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Transcript of Northern Triangle Security Analysis MAGG Capstone … · Dr. Jose Miguel Cruz Florida International...
Running Head: NORTHERN TRIANLGE SECURITY
1
Northern Triangle Security Analysis
MAGG Capstone
Dr. Jose Miguel Cruz
Florida International University
Christian Ostergaard and Shota Tchigladze
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 2
Northern Triangle Security Overview
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effectiveness of the Central American
Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) in the northern triangle countries of Guatemala, El
Salvador, and Honduras. This paper will examine the strengths and limitations of CARSI
and how the United States Southern Command can further protect its national security, in
cooperation with CARSI, by understanding the weaknesses in the northern triangle
country’s security systems. Each country will be examined on the effectiveness of
CARSI, and how Southern Command can format its policy based on each country’s
situation. To assess threats posed by gangs and cartels, the final portion of this paper will
provide solutions and recommendations that could protect the United States and northern
triangle’s national security.
On March 12, General Kelly (2015) expressed concern that human smugglers are
managing to bring thousands of people into the United States, particularly via drug routes
that are vulnerable to national security. Due to weak security in the northern triangle
countries, “terrorist organizations could seek to leverage those same smuggling routes to
move operatives with intent to cause grave harm to our citizens or even bring weapons of
mass destruction into the United States” (Kelly, 2015).
Limited security in the Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, El Salvador,
and Honduras not only pose a threat to Central America, but to the United States’
national security. In the northern triangle countries, crime and violence affect 7.5 percent
of their combined GDP, and gangs control a vast amount of territory. Given the
geographical location, close proximity, weak governance, economic stagnation, and
emigration, the northern triangle country’s high levels of crime and violence, as well as
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 3
organized crime, all pose a direct threat to the national security of United States and its
neighboring countries.
This national security threat derives from gangs and cartels, such as MS-13,
Barrio 18, and Zetas that control territory in all three countries, all of which use many
forms of organized crime to advance their business. These gangs and cartels help support
the rise of corrupt government officials, and because of such high levels of illicit
trafficking, citizens are becoming less supportive of democracy in these countries (Meyer
& Seelke, 2014). Each county government within these countries has employed ways to
fight organized crime, but weak institutions, poverty, and limited funds have created a
safe haven for trafficking organizations.
Each government has been trying to combat the problem with support of CARSI
provided by the United States. Honduras has taken an approach that strongly involves its
military in police activities, where Guatemala has been trying to work with other Central
American governments to legalize narcotics to combat trafficking. In 2012 and 2013, El
Salvador successfully brokered a truce between MS-13 and Barrio 18, which lowered
homicides by almost 40 percent. Unfortunately, given the nature of these gangs, they took
advantage of the truce and expanded their territory where today homicide rates are back
to pre-truce levels (Meyer & Seelke, 2014). As the United States recognizes the threat,
they have implemented CARSI to help change the direction of the northern triangle.
CARSI has many successes and many limitations, and other federal U.S. law
enforcement agencies and the Department of Defense play a vital role in continuing to
support the countries in Central America.
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 4
CARSI Overview
In the 1980s, the United States supported military and economic assistance of
$1.4 billion annually to Central America, which was dedicated to overthrowing guerrilla
movements. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, support and funding to the region
declined sharply and the United States shifted its focus to combating drug trafficking in
Colombia and Mexico. As a result of the United States’ sponsored security initiatives
such as Plan Colombia and security programs in Mexico, drug cartels moved their
operations into Central America to avoid seizures from law enforcement (Meyer &
Seelke, 2014).
The United States’ Merida Initiative began in 2007 to assist Mexico in the war on
drugs because of the increasing flow of narcotics and organized crime.
The portion of the initiative that focused on Central America had split from the
Merida initiative in 2010 and became the Central American Regional Security Initiative
(CARSI). CARSI has a broad, rather than traditional, approach on security and narcotic-
trafficking efforts. Further, CARSI not only provides training and technical support
assistance to law enforcement, which helps to prevent vulnerable societies from criminal
threats, but also attempts to strengthen the governmental institutions in host countries to
overcome security challenges that are contributed by economic or social factors (Meyer
& Seelke, 2014). CARSI’s five main objectives are: to create safer streets, disrupt the
movement of criminals and contraband, support the development of strong, capable, and
accountable governments, initiate an effective state security presence to at risk
communities, and enhance the rule of law by fostering cooperation among nations in the
region (Department of State, n.d.).
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 5
Since FY2008, Congress has allocated an estimated $803.6 million for Central
American countries through the Merida and CARSI programs, and an additional $130
million already has been requested for CARSI in 2015. The International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) received 64% of the appropriated funds, which is
managed by International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) under the State
Department. The other 32% of funds were assigned under the Economic Support Fund
(ESF), which is managed by USAID. Other small portions of this funding are allocated
for anti-terrorism, de-mining and foreign military financing programs (Meyer & Seelke,
2014).
Guatemala
Since 2011, Guatemala has received more assistance from the United States than
any other country in Central America, with a total of 106.7 million in 2014 (Foreign
Assistance.gov, n.d.). This foreign aid is intended to helped combat the organized crime
and violence problems that originated in its civil war that ended in 1986. The end of the
civil war created a democratically-elected government, but has not created full optimism
between the United States and allied governments. The fallout from the civil war lasted
over ten years, once a new government took place, and this helped birth organized crime
and government corruption. Today, the country’s violence is not a result of internal civil
conflict, but from the vast amounts of organized crime activity that move illicit products.
It is estimated that 80% of the violence is a result of the drug trade, and it is projected that
over 60% of the territory in Guatemala is controlled by drug traffickers (Morales, 2014).
The Guatemalan police force is focused on combating drug traffickers and organized
crime, but unfortunately its military is taking on the role of police, which decreases
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 6
border security. It is estimated that less than ten percent of the Guatemalan military
perform traditional duties, and that the rest take on police roles to combat violence
(Meyer & Seelke, 2014).
Gangs have become a primary source for the increase in violence, especially with
their continued support to the Mexican drug cartels. The Mexican cartels that were
pushed into Guatemala after Mexico’s crackdown on drug operations have been able to
use gangs like MS-13 as assassins and protection for their drug operations. These MS-13
members received extensive military-type training so they can successfully help the drug
cartels move shipments, at first into Mexico, and eventually into the United States.
Gangs like MS-13 receive advanced weapons and equipment from the regional arms
trade, which filters through sources like the El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua
militaries (Lum & Farah, 2013). This poses a direct threat to the United States, especially
because the Department of State and Department of Defense policies are to help supply
and train these militaries to fight the crimes they are involved in. With Guatemala on the
border of Mexico, and transnational gangs coordinating with the Mexican cartels, it
allows MS-13 and their counterparts to involve themselves in many illicit trades that pose
a national security threat to the United States. MS-13 operates differently in Honduras
and El Salvador, but they work with the Mexican cartels in Guatemala to transport
humans, drugs, arms, and anything else that generates profit. Guatemala is located in a
region that will pose the greatest threat to the United States’ national security, mainly
because of the connection between the Mexican cartels in both countries (Lum & Farah,
2013).
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 7
Another result of Guatemala’s high rates of crime and violence originates from
the lack of criminal prosecutions and government corruption. Weak institutions and
security forces are still feeling the effects from the country’s civil war, and citizens are
afraid of the military because of the violations of human rights during the war. Drug
traffickers have taken over regions where the military has not been able to operate due to
lack of funding, especially in the Quiche and Izabal regions, where they are drug transit
regions with close proximity to Mexico. The lack of law enforcement in some of these
areas has not only allowed the Guatemalan drug cartels to traffic illicit products, but also
opened the door for Mexican cartels to operate. The following map shows the drug transit
routes from El Salvador, Honduras, and into Mexico:
Guatemala is a major transit country for cocaine and other illicit products moving in from
south of its borders, and has insecure northern borders that have allowed traffickers to
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 8
move drugs, arms, and humans into Mexico with ease (Morales, 2014). The United States
has rightfully supported the Mexican and Guatemalan government to secure Mexico’s
southern border, and additional funding and training of non-corrupt military personnel
must continue to ensure organized crime decreases (Kelly, 2015).
CARSI Policy in Guatemala
CARSI in the northern triangle allows the United States military and other
agencies to support local law enforcement and militaries with equipment, training, and
drug interdiction. CARSI has specifically helped Guatemala by providing specialized
helicopters that are able to fly into areas that are either too dangerous or too difficult.
These types of equipment have helped drug interdiction efforts and have assisted in the
effort to combat organized crime. El Salvador established the first anti-gang units, but
CARSI has allowed these units to be developed in Guatemala, with the goal of decreasing
gang-related violence and curbing illicit activity (Meyer & Seelke, 2014). It has been
estimated that over two-thirds of the cocaine from South America moves through
Guatemala before entering Mexico, and eventually, the United States, and Guatemala is
now a supplier of poppy seed, further proving that anti-gang units are essential for the
country’s security.
CARSI funds support the INL and USAID in Guatemala, and they have seen
success in a number of ways. Funding has helped decrease homicide rates, has created
Team Omega to patrol the borders, built 24-hour court systems, and has provided
helicopters and anti-gang units to the Guatemalan military (Phillips, 2015, p. 127 & 129).
In 2009, homicides were as high as 40.7 per 100,000 in Guatemala City, but at the end of
2013, they dropped to 32.1 per 100,000. This drop in homicides was not just because of
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 9
security alone, but was from factors like decreasing emergency response time, less
corrupt and more responsible local governance, and investments towards safer and
updated infrastructure (Phillips, 2015, p. 110). The following chart depicts Guatemala’s
homicide levels from 2003 to 2013:
The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) has also had some
success, and is not affiliated with CARSI. Even though it has only dropped the impunity
rate from 95% in 2009 to 72% in 2012, it has helped stop corrupt people from acquiring
jobs in the Guatemalan government, has also reformed some of the country’s justice
institutions, and has assisted with prosecuting criminals (Meyer & Seelke, 2014).
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 10
CARSI supports a few different U.S. agencies in Guatemala, but the major two
are USAID and INL of the State Department. Both the INL and USAID need to set goals
that are specific for Guatemala in order for them to use funds from the CARSI account.
Both programs do not specifically deal with drugs, but attack the social implications of
illicit trafficking and violence. Some areas of INL like Team Omega target drug
trafficking, but can also arrest human traffickers. Both of these CARSI funded strategies
perform tactics that help build and strengthen Guatemala’s institutions and infrastructure
so the country is better equip to fight organized crime and protect its citizens (Phillips,
2015, p. 125 & 127).
USAID
In order for Guatemala to begin building its economy and provide security for its
citizens, it needs to focus on crime reduction. One of USAID’s primary focuses is
decreasing crime in order to build infrastructure and economic development. These goals
are to stabilize Guatemala by reforming police and the justice department, strengthening
government capacity in finance and administration, and strengthening the internal
government by creating institutionalized violence prevention strategies (Phillips, 2015, p.
130).
USAID has three development objectives, and the first involves greater security
and justice for citizens, which will be discussed in this paper. The second objective is to
improve levels of economic growth and social development in the western highlands, and
the third is dedicated to improving the management of natural resources to mitigate the
impacts of global climate change. Through USAID, Guatemala will develop a working
police force that has lower corruption and protects human rights. CARSI allocates funds
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 11
towards this portion of USAID’s projects because it helps build trust between citizens
and the police. Police trust has been lacking in the past at a 22 percent favorable rate by
the public, and USAID looks to establish community-based programs that change police
tactics and help facilitate relationships (Bliss, Forman, & Johnson, 2012). USAID
through CARSI will help create communication between the police and Guatemala’s
citizens so projects are implemented properly and crime will be reduced (USAID
Guatemala Development Strategy, 2012).
The USAID security strategy also involves the betterment of the country’s
judicial system so citizens can participate in policy matters that allow them to define their
security concerns. USAID is promoting stable local governments so they can better
combat crime, and this will also build trust among the population. USAID Guatemala
also focuses on youth joining gangs, and they are implementing programs that will
educate families so the country’s youth stays out of gang life, and focuses on education
(USAID Guatemala Development Strategy, 2012).
INL
INL’s job is not to disrupt the flow of narcotics, but to support the Guatemalan
security forces so they can thwart illicit drug trafficking. INL focuses on building strong
institutions because it believes that if the drug trade were to all of a sudden stop, violence
would still occur. INL wants Guatemalans to depend on themselves so they do not need
to be supported by the United States. INL focuses on training and equipping the local
police forces, and they want the police and the country’s residents to be able to
communicate with each other. The last poll taken in 2012 showed that Guatemalans did
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 12
not have confidence in their police forces, and INL is hoping to build that mutual trust
network (Phillips, 2015, p. 135 & 136).
INL helped establish Guatemala’s national anti-gang unit that is called PANDA,
and supplied them with electronic and surveillance equipment, and bulletproof vests.
Along with providing PANDA with equipment, INL trained and vetted them so they
would be an effective unit. PANDA has been doing a good job stopping gangs because
they do not take the traditional approach, but they investigate and build a case on an
entire gang for extended periods of time, and take down the entire criminal network. By
the end of 2013, PANDA split up over 15 gangs with 650 arrests, indicating that the INL
program has worked (Phillips, 2015, p. 138 & 139).
Along with PANDA, INL worked with the Guatemalan government to establish
Team Omega, a mobile interdiction team that primarily operates on land. Omega’s
purpose was to patrol the Guatemalan, Belize, and Mexican borders to thwart the flow of
illicit products. By using advanced technologies and fiber optics, Omega has created
checkpoints to search vehicles and stop any transnational drug movements. Team
Omega’s main success involves protecting U.S. national security: when searching for
smuggled drugs, they also have apprehended humans and animals being smuggled into
the U.S. (Phillips, 2015, p. 127 & 139).
Limitations
CARSI has been unable to provide appropriate resources to fully train and equip
the local police in Guatemala. Much of the funding goes directly to the anti-gang units,
and this does not fix the problem of police corruption. One of the reasons violence is high
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 13
in Guatemala is because the country has an illegal gun problem and healthy illicit arms
trade, and a majority of crimes are committed with these illegal guns.
Even though through CARSI the INL has developed Team Omega to patrol the
borders between Guatemala, Mexico, and Belize, there are still many blind crossings that
need to be addressed. Mexican officials estimate that there are over 350 blind crossings
on the border, and the local peasants take control of these crossings by charging a toll.
INL, through CARSI, should be focused on building Team Omega to secure these
crossings and take them over from the peasants to thwart the flow of humans and drugs.
Migrants will use river crossings along the Usumacinta River or even pay one dollar to
use zip lines to get into Mexico on the Suchiate River, which causes further security
issues (UNODC Smuggling of Migrants, n.d).
As CARSI is a regional initiative, there needs to be communication between the
northern triangle governments to secure their borders. It is easy to move between
Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, and this opens up numerous United States
national security threats, largely due to human smugglers, and their ability to use peasants
located on the border of Guatemala and Mexico to move potential threats into the United
States. Along the Guatemala and Mexico border, there are eight official crossings and
only four of them have adequate and armed security. Much of the military security left
after the civil war because Guatemala needed additional police support, which is still in
demand today.
The INL through CARSI focus most of their efforts on police security and bypass
the issue of militarized border security between the Northern Triangle countries. INL
lacks focus on ensuring measurable numbers of border security teams that focus on the
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 14
blind crossings. This is where CARSI should step in and use additional funds, through
help of the DOD, to ensure borders are protected from traffickers. Even though Team
Omega operates on the border, they are still too small to be effective in the remote
regions where there is no military or police presence. The Guatemalan government is
aware that supporting security forces on the border will help combat the illicit trade, but
when they send personnel to the border, they lack the appropriate funds and equipment to
be effective. Other than Team Omega, which has limited personnel, CARSI does not
have a specific border strategy to tackle the flow of organized crime. While building
infrastructure and institutions is important in Guatemala to secure its country, there needs
to be an emphasis on security personnel who are trained and funded on the border to
thwart human trafficking (Espach & Haering, 2012). The following map provided by the
Center for Naval Analysis shows the eight major crossing into Mexico, and shows the
amount of territory where there are blind crossings.
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El Salvador
Ever since the country ended its thirteen-year civil war in 1992, it has seen
extremely high violence. With the lack of job opportunities and a high quantity of
weaponry left over from the civil war, guerrillas and militaries took up arms and began
work in organized crime. As gang deportees from the United States were sent back into
El Salvador, and these former combatants had extensive access to arms, they took
advantage of the new drug smuggling routes that came from the Andes and into Central
America. This was a dangerous combination and the problem still exists today. After a
decade, these ex-military members and gangs connected with the Mexican cartels to
coordinate drug and human trafficking operations. El Salvador is a different situation
than Guatemala and Honduras because there is a large area in the country that is
unprotected where traffickers operate freely. Instead of operating under the radar in
remote location as in the other two countries, traffickers are able to operate in urban areas
because they have extensive connections to the El Salvadoran political parties (Eguizabal,
2015, p. 58 & 61).
Per capita, El Salvador has the most gang members in all of Central America,
with estimates of 20,000, and they are responsible for a majority of the violence-taking
place (UNODC, 2012). MS-13 and Barrio 18 are the two gangs responsible for a
majority of the violence and crimes taking place in El Salvador, and they are working
with the Mexican cartels moving illicit products north. In 2012, the two gangs worked out
a truce that yielded a 40 percent drop in homicides the first year, and a decrease in 2013
as well. According to former President Mauricio Funes, the truce only “allowed the gangs
to grow and strengthen” (Gurney, 2015). The truce only lasted a few years, and
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 16
homicides and violence has spiked to numbers prior to 2012. In 2011, there were 72
homicides per 100,000, and in 2012, it dropped to 32 per 100,000 (Garzon, 2013). Since
the truce ended, homicides have increased 50 percent to 67 per 100,000 in 2014 (Gurney,
2015). Unfortunately, the truce was short-lived because society did not support it, and
there was a lack of transparency between the public and private sector (Gagne, 2014).
MS-13 and Barrio 18 are now transnational criminal organizations with their connection
to drug and human smuggling, and murder rates have steadily increased since the truce
expired. The following chart depicts El Salvador’s homicide levels from 2002 to 2012,
before the truce ended:
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 17
MS-13 and Barrio 18 are able to take advantage of the large illegal firearm
market, where El Salvador does not lack access to them. The firearms black market is
extensive in El Salvador, and the weapons come from a variety of sources. Fifty percent
of the firearms seized can be traced back to the United States, and the other fifty percent
come from a number of sources including the El Salvadoran and Nicaraguan militaries,
and local police forces. The ATF have moved on this illegal supply trying to seize the
firearms before the criminal gangs acquire them. The ATF has implemented e-Trace
systems similar to Mexico so they are able to track down arms movements and find the
Mexican drug trafficking organizations that are making them available to MS-13 and
Barrio 18 (Eguizabal, 2015, p. 79 & 80). One former El Salvadoran president was asked
what cartels and gangs operate in his country, and he responded by saying “Everybody.
There are Salvadoran cartels in connection with Colombian cartels. Guatemalan cartels
are there. And recently we have found evidence of the presence of Los Zetas” (Farah,
2011).
Similar to Guatemala and Honduras, El Salvador’s borders are not secure and
traffickers are able to move illicit products freely by paying off law enforcement
personnel. Similar to Guatemala, the El Salvadoran government has ignored border
security since the end of the country’s civil war, and budget cuts have limited the
country’s ability to employ a legitimate police force. El Salvador has been implementing
programs to try and improve its institutions and fight crime, including a focus on national
security reforms. They have also been trying to create budgets, develop services for crime
victims, and address faults in the penal system. Border security was not something the El
Salvadoran government focused on, and can be an area that Southern Command can work
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 18
with the government to continue organized crime interdiction efforts (Espach & Haering,
2012).
Geography is a key element in El Salvador’s role in the transnational criminal
network, and they do not produce any narcotics inside its borders. Transportation groups
like Los Perrones Orentales take control of the shipments of cocaine when it hits El
Salvadoran territory, and then move it north so the Mexican cartels take control of it. The
same routes are used for human trafficking, and cartels and gangs exchange services
through “pay in kind,” which is a major contribution to the high homicide rate (Farah,
2011). El Salvadoran violence becomes a national security interest to the United States
when MS-13 and the Los Zetas work together to traffic people. MS-13 is very good at
using regional networks to move illicit products and generate profits, and with unsecure
borders, cartels, gangs, and regional transportation networks will continue working
together and pose a direct threat to the United States (Farah & Lum, 2013). The
following map shows the routes that gangs and cartels take to move drugs into El
Salvador and Guatemala:
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 19
CARSI Policy in El Salvador
CARSI has changed throughout the years since its implementation.Under the
Merida framework, the primary focus was military-oriented, influenced by the “war on
drugs” approach. The main changes in CARSI shifted the focus to institution building
and crime prevention. Currently, El Salvador continues to receive a variety of U.S.
assistance from different funding sources, the largest being CARSI. In November 2011,
the United States and El Salvador signed a joint action plan to collectively evaluate and
reach the objectives funded by CARSI.
USAID
Since 1980s, the region’s largest democratic assistance was provided by USAID.
Despite the program’s goals, USAID did not address the fundamental issue causes of
violence in El Salvador, which was largely due to interests of the political elite and
power-hungry officials (Eguizabal, 2015, p. 67). The violence in El Salvador today is not
caused by police paramilitary activities, as it was in the 1980s, but a variety of factors
such as impunity and corruption, which helped facilitate organized crime and triggered
violence caused by street gangs.
USAID assistance in El Salvador is implementing five main initiatives funded by
CARSI: Violence Prevention, Adopt a School, Improving Justice System, Global
Development Alliance, and Rule of Law. These USAID programs seek to provide
education and other opportunities to help young people with dysfunctional families who
have minimal access to basic services, which makes them high risk of participating in
gangs (USAID El Salvador, 2013).
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INL
INL opened its physical location at the United States embassy in El Salvador in
2012. Since 2008, the INL funded law enforcement programs have allocated $47.1
million, and not only through CARSI (Eguizabal, 2015, p. 93). CARSI assistance
provided through INL supports specialized vetted law enforcement units. INL has created
a vetted unit programs in El Salvador such the Drug Enforcement Agency’s Special Anti-
narcotics Group, and ICE’s Transnational Investigative Unit. These units are engaged in
complex investigations of drug trafficking, money laundering, and arms and human
trafficking. Funding provided by INL through CARSI covers operating costs, technology,
equipment, and training vetting units.
INL also oversees some task forces, the most notable among them is The Grupo
Cuscatlan. This unit’s main function is to intercept air, sea and land drug shipments in El
Salvador. U.S. personnel are not directly involved in the operations, but they act in a
supervisory capacity or as advisors in counter activities (Eguizabal, 2015, p. 95).
INL’s task forces and vetted units are designed to conduct successful operations and
investigations, and they act a role model that will positively impact law enforcement
institutions. Overall, these vetted units and task forces have conducted many successful
operations and investigation, although their success has been shadowed by El Salvadoran
police officer corruption and insufficiency (Eguizabal, 2015, p. 96).
Besides the traditional training approach, vetting units providing equipment and
expertise, INL also launched the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT)
program. GREAT is education-based violence prevention program designed for
elementary and high school children, which provides children education and life skills to
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 21
avoid violence. 25,000 students have finished this program since its establishment in
2010. GREAT not only helps children in the community not to join gangs, but it saves
their lives (Eguizabal, 2015, p. 97).
INL directly focuses on training community police. For instance, it has created
“model precincts” which encourages local police to implement best practices in crime
prevention efforts. INL recently sponsored the training of 600 El Salvadoran police
officers that came from the United States. The model of precincts are established
throughout El Salvador, which will help increase the level of professionalism of local
police and be extremely useful in crime prevention efforts. Even though local level INL
programs start having successful results, violence data in El Salvador indicators are still
high (Eguizabal, 2015, p. 95).
Limitations
USAID has gotten criticism over its lack of collaboration and its dependence on
U.S. contractors, which disconnects program from local realities. USAID traditionally
contracted U.S.- based firms, but with new direction implemented by USAID, it allows
more local organizations and businesses to participate in these programs. With the agenda
to achieve long-term sustainability, USAID started supporting local private sectors and
organizations that are dedicated towards progress and growth for El Salvador. In 2012,
USAID launched SolutionsES that carries similar crime prevention strategies. It is too
early to evaluate effectiveness and overall efficiency of USAID initiatives. INL and
USAID both contribute to community policing, where USAID supports the National
Civilian Police in becoming more local community oriented law enforcement. This
assistance focuses on the police’s professional development and promotes productive
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 22
relationships with local citizens, and it also provides action plans to fight against crimes
(Eguizabal, 2015, p. 93).
Honduras
Honduras’ geographic location in the heart of Central America serves as a favored
transit route for drug traffickers. Poor border control, corruption and the lack of
governance in remote areas worsen the situation and also it helps to facilitate drug
trafficking networks activities in the region. Based on 2013, United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime report (UNODC), Honduras continues to remain the country with the
highest homicide rate in the world, which is a result from drug trafficking and local
organized crime. Major areas for this violence are concentrated in large cities in
Honduras across the Guatemalan border, where drug trade routes and criminal cartels are
very active. For instance, homicide rates reach up to 133 per 100,000 citizens in the
provinces of Cortes and Atlantida and are much higher than the national average. Gang
members and young males commit over 83.3 percent of these homicides using firearms
(Korthuis, 2015, p.169).
Honduran provinces of Copan and Ocotepeque also has a record high homicide
rate of 102 per 100,000, 20 percent higher than Honduras’ national average in 2012. The
Honduran-Guatemalan border area was nicknamed “Corridor of Violence,” which serves
as a very important transit zones for illicit products and narcotics. There are hundreds of
routes for illegal border crossing. Even though these regions have a long history of being
main transit points of illegal trafficking of narcotics and other illicit products, they have
not always been so violent. According to the reports by the International Crisis Group
(ICG), external factors such as the U.S. heavy measures to combat drug trafficking and a
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 23
declined in the demand of the U.S. cocaine market left local gangs with much smaller
profits to share, which created bloody competition among drug trafficking organizations
(Cawley, 2014). The following chart shows Honduras’s homicide levels from 2004 to
2013:
The local criminal group called the “transportistas,” contracted by Mexican
cartels, operates narcotics trafficking and other illicit activities, mostly in the northern
region of Honduras via land, air and sea. As Honduras became the center of narcotics
trafficking in the last decade, rivalry between criminal cartels, lack of governance, and a
high impunity rate in these areas provided a perfect environment for violence and
organized crime activities such drug trafficking, arms trafficking and human trafficking.
According to estimates by the U.S. Department of State (DOS), 87 percent of narcotics
trafficking flights that came from Colombia and Venezuela first stop in Honduras as a
transit point (DOS Honduras, 2013). These flights first land in remote areas in Nicaragua
and then continue low altitude flights over Honduras to avoid radar detection. Lack of
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 24
cooperation with the Venezuelan government since the mid-2000s, Venezuela became a
main location for drug flights transits aimed for its final destination in the United States.
What is accelerating the illicit trafficking and gang violence are the extended
coastlines, long borders and many islands that are situated close to the shorelines, which
further aggravates the problem. These critical geographic areas limit the U.S. fight
against illicit trafficking. Without adequate resources including technology, equipment,
and manpower, there is no solution for effective border control. Consequently, loosely
controlled borders and different jurisdictions offer favorable accommodations for
transnational organized networks to conduct successful drug trafficking (Gavin, Corbin,
& Lecce, 2013, p.20). General John Kelly of Southern Command noted that drug
traffickers use fast boats and are able to move drugs quickly between Venezuela and the
Honduran coast (Kelly, 2015). The following map depicts the routes taken by drug
traffickers:
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 25
Drug traffickers, because of impunity, favor the northern coastline, where it gives them
the ability to operate in this region. Further, local authorities are suspected to be involved
with organized crime, and frequent allegations indicate that the politicians receive drug
money to operate their electoral campaigns. Even though there are many examples where
the Honduran government has taken actions to demonstrate their willingness to combat
drug trafficking and impunity, results from these actions are not quite successful. For
instance, Honduran authorities in 2013 took actions against individual and groups such as
Handal (former political candidate) and the Cachiros (drug lord) seizing $800 million
worth of assets. In Handel's case, many of his assets were already removed from the
house, and with Cachiros, some of his bank accounts were emptied (Parkinson, 2013).
There are estimated 12,000 gang members in Honduras conducting extortion,
human, drugs, and arms trafficking (UNODC, 2012). Consequently, growing violence
resulted in a significant rise of migration. Many citizens left the country because of gang
related violence. In 2012, there were over 35,500 Hondurans deported from the U.S. and
more than 40 percent had criminal histories. Emigrants join these criminal enterprises
because of weak states, a fledgling social economic system, and lack of unemployment
(Seelke, 2014).
Having the capacity to control large urban areas and criminal activities represents
a major factor of Honduras’ alarming violence. In addition to this condition, state security
forces and police often are involved in corruption. In 2014, Honduran major newspaper
published articles exposing corruption in the Honduran police and highlighted that 200
active duty police officers were involved in narcotics trafficking and other criminal
activities (Korthuis, 2015, p.175).
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 26
CARSI Policy in Honduras
The United States efforts to address organized crime, violence and corruption
through CARSI is primarily focused on dealing with security challenges to assure long
term sustainability in Honduras. U.S. through CARSI identifies three major problems
such as: drug trafficking, organized crime and low capacity of government justice
institutions to prosecute and investigate crimes. The U.S. considers drug trafficking as a
paramount issue, therefore CARSI aid received in Honduras primarily deals with this
problem. In order to fight crime and strengthen weak institutions, the U.S. CARSI
implementation program in Honduras engages a strategy based on the three main
components: Law enforcement, capacity building, and prevention. Similar to Guatemala
and El Salvador, these elements of CARSI are supervised by USAID and INL (U.S.
DOS, 2012).
USAID
USAID oversees a large range of different prevention programs in Honduras, and
these programs are focused on youth and families in high-risk crime neighborhoods.
USAID helps to service this community’s youth to keep them out of the streets and from
joining gangs. The prevention program Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET),
operated under USAID, is dedicated to help identifying and preventing potential
individuals who are likely to join gangs or conduct criminal activity. The USAID and
INL joint neighborhood community-policing program, which was launched in
Tegucipalpa, is very important for helping build a bridge between Honduran residence
and police.
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 27
All these programs have a geographical focus to serve in the most violent
neighborhoods, which also gives opportunity to coordinate programs such as teen
pregnancy and other educationally-oriented crime prevention efforts. The Gang
Resistance Education and Training program (GREAT), drug prevention program,
neighborhood community policy programs, and other crime prevention programs are
designed to provide long-term sustainability and security in the region (Korthuis, 2015,
p.198).
INL
Creating vetting units and anti-gang task forces are long-supported law
enforcement effort by the United States, and serve to improve capacity of local law
enforcement agencies. Building units to conduct sensitive operations and to improve
overall law enforcement efforts combating against criminals plays a major role in
Honduras. There are two main task force units created with CARSI, both of which are
supervised by INL: Violent Crime Task Force and the Financial Crime Task Force.
CARSI funds through INL provide computers, technology, cameras, and other items
necessary for task force operations (Meyer & Seelke, 2014, p. 29).
Limitations
Despite some coordinated efforts between USAID and INL, there are disconnects
between law enforcement and capacity building, and it is still unclear how the programs
can coordinate to make CARSI more effective. This indicates that coordination among
projects is limited. Other challenges that the CARSI strategy in Honduras is facing are
compatibilities to Honduran government priorities for citizen’s security. In some areas,
Honduran and U.S. strategies are different from each other, presenting problems for
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 28
CARSI programs. For instance, despite public and U.S. disagreement, Honduras’ new
law authorizes authorities to shoot-down flights suspected on transiting drugs.
Subsequently, U.S. suspended radar data support to the Honduran government (Cave,
2012).
In order for CARSI to be successfully implemented, there needs to be political
will of the Honduran government. Success of the program heavily depends on
willingness of authorities to respect and abide by the rule of law and reduce privileges to
political elites and also to come up with long term solution. The government’s lack of
commitment to vet police units explains that the political atmosphere does not exist to
provide sustainability by CARSI programs. For instance, efforts to fight against
corruption and to support crime prevention programs new reforms have not materialized.
Yet, the Honduran government’s failure to address these issues puts CARSI efforts in
isolation and unsustainable over time, due to the fact that limited funds are allocated
through CARSI. Based on the past five years, since CARSI implementation in Honduras,
the United States should direct more efforts to encourage the Honduran government to
demonstrate political will by implementing new reforms that will provide better
accountability and increase the importance for the rule of law in Honduras (Kleinfeld,
2012).
There have been successes with the violent crime and financial crime task units.
The operation against the CACHIROS Honduran drug trafficking organization was a
success because it resulted in a seizure of $800 million in assets and arrested the drug
lord “Negro Lobo.” This incident demonstrates that the U.S.-supported vetted units have
provided a successful campaign against narcotics trafficking. On the other hand, isolation
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 29
and lack of information sharing prevents for better outcomes and worsening impunity in
Honduras (DOS Honduras, 2014). In regards to the Financial Crime Task Force, one
particular case raises questions about their successes. In 2013, a major multiagency effort
was conducted against the notorious drug trafficking organization, Los Cachiros, led by
The Financial Crime Task Force. Despite multiagency efforts, the operation failed in key
areas. Even though Cachiros’ 71 bank accounts were frozen, it was later found that before
the operation was conducted money was removed from these accounts (Parkinson, 2013).
The Violent Crime Task Force’s improved performance is also limited. For instance, in
Tegucigapla City, where 86 homicides occur every month, most of the homicide
investigation gets assigned to local homicide units, while the Violent Crime Task Units
gets assigned fewer than 15 percent of the investigations (Korthuis, 2015, p.216). Vetted
Units and Task Forces produce important results, as a main aspect of CARSI, but it needs
to be transformed to support the performance of the Honduran police when they combat
crime and work to achieve institutional reforms.
CARSI has had its success in Honduras, but the programs are still facing
challenges. First, the lack of coordination between myriad programs funded by INL and
USAID should be more transparent and needs to be improved. Coordination and
information sharing between task forces and law enforcement will produce positive
results if they share the same prevention methods. Second, the USAID and INL strategy
should be reevaluated based on their performances and impacts. In order to do that the
U.S. should improve ways success can be measured to examine the impact of those
programs. The security assistance to Honduras provides undeniable success in prevention
efforts, but it is important to acknowledge the program’s impacts and limitations to
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 30
further improve criminological situations and to provide sustainability to Honduras
(Korthuis, 2015).
Even though it has been five years since the implementation of CARSI, drug
trafficking, urban violence, and corruption remain rampant. Despite CARSI’s limitations,
good things are happening. Recently, the Honduras government started taking strong
actions to fight drug trafficking and establish governance in rural areas. According to
General Kelly’s (2015) statement, the Honduran government, for the first time, extradited
seven Honduran drug traffickers to the United States to face charges. Also, based on
government data, the 2014 homicide rate dropped 25% lower than the previous two
years, to 66.4 per 100,000. Even though the Honduran military is being used for domestic
law enforcement, which has created controversy, the comprehensive strategy of the
Military Police of Public Order (PMOP) has brought charges against high profile
government officials involved in corruption.
Despite the U.S. CARSI successes to ensure security, which includes expertise,
training, equipment and technical assistance to help law enforcement interdiction
operation, the current humanitarian crisis along U.S. borders indicates that these
programs are insufficient. The problems are not just about the limitations in CARSI
programs, but also about Honduran government’s lack of political will. Therefore,
combating transnational organized crime and border issues requires cooperation among
nations and a multidimensional strategy.
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 31
Recommendations
Honduras
While the INL and Southern Command can continue vetting military and police
forces to ensure human rights abuses do not continue, the country of Honduras needs
funding support to rebuild their fleet of F-5 fighter jets. Repairing these fighter jets will
help detect and stop drug flights coming in from South America, and it will provide a
sense of national security protection. Honduras needs more assistance with its maritime
interdiction capabilities, and U.S. military budget cuts continue to weaken Southern
Command’s ability to offer support. Assistance to Honduras needs to continue because if
it is stopped, the country will not have the capabilities to secure itself and illicit networks
will continue expanding their territory and will keep moving products north that will
eventually reach the United States (Quintana, 2014).
Guatemala
The DOD and Southern Command need to continue training Guatemala’s military
and provide assistance to the vetted police forces. Washington’s proposal for FY2015 is a
good start, and it includes more than just funding and support to police forces. The
proposal would give the necessary funds to the Guatemalan military and allow them to
protect their own national security. Southern Command will be able to continue training
the Guatemalan military, while also teaching about human rights and what democratic
values mean to a nation.
CARSI fails to provide extensive vetting to the military, and it is good that the
DOD has implemented those vetting programs. It is important for the DOD to continue
vetting former civil war military officers so the Guatemalan military does not have
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 32
leadership that committed human rights violations. As the INL does this for police forces,
it needs to continue and expand under the DOD so there are not internal threats of
corruption or misconduct in the Guatemalan military ranks (Morales, 2014).
The DOD needs to address why the Guatemalan government continues to rely on
its military to conduct police roles, and work on addressing the issue of trust between the
public and the military. The country’s police force is underfunded and untrained, and
many times they are unable and unwilling to confront organized crime, which lowers
public trust and forces the government to use its military. Even though the police have
corruption issues, one report said that, “There is no clear or coherent agreement among
civilian government officials about what role the armed forces should play. Instead, there
is a tendency to resort to employing the armed forces on an ad hoc basis to assist with
critical tasks that civilian institutions are incapable of performing” (Police Reform
Guatemala, 2012). The Guatemalan government and the country’s civilians are
concerned about human rights issues if the military continues to take on the role of
police. It is continuously important for Southern Command to work with the Guatemalan
military to ensure these human rights violations are minimal. In General Kelly’s 2015
posture statement, he discussed human rights being “embedded in our doctrine, our
training, and our education, and above all, our moral code” (Kelly, 2015).
Although the DOD is currently working with the Guatemalan security forces to
secure the border between Mexico and Guatemala, more funds must be allocated to
expand border security. Team Omega is a good start and focuses on policing the borders,
but it is limited to only 38 or so men that need to secure a 600-mile border. As CARSI is
focused on building local law enforcement, Southern Command needs to work with the
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 33
Guatemalan military, as the Guatemalan government pulled resources away from the
border and refocused them on policing. This Guatemalan policy left their borders and
national security interests to be determined by the transnational traffickers, and the
United States’ security will benefit if Southern Command continues to support the
expansion of the Guatemalan security forces like Team Omega through their Joint
Interagency Task Force-South (Realuyo, 2013).
El Salvador
DOD operations in El Salvador need to take a different approach than Guatemala
because it is purely a transit country, but it has higher levels of crime, violence and gang
influence. A majority of drugs are driven on fast boats from Colombia and reach the
shores of El Salvador where transit organizations offload the cargo and move it north
towards Guatemala or Honduras. Similar to Guatemala, Southern Command needs to
continue supporting the El Salvadoran military so they can help combat organize crime
and illicit trafficking.
As CARSI does not necessarily focus on El Salvador’s national security, Southern
Command needs to continue protecting and intercepting shipments, similar to Operation
Martillo, so it does not impact the security situations in Guatemala and Honduras. This
will stop traffickers at the source and halt any national security threats to the United
States when human trafficking gets imbedded with drug trafficking. Undoubtedly, there
is a need to expand funding and multilevel coordination on the national and local levels
to improve security in El Salvador. A big share of funding has to come from the national
government of El Salvador so it demonstrates an increase of political will.
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 34
Conclusion
Unlike ten years ago, transnational criminal organizations, drug cartels, and local
organized crime have begun working together to generate profits and advance their
interests. Due to a lack of government institutions and mass corruption in the northern
triangle countries, the United States’ national security is threatened by human smuggling
through drug trafficking channels. Unfortunately, programs like CARSI, while good,
lacks important funding measures and does not address national security issues for the
northern triangle. Southern Command has been doing a better job of combating illicit
trafficking from supporting U.S. law enforcement agencies and local partners in the
region than CARSI, and all these efforts need to be in line with each other (Realuyo,
2013).
Through CARSI, there needs to be an effort to work with the governments of the
northern triangle countries so they expand their efforts to build up their militaries and
secure their borders. This has started on a smaller scale by creating task force units to
carry out operations, but it needs more funding and must cover more territory, especially
the regions where security is limited.
Southern Command needs to continue what it is doing in the region, and focus on
combating all forms of illicit trafficking simultaneously. Transparency is essential
between agencies so the U.S.-backed aid programs and law enforcement are used in the
right places. As corruption is high, Southern Command needs to promote transparency
and work with the northern triangle governments to ensure that they are not militarizing
the police forces, and that Southern Command will cut off aid if they do. The DOS and
DOD need to coordinate together through military diplomacy so Southern Command is
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 35
supporting the Guatemalan, El Salvadoran, and Honduran militaries, and not the
corruption vulnerable police force. In order for the civilians of these countries to feel
secure, the U.S. needs to continue supporting efforts that protect the northern triangle
residence’s human rights (Haugaard, Isacson, Kinosian, Poe, & Withers, 2013).
The United States’ initiatives should not just focus primarily on counter-narcotic
efforts. As experience in Central America has demonstrated that just drug interdiction
and eradication has experienced some limited success and it comes up short to address
long-term problems. For instance, Colombia has experienced significant progress in
counter-narcotics efforts, however, drug production and trafficking moved to the northern
triangle countries.
Evaluation is needed to measure the impact of security assistance programs in
order to determine whether these programs resulted in significant change. Just training
and vetting units is not sufficient. Large numbers of successful drug operations does not
mean that it will reduce crime, violence and diminish supply or demand. An aggressive
approach of anti-corruption efforts and improved prosecution is required in the region
immediately. Further, CARSI should address the issues that cause rapid migration so the
United States’ security is protected (Olson, E. 2014).
NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 36
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