North Caucasus:

the Russian Gordian knot

The key problems and conflictsin the region and the effectthereof on the future of Russia

Maciej Falkowski

Theses

1. North Caucasus is the most instable part ofthe Russian Federation: since the early 90’s, the-re has been going on the military conflict in Che-chnya, which is gradually spilling over into theother republics of the region, terrorism seems tohave occupied its regular position in the politicallife of Caucasus, organised crime is flourishing,the tension persists there and military incidentsand attacks are breaking out every now andagain. During the recent year, the destabilisationof the region, which affects many fields of Russianpolitical and social life, has grown to an alar-ming size.

2. There are many reasons for the instability inthe region; they stem from numerous political,religious and socioeconomic problems and con-flicts. They all overlap, interweave and create a complex network. The most difficult problemis the war in Chechnya, lasting since the early90’s, which is spilling over the neighbouring re-publics, takes increasingly more drastic shapesand poses a threat to the security and stability ofthe entire country. The conflict stimulates dan-gerous tendencies and processes all over Cauca-sus: it is one of the reasons for the intensifyinganti-Russian sentiments in the local communities,and it accelerates their drifting towards radicalIslam, etc. Moreover, the region is a scene of nu-merous ethnic conflicts (the conflicts in Dage-stan, the western part of Caucasus, the Ingush--Ossetian conflict), religious (mainly inside Islam)and conflicts between the indigenous Russianpeople and immigrants from Caucasus and Cen-tral Asia in Stavropol and Krasnodar Krais as wellas acute socioeconomic problems (poverty, un-employment, overpopulation, growing crime).

3. Since the collapse of the USSR, the Kremlin hasfailed to frame a consistent and long-term con-cept for development of North Caucasus and itsintegration with the rest of Russia. The Russianauthorities’ policy towards Caucasus is limited toemergency actions, responding to crises insteadof preventing them. It consists in abortiveattempts to liquidate the effects of negative ten-dencies and events and not on counteracting thecauses thereof. The authorities are still makingthe same mistakes, unwilling to recognise their

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obvious failures. The key elements of the policyinclude: preventing any interference of othercountries and international organisations in theregion, conducting the “antiterrorist operation”,supporting the puppet regimes in particular re-publics, marginalisation of the opposition and thefar-flung propaganda in the mass media, whichshows a false picture of the reality. A great rolein the Caucasian policy of the Kremlin is playedby law enforcement structures, whose interestsoften collide with the interests of the Russianstate. Such a policy does not lead to resolvingproblems and conflicts, on the contrary, it leadsto deepening and escalation thereof.

4. The future of North Caucasus depends oneither settlement or worsening of the existingproblems; if they intensify, Caucasus will beplunging in chaos. The instability in the regionis accompanied by further-reaching processes,i.e. gradual drifting apart of Caucasus from Rus-sia, its derussification and increasingly fasterIslamisation. Such tendencies, which in the pros-pect of several decades could end in a high degreeof autonomy or even separation of the regionfrom the Russian Federation, could be sloweddown through working out of a comprehensiveconcept for development of the region. However,for the time being, the Kremlin has neither poli-tical will nor ability to develop and implementsuch a concept: the main reasons for that are theviews of the Russian ruling elites and the generalcondition of the Russian state (the lack of suffi-cient financial means, lack of proper staff, resis-tance of the law enforcement structures, dege-neration of the state structures, etc.).

5. North Caucasus is a region where many seriousproblems are concentrated. The future of Russiawill depend on their resolution (the Chechen war,other ethnic and religious conflicts, rapid growthof non-Russian and Muslim population, decreasingnumber of ethnic Russians, etc.). So long as Mos-cow is unable to resolve them, Russia will be anunpredictable and instable country, in danger ofterrorism and convulsed by internal conflicts.Unless the Kremlin copes with the issue of Cau-casus, it will not be possible for Russia to enteron the path of democratic reform, to make theattempt to create a modern country, open to glo-bal cooperation. Caucasus is today a source of

disintegration of the Russian state, of its struc-tures and society; unless this is held back, in thelonger term, it may become a source of its col-lapse. Russia’s position in the post-Soviet area and,above all, in South Caucasus will also depend onthe way the situation in North Caucasus develops.

Introduction

This paper is meant to systematise and describethe complex political, social, religious and eco-nomic situation in the region, above all, the keyproblems and conflicts, which give rise to the re-gional destabilisation. In our analysis of the cau-ses of instability in North Caucasus and of theKremlin’s policy in the region we will try to ans-wer the question about the future of the RussianCaucasus and the influence of the processes andtendencies existing there on the future of Russia.

I. The key problems of theregion

North Caucasus is situated in the southern partof the Russian Federation, between the Black andCaspian Seas. In the south, it borders on Georgiaand Azerbaijan, which together with Armeniaform South Caucasus1. North Caucasus consistsof eight autonomous republics, which are main-ly inhabited by indigenous Caucasian peoples(Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia,Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Adyge-ya and Kalmykia) and the Stavropol and Krasno-dar Krais (where Russians are a majority)2. [Fordetailed characteristics of the republics and kraissee the annex].

North Caucasus is characterised by a multitudeand complexity of problems and conflicts exist-ing there. They overlap, interweave and create a difficult to describe complicated network. Often,sources of one conflict can be found in another,and solution to a given problem is impossiblewithout finding a way out from another. Forinstance, it is impossible to analyse the internalsituation in Dagestan or Ingushetia without con-sidering the situation in Chechnya; likewise it isdifficult to understand the ethnic problems ofthe region without analysing the socioeconomic

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situation. Therefore, to understand the complexsituation in the entire North Caucasus and to iden-tify the sources of instability there, it is necessaryto systematise the problems which we have todeal with and to briefly describe each of them.

1. The war in Chechnya

The most serious problem of the region is themilitary conflict in Chechnya, lasting since theearly 90’s, the consequences of which affect notonly North Caucasus but also Russia as a whole.The Chechen war is a conflict between the me-tropolis and the periphery aspiring to indepen-dence (for this reason it is often referred to as ananti-colonial war), which has risen out of thestill remembered bitter events of the past (theconquest of Chechnya by Russia in the 19th cen-tury, the Tsarist and Soviet repressions aimedagainst Chechens, etc.). To justify its policy offorce in the republic, the Kremlin attempts toplace the events in Chechnya in the context offight against international terrorism, while infact the source and main reason for the conflictis the Chechen separatism, the striving ofChechens to leave the Russian Federation andcreate a state of their own.

1.1. The conflict in 1991–1999The conflict broke out in autumn 1990, when thedelegates gathered at the 1st Congress of the Che-chen Nation announced separation of Chechnyafrom the USSR and proclaimed its independence.A year later (August 1991), the so-called Chechenrevolution broke out (the abolishment of the com-munist authorities in Grozny by supporters of in-dependence), during which gen. Jokhar Dudayevreached out for power (he was elected presidentin November 1991). After the retreat of the Rus-sian army from Chechnya (1992), the republicgained real independence. The economic blockadeimposed on Chechnya by Moscow and attemptsto abolish Dudayev with the usage of the oppo-sition had proven unsuccessful, therefore theKremlin decided to launch a military interven-tion in December 19943.

The so-called first Chechen war had been lastinguntil August 1996 and ended in a military andpolitical disaster for Russia. The federal forceswere not capable of defeating the Chechen guer-

rillas, who were supported by local civilians, andthe war was unpopular among the Russian pub-lic; therefore president Boris Yeltsin, who wasseeking re-election, decided to conduct peacenegotiations with the separatist leaders. Underthe accords signed in Khasavyurt on 31 August1996, Chechnya gained real independence (thestatus of the republic was supposed to be deter-mined during bilateral negotiations until 2001),the federal troops were withdrawn from the re-public and the power was again taken over bythe separatists4.

In January 1997 presidential election was held inChechnya. The winner was the Chechen chief ofstaff Aslan Maskhadov5. The period of the secondquasi-independence of Chechnya (1996–1999),during which the authorities in Grozny wereawkwardly trying to lay the foundations for theChechen state, was characterised by a constantlyworsening internal chaos. The mass unemploy-ment, the material and moral consequences ofthe war, the lack of any external support; all thisled to unprecedented increase in organised crime(kidnappings for ransom, illegal trade in oil, guns,drugs, etc.), and the weakness of the centralauthorities contributed to the internal anarchy.Quite soon a strong Islamic opposition grew inChechnya (its leaders being Shamil Basayev,Movladi Udugov and Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev),which, from 1998, started making demands forMaskhadov’s stepping down as president andtransformation of the republic into an Islamicstate. The crisis in the republic reached its cli-max in spring 1999, when the so-called Congressof the Peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan washeld. The Chechen and Dagestani Islamic radicalsopted at the congress for uniting both republicsinto an Islamic state by way military fight againstRussia6.

1.2. The second Chechen war: from occupation to ChechenisationThe attack launched from the territory of Che-chnya on Dagestan by Islamic activists led by Basa-yev and Khattab in August and September 1999and the series of terrorist attacks in Russian towns(September 1999), which Chechens were accusedof, gave the Kremlin a pretext for making anotherattempt to subjugate the rebel republic with theusage of military means7. In the atmosphere of

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fear of subsequent attacks, heated by Russian pro-paganda, and the anti-Chechen campaign in themass media, Vladimir Putin, who was Prime Mini-ster at the time, terminated the Khasavyurt ac-cords and promised launching an “antiterroristoperation” in North Caucasus. Having dislodgedthe militants from Dagestan, the Russian forcesstarted heavy bombardments of Chechnya and,on 1 October 1999, they marched in the territo-ry of the republic (the beginning of the militaryoperation caused mass escape of Chechen civilianpopulation; during the first months of the war,nearly 350 thousand Chechens took shelter inIngushetia alone8). The so-called second Chechenwar, which then began, has not ended until now.After several months of relentless fight (byspring 2000), Russians managed to occupy theentire Chechnya and defeat the key militant units,who started on guerrilla warfare.

During the first two years (2000–2002) the con-trol over the de facto occupied Chechnya was inthe hands of almost exclusively the federal army,which reaped profits from oil trade, robbing thelocal residents and other illegal sources if income,violating human rights on a massive scale, whichhad the features of homicide (mass murders,rape, robbery, torture, trade in people, etc.)9. TheKremlin started gradually, albeit insignificantly,curtailing the powers of the military from mid2002. That was an element of the so-called Che-chenisation policy, the official objective of whichwas the legalisation of the pro-Russian Chechenauthorities, while the unofficial one was chang-ing the nature of the war from Russian-Checheninto interchechen. As a part of the Chechenisa-tion policy (the key figure of which was AkhmadKadyrov, chief of administration of the republicand, from October 2003, president of Chechnya)the powers of the pro-Russian authorities in Groz-ny were gradually being increased, the Chechenmilitia was created, a constitutional referendum(March 2003) and presidential election (October2003) were held in the republic, enlistment offormer militants into pro-Russian forces wassupported, etc. Such actions were accompaniedby a far-flung propaganda in the mass media,with the usage of which attempts were made topersuade the international opinion and theRussian public that law and order had been re-stored in Chechnya10.

In spite of the successful image of Chechenisa-tion in the mass media, it soon appeared that itcould not bring the conflict in the republic nearerto the end. The policy failed, which was also a bitter political defeat of president Putin, afterthe 2004 events: death of president Akhmad Ka-dyrov (on 9 May; as a result of his assassinationat the stadium in Grozny) and the whole seriesof terrorist attacks organised by Chechen mili-tants11. They proved that, contrary to what theKremlin was claiming, the guerrillas still had si-gnificant forces and were able to destabilise thesituation in the entire region. Chechenisationdid not have any chance of success for severalreasons. Firstly, it was opposed by the Russianarmy (the military think that the power in therepublic should not be handed over to Chechens),for whom this meant weakening of their ownposition in the republic and reduction of theirincomes from the businesses they were runningthere12. Secondly, even the moderate militantswere not admitted to take part in the politicaldialogue in Chechnya, which prevented any at-tempt to settle the conflict at its source, i.e. theChechen separatism. Thirdly, the pro-Russianauthorities in the republic were (and still are)made up of people who are only guided by theinterests of their own clan, whose only purpose isto keep the power and get rich. Those individualscommit crimes against their own nation; theyare hated and perceived as traitors by a vast ma-jority of Chechens13.

Even though the Kremlin’s policy in Chechnyaleads to escalation of the conflict in the republic,still nothing seems to indicate that it could bechanged in the nearest future. This year presi-dential election, held on 29 August, in which AluAlkhanov, minister of internal affairs of Chechnya,was elected to be Kadyrov’s successor, has proventhat the policy is being continued.

1.3. The consequences of the war for Chechnya and for the entire regionInitially, the second Chechen war used to have a stabilising effect on North Caucasus. The deci-sive actions of the Kremlin in the republic signifi-cantly curtailed the quite strong separatist ten-dencies and influence of radical Islam in the re-gion. The uncompromising defeat of the mili-tants enabled president Putin to have greater

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control over the local regimes and to get rid ofsuch inconvenient local leaders as e.g. presidentof Ingushetia, Ruslan Aushev (1992–2001), whowas replaced by a general of Federal Security Ser-vice Murat Ziazikov. The war had also caused fur-ther erosion of the Caucasian community spirit:while during the first war, Chechens had beenpopular and had enjoyed common sympathy inthe region, starting from 1999, most of residentsof Caucasus began to believe Chechens were themain culprits of their own troubles, which trans-lated into acceptance of the military solution tothe Chechen problem.

However, as the conflict in North Caucasus drag-ged out, there intensified socio-political processesthat caused serious destabilisation of the situa-tion in the region and extending military actionsover other Caucasian republics (first of all, Ingu-shetia and Dagestan). Such processes concerned:the Chechen separatist camp, the Chechen socie-ty and residents of other Muslim republics inCaucasus.

Two very significant changes took place in themilitants’ camp: radicalisation of the war con-ducting methods and changes in the ideologyfollowed by the guerrillas. In the military field,the separatists started using terrorist methods(including suicide attacks) and started to bringtheir military actions out of the territory of Che-chnya14. While, initially, president Maskhadovwas against carrying out military actions out-side of Chechnya, now, even he started threaten-ing Russia with attacks all over its territory(though he still condemns terrorism)15. In termsof ideology, noticeable is the turn from nationa-lism towards Islamic ideology among both radi-cals and moderate Chechens. At the beginning ofthe current war, most of the militant comman-ders claimed they were fighting first of all for in-dependence, followed the idea of a secular de-mocratic state and were oriented to the West,counting on its support. As the war stretchedon, their views were evolving towards radicalIslam: today, a significant part of the militantsare fighting not under the independence slogansbut under Islamic slogans16.

Since the beginning of the second war in Che-chnya, significant changes have also taken place

in the Chechen society. The anti-Russian senti-ments are extremely intense; most of Chechensdo not consider themselves to be citizens of theRussian Federation and perceive Russian soldiersand representatives of the authorities as occu-piers. This concerns both those Chechens whosympathise with the militants and those who for-mally represent the pro-Russian option. More-over, the number of radical Islam supporters andthe religiousness level are constantly growingamong Chechens. Increasingly more residents ofChechnya support or at least justify the radicalfight methods used by the Chechen commanders.Such processes (anti-Russian sentiments, increa-sed religiousness and radicalisation of views)mainly concern the young generation, who weregrowing up in the conditions of war and did notget even primary education. The Russian cultureis strange to them and, unlike middle-aged peo-ple, they do not feel attached to Russia and theyare not sentimental about the USSR.

Similar processes are also taking place in otherCaucasian Muslim republics. They stem from thedeepening frustration about Moscow’s policy inthe region, which translates into increasingsympathy and even support for Chechens. Thebelief that it was the Chechens who were guiltyof provoking the conflict is slowly replaced byaccusing the Kremlin of unwillingness to end thewar and treating residents of Caucasus as second-class citizens17. The radicalisation of sentimentsin Caucasus is also due to the transferring of themethods used in the “anti-terrorist operation”outside of Chechnya; particular unrest is causedby the activity of the so-called Federal SecurityService death squadrons, who kidnap, take toChechnya, torture and often murder many inno-cent people in Ingushetia and Dagestan18. Youngresidents of Caucasus, seeing that they receivenothing in exchange for their loyalty to Russia,start supporting Chechens and joining theirtroops. In Caucasus, noticeable is also significantintensification of anti-Russian sentiments and in-creasingly more radical Islamisation, in particu-lar, among young people (including the youngelites of the region19). Islam is gradually becom-ing a unifying factor for residents of the Muslimrepublics of the region, which, seemingly, causesrevival of the idea of Caucasian solidarity, whichfailed back in the 90’s. As a result of such pro-

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cesses, the Chechen war is gradually spillingover the entire region, the region is destabilisedand non-Chechen guerrilla units, which organiseterrorist attacks in the south of Russia, propaga-te separation of Caucasus from the Russian Fede-ration and creation of an independent Islamicstate there, emerge20. Many things seem to indi-cate that, unless the processes are slowed down,Moscow will have to deal soon not with a Che-chen war but with an all-Caucasian conflict21.

2. The ethnic conflicts

2.1. Dagestan: the land conflictDagestan is troubled by the greatest number ofethnic conflicts, which additionally overlap withthe severe economic and social problems. Thebasic problem is the conflict between the peo-ples inhabiting the lowland and piedmont partsof north Dagestan (i.e. Kumyks, Chechens-Akins,Nogays and Russians) and the mountain peoples(Avars, Dargins, Laks and others). Its sourcesshould be traced back to the policy of the Sovietauthorities, which, starting from the 50’s, hadbeen conducting mass displacements of peoplefrom the highland regions down to the low-lands. It was mainly the Avars (the largest ethnicgroup of Dagestan), the Dargins and the Lakswho had been displaced and forced to settle inthe land of the Kumyks, Nogays, Russians andChechens. Some time later, the voluntary migra-tion of highlanders down to the lowlands beganand it has been lasting until now.

The conflicts between the highlanders and low-landers existed already in the USSR times, yetthe totalitarian Soviet system kept them undercontrol. Perestroika and the collapse of the SovietUnion caused national revival in Dagestan anduncovering of the so far hidden ethnic conflicts,the basis for which was a clash of economic in-terests. The situation was aggravated by the eco-nomic crisis, which affected North Caucasus muchstronger than other parts of the former empire.The national movements of Kumyks, Nogays,Chechens and the Russian population startedmaking demands for curtailing the settlement ofthe highland peoples on the lowlands and evenfor return of the land that had been taken awayfrom them by the authorities. In turn, Avars,Dargins and Laks started forming military units,

threatening they would use force, if any attemptsto remove them from the land occupied by themwere made. The conflict between Chechens-Akinsand the Avar and Lak peoples in western Dage-stan is particularly bitter. In 1944, Chechens,who had lived there, were deported to CentralAsia, their “national” (Aukhovskiy) district wasliquidated, and Avar and Lak settlers came toreplace the Chechen population. In the late 80’s,the Chechen national movement demanded re-storation of the Aukhovskiy district and displa-cement of the Laks and Avars from there, whichmet with determined resistance of the latter22.

Although the ethnic conflicts in Dagestan hadmany a time dangerously aggravated (especiallyin the 90’s), the situation never ran out of con-trol and each time open clashes were luckilyavoided. Still, none of the ethnic problems linkedto land conflicts has been resolved, which causesthat they can escalate any time; and this will de-stabilise the situation in the republic23.

2.2. Dagestan: the fight for powerThere is constant fierce rivalry between the par-ticular ethnic groups of Dagestan for power andinfluence in the republic. Since the late 80’s, thepower has been concentrated around the Darginclan led by the 74-year-old Magomedali Mago-medov, the Chairman of the State Council. SomeKumyk and Avar clans are allied to him, whilethe opposition core is made up of Avars, Lezginsand Laks. Neither representatives of the authori-ties (they are mainly former communist appa-ratchiks and people who have criminal past) normost of the opposition members follow any ide-ology or have any clear political views or pro-grammes. Their main motivations include striv-ing for power, getting rich and dominating theother ethnic groups. Politicians who offer anyconcrete political programmes, make appeals forreconstruction of the socio-political life in therepublic or those who enjoy actual prestige inthe republic are systematically liquidated byeither the authorities or the criminal groupsconnected with the authorities24.

Until mid 2004, the political fight was unofficial:it was not mentioned publicly; instead thealleged “friendship between the peoples of therepublic” was manifested on the outside. The

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main method of elimination of the opponentswas political murder (of which radical Islamistswere usually accused) or their intimidation andforcing them to leave Dagestan, and not elections,which were notoriously fixed. The strongesttrump card of the clan of Magomedov, which lethim keep the power in Makhachkala for such a long time, was the support of the Kremlin,which in exchange for loyalty and support to itsown policy in Caucasus gave him carte blanche toconduct his internal policy25.

The situation in the republic changed when thenew constitution was adopted as a result of the2003 referendum (the collective State Councilwas liquidated and the post of the president ofthe republic was introduced; the first presiden-tial election has been scheduled for 2006). Thenew constitution shook the previous system ofpower distribution in the republic, which, despiteits fragility, has never turned into an open mili-tary conflict. The main division line has emergedbetween Magomedov and the Dargin and Kumykactivists, who support him, and Avar and Lezginpoliticians26. Although blood has not been shedin Dagestan as yet, as the election is drawingnearer, the situation is getting increasingly tenser,and there is real danger that an ethnic conflictwill break out. The situation is additionally com-plicated by the proximity to Chechnya, activationof the Islamic opposition in Dagestan and the factthat every Dagestani politician has a several-thousand-strong, well-armed unit of militants athis disposal27.

2.3. Dagestan: the Lezgin questionWhen the USSR broke up, the Lezgin, who inhabi-ted southern Dagestan and northern Azerbaijan,were artificially separated by the state border.The Lezgin national movement, which emergedthen, was advocating unification of the Lezginterritories and creation of one Lezgistan as a partof Russia. This aroused anxiety in Azerbaijan,whose authorities feared that Russia, which wasstriving for maintaining its influence in SouthCaucasus, could use the Lezgin question to de-stabilise the internal situation in their country.Lezgins have many a time protested against thetightening of the Russian-Azeri border, whichmakes life more difficult for inhabitants of thefrontier. There have also happened several clashes

between the Lezgin population and Azeri borderguards. Even though the Lezgin issue has notice-ably relented since the late 90’s, still it remainsa very serious potential source of tension in southDagestan (inter alia in Derbent, inhabited by Lez-gins and Azeris) as well as in the relations be-tween Russia and Azerbaijan28.

2.4. The Ingush-Ossetian conflictThe tension between Ossetians, who are mem-bers Orthodox Christians and speak a languagebelonging to the Iranian branch, and Ingushes,who are Muslims and are closely related to Che-chens, has existed since 1992. In that year, thetwo peoples engaged in a brief military conflict:as a result of fights for the so-called prigorodnyidistrict (the suburbs of Vladikavkaz) more than800 people were killed and nearly 30 thousandIngushes escaped from Ossetia to Ingushetia(most of them still live in refugee camps)29. Theenmity between the two nations, manifestingitself inter alia in their mutual, almost total, iso-lation, has not eased, even though more than 12years have passed since the end of the clashes.Moreover, following the tragic terrorist attack inBeslan, in which many Ingushes took part, re-escalation of the conflict cannot be excluded (thepublic opinion in Ossetia blames Ingushes fororganising the attack)30.

The Ingush-Ossetian conflict is so bitter for seve-ral reasons: its protraction, failure to sign a com-promise peace accord after the 1992 fights (theconflict ended in a ceasefire, forced by Moscow),the negative effects of the war in Chechnya, thegrowing cultural and civilisation-related differ-ences between the secularized Ossetia and thefast-Islamising Ingushetia, and the demographicprocesses (Ingushetia has the greatest popula-tion growth rate in the Russian Federation, whilein Ossetia it is much lower).

Another outbreak of fights between Ingushes andOssetians would have very negative consequen-ces for Moscow, mainly due to the fact that bothrepublics are situated in the central part of Cau-casus, which is strategically the most importantone. This would also frustrate the Kremlin’s poli-cy in South Ossetia, which following the war inthe early 90’s has separated from Georgia and istoday a quasi-independent state, unofficially

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supported by Moscow (Tbilisi strives for takingover control of South Ossetia, while Russia aimsat freezing the conflict, which enables it to exertpressure on Georgia; South Ossetia would like tojoin the Russian Federation).

2.5. Conflicts in the western part of North CaucasusThe danger of turning of the conflicts in the wes-tern part of North Caucasus into military clasheshas many a time seemed imminent. These inclu-de, above all, the conflicts in Kabardino-Balkariaand Karachay-Cherkessia (between the Turkic--speaking Balkars and Karachays and Kabardinsand Circassians, whose languages belong to theCaucasian branch)31. Both republics were artifi-cially created in the 1930’s. When, following thecollapse of the USSR, the Balkar, Karachay andCircassian national movements emerged (Circas-sians, Kabardins and Adygeyans basically formone nation) it seemed that they would naturallybreak up. Since the early 90’s, the nationalist op-position has inter alia made demands for eitherseparation of Balkaria and creation of a separaterepublic or its unification with the Karachay, aswell as for uniting all the lands inhabited by theCircassian people (Kabarda, Cherkessia and Ady-geya), creation of one republic and gradual sepa-ration from the Russian Federation. The slogansof return of the so-called muhajir from Turkeyand Middle East countries to their ancestors’ landwere also popular in the Circassian national mo-vement32. However, like it was in the case of Da-gestan, the Kremlin actively supported the localcommunist elites, who have kept the power inNalchik and Cherkessk and prevented any suchdivides33.

Even though the conflicts between Kabardinsand Balkars and between Karachays and Circas-sians have never turned into a military confronta-tion, the tension is all the time there and it sub-stantially grows before every elections. The mostserious crisis emerged during the 1999 presiden-tial election in Karachay-Cherkessia; mass demon-strations and riots sparked then in Cherkesskbetween supporters of the Karachay VladimirSemionov and the Circassian Stanislav Derev34.

3. The religious conflicts

3.1. The major religions of the regionIn terms of religion, North Caucasus can be divi-ded into two parts: the Russian Orthodox northand the Muslim south. Most of the residents ofStavropol and Krasnodar Krais and 2/3 of the resi-dents of North Ossetia are members of the Rus-sian Orthodox Church. A great majority of thepopulation of the autonomous republics practiceIslam in the Sunni version (only Azeris living inDagestan are Shiites)35. There also live represen-tatives of other religions, including Buddhists(most of the Kalmyks), Jews, Catholics, Protes-tants and Russian Old Believers, in the region.

3.2. The divides and conflicts inside Islam The North Caucasian Islam is not uniform; it isinside it that the most numerous religious con-flicts occur. The conflicts, which had been growingas Islam had been reviving since the collapse ofthe USSR, became subdued after the outbreak ofthe second Chechen war. However, currently, theyare getting sharper again.

The bitterest conflict is the one between the sup-porters of the so-called traditional Islam and thereformers; it mostly concerns the Dagestani andChechen Islam. In Caucasus, the following groupsare referred to as traditionalist: – representatives of the so-called official Islam:these include the muftiats of particular republics,which are called the Spiritual Administrations(e.g. the SA of Muslims in Dagestan), each ofwhich forms a separate organisation; all the“legal” Muslim clergymen report to them; – sheikhs and members of Sufi brotherhoods(tariqas): many Muslims of Dagestan, Chechnyaand Ingushetia belong to them; in Dagestan, themost popular is the Naqshbandiya brotherhood,and in Chechnya, the Kadiriya; the sheikhs andtheir murids form very strong and well-organ-ised groups; they have an immense influence onthe political life of Chechnya and Dagestan36.

Representatives of the official Islam and mem-bers of the Sufi brotherhoods claim that theNorth Caucasian Islam differs from the rest ofthe Islamic world; it has its own traditions, cer-emonies and forms of cult. Both of them do not

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see any need for religious reform (they treat thereform advocates as extremists) and they strivefor isolation from the external world. Both ofthem are loyal to the authorities and they closelycooperate with them, which ensures them favourand support from the authorities in fighting theiropponents (except for Chechnya, where manymembers of the brotherhoods fight on the sideof the militants)37.

The reformers, who are usually referred to asWahhabis or Salafis (Arabian salaf means ances-tor or going back to the roots), can in turn be di-vided into:– moderate: a small group made up of represen-tatives of the intelligentsia and clergy; they op-pose the official Islam and Sufism, claiming theseforms are fossilized, outdated and discredited dueto their cooperation with the authorities; in theiropinion, Islam in Caucasus should be reformedand cleaned off the non-Islamic loans, which oc-curred in the Soviet times; they are advocates ofthe idea of Muslim solidarity (both in Caucasusand all over the world); they believe that thechanges should be made in a peaceful way; theyare not well-organised, they do not found any or-ganisations or political parties;– radicals: a conglomerate of small groups ofpeople organised in the so-called Jamaats; simi-larly to the moderates, they opt for reform of theNorth Caucasian Islam, yet they believe that thisshould be done through abolishment of the cur-rent authorities (both secular and religious); so-me of them are advocates of creation of an inde-pendent Islamic state in Caucasus; the radicalWahhabis are stronger and more numerous thanthe moderate ones; they are mainly active inChechnya and Dagestan, yet also in Ingushetia,Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria38.

The conflict between the Wahhabis and the tra-ditionalists has existed since the appearance ofthe former ones in Caucasus39. It reached its peakin 1996–1999. At that time, the centre of the radi-cal Islam was the uncontrolled by the KremlinChechnya, which, in early 1999, was proclaimedan Islamic state, and the Shariah law was intro-duced in its territory40. Many Chechen comman-ders then accepted the Wahhabi ideology as theirown and supported its followers outside of Che-chnya41. Wahhabis were also very active in Dage-

stan. The best-known “Islamic experiment” inthe republic was the proclamation in spring 1998of several villages of Buinaksk district (the so-called Kadar zone) a free Islamic territory (wherethe Shariah law applied) and driving representa-tives of the authorities out of there. As the secondChechen war began, the Kadar zone was liqui-dated by the federal troops (September 1999).

Since 1999, Islamists in North Caucasus (both acti-vists and people who sympathise with them) andany opponents of the official Islam have beenpersecuted. This has taken a particularly brutalform in Dagestan, where under the pressure ofthe Muslim clergy a law that bans propagationof Wahhabism has been adopted. In spite of thepersecutions, the number of supporters of radi-cal Islam in Caucasus is constantly growing: mostof the Chechen militants today are followers ofthe Islamic ideology; strong Wahhabi groups existin Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ka-rachay-Cherkessia and in Stavropol Krai. The con-flict of Wahhabis with the traditionalists and theauthorities is intensifying and it soon may be-come much more serious than the ethnic conflicts.The stimulating factors include the Chechen warspilling over the neighbouring republics, the per-secution of the Caucasian population by the Rus-sian law enforcement agencies and the terriblesocioeconomic situation in the region. The autho-rities reject any possibility of dialogue with theIslamists; therefore this movement is getting in-creasingly more radical and it not infrequentlychooses terrorism as a fight method42.

It is very difficult to assess the scale of externalinfluence on the development of the Wahhabimovement in North Caucasus. The Kremlin exag-gerates this, trying to prove that radical Islamand terrorism linked to it are an effect of the in-fluence of the international terrorism. However,the reality is slightly different. Although contactsof the North Caucasian radicals with Islamists allover the world, including with terrorist organi-sations, really exist, still they should not beoverestimated. Both terrorism and developmentof radical Islam in Caucasus are a direct result ofthe regional problems, and the existence of anexternal factor is of secondary meaning in thiscontext.

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3.3. The Orthodox Church vs. IslamDisputes between Islam and the Orthodox Churchare rare in the region. Nevertheless, the growingtension and escalation of violence there bringabout first signs of such a conflict. This, in par-ticular, concerns the regions inhabited mostly byRussians, to which increasingly more Muslimsare migrating. Conflicts between the indigenouspopulation and immigrants (usually economicallymotivated) very often take the form of religiousconflicts. They are also presented in this contextby some Russian nationalist politicians and somehierarchs and clergymen of the Russian OrthodoxChurch. There also are increasingly more con-flicts between members of the Orthodox Churchand Muslims over the construction of templesand other places of religious cult.

4. The problems of the “Russian-speaking” Caucasus

One of the greatest problems of the Russian-speaking Caucasus (Stavropol and KrasnodarKrais) is the issue of migrations (both internal andexternal) and the ethnic and religious conflictslinked thereto, as well as the problem of growingxenophobia and radicalisation of the public sen-timents.

4.1. The migrationsSince the break-up of the USSR, the North Cau-casian region, which used to be located insidethe country, has become the southernmost partof the Russian Federation, a region directly bor-dering on the turbulent South Caucasus and Cen-tral Asia. The military conflicts in the countriesof those regions, the economic crisis that emer-ged there as a result of the breakdown of the So-viet economy and the intensifying anti-Russiansentiments caused that Stavropol and KrasnodarKrais have since the early 90’s become targets ofmass immigration43. The immigrants who gothere can be divided into the following groups: – ethnic Russians: they are leaving both the sta-tes of South Caucasus and Central Asia and theautonomous republics of North Caucasus (nearly300 thousand Russians, most of whom settled inboth krais, have left Chechnya alone); – Armenians, Azeris, Georgians, Abkhaziansand other indigenous residents of South Cauca-sus: initially, they were mostly refugees from the

areas troubled by military conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, thereaftereconomic emigrants joined them;– Chechens, Dagestanis and other North Cauca-sian autochthones, who leave their republics dueto the war or economic difficulties (vast unem-ployment, hunger for land, overpopulation);– Tajiks, Kazakhs, Uzbeks and other represen-tatives of the indigenous population of CentralAsia: initially, they were refugees from civil-war--torn Tajikistan and groups prosecuted due totheir ethnic background (e.g. Meskhetin Turks);thereafter economic emigrants joined them.

The influx of non-Russians is accompanied by theconstantly lessening number of the native Rus-sian population due to low population growthrates (small number of births and high mortalityrate) and emigration of Russians to other regionsof the Federation (mainly to Moscow) and abroad(United States, Western Europe, Israel). In con-trast, among the immigrants (mainly Muslim),the population growth rate is very high, whichmakes them even more numerous in southernRussia44.

4.2. The conflicts of Russians with immigrantsInitially, conflicts between Russians and immi-grants resulted mainly from contradictory eco-nomic interests. The newcomers, who were moremobile, hard-working, willing to take the hardestjobs and engage in the most risky enterprisesand, additionally, supported by the well-develo-ped clan structures, were perceived by Russiansas strong competitors, who were taking awaytheir jobs and dishonesty getting rich at theirexpense. Problems with contacts between the twogroups stemmed from the differences betweentheir cultures and mentalities as well as from thecommon stereotypes and superstitions. The pre-judices and misunderstandings started graduallyturning into enmity manifesting itself in increas-ingly more frequent violent conflicts and grad-ual mutual isolation of both communities. Thefactor that has stimulated the ethnic conflicts,which are now turning even into racial conflicts(hatred to all the “black”, as Russians call resi-dents of Caucasus and Central Asia), is the warin Chechnya and the terrorist attacks in Russia,which are linked to the war.

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The local authorities not only do nothing tocounteract the mounting wave of xenophobicsentiments among Russians (which are referredto by analysts and journalists as Caucasophobiaor Islamophobia), but also even instigate suchattitudes. This is the case for instance in Krasno-dar Krai, the governor of which, Aleksandr Tka-chov, known for his nationalist views, has formany years lobbied in Moscow for sharpening ofthe immigration law, including for making easierdeportation of illegal immigrants and introducingsettlement quotas for particular ethnic groups45.Repressions, harassment, deprivation of rightsand other forms of persecution used by the autho-rities (above all, militia and administration clerks)against immigrants from Caucasus and CentralAsia are considered normal there46. Pogroms ofnon-Russian population are sporadically organisedby neo-fascist or Cossack gangs, while the autho-rities remain totally passive47.

5. The socioeconomic problems

5.1 The socioeconomic situationNorth Caucasus is one of the poorest regions ofthe Russian Federation. Already in the Soviet ti-mes, it was backward as compared to other partsof the empire; there was hidden unemploymentthere (e.g. in Chechnya and Dagestan) and manypeople were forced to emigrate in search for jobs.The break-up of the USSR, the collapse of thecentrally planned economy, the outbreak of mili-tary conflicts, closure of many borders: all thishas only aggravated the existing problems.

The situation is the worst in Chechnya, whoseeconomy is in ruin despite the existence of high-quality oil deposits in the republic; most of thetowns and villages destroyed during the twowars (including Grozny) have not been rebuilt,land cultivation or cattle breeding is impossiblein many parts of the republic due to the mine-fields. The unemployment level is as high as 80%,and people only survive owing to barter economyand trade in illegally produced oil. Although theRussian budget allocates enormous funds for eco-nomic reconstruction of Chechnya (since 2000,62 billion roubles, i.e. over US$ 2 billion), most ofthem remain in the hands of officials in Moscowand Grozny and some are taken over by the mili-tants48.

The economic situation in such republics as Dage-stan, Ingushetia or North Ossetia is not muchbetter: basically, no enterprises are operatingthere, most of the population live in unimagin-able poverty, surviving only thanks to cultiva-tion of small bits of land around their houses,relatively regularly paid old-age pensions, smalltrade and work of young men outside Caucasus.The only ones to be well-off are the people havingconnections with the authorities (approximately2% of the population), whose sources of incomeinclude: subsidies from the federal budget, tradein profitable goods (mainly oil and caviar), forc-ing out protection money from the population(e.g. for accepting a child to a school, at militiastations, for “safe” business running, etc.)49.

The economic situation is even aggravated bythe high population growth, which e.g. in Ingu-shetia is approximately 11 per mils annually, andin Dagestan the rate is approximately 950. Thehunger for land and the lack of jobs in the moun-tains forces a multitude of people (above all, theyoung) to emigrate to the cities, where they donot have any bright prospects, either; as a result,in such cities as Makhachkala (its population hasgrown from 300 thousand in 1989 to 550 thou-sand in 2004) or Vladikavkaz, there are districtswhere people live in extreme poverty, there areincreasingly more unemployed and desperatepeople, ready for anything51.

The constantly worsening economic conditionsand the lack of any prospect for improvement ofthe situation have very far-reaching social effects.The lack of jobs causes many people choose cri-me as their way of living and the common avai-lability of guns makes North Caucasus the mostcriminalised region of the Russian Federation52.One of the most profitable sources of income iskidnapping people for ransom, which is not onlydone by armed gangs in Chechnya and Dagestan,but also by federal soldiers and pro-RussianChechen groups (above all, the troops reportingto deputy prime minister of Chechnya, RamzanKadyrov). The economic crisis is also the cause ofthe progressing disintegration of family and clanties (mass emigrations of men in search for jobslead to break-up of many families) and decay ofthe traditional moral values (earlier, e.g. therewas no prostitution, begging or homelessness in

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Caucasus; now, this occurs increasingly moreoften). Additionally, more and more people areengaged in drug production and smuggling53.

5.2. The danger of social revoltThe current socioeconomic crisis in Caucasus isso serious that an outbreak of mass social unrestor even social revolt cannot be excluded. In par-ticular, this concerns the eastern part of the re-gion, where the situation is the hardest, the popu-lation growth is the highest and the populationis the youngest. In case of a sudden destabilisa-tion of the political situation, which is possibleany time there, the accumulated social frustra-tion may lead to an uncontrolled explosion. Thisis even more probable because the conflict be-tween the great majority of people living inextreme poverty and the commonly hated elite,which is constantly getting richer, is getting bit-terer in those communities. The fact that peopleshow deep dislike to the authorities can be pro-ven for instance by the silent support they giveto the radical Islamist groups which organiseattacks on representatives of the Dagestani lawenforcement agencies (since the beginning of thisyear, tens of them have been killed). Regardlessof their enormous efforts, the authorities havenot managed to catch even one perpetrator ofsuch crimes. For some time now, increasinglymore Dagestanis, Ingushes and representativesof other ethnic groups join Chechen guerrillaforces or form their own military units. Manyfacts also indicate that residents of the republicsneighbouring on Chechnya sympathise with oractively help the militants moving towards therepublic. Unless the situation in the region startsimproving, it cannot be excluded that, if e.g. rad-ical Islamists make an attempt to abolish the au-thorities in one of the republics, a great part ofthe population can take their side.

II. The Kremlin’s Policy in North Caucasus

Regardless of the existence of so many problemsand conflicts in the region, the Kremlin hasfailed to work out any coherent and long-termconcept for the development of North Caucasusor a programme for integration of the region withthe rest of the Russian Federation that would take

into consideration its ethnic, religious and socialpeculiarities. The authorities often take emer-gency actions in response to crises instead ofpreventing them; decisions taken by variousauthorities responsible for the Kremlin’s policyin Caucasus are often mutually contradictory andtheir actions are uncoordinated (e.g. in Chechnya,particular law enforcement agencies are rival-ling one another, which affects the security levelin the republic). This policy consists in abortiveattempts to liquidate the consequences of nega-tive tendencies and phenomena and not in fight-ing the causes thereof. Sticking to some dogmasin the Caucasian policy (e.g. the belief that force-ful solutions are successful), the authorities areall the time making the same mistakes, unwill-ing to recognise their obvious failures. A perfectexample is Vladimir Putin’s policy in Chechnya:although the assassination of president Kadyrovclearly showed that a politician with no publicsupport, elected as a result of fixed electionsthat provide no other alternative, is not able tokeep the power for a long time, again, thisAugust, the Kremlin conducted another identicalelection in Chechnya (Alu Alkhanov was “elect-ed” president)54.

1. Caucasus as an internal affair of Russia

One of the priorities of the Kremlin’s policy inCaucasus is preventing other countries frominterfering in the region’s affairs. Even thoughno state or international organisation challengesthe fact that Caucasus is an internal affair ofRussia, still Moscow treats any, even the softest,criticism of its policy in the region (in particular,violations of human rights by Russian soldiers inChechnya, appeals for Moscow to embark uponpeace negotiations with the Chechens or attemptsto discuss the issue of Chechnya at the interna-tional forum) as violation of this principle55.Although internationalisation of the Chechen pro-blem to some degree, engagement of interna-tional organisations in resolution of the conflictand enabling them to act in the republic couldhave contributed to ending the war, Moscowstrongly opposes any external interference.

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2. The “antiterrorist operation”

An important element of the Russian policy inNorth Caucasus is the “antiterrorist operation”56.From autumn 1999, it was led by the federalarmy, from June 2000 to June 2003, it was con-ducted by the Federal Security Service, and cur-rently it is controlled by the Ministry of InternalAffairs. The official purpose of launching theoperation was to detain or liquidate the terroristleaders responsible for the raid on Dagestan andbombings in Russian cities, who were hiding inChechnya, while the real target was to pacify theseparatist Chechnya and liquidate its authoritiesand military units reporting to them.

It was only possible to launch the antiterroristoperation in Caucasus owing to the victory ofsupporters of the forceful solution to the Che-chen issue at the Kremlin. It is based on the con-viction, which has lingered on in Russia at leastsince the 19th century, that force is the only suc-cessful method in Caucasus, and that Caucasiannations and politicians cannot be trusted andthat they cannot be treated as equal partners indialogue but only as inferiors. This view is, aboveall, represented by the law enforcement agencies(the federal army, the Ministry of Internal Affairsand Federal Security Service), a significant part ofRussian politicians (including president VladimirPutin) and by the public opinion. SubsequentRussian failures in Caucasus are usually blamedon too lenient methods, poor performance of spe-cial forces or lack of coordination between par-ticular law enforcement forces, and never on dis-proportionate usage of force. Those few politi-cians, journalists and human rights activistswho appeal for revising the policy of force in Cau-casus and launching negotiations with the Che-chen separatists (e.g. Anna Politkovskaya, SergeyKovalov, Andrei Babitsky) are seen by the authori-ties as traitors and representatives of the inte-rests of the West or even supporters of the “ter-rorists”.

The operation objective set in 1999 (both the offi-cial and unofficial one) has never been achieved:those guilty of the raid on Dagestan and bomb-ings in Russian cities have not been caught, ithas proved impossible to finally defeat the mili-tants, who still are a serious military force and

are supported by a significant part of the resi-dents of Chechnya. Instead, the consequences ofthe actions taken as a part of the operation havebeen born, first of all, by the Chechen civilianpopulation and at times also by residents of therepublics neighbouring on Chechnya. The opera-tion has had the opposite effect to the intendedone: the Chechen conflict has not ended or evenlocalised, instead, it is gradually spilling overthe entire North Caucasian region; terrorism hasnot been liquidated, instead, its real birth hasbeen provoked57.

3. The role of the law enforcementagencies

North Caucasus is often referred to as a “republicof the military”. This is due to the fact that it isthe most militarised region of the Russian Fede-ration, where the law enforcement agencies havethe greatest influence and the strongest stand-ing58. Of the three key Russian law enforcementagencies (Ministry of Defence, Federal SecurityService and Ministry of Internal Affairs), the Ar-med Forces of the Russian Federation (usually re-ferred to as the federal army, reporting to theRussian Ministry of Defence), which de facto con-trol the “antiterrorist operation”, are taking thelead. The standing and influence of the army,which had been weakened by its defeat in thefirst Chechen war and humiliated by the need towithdraw from Chechnya (1996), have excessivelystrengthened since the beginning of the “anti-terrorist operation”.

The law enforcement agencies are interested inkeeping the situation instable in North Caucasus,owing to which their influence in the country isstrengthening. This also causes constant growthof the budget spending on military purposes(e.g. the outlays on the military in 2005 are sup-posed to be higher by 35% as compared to 200459)and provides additional chance of being promot-ed and making a career outside of the army60.The war has also provided the military with theopportunity to do numerous illegal businesses,such as: trade in oil produced in Chechnya61, rob-bing the civilian population, forcing out protec-tion money (mainly at checkpoints and on roads)and trade in people.

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Law enforcement agencies form a pillar of theCaucasian policy of president Putin, who hasbeen consistently applying the forceful solutionthere. This, however, also affects the head of theRussian state, who by relying on the army andspecial forces in his Caucasian policy is becom-ing their hostage. It was the war in Chechnyathat enabled Putin rise to power and today hemust pay due respect to the interests of the mil-itary, even though protracting the conflict inChechnya, and even less so its spilling over theneighbouring republics, is not in the Kremlin’sinterest.

4. Supporting the puppet regimes

The political system in the republics of NorthCaucasus reminds of a classical colonial system(the system is also similar in other Russianregions; however, in Caucasus this is particular-ly noticeable). The power is there in the hands ofcorrupt local clans (always made up of represen-tatives of the autochthon population) having con-nections with the criminal world, whom Mos-cow, in exchange for their loyalty, allows for a certain degree of economic independence andconducting their independent internal policy(fighting the opposition, nominating their peopleto important posts, etc.). The Kremlin gives thelocal regimes, hated by most of the local popula-tion, the ability to dispose of the funds receivedby them from the federal budget, which theyspend almost exclusively on their private needs,in an uncontrolled way (to a certain extent). Thisis the price Moscow is ready to pay for keepingthe republics in relative peace, unarguably fulfill-ing its directives concerning regional and foreignpolicy and ensuring proper outcome and turnoutin presidential and parliamentary elections62.The classical examples of such puppet regimes,separated from their own communities and sup-ported by the Kremlin, are the rules of the clansof Kadyrov in Chechnya, Magomedali Magome-dov in Dagestan or Valery Kokov in Kabardino--Balkaria.

5. The marginalisation of the opposition

Relying on puppet regimes, Moscow at the sametime rejects any possibility of dialogue with theopposition forces in particular republics, whichoften enjoy much greater support and respect ofthe public than the authorities. Since the begin-ning of the current war in Chechnya, Moscowhas consistently refused embarking on negotia-tions with the leaders of the militants, includingwith the legally elected (January 1997) presidentAslan Maskhadov, who has many a time appealedfor dialogue, giving to understand that the Che-chen leaders are ready to make far-reaching con-cessions on many issues (including on the issueof independence of Chechnya)63. AlthoughMaskhadov and his envoys abroad (among othersAkhmad Zakayev, Umar Khambiyev) have manya time condemned terrorism as a method of strug-gle and the Kremlin has never presented any prooffor their participation in staging any attacks, theRussian authorities label the Chechen leaders ter-rorists, with whom only unconditional capitula-tion can be discussed.

The situation is similar in Ingushetia. In December2001, president of the republic, Ruslan Aushev,who was deeply respected among the Ingush pu-blic, was removed from his post and replaced byMurat Ziazikov, the unpopular and deprived ofany charisma general of Federal Security Servi-ce64. His policy (or rather implementation of dire-ctives given by the Kremlin or particular law en-forcement agencies) has led to destabilisation ofthe internal situation in the republic, which is onthe brink of civil war now (even the mufti ofIngushetia, Magomed Albogachiyev has rebelledagainst Ziazikov). The opposition forces in otherrepublics of the region are deprived of any influ-ence, as well.

The authorities also reject any dialogue with theincreasingly stronger Islamists (Dagestan, Ka-bardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia), who, un-der the pretext of combating terrorism and Wah-habism, are fought against by the local authoritiesand representatives of the official Islam. Pushingopposition forces on the margins of political lifeleads to their radicalisation (in terms of both ide-ology and political struggle methods), taking the

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anti-Russian position, search for contacts withChechen separatists and often joining the mili-tant troops.

6. The propaganda

Another important element of the Kremlin’s poli-cy in Caucasus is the propaganda in the massmedia, which is targeted at both the domesticaudience and the international opinion. Throughadequate selection of information on the regionand intentional disinformation, which is possibleowing to their control over the key mass media(above all, television) the Russian authorities aretrying to convince Russians and the West thatthe situation in the region is stable and peaceful,and that any problems are resolved owing to theperfect cooperation of the federal centre withthe local authorities65. The Kremlin’s propagandain the mass media is particularly aggressive whenit comes to the situation in Chechnya: the infor-mation is often untrue and reports e.g. on elec-tions in the republic look as if they were made inthe worst communist times. The Kremlin is ableto provide information that could not be furtherfrom the truth and to present Chechnya as a kindof a “Potiomkin-style village” due to the limita-tion of freedom of the mass media under presi-dent Putin’s rules and holding an almost totalmonopoly on information from Chechnya66. Thepropaganda really works in the Russian society,a proof to that being the results of public opin-ion polls carried out after the tragic events inRussia linked to the situation in Caucasus, e.g.after the Dubrovka theatre or Beslan attacks. Theproper way of reporting and commenting suchevents causes that they do not affect the popu-larity of president Putin, who is to a great extentresponsible for them67.

III. North Caucasus and the future of Russia

1. The effect of the situation in Caucasus on Russia

The instable situation in North Caucasus pro-foundly affects many spheres of Russian politi-cal, social and economic life. It leaves its markon the internal situation, foreign policy, power

system, elites, state institutions and structures,on the society, economy, mass media, etc. It is a serious threat to the national security, an impedi-ment to implementing reforms, a source of dege-neration of the state administration and demo-ralisation of the Russian army. The situation inCaucasus is also a key reason for the develop-ment of terrorism in Russia, it is one of the stimu-lants to increasing the influence of the law enfor-cement agencies in the state, it causes strengthen-ing of authoritarianism and limitation of thefreedom of speech under the rule of presidentPutin as well as intensification of Caucasophobiaand Islamophobia among the Russian society anddevelopment of nationalist sentiments68.

2. The future of Caucasus

The future of North Caucasus to a great extentdepends on whether the problems and conflictsexisting in the region are resolved or aggravate.If they intensify and deepen, in the nearest years,Caucasus will be plunging into chaos and insta-bility; further escalation of violence and subse-quent terrorist attacks should also be expected.Such a scenario will also mean continuation ofthe dangerous for Russia tendencies and proces-ses: the gradual drifting away of Caucasus fromRussia, its derussification and Islamisation. Anextreme example of this is Chechnya: the Rus-sian law practically does not apply there (inter-personal relations are based on either the law ofthe stronger, Shariah or adat, the unwritten Che-chen law), Chechens do not serve in the Russianarmy, almost all the Russians who had lived inChechnya before 1989 have left the republic, andthe young generation does not feel in any waytied with the Russian state, culture or society69.

Other Muslim Caucasian republics are also beco-ming less and less Russian (although this pro-cess is much slower there than in Chechnya),drifting towards Islam, which is slowly becom-ing one of the most important components ofthe North Caucasian identity70. Their residentsless and less identify themselves with the Rus-sian state, feeling they do not belong to it, andeven though they leave for Moscow and otherRussian regions in search for jobs, they feel stran-gers there71. This is to a great extent a result ofthe widespread xenophobia in Russia towards all

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“people of Caucasian nationality” as people com-ing from Caucasus are there commonly referredto (this term is perceived by them as extremelyoffensive). Already today, North Caucasus is a kindof an enclave, a foreign body within the bordersof the Russian Federation, which is also confir-med by Russians visiting this region (journalists,soldiers on military service there and people whohave accidentally found themselves in any of theCaucasian republics). This explains to a certaindegree the reactions of the Russian society to theevents happening in Caucasus: information onCaucasus in the mass media is perceived by amajority of Russians as reports from abroad andnot as from a part of their country. So long as thetragedies happening there (except for such terri-ble ones as e.g. the attack in Beslan) do not crossthe borders of Caucasus and do not affect Russiaproper, the public opinion is indifferent. This isdue to the fact that Caucasus is departing fromRussia not only in reality but also in the minds ofRussians themselves.

The tendencies described above could be sloweddown by a change in the Kremlin’s policy towardsthe region: making a real attempt to end the Che-chen war, curtailing the powers of the law en-forcement agencies in the region, dialogue withthe opposition in particular republics, giving upforceful methods and letting the internationalcommunity become involved in cooperation inthe region. It would also be necessary to workout a coherent long-term concept for socioeco-nomic development of the region and its inte-gration with the Russian Federation. This wouldcertainly need huge financial outlays, enormouseffort by authorities on all the levels and the willto overcome the objection of those who benefitfrom instability in the region. However, such achange is impossible in Russia today for manyreasons.

Firstly, the Kremlin lacks the will to revise itspolicy towards Caucasus: president Putin and hisclosest milieu, most of whom originate from theSoviet special services, see any will to compro-mise and admitting their own mistakes as show-ing their weakness, and the only remedies fortheir failures in Caucasus they can resort to in-clude increasing the powers of the law enforce-ment agencies and strengthening their control

over the society and sharpening the regime inChechnya and other republics. Any decided mo-ves in Caucasus meant to change the policy inthe region must have been accompanied by ex-tensive political, social and economic reforms inthe country, which president Putin has failed tochoose72. Secondly, even if the Kremlin made anattempt to change its policy in Caucasus, thiscould be blocked by such factors as: – the lack of sufficient funds, – the lack of proper staff, – the resistance of the law enforcement agencies, – degeneration of state officers (soldiers, clerks,etc.). Russia’s cooperation with international organi-sations and its opening to foreign aid would havemade it easier for Moscow to overcome such dif-ficulties, yet president Putin’s team is unwillingto such cooperation. Thus, with the current ad-ministration, which is striving for imposing onthe country as authoritarian rules as possible,and given the present condition of the Russianstate, any change of the Caucasian policy is im-possible. This means that the chaos in Caucasus,which is departing increasingly further awayfrom Moscow, and the processes described here-in above will be deepening. In the longer term,this may end in a far-going autonomy or evenseparation of the region from the Russian Fede-ration73.

2. The impact of North Caucasus on the future of Russia

Even though as recently as in the first half of the90’s North Caucasus seemed to be an unimpor-tant periphery of the empire, and the problemsand conflicts there seemed insignificant for theRussian state, the first Chechen war has proventhat the situation in the region is of enormousimportance for Russia. North Caucasus is the re-gion where many extremely serious problemsare concentrated, and the resolution to them willdecide on the future of Russia74. Such issues as:the Chechen war, other ethnic and religious con-flicts, rapid growth of non-Russian and Muslimpopulation, decreasing number of ethnic Russians,etc. pose questions of existential nature to theRussian state. How to integrate the non-Russianpopulation with the rest of the country’s resi-dents, on what basis should the state be built

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and which idea should unite the increasingly mo-re diverse society (whether the state should benational or multiethnic, federalised or centra-lised, secular or based on the Orthodox Church)?How to prevent ethnic and religious conflictswhich may blow up the Russian Federation fromwithin? Therefore, such fundamental issues asendurance of the Russian Federation, its futureshape and political, administrational and socialsystem, stability and security of the state willdepend on whether and how Russia copes withthe problems of Caucasus.

So long as Moscow is unable to resolve the prob-lems of North Caucasus, above all, to end the warin Chechnya as soon as possible, it will remain a greatly unpredictable and instable country indanger of terrorism and shaken by increasinglydeeper internal conflicts, a country from whichthousands emigrate because they are persecutedfor their nationality or religion75. Unless theKremlin copes with Caucasus, it will not be pos-sible for Russia to take the path of democratic re-form and to make the attempt to create a moderncountry, open to cooperation with the world.The alternative is an authoritarian state, limitingcivil liberties and exerting increasingly greatercontrol over the society, an economically back-ward country, isolating itself from the rest of theworld. Already today, Caucasus is the cause ofgradual disintegration of the Russian state, itsstructures and society76; unless this is sloweddown by changing the policy towards the region,it may become the cause of its collapse.

Caucasus is strategically very important for Mos-cow, as it is the southernmost part, the “soft un-derbelly of Russia”, a region which separates Rus-sia proper from South Caucasus and the MiddleEast and Central Asia, where very disturbingprocesses are taking place (e.g. the developmentof Islamic fundamentalism). A stable and inte-grated with the rest of the Federation NorthCaucasus can be a dam protecting Russia againstingress of such processes, while an instable onewill be an entry gate for Islamic radicals, inter-national terrorists, organised crime, etc. Furtherdevelopment of the situation in North Caucasuswill also decide on Russia’s standing in the post-Soviet area, above all, in South Caucasus. North

Caucasian republics are a kind of back-up facili-ties for the Russian policy towards Georgia, Ar-menia and Azerbaijan; therefore, to maintain itsinfluence there, Moscow must ensure stabilityand security in North Caucasus. Maciej Falkowski

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Annex

Brief characteristics of particu-lar parts of North Caucasus

Dagestan area: 50.3 thousand km2; location: eastern part of North Caucasus by theCaspian Sea: borders on Azerbaijan, Georgia,Chechnya, Stavropol Krai and Kalmykia; capital: Makhachkala (pop. approx. 550 thousand); other large cities: Derbent (95 thousand), Kha-savyurt (88 thousand) and Kaspiysk (71 thou-sand); population: 2.58 million; ethnic make-up: Avars (27.5%), Dargins (15.5%),Kumyks (12.8%), Lezgins (11.3%), Russians(approx. 6%), Laks (5.1%), Tabassarans (4.3%),Azeris (4.1%), Chechens-Akins (3.2%), Nogays(1.5%), Rutuls (0.8%), Aghuls (0.7%), Tats (0.7%),Tsakhurs (0.2%) and other; religion: more than 90% of the residents areSunni Muslims, other religious groups: ShiiteMuslims, Orthodox Christians and Jews; chairman of the State Council: Magomedali Ma-gomedov (since 1990)77

Chechnyaarea: approx. 16.5 thousand km2 (since the divi-sion of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR in 1992, theborder between Chechnya and Ingushetia hasnot been formally fixed); location: central-eastern part of North Caucasus;borders on Georgia, Ingushetia, North Ossetia,Stavropol Krai and Dagestan; capital: Grozny (from 40 to 120 thousand residents);other large cities: Urus-Martan (approx. 40 thou-sand), Gudermes (approx. 30 thousand), Shali(approx. 24 thousand), Argun (approx. 23 thou-sand); population: approx. 600 thousand (officially 1.1million, however, the number is, in all probabil-ity, overstated); ethnic make-up: Chechens (more than 90%;until 1989, they accounted for 57.8% of the pop-ulation), Russians (no data available, a little morethan ten thousand people; until 1989, 23.1%); religion: Sunni Muslims (over 90%), a smallnumber of Orthodox Christians; president Alu Alkhanov (since 2004)

Ingushetia area: approx. 4.3 thousand km2 (the smallestentity of the Russian Federation); location: central-eastern part of North Caucasus;borders on Georgia, Chechnya, North Ossetia andStavropol Krai; capital: Magas (no permanent residents, onlyadministration centre); other large cities: Nazran (120 thousand; until1998, the capital city), Malgobek (50 thousand),Karabulak (29 thousand); population: 468 thousand; ethnic make-up: Ingushes (approx. 80%), Che-chens (approx. 20%; most of them are Chechenrefugees); religion: Sunni Muslims (almost 100%); president Murat Ziazikov (since 2002)

North Ossetia area: 8 thousand km2; location: central part of North Caucasus; borderson Georgia (including the separatist SouthOssetia), Ingushetia, Chechnya, Stavropol Kraiand Kabardino-Balkaria; capital: Vladikavkaz (313 thousand); other large cities: Mozdok (40 thousand) andBeslan (35 thousand); population: 709 thousand; ethnic make-up: Ossetians (59%), Russians (24%),Ingushes (5.4%), Armenians (2.2%) and others; religion: Orthodox Christians (approx. 70%),Sunni Muslims (approx. 30%); president Aleksandr Dzasokhov (since 1998)

Kabardino-Balkaria area: 12.5 thousand km2; location: central-western part of North Cauca-sus; borders on Georgia, North Ossetia, StavropolKrai and Karachay-Cherkessia; capital: Nalchik (234 thousand); other large cities: Prokhladnyi (60 thousand)and Baksan (32 thousand); population: 900 thousand; ethnic make-up: Kabardins (48%), Russians (32%),Balkars (9%) and others; religion: Sunni Muslims (Kabardins and Balkars)and Orthodox Christians (Russians); president Valery Kokov (since 1991)

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Karachay-Cherkessia area: 14.1 thousand km2; location: western part of North Caucasus; bor-ders on Georgia (including the separatist Abkha-zia), Krasnodar Krai, Stavropol Krai and Kabardi-no-Balkaria; capital: Cherkessk (122 thousand); other large cities: Ust-Jeguta (31 thousand) andKarachayevsk (15 thousand); population: 439 thousand; ethnic make-up: Russians (40%), Karachays(33.4%), Circassians (11%), the Abaza (4.6%), No-gays (3.1%); religion: mainly Sunni Muslims; president Mustafa Batdiyev (since 2003)

Adygeya area: 7.6 thousand km2; location: western part of North Caucasus (encir-cled by the territory of Krasnodar Krai); capital: Maikop (167 thousand); other large cities: Adygeysk (12 thousand); population: 447 thousand; ethnic make-up: Russians (68%), Adygeyans(22%), Ukrainians (3.2%), Armenians (2.4%); religion: Orthodox Christians and Sunni Mus-lims; president Khazret Sovmen (since 2002)

Stavropol Krai: area: 66.5 thousand km2; location: central part of North Caucasus; borderson Rostov oblast, Krasnodar Krai, Karachay-Cher-kessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Che-chnya, Dagestan and Kalmykia; capital: Stavropol (346 thousand); other large cities: Piatigorsk (134 thousand),Nevinnomysk (134 thousand), Kislovodsk (123thousand) and Essentuki (99 thousand); population: 2.73 million; ethnic make-up: Russians (approx. 70%), Cauca-sian peoples (approx. 30%, including Armenians,Georgians, Azeris, Chechens, Dagestani peoples,Karachays and others); religion: Orthodox Christians are the great ma-jority, other religious groups include Sunni Mus-lims; governor Aleksandr Chernogorov (since 1996)

Krasnodar Krai (Kuban)area: 76 thousand km2; location: western part of North Caucasus by theBlack Sea; borders on Georgia (the territory of theseparatist Abkhazia), Adygeya, Karachay-Cher-kessia, Stavropol Krai and Rostov oblast;capital: Krasnodar (643 thousand); other large cities: Sochi (366 thousand), Novo-rossiysk (205 thousand), Armavir (166 thousand); population: 5.1 million; ethnic make-up: Russians (approx. 80%), Cauca-sian peoples (approx. 20%; mainly Armenians,Georgians, Azeris, Abkhazians and others); religion: Orthodox Christians are the majority,other religious groups include Muslims; governor Aleksandr Tkachov (since 2000)

Kalmykia: area: 76.1 thousand km2; location: north-eastern part of North Caucasusby the Caspian Sea; borders on Dagestan, Stav-ropol Krai and the oblasts of Rostov, Volgogradand Astrakhan; capital: Elista (105 thousand); other large cities: Lagan (15 thousand); population: 292 thousand; ethnic make-up: Kalmyks (approx. 50%), Rus-sians (approx. 40%); religion: Buddhists (Kalmyks) and OrthodoxChristians (Russians); president Kirsan Ilumzhinov (since 1993)

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1 According to the Russian terminology, Transcaucasia(North Caucasus is also referred to as North Caucasia).2 In some definitions, North Caucasus also includes the otherunits of the southern federal district, created in 2000, itscentral city being Rostov-on-Don, i.e. the Rostov, Astrakhanand Volgograd oblasts. According to such a definition, theNorth Caucasian region has the area of 582 thousand km2

(3.4% of the Russian Federation territory) and is inhabited bymore than 21 million people (14% of the population of theRussian Federation); http://wgeo.ru/russia/okr_ugn.shtml3 For more details on the events in Chechnya in 1991–1994and on the causes of the so-called first Chechen war see: P. Grochmalski, Czeczenia: rys prawdziwy, Wroc∏aw: atla21999; A. Malashenko, D. Trenin, Vremia Yuga, Moscow: Mos-kovskiy Centr Carnegie 2002; D. Furman, Rossiya i Chechnya,obshchestva i gosudarstva, Moscow 1999; S. Ciesielski, Rosja– Czeczenia. Dwa stulecia konfliktu, Wroc∏aw: WydawnictwoUniwersytetu Wroc∏awskiego 2003.4 For information on the so-called first Chechen war see:Ibidem and: J. Cichocki, Wojna rosyjsko-czeczeƒska, CES Ma-terials 1997.5 The election was recognised as democratic and legal bymany international organisations (e.g. OSCE) and by Russiaitself.6 For more information on the inter-war period see inter alia:A. Malashenko, D. Trenin, op. cit., D. Furman, op. cit.; W. Góre-cki, Czy Rosja straci∏a Kaukaz Pó∏nocny?, Week in the East,28 December 1998; M. Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, Wa-shington: Brookings Institution Press 2002.7 Although the Russian authorities accused Chechens of theattacks, it has not been cleared out until now who they infact were organised by. Many facts indicate that they couldhave been staged by Russian special forces. This thesis is ad-vanced among others by the former Federal Security Serviceofficer, Aleksandr Litvinenko in the book by Aleksandr Mik-hailov: Chechenskoye koleso, Moscow: Sovershenno sekretno2002 and by the Russian press baron Boris Berezovski (hepresented his views on this subject, inter alia, in the filmBlown up Russia). For information on the events in Dagestansee inter alia: http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/N-Caucas/conf2809.htm8 In 2002, the compulsory returns of refugees from Ingu-shetia to Chechnya began: by exerting administrative pres-sure (gradually, all the refugee camps were liquidated), usingthreats and promises of compensation payment, most ofthe escapees were forced to leave. Currently, approximately70 thousand refugees are staying in Ingushetia. For infor-mation on the current situation of Chechen refugees inRussia see: http://www.memo.ru/hr/refugees/doklad2004/chech04.htm9 For information on violation of human rights in Chechnyaby the Russian army see inter alia: Memorial o voyne na Se-vernom Kavkaze http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/caucas1/index.htm; http://www.hrw.org/russian/editorials/chechnya/index.html10 Chechenisation (a press term) was officially referred to bythe Russian authorities as a „peacekeeping process in theChechen Republic”. For more information on particular sta-ges of the Chechenisation policy see: A. Makarkin, Uzako-

nennaya chechenizatsiya, http://www.politcom.ru/2002/pvz10.php; A. Makarkin, Gibel Kadyrova i sudba checheni-zatsiyi, http://www.politcom.ru/2004/pvz417.php; N. Serova,Tri problemy chechenizatsiyi, http://www.politcom.ru11 The most significant armed operations of the militants in2004 included: the assassination of Akhmad Kadyrov at thestadium in Grozny (9 May), the attack on Ingushetia (at nighton 21/22 June), in which nearly 100 people were killed andthe raid on Grozny (at night on 21/22 August); in late August/early September, there also happened three awful terroristattacks: the blowing up of 2 airplanes in southern Russia(24 August; 90 people were killed), the suicide bombing atRizhskaya metro station in Moscow (31 August; 11 peoplekilled) and the seizure of the school in Beslan, North Ossetia(the worst terrorist attack in the Russian history; duringthe assault on the terrorist-controlled school, which waslaunched in unclear circumstances, nearly 350 people werekilled, including several hundred children). Shamil Basayevadmitted he was the author of all those attacks on one ofthe Chechen separatistsí websites www.kavkazcenter.com12 It cannot be excluded that the assassination of AkhmadKadyrov was staged by the military, as his strong authoritystarted to challenge their position in the republic. Kadyrovopenly criticised the army for prosecution of civilian popu-lation and demanded limiting their powers in the republic.13 This mainly concerns representatives of the so-called Ka-dyrov’s clan, the leader of which is a son of the assassinatedpresident, Ramzan Kadyrov (currently deputy prime minis-ter of Chechnya). The security service, which he is in chargeof, terrorises the local residents and commits crimes on amass scale.14 The Dubrovka attack (October 2002) was a harbinger ofthe introduction of new methods into the military actions.Since that time, Chechens have executed tens of terroristattacks and armed raids outside the territory of Chechnya.For statistical data on the worst terrorist attacks since Octo-ber 2002 see: M. Falkowski, Nowa fala terroru w Rosji, Weekin the East, 2 September 2004.15 Maskhadov admitted among other things having launchedthe attack on Ingushetia this June. Then, he also promisedsubsequent military actions would be conducted in the ter-ritory of Russia.16 The ideological changes in the militant camp have beendescribed among others by the journalist of Radio Svoboda,Andrei Babitsky in his recent reports from Chechnya (see:www.svoboda.org).17 This is mainly a result of the growing Caucasophobia andIslamophobia in Russia. For more thorough analysis of theseproblems see: A. Malashenko, D. Trenin, op. cit., pages 57–62;A. Levinson, Kavkaz podo mnoiu, http://www.polit.ru/docs/618834.html; A. Gorbova, My nie shakhidki, Novye Izvestia,01.10.2004.18 The death squadrons kidnapped and killed among othersthe deputy prosecutor of Ingushetia Rashid Ozdoyev, whohad been making attempts to oppose their illicit actions;this affair is thoroughly described in the opposition websitewww.ingushetiya.ru; see also: A. Politkovskaya, Mestona-khozhdenie zakona ne ustanovleno, Novaya Gazeta,

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02–04.08.2004; FSB pokhishchayet ludei v Dagestane,http://yaseen.ru/politica/fsb.htm19 The views of the young elite of Caucasus (mostly of Da-gestan), which are evolving fast towards Islam, can be readon the website www.yaseen.ru20 The most numerous of them are the troops commandedby Rappani Khalilov and Rasul Makasharipov (Dagestan) andMagomed Yevloyev (Ingushetia).21 For information on the war spilling over the neighbour-ing republics see inter alia: A. Riskin, M. Bondarenko, N. Po-pova, Nowoye podbrushye Rossii, Nezavisimaya Gazeta,20.08.2004; A. Magomedov, Dagestan na grani, http://yaseen.ru/politica/dag_na_grani.htm; O. Allerova, Dalshebudut Dagestan, Kabarda i Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Kom-mersant, 28.06.2004; S. Gomzikova, A. Riskin, Kavkaz ras-strelnyi, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 01.10.2003; I. Sukhov, Etoprivediot k bolszoi krovi, Vremia Novostei, 03.09.2004.22 For more information on the Chechen problem in Dage-stan see: Y. Kulchik, A. Adilsultanov, Chechentsi-Akkintsi(Aukhovtsi) i ikh grazhdanskiye formirovaniya, http://www.igpi.ru/bibl/igpi_publ/dag_akk/chechen.html; A. Aliyev,Chechentsi-Akkintsi Dagestana, Makhachkala 1993.23 For more information on the ethnic conflicts in Dagestansee: E. Kisriyev, Dagestan: prichiny konfliktov i faktory sta-bilnosti, Centralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz, http://www.ca-c.org/journal/cac-10-2000/20.kisriev.shtml; M. Savva, Konfliktnyipotentsial mezhetnicheskikh otnosheniy na Severnom Kav-kaze, Centralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz no. 3/2004.24 E.g. Nadirshakh Khachilaev, the leader of the Lak nationalmovement and thereafter advocate of creation of an Islamicrepublic in dagestan, who was murdered in August 2003, orthe well-known Magomedsalikh Gusaev, who was consideredas a potential successor of Magomedov, killed in the samemonth. For the story of the charismatic Khachilaev see:Komu mogla byt’ nuzhna smert’ Nadirshakha Khachilaeva?,http://www.politcom.ru/2003/gvozd181.php25 For more information on the power distribution systemin Dagestan see: Vvedeniye posta presidenta v Dagestane,http://www.svoboda.org/programs/cauc/2004/cauc.021804.asp; K. Kazenin, Krepok li tyl Rossii na Kavkaze? Chast’ 1,http://www.regnum.ru/allnews/326969.html26 Among others, Saigidpasha Umakhanov, mayor of Kha-savyurt; Gadji Makhachev, deputy to the Russian Duma;Ramazan Abdulatipov, member of the Federation Council ofSaratov oblast. While Magomedov, who is still supportedby the Kremlin, has taken actions to secure his own victoryin the approaching election (e.g. removing representativesof local authorities who are disloyal to him), the opposition,among whom Umakhanov has taken the lead, has promi-sed it will prevent his re-election. In late July/early August2004, there was serious unrest in Khasavyurt, during whichUmakhanov demanded that Magomedov should step downand early elections should be held. 27 For information on the power struggle in Dagestan dur-ing the recent months see: S. Samoilova, Dagestan: krizisklanovoi sistemy, http://www.politcom.ru/2004/zloba4596.php; A. Riskin, Raskol Dagestana stanovitsia realnostiu, Ne-zavisimaya Gazeta, 17.08.2004.

28 For more information on the so-called Lezgin issue see: E. Kisriyev, op. cit.29 The conflict genesis dates back to 1944, when Ingushesand Chechens were displaced and forced to settle in CentralAsia. The prigorodnyi district, which had earlier belonged tothe Chechen-Ingush ASSR, was then made a part of NorthOssetia, and Ossetians began settling on the Ingush land.Ingushes have never accepted this state of affairs. For moreinformation see: http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/caucas1/left41.htm; A. Dzadziyev, A. Dzarasov, Po zniesieniu stanuwyjàtkowego, Eurazja no. 1/1996, CES.30 Severnaya Osetiya – Ingushetiya: posledstviye terroris-ticheskogo akta w Beslane, http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/caucas1/prigorod/rubr/1/index.htm; Ivan Sukhow,Ogneopasnyi raion, Vremia Novostei, 06.09.2004.31 Similarly to Chechens and Ingushes, Balkars and Kara-chays had been displaced to Central Asia in the 40’s. Whilethey had been living in Kazakhstan, Kabardins and Circas-sians had settled on their land, which caused serious con-flicts after the return of Balkars and Karachays from exile.32 The muhajir were those residents of Caucasus, who wereforced by the Tsarist authorities to emigrate to Turkey andthe Middle East after the end of the Caucasian war in the19th century (they were mostly (Circassians, Chechens andDagestanis).33 For more information on the conflicts in the western partof Caucasus see: K. Kazenin, Krepok li tyl Rossii na SevernomKavkaze? Chast’ 3. Informatsionnoye Agentstvo Regnum,http://www.regnum.ru 34 Situatsiya v Karachayevo-Cherkessii posle vyborov;http://www.memo.ru/hr/news/karach3.htm; M. Bondarenko,Zharkiy iyul dla Karachayevo-Cherkessii, Nezavisimaya Ga-zeta, 14.03.2004.35 According to calculations made by Alexei Malashenko ofthe Moscow Carnegie Centre, approximately 4 million Mus-lims, i.e. one fourth of all the Muslims in Russia, live in NorthCaucasus. A. Malashenko, Islamskiye orientiry SevernogoKavkaza, Moscow: Moskovskiy Centr Carnegie 2001.36 Members of Kadiriya brotherhood e.g. played a great rolein the radicalisation of the Chechen separatists under therule of Jokhar Dudayev, and one of the Dagestani sheikhs,Said-efendi of Chirkey, is one of the key figures in the repub-lic, who de facto controls the SA of Muslims in Dagestan. Formore information on the North Caucasian Sufism see: A. Shykhsaidov, Islam v Dagestane, Centralnaya Aziya i Kav-kaz no. 5/1997; A. Malashenko, Islamskiye orientiry..., op.cit; Y. Chesnov, Sufizm i etnicheskiy mentalitet chechentsev,Rasy i Narody, no. 26/2001.37 In the Soviet times, many Muslim clergymen, similarly toRussian Orthodox priests, collaborated with KGB. For thisreason, they are not really respected by people. For moreinformation on the traditional Islam see: S. Berezhnoy, I Do-bayev (edited), Islam i islamizm na yuge Rossii, Yuzhno-rossiyskoye Obozreniye no. 11/2002; K. Kazenin, Prizrak wah-habizma, Vremia Novostei, 09.01.2003.38 For more information on the Wahhabi movement in NorthCaucasus see: V. Akayev, Islamskiy fundamentalism na Se-vernom Kavkaze: mif i realnost, Centralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz,no. 9/2000., A. Malashenko, Islamskiye orientiry..., op. cit.

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39 The first Islamic organisation in the USSR to opt for reformof Islam was the Islamic Rebirth Party, founded in 1990 inAstrakhan. Among its founding fathers were many Dage-stanians, including the key ideologist of Wahhabis, Bagaut-din Kebedov. 40 Both in Russian and international opinion, this was con-sidered barbarian (inter alia, several public executions inGrozny were shown), meanwhile, according to many scien-tists, among others Vladimir Bobrovnikov of the RussianAcademy of Sciences, Shariah could have had very positiveeffects on the security and stability in Caucasus. See: V. Bo-brovnikov, Islamofobia i religioznoye zakonodatelstvo v Da-gestane, Centralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz, http://www.ca-c.org/journal/cac-08-2000/15.bobrovn.shtml, V. Bobrovnikov,http://www.carnegie.ru/ru/pubs/books/volume/36592.htm41 In many cases, activities of Chechen commanders (e.g.trade in people) had nothing to do with Islam. There is evi-dence proving that some Wahhabi groups, whose actualmain activity is kidnapping people for ransom, are supportedby Federal Security Service to destabilise the situation inChechnya (Russian services supported inter alia the groupsof Arbi Barayev and of brothers Akhmadov).42 Many terrorist attacks in south Russia have been stagednot by Chechens but by Wahhabis from other republics.43 According to official data, the population of the entireNorth Caucasus grew by nearly 1 million in 1992–1999, V. Beloziorov, Migratsionniye processy na Severnom Kavkaze,http://www.polit.ru/country/2003/08/12/622836.html44 V. Beloziorov, Rusifikatsiya i derusifikatsiya: etnicheskayakarta Kavkaza vchera i siegodnia, Moscow: OGI 2003.45 Persecutions in Krasnodar Krai especially painfully affectedthe community of Meskhetin Turks (several ten thousandpeople), who after their driving out of Uzbekistan (they hadbeen deported there in 1943 upon an order of Joseph Stalinfrom the Georgian Meskhetia) started settling there, Ochered-noye izbiyeniye turok na Kubani, Informatsionnoye Agent-stvo Regnum of 17 January 2000, Mikhail Savva, Meskhe-tians head for America, http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/cau/cau_200408_246_2_eng.txt46 The most widespread form of harassment is causing pro-blems with getting the so-called propiska (permanent resi-dence registration) and registration (temporary residenceregistration) as well as forcing out protection money fromentrepreneurs and small traders of non-Russian nationalbackground.47 See inter alia: M. Nersesian, Southern Russia’s migrantsforce deportation, http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/cau/cau_200303_172_3_eng.txt; A. Nikolayev, Kuban dlakubanoidov, http://www.polit.ru/world/2003/09/12/624815.html; M. Bondarenko, Migranty ne dolzhny zhyt vozle stra-tegicheskikh obiektov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 14.04.2003.48 http://echo.msk.ru/7news/archive/197224.html49 According to official data, the average monthly incomeper person in North Caucasus is 65% of the general Russianmean, the average wages are 1.5 times lower than in theother parts of the Russian Federation, and 35% of all theRussian unemployed live in the region; http:///www.gzt.ru/rubricator_text.gzt?rubric=novosti&id=64050700000030580;

50 For more information on the demographic processes takingplace in North Caucasus see: http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2004/0157/analit05.php; http://www.mhg.ru/publications/3DDF63451 N. Agayeva, Dagestan’s capital bursts with migrants,http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/cau/cau_200406_236_4_eng.txt52 I. Maksakov, Kavkazskiy barometr, Nezavisimaya Gazeta,18.03.2002; V. Gavrikov, Biznes kavkazskoi natsionalnosti,Profil, 25.12.2000.53 For more information on the socioeconomic situation inCaucasus see: http://www.kavkaz.memo.ru.54 Alkhanov allegedly won over 70% votes, with the turn-out exceeding 80%. However, independent journalists andhuman rights activists claim that not more than 20% ofChechens cast their ballots. 55 The hysterical and highly emotional reactions of Russia’srepresentatives (including president Putin) any time theChechen issue is raised by Western politicians or journal-ists prove how painful a problem Chechnya is for Moscow. 56 I.e. de facto a war, though the current conflict in Chechnyahas never been called a war. Instead, the term “antiterror-ist operation” is used.57 For more information on the development of terrorism inRussia see: M. Falkowski, Skàd si´ wzià∏ terroryzm w Rosji?,Week in the East, 22 January 2004.58 In Chechnya alone, nearly 80 thousand officers of theRussian law enforcement agencies are stationed, more thana half of which are soldiers of the federal army (the otherunits report to inter alia the Ministry of Internal Affairs andFederal Security Service). As a total, the North Caucasian Mi-litary District has more than 102 thousand soldiers (of theRussian Ground Forces alone), which accounts for 10% ofthe total professional staff of the Russian army and as muchas 32% of the Ground Forces. 59 CES News, 15 September 2004.60 For many Russian generals Chechnya has meant thebeginning of their political career; e.g. Gen. Viktor Kazan-tsev, former commander of the federal forces in Caucasus,in 2000–2004, was the Russian president’s envoy to thesouthern federal district, Gen. Vladimir Shamanov, formercommander of the 58th Army in Chechnya, is the governor ofUlyanovsk oblast, Gen. Konstantin Pulikovsky, former com-mander of Russian forces in Chechnya (during the first war)is the Russian president’s envoy to the far-east federal dis-trict, etc. 61 For more information see: W. Górecki, E. Paszyc, Walka o czeczeƒskà rop´, Week in the East, 4 January 2001.62 The election results in the Caucasian republics are alwaysincredibly good for the Kremlin, and the turnout is very high.E.g. in this March presidential election, in Dagestan theturnout was allegedly 94.09% (94.61% voted for Putin), inIngushetia 96.22% (98.28% for Putin) and in Chechnya 94%(92.3% for Putin). Such results indicate that the electionsare evidently fixed there, http://kavkaz.memo.ru/reginfotext/reginfo/id/656852.html63 The only contact between the Kremlin and the separa-tists were the talks between president Maskhadov’s envoyAkhmad Zakayev and of the Russian president’s envoy to

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the southern federal district, Gen. Viktor Kazantsev, whichwere held in December 2001 at Sheremetievo airport inMoscow. Due to the negative attitude of the Kremlin to fur-ther talks, they have not been continued. 64 Ziazikov, who has been forced upon Ingushes, is so un-popular that eruption of serious social unrest in Ingushetiacannot be excluded in the nearest future (the oppositionhas many a time promised active undertakings to removehim from power). 65 The Kremlin’s propaganda of success in Chechnya hasnot overlooked even such a field as sports: president Putinhimself has engaged in this by meeting several times withTerek Grozny football team (by the way playing outside ofChechnya) after the Chechen club had won the Cup of Russia. 66 It is impossible for western journalists to legally get intoChechnya, and most Russian journalists stick to the autho-rities’ directives on proper selection of information on Che-chnya. Noticeable is the clear difference between the firstand the second Chechen wars: during the conflict in1994–1996, journalists used to go to Chechnya unimpeded,and their independent and critical reports contributed toending the first war (the Russian public, who were infor-med in an unbiased way, were definitely against the con-tinuation of the war). 67 The mass media which the Kremlin uses for its propa-ganda concerning the situation in North Caucasus include:TV stations ORT and RTR, Rossiyskaya Gazeta daily newspa-per (http://www.rg.ru), and the websites: www.strana.ru,www.kavkaz.strana.ru, www.chechnyafree.ru, www.utro.ru,www.rian.ru and other.68 For information on the negative effect of the situation inChechnya on Russia see: M. Falkowski, Chechnya and Rus-sia: The significance of the Chechen problem for contempo-rary Russia, CES Studies, August 2003.69 L. Radikhovsky, Zakon sokhraneniya energii, http://www.politcom.ru/2004/pvz486.php70 The tendency is noticeable, although, for the time being,it is difficult to assess its real scale. It, however, cannot beexcluded that in the future the idea of Caucasian solidarity,which failed in the 90’s, will revive owing to the religiousunity of Caucasian nations.71 An example of lack of identification with the Russian sta-te can be the results of conscription to the army in NorthCaucasian republics, for instance, in 2003, in Chirkey, one ofthe largest Dagestani villages in Buinaksk district, out of the197 conscripts only 4 could be drafted in due time; http://www.regnum.ru/allnews/199836.html. The intensifyinganti-Russian sentiments, the growing feeling of being dis-tinct from the rest of Russia and of Caucasian solidarity, aswell as the increasingly faster Islamisation of the region arealso reflected in the trends dominating in the culturalworks of young residents of Caucasus, such as Chechenbards (Timur Mutsurayev, Imam Alimsultanov and others)popular in the entire region, and of many Caucasian musi-cians, writers and poets. 72 See: J. Rogo˝a, Putin after re-election, current issue of theCES Studies.73 This forecast is based on the assumption that the currenttendencies will persist in the region for at least ten years or

even several decades. It also seems that such a scenariowould only have been possible in the case of a radicalchange of both the ruling team and the political system inRussia. Most of the Russian public seems not to be againstsuch a turn of events: already today, the number of sup-porters of withdrawing the troops from Chechnya and sep-aration of the republic from Russia (to get rid of an unnec-essary area which absorbs enormous funds and where hun-dreds of Russian soldiers die) is relatively high. 74 Even though problems of North Caucasus are very sig-nificant for Russia, still they must not be overrated, asthere exist many other important issues, the meaning ofwhich is equally important for the future of the RussianFederation. 75 Already today, a few dozen thousand Chechen refugeeslive in European Union countries, and their number is con-stantly growing; nearly 4 thousand Chechens annuallyapply for being granted the refugee status in such coun-tries as Austria, Czech Republic or Poland. 76 Since 1994, nearly 1 million young Russians coming fromall the regions of the country have served in Chechnya. Mostof them are unable to normally function in the society. 77 Data on all the republics, according to: http://wgeo.ru/russia/okr_ugn.shtml; http://kavkaz.memo.ru/encyclopedia/;http://www.c-s-r.ru/rusinfo/sev-kavkaz.htm 65

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Abbreviations: N.O. – North Ossetia; S.O. – South Ossetia; ING. – Ingushetia