No Man an Island

8/12/2019 No Man an Island

1/10

No Man an Island: Refuting Robert Nozick'sLibertarian Political Philosophy

Galvin Chia*

InAnarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick expounds a property-based

theory of rights. Fundamental to his philosophy is the claim

(reminiscent of Kant) that an individual possesses ownership over

himself, and because of this the individual is inviolable a claim that is

often heard in contemporary rights discourse. Stemming from this is his

conception of rights and his entitlement theory, which outlines his

concept of justice. This results in Nozicks derivation of the minimal

state a state dedicated only to the protection of property rights and the

enforcement of fair exchanges. In this form, Nozicks political

philosophy enshrines the claim of an individual to his rightful property,

as well as the inalienability of the individual entity itself. Although such

claims may seem appealing within the liberal western paradigm, this

paper will show that such Nozicks extreme libertarian approach is

unsustainable under critical examination. The minimal state that he

builds upon these values is an altogether unconvincing construction,wrought with both internal inconsistencies and external fallacies.

I Individualism, Justice and the Minimal State

Self-ownership is the cornerstone of Nozicks work it is from this

source that the rights of the individual, and subsequently the minimal

state, originate. As individuals own themselves, they cannot be treated

as means and must be seen as ends, in Kantian fashion.1

Self-ownershipthus accords them this right, which is a fundamental one.2Like Locke,

he defines rights to be naturalrights: inalienable and inviolable.3This is

Nozicks categorical imperative what he calls side constraints and

*Galvin Chia is in his second year of a combined Bachelor of Arts/Bachelor of Economics

degree at the Australian National University. He is a current resident of Bruce Hall.1Robert Nozick,Anarchy, State, and Utopia(Basic Books, 1974) 105.2G A Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality(Cambridge University Press, 1995) 67-

8.3Alan H Goldman, The Entitlement Theory of Distributive Justice (1976) 73(21)Journal of

Philosophy 833.


2/10

138 Cross-sections Volume VI 2010

represents the inviolability of other persons.4 As this conception of

rights operates on a universal level, it grants moral equality to all

individuals.

Following this is his entitlement theory, which defines how individualsmay justly come to possess things. The theory, from which stems his

conception of justice, is a narrow one that is grounded in the non-

violation of property rights. There are three aspects to this. First is the

concept of justice in acquisition, which states that a possession is justly

held if it was acquired in a just fashion that is, acquired without the

violation of anothers self-ownership or right to property. Second is

justice in transaction, in that whatever is justly held can be freely

transferred. The notion of free in this case would seem to meanfreedom from force, theft, fraud, and so on.5 Third is the method of

rectification of past injustices, in which if the current distribution of

property holdings are the result of unjust acquisitions, then a

distribution which would have arisen had the transaction been just

must be realised.6 This necessitates a historical approach; unjust

acquisition in the past must be rectified

The entitlement theory says nothing about the process of initialappropriation, however. To this, Nozick appeals to a Lockean provisio,

such that an individual can legitimately claim possession of the natural

world. Kymlicka summarizes the sentiment succinctly:

1) People own themselves.2) The world is initially unowned.3) You can acquire absolute rights over a disproportionate share of

the world, if you do not worsen the condition of others.

4) It is relatively easy to acquire absolute rights over adisproportionate share of the world.

4Nozick, above n 1, 105.5Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy(Oxford University Press, 2nded, 2002)104.6Nozick, above n 1, 153.


3/10

No Man an Island Galvin Chia 139

5) Therefore once people have appropriated private property, afree market in capital and labour is morally required.7

The minimal state, in Nozicks opinion, follows naturally from these

claims. It is one, which, through a monopoly of force, enforcesNozickian rights and maintains the inviolability of the individual, but

nothing more. Whilst conventional conceptions of the state usually

imply functions such as the provision of public goods, arbitration and

taxation, Nozick sees these as incompatible with our fundamental

rights. The funding of such state functions more often than not requires

taxation, which Nozick sees as a state violation of a citizens right to

property. Public services, such as the provision of defence and

healthcare, are seen as unjust redistributive efforts, again on thegrounds of violating property rights.8As such the minimal state is the

most extensive state that can be justified.9The processes through which

the minimal state emerges from an optimistic Nozickean state of

nature to the development of protection agencies will not be

discussed here, for the sake of brevity.

II Internal Critique

Nozicks approach to justifying the minimal state can therefore be

summarised as:

1) Self-ownership is fundamental, and from this stems conceptionsof rights and justice.

2) On the basis of these principles, the minimal state is constructedand is the most extensive state that can exist.

Since the validity of 2) relies on the strength of the premise 1), the

critique will target the premise to not only show that Nozicks

conception of the minimal state is invalid, but that its foundations are

flawed. This first part will consider arguments against Nozick, ad

hominem.

7Cohen in Kymlicka, above n 5, 116.8Nozick, above n 1,101.9Ibid 106.


4/10


There are serious questions that can be raised concerning justice in

initial acquisition. In a historical context, there have been many

instances in which the appropriation of property has been carried out

through force, coercion or in an otherwise unjust (by Nozicks

standards) fashion. The violent appropriation of land in North Americaand Australia by early European settlers, for instance, is a clear case in

which initial acquisition was unjust, and has remained unrectified to

this day.

However Nozicks model does call for the rectification of these past

transgressions of indigenous property rights. Though this is currently

achieved in some cases through fiscal compensation or affirmative

action schemes, under Nozicks system of rights this would beillegitimate not simply because they would be services provided for

by an illegitimate, more-than-minimal state, but also because they

would require funding through taxation, which is in itself a violation of

the property rights of the taxed.10 The only available option would be

nothing short of returningall the land unjustly claimed from indigenous

peoples this would include much of North America, and almost all of

Australia. What, then, of the Australian property owner who has justly

bought what was initially unjustly appropriated land? Would not his

right to property be violated as well? These two tensions remain

unresolved by Nozick it is unclear how historical injustices such as

these could be resolved.

Cohen notes that as long as historical injustice is unresolved, Nozicks

entire position on rights and the minimal state is rendered nigh invalid.

As noted, historical injustice violates property rights. If property rights

are allowed to remain compromised, then there is no moral objection to

further infringing property rights for instance, through taxation.11The

minimal state would cease to be the most extensive state that can be

justified a Rawlsian welfare state or Hobbsian leviathan would be

made morally justifiable.

10Kymlicka, above n 5, 112.11Cohen in Kymlicka, above n 5, 111.


5/10


Next is an issue of Nozicks justice in transfer. Nozick claims that just

situations result from just actions, but this is not always the case.

Consider the case where an individual willingly sells himself into

slavery. No justice in transfer principles are violated, but in effect the

free individual an ends is subsumed as a means, and self-ownershipis violated.12 Nozicks firm stance against slavery and belief in the

necessity of self-ownership is clearly expressed in his Tale of the Slave

in which a slave with a plethora of rights and benefits, but not

freedom, is still in a morally unacceptable position.13This is indicative

that Nozicks model does not necessarily remain just in all cases. How

would the minimal state react in this case? There appears to be no case

on which it could act the new slave has not violated any principles,

and to take the slave away from his owner would be to violate theowners rights to owning the slave. That there is no solution to this

significant contradiction goes to show, again, that the principles on

which Nozick bases his minimal state on are not entirely sound.

Thirdly, there are issues with Nozicks use of the Lockean provisio.

Recall that it is just to acquire a disproportionate share of the world for

yourself to prevent the tragedy of the commonsprovided nobody

is made worse off. On a more general level, this conflicts with the

themes of moral equality expressed in Nozicks categorical imperative.

Goldman notes that recognition of the moral equality of others

generates a presumption of equality of conditions, which obviously

does not hold if one is justly allowed to own disproportionate shares of

the world.14

The provisio is not impervious to what could essentially be seen as

coercion, either. Take Jake, who, after having the commons on which he

subsisted on appropriated by an entrepreneurial individual, faces the

option of either working for a minimal wage, option A, or starving,

option B. Assuming the transactions that led to this situation were

entirely legitimate, then, according to Nozick, if [Jake] is forced to do A

or B, and A is the only thing it would be reasonable for him to do, and

12Cohen, above n 2, 21.13Nozick, above n 1, 290-3.14Goldman, above n 3, 835.


6/10


[Jake] does A, then [Jake] is forced to do A.15Because we may construe

the case as a transaction of labour, the transaction has been indirectly

rendered unjust by the fact that action was forced.

Although Jake may have technically given consent to do A, it cannot besaid that he exercised his freedom to decide. Nozick believes otherwise:

that the choice of a feasible over an unfeasible action does not render the

choice illusory.16 Semantics aside, it is clear from a commonsensical

approach that Jakes choices were indeed limited. Within the realm of

Jakes abilities or sensibilities, B is a distinctly infeasible option; thus the

choice is not really a choice at all, and Jake was indeed forcedto do A. It

is as if one were presented with the option of either walking across the

street or burrowing under it to get to the other side; the latter is notreally a choice at all, within our ability or sensibility, and we are

necessarily limited to choosing the former.

This then suggests that acting on the provisio can violate Nozicks

theory of rights. Having this problematic provisio so closely intertwined

with his theory of rights paints in contrast to the sentiments of the

morally egalitarian imperative a distinctly inegalitarian picture of the

minimal state. It unclear how the minimal state would react to this clashbetween individual liberty and the acquisition of property rights.17

Finally, it should be noted that whilst Nozick intended the provisio to

be a method with which to escape the tragedy of the commons, he has

failed to show exactly why it is the best system to adopt. As Kymlicka

states, given the tragedy of the commons, any system of property-

ownership would pass this test, including state ownership

*or+


7/10


III External Critique

From an external perspective, it is unclear how Nozick derives his

fundamental conception rights. Unlike Locke, who arguably adopts a

religious, God-given origin to his conception of fundamental rights,Nozick presents no such fundamental derivation.19His specific selection

of property rights as the basis of his categorical imperative relies heavily

on the presupposition of the Lockean state of nature. This is an

optimistic assumption, in which individuals are in a state of perfect

freedom, and bound by natural rights.20Nozicks adoption of Lockes

position is an axiomatic one, and is simply treated as a given at the start

of his work. The sensibilities of taking this state of nature to be

descriptive of the true state of nature is problematic there is noevidence to suggest why this is necessarily the case, or why, say,

Hobbes pessimistic views on the state of nature may instead be the

case.21

It is also an issue of how Nozick has managed to single out his branch of

property rights from moral discourse as a whole. Nozick admits that an

individual is allowed to maintain his own moral considerations: for

instance, a Singeresque responsibility to others and desire to donatecharitably (though he scorns that such action is irrational).22 Provided

that these actions do not violate his side constraints, they are legitimate.

Thus these sets of moral considerations can coexist, and both are equally

valid Nozick only defends his account on grounds of rationality. It

seems reasonable enough to extend this condition to a whole host of

other moral considerations, such as welfare or equality of opportunity.

The issue then lies in how Nozick has managed to isolate his categorical

imperative as the most important of moral considerations simple

assertion is inadequate. Indeed, as Singer notes, Nozicks theory of

rights does not pronounce on whether the rich ought to give to the

19Grimes, Alan P., and Robert H. Horwitz.Modern Political Ideologies. 1959 ed. New York:

Oxford University Press, 69; Goldman, above n 3, 833.20Nozick, above n 1, 10.21Murray N. Rothbard, Robert Nozick and the Immaculate Conception of the State.(1977) 1(1)Journal of Libertarian Studies, 45.22Nozick, above n 1, 268.


8/10


poor.23 Could not a more-than-minimal state, with welfare functions,

thus be borne from the philanthropy of individuals like Singer? This

fundamentally undermines the minimal state; a more extensive state

could in this way be justified based on the moral consideration of

others.

Goldman notes that Nozicks principles place absolute priority of the

freedom of the individuals over their welfare, and from a

commonsensical approach this is problematic.24Nozicks lexical priority

of freedom before welfare suggests, ironically, that we are bound to his

concepts of freedom. From the Tale of the Slave, this implies that it is

morally justified if we are free and impoverished, but morally wrong to

be in slavery and tremendously well off. A system of morals which failsto take into account the welfare of its moral agents is clearly flawed

how are we to exercise the freedoms that we are entitled to if we are

physically in no condition to do? By virtue of the definition of freedom

presented previously, if our condition - in limiting our abilities and

sensibilities reduces the options available to us from, say, 2 to 1, then

individual freedom itself has been reduced. What good are your

property rights, or for that matter, anybody elses, if you are too hungry

to move? The minimal state, being the unintrusive entity that it is, has

no answer to this.

It has been made clear in this paper that Nozicks position on rights and

the minimal state is an inadequate one. Internally, Nozicks concepts of

justice in initial acquisition, justice in transfer and the reliance on the

Lockean provisio have been shown to be inconsistent, and in cases

contradictory to the themes of individualism and moral equality that he

sets out in his work. Externally, Nozicks presupposition of the Lockean

state of nature, the assumption of the paramount importance of

property rights and the lexical priority of freedom over welfare have

shown to be problematic, and by and large remain unaddressed. Along

the way, the minimal state, which was based solely on these shaky

premises, was shown to be an unconvincing and problematic

conclusion.

23Peter Singer, Practical Ethics. (Cambridge University Press, 1979) 173.24Goldman, above n 3, 825.


9/10


Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Joel Chow for his invaluable ideas and advice

during the writing process, as well as John Shellard for his time and

effort in editing the essay.


10/10


References

Cohen, G.A, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality(Cambridge

University Press, 1995).

Goldman, Alan H, The Entitlement Theory of Distributive Justice.

(1976) 21Journal of Philosophy73.

Grimes, Alan P, and Robert H. Horwitz,Modern Political Ideologies

(Oxford University Press, 1959)

Kymlicka, Will, Contemporary Political Philosophy(Oxford University

Press, 2nded,2002)

Nozick, Robert,Anarchy, State, and Utopia(Basic Books, 1974)

Rothbard, Murray N., Robert Nozick and the Immaculate Conception

of the State (1977) 1Journal of Libertarian Studies1

Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics(Cambridge University Press, 1979)

Wolff, Jonathan, Robert Nozick, Libertarianism, and Utopia Critiques of

Libertarianism. . (25

October 2007) accessed 28 April 2010

No Man an Island

Documents

Transcript of No Man an Island