2nd Polish Demographic Congress

Warsaw, 22nd-23rd March

Population-related policy in the United Kingdom: not much to

report.

D.A. Coleman

Oxford Centre for Population Research

University of Oxford

david.coleman@spi.ox.ac.uk http://www.spi.ox.ac.uk/oxpop/

No population-related policy please; we’re British.

‘Population-related’ could embrace most government policy.Modern governments spend about 50% of GDP –affects rationality of

union formation, reproduction, death rate and migration incentives.Many (most?) effects of policy are unintended.Some examples of policies not intended to affect population.

Free state educationFree medical careSubsidised / free housingWelfare incentives for lone parents.Anti-poverty welfare programmes.Foreign policy – e.g. support for EU expansion (migration)

So can be difficult to decide which policies are ‘population-related’.Certainly no ‘pronatalist’ policy in UK.

Population ageingOlder population structures here to stay – an irrevocable,

feature of demographically mature society. A consequence of the demographic transition caused by

beneficial reductions in death and birth rates.A sustainable youthful population would require a return to

high birth and death rates: back to the risk environment of the 18th century and earlier times.

Population age-structures will eventually stabilize, given constant vital rates (i.e. ageing does not get worse and worse).

However longer life does mean even older populations, but changes meaning of ‘old age’.

Given reasonable fertility levels, non-demographic responses should protect the economy and welfare

Earlier history of official policy in UK relating to fertility and population size (a very short story)

National Birth-Rate Commission report 1916 (semi-official) – response to fall in birth rate after 1880s.

Royal Commission on Population 1944 – 1949 Cmd 7695 (low 1930s birth rate and fear of decline)

Select Committee on Science and Technology 1971 (overpopulation following 1960s baby boom)

Overseas Settlement Department 1925 Cmd 4689 1934 and Overseas Migration Board 1936, 1953 – (promoting emigration).

Immigration Acts 1905, 1919, 1962, 1971 and 2010 etc restricting immigration.

Immigration measures 1997 – 2009 facilitating immigration (an innovation with lasting consequences).

Population-related problems in the UKFertility and ageing

Total fertility 1.95 – no action required or contemplated.

Teenage fertility too high – 1998 policy to reduce by 50%. FP, hostels,

Births to immigrant parents – now 30% of total. No policy.

Population ageing - a concern, but less severe than in many countries.

HealthOverall mortality and under-five mortality ‘too high’.

Obesity and Type-2 diabetes (a special UK problem)

Excessive alcohol consumption, liver disease

Poor cancer survival rates (especially breast cancer)

Old-age disability (common to all developed counties)

Immigration / populationReduce net immigration ‘from hundreds of thousands to tens of thousands’ as of 2010. Election promise –strong popular support.

Population growth and population density ‘70 million limit’ a focal point but no specific target.

Some popular concern about ‘ethnic replacement’ but no (direct) policy.

Fertility rates – the basic driver of population ageing and its international divergence.TFR trends Major Regions 1950 - 2009

unweighted means. Source: Council of Europe, Eurostat, national statistical offices

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

1950

1952

1954

1956

1958

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

CEE unweighted meanSouthern unweighted meanFSU unweighted mean (excluding Moldova)Northern EuropeWestern EuropeUSA

TFR trends France, United Kingdom 1945 – 2010. an incomprehensible similarity?

TFR trends in France and the UK 1945 - 2010Sources: ONS, Eurostat and INED.

1.5

1.6

1.7

1.8

1.9

2.0

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.5

2.6

2.7

2.8

2.9

3.0

1945

1948

1951

1954

1957

1960

1963

1966

1969

1972

1975

1978

1981

1984

1987

1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

2008

United Kingdom

France

OXPOP

Total fertility trends 1945 - 2010: Czech Republic. France, Poland, UK. Source: Eurostat

1.00

1.25

1.50

1.75

2.00

2.25

2.50

2.75

3.00

3.25

3.50

3.75

4.00

1945

1947

1949

1951

1953

1955

1957

1959

1961

1963

1965

1967

1969

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

United Kingdom

France

Czech Republic

Poland

Population ageing – an inevitable consequence of demographic transition but

less severe in UK than in many others.Aged potential support ratios 2010, 2060 assuming constant nominal working age 20-64. Source: calculated from UN

2010.

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

9.0

Japan Italy Germany France UK Norway Poland Russia SouthKorea

China

Age

d p

oten

tial

su

ppor

t ra

tio

Potential Support Ratio 2010

Potential Support Ratio 2060

The British teenage underclassAlfie Patten, father at 13. Samantha aged 15 and Daniel age 16, parent of twins.

Age-specific fertility rate, ages 15-19, in France, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, UK and EU27, 1960 – 2010. Source: Eurostat

0.000

0.005

0.010

0.015

0.020

0.025

0.030

0.035

0.040

0.045

0.050

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

France

Netherlands

Poland

Sweden

United Kingdom

Teenage Pregnancy and Parenthood Strategy and Action Plan 2002-7

Reduce birth-rate to teenage mothers by 20% by 2007.

Reduce birth-rate of teenage mothers under 17 by 40%

75% of teenagers should not have had sexual intercourse by age 16

100% teenage mothers complete formal education

50% teenage mothers in post-16 education.

The development of UK ‘family policy’No coherent explicit family policy even today. Term little used. (no explicit co-ordinated

public programme with clear ‘family’ aims, despite ‘Minister for the Family’ in 1994, ‘Minister of State for Children’ 2003). Balancing work and family a private matter.

Objectives of social policy affect family but not directed at it. Aimed at vulnerable, alleviation of poverty.

Originally based on ‘breadwinner’ model of family and welfare state, entitlement to welfare and security, employment central. A ‘liberal welfare regime’

Policy responds to changes in family patterns: one-parent families, more welfare (and v-v?)

Policies against ‘dependency culture’ created by welfare: Child Support Agency 1993 making absent fathers responsible. ‘obligations more than rights’ Treasury function.

Implicit family policy from ‘New Labour’ 1997.

Employment for all including single mothers. Work/family balance : more childcare services, childcare leave, right to request flexible work time. Redress paid / unpaid work balance.

Target (1999) to abolish child poverty by 2020.

Home Office Family Policy Unit 1999, now DES sure Start etc., Baby Bonds, Education Maintenance Allowances. Early Years Education, parental leave and flexible working. 12 months paid maternity leave 2010

Child Tax credit designed to promote employment and reduce poverty

New Tory policy post 2010

Have recent family policy measures affected the birth rate? (Brewer, Ratcliffe and Smith 2007)

Post-1999 policies focused on benefits for poor families.Working Families Tax Credit (wage supplement for poor).Means-tested Income Support for workless households with

children.50% increase in expenditure on children 1999-2003,

unprecedented in 30 years. increased net income of bottom quintile 10-12%

10% increased probability of birth among couples (especially first births).

Increased employment of lone mothers, fertility effect unclear but may have depressed it (opportunity cost).

No ‘pro-natalist’ intention.

Male expectation of life at birth, selected European

countries, 1945- 2010. Source: Eurostat, Council of Europe, national statistical offices.

Expectation of life at birth, males, selected European countries 1945 - 2010

55

60

65

70

75

80

1945

1948

1951

1954

1957

1960

1963

1966

1969

1972

1975

1978

1981

1984

1987

1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

2008

Switzerland

United Kingdom

France

Poland

Hungary

Russia

Ukraine

OXPOP

Obesity rates in UK and selected European

countries, and projection to 2050. Sources OECD. Foresight Tackling Obesity Future Choices

Obesity rates among adults, selected European populations around 1990

and 2000. Source: data from OECD 2004 Figure 7

0

5

10

15

20

25

Fran

ce 9

0,00

Net

herl

ands

90,0

1

Swed

en 8

9, 0

1

Ital

y 94

, 00

Aus

tria

91,

99

Den

mar

k 87

,00

Finl

and

90, 0

1

Icel

and

90, 0

2

Spai

n 87

, 01

Cze

ch re

publ

ic93

, 02

Uni

ted

Kin

gdom

91, 0

1

Per

cent

of a

dult

s w

ith

Bod

y M

ass

Inde

x ov

er 3

0.

1990

2000

Future forecast of the proportion of adults and children overweight and obese, UK to 2050.

Recent UK migration situation

Uneasy consensus on restriction since 1960s broken in 1997.Public dislike of large inflows contributed to Labour election

defeat in 2010.Labour government policy 1997-2010: easier entry for labour

and non-labour migration, family, students.New government 2010 promised to reduce net inflow to ‘tens

of thousands’.Net inflow 2009 198,000; foreign +242k net, UK -44k. Net

inflow since late 1990s historically high. Most net immigration not work related.Consequent inflow of 3 million immigrants since 1997; 2

million additional immigrant population. Fastest population growth since 1962. 16 million additional population projected up to 2051.

Claims made in favour of more immigration

Demographic benefits - workforce, ageing.‘Essential for economic growth’.Entrepreneurial benefits.Fiscal benefits.Fill skills shortages, keeps NHS going, IT needs.Perform ‘dirty jobs’.‘London / UK / NHS would collapse without them’.Cultural, social benefits of ‘diversity’.All with no damage to ‘native’ interests.And England always a ‘country of immigration’.

Three related demographic problems behind argument for more immigrants.

End of growth of population, possible decline.End of growth and possible decline in labour force

and of young labour force entrants; failure of economic growth.

Population ageing leads to crises in pensions and old-age care.

Made salient by UN Report of 2000 on ‘Replacement migration’.

UK net immigration trends 1962 – 2010 (thousands)

-100

-50

0

50

100

150

200

250

30019

63

1965

1967

1969

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

thou

san

ds

UK Net Immigration 1962-2010(thousands). Source: ONS.

Net balance corrected

Post-2001 Census

more

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

40000

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

Spouse migration by sex , UK 1973-2006Source: Home Office acceptances for settlement.

All husbands All wives

UK net immigration by citizenship 1967 – 2010.

-200

-100

0

100

200

300

400

1967

1969

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

UK net migration by citizenship 1967 - 2010(thousands).

Note: there are discontinuities in this series from 1991. Source: ONS International Migration Statistics Series MN, ONS Statistical Bulletin, Migration Statistics 2009.

Foreign citizens

Foreign citizens (post 1991)

UK citizens

UK Citizens (post 1991)

Projection of UK population, 2011 – 2061. Sources: ONS and OXPOP.

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 2051 2056 2061

UK population 2010 - 2061. Principal projection and high and low migration variants

ONS high migration variant

ONS low migration variant

ONS Principal projection. TFR = 1.84, net migation = 200k

OXPOP TFR 1.95, net migration 240k

OXPOP

Polish-born population UK 2001-2010 (thousands). Source: ONS Annual Population Survey.

0

100

200

300

400

500

60020

01

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Projection of UK population 2006 – 2056, three major ethnic categories. Assumptions: overall population total, net

immigration and mortality trends as in ONS 2008-based Principal Projection

Standard scenario, percent of UK population in three major ethnic categories, 2006 - 2056

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 2051 2056

British, Scottish, Irish

Non-white ethnic minorities

Other White

Obstacles to achieving aim of reducing net immigration to the UK

Hostility of Liberal Democrat coalition partners to basic policy of reduction of immigration.

Hostility of Liberal Democrat partners to reform of Human Rights legislation, EU arrangements.

Incompatibility with other strands of government policy: cutting expenditure on police and border controls, enthusiasm for EU membership of Balkan countries, Turkey, increase in foreign aid.

EU immigration (Eastern Europe) cannot be stopped.Economic dependency and distortion from 13 years of high immigration.Opposition from business interests – ‘risking the recovery’.Opposition from universities made dependent upon non-EU students.Strength of well-funded immigrant pressure groups.Electoral pressure from immigrants, including non-UK citizens.Likely long-term increase of asylum claims, forced climate migration.Instability of ‘net’ migration (little control over emigration element).

New policies to reduce immigration

Restriction on labour migration - temporary quota, raising of points requirements, abolition of unskilled non-EU labour migration

Raising minimum age of spouses to 21Enhanced English-language requirementMore rigorous checking of colleges taking overseas

students, and tight visa requirementsEnforcement of evidence of entitlement to work in

UK(No effect on EU migration)

Current explicit population-related policies

Reduction of teenage childbearing by 50% by 2010 (only fertility target ever proposed - 1998)

Reduction of net immigration from ‘hundreds of thousands’ to ‘tens of thousands’ 2010

Population distribution (?)

NO POLICY on overall birth-rate

England and Wales 1990 – 2009, percent of births to immigrant parents. Source: ONS.

England and Wales 1990 - 2009, percent of births by birthplace of parents (cases where both parents' birthplaces recorded only).

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Per

cen

t of

bir

ths

by

birt

hpla

ce o

f pa

ren

ts

Neither parent UK-born

UK born father, non-UK born mother

UK born mother, non-UK born father

Mother born outside UK

One or both parents born outside UK

Social Justice Strategy White Paper ‘Social Justice: Transforming Lives’ (CM 8314). 13 March

2012

The government says it wants to see "more stable families - an increase in the number of families staying together, and conversely a reduction in divorce and separation rates, especially where children are involved".

• 28% of children in lone-parent families live in relative poverty, compared with 17% for those for "couple families".

• It adds: "The government believes that investing in support to stabilise vulnerable families is the best starting point for tackling disadvantage and poverty.

• "It has cloaked neglect of the family under the veil of neutrality, failing to invest in the prevention of breakdown and introducing rules and institutions - such as the couple penalty in the tax credit system - that made it more worthwhile for couples to live apart than to stay together.

• research consistently shows that, wherever possible, it is better for children to be raised within the context of a loving family with two parents who are married to one another." Mark molden

I.D. Smith: Work and Pensions Secretary

Results of policy?

Overall fertility –increased through immigration and welfare changes and ‘recuperation’

Teenage fertility only slight reduction, Young People’s Development Programme no results

Obesity – contradictory evidence3 programmes aimed at diet and exercise in children, increase in knowledge and activity, no change in overweight prevalence.(WHO 2007).

School Food, Child Measurement, Healthy Towns, Food labelling and diet change. recent flat-lining in prevalence in adults and children.

Immigration – net immigration substantially increased

An example: Potential Support Ratio (a measure of population ageing), UK 1980-2100 GAD Principal Projection 1998-based. Population Trends 103

Figure 7 Ratio of persons aged 15-64 to those aged 65 and over, United Kingdom, 1980-2100

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100

Year

Rat

io

HF - HM

PP

HF - PMHF - LMPF - HM

LF - HMPF - LM

LF - PMLF - LM

See Box 4 for key

Projected

How to restore UK PSR to about 4 by 2056 (i) TFR of 5.5

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

2006

2016

2026

2036

2046

2056

2066

2076

2086

UK population 2006-86. Major age-groups (percent of total)

.

0-14

15-64

65 and over

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

300,000

350,000

400,000

450,000

500,000

2006

2016

2026

2036

2046

2056

2066

2076

2086

United Kingdom. Population projection 2006-2086 (thousands).

OXPOP projection

ONS Principal Projection

1.02.03.04.05.06.07.08.09.0

10.0

2006

2016

2026

2036

2046

2056

2066

2076

2086

United Kingdom 2006-86. Aged potential support ratio

4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0

0-4

5-9

10-14

15-19

20-24

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

45-49

50-54

55-59

60-64

65-69

70-74

75-79

80-84

85-89

90-94

95-99

100+

UK population distribution by age and sex 2006 (percent)

females males

-10.0 -5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

100+

UK Population distribution by age and sex 2086 (percent)

females males

8.007.006.005.004.003.002.001.000.001.002.003.004.005.006.007.008.00

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

100+

UK population distribution by age and sex 2026 (percent )

females males

How to restore UK PSR to 4 by 2056. (ii) increase net annual immigration to 800,000.

50,000

70,000

90,000

110,000

130,000

150,000

170,000

190,0002

00

6

20

16

20

26

20

36

20

46

20

56

20

66

20

76

20

86

United Kingdom. Population projection 2006-2086 (thousands).

OXPOP projection

ONS Principal Projection

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

06

20

16

20

26

20

36

20

46

20

56

20

66

20

76

20

86

UK population 2006-86. Major age-groups (percent of total)

.

0-14

15-64

65 and over

4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0

0-4

5-9

10-14

15-19

20-24

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

45-49

50-54

55-59

60-64

65-69

70-74

75-79

80-84

85-89

90-94

95-99

100+

UK population distribution by age and sex 2006 (percent)

females males

-4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

100+

UK Population distribution by age and sex 2086 (percent)

females males5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

100+

UK population distribution by age and sex 2026 (percent )

females males

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

2006

2016

2026

2036

2046

2056

2066

2076

2086

United Kingdom 2006-86. Aged potential support ratio

UK 2056. Projected population according to age, sex and minority status.

Assumptions: overall fertility, net migration and mortality as for ONS 2008 Principal Projection. Ethnic distribution of TFR and immigration according to Coleman (2010).

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

0-4

5-9

10-14

15-19

20-24

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

45-49

50-54

55-59

60-64

65-69

70-74

75-79

80-84

85-89

90-94

95-99

100+

UK population 2056, major ethnic groups by age and sex. Source: OXPOP baseline projection.

Minority male population

White British male population

Minority female population

White British female population

Managing population ageing – non-demographic approaches.

Improve the actual support ratio.(a) increase the average age of retirement

increase pension entitlement age remove tax and other disincentives for working pensionersend of ‘cliff-edge’ retirement.

(b) increase workforce participationretraining unemployed, discouraging early retirement and perpetual students, more flexible labour market arrangements family policy to help women to combine work with childcare

Moderate the financial burdenimprovements to pension systems.

Increase labour productivity

Keeping retirement in line with longer life. The effect of expanding nominal working age limits from ages 20-64 to ages 20-69: potential support ratios in 2060 by comparison

with potential support ratios in 2010. Source: calculated from UN 2010.

PSR 2060 as a fraction of 2010 PSR20-64 working 20-69 working increase in 2060

age in 2060 age in 2060 PSR percent.China 0.22 0.34 52.5

France 0.59 0.81 38.3Germany 0.54 0.75 38.0

Italy 0.52 0.71 35.9Japan 0.51 0.68 34.1

Norway 0.53 0.76 43.7Poland 0.34 0.49 43.9

South Korea 0.24 0.35 45.1Russia 0.41 0.58 41.0

UK 0.58 0.83 44.9

Effects on UK PSR of higher retirement ages Shaw 2001, Population Trends 103

Figure 8 Support ratio under alternative assumptions, United Kingdom, 1980-2100(a) alternative migration assumptions

(b) alternative fertility assumptions

(c) alternative upper boundaries for working age

0.00.51.01.52.02.53.03.54.04.55.05.5

1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100Year

Rat

io

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

5.5

1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100Year

Rat

io

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100Year

Rat

io 65

69686766

70

71

72Long-term TFR: 1.8Long-term annual net inward migration: 95,000