North Atlantic Treaty Organization VMUN 2016 Background ...

North Atlantic Treaty Organization VMUN 2016 Background Guide 1


Dear Delegates, Welcome to NATO! My name is Raymond, and it is an absolute pleasure to be your director for VMUN 2015. A little bit about myself: I’m a senior student at St. George’s School, and I’ve been with MUN since Grade 7. Together with your chair Wendy and your AD Julie, we can’t wait to get to know all of you – looking forward to 3 days of fantastic debate, growth, and co-operation! You may have noticed that the two agenda items for NATO this year concern Maritime Piracy and Cyber Defense – topics that are highly relevant to our world today. In defending the interests of the NATO nations in the 21st century, it pays to carefully consider how modern technology, warfare, and the changing international-relations landscape have shifted the approach of the organization. In October 2001, NATO launched the maritime surveillance operation Active Endeavor, focused on detecting and deterring terrorist activity in the Mediterranean. Since April 2003, NATO has been systematically boarding suspect ships; this operation was later combined with Operation Ocean Shield and focused on at-sea counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. Both Operation Active Endeavor and Operation Ocean Shield have proven to be extremely effective in achieving the goal of reducing international terrorism through the gathering of intelligence, detaining known terrorists and destroying weapons. However, piracy and maritime crimes are still very active problems to date. Cyber defense stands as a core component of NATO’s task of collective defense, and currently, NATO is advancing its efforts to confront a wide range of cyber threats on a daily basis. The growing sophistication of cyber-attacks makes the protection of the Alliance’s communications and information systems (CIS) an urgent task. NATO must now enhance its capabilities for cyber education, training and exercises in order to continue protecting the interests of its members and the integrity of the alliance, and it is up to all of you to come up with the right plan. During your research, we implore you to consider your bloc positions carefully, and to think outside the box. Undoubtedly, there will be a significant amount of information to digest as you research these topics. Please do not hesitate to get in touch with us if you have any questions. Sincerely, Raymond Wang Director, North Atlantic Treaty Organization | VMUN 2016

Jake Hauser Secretary-General

Jason Liu

Director-General

Andrew Tsai Chief of Staff

Claudia Wang

USG General Assemblies

Chris Pang USG Committees

Alvin Tsuei

USG Delegate Affairs 1

Eva Zhang USG Delegate Affairs 2

Ashley Ng

USG Conference

Evan Johnson USG Finance

Isabelle Cheng

USG Sponsorship

Sunny Cui USG Marketing

VANCOUVER MODEL UNITED NATIONS the fifteenth annual conference | January 22-24, 2016


North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Position Paper Policy What is a Position Paper? A position paper is a brief overview of a country’s stance on the topics being discussed by a particular committee. Though there is no specific format the position paper must follow, it should include a description of your positions your country holds on the issues on the agenda, relevant actions that your country has taken, and potential solutions that your country would support. At Vancouver Model United Nations, delegates should write a position paper for each of the committee’s topics. Each position paper should not exceed one page, and should all be combined into a single document per delegate. For the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, position papers are mandatory, especially for a delegate to be considered for an award. Formatting Position papers should: — Include the name of the delegate, his/her country, and the committee — Be in a standard font (e.g. Times New Roman) with a 12-point font size and 1-inch document margins — Not include illustrations, diagrams, decorations, national symbols, watermarks, or page borders — Include citations and a bibliography, in any format, giving due credit to the sources used in research (not included in the 1-page limit) Due Dates and Submission Procedure Position papers for this committee must be submitted by midnight on January 15th, 2016. Once your position paper is complete, please save the file as your last name, your first name and send it as an attachment in an email, to your committee’s email address, with the subject heading as your last name, your first name — Position Paper. Please do not add any other attachments to the email or write anything else in the body. Both your position papers should be combined into a single PDF or Word document file; position papers submitted in another format will not be accepted. Each position paper will be manually reviewed and considered for the Best Position Paper award. The email address for this committee is [email protected].


Table of Contents

Enhancing NATO’s Maritime Operational Capabilities ....................................................................... 5Overview ..................................................................................................................................................................... 5

General ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 5Gulf of Aden: Operation Ocean Shield .................................................................................................................................. 6Mediterranean Sea: Operation Active Endeavour ................................................................................................................ 6

Timeline - Gulf of Aden ............................................................................................................................................ 7Historical Analysis ..................................................................................................................................................... 8

Gulf of Aden .............................................................................................................................................................................. 8Mediterranean ........................................................................................................................................................................... 9

Current Situation ....................................................................................................................................................... 9Anti-Piracy ................................................................................................................................................................................. 9

Past UN/International Involvement ...................................................................................................................... 10Possible Solutions and Controversies ................................................................................................................... 11Bloc Positions ........................................................................................................................................................... 11Discussion Questions .............................................................................................................................................. 12Additional Sources .................................................................................................................................................. 13References ................................................................................................................................................................. 13

Cybersecurity and SIGINT .................................................................................................................. 15

Overview ................................................................................................................................................................... 15Timeline .................................................................................................................................................................... 15Historical Context ................................................................................................................................................... 17

The Logic Bomb (1980’s) ....................................................................................................................................................... 17Increased Use (1990’s) ............................................................................................................................................................ 17Commonplace Cyber Attacks (2000’s) ................................................................................................................................. 18

Current Situation & Analysis of Cyber-Attack Trends: ...................................................................................... 18“Limited” Cyber Attacks ........................................................................................................................................................ 18Cyber Espionage ...................................................................................................................................................................... 19“Unrestricted” Cyber Attacks ................................................................................................................................................ 19

Current NATO Involvement: ................................................................................................................................. 19NATO Policy on Cyber-Defence .......................................................................................................................................... 19Assisting individual Allies ...................................................................................................................................................... 20Developing the NATO cyber defence capability ................................................................................................................. 20Increasing NATO cyber defence capacity ............................................................................................................................ 21Cooperation with partners .................................................................................................................................................... 21Cooperation with industry .................................................................................................................................................... 21

Bloc Positions ........................................................................................................................................................... 22Within NATO .......................................................................................................................................................................... 22Within the international community ................................................................................................................................... 22

Discussion Questions .............................................................................................................................................. 23Additional Resources .............................................................................................................................................. 23References ................................................................................................................................................................. 24


North Atlantic Treaty Organization Topic A

Enhancing NATO’s Maritime Operational Capabilities Overview

Figure 1: NATO maritime operations within the Gulf of Aden

General The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is unique in its operational structure as the opinions of member nations notoriously align on a preconceived basis. The organization operates using three parallel structures (military, civilian and organization/agencies). The political decision-making and oversight body, known as ‘Headquarters’, hosts over 5,000 meetings a year in order to facilitate dialogue on the topic of enhancing security and fostering peace within member countries and beyond. This sheer level of collaboration allows for limited differentiation amongst member perspectives with regards to international security matters. The 2010 Strategic Concept defines NATO’s cores tasks as: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. Therefore, it is in the interest of all members to collaborate in an effort to ensure domestic security and strive for peace abroad. NATO is responsible for two active maritime operations known as Operation Ocean Shield and Operation Active Endeavour. These operations are facilitated by Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), which is based at Northwood Headquarters in Middlesex, United Kingdom. These operations are facilitated through Immediate Reaction Forces known as Standing Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1), Standing Maritime Group 2 (SNMG1) in collaboration with Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups (SNMCMG1 and SNMCMG2)1. These maritime groups are multinational, integrated forces that compose of various allied vessels that are permanently available to NATO MARCOM, along with numerous vessels from members of the international community that are not

1 "Operation Active Endeavour." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. n.p., n.d. Web. 12 July 2015. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm&gt


part of NATO, including China, Russia, Pakistan, and more. They focus specifically on protection and security to secure the region, fight piracy, and ensure safe transport of goods and relief supplies. These two operations have been significantly beneficial in enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Aden and the Mediterranean Sea. These operations are integral to ensuring the implementation of peace and the obedience of international law in global waterways. Furthermore, these operations have fostered a new type of maritime collaboration amongst maritime forces to reduce tyranny in international waters. 2Conducted in accordance with the rules of international law, these operations have directly opposed the growth of terrorism and the constant danger of piracy. Gulf of Aden: Operation Ocean Shield Piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the Horn of Africa and in the Indian Ocean has been hindering the success of international humanitarian missions, in conjunction to compromising the safety of one of the world’s most essential maritime routes, the Suez Cannel. Furthermore, this body of water has been used for the transportation of assets and weapons that could be used in terrorist actions against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members. Operations in the Gulf of Aden began after a request made by United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in late 2008. Following this request, NATO began providing escorts to United Nation (UN) and World Food Programme (WFP) vessels transiting through these dangerous waters3. This first operation was branded under the alias Operation Allied Provider. In addition to providing close protection to WFP chartered ships, this operation conducted deterrence patrols that prevented vessels from being hijacked and reduced the ability for ship employees to be taken hostage. Operation Allied Provider concluded in December of 2008 and was seceded by the currently active Operation Ocean Shield3. This current NATO led coalition is currently slated to conclude at the end of 2016. Operation Ocean Shield’s actions are complemented by Combined Task Force 151, a naval ant-piracy force known for the famous rescue of Captain Richard Philips, and Operation Atalanta, another naval force operated by the European Union, as well as individual deployments from China, India and South Korea, in the fight against maritime terrorism5. These two operations have experienced significant levels of success in reducing the overall pirate attack success rate. Specifically, Operation Atalanta has been reduced from 44 per cent in 2004 to 16 per cent in 20114. All of these operations happened within the Gulf of Aden, an extension of the Indian Ocean located in between Africa and Asia, which forms a natural territorial separation between the countries of Somalia and Yemen. This area flows into the Red Sea through the Bab el Mandeb. The main ports along the Gulf of Aden are situated in Aden in Yemen, Djibouti City in Djibouti, and Zeila, Berbera and Bosano in Somalia. Piracy in the region has impeded the delivery of shipments and increased shipping expenses, costing an estimated $6.6 to $6.9 billion a year in global trade in 2015. The Gulf of Aden and NATO’s area of operation is in close proximity to the Strait of Hormuz. This strait (found between Iran and Oman) is responsible for the exportation of 17 million barrels per day, equivalent to approximately 30% of all seaborne-traded oil10, and needs to be closely protected. Mediterranean Sea: Operation Active Endeavour 2 "Counter-piracy Operations." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. N.p., n.d. Web. 11 July 2015. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48815.htm?selectedLocale=en 3 "NATO Standing Maritime Groups." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 July 2015. <http://www.mc.nato.int/org/smg/Pages/default.aspx>. 4 "Gulf of Aden." - New World Encyclopedia. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 July 2015. <http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Gulf_of_Aden>.


Under Operation Active Endeavour, NATO vessels are patrolling the Mediterranean and monitoring shipping to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist activity. Operation Active Endeavour is currently NATO’s only Article 5 operation on Anti-Terrorism activities5. The current mandate consists of tracking and controlling suspicious vessels through boarding, searching, and seizing boats in the general area. By conducting these maritime operations against terrorist activity, NATO’s presence in these waters has benefited all shipping travelling through the Straits of Gibraltar by improving both the quality and scale of security. Keeping the Mediterranean’s busy trade routes open and safe is critical to NATO’s success. In terms of energy alone, some 65 per cent of the oil and natural gas consumed in Western Europe pass through the Mediterranean each year, with major pipelines connecting Libya to Italy and Morocco to Spain6

. For this reason, NATO ships are systematically carrying out preparatory route surveys in “choke” points as well as in important passages and harbors throughout the Mediterranean. This operation functions by vessels traversing through the Eastern Mediterranean being hailed for inspection by NATO warships seeking identification of themselves and their activity. This information is then reported to NATO’s Maritime Commander in Northwood, United Kingdom. If anything appears unusual or suspicious, teams of between 15 and 20 of the ships’ crew may board vessels to inspect documentation and cargo13. These NATO ships and helicopters have also aided in many rescue missions to save civilians on stricken oilrigs and sinking ships. Timeline - Gulf of Aden 1963 - The Aden Emergency In what is now known as Yemen, there is an insurgence against the British crown forces. Through October to November, the National Liberation Front (NLF) attacks the British High Commission, killing one and injuring fifty. Because of this, the British Government declares this as a state of emergency. 2000 - Bombing of the USS Cole The bombing of the USS Cole (DDG-67), the US Navy guided-missile destroyer, occurs on October 12th, 2000. The USS Cole is attacked when it was harbored in the Yemeni port of Aden. Recognized as a terrorist attack, 17 American sailors are killed and 39 face injuries.7 2004 - Founding of Combined Task Force 152 (CTF 152) Operated by the Combined Maritime Forces, the Combined Task Force 152 (CTF 152) is founded. It is utilized in the Arabian Gulf during which it conducts Maritime Security Operations, coordinates Theatre Security Cooperation activities with nearby partners, and remains ready to respond to crises. 2008 - Founding of NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield

5 "Mediterranean Sea." WorldAtlas. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 July 2015. <http:// www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/infopage/medsea.htm>. 6 Operation Active Endeavour. (n.d.). Retrieved December 15, 2015, from http://www.mc.nato.int/ops/Pages/OAE.aspx 7 “Bombing of USS Cole” (n.d.). Retrieved December 12, 2015, from http://www.911memorial.org/uss-cole-bombing


The NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield is founded in 2008 as a counter piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa. With the founding of this mission, NATO has been aiding in disrupting and deterring pirate attacks as well as protecting ships and increasing the level of regional security. 2009 - Founding of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) Set up to respond to piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, the Combined Task Force 151 is a continental naval task force established in 2009. Its purpose is to disrupt armed robbery at sea and halt piracy as well as engage with partners to improve capabilities in order to ensure navigation freedom and protect worldwide maritime commerce.8 2011 - Founding of NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour Beginning as support to the United States after the 9/11 attack, Operation Active Endeavour is created on October 24th. It is currently NATO’s only Article 5 operation on Anti-Terrorism activities. This mission ensures ships patrol the Mediterranean and monitor shipping in order to protect against terrorism. This operation additionally enables NATO in strengthening its bonds with partner countries. 2014 - NATO Operation Ocean Shield Mandate Extended In June, the North Atlantic Council extended the Operation Ocean Shield Mandate until the end of the year 2016. 2016 - NATO Operation Ocean Shield Mandate Expires Due to the 2014 extension of the Operation Ocean Shield Mandate, the operation will expire at the end of 2016. Historical Analysis Gulf of Aden In the early 1980s, prior to the outbreak of the civil war in Somalia, the Somali Ministry of Fisheries and the Coastal Development Agency (CDA) launched a development program focusing on the establishment of agricultural and fishery cooperatives for local Somali fishermen. This project was aimed at curbing unemployment, all the while enhancing the countries Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Maritime studies found that Somalia had a virtually unexploited stockpile of fish that could aid in the country’s economic stabilization. Somalia began seeking foreign investment for fishing through licensing and fishing alliances. Three alliances with Italy, Iraq and the USSR were brokered as a result. After the collapse of the central government in the ensuing civil war, the Somali Navy disbanded. With Somali territorial waters now undefended, foreign fishing trawlers began illegally fishing within Somali coastal waters. Furthermore, foreign merchant vessels began dumping large quantities of toxic waste into the Gulf’s waters.9 These illicit activities led to the erosion of fish stock off the Somali coast, which furthermore led to an increase in the level of poverty in Somalia.

8CTF 151: Counter-piracy (n.d.). Retrieved December 11th, 2015 from http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151-counter-piracy/ 9 "Somalia Fishing Industry Has Growth Potential." National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (n.d.): n. p. Web. 4 July 2015.


In response, local fishermen began to form armed groups to stop the further ships, but then began to turn to hijacking foreign vessels as an alternate source of income. They began cooperating with each other in order to deter these illegal activities through the use of their fishing skiffs to facilitate hijackings and hostage takings. After seeing the profitability of ransom payments, some financiers and former militiamen later began to fund pirate activities, creating profit-splitting schemes with the former fishermen. After an incredibly high rise of piracy in the area, NATO began its initial operation, Operation Allied Protector with ships from nine member nations. Just four days after its deployment on March 24th, 2009, the USS Halyburton engaged in open combat with a pirate skiff, coming under both machine-gun fire and a rocket-propelled grenade attack. This set the precedent for the next few years to come, with small pockets of violence coming up every few weeks. Immediately after the termination of Operation Allied Protection, NATO began Operation Open Shield, this time with 13 NATO member states, in conjunction with 17 non-member NATO states.10 These operations have been incredibly effective, creating both a strong deterrence against future pirate attacks and drastically reducing the number of successful ones. By the end of 2011, pirates had only managed to successfully seize four ships off the coast of Somalia compared to the 26 that they had captured the year before. Mediterranean The operation evolved out of NATO’s immediate response to the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001.16 In lieu of its success, this operation has been continued and expanded to foster increased maritime security within the region. Operation Active Endeavour was originally an Article Five Response Package that was one of eight initiatives launched after the attack against New York City. The main idea behind Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty is that it commits each member state to consider an armed attack against one member state be an armed attack against all member states, leading to the deployment of this naval operation. 11 This Operation serves as a measure to control and identify the movement of vessels through the Mediterranean Sea. By doing so, the shipment of weapons as well as the movement of individuals with ties to terrorist organizations may be reduced. Since its creation, these ships have monitored over 100,000 ships and have conducted voluntary boarding of over 100. They have also escorted over 480 vessels through the strait of Griblatar. In addition to its constant anti-terrorism operations, this operation has also brought two tangible benefits to the region, by both acting as recue ships and working with the Greek government on illegal immigration. On December 4, 2001, three NATO ships removed 84 oil workers from a stricken oil rig. On March 23, 2006, NATO forces alerted the Greek coast guard of a vessel named M/V Crystal, which attempted to smuggle 126 illegal immigrants. Current Situation Anti-Piracy

10 "United Nations Documents on Piracy." UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web. 12 July 2015. <http://www.un.org/depts/los/piracy/piracy_documents.htm>. 11 Nordenman, M. (2015, July 13). The Naval Alliance: Preparing NATO for a Maritime Century. Retrieved December 15, 2015, from http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/the-naval-alliance-preparing-nato-for-a-maritime-century


Since 2011, rates of Somali piracy have been reduced dramatically due to the presence of international naval vessels in the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Furthermore, piracy has been reduced due to the implementation innovative anti-piracy methods being implemented by many shipping companies. However, the same cannot be said for West Africa’s Gulf of Guinea. Between 1995 and 2013, 1,129 incidents of piracy were reported in the Gulf of Guinea. This represents a shift from East to West African Waters. According to UNOSAT, in 2012 “more seafarers were subject to attacks and boardings by West African piracy than by Somalia-based piracy.” In 2012, 73 incidents occurred. In total, 207 crew members were taken hostage by West African pirates. This east-west shift prompted United Kingdom insurance group Lloyd’s to rate the risk of piracy in the region at the same rate as they do for Somalia. West African pirates have often targeted vessels carrying oil exports from Nigeria. This has prompted many piracy experts to refer to these groups as “petro-pirates.”12 Unlike their Somali counterparts, are more interested in stealing the target’s cargo (oil) rather than kidnapping the crew. In the first six months of 2013, 30 such attacks took place. Once these pirates take control of tanker ships, they often crudely transfer the oil onto smaller vessels and bring their bounty to shore and sell the oil on the black market. These pirates have known links to terrorist organizations including Nigeria-based Boko Haram and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) where piracy provides an ideal revenue stream for these groups to generate funds. In combination to the rise of piracy in Western Africa, Southeastern Asia has seen an exponential rise in piracy. A survey from Dryad shows that the majority of maritime crime now occurs around Southeast Asia. For comparison, in July 2015 there have been 34 incidents of crime in the Gulf of Guinea near West Africa and just four incidents in the Indian Ocean. This Increase of Piracy represents a 22% year over year for incidents in the region. There were a further 25 attacks around the rest of the world. NATO will maintain its counter-piracy efforts through Operation Ocean Shield at sea and ashore by supporting countries in the region to build the capacity to fight piracy themselves until the end of calendar year 2016. Past UN/International Involvement The fights against maritime piracy is being fought on numerous fronts. The War against modern piracy has seen significant collaboration on the part of the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and various sovereign nations. The United Nations has forged numerous Security Council Resolutions in an attempt to reduce piracy in the Gulf of Yemen and the Gulf of Guinea. These resolutions are listed as follows: Resolution 1816 (2008) , Resolution 1838 (2008) , Resolution 1846 (2008) , Resolution 1851 (2008) , Resolution 1897 (2009) , Resolution 1918 (2010) , Resolution 1950 (2010) , Resolution 1976 (2011) , Resolution 2015 (2011) , Resolution 2018 (2011) , Resolution 2020 (2011) , Resolution 2039 (2012).13

12 "Petro-Piracy: Oil and Troubled Waters." Foreign Policy Research Institute. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 July 2015. <http://www.fpri.org/articles/2013/07/petro-piracy-oil-and- troubled-waters>. 13 "United Nations Documents on Piracy." UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web. 12 July 2015. <http://www.un.org/depts/los/piracy/piracy_documents.htm>.


It should be reaffirmed that Operation Ocean Shield was facilitated at the request of United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to facilitate the protection of World Food Programme (WFP) vessels. This protection of relief and aid ensures that the UN peacekeeping missions in the region can actually provide aid to the people. Furthermore, international policing agencies such as INTERPOL have been actively seized in pursuing the sharing of international intelligence and prosecuting resources. Possible Solutions and Controversies Expanding NATO’s maritime purview is a proposition that may be able to enhance security levels on a multitude of international waterways. The success of Operation Ocean Shield and Operation Active Endeavour attest to the organizations ability to strengthen international cooperation in the pursuit of maritime security. The lessons learned through these two operations can be used to enhance the efficiency of future international naval endeavours. One possibility for enhancing these capabilities involves implementing regional operational zones that a Standing Maritime Group would be stationed to. Rather than utilizing specific operations, vessels can be assigned to certain approved security tasks assigned by NATO Headquarters and NATO’s military committee. In doing so, response times to situations of international precedence are reduced. Furthermore, member nations resources are better coordinated in a means that allows for efficient use of naval assets. By reducing the amount of operational task forces in the region into one central command, real time information has the potential to be distributed with increased speed and accuracy. Operational necessities can be better aligned to the current situation as real time decisions pertaining to all active regional warships can be made by one central command structure. By securing international waterways, the likelihood of piracy is reduced. This increased level of security also provides a medium for the reduction of international arms and human trade, equating to domestic security enhancements. This expansion of maritime responsibility could be seen by non NATO member nations as policing international waters through Western influence. It is important to note that numerous unaffiliated nations conduct naval operations in international waters with the intent of fostering peace through the reduction of piracy and monitoring of trade. Nonetheless, certain nations may be threatened by an increasingly organized western flotilla operating in international waters within the vicinity of their own sovereign costal waters. Bloc Positions Europe The Operation Ocean Shield’s actions are complemented by Operation Atalanta, the European Union’s current counter-piracy maritime mission. Because of this, most European countries are in support of enhancing maritime missions. However, because the European Union and NATO share many maritime operational theatres and many member states, the EU nations would want to avoid costly and duplicative maritime operations.14 United States of America Ever since the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, the United States has been keen on monitoring possible terrorist activities. The United States remains wary of foreign activities and would want to enhance maritime operational capabilities in order to maintain safety for the nation and for its civilians. With the founding of NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour as a support to the US and with

14 “Operation Atalanta” Retrieved December 12th, 2015 from http://eunavfor.eu/


its continuous success, it is clear that the United States believe the operations are integral for peace and obedience of international law in global waterways. Middle East In order to move forward in its maritime operations, NATO must first consider its use in the global domain. Central to a crumbling Middle East, maritime operations enhancement is necessary. With Syria’s ongoing civil war, there is turbulence near the Mediterranean’s south rim, initiating a large flow of refugees across the Mediterranean. Maritime enhancement is required to monitor the bodies of water, oversee refugee travels, and halt smugglers. Asia and Oceania Relating to transatlantic interests and security, NATO’s operations have become increasingly popular. Because Asian and Oceanic nations are close to many bodies of water, the seas are vital transportation routes for global trade. If terrorist activity disrupt this flow of trade, economic security could be in peril. Thus, Asian and Oceanic countries have expressed interest in increasing maritime operations and power. In order to avoid possible disruptions to trade and to safety of the nation, it seems that the enhancement of maritime operational capabilities is favored by Asia and Oceania. The Russian Federation has updated their maritime doctrine ‘to counter NATO’s eastward expansion’. Further military asset increases made on behalf of the organization to enhance maritime readiness may be seen by the Russian Federation as being a threat. The Russian government has increased ties with the People’s Republic of China in an effort to promote eastern collaboration. Discussion Questions 1. Would an increased presence of NATO warships in international waters increase the safety of maritime vessels? 2. Would patrolling international waterways reduce terrorism and the trafficking of illicit goods? 3. Should NATO station Standing Maritime Groups into geographical areas that are deemed to be high risk for terrorist/piracy related activities? 4. Would an individual central command be an effective means of dispatching member’s vessels? 5. How can an international command be facilitated without reducing the presence of a member’s unique and domestic actives? 6. Would establishing a central operational command be considered a sovereign threat to non member nations? 7. What is the legal ability of NATO to patrol international territorial waters? 8. Should NATO continue Operation Ocean Shield beyond it’s 2016 date of expiration? 9. Can NATO effectively asset international shipping companies in safely transiting international waters of major concern?


Additional Sources NATO Shipping Centre: http://www.shipping.nato.int/Pages/default.aspx Royal Navy: http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/operations/mediterranean-and-black-sea/nato-mcmv IMB Piracy Reporting Centre: https://icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea: http://www.un.org/depts/los/index.htm References "Operation Active Endeavour." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 July 2015.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm&gt "Counter-piracy Operations." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. N.p., n.d. Web. 11 July 2015.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48815.htm?selectedLocale=en "NATO Standing Maritime Groups." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 July 2015.

<http://www.mc.nato.int/org/smg/Pages/default.aspx>. "Gulf of Aden." - New World Encyclopedia. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 July 2015.

<http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Gulf_of_Aden>. "Mediterranean Sea." WorldAtlas. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 July 2015.

<http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/infopage/medsea.htm>. "Somalia Fishing Industry Has Growth Potential." National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration

(n.d.): n. pag. Web. 4 July 2015. "United Nations Documents on Piracy." UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web. 12 July 2015.

<http://www.un.org/depts/los/piracy/piracy_documents.htm>. Suez Canal Oil Transport Statistics. Suez Canal Authority, n.d. Web. 11 July 2015.

<www.suezcanal.gov.eg%2FTRstat.aspx%3FreportId%3D7>. "Petro-Piracy: Oil and Troubled Waters." Foreign Policy Research Institute. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 July

2015. <http://www.fpri.org/articles/2013/07/petro-piracy-oil-and-troubled-waters>. CTF 152: Gulf Maritime Security. (2010, September 17). Retrieved December 15, 2015, from

http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-152-gulf-security-cooperation/ Friedman, H. (2007, January 30). Psyop of the Aden Emergency 1963-1967. Retrieved December 15,

2015, from http://www.psywar.org/aden.php


Nordenman, M. (2015, July 13). Opinion: Russia, Middle East Will Define NATO's Emerging Maritime Century. Retrieved December 15, 2015, from http://news.usni.org/2015/07/13/opinion-russia-middle-east-will-define-natos-emerging-maritime-century

Nordenman, M. (2015, July 13). The Naval Alliance: Preparing NATO for a Maritime Century.

Retrieved December 15, 2015, from http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/the-naval-alliance-preparing-nato-for-a-maritime-century

Operation Active Endeavour. (n.d.). Retrieved December 15, 2015, from

http://www.mc.nato.int/ops/Pages/OAE.aspx Operation Ocean Shield. (n.d.). Retrieved December 15, 2015, from

http://www.mc.nato.int/ops/Pages/OOS.aspx


North Atlantic Treaty Organization Topic B

Cybersecurity and SIGINT Overview With the world’s increasing reliance on technology and web-based services, the threat of cyber-attacks is becoming an increasingly concerning topic. Cyber-attacks take many forms, and are generally defined to encompass any type of offensive maneuver employed by individuals or groups, often anonymously, to target electronic infrastructure and computer information systems, in order to steal from, alter, or destroy vulnerable systems. Depending on their severity, cyber-attacks can range from simple spyware installations to entire campaigns in forms of organized cyber warfare or cyber terrorism, designed to disrupt key infrastructure of entire nations. As cyber-attacks become increasingly sophisticated, NATO is advancing its efforts to confront a wide range of cyber threats on a daily basis. The protection of the Alliance's communications and information systems (CIS) is becoming an increasingly urgent task. Thus, cyber defense stands as a core component of NATO’s task of collective defense.15 Since the ratification of the first cyber defense policy in January 2008 against Estonia, NATO has been responsible for protecting its own networks, which interconnect with those of member nations. In the recent years, NATO has been intensifying its cooperation with industry. In conjunction with this, NATO aims to enhance its capabilities for cyber education, training and exercises. As the breadth and severity of cyber-attacks worsen, it is critical that NATO member states take further steps to protect the security of their common systems in cyberspace. As with nuclear, biological and traditional weapons, NATO must now discuss the issue and create a detailed plan to ready themselves against the growing threat of cyber-attacks.16 Timeline 1941 - Because of its usefulness in World War II to decode Japanese transmissions, the SIGINT cooperation is finalized and establishes its importance in the world. 1942 - The Central Bureau of the Allied Intelligence Bureau for the Pacific is instated in Melbourne, maintained by a US Chief and an Australian Deputy Chief. 1947- The first general purpose electronic computer is introduced. 1982 - Soviet gas pipeline explodes due to logic bomb, in one of the earliest instances of cyber-exploitation. 1988 - Mainly in the US, the Morris worm is spread to computers, which slows the machines down to unusable conditions. It is one of the first worms to affect the emerging global cyber infrastructure. 1998 - During the Kosovo war, the US hacks into Serbian air force programs. 2001 – The Nimda computer virus attacks financial systems, causing major economic damage.

15 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm 16 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm


2006 - NASA’s plans for US space launch vehicles are hacked by unknown overseas intruders. NASA is forced to block all attachments in emails before the launch. April 2007 - After a disagreement with Russia, Estonia is hacked by foreign intruders. Online government services and banking are halted. However, the Estonian government responds immediately and resolves the issue in just a few days. June 2007 - Unknown infiltrators hack into The US Secretary of Defense’s email account in order to access and utilize the Pentagon’s network. October 2007 - After spyware was discovered in the networks of designated departments, The People’s Republic of China’s Ministry of Security states that overseas hackers, with about 42% of them from Taipei and another 25% of them from the United States, have been stealing key information from the Chinese network. 2008 - Cyber-attacks take on major roles in the Russia-Georgia conflict. 2009 - Israel’s internet infrastructure is hacked during the Gaza Strip military offensive. With a focus mainly on government databases, the attack is carried out to approximately 5,000,000 computers. 2010 - The Iranian Cyber Army disrupts the service of Twitter as well as Baidu, the well-known Chinese search engine, by redirecting pages to display a political message from Iran. 2010 - Stuxnet, a malware piece designed to disrupt Siemens’ industrial control databases, is found in Iran and Indonesia. Speculations postulate that Stuxnet is a cyber weapon made by governments aiming to disrupt the Iranian nuclear program. January 2011 - A major cyber attack forces Canadian major economic agencies, the Finance Department and Treasury Board, to unplug from the Internet. July 2011 - The US Deputy Secretary of Defense states that a major defense contractor was hacked and 24,000 files were taken from the Department of Defense. 2012 - Kaspersky, a Russian cyber security firm, discovers a global cyber attack mechanism called the “Red October” that has been used since 2007 to steal critical government embassy and nuclear infrastructure information through vulnerabilities in Microsoft programs. The attack is primarily focused in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the former USSR.17 June 2013 - The first meeting for cyber defense is held. NATO Defense Ministers stated that cyber-defense should be immediately operational to protect the networks of NATO’ member nations. October 2013 - The NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) project is completed to help NATO combat the increasing number of cyber-attacks in its member states. 2014 - NATO adopts a new policy, which states that cyber defense is part of the Alliance’s key collective defense and ensures that international law is applicable in cyberspace. 2015 - A Russian hacking division, “The Dukes”, is discovered after allegedly attacking governments and organizations in foreign nations for seven years.18 17 http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-21013087 18 http://www.theverge.com/2015/9/17/9342287/russia-cyber-espionage-malware-attack-duke


Historical Context Traditionally, there have been three recognized domains of war that span land, sea, and air. However, with rapid developments in information technology, a new territory of war is now emerging as cyberspace. Once thought of as science fiction, cyber-warfare is now widely recognized as a serious threat to the integrity of nations worldwide. Because of the anonymous nature of modern internet systems, cyber-attacks are unique in that they often deny an opponent’s ability to retaliate, while employing technological instruments of war to attack an opponent’s critical computer systems. In a world where the population is becoming ever more reliant on computers for day-to-day life, digital attacks have the potential to be devastating. The currently underdeveloped system of rules and regulations in cyberspace and the relatively low cost building a cyber-weapon can mean that small groups, and even individuals, could use computer technology to wage war against entire continents. To illustrate the historical context of cybersecurity, we consider multiple case studies of cyberwarfare in the past. The Logic Bomb (1980’s) In June of 1982, during the Cold War, a large blast in Siberia was detected. A Soviet gas pipeline had exploded, but this was no normal explosion. It turns out that the cause was a malfunction in the computer-based system that ran the pipeline. According to Thomas Reed, a former Secretary of the U.S. Air Force, the CIA had corrupted the software so that the pipeline exploded in a ball of flame that “was the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space19.” This was one of the first uses of a “logic bomb”. A logic bomb is malicious software that, when activated causes widespread damage of computer systems. In the early days of cyberwarfare, logic bombs were rarely used (the pipeline explosion is the only example). However, throughout the Cold War, Soviet and American spies used information technology to extract information and compromise enemy plans20. While cyber-attacks during the 1980’s were basic by today’s standards they set the stage for increasingly dangerous and frequent attacks in the next decade. Increased Use (1990’s) Due to the increased connectivity of computers and an increasingly sophisticated hacker community, the 1990’s saw more and more instances of cyber-attacks. Governments such as China began to recognize the possibility of cyber warfare and started up preliminary military programs. The ease with which cyber-attacks could be launched is evidenced in the United States 1997 military exercise “Eligible Receiver”, in which team of hackers from the National Security Agency were asked to hack into the Pentagon’s systems. Though some details are still classified it is known that the group was able to infiltrate the power grid and 911 systems of 9 major US cities21. Cyber weapons were also used for the first time as an adjunct to standard warfare during this period. In an interview with PBS, John Arquilla mentioned that during the Kosovo war, the United States used technology to distort images used by Serbian air defense systems.22 In the late 90’s, the dangerous nature of cyber-attacks was recognized by many governments and media sources and cyber-warfare became a realistic concern. 19 War in the Fifth Domain The Economist July 3rd 2010 20 Tech Sabotage during the Cold War http://web.archive.org/web/20071228164807rn_1/www.fcw.com/print/10_12/news/82709-1.html 21 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwar/warnings/ 22 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwar/interviews/arquilla.html


Commonplace Cyber Attacks (2000’s) As more and more people began using the internet for business and social purposes, cyber-attacks expanded from the realm of secret nation to nation conflict to attacks on business and personal computers. Worms, viruses and Trojan horses began popping up all over the internet. The Nimda worm, released in 2001, spread quickly, causing devastating economic damage and becoming the internet’s most widespread cyber attack.23 That same year, in the summer of 2001, the US detected a suspicious pattern of intrusions into the infrastructure of various American cities. These probes came from the Middle East and were extracting information on the cities’ utilities and emergency systems. After 9/11 Al Qaeda computers were seized and it appears that the probes may have been related to terrorist activity.24 In the early 2000’s more and more countries began cyber warfare military programs and as technology advanced, so did the ease with which cyber-attacks could be performed. Even smaller countries such as Israel began using cyber weapons to disrupt their enemy’s systems.25 The first instance of widespread cyber attack on a nation occurred in April 2007. After the Estonian government decided to move a Soviet war memorial away from its capital city of Tallinn, the government, bank and media servers of Estonia were hit with a massive cyber attack. Known as “Web War I”, groups of hackers (suspected to be working for Russia) used computers around the globe to launch a denial of service attacks to bring down the internet in Estonia. Denial of service attacks flood a website with fake requests and cause an information overload.26 The attack on Estonia was more of a “cyber-riot” than a war but effectively cut Estonia off from the internet and showed the potential for a more serious attack in the future. Merely a year later, there was once again a major cyber attack in the Caucasus region. In August 2008, Russia physically invaded Georgia. The physical attack was accompanied by a sophisticated cyber attack that denied Georgians access to news cash and transportation tickets27. The Georgian government found it difficult to communicate with its citizens and the outside world and Georgian websites were defaced with Russian propaganda. Russia denied any state sponsored cyber attack on Georgia and claimed it was the work of radical Russian nationalists around the world. While Russia has been active in cyber activity, it is by no means the only country to be accused of cyber-warfare. In 2009, two major attacks were launched from computer servers based in China; Ghost Net and Operation Aurora. Ghost Net was a large-scale cyber espionage project that tapped into the computers of many governments, corporations and Tibetan rebels. Later in 2009, Operation Aurora was an attack on foreign corporations, the most notable being Google. Intellectual property was stolen from the companies and Google responded by removing censors on its website in China. During the last ten years cyber-attacks have continued to evolve. Though they have yet to cause massive physical damage or loss of human life, attacks have been widespread. Governments, corporations, citizens, in both NATO nations and the world at large are all at risk. Current Situation & Analysis of Cyber-Attack Trends: To understand the realm of cybersecurity, it is critical that the mechanisms of cyber-attacks are considered. There are three main areas of concern when it comes to cyber-warfare: information warfare (cyber espionage), nation to nation attacks, and independent, radical attacks (cyber terrorism). “Limited” Cyber Attacks

23 Nimda Worm Information http://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/nimda.shtml 24 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwar/warnings/ 25 http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,210486,00.html 26 http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2010dltr003.html#41 27 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/us/28cyber.html?pagewanted=3&_r=1&ref=technology


Many so called cyber-attacks have not actually been all that potent. These attacks, known as “limited” cyber-attacks, slow down websites, block internet access and spread propaganda.28 Nationalists from countries such as Russia and China have been known to hamper opponents’ websites and partake in “web-graffiti”. The denial of service attacks on Estonia is a recent example of this kind of attack. Though these attacks are an inconvenience they are not particularly dangerous. Nevertheless, there should be some rules that prevent the many “limited” attacks that occur worldwide, they disrupt a nation’s affairs and are carried out with malicious intent. There are three main areas of concern when it comes to cyber-warfare: information warfare (cyber espionage), nation to nation attacks, and independent, radical attacks (cyber terrorism). Cyber Espionage Cyber espionage is the infiltration of secure systems in order to steal information. It is the first step in the cyber warfare process. Traditional spies risk arrest by trying to smuggle information out of hostile countries, in cyberspace there are none of these risks. Cyber spies, if given enough time and resources will almost always be able to penetrate a targeted system. Adding to the problem is the fact that cyber spies can steal vast amounts of information, more than traditional spies ever dreamt of stealing. “A spy might once have been able to take a few book’s worth of material...now they can take the whole library,” a senior American official said.29 Recently, China has come under fire for wholesale espionage. Governments and corporation are worried that the loss of information could damage their economic advantages, or, in the case of governments, affect their military capability. Jim Lewis, of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies says “Cyber espionage is the biggest intelligence disaster since the loss of nuclear secrets.” 30Stolen information can be used for nefarious purposes. In order to ensure the safety of people around the world, Cyber-espionage needs to be brought under control. “Unrestricted” Cyber Attacks These types of cyber-attacks are extremely dangerous. Unrestricted cyber-attacks target both the military and civilians and cause physical or economic damage and/or loss of life. Experts fear that cyber-attacks could go after power grids or vital city infrastructure. A loss of power in a major country such as the U.S would have severe economic implications31. Other potential targets include satellites, traffic grids and factories/chemical plants. A logic bomb planted in a factory of plant has the potential to be devastating. Though there have been no unrestricted cyber-attacks in recent years, governments are responding to the growing threat with military power. America has set up a Cyber Command to defend its network and to retaliate if attacked by a rival nation or group. Unrestricted attacks are frightening due to their unpredictability. A terrorist group such as Al-Qaeda, giving the right funding and technology could attack infrastructure relatively easily at any given moment. If the threat of unrestricted cyber-attacks is not dealt with promptly, there will be dire consequences. Current NATO Involvement: NATO Policy on Cyber-Defence In order to keep abreast with the rapidly changing threat landscape and maintain a robust cyber defence, NATO has adopted a new enhanced policy and its action plan, which was endorsed by Allies at the Wales Summit in September 2014. The policy establishes that cyber defence is part of the

28 http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/0104-04.htm 29 War in the Fifth Domain The Economist 31 Cyberwar” The Economist


Alliance’s core task of collective defence, confirms that international law applies in cyberspace and intensifies NATO’s cooperation with industry. The top priority is the protection of the communications systems owned and operated by the Alliance. The new policy also reflects Allied decisions on issues such as streamlined cyber defence governance, procedures for assistance to Allied countries, and the integration of cyber defence into operational planning (including civil emergency planning). Further, the policy defines ways to take awareness, education, training, and exercise activities forward, and encourages further progress in various cooperation initiatives, including those with partner countries and international organizations. It also foresees boosting NATO’s cooperation with industry based on information sharing and cooperative supply chain management. The Allies have also committed to enhancing information sharing and mutual assistance in preventing, mitigating and recovering from cyber-attacks. The new policy is complemented by an action plan with concrete objectives and implementation timelines. Assisting individual Allies While NATO’s top priority for cyber defence is the protection of communications and information systems (CIS) which are owned and operated by NATO, the Alliance requires a reliable and secure supporting national infrastructure, in particular those national networks which may be considered critical for NATO missions. To this end, NATO works with national authorities to develop principles, criteria and mechanisms to ensure an appropriate level of cyber defence for national CIS. The Alliance will continue to identify NATO dependencies on the Allies’ national CIS for critical Alliance tasks and will work with NATO countries to develop common standards. NATO is also helping member countries in their efforts to protect their own critical infrastructures by sharing information and best practices, and by conducting cyber defence exercises to help develop national expertise. Similarly, individual Allied countries may, on a voluntary basis and facilitated by NATO, assist other Allies to develop their national cyber defence capabilities. 32 Developing the NATO cyber defence capability The NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) protects NATO’s own networks by providing centralized and round-the-clock cyber defence support to the various NATO sites. This capability is expected to evolve on a continual basis, to maintain pace with the rapidly changing threat and technology environment. To facilitate an Alliance-wide and common approach to cyber defence capability development, NATO also defines targets for Allied countries’ implementation of national cyber defence capabilities via the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). Cyber defence has also been integrated into NATO’s Smart Defence initiative. Smart Defence enables countries to work together to develop and maintain capabilities they could not afford to develop or procure alone, and to free resources for developing other capabilities. The Smart Defence projects in cyber defence, so far, include the Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP), the Smart Defence Multinational Cyber Defence Capability Development (MN CD2) project, and the Multinational Cyber Defence Education and Training (MN CD E&T) project.

32 UN Report on Cybersecurity http://www.cfr.org/publication/9161/un_report.html September 15th, 2010


Increasing NATO cyber defence capacity Recognizing that cyber defence is as much about people as it is about technology, NATO continues to improve the state of its cyber defence education, training, exercises and evaluation. NATO conducts regular exercises, such as the annual Cyber Coalition Exercise, and aims to integrate cyber defence elements and considerations into the entire range of Alliance exercises. NATO is also enhancing its capabilities for cyber education, training and exercises, including the NATO Cyber Range, which is based on a facility provided by Estonia. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD CoE) in Tallinn, Estonia is the foremost NATO-accredited research and training facility dealing with cyber defence education, consultation, lessons learned, research and development. Although it is not part of the NATO command structure, the CCD CoE offers recognized expertise and experience. The NATO Communications and Information Systems School (NCISS) in Latina, Italy provides training to personnel from Allied (as well as non-NATO) nations relating to the operation and maintenance of some NATO communication and information systems. NCISS will soon relocate to Portugal, where it will provide greater emphasis on cyber defence training and education. The NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany conducts cyber defence-related education and training to support Alliance operations, strategy, policy, doctrine and procedures. The NATO Defense College in Rome fosters strategic thinking on political-military matters, including on cyber defence issues. 33 Cooperation with partners Because cyber threats defy state borders and organizational boundaries, NATO engages with relevant countries and organizations to enhance international security. Engagement with partner countries is based on shared values and common approaches to cyber defence. Requests for cooperation with the Alliance are handled on a case-by-case basis. NATO also works with, among others, the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Alliance’s cooperation with other international organizations is intended to ensure that actions are complementary and avoid unnecessary duplication of work. Cooperation with industry The private sector is a key player in cyberspace, and technological innovations and expertise from the private sector are crucial to enable NATO and Allied countries to mount an effective cyber defence. Via the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership (NICP), NATO and Allies will work to reinforce their relationships with industry. The principal aim of the NICP will be to facilitate voluntary engagement between NATO and industry. This partnership will rely on existing structures and will include NATO entities, national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and NATO member countries’ industry representatives.

33 Resolution on Cyberwarfare http://www.itu.int/publ/T-RES-T.50-2008/en September 19th, 2010


It is recommended that the delegates of NATO take into account all the complicating factors of this issue in order to create an effective resolution. Bloc Positions Within NATO (These are the positions of the important blocs on this topic within NATO. Delegates should keep these positions in mind while engaging in debate and creating resolutions.) Cyber-warfare aggressors These countries are known to be very active. Some, like Iran, have been building “cyber-armies.” These countries would likely be against limitations due to their developed cyber-warfare programs: China, Iran, India, Pakistan, Israel, Japan, Turkey, Pakistan Cyber-warfare moderates These countries have developed cyber warfare programs but would most likely accept a treaty that limits the use of cyber weapons: United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Canada, Australia Neutral These countries have yet limited experience with cyber-warfare and their opinions are still very much flexible: All other United Nation member states Key Players These countries are very active in the realm of cyber-warfare and will be active during discussions: China, Russia*, United States, Iran *Russia has long been associated with aggressive use of cyber weaponry. However, the Russian government has called for an international treaty and may be accepting of limitations. Within the international community Europe Especially with the attack of the “Red October”, European nations are enforcing more cyber defence. European nations are fostering global cooperation in cyberspace. European states, after facing numerous past attacks, is advocating the preservation of an open and secure cyberspace with international organizations and partners. However, some nations, such as Russia, have been severely criticized for their part in cyber-attacks. United States of America Ever since 1988, the USA has been a huge target of cyber-attacks with severe hacking into government networks of highly classified information. Recently, the US Defence Secretary has urged NATO member nations to strengthen defences due to a heightening threat from Russia. The United States has


underscored the importance of cyber defence in order to protect NATO networks and key infrastructure, stating that defence is more important than the development of offense techniques.34 Middle East The Global Economic Crime Survey in 2014 found that cyber crime was the second most common type of economic crime in the Middle East. Cyber defence has remained poor and unclear; laws combating attacks only monitor dissent rather than addressing the threats. With past devastating attacks, the Middle East focuses on ensuring the continuity of business during an attack. Thus, the Middle East’s cyber defence sector is to grow economically by billions over the next few years to form intrusion prevention systems, firewalls, and data encryption. Asia and Oceania The Asia-Oceania region has suffered several cyber-attacks in recent years. Some nations have put in place provisions to govern data security; however, a majority of nations do not have these provisions. In addition, some of the standard of protection and security for data state that liability is based on an object assessment of the organization’s collection of data. One of the most well-known cyber defence mechanisms in this region is China’s Great Firewall. Even though these defence methods are useful, the rights of the individual do not come into play. Discussion Questions

1. Is cyberspace at risk of being militarized?

2. To what extent is NATO responsible for the cybersecurity of its member states?

3. How can NATO facilitate greater cooperation of its communication and information systems (CIS) within its organization?

4. What is the relationship between NATO and other key players (e.g.: private industries, potentially "hostile" states, supranational organizations...) within the realm of cybersecurity?

5. What are the most significant risks towards NATO members in the current situation of cybersecurity?

6. What is the most effective method to integrate cybersecurity and SIGNIT within NATO's current military framework?

Additional Resources http://www.nato.int http://www.psycom.net/iwar.2.html http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/cyberwarfare.html http://www.iwar.org.uk/ The 2011 Vancouver Model United Nations Disarmament and International Security Committee http://www.iiss.org/welcome/ http://bit.ly/aFbqyd 34 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/23/us-appoints-cyber-warfare-general


http://bit.ly/bkbGik http://www.itu.int/en/pages/default.aspx

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