnia, 149

Jeremiah, David Aprill993 meeting with

President, 201 effect of air strikes, 173-4

Jervis, Robert on historical learning, 114, 265

(n 11) on Hitler, 265 (n 8)

JNA, see Yugoslav People's Army Joint Action Plan (JAP), 203 Juppe, Alain

compared John Major to Neville Chamberlain, 221-2

US and Russia doomed European Action Plan, 209

see also European Action Plan

Kaplan, Morton, 250 (n I) Karadzic, Radovan

declared Serb republic in Bosnia, 35

290 Index

Karadzic, Radovan ( Cont.) influence of Karadzic and Mladic

after Dayton, 229 meeting, agreement with Boban,

30, 187 proposed Owen-Stoltenberg

plan, 204 rejected Contact Group plan, 216

Kennedy, President john, on inducements to escalation, 122

King Alexander, 24 Kinkel, Klaus, see European Action

Plan Kirkpatrick, Jeanne J.

favored air strikes, 171-2 position on Bosnia, 34, 85, 254

(n 22) Knin, and rail line, 45 Kohl, Helmut, and support for

lifting embargo, 181 Kosovo

as target of aggression, 152 impoverished, 25 Serbian grievances in, 28 see also Albanians

Kosovo Polje, 103 Kozyrev, Andrei

admonishment of Serbs, 184 optimism in Lisbon, 151 pessimism on Bosnia, 151

Kucan, Milan, and rhetoric, 26, 28 Kupres, and highway, 46

Lake, Anthony American diplomatic offensive

(1995), 223 focus on long term, 199 plan to relate power to

diplomacy, 205 reaction to February 1994

shelling, 212 security interest in Bosnia, 69 views in April1993 meeting,

200-1 views on Bosnia, 197

Lane, Christopher, arguments against intervention, 153

Lebow, Richard Ned, on irrational behavior, 117

Lewis, Anthony alleged similarities between

George Bush and Neville Chamberlain, 153

on lift and strike, 176 position on Bosnia, 85

lift and strike European opposition to, 176-7 problems with, 176-7 US opinion on, 178

limited objectives approach to intervention

definition and defense of, 18-20

rejected by Congress, 187 see also Les Asp in, Colin Powell

limited war, 15 Lippmann, Walter, views on foreign

policy, 80 Lisbon Conference

and Baker on Europeans, 149 Kozyrev's optimism at, 151 London Conference ( 1992) failure of, 152 Major, john, scepticism about,

152 Serbs renege on promises, 152,

161, 271 (n 60) London Conference (1995), and

pledge of military action, 220 Lugar, Richard

position on Bosnia, 187 reaction to February 1994

shelling, 211 Luttwak, Edward N., on US policy,

251 (n 16)

Macedonia Bush supported sending

peacekeepers, 158 ethnic complexity, 93-4 and US troops, 66

Major,John favors safe havens, 154 likely to pressure Muslims, 154

Malcolm, Noel, influence on Clinton, 104

Mallet, Jean Claude, and Bosnian position on lift and strike, 172

Index 291

Markovic, Ante popularity, 31 Reforms of, 26-7,39

Martie, Milan, 39 Maynes, Charles William, security

interests in Bosnia, 69 McCain, John

on legality of arms embargo, 178 and mission creep, 115 position on Bosnia, 85 statement on Holocaust, 277

(n 14) McCaffrey, Barry R., estimate of

troop levels, 273 {n 2) McCloskey, Frank, view on Bosnia

policy, 85 McElroy, Robert W., motivation for

humanitarian intervention, 258 (intro, n 3)

McPeak, Merriii A., effect of air strikes, 174

Mesic, Stipe allowed turn at presidency, 140 turn at presidency blocked by

Serbs, 134-5 military strength of warring parties,

273 (n 21) Milosevic, Slobodan

agreement to divide Bosnia, 187 crowd pleasing speeches of, 26 continued supply to Bosnian

Serbs, 216 contradictions in arguments on

minorities, 33 on dismembering Bosnia, 33 ended autonomy: Kosovo,

Vojvodina, Kosovo, 29 loosened sanctions reward for

cooperation, 212 meeting with Tudjman, 30, 254

{n 22) multiethnic cultural legacy, 255

(n 37) political tactiCs of, 28 role in Bosnian war, 214 nationalist movement of, 42

mission creep, 121 see also deterrence

Mitchell, George favored strong military action,

187 position on Bosnia, 85

Mladic, Ratko, see Karadzic, Radovan

Morgenthau, Hans, views on foreign policy, 80

Mostar continued conflict with Muslims,

229-30 destruction of stone bridge, 57

Mueller,John, importance of public opinion, 80-1

multiethnic democracy, 238-9 multilateral military actions, 12, 13 municipal elections postponed, 230 Muravchik,Joshua, objectives of

French policy, 279 (n 62) Muslims

in cities, 45 and Clinton concern over, 205 hard-liners and implementation

of Dayton Agreement, 229 and Muslim-based state, 32 and warfare with Croats, 32

NATO agreed to provide air support, 165 credibility and morale at stake, 246 effect of air strikes, 227-8 preservation of NATO as US

interest, 66-7 troop force under Dayton

Agreement, 227 Nazi behavior, similarities with

Serbs, 150 neo-isolationism, in US, 9-10 Nickles amendment, suspension of,

136 Niles, M.T., importance of

Milosevic, 159 Nixon, Richard

advice on Bosnia, 156 view on security interests in

Bosnia, 68 no-fly rule, lack of enforcement

approval, 158

292 Index

Nunn, Sam, on lift and strike, 177, 178, 179

Nunn-Mitchell amendment, 216 Nye,Joseph S.

on military spending, 251(n 14) on US role, 8

Odom, William E. opposed air strikes, 180 on sending ground troops to

Bosnia, 179, 258 (chap. 5, n 1) and US security interests, 179

Operation Deliberate Force, see bombing offensive ( 1995)

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), ruling on election, 229

see also Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

Ottoman Empire, 6 and history of oppression, 214-15 as occupying force, 23

Owen, Lord David advocacy of air strikes, 172 co-chair of negotiations in

Geneva, 162 comments on Karadzic, 168 co-sponsor of Vance-Owen peace

plan, 191 defense of Owen-Stoltenberg

plan, 204 drawbacks of Owen-Stoltenberg

principle, 278 (n 35) on European role in crisis, 138-9 on indecisiveness of Americans,

210 on Joint Action Plan, 203 mistakes with Milosevic, 278 (n 39) opposed ultimatum after

February 1994 shelling, 212 recommended strategy, 241

Owen-Stoltenberg plan Bosnian government rejection of,

207-8 European pressure on Muslims,

207 nature of, 204, 206-7

Owen, David, pressure on Bosnians, 207

return to promotion of, 206 resurrection of and rejection of,

206-7 US support for, 204

paradigms in foreign policy, 111-13 Party of Democratic Acion (SDA)

organized along ethnic lines, 30 plurality in 1990 election, 31

Pavlowitch, Stevan K., views on recognition, 146

peacekeepers, UN decision to send to Croatia, 142-3 need for in Bosnia, 165 opposition to sending to Croatia,

141 see also UNPROFOR

Perkins, Edward, deplores Serb agression, 159

Perle, Richard, on lifting arms embargo, 179

Perry, William and assessment of 1995 air strikes,

272 (n 16) and use of force, 252 and US security interests in

Bosnia, 259 (n 8) US will not defend Gorazde, 213

Pfaff, William, on Vance-Owen plan, 194

Poos,Jacques, and European overconfidence, 139

Posavina corridor, 45 and role in Contact Group plan,

215 post-Cold War foreign policy

effect of all-or-nothing approach, 247

need for cost-benefit analysis, 248-9

resemblance to domestic policy, 247-9

transition to, 3-7 Powell, Colin

and arguments against intervention, 157-8, 206, 275 (n 43)

Index 293

on effect of air strikes, 174 and intervention guidelines, 17 meeting with President, 20 as member of Principals

Committee, 198 on White House decision-making,

277 (n 13) Principals Committee, 197-8 public opinion, impact of, 81 public support for intervention

after 1994 Sarajevo shelling, 88-9

among different groups, 88 and contradictory attitudes, 88 general support for intervention,

86 opposition to sending troops,

89-90, 262-3 (n 29) and support for Muslims, 89

Ramet, Sabrina P. and preventing aggression, 146 and recognition, 145

Rapid Reaction Force, introduction to battlefield, 217

Ravena!, Earl C., 251 recognition of Bosnia, US position,

148 recognition of republics

argument for conditional recognition, 145-6

argument for earlier recognition, 145

EC recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, 137

and German role, 143-4, 269 (n 31)

and influence on war, 143-7 and Izetbegovic position, 144 and Lord Carrington, 144 US would not grant, 137

Redman, Charles, and jumping the moral bridge, 215

refugees from Bosnia, 155 number of, 51-2 Serb refugees fleeing Croats, 256

(n 18) see also Thatcher, Margaret

Rieff, David Bosnians compared to Irish, 272

(n 4) and chances of war, 30 on Serb military doctrine, 50 on UN policy, 167 see also Germans in Yugoslavia

Rifkind, Malcolm attack on Bob Dole, 216 and French policy, 219 and responses to French

criticism, 222 Roman Empire, splitting of, 23 Roman script, used by Croats, 25 Rose, General, favored ceasefire,

212 Roskin, Michael

on paradigms, 111-13 and Vietnam paradigm, 112-13

Russian role after February 1994, 175 approach to Bosnia, 184-6 involvement of troops, 185 and participation in Dayton

Agreement, 186 US policy toward, 185-6

Rwanda, intervention in, 73, 77-9, 261 (n 16)

safe area policy effect of, 169-70 and fall of Srebrenica and Zepa,

221 and UN resolution, 203 and US responsibilities, 203-4

Safire, William, and criticism of US policy, 140

San Diego Union Tribune, 84 Sandzak, as target of aggression, 152 Sarajevo

and bombardment of non-Serb areas, 51

government under Dayton Agreement, 225

rejection of plan to relieve, 205 and Serb retreat, 206 shelling incident in (1995), 220 shelling of, 196 siege of (1993), 205

294 Index

Sarajevo (Cont.) strategic importance of, 44-5 temporary end of siege, 46

Schneider, William, public attitudes on the war, 83

Schwartz, Stephen, and multiethnic cultural legacy in Bosnia, 255 (n 37)

Scowcroft, Brent, 263 (n 1) Serbia

and aid to Bosnian Serbs, 35 and authoritarian tendencies, 147 and autonomy of Kosovo and

Vojvodina, 253 blamed for war by US, 143 birth of modern state, 24 demonstrations in, 29 intent on keeping Yugoslavia

intact, 29 interest in US actions, 117-18,

266 (n 17) and martyr complex, 214-15 and minorities, 276 (n 4) and objectives in Bosnia, 44-6 and paranoia, 147 political and cultural uniqueness,

23 and role of foreign oppression,

214-15 and roll back of, 46 and similarities to Nazis, 161 and terrorization of moderates,

39-40 and UN relief convoys, 168 and willingness to use force, 43

Serb-Croat collaboration, 155 Serbian Democratic Party (SDS),

and 1990 elections, 31 Serbian Socialist Party (SPS), and

election of 1990, 31 Seselj, Vojislav, and neo-fascist

Serbian Radical Party, 40 Shahkalili, Cyrus, on the nature of

the war, 51 Shalikashvili, John

assessment of military potential, 174

importance of US leadership, 174

presence at opening of US embassy, 166

Shultz, George, and public support for intervention, 252 (n 4)

Silajdzic, Haris conflict with Izetbegovic, 229 created professional army, 47

Slocomb, Walter on lifting of arms embargo, 177 on safe areas policy, 277 (n 27)

Slovenia absence of Serb minority, 34 disassociation from Yugoslavia,

34, 136, 137 pleb~scite held, 34 resisted centralized Yugoslavia,

29,30 spread of war, and Hungary,

Kosovo, Macedonia, 66 Srebrenica

Clinton saw pictures of, 198 French criticism after fall of, 221 many Muslims in, 45 shelling of, 196

Stalin, break with Tito, 25 Stambolic, Ivan, 28 strategic leadership

absence of in Europe, 183 absence of in US, 183-4

succession, see Slovenia and Croatia Suddeutsche Zeitung, position on war,

181

Tarnoff, Peter and American diplomatic

offensive, 223 on lifting arms embargo, 177 and limits on foreign policy, 11 and security interests in Bosnia,

68-9 Thatcher, Margaret

advocate of strong action, 154 , potential Western role in Bosnia,

184 preventing refugees as Western

interest, 62 security interests in Bosnia, 69

Tito, Jozef Broz split with Stalin, 5

Index 295

and Yugoslavia, 25 Trenton Times, and legacy of Gulf

War 261 (n ll) Tucker, Robert W.

and legality of US position, 263 (n 4)

on lift and strike, 264 (n 14) Tudjman, Franjo

and agreement to divide Bosnia, 187

contradictions on minorities, 33 equivalent of Milosevic in

cunning, 29 meetings with Milosevic, 30, 254

(n 22) proposed Owen-Stoltenberg

plan, 204 as villain in war, 168

Turaljic, Hakija, assasinated by Bosnian Serbs, 168

Turkey, suggested use of force at London Conference, 152

Tuzla, Muslims in, 45

UN attitudes toward Bosnian army, 166 General Assembly vote on Bosnia,

265 (n 2) mandate and goals in Bosnia,

164-6 ·and reassuring pronouncements,

183 Special Representative in Bosnia,

165 UNHCR, differences with

UNPROFOR, 169 UNPROFOR: congruence with

Serbian objectives, 165-9; threatened withdrawal of, 221

United Nations, see UN UN trade embargo and sanctions,

150 US intervention

and credibility, 118, 266 (n 19) historical record on, 95 and Vietnam model, 163 and willingness to intervene, 94-7

US Bosnia policy and actions taken, 162

and allied agreement, 211 and American option, 224-5 and consideration of unilateral

action, 205 and European agreement to

stronger policy, 205 and gap between words and

action, 128 and Serb retreat, 206 analogy to Gulf War, 160 arguments about involvement, 153 failure of compromise policy, 157 futility of, 217-18, 219 opposition to aggression and

atrocities, 159-60 and reassessment of EC

leadership, 148 and Serbia as culprit, 159 and support for Contact Group

plan, 212 and support for status quo ante,

160-1, 271 (n 59) US attempt to take lead from EC,

150 US not world's policeman, 162

US military and Clinton meeting with, 200-1 Vietnam and views on Bosnia, 158 see also Shalikashvili,John, Powell,

Colin Ustashi, 24

Vance, Cyrus co-chair of negotiations in

Geneva, 162 co-sponsor of Vance-Owen peace

plan, 191 and drawbacks of

Owen-Stoltenberg principle, 278 (n 35)

and lack of influence, 149 Vance-Owen peace plan

American rejection of, 195-7 and Bosnian view, 193-4, 276

(n 6, 8) contents of, 191-4 is dead, 203

. Owen, David on, 194-5 Serb view of, 193, 276 (n 8)

296 Index

Vietnam analogy and Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 266

(n 15) and Europeans, 182 impeding relief efforts, 151 lessons from, 112-13 and Powell, Colin, 157 relevance to Bosnia, 153

Vojvodina, as potential target of aggression, 152

Vukovar, shelling of, 50-1

Warner,John on Congressional views, 187 position on Bosnia, 85

Washington Federation Agreement, see Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Weinberger, Caspar, and guidelines for intervention, 14-16

well-fed dead, 239 West, Rebecca, 252 (n 3) Western officials, trained in Cold

War, 242 Woodward, Susan L.

agreement with Cohen's view, 41 causes of the war, 37-8, 254 (n 29) intervention as security interest,

258 (chap. 5, n 5) weakening of central institutions,

26 Yugoslav international position,

250 (n 4) Wohlstetter, Albert, position on

Bosnia, 85 World War II

fate of Balkan states, 24 number killed, 99-100

Yugoslavia 1990 elections, 31 arms embargo on, 34 and Bismarck, 258 (chap. 5, n 4) and economic problems, 26 growth of nationalism, 29-31 importance of, 5 languages and population of

republics, 25 military insignificance of

successor states, 65 post-Cold War importance,

127-8 post-World War II, 25 pre-World War II, 24 and problems of minorities,

32-3 and standard of living in

republics, 25 as strategic backwater, 65 and World War II fighting, 24

Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) fighting in Slovenia, 34 personnel in Bosnia, 150 role of in Croatia, 141

Zakaria, Fareed advised against encouraging

Bosnians, 210 on general deterrence, 116-17

Zepa, French criticism after fall of, 221

Zimmermann, Warren causes of the war, 36-7 recall from Belgrade, 148-9 views on recognition of Bosnia,

146-7

Notes and References - Springer978-0-230-37276-4/1.pdf · Notes and References 1. The United States...

Documents

Transcript of Notes and References - Springer978-0-230-37276-4/1.pdf · Notes and References 1. The United States...