No Change in the Russian Caucasus. The Winter Olympics ... · no change in the russian caucasus the...
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NO CHANGE IN THE RUSSIAN CAUCASUS THE WINTER OLYMPICS AMID A LOCAL WAR Wojciech Górecki 47
Transcript of No Change in the Russian Caucasus. The Winter Olympics ... · no change in the russian caucasus the...
NO CHANGE IN THE RUSSIAN CAUCASUSTHE WINTER OLYMPICS AMID A LOCAL WAR
Wojciech Górecki
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NO CHANGE IN THE RUSSIAN CAUCASUS THE WINTER OLYMPICS AMID A LOCAL WAR
Wojciech Górecki
NUMBER 47WARSAWJANUARY 2014
© Copyright by Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnichim. Marka Karpia / Centre for Eastern Studies
CONTENT EDITORSAdam Eberhardt, Marek Menkiszak
EDITORAnna Łabuszewska
CO-OPERATIONKatarzyna Kazimierska
TRANSLATIONOSW
CO-OPERATIONNicholas Furnival
GRAPHIC DESIGN PARA-BUCH
PHOTOGRAPH ON COVERWojciech Górecki (painting by Alexander Novoselov, from the collection of the Akhmad Kadyrov Museum in Grozny)
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MAPWojciech Mańkowski
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ISBN 978-83-62936-39-7
Contents
KEY POINTS /5
INTrOduCTION /8
I. ThE gEOgraPhICal aNd hISTOrICal CONTExT /9
II. ThE CIvIl war /13
1. Parties to the conflict and their aims /132. The Caucasus Emirate /15
2.1. Origins /152.2. Structures /182.3. Evolving tactics /20
3. Federal and local security forces /254. Consequences for the region /26
III. SITuaTION IN ThE NOrTh CauCaSuS SubjECTS OF ThE ruSSIaN FEdEraTION /29
IV. ThE rOlE OF azErbaIjaN aNd gEOrgIa /49
V. CulTural aNd CIvIlISaTIONal ChaNgES /53
VI. ThE NOrTh CauCaSuS IN MOSCOw’S POlICIES /58
1. Strategies towards the region /582. Operation Sochi 2014 /63
VII. CONCluSIONS aNd TENTaTIvE FOrECaST: ruSSIa wIThOuT ThE CauCaSuS? /67
aPPENdICES /74MaP /78
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KEY POINTS
• TheNorthCaucasusremainsthemostvolatileregionintheRussianFed-eration,andthereisnothingtosuggestthatthesituationcouldchangeoverthenextfewyears.Withtheveryhighlevelofviolence(clasheswiththearmedIslamicundergroundandactsofterrorclaim700–750casualtiesonaverageyearly)theregionmayjustifiablybeconsideredtobeinastateofcivilwar.Underlyingtheconflictisaclashbetweentwoopposingvisionsfor theNorth Caucasus as either a confessional (Salafi Islamic) republicindependentofMoscow,orasaregionthatremainspartofRussiawhilemaintainingitsseparate,specificcharacterwithamajorrolefortradition-alIslam.Thesetwovisionsarerepresentedbythetwosidesoftheconflict:theCaucasusEmirate, adecentralised terrororganisationestablished in2007; and the secular regimes in power in the individual North Cauca-susrepublics,backedbythelocalandfederalsecurityforces(FSBandthestructuresoftheInteriorMinistry).Atthebeginningofthepresentdecade(around2011),thecharacterofthecivilwarchangedfrom‘total’,affectingtheentirepopulationinvaryingdegrees,to‘selective’,involvingonlythemilitantsandthesecurityforces.Thisdevelopmenthasledtoadeclineinthenumberofciviliancasualties.
• In cultural terms, the North Caucasus has been drifting ever furtherawayfromtherestofRussia.OneofthemostsignificantprocessesintheregionconcernsitsIslamisation,withbothcurrentsofIslamgainingeverlargernumbersofadherents.Theprocessofde-modernisationisalsoim-portant,i.e.therevivaloftraditionalsocialinstitutionsthatexistedbe-fore these landswere incorporated intoRussia.Finallyaprocessofde-Russificationisvisible,wherebytheCaucasuslanguagesarepushingoutRussianand theknowledgeofRussian isdeclining.There is a growingsenseofmutualalienationbetweentheNorthCaucasusandtherestofRussia, visible in thefindings of sociological surveys,which show thatmorethan50percentofRussianswouldacceptthesecessionofChechnyafromtheRussianFederation.
• Theprocessesmentionedabovehavebeenfeltintheentireregion.None-theless,thedynamicsofdevelopmentsvarybetweentheNorthCaucasusrepublics.Forexample,inDagestan,acountrymarkedbyhighdiversity,therearemanyinternalactors(apartfromthearmedIslamicundergroundand the local governments there are also criminal business groups, na-tionalmovementelitesandgroupscentredaroundreligiousleaders)who
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maintainadynamicbalanceamongthemselves.Themostimportantsocialchangetohave takenplace inChechnyaconcerns theerosionof the tra-ditionalroleofclansandthegradualdevelopmentofamodernnation.InIngushetia,however,theclanstructurepersists,butthecountryhaspo-liticalopposition,somethingRamzanKadyrovhasmanagedtoeliminateinChechnya.
• For Moscow, the North Caucasus is important mainly as a border areawhereimportanttransportroutesarelocated.Afurtherescalationofthesituationintheregionwouldposearisktothesecurityofthisinfrastruc-ture.Moreover,ifRussiawishestomaintainitsinfluenceinGeorgia,Azer-baijanandArmeniaitmustensureitretainseffectivecontroloftheNorthCaucasus.Thereisalsothephenomenonwhereininstabilitygets‘export-ed’beyondtheNorthCaucasus,withattackscarriedoutbytheCaucasusEmirate in central Russia (for example in theMoscowmetro in 2010 orMoscowDomodedovoairportin2011).Meanwhile,theriseinthenumberofmigrantsfromtheNorthCaucasusinRussiancitieshasbeengeneratingethnicclashes,increasinglyoftentakingtheformofriots(mostrecentlyinMoscowinOctober2013).
• Intheshortterm,theabsolutepriorityfortheKremlinistoensuresecu-rityfortheOlympicGamesinSochi.Intherun-uptotheGames,Moscowhasbeenavoidinganymeasuresthatcouldescalatetensions.AnyattackjustbeforeorduringtheGames,inSochiorinitssurroundingarea,wouldbeablowtotheprestigeoftheRussianstateandofPresidentVladimirPu-tinpersonally.WhiletheEmiratehasnotattackedanytargetsbeyondtheregionsinceJanuary2011,achangeofthispolicyshouldnotberuledout,sincethemilitantshavethreatenedtoattempttodisrupttheGames(whichstarton7February2014).TheattackonabusinVolgogradon21October2013mightbethefirstactofviolenceendingthelonghiatus.
• Inthelongerterm,thegreatestthreattotheregion’sstability,apartfromtheactivitiesoftheEmirate,willcomefromtheambitionsoftheChechenleaderRamzanKadyrov,whoseaimistoestablishcontrolfirstofIngushe-tia,andthenofatleastapartofDagestan.InChechnya,Kadyrov’spowerisalmostunlimitedand,despitehisdeclarationsofloyaltytoMoscow(whichisfinancinghisgovernment),theChechenleaderispracticallymoreinde-pendentofRussiathantheseparatistleadersDzhokharDudayevandAslanMaskhadovwere in the past.Kadyrovhas been legitimisinghis rule byreferencestotraditionalist(Sufi)Islam,whileintroducingsomeelements
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ofsharia into the local legislation;hehas,however, takenactionagainstSalafiIslam.
• TheNorthCaucasus is thepoorestregionofRussia,with thehighestre-cordedunemploymentand the lowest incomes.The roleof theeconomicfactorinsocialandpoliticalinstabilityseems,though,tobelimitedandofsecondaryimportance.TheNorthCaucasussocietiesareinrealitymuchwealthierthanthestatisticswouldsuggest,duetoawell-developedgreyeconomyaswellashighlevelsofeconomicmigrationandtheremittancesprovidedby thoseworking incentralRussia to familymemberswhore-mainintheregion.
• Moscowhasnotyetworkedoutanycoherentstrategyforthedevelopmentoftheregion.ItspolicytowardstheNorthCaucasushasevolvedfromtheuseofforceto‘economic’solutions(involvingtransfersoflargesumsofmoneyforvariousdevelopmentprogrammes).Thefundsarenotbeingspenteffectivelyandincreasethelevelsofcriminalityinthelocaleconomies.Theydo,never-theless,buytheloyaltyofthelocalelitesandreinforcethelocalparticular-isms,makingtheregioneasiertomanageinlinewiththeprincipleofdivideandrule.MoscowappearsnottohavedecidedyetwhethertointegratetheNorthCaucasusintotherestoftheFederation,ortoisolateit,acceptingtheexistenceofaninformal‘internalabroad’withinRussia.
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INTrOducTION
Thepresentpaperisneitherafullmonographicstudyoftheregion,norade-scriptionofthepreparationsfortheWinterOlympicsinSochi.ItspurposeistopresentthesituationintheNorthCaucasus,withspecialfocusonthoseas-pectswhich,intheauthor’sopinion,maydirectlyorindirectlyinfluencethesecurityoftheGamesorplayanimportantroleindevelopmentsintheregioninthecomingyears.Thepaperdiscusses:theactivitiesoftheCaucasusEmir-ate(potentiallythegreatestthreattothesecurityoftheGames),thedynam-icsofdevelopmentsintheindividualrepublics,andtheimpactofGeorgiaandAzerbaijanontheregion.TheactivitiesoftheChechenleaderRamzanKady-rov,undoubtedlythemostinfluentialpoliticianintheNorthCaucasus,withambitionstocontroltheneighbouringrepublics,arealsodiscussedindetail.ThetwofinalchaptersaredevotedtoculturalandcivilizationalchangesintheregionandthestrategiesthatMoscowhasbeenadoptingindealingwiththem.Thepaperendswithaconclusionandanattemptataforecast.
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I. ThE gEOgraPhIcal aNd hISTOrIcal cONTExT
TheNorthCaucasus isdefined invariousways in the literature,with somedefinitionsproposingabroaderunderstandingoftheregion,andothersnar-rowingdownitsscope.Forthepurposesofthepresentpaper,aratherbroaddefinitionoftheregionhasbeenadopted,whichincludestheCaucasusfore-land(Ciscaucasia).Itcomprisestenadministrativeunits(subjects)oftheRus-sianFederation,includingsevenrepublics(fromwesttoeasttheseare:Ady-gea, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Ingushetia,ChechnyaandDagestan),twokrais(KrasnodarandStavropol)andoneoblast(RostovOblast,withthecapital inRostov-on-Don).1 Itspansanareaofmorethan 350,ooo km2 (around 2% of Russia’s territory), and has a population ofnearly20millionpeople(around13.6%ofRussia’stotalpopulation).
ThelandsoftheNorthCaucasusarelocatedintwofederaldistricts:2theNorthCaucasusFederalDistrict,which includessixof therepublics (withoutAdy-gea)andStavropolKrai,andtheSouthernFederalDistrict,withAdygea,Kras-nodarKrai(whereSochiissituated)andRostovOblast,aswellasthreeothersubjectsoftheRussianFederation.TheNorthCaucasusFederalDistrictwasseparatedfromtheSouthernFederalDistrict in2010.Oneofthereasonsforthiswas to symbolically separate theOlympic townofSochi from themostvolatilerepublicsoftheNorth-EastCaucasus.3
Thesedivisionsintheregionalongadministrative-territoriallinesreflectitshighethnicandlinguisticdiversity.InCiscaucasia(RostovOblastandthetwokrais)Slavs(mostlyRussiansbutalsoUkrainians,oftenofCossackorigin)arethedominantethnicgroup,whiletheNorth-WestCaucasus ismainlypopu-latedbytheCaucasianpeoplesfromtheCircassiangroup(Adyghes,Cherkess,Kabardin),andtheNorthEastCaucasusbypeoplesfromtheVainakh4-Dagest-anigroup(Ingush,ChechensandAvars,Dargwa,Lezgians,Laks,Tabasarans
1 Inthenarrowermeaning,theregiononlyincludestherepublics(sometimesevenwithoutAdygea),whilethebroadestdefinitionincludesKalmykia,andinsomecaseseventheVol-gogradandAstrakhanOblasts.
2 Createdin2000,thefederaldistrictsarenotatieroftheadministrative-territorialdivi-sionofthecountrybutmorecloselyresemblemilitaryoreconomicdistricts.Eachfederaldistrictisagroupingofseveraltomorethantenfederationsubjects,governedbyapresi-dentialplenipotentiaryrepresentative.
3 ThismovewillbediscussedinmoredetailinthechapteronMoscow’sstrategiestowardstheregion.
4 VainakhsisanamedenotingtheIngushandtheChechens.
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andothers).TurkicnationsincludingBalkarsandKarachaysaswellasNogaisandKumyksarealsopresent.TheOssetians,whoareanIranianpeople,belongtotheIndo-Europeans,liketheSlavs.
WiththeexceptionofCiscaucasia,theNorthCaucasuswasincorporatedintoRussiaonly inthesecondhalfof the19thcentury,severaldecades later thanthelandsoftoday’sGeorgia,ArmeniaandAzerbaijan.Thiswasduetostrongresistance fromthehighlanders.Theconquestof theeasternpartof there-gionwascompletedin1859withthecaptureofImamShamil.InthefollowingdecadestheRussianslimitedthemselvestocontrollingtransportroutesthereandcombatinginsurgencies.Theydidnotinterferewiththeinternalaffairsof the local communities inDagestan,Chechnyaor Ingushetia,nordid theydraftthehighlanders intothearmyorspreadOrthodoxChristianity,whichcontributedtothepetrificationofthetraditionalsocialorderandallowedIs-lamtomaintainitsdominantrole.TheconquestoftheNorth-WestCaucasusendedin1864,theyearwhichmarkedtheendoftheentireCaucasianWarsperiod.5Alargeproportionofthesurvivingnatives(especiallytheCircassians)thenhadtofleetotheterritoryoftheOttomanEmpire.TheemigrantsstartedtheCircassiandiaspora,whichtodayisscatteredallaroundtheworld,andtheabandonedlandswerepopulatedbySlavicpeoples,asaresultofwhichtheirethnicmake-upandreligiousrelationschangedovertime.Theeffectsofthepolicypursuedatthattimetowardsthetwopartsoftheregionarestillvisibletoday,forexampleintheproportionofRussiansinthetotalpopulationofthedifferentrepublics(thefurthereast,thesmallertheproportion)orinthelevelofreligiouspractice(diminishingfromeasttowest).
Following the fallof theshort-livedMountainousRepublic (1917–1919)estab-lishedintheNorthCaucasusasthepowerofthecentralgovernmentinRussiawaned(monarchyoverthrown,thecivilwarinRussia),theBolshevikscreatedanumberofethnic-territorialunitsintheregionwhich,ontheonehand,of-feredthenativeethnicgroupsoftheNorthCaucasusaformofstatehood,butontheother,createdartificialdivisionswhichunderminedtheirsenseofpan-Caucasianunity,whichwasstrongamongthehighlanders,despitenumerousdifferencesbetweenthevariousgroups(divide et impera,ordivideandrule).
5 Thevictoryparadewasheldon12May1864inKrasnayaPolyananearSochi,wheresomeofthesportingeventswilltakeplaceduringtheGames.SomeoftheCircassiancommunitiesabroadconsiderthistobeadesecrationofacemeteryofthehighlanderswhodiedfightinginthatarea,especiallysincetheOlympicyearalsomarksthe150thanniversaryofthecon-questoftheNorthCaucasus.
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Thebreakingupof theCircassianethnos (propername:Adyghe) into threegroupsisacaseinpoint:itwasintendedtoleadovertimetotheformationofthreesmallnations intheplaceofoneasaresultofdeepeningethnograph-ic and linguistic differences. Three territorial units, i.e. Adygea, Karachay--CherkessiaandKabardino-Balkaria,wereestablishedintheCircassianlands,andinadditiontheCircassianshadtosharetwoofthemwiththeCaucasianTurks,apeople thatwasalsosplitbetween twodifferentunits (asingleKa-rachay-Balkarianlanguageexiststothisday).Theshapeoftheadministrativeborders(andtheresultingclaimsaboutwhatbelongstowhom)becameoneofthemainconflict-generatingfactorsintheNorthCaucasusafterthebreak-upoftheUSSR.6
Sincethebeginningofthe1990s,theNorthCaucasushasbeenthemostun-stableregionoftheRussianFederation(andalongwiththeSouthCaucasus–oftheentirepost-Sovietarea).Conflictsintheareainitiallyconcernedethnicandpoliticalissues(e.g.theIngush-Ossetianwarovertheso-called“Prigorod-nyDistrict”intheautumnof1992,orChechenseparatism,whichbecameoneofthemainreasonsforRussia’smilitaryintervention,andthefirstChechenWarof1994–1996.7AfterradicalSalafiIslamemergedintheregioninthemid-1990sandgainedimportanceattheturnofthedecade,itgraduallybecamethesourceofcentrifugaltendencies,forwhichitprovidedanideologicalration-ale. During the second ChechenWar (1999–2009, regular armed operationsto2000), theChechenfight fornational independenceevolved intoaCauca-sianJihad,whichmanifesteditselfinthereplacementofthestructuresoftheunrecognisedChechenRepublicof IchkeriabytheCaucasusEmirate,which
6 Thesituationwasfurthercomplicatedbythefactthatinthe1920s–1950stheadministrativedivisionsof theNorthCaucasuswerereorganisedonseveraloccasions, inter alia incon-nectionwiththedeportationsofthefournations–theChechens,theIngush,theBalkarsandtheKarachays–toCentralAsiaduringWorldWarIIandtheirreturntotheCaucasusafterStalin’sdeath(afterthedeportation,theadministrativeunitscorrespondingtothosenationsweredismantled,andsubsequentlyrestored,butwithslightlydifferentborders).AfterthecollapseoftheUSSRthetwooriginalautonomousdistricts(AdygeainKrasnodarKraiandKarachay-CherkessiainStavropolKrai)becamerepublics,andChechen-Ingushe-tiawassplitintotwoparts.Intheaftermathofthebreak-upoftheUSSRsomenationsfoundthemselveslivingintwoseparatestates:theOssetiansinRussiaandGeorgia,theLezgiansandtheAvarsinRussiaandAzerbaijan.
7 TheNorthCaucasuswasalsoinvolvedintheconflictsthattookplaceinthefirsthalfofthe1990sinGeorgia.TheleadershipandthepeopleofNorthOssetiabackedtheOssetiansideintheGeorgian-South-Ossetianwar(1991–1992),volunteersfromtheCircassianrepublicstookpartintheGeorgian-Abkhazianwar(1992–1993;theCircassiansareethnicallyclosetotheAbkhazians),andin1992,theoustedGeorgianpresidentZviadGamsakhurdiawasofferedsafehaveninGrozny.
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isstillinoperation.8AtthesametimetheroleoftraditionalIslam(regardedas‘impure’bytheradicalsbecauseitincludeselementsoflocalreligiouscus-toms)alsogrew,alongwiththere-emergenceoftraditionalsocialinstitutionssuchasvendetta,councilsofelders,clandivisions9andarevivalofnationalcultures. In the civilizationaldimension, thoseprocesseshavebeendrivingtheNorthCaucasuseverfurtherawayfromRussia,leadingtoagrowingsenseofmutualalienation,amongotherphenomena.
8 Thisprocesswillbediscussedinmoredetailinthenextchapter.9 TheroleoftraditionalclanstructuresisdiminishingonlyinChechnya–thereasonsfor
thiswillbediscussedbelow.
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II. ThE cIvIl war
1. Parties to the conflict and their aims
Thearmedconflict,whichhasbeenongoingintheCaucasusfortwentyyearswithoutrespite,finallymorphedintoafull-fledgedcivilwarinearly2011.10Thefactthattheconflictisindeedacivilwarmanifestsitselfbothinthescaleofviolence,claimingmorethanadozenlivesaweekonaverageasaresultofdif-ferentkindsofclashesandattacks,andintheideologicalmotivationsofthetwosides.Onepartytotheconflictisthemilitantunderground,i.e.adecen-tralisedterrororganisationoperatingundertheumbrellanameoftheCauca-susEmirate,whoseaimistoseparatetheregionfromRussiaandtocreateanIslamicconfessionalstategovernedbysharialawandhavingcloselinkswiththe countries of the Arabian Peninsula and theMiddle East. In statementspublishedasvideorecordsontheEmirate’swebsitetheorganisation’sleaderDokkuUmarovoftenemphasisesthattheNorthCaucasusispartoftheUm-mah,i.e.thecommunityofallMuslims,andthattheoperationsperformedbytheCaucasusmilitantsarepartofglobal jihad.11TheEmirateclaimstohaveitsrootsinthe19thcenturytheocracyofImamShamil12andfollowstheSalafiversionofIslamwhiledisrespectingtraditionalIslam.ThisdoesnotofcoursemeanthatallCaucasianSalafisaremilitantsand terrorists–manyof themhavenothingtodowiththeEmirate.13AccordingtotheEmirate’sideologues,
10 WojciechGórecki, ‘Creeping’ civilwar in theNorth Caucasus,OSW Commentary, No 50,15.03.2011. http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2011-03-15/creeping-civil-war-north-caucasus
11 Forexample,inastatementon7February2011,Umarovmentionedthebreak-upofSudan,which,heargued,tookplaceunderpressurefromIsraelandtheUnitedStatesseekingtotakeovercontrolofthecountry’senergyresources.ThismightbeawayforUmarovtowoopotentialsponsorsfromtheArabworld–adeclarationthattheCaucasusmilitantsarein-terestedindevelopmentsinSudanmaycontainahiddensuggestionthattheArabworldshouldnotforgetabouttheCaucasus.Umarov’sstatementsarealsoameanstodiscusscur-renttacticalissuesrelevantforthemilitantundergroundandtotransmitgeneralguide-linesforthemilitants.
12 ImamShamilwasaleaderfromtheperiodoftheCaucasianWarswhocombinedsecularandspiritualpowerandwhobytoday’sdefinitionswasafundamentalist:hereplacedcus-tomarylawnorms,theso-calledadats,withtheShariaandsoughttoeradicatethosetradi-tionswhichheconsideredtobepagan.
13 Thedichotomybetweentraditionalandnon-traditionalIslam(withinSunniIslam)isasim-plification.Ontheonehand,‘traditional’Islamisnothomogeneous,andontheother,‘non-traditional’IslamalsohasahistoryintheCaucasus.SalafismiscurrentlybannedinChechn-ya,but isopenlypractised inDagestan (see thenextchapter formore information).SomeresearchersbelievethatSalafismshouldberegardedasanequallylegitimatecurrentofIslaminRussia(onthesamefootingastheSufism,theHanafischool,theShafi’ischool,etc.).See:
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armedstrugglemustgohandinhandwitheducational ‘workatthefounda-tions’–thelocalcommunitiesneedtogrowtoacceptthechanges,andforthisreasonthenoticeableIslamisationoftheregion(e.g.theemergenceofSalafinurseryschoolsorhalal restaurants)issuretoplayintothehandsofthemili-tantundergroundinthelongerterm.
Thedeclared,formalenemyoftheCaucasusEmirateisMoscow,i.e.theRus-sianfederalgovernment.Inreality,however,itisthegovernmentsofthedif-ferent Caucasian subjects of the Russian Federation and the security forcesbackingthem(theso-calledsiloviki14)thataretheenemyontheothersideoftheCaucasuscivilconflict.Intheideologicaldimension,abroadlyunderstood‘West’isalsotheEmirate’senemy.
TheofficialleadershipsoftheNorthCaucasusrepublicswanttheregiontobesecular and to remainwithin theRussianFederation forpragmatic reasonswhilemaintaining a considerable degree of independence from the centralgovernmentinMoscow.TheyacceptthedominantroleofIslam,especiallytra-ditionalIslam,insociallife,providedthatreligiousleadersremainloyaltothestate(thisacceptanceisthewidestinChechnyaandDagestan).Thecivilwarandthepresenceofundergroundmilitantgroupsposesathreattothemontheonehand,butontheotheritprovidesthemwithabargainingchipindealingswiththecentralfederalgovernment.ThelocalelitesblackmailMoscowinor-dertopreservetheirpositionsbycreatingtheimpressionthattheyaloneareabletoguaranteestabilityandsecularityinthegivenarea,whilethesilovikioftenexaggeratethesecuritythreatsinordertodemonstratehownecessarytheyareand to justify theirfinancial claims.The funding for theCaucasusprovidedfromthecentralbudgetistreatedlocallyasaduepaymentforloyalty(de factoextortionmoney)andasignofMoscow’sweakness.152013sawsomesignalsthatMoscowmayattempttochangethissituation.16However,theRus-
Бадма Бюрчиев, Алексей Малашенко: ваххабизм надо оставить в покое,Big Caucasus,7.01.2013.http://www.bigcaucasus.com/events/topday/07-01-2013/82007-malashenko-0/
14 FromRussian–thefunctionariesofallthesecurityforces,andthesecurityservicesingen-eral(MinistryofDefence,InteriorMinistry,FederalSecurityService,InvestigativeCom-mitteeoftheRussianFederation,structuresoftheProsecutor’sOffice,etc.).
15 AccordingtoaRussianexpertinterviewedinApril2010.Theexpertalsosaidthat“ifnotforthismoney,thelocaleliteswouldconsiderthemselvesfreedofanyobligationtoremainloyaltothecentralgovernment”.Seethechapteronthesituationintheindividualrepub-licsformoreinformationonthelocalgovernments.
16 Thearrestofthelong-timemayorofMakhachkalaSaidAmirov,andtheharshcriticismoftheprofligacyofCaucasianpoliticiansmaybeinterpretedinthisway.Seefollowingchap-tersformoreinformation.
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sianleadershipisunlikelytotakeanysignificantstepsinthisdirectionbeforeorimmediatelyaftertheSochiOlympics.
2. The caucasus Emirate
2.1. Origins
TheCaucasusEmirateoriginated inChechnya.TheconditionswhichenableditsformationbegantoemergeintheperiodbetweentheFirstandtheSecondChechenWars,i.e.intheyears1996–1999whentherepublichadnoformalstatus(undertheagreementwhichendedthewar,signedon31August1996intheDag-estanitownofKhasav-Yurt,itsstatuswastobedeterminedwithinthenextfiveyears).Thequasi-independentChechnya(theChechenRepublicofIchkeria)wasinapermanentsevereeconomic,social,politicalandideologicalcrisiscausedbythedamageinflictedbywar,byMoscow’spolicy(ade facto blockadeoftherepublic,suspendedfinancing),andbythebrutalturfwarwagedbytheformerfieldcommanderswhoheldprivatearmiesandcontrolledlargeswathesoftherepublic(thisconsiderablyrestrictedtherealpowerandroomformanoeuvreofAslanMaskhadov,electedasthepresidentofChechnyaon27January1997).17
Disillusionedby‘democracy’,whichtheyassociatedwithwarandviolence(Bo-risYeltsin, the thenpresidentofRussiawhowas responsible for starting thewar,likedtopresenthimselfasademocrat),and‘independence’,perceivedinthecontextofpauperisation,thelackofprospectsandrisingcrime,includingkidnappings for ransom,more andmoreChechensbegan to cherish the ideaofbuildinga‘just’IslamicrepublicinChechnya.Theideawaspopularinpar-ticular among the adherents of the fundamentalist Salafi Islam, which wasrelativelynewintheCaucasusandwassometimesreferredtoas ‘pure’, ‘new’or‘Arabic’,todistinguishitfromthetraditionalSufiIslam,whoserolewasalsorising.ThepropagationofSalafiIslamwasaidedbythepresenceinChechnyaof foreignmujahideen,18 including theSaudi-born commander Ibnal-Khattabwhostayedintherepublicafterthewarandfoundedatrainingcampformili-tants,fundedbytheglobaljihadistcentres.Followinghisexample,someoftheinfluentialChechencommanders,includingShamilBasayev,adoptedSalafism.
17 Many commanders operated at the intersectionof politics, business andmafia. SomeofthemweremembersoftheChechenparliamentandhadregisteredbusinesses,butthelarg-estproportionof the incomeof thisgroupcame fromillegalactivities (smuggling,armstrafficking,kidnaping).ServingintheprivatearmiesofformercommanderswasatthattimeoneofveryfewcareeropportunitiesavailabletoChechenmenatthattime.
18 InIslamicculture,amujahideenisamilitantmotivatedbyreligion.
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Aslan Maskhadov himself indirectly contributed to the strengthening ofSalafism.The presidentwas an advocate of a secularChechnya, but havingfailedtosubordinatetheformercommandersortoforceal-Khattabandtheother foreignmujahideen to leave,hedecided tocreateabroadcoalition in-volvingtheSalafis(includingBasayev,whomheappointedastheprimeminis-ter)andtointroduceelementsofshariaintolocallegislation(e.g.publicexecu-tions,formalrecognitionofshariacourts).
Contrary to his declared intentions (reconciliation and national unity),Maskhadov’sdecisionsonlyentrenchedthemarginalisationofthesecularistsandhighlighted thedivisionsbetweenthe Islamic traditionalists (knownastarikatists)andtheSalafis.ThoseprocessesgainedmomentumafterthesecondChechenwarbrokeoutintheautumnof1999.19TheleadingChechencommand-ersandthemilitants’websitesbegantoincreasinglyemphasisethereligiousaspectoftheconflictasawaragainsttheenemiesofIslam,attheexpenseofthenationalliberationaspect(thewarforindependence).20Thischoicewasideolog-ical,butalsopragmatic–itwasintendedtoencouragemorefighterstojointhearmedstruggleandwasaddressedtopeoplefromtheneighbouringCaucasusnations,whowouldnotbeinterestedinfightingforafreeChechnyaasthere-gionfearedpotentialChechendomination,butwhomightbewillingtosupportthejihad.ItwasalsoaddressedtoMuslimsfrombeyondtheregion,21inlinewiththeconcepttotakethewarbeyondChechnya,developedbyShamilBasayev.Itwasalsoimportantthatthemovetowardsjihadcouldopenaccesstofund-ingfromfundamentalistcirclesintheArabstates(themoneywastobetrans-ferredbytheArabmujahideen,initiallymainlybyal-Khattab).
Another development that aided the formation of an armed Islamic under-ground ideologically motivated by radical Islam consisted in the Kremlin’s
19 TheKremlinstartedthesecondChechenwarundertheslogansofthefightagainstterror-ism(whiletheaimofthefirstwarhadbeentorestore‘constitutionalorder’,i.e.toelimi-nateChechenseparatism):itsoutbreakinlateSeptemberandearlyOctober1999hadbeenprecededbyaraidintoDagestanundertakenbyBasayevandal-Khattab(inAugust,underthepretextofaidingananti-Russianinsurgencythatwasallegedlybeingpreparedthere),andaseriesofattacksagainstresidentialbuildingsinMoscow,BuynakskandVolgodonsk(September1999,thecircumstanceoftheattackshavestillnotbeenfullyclarified).
20 ThedeathofAslanMaskhadovon8March2005wasasymbolicbreakthrough.21 AccordingtotheRussianauthorities,representativesofatleast52states,identifiedonthe
basisofdocumentsfoundonthem,werefightingonthemilitants’sideinthesecondChech-enwar.МВД РФ: среди чеченских боевиков были наемники из 52 стран,Newsru.com,22.10.2008.http://www.newsru.com/russia/22oct2008/baranov.html
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decision to formally hand over power in Chechnya to ‘pro-Russian’ Chech-enpoliticians.22Theaimof thatprocess,whichcommentatorsreferredtoas‘Chechenisation’,was to combat themilitantsmoreeffectivelyand to createtheimpressionthatthereisnoRussian-Chechenwar,onlyaninternalChech-enconflictbetweenthelegitimateleadershipoftherepublicandtherebels.23MuftiAkhmadKadyrov,whofoughtontherebelsideinthefirstChechenwar,becamethefirstChechenleadertobeappointedbyMoscow,andwhenhediedinanattackin2004,hissonRamzantookover.24Overtime,theKadyrovsman-agedtogainconsiderable independence,concentratingrealpowerinthere-publicintheirhands.
TheKadyrovsadhere to traditional Islamand theyconsidered theSalafis tobetheirmainenemy.Thishasenabledthemtoconvinceaconsiderablepro-portionof themilitants, thosewhoweremotivatedbynational rather thanreligioussentiments, to laydowntheirarmsand join thearmedformationscontrolledbytheChechenleader(whichformallyareregularunitsoftheRus-sianInteriorMinistry25).ThishasbeenpossibleduetoaseriesofamnestiesagreedwithMoscow.Bythesecondhalfofthe2000s,therewerepracticallynoindependencefightersleftamongthemilitants–thosewhodidnotjointheKadyrovs’unitswerekilled,emigrated,orbecamejihadiststhemselves.
On31October2007DokkuUmarov,thepresidentoftheunrecognisedChechenRepublicofIchkeria(whosucceededKhalimSadulayev,thecommanderoftheChechenundergroundfollowingAslanMaskhadov’sdeath),steppeddownfromoffice,dismantledtheexistingstructuresandreplacedthemwiththeCaucasusEmirate(Imarat).Heappointedhimselfastheemir(amir),assumedtheArabicnameofAbuUsmanandhasbeenleadingtheCaucasianjihadsincethen.
22 As numerous cases demonstrate, being ‘pro-Russian’ is often only a tactic for Chechenpoliticians.Forexample,referringtothecurrentChechenleaderRamzanKadyrovaspro-Russianwouldbeasimplificationobscuringamuchmorecomplexreality(seetheboxonRamzan Kadyrov’s ambitions formoreinformation).
23 Byspring2000thefederalforceshadgainedcontroloftheentireterritoryoftherepublic(townsandtransportroutes),buttheycouldnotultimatelydefeatthemilitants,andhold-ingtotheirpositionsrequiredtheconstantpresenceofthearmyandgeneratedconsider-ablefinancialcosts.InthissituationinvitingloyalChechenforces,withtheirbetterknowl-edgeof the terrainand the local social relations, to takepart in themilitaryoperationsofferedachancetomoreeffectivelyeliminatethemilitants.
24 FormallyRamzanKadyrov took thepostofpresidentofChechnya in2007, shortlyafterreachinghisthirtiethbirthday,whichislegallyrequiredforthisposition.
25 Inaddition,theRussianMinistryofDefenceformedtwospetsnazGRUbattalionsmadeupofethnicChechens;theKadyrovshadnocontrolovertheseforalongertime.
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2.2. Structures
TheCaucasusEmirateisavirtualIslamic ‘state’whosearealargelyoverlapswith the North Caucasus Federal District. It is divided into five provinces(vilayats)whosebordersgenerallycorrespondtotheadministrativebordersoftherepublics):Dagestan,Nokhchiycho(Chechnya),Galgayche(Ingushetia),Kabarda-Balkaria-Karachay,andtheNogaySteppe(southernpartofStavropolKrai)26. The vilayats consist of so-called “fronts” (northern, north-western,south-eastern,etc.).Thevilayatsandthe frontsaregovernedby localemirs(amirs).TheEmirateusesitsowngeographicnames,e.g.GroznyisDzhokhar,MakhachkalaisShamilkala,KizilyurtisRabbanikala,etc.
Despitethiscentralisedstructure,theEmirateisinfactafederationofmilitantgroupsenjoyingconsiderableindependence,connectedbyasharedideaandbythefactthattheyallformallyrecognisethesupremacyofDokkuUmarov,whois theonlypersonauthorised tonominate lower-levelemirs.TheEmirate isakindofumbrellaortrademark,attractiveandrecognisableenoughforradi-calsfromotherpartsofRussiatoidentifywith.27Thefactthatthemilitantsaredispersed,andthatitisthereforedifficulttoco-ordinatetheactivitiesofdif-ferentgroupsontheonehandmakesitimpossiblefortheEmiratetoorganisealarger-scaleoperation,suchasanattemptattakingcontrolofatown(liketheattackonNalchikinOctober2005,duringthesecondChechenwar),butontheotherhandmakesitdifficultfortheauthoritiestocombattheinsurgency.
Theexactnumberofthemilitantsisimpossibletoascertain.Basedonexpertestimates and statements by representatives of the Russian federal and lo-calauthoritiesandsecurityservices,onemayassumethattheentireregion
26 Since11May2009,thevilayatGalgaychealsoincludesNorthOssetia,whichhadpreviouslybeenaseparatevilayat(Iriston).The“unitedvilayatofKabarda,BalkariaandKarachay”(KBK)spanstheareaofKabardino-BalkariaandKarachay-Cherkessia.Thedecisiontocre-ate ‘national’ vilayats took into account the strong ethnic identification of themilitants(despitetheEmirate’sassumptionofunityandtheequalityofallMuslims),andespeciallythestrongattachmenttonationaltraditionsamongthecivilianpopulation,whichwasex-pectedtoprovidebackupandsupporttothemilitantgroups.Inthesummerof2010,acon-flictaroseagainstthisbackgroundbetweenUmarovandmilitantsfromthegroupledbyKhuseynGakayev.WhilenotrejectingtheidealoftheEmirate,GakayevatthesametimerecognisedtherightoftheCaucasusnationstoself-determination(thiswasparticularlyimportantforyoungChechens,whoaccountedforthemajorityofthemilitants).Thecon-flictwasresolvedafterseveralmonths,andGakayevandhisfollowersrepeatedtheiroathofloyaltytoUmarov.However,asimilardivisioninthefuturecannotberuledout.
27 RadicalsfromTatarstanandtheentireVolgaRegionoftenrefertotheirareaasthe‘Idel-Uralvilayat’.
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containsbetweenseveralhundred(closetoonethousand28)andseveralthou-sandmilitants.Someofthemarestationedinbasesinthemountains,andsomeinrentedhousesandflatsfromwhichtheysetoutfortheirterroroperations.Theback-upandsupport, i.e. thepeople inchargeofpropaganda(includingthewebsites),financeandbroadlyunderstoodlogistics,arecertainlygreaterinnumber,butit isevenmoredifficulttoestimatehowmanyofthemthereare.ThenumberofpeopleactivelysympathisingwiththeEmirate,i.e.thosereadytoputamilitantupforanight,lendacarorwarnagainstthepolice,isthemostdifficulttodetermine,especiallysinceasenseofloyaltytofellowclanmembersorneighbours,whichisverystrongintheCaucasus,mayalsocomeintoplayinsuchcases.ResearchersagreethatsincethebeginningofEmir-ate’sexistence,thenumberofmilitantshasremainedstable,whichmeansthateveryyearbetween fourandsevenhundrednewfightershavebeen joiningthemilitantgroups(correspondingtothenumberofmilitantstheEmiratehaslostannuallyinrecentyears,includingthosekilledandthosedetained).Theaverageageofthemilitantshasbeenconstantlycomingdown,andtheaveragedurationoftheiractiveservice(fromthetimetheyjoinamilitantunituntiltheyarekilledordetained)hasbeengettingshorter:itiscurrentlyestimatedataround18months.29
TheCaucasusEmirateisfinancedfromseveralsources.Sincethebeginningofthepreviousdecadeithasmostprobablyreliedmainlyonextortionmoneypaidbybusinessmenfromtheregionandbeyond,whilethesignificanceoffor-eignfundingfromtheArabstates,transferredbymujahideenwithcontactsinal-Qaedaandotherjihadicentres,hasbeensteadilyfalling.Thereasonsforthisinclude,firstly,thefactthatthenumberofforeignfightershasbeendi-minishing:withtheArabSpring,andespeciallytheoutbreakofcivilwarinSyria, theCaucasusceased tobeattractive for suchpeopleasaplacewheretheycouldfightagainstthe‘enemiesofIslam’.Secondly,theroleofthemuja-hideenintheEmiratehasbeengraduallydiminishing.Afteral-Khattabdiedin 2002,hewas replacedby theArabmujahideen leadersAbual-Walid and
28 TheDagestanipresidentRamazanAbdulatipovhasestimatedtheirnumberinhisrepublicat“150–250,notmorethan500”inastatementduringameetingoftheValdaiDiscussionClub,16–19September2013.
29 Theaverageageofmilitantsiscurrentlyestimatedat21–23years(whilethreeyearsagoitwasatleast25years).Typically,menjointhearmedunitsbetweentheageof18and20.Seee.g.:Екатерина Абрамова, Евкуров: За 20 лет Ингушетия сделала огромный рывок, но работы еще много,Mir24,11.03.2013.http://mir24.tv/news/politics/6648308;Петр Акопов, Человек, который давал выход,Взгляд,27.08.2013.http://vz.ru/politics/2013/8/27/647421.html
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AbuKhavsrespectively,astheperceivedal-QaedarepresentativesintheCau-casus.30Theydidnotmakeittothetopleadershipofthearmedunderground,thoughwhile the JordanianMuhannad,whocommandedtheArabgroup intheyears2006-2011felloutwithDokkuUmarov,whomhehadinitiallybeencloselyassociatedwith,possiblyoverfinancialissues.31
2.3. Evolving tactics
The Emirate’s principalmethod of operation consists in attacks on variouspersonsorfacilities.Asthemilitantforcesareconsiderablysmallerthanthegovernmentforces,themilitantsavoidopenfighting;itdoesnonethelesstakesplaceoccasionally.Thelargestclashesafter2004tookplaceon13-17February2012 in themountainson theadministrativeborderbetweenChechnyaandDagestan;itispossiblethatasmanyasseveraldozenpeoplediedasaresult.32Overthesixyearsofitsexistence,theEmiratechangeditstacticsonseveraloccasions.Itshistorycanbedividedintofourperiods.33
30 TherewerealsoTurkishnationals(TurksandKurds)andUyghursfromChinaamongthemujahideenfighters.AtitslargestduringthefirstmonthsofthesecondChechenwar,thisgroup could reachnumbersofmore than 500mujahideen, currently there areprobablyseveraldozenofthematmost.
31 Inthesummerof2010Muhannadbackedthebreak-awaygroupwithintheEmirate.Sincehisdeathon21April2011,theforeignmujahideenprobablynolongerhaveaseparatecom-mander.
32 TheChechen InteriorMinistry reported 17 casualties and24 injured,but itwasunclearifthesefiguresreferredonlytoitsownforcesorall thesecurityforcesthattookpart inthefighting.Thesamesourcereportedthat7militantswerekilled.ThefirstskirmishtookplaceintheregionofNozhay-YurtinChechnyawhereaunitoftheChechenInteriorMinis-tryforcesattackedandsurroundedamilitantgroupcommandedbyMakharbiTimiraliyev.TheinsurgentsmanagedtoescapefromandmadeittoDagestan.There,twogroupsofDag-estanimilitantsjoinedthem–atthatpointtheinsurgentforcesnumberedatotalofaround60–100men.TheywereconfrontedbythetroopsoftheRussianInteriorMinistrywhichusedartilleryandairattack,amongothermeasures(theChechenpolicealsotookpartintheoperationuntil itscompletion).WojciechGórecki,Clashesat theborderofChechnyaand Dagestan, Eastweek OSW, 22.02.2012. http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-ses/2012-02-22/clashes-border-chechnya-and-dagestan
33 The division into periods is based on the dates of individual video-statementsmade byDokkuUmarov(datesofonlinepublication,whicharenotthesameasdatesofrecording;thechangesoftacticusuallybecamevisiblyeffectiveseveralweeksafterthepublicationofeachstatement).ThisapproachtodividingtheEmirate’shistoryintoperiodsstemsfromtheassumptionthattheEmirateisanautonomousentity;whilethemediahasspeculatedabouttheEmirate’slinkstotheRussiansecretservicesthereisnoevidencethatthepoten-tialexistenceofsuchlinks(whichinthemselvesarebeyondthescopeofthispaper)hasanyinfluenceonthetacticsandthemodusoperandiofthearmedunderground.
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2.3.1. Guerrillawar(31October2007–25April2009)Duringthefirstyearorsoofitsexistence,theEmiratecontinuedtheguerrillawarfarewhichhadpreviouslybeenwagedbytheunrecognisedChechenRepub-licofIchkeria.TheendofthatperiodcoincidedwiththeformalendingofthesecondChechenwar–on15April2009theso-called“anti-terroroperationre-gime”(Russian: KTO, контртеррористическая операция)wasliftedinChechn-ya,havingbeeninplacefornearlytenyears.WhentheformationoftheEmiratewasannounced,thefactthatSochihadbeenselectedtoorganisethe2014Win-terOlympicswasalreadyknown(thedecisionhadbeentakeninJuly2007).
2.3.2. Dramaticattacks(25April2009–2February2012)Inastatementof25April2009DokkuUmarovsaid,“Ifwearenotallowedtokill[Russian]citizens, theso-calledcivilians,whoprovidethearmyandtheFSBwiththeirtaxesandtheirsilence,whosupportthisarmywiththeirapprovingsilence,ifsuchpeoplearetoberegardedascivilians,thenIdon’tknowaccord-ingtowhatcriteriathisassessmentismade”.34ThestatementwasreceivedasacalltomassiveattacksthroughoutRussia,oratleastasapprovalforsuchat-tacks,especiallygiventhatatthesametimeUmarovreactivatedtheso-called“Riyad-us-Saliheen”brigade(GardensoftheRighteousinArabic), i.e.asabo-tage-terrorgroupspecialisinginsuicideattacks.35Itappearsthatthedecisiontocarryoutattacks thatwouldclaimlargenumbersofcasualties (especiallyamongcivilians),includingoutsidetheCaucasus,wasintendedtodemonstratetheEmirate’spowerandpotentialtotheRussianauthoritiesandthepublicinRussiaandintheNorthCaucasusrepublics,andalsototheglobaljihadicentres.
TheEmiratecarriedoutitsmostnotoriousandmosttragicattacksintheyears2009–2011.36 They included the attempt at assassinating the president of In-gushetia,Yunus-BekYevkurov(on22June2009,Yevkurovsurvivedbuttwo
34 Имарат Кавказ на пути от Йемена к Алжиру (часть 1),Prague Watchdog,6.06.2009.http://www.watchdog.cz/?show=000000-000024-000004-000004&lang=2
35 Thebrigadewasformedbackin2001byShamilBasayev.AfteritsreactivationSaidBuryat-sky,theEmirate’smainideologue,becameitscommander(AlexandrTikhomirov—diedon2March2010),followedbyEmirKhamzat(AslanByutukayev—heaccompaniedUmarovinthevideo-statementpublishedonlineonFebruary2011).
36 TheEmirateroutinelyclaimsresponsibilityforallattacksintheNorthCaucasusandotherpartsofRussiaandinmostcasesitisactuallyresponsible.However,theaccidentattheSaya-no–Shushenskayahydroelectricpowerstationon17August2009,inwhich75peoplediedandforwhichtheEmiratealsoclaimedresponsibility,wasnotcausedbyaterrorattackaccordingtothefindingsoftheinvestigation.ClaimsofresponsibilityforattacksareusuallynotmadebytheEmirateasawhole,butbyindividualunitssuchastheRiyad-us-Saliheenbrigadeorthevilayats,whichfurtherprovesthattheEmirateisnotacentralisedorganisation.
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peoplewhowereaccompanyinghimdied),theattackontheNevskyExpresstrain(27November2009,28casualties),thedoubleattackontheMoscowun-derground(29March2010,41casualties), thesabotageat theBaksanhydro-electricpower station inKabardino-Balkaria (21 July 2010, 2 casualties), theattackagainstalocalmarketinVladikavkaz,NorthOssetia(9September2010,19casualties),theattackonDomodedovoairportinMoscow(24January2011,37casualties),aseriesofattacksinKabardino-Balkaria(18-25February2011,atleast6casualties;inaddition,acablecaronElbruswasblownupintheat-tack).On8February2010theRussianSupremeCourtruledthattheCaucasusEmiratewasaterroristorganisation,andon26May2011theUSDepartmentofStateissuedasimilarruling.
TheEmiratehasdemonstrated its ability todestabilise the situation inare-asclose to theOlympic facilities (theattacks inKabardino-Balkaria),whichmeans it could threaten the security of theGames.37However,while the at-tacksinMoscowhaveshownthattheCaucasusterroristsarepreparedtoat-tackanytarget,disregardingallhumanitarianconsiderations,theyhavealsoexposedtheEmirate’slimitations.TheyshowedthatthemilitantswereabletoprepareandcarryoutnomorethanonelargeattackinCentralRussiaperyear,whichwasnotenoughto intimidatetheRussianpublic.Manypeople intheCaucasus, evenamong thosenegativelydisposed towards theRussian state,haveturnedagainsttheEmiratebecauseofthelargenumbersofciviliancasu-altiesclaimedbyitsattacks.Aswasmentionedabove,intheperiodinquestionthemilitantscouldnolongercountonmajorsupportfrommilitantcentresintheArabstatesirrespectiveofwhattheydid,becauseofthesituationintheEmirateitselfanddevelopmentsintheMiddleEast.
2.3.3. Targetedstrikes(2February2012–3July2013)Inhis statementof 2February2012Umarovordered themilitants to refrainfromattacksonciviliantargets,explainingthattheRussianpublichadceasedtosupporttheKremlin’spolicy(inDecember2011Moscowandothercitieswit-nessedmassiveprotestsagainstballotriggingduringtheparliamentaryelec-tions).Instead,hecalledonthemilitantstodeliver“preciseandisolated”blowsto the security forces and those in power.38 This new tactic was apparentlyadoptedmainlybecausethepreviousonehadturnedouttobeineffective:the
37 Inconnectionwiththis,someRussianexpertshavesuggestedthattheRussiangovernmentwouldhavetopayUmarovtorefrainfromattacksbeforeandduringtheGames.
38 Умаров приказал боевикам на Кавказе избегать атак на мирные цели, Kavkaz-uzel,3.02.2012.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/200452/
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largestrikes,especiallybeyondtheCaucasus,notonlyreinforcedthemilitants’image as terrorists, butwere undoubtedly financially costly and logisticallycomplicated(involvingahigherriskofdiscovery),andtheyfailedtoproducetheeffectstheEmirateexpected.ItisalsopossiblethatUmarovtookthisdeci-sionafterultimatelyrealisingthatthearmedunderground’srealandmainen-emywasnotthefederalauthoritiessomuchasthesecularregimesinpowerintheindividualrepublicsoftheregion.ItisalsoworthnotingthatthelastattackwithciviliancasualtiesthatwascarriedoutbeyondtheCaucasustookplaceon24January2011,i.e.morethanayearbeforethe‘moratorium’wasannounced.39
IntheperiodinquestiontheEmiratelimiteditsactivitiestotheareaoftheNorthCaucasus,focusingonthefightagainstthelocalsecurityforces(andinthisway,theconflictultimatelymorphedintoalocalcivilwar).40ThevictimsoftheattacksweremainlyofficersoftheInteriorMinistry,theFSBandothersiloviki,aswellaspublicofficialsofvariouslevels(includingjudgesandprosecutors),Muslimclericsloyaltotheauthorities,andjournalistswhomthearmedundergrounddeemedharmfulordangerous.41Amongtheciviliancasualties,arelativelylargegroupiscomprisedofpeopledealingwithbroadlyunderstoodmagic(fortune-tellers,healers),whiletheremainingoneswereusuallybystanders.42Themostfrequently attacked facilities includedpolice stationsandheadquarters,mili-tarybarracks, localoffices,andshopsandrestaurantssellingalcohol.43Theseweretargetedfor‘educational’purposesaccordingtostatementspublishedontheEmirate’swebsites(thesamejustificationwasgivenforthe‘elimination’ofthecentresofmagicalpracticeasnotconformingwithIslam).Inthemountainareas,regulararmedclashesweretakingplaceatthesametime.
39 TheRiyad-us-SaliheenbrigadehasalsoclaimedresponsibilityfortheshootingofColonelYuriBudanovinMoscowon10June2011.Budanovkidnappedandkilledaneighteen-yearoldgirlduringthesecondChechenwar.
40 TheEmiratehasfirmlydistanceditselffromtheTsarnayevbrotherswhowerebehindtheat-tackontheBostonmarathonon15April2013–itstateditisnotatwarwiththeUnitedStates.
41 Unlikeinthecaseofthesiloviki,inattacksagainstofficials,clericsandjournaliststhevic-timswereusuallyspecificpeopleidentifiedbythearmedunderground,ratherthanran-domrepresentativesofatargetgroup.
42 Thelargestnumbersofcasualtiesdiedinso-called“doubleattacks”wherebyasecondex-plosivedevicewouldbesetoffsometimeafterthefirstone,whenthepoliceandotherser-vicesand,often,thefirstonlookershadarrivedatthescene.Theattackon19August2012intheMalgobekregionofIngushetiawhereasuicidebomberblewhimselfupatthefuneralofapolicemankilledthedaybefore,wasaspecialcaseofthistactic.Apartfromthebomber,sevenpeopledied,mostofthempoliceofficers.
43 UsuallythosewhichrefusetopayextortionmoneytotheEmirate;inmostcasestheattackswereprecededbywarnings(withtheexceptionofChechnya,alcoholiswidelyavailableintheregion).
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ThenewtactichelpedtomitigatetheaversiontotheEmirateamongthelocalpopulationsandincreasedtheattractivenessofthemodelofIslampromotedbythemilitants.
2.3.4. “Theendjustifiesthemeans”?(3July2013–)Inastatementpublishedon3 July2013DokkuUmarovrecalledthe ‘morato-rium’onattacksinRussia‘proper’,explainingthatthatgesturehadbeenper-ceivedbyMoscowasasignofweakness.HealsocalledonthemilitantstouseallmeansavailabletodisrupttheGamesinSochi.44Atthesametimeheem-phasisedthat thewarwagedbytheEmiratewaspartofglobal jihad(whichwasprobablyintendedtoserveasareminderorcallonforeigncentrestosup-porttheCaucasusmilitants),andsaidthatinadditiontotheNorthCaucasus,jihadistsinRussiawerealsoactiveintherepublicsofTatarstanandBashkor-tostanintheVolgaregion.
Atthetimeofwriting(December2013),thisnewchangeintheEmirate’stacticshasnotbeenputintopractice,exceptthroughaslightincreaseinthepercentageofciviliansinthetotalnumberofcasualties(whilethetotalnumberofcasual-tieshasdecreased).TheEmirateisstillfightingthebroadlyunderstood‘authori-ties’inanarealimitedtotheNorthCaucasus,targetingmainlythesiloviki.Themostnotoriousoperationintheperiodinquestionconsistedintheassassina-tionofIngushetia’sSecurityCouncilchiefAhmedKotiyevontheroadbetweenMalgobekandNazranon27August2013,inwhichKotiyev’sdriveralsodied.Inanotherattackon16September,asuicidebomberblewhimselfupinfrontofthepoliceheadquartersinSernovodskinChechnya,killingfourpoliceofficers.
Againstthisbackground,theattackonacitybusinVolgogradon21October2013lookstobemoretheexceptionthananewrule.45Itcannotberuledoutthat anEmirate cellwasbehind thebombing although theEmiratehasnotclaimedresponsibility.According to theRussianauthorities, theattackwascarriedoutbyNaidaAsiyalova,athirty-one-year-oldfemalesuicidebomberfromDagestan,butit ishighlyunlikelythatasingleattackthree-and-a-halfmonthsbeforetheGames,carriedoutinatownaround800kilometresaway
44 Умаров призвал вооруженное подполье к срыву Олимпиады в Сочи, Kavkaz-uzel,3.07.2013.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/226558/
ThemilitantleaderhascalledtheGames‘satanic’astheyarebeingorganised“onthebonesof our ancestors”. See the Conclusions for an assessment of the likelihood of attacks onOlympictargets.
45 WojciechGórecki,AttackonabusinVolgograd,EastweekOSW,23.10.2013.http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-10-23/attack-a-bus-volgograd
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fromSochicoulddestabiliseRussiaintheslightestdegreeordiscourageOlym-piansandsportsfansfromtravellingtoSochi.However, thesituationcouldchange if severalmoreattacksofa similarnaturewere tobecarriedout intownsclosertotheOlympicfacilities.
RegardlessofthefactthatnoattackshavetakenplaceyetinSochiorintheen-tireKrasnodarKrai,theEmirate’sterroractivitiescontinuetoposethegreat-estthreattothesecurityoftheGamesandthestabilityoftheregioningeneral.
3. Federal and local security forces
TheoperationsagainsttheEmirateareconductedmainlybytheInternalTroopsofRussia,includingunitscontrolledbythefederalInteriorMinistryaswellasthosesubordinatedtotheInteriorMinistriesoftheindividualNorthCaucasusrepublics.TheFSBisalsoinvolved,againwithunitscontrolledbytheFSBHead-quartersinMoscowandunitsoperatingunderthelocalFSBdelegations.Thiscomplicatedsystemofsubordinationrelationsandexistingconflictsofinterest(officersofthelocalInteriorMinistriesareusuallymembersofthelocaltitularnations,withsomeexceptionsatthehighestlevelofministryleadership)hasbeenunderminingtheeffectivenessofthisstructure.46ThenumbersofsoldiersfromtheInternalTroopsinvolvedintheregionhavebeengrowingconstantly.Inlate2009andearly2010,23,000soldiersservedintheregion,47whileinlate2012“nearlyhalfofthetotalnumberof182,000”ofRussia’sInternalTroops48wereengagedintheregion,includingaround10,000inthespetsnaz.49UnitsoftheFSBbordertroopsintheNorthCaucasusdistrictnumbered165,000in2012(including19,400civilianworkers),groupedinto17detachments.50
UnitsoftheRussianMinistryofDefence(whichhasnorepresentationontherepublican level)havenotbeenregularly involved inoperationsagainst themilitantssince2002(theywouldoccasionallygetinvolvedaslateonas2006;inaddition,thearmywouldlendheavyequipmentsuchastankstotheInterior
46 WojciechGórecki,‘Creeping’civilwar...,op. cit.47 Outof78,000,whichwasthetotalnumberofallsoldiersfromtheInternalTroopsinRus-
siaatthattime.Владимир Мухин, Бессилие антитеррора, Независимая Газета,31.03.2010.http://www.ng.ru/politics/2010-03-31/1_antiterror.html
48 A year earlier, the Russian Internal Troops had 170,000 soldiers. Анатолий Цыганок, Безопасность на Большом Кавказе, Icisecurity.ru, 10.12.2012.http://www.icisecurity.ru/references/aktual_publications/kavkaz_bezopastost_12/
49 Ibid.50 Ibid.
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Ministry for the purposes of single operations,mainly in Dagestan). In thespringof2012themediareportedthatlargenumbersoftroopshadbeenmovedfromChechnyatoDagestan.Thoseunits,however,likeotherunitsofthearmydeployedintheNorthCaucasus,werenotusedinoperationsagainstthemili-tantsbutremainedinthelocationswheretheywerestationed.Itwasonlyinthespringof2012,afterasix-yearrespite,thatarmyunitsbecameinvolvedonalimitedscaleinlocalanti-terroroperations,followingadecisionfromtheNa-tionalAnti-terrorCommittee(NAK).51ThetotalpresenceofRussianMinistryofDefencetroopsintheregionisestimatedat110,000soldiers.52AtthisstagetheMinistryofDefenceunitscannotberegardedasapartyoftheCaucasusconflict (unlike the InteriorMinistry forces).This situationcouldchange inthefuture,though.
The siloviki have been combatting the armed underground by carrying out“anti-terroroperations”whichcantakedifferentformsdependingonthelo-cation(the ‘liquidation’ofmilitants inresidentialbuildingsincitydistricts,blockades of entire villages and systematic searches for people in hiding orarmsdepotsinthecaseofmountainsettlements,orattacksonEmiratehidea-ways indifficult-to-access forestranges).The term ‘operation’usuallyreferstothemilitaryactionitselfaswellasthelegalstatuswhichgrantsthesilovikiinvolvedadditionalpowers,e.g.tofreelyenterprivateapartments.The“anti-terroroperationregime”appliestoapreciselydefinedareafromthetimeitisannouncedbytheFSBuntilitislifted;usuallyittakesbetweenseveralhourstoseveraldays.
4. consequences for the region
InrecentyearstheaveragenumberofpeoplekilledintheCaucasuswarhasremainedstableatalevelof700–750peopleayear,whilethenumberofthoseinjuredhasbeenfalling.53Dagestanaccountsformorethanhalfofallthecas-
51 They turnedout tobepoorlyprepared forfighting in themountainsandsuffered lossesin those operations.Источник: подразделения Минобороны спустя 6 лет привлекли к боевым действиям в Чечне, уже 4 жертвы,Gazeta.ru,8.10.2012.http://www.gazeta.ru/social/news/2012/10/08/n_2561873.shtml
52 Анатолий Цыганок, Безопасность...,op. cit.53 StatisticsquotedhereandbelowonthenumbersofcasualtiesintheNorthCaucasuscon-
flictcomefromtheKavkaz-uzel.ru websiterunbytheMemorialassociation,whichisthemostauthoritativesourceinthisregard.In2010,754peoplewerekilledand956wounded.In2011,750werekilledand628wounded.In2012,700killedand525wounded.BetweenJanuaryandSeptember2013,373werekilledand345wounded.
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ualties, while Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia and Chechnya exchange thetopplacesfollowingDagestan(withIngushetiareportingthe largestratioofcasualtiestototalpopulation),followedbyNorthOssetia,StavropolKraiandKarachay-Cherkessia (seeAppendices 1and3).On8October2013AleksandrBortnikov,theNAKchairmananddirectoroftheFSB,saidthat144casesofterrorismhadbeenreportedinRussia,ofwhich120tookplaceinDagestan.54AccordingtotheInternationalCrisisGroup,theCaucasusarmedconflictisthemostdeadlyandbrutalinEurope.55
WiththechangeintacticbytheEmirate–i.e.thedecisionnottoattackcivil-iantargets–thenatureofthecivilwarchangednoticeably;beforeearly2012itwaspossibletospeak(bearinginmindthatsuchtermsarenaturallyamat-terofconvention)ofa‘total’waraffectingtheentirepopulationoftheNorthCaucasus,albeitinvaryingdegrees,whileafterthatpointtheconflictbecamean‘isolated’warlimitedinpracticetothemilitantsandthesiloviki.Thishasalsobeenreflectedinthestatistics,whichshowaconsiderablefallinthenum-berofciviliancasualties,from180killedand489injuredin2010(accountingformorethan39%oftotalcasualties)to89killedand127injuredin2012(lessthan18%of totalcasualties).Thenumbersofkilledand injuredsiloviki haveremainedrelativelystable(in2012,211werekilledand389injured,accountingfornearly49%oftotalcasualties),whilethenumberofmilitantcasualtieshasbeenincreasingslightly(409killedin2012,accountingfor33%oftotalcasual-ties,and14detained)56,seealsoAppendix2.
Asthenatureoftheconflictchanged,ithasbecomemuchlessofaburdenforcivilians.Thefrequencyofvariouscheckshasdecreasedandtheyhavebecome
54 ФСБ: в 2013 году в РФ зафиксировано 144 террористических проявления, из них 120 – в Дагестане,Kavkaz-uzel,8.10.2013.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/231311/
Anotherhigh-ranking representative of theNAK,Evgeny Ilin, said inOctober 2013 thatmorethan98%ofallterroristcrimeswerecommittedintheNorthCaucasusfederaldis-trict.На СКФО приходится 98% терактов в России – НАК,Ekhokavkaza,14.10.2013.http://www.ekhokavkaza.org/articleprintview/25136341.html
55 TheNorth Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (III), Governance, Elections, Rule ofLaw. Europe Report, No.226, September 2013. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/eu-rope/north-caucasus/226-north-caucasus-the-challenges-of-integration-iii-governance-elections-rule-of-law.aspx.
56 FiguresofKavkaz-uzel.ru.Nodataisavailableonthenumberofinjuredmilitants,someofthemwereprobablydetained,andothersevacuatedbyfellowmilitantsandnotincludedinthestatistics.Itshouldberememberedthatcasualtiesareclassifiedasmilitantsundercommuniquésofthesecurityforces,insomecasesconfirmedbytheEmirate.However,insomeknowncasesitwasclaimedthatakilledpersonwasamemberofthearmedunder-groundwhileinrealityhewasapasser-bywhodiedasaresultofaterroroperation.
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muchlessinconvenient(includingchecksatthebordersoftherepublics,wherecurrentlyagreatmajorityofvehiclespasswithoutbeingstopped,whileearliernearlyallcarswouldbechecked).WiththeexceptionofDagestan,theimposi-tionoftheanti-terroroperationregimeincitiesisonlyexceptionallystillac-companiedbystreetblockadesusingheavyequipment,andanatmosphereoffearandtensioncanbesensedlessandlessfrequentlyintheregion.
Asmentioned above, it is verydifficult to assess the level of support for thearmedundergroundamongthepublicintheCaucasusrepublics,evenapproxi-mately.Theaversiontothecorruptbureaucracy,widespreadintheregion,andtheprogressingde-Russificationandde-modernisationoftheNorthCaucasuscouldaddcredibilitytotheassumptionthatthemilitantsenjoythesympathy,oratleastunderstanding,ofsectionsoftheCaucasuspopulations.57Untilrecently,themilitantsalsobenefitedfromtheactivitiesofthepolice,whichmassivelybreachedtherightsofMuslimsbypersecutingbelievers,e.g.beardedmen,witharrests,beatings,orverybrutalinterrogations–aftersuchexperiencesthevic-timswouldoften join the radicals.58Thecurrent situation is stillworrying,59butsomeimprovementhasbeenreported,mainlyduethefactthateverfewerpoliceofficershavetheiroriginsbeyondtheNorthCaucasus(deployedintheregiononofficialmissions),andlocalpoliceofficershavetotakenoteofpub-licopinionatleasttoaminimumdegree(outofconsiderationforthesecurityof their families), andmoreover, theyare themselvespracticingMuslims. Inaddition,asthewagesinthepolicehaveincreased,servicehasbecomemoreprestigious.InApril2012,ahigher-rankingpoliceofficerinKabardino-Balka-riacouldearnasmuchas50,000roublesmonthly(aroundUS$1,500),i.e.threetimestheaveragesalaryintherepublic,whilealower-rankpolicefunctionaryearned30,000roubles(aroundUS$900).Thosedevelopmentshavebeencondu-civetoapolarisationofopinionsandpositionsonthearmedconflict.
57 Thoseprocesseswillbediscussedinthechapteronculturalchanges.58 WojciechGórecki,‘Creeping’civilwar...,op. cit.59 See thereportof theEuropeanCommittee for thePreventionofTorture,draftedon the
basisofinformationcollectedduringastudyvisittoDagestan,ChechnyaandNorthOsse-tiain2011,publishedinStrasbourgon24January2013.http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/rus/2013-01-inf-eng.htm
AccordingtoanindependenttradeunionofthepoliceandprosecutionauthoritiesinDagest-an,itisnecessarytopayabribeof3-500,000roubles(aroundUS$9,200–15,400)togetajobasalow-rankingpolicefunctionary,thepostofahigher-rankingofficercostsaroundonemil-lionroubles(aroundUS$30,700),whilethepostofaminister–around7to8milliondollars.Thosepayingsuchbribesexpecttorecoupthemoneywithinashorttimespan.Светлана Болотникова, Сколько стоит пост главы дагестанского МВД?,Bigcaucasus.com,4.03.2013.http://www.bigcaucasus.com/events/topday/04-03-2013/82650-mvd_dagestan-0/
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III. SITuaTION IN ThE NOrTh caucaSuS SubjEcTS OF ThE ruSSIaN FEdEraTION
TheNorthCaucasus republics and, to a lesser extent, the twokrais and theRostovOblast,aregovernedbymafia-clangroupsmoreor lessdisconnectedfromthesocieties.Corruptionisamajorproblemeverywhereand,accordingtosomeresearchers,itwillbeagreaterobstacletotheregion’sdevelopmentin the longer term than terrorismand extremism, and is certainlymore ofaproblemthanethnictensions,whichcurrentlyseldomleadtoseriouscon-flicts.60Evenleadersregardedashonestandnotcorrupt,suchasYunus-bekYevkurovofIngushetia,arenotabletoeffectivelycombatcorruptionintheircountries,whichtheythemselvesadmit.61
Therepublicsallshareasimilar,verydifficulteconomicandsocialsituation.TheyoccupythelowestpositionsinrankingsoftheRussianFederation’ssub-jectsintermsofinvestment62orGDPpercapita,andaveragemonthlysalariesperpersoncanbeasmuchasfiftypercent lower than theRussianaverage(withpricesonly10-15%lower).63Unemploymentratesarehigh,withthehigh-estinIngushetiaat47.68%andinChechnyaat29.81%(theaverageinthere-mainingNorthCaucasusrepublicsrangesbetween8%and12%,comparedtotheRussianaverageof5.46%).64Overpopulation(duetohighbirthrates)andthescarcityof landarecausingmassmigrationtootherpartsofRussia (es-peciallytothebigcities)65andabroad.Accordingtothefindingsofaresearchprojectby theLevadaCentre, thearmedconflict isnot thegreatestcauseofconcernforpeopleintheregion–itisinsteadunemploymentandpoverty.66
60 OSWinterviewwithaChechenpoliticalscientist,June2013.61 Екатерина Абрамова, Евкуров: За 20 лет Ингушетия сделала огромный рывок, но
работы еще много,Mir24,11.03.2013.http://mir24.tv/news/politics/664830862 According to Rosstat (Федеральная служба государственной статистики, the Federal
Statistical Service), during the first quarter of 2013, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino--BalkariaandKarachay-Cherkessiadidnotreceiveasingledollarof foreign investment.http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/publications/catalog/doc_1140086420641
63 Rosstatfiguresforthe1sthalfof2013.Ibid.64 Officialfiguresfor2012:http://xn----8sbcbbscql7bijpi7ac0eweh.xn--p1ai/ Unofficialunemploymentestimatesareevenhigher,ataround60%forIngushetia,around
40–50%forChechnyaandaround20%fortheremainingrepublics.65 Which,inturn,generatesconflictsituations.Thisissue,aswellasotheraspectsoftherela-
tionsbetweentheNorthCaucasusandthefederalcentre,willbediscussedinthechapteronMoscow’sstrategiestowardstheregion.
66 Социологи: жители Северного Кавказа опасаются безработицы и последствий
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However,remittancessentbythemigrantstotheirfamiliesintheregion,aswellasrevenuesfromthegreyeconomy(puttingtoonesidetheabovemen-tionedcorruption)mitigatethisdifficultsituationtoaconsiderabledegree.67
In2013theparliamentsofIngushetiaandDagestandecidedthattheheadsofthoseFederationsubjectswouldnotbeelectedingeneralelections(whilegen-eral elections of governorswere restored inRussia after eight years duringwhichleadersofFederationsubjectswerenominated,68withindividualsub-jectsoftheFederationbeingofferedanopt-out).On8September2013,i.e.thedayof localelections inRussia, theIngushparliamentarianselectedYunus-bekYevkurovforasecondtermastheleaderofIngushetia,andthemembersoftheDagestaniparliamentelectedRamazanAbdulatipov,whohadbeenthecountry’sactingpresidentsinceJanuary2013,asthepresidentoftherepublic.ThetermsoftheremainingNorthCaucasusleadersexpireintheyears2015–2017,buttheparliamentofNorthOssetiahasalreadydecidedthattherewillbenogeneralelectioninthatrepublic,either(thetermofthecurrentleaderoftherepublic,TaymurazMamsurov,endsin201569).Thedecisionsnottoholdgeneralelectionsareclearlydesignedtoprotecttheinterestsofthelocalpoliti-calelites,concernedaboutpotentiallylosingpowerintheeventofavictoryofsomeone fromoutside their circle (noFederationsubjectsoutside theNorthCaucasushavechosentousetheopt-outyet).
*
Sincethebeginningofthisdecade,dagestan hasbeenthemostunstablere-publicintheregion,accountingformorethanhalfofthetotalnumberofpeo-plekilledinthearmedconflict.Moreover,thisproportionhasbeengrowing:
социального расслоения больше, чем терроризма,Kavkaz-uzel,28.01.2013.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/219264/
67 ComparedtocitiesincentralRussia,citiesintheregionaremoreneglected–thisrefersinparticulartoinfrastructureandpublicfacilities,whileprivatehousesdonotdifferintermsof thequalityandstandardof furnishings fromthose inRussia,even inMoscow.IwonaKaliszewskanotesthat“ifwetakeacloserlookattheireverydaylife,thestatisticsseemdifficulttobelieve”(EverydaylifeinNorthCaucasus,http://www.udsc.gov.pl/files/WIKP/info_pdf/Binder1_Kaukaz_ang.pdf).
68 TheleadersoftheRussianrepublicsarecalledheads(главаinRussian).OnlytheleadersofDagestan,TatarstanandBashkortostanhavestillretainedthetitleof‘presidents’,whichwasusedcommonlybeforetheendofthelastdecade,butinfutureisgoingtobereservedonlyforthepresidentoftheRussianFederation.Theleadersorkraisandoblastsarecalledgovernors.
69 Парламент Северной Осетии принял поправки об отмене прямых выборов главы региона,Kavkaz-uzel,28.11.2013.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/234254/
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in2010,378peoplediedthere,outofatotalof754killedintheentireregion;in2011thefigurewas413(outof750),in2012itwas405(outof700),andinthefirstsevenmonthsof2013itwas176(outof287).
In the first half of 2013, the average salary in Dagestan was 16,676 roublesa month (around US$ 510), compared to the Russian average of 23,076 rou-bles (aroundUS$710).Thepopulationgrowthratewas11.9%(17.5birthsand5.6deathsperonethousandinhabitants),comparedtotheRussianaverageof-0.8%.70Theunemploymentratein2012fellto11.7%(before2007ithadneverbeenlowerthan20%,in2010itdecreasedto14.8%andin2011to12.7%).71In2011therepublicranked80thinRussia(outofthe83subjectsoftheFederation)intermsofthenumberofcarsperonethousandinhabitantsandequal81stplace(infact,lastplacewithtwoothersubjects)intermsofthenumberofcomput-ersperonehundredworkers.72
Ethnically,therepublicishighlydiversified–itispopulatedbyseveraldozensofnationsandsmallerethnicgroups,andfourteenlanguagesarerecognisedasofficial.ApartfromthearmedIslamicunderground,severalcriminal-busi-nessclansareoperatingthereandarebrutallyjostlingforsupremacy.Otheractors include the relativelyweak republic government as well as nationalmovementelitesandgroupscentredonthemajorreligiousleaders.Ontheonehandthismultiplicityofactorsconstantlygeneratesconflictsovervariousis-sues,butontheother,paradoxically,ithelpspreservetherepublic’sintegrity,sincenosingleactorisstrongenoughtodominatetheothers,andadynamicbalanceprevailsamongthem.73Asapeculiar‘sideeffect’ofthisfragmentation,
70 ThesefiguresanddatainthefollowingsectionsontheotherFederationsubjectsarequotedafterRosstat,op. cit.
71 These and other unemployment figures quoted after http://xn----8sbcbbscql7bijpi7ac0e-weh.xn--p1ai/
72 Figures on this subject taken from: http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b12_14p/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/01-04.htm
73 In1994,aStateCouncilwasformedinDagestan;itwasacollegeoffourteenmembers,whichconstitutedacollective‘presidency’establishedinordertoensurestabilityfortherepub-licinasituationofaweakeningfederalgovernmentfollowingthebreak-upoftheUSSR.Nationalconstituencieswerealsocreated,whichcouldnominatecandidatesofonlyonenationality–thiswasintendedtoensureparityintheparliamentwhilenotprecludingrealelectionstruggle(severalcandidateswouldbenominatedfromeachconstituency)andnotdiscriminatingagainstanyone(personsofdifferentnationalitieshadtheirownconstitu-encies).WhenVladimirPutincametopower,thenationalconstituencieswereabolished,which ledtomanycomplications for therepublic (itbecamenecessarytomakeveryde-tailedarrangementsandtediouslycompileelectionlistsinordertoensureethnicparityintheparliament),andin2006MoscownominatedthefirstpresidentofDagestan.Asaresult
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Dagestanalsohasafreepress–ajournalistwhocoversasubjectinconvenientforonegroupwillfindprotectorsinanother.Inthis,Dagestanisexceptionalnotonlyintheregion,butalsoinRussiaasawhole.Theforecastofabreak-upoftherepublicanda‘warofallagainstall’,whichexpertshavebeenreiterat-ingsinceatleastthemid-1990s,havefailedtomaterialise,althoughinstabilityhasbeengrowingoverthelastseveralyears.
OneoftheaxesoftheinternalDagestaniconflictconcernstherivalrybetweenthoseprofessingtraditionalIslam(inDagestan,asinChechnya,thiscurrentofIslamcomprisesmainlySufibrotherhoods),andtheadherentsofSalafism,whoaresufficientlystrongintherepublicfortheauthoritiestobeobligedtotoleratethem.74TheSalafiscontrolanumberofmosquesandsomesectorsoftrade.ThesituationintherepublicworsenedinlateAugust2012,whenSheikhSaidAfandi (Atsayev), themost influential leaderof traditionalistMuslims,wasassassinated.Afandi,whoexertedamajor influenceonpolitical life,asmanyministers,parliamentariansandmembersof theofficial religiousau-thoritieshadbeenhisdisciples,advocateddialoguewiththeSalafis,whichwascontestedbysomeofthetraditionalists,75andbythemostradicalSalafisbe-hindthearmedIslamicunderground.Hisassassinationappearstohavebeenintendedtoincitethedisruptionofthisdialogue;dialoguenonethelesscontin-uedinthefollowingmonthsasthetraditionalistsrefrainedfromretaliatoryactionsandtheSalafisdistancedthemselvesfromtheattack.76TheSalafisarealreadymorenumerousthanthetraditionalists,andareusuallymoredeeplyreligious.Manyexpertssharetheopinionthattheirsuperioritywillbegrow-ing,andwouldbegrowingevenfasterifnotforthesupportofferedbythestatestructurestotheirideologicalrivals.
ofthosechanges,thelocalgovernmentlostauthorityandbecameincreasinglyalienated.(StatementbyaRussiansociologist,November2012).
74 TheSalafisbecamestronger inmanyplaces,especially inthemountains,asearlyasthe1990s (thevillagesofKaramakhi,ChabanmakhiandKadarevenproclaimed themselvesan“independentIslamicterritory”andlivedaccordingtosharia).Currentlyit isusuallyforbiddento,forinstance,sellalcoholinthemountainvillages(bydecisionofamajorityofinhabitants).DagestanistheonlyplaceinRussiawhereasecondgenerationofSalafishasalreadyreachedadulthood.
75 Membersof thecentral religiousauthoritieshavequestioned thepointof suchdialogue(statementsbymembersoftheSpiritualBoardofMuslimsofEuropeanRussiainameetingoftheValdaiDiscussionClub,16–19September2013),butinDagestan,thesecularandreli-giousauthorities(theSpiritualBoardofMuslimsofDagestan)believeittobenecessary.
76 TheweaknessoftheDagestanigovernmentisvisibleinthefactthatthethenpresidentofDagestancalledonpeopletocreateself-defencemilitiasintheentireDagestanwhenthecountryfacedthethreatofriotsinthewakeoftheassassinationofSaidAfandi(thelasttimesuchmilitiashadbeencreatedwasin1999,ontheeveoftheSecondChechenWar).
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*
Inchechnya,thenumberofvictimsofthearmedconflicthasbeendecreas-ingsystematically since2010 (havingrisenat the turnof thedecade, in thefinalphaseoftheSecondChechenWarandimmediatelyafteritsend).In2010,127diedand123wereinjured,in2011,95diedand106wereinjured,andin2012,82diedand92wereinjured.Duringthefirstsevenmonthsof2013,30peoplewerekilledand46wereinjured.
In the first half of 2013, the averagemonthly salary amounted to 15,096 rou-bles (around US$ 460), and the population growth rate was as high as 19%(24.1birthsand5.1deathsperonethousandinhabitants).Thecurrentunemploy-mentrateofnearly30%isthelowestsince2006,whenunemploymentstatisticsfirststartedtobecompliedfortherepublic(theofficialunemploymentrateinthatyearwas67.7%;ithadfallento43.3%by2010andto37.3%in2011).Intermsofthenumberofcarsperonethousandinhabitants,Chechnyawasinlast-but-onepositioninRussiain2011(aheadoftheChukotkaAutonomousDistrict).
UnlikeDagestan,Chechnyaisamono-ethnicrepublic–theChechensaccountformorethan95%ofthepopulation(comparedto66%in1989).TraditionalIslamisthedominantreligion,whileSalafismisbanned.ThepoliciesoftheChechenleaderRamzanKadyrovareconducive to thestrengtheningof thepositionofreligion–Kadyrovhasbeenintroducingelementsofshariaintothelocallegis-lation,whichhasledtoquestionsaboutthecomplianceofsuchruleswiththeconstitutionoftheRussianFederation.77Inpractice,threelegalsystemsoperateintherepublic:RussianlawbasedonRomanlaw,sharialaw,andcustomarylaw(theadats).Theyrefertodifferentspheresoflife(public,family,relationsamongneighbours,etc.),andwheretheyoverlap,thechoiceofthelegalsystemtobeapplieddependsonthecontextandthespecificityofthegivensocialgroup.78Inmid-2013,aconceptoftheChechennational ideologywasdevelopedonKady-rov’srequest.Itisbasedonadynamicbalanceamongthreeelements,noneofwhichshoulddominate:1)ChechnyaaspartofRussia,2)Chechnyaasthecoun-tryoftheChechens,and3)ChechnyaasanIslamicrepublic.79
77 AccordingtoaChechenpoliticalscientist,ChechnyamakesthemostofthelegaloptionsofferedbythefederativesystemofRussia,butitdoesnotexceeditslimitations(OSWinter-viewwithaChechenpoliticalscientist...,op. cit.).Formoreinformation,seetheboxontheambitionsofRamzanKadyrov.
78 IwonaKaliszewska,Everydaylife...,op. cit.79 OSWinterviewwithaChechenpoliticalscientist...,op. cit.Theresearcherexplainedthatin
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Chechnyaisrelativelystable,especiallycomparedtotheneighbouringrepublicsofDagestanandIngushetia,anditsgovernmenthavealsomanagedtoconsid-erablyreducecommoncrime.However,thishasbeenachievedattheexpenseofeliminatingtheopposition,andofrepressionsagainstanumberofgroups,includinghumanrightsactivistsandthefamiliesofmilitants.80RamzanKady-rov’sautocraticrule, in turn,hasbeenmadepossibledue to thechanges thattransformedChechensocietyasaresultof the twowars.Firstofall, theroleofclansdiminished–their leadersno longerenjoysuchgreatauthoritysincetheformercommanderstookoverspiritualleadershipafterthefirstwarand,atpresent,itisKadyrovhimselfwhohasconcentratedalltheinstrumentsofpow-erincludingmoney,supportoftheclergyandgoodrelationswithMoscow,inhishands.Inthissituationtheclansarenolongerabletofulfiltheirbasicfunction(self-defenceandcomprehensiveprotectionoftheclanmembers),whichopensthewaytotheformationofamodernnation.Thosedissatisfiedwiththecurrenteconomicandsocialsituation,i.e.theunemployment,lowsalaries,lackofpros-pects,andalsowiththepoliticalsituation)leaveforRussiaorabroad.Emigrationintensifiedin2013–duringthefirstsixmonthsnearly10,000Russiancitizens,adecisivemajorityofthemChechens,claimedasyluminGermanyalone(whichis86.5%morethaninthecorrespondingperiodof2012).81
ramzan Kadyrov’s ambitions
In themedium term, and especially the long term, the ambitions of theChechen leaderRamzanKadyrovmayposeno lessa threat to thestabil-ityoftheregionandtheterritorialintegrityofRussiathantheactivitiesoftheCaucasusEmirate.Duetohiseffectiveanduncompromisingpolicy,Kadyrovhasmanagedtogainmuchgreaterpowerthantheseparatistpres-identsDzhokharDudayevandAslanMaskhadovenjoyedand,paradoxical-ly,hasbecomemuchmoreindependentofMoscowthantheywere.HavingestablishedfullcontrolofChechnya,Kadyrovnowseekstogaincontrolof
theUSSR,thefirstelementwasdominant,i.e.theKremlindecidedoneverything.DzhokharDudayevemphasisedthesecondelement,i.e.thenationalandethnicelementwhileunder-estimatingIslamandseekingtobreakalltieswithRussia.ThisethnicseparatismledtotheoutbreakoftheFirstChechenWaraccordingtotheresearcher.UnderAslanMaskhadov’srule,thethirdelement,i.e.Islam,dominatedtheentiretyofpubliclifeinChechnya,whichcontributedtotheoutbreakoftheSecondChechenWar.RamzanKadyrovhasbeenimple-mentingthisideologyinpracticeforsometimealready.
80 Formoreinformation,see:RamzanKadyrov’sambitions.81 В Германии зафиксирован массовый приток беженцев-чеченцев из России, Newsru.com,
17.07.2013.http://newsru.com/world/17jul2013/cheger_print.html.Thediscussiononthecaus-esoftherapidincreaseinthenumberofasylumapplicationsisbeyondthescopeofthispaper.
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IngushetiaandatleastapartofDagestan,andultimately,perhaps,eventheentireNorth-EastCaucasus.
Kadyrovhasbeenable to reachhis currentpositiondue to thepolicyofChechenisation.82 Initially, his independence was limited by influentialgroupsinChechnya,whichalsoadvocatedco-operationwithMoscow.Overtime, though,hemanaged to subordinateor eliminate them.Thebreak-throughcamewiththedisbanding,inNovember2008,oftwoSpetsnazGRUbattalions(“West”and“East”),whichhadbeenpartofthe42ndMotorRifleDivisionoftheRussianArmedForces.83Thetwounits,mannedbyethnicChechens,hadbeencreatedfiveyearsearlierandtheircommanders,Said-MagomedKakiyevandSulimYamadayev,hadgood links in theRussianMinistryofDefence(whileKadyrovatthattimewasbelievedtobeaprotégéoftheInteriorMinistryandtheFSB).Thetwobattalionsweredisbandedas a result of actions takenbyKadyrov,who accused their commandersandsoldiersofanumberofoffences,andevensentanarrestwarrantforYamadayev.84By2011,Kadyrovhadnomajoropponentsleftintherepublic(manypeoplehad leftChechnya), and it became impossible to openlyorpubliclycriticisehimorthesecurityforcesandtheadministrationofjus-tice.Accordingtohumanrightsactivists,therepublichaswitnessedandisstillwitnessingcasesofpeoplebeingintimidatedorterrorisedusingsuchmethodsasextrajudicialkillings,hostagetaking,kidnapping,torture,ordetention inprivateprisons.85Organisationsandpersonswhosemission
82 Chechenisation is discussed inmore detail in the section on the origins of the CaucasusEmirate.
83 Rozformowaniebatalionów„Wschód”i„Zachód”wCzeczenii,Tydzień na Wschodzie, OSW,19.11.2008.
84 OriginatingfromthetownofGudermes,theYamadayevfamilywasthemainforceop-posingKadyrovinChechnyainthesecondhalfofthe2000s(apartfromthemilitants).Itceasedtoplayasignificantrolefollowingtheassassinationsofitstwomostprominentmembers,i.e.Ruslan,aformerdeputytotheRussianStateDuma(killedon24September2008inMoscow)andhisbrother,Sulim(killedon28March2009inDubai).Thethirdbrother,Isa,blamedtheChechenleaderfortheirdeaths,aswellasforfailedassassina-tion attemptsdirected athimself, but thenbackeddownon the accusations andon 23August2010becamereconciledwithKadyrov–thiswasanindicationthatthelatterhadinpracticeestablishedamonopolyonthesystemofpowerinChechnya(thefourthYama-dayevbrother,Dzhabrail,haddiedbackin2003,andthefifthandthesixth,i.e.BadrudinandMusa,arealive,buttheydonottakeanactivepartinpubliclife).Kadyrov’spossibleinvolvementintheassassinationsoftheYamadayevs,andofsixotherprominentoppo-nentswhodiedinattacksinRussia,Azerbaijan,TurkeyandintheWestinlate2008andearly2009,hasnotbeenproven.
85 Seee.g.Российские правозащитники получили международный приз за работу в Чечне,Lenta.ru,9.10.2013.http://lenta.ru/news/2013/10/09/watchdog/
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istodocumentsuchcasesareunablecarryouttheirwork86–NatalyaEs-temirova, anactivist from theMemorial associationwaskidnappedandmurderedon15July2009andhasbecomeasymbolofthevictims.
Kadyrov’sauthoritarianrulerestsonthearmedformationshecontrols,es-peciallythe“North”and“South”battalions,whichareformallypartofthe46thBrigadeoftheInternalTroopsoftheRussianInteriorMinistry,87andtheunitsoftheguardoftheHeadofRepublic,knownasKadyrovtsy).TheChechenleaderhasbeenlegitimisinghispowerbyrepresentinghimselfasaChechenpatriotandapiousMuslim,andhighlightingsuchnotionsasna-tionalpride,loyaltytothefaithoftheancestors,orthesacrednessandinvi-olabilityofthefamily.88AnimportantelementintheformationofthisnewChechenidentity(whichitwaspossibletostartbuildingduetotheweak-eningoftheroleofclansmentionedabove)concernsthecultofAkhmadKadyrovasthefoundingfatherofthenewrepublic,whichresemblesthecultofHeydarAliyevinAzerbaijan,albeitonasmallerscale.PortraitsofAkhmadKadyrov,whowasbothapoliticianandaMuslimclergyman,aredisplayedonentrancegatestotownsandvillages,nexttoportraitsofPutinand,lessfrequently,ofRamzanKadyrovhimself.The“North”battalion,theAkhmadArenastadiuminGroznyandthe“HeartofChechnya”mosqueinGroznyareamongthefacilitiesinChechnyathatbearthenameofAkhmadKadyrov,andtheChechencapitalhostsanAkhmadKadyrovMuseum.TheresearcherSergeiMarkedonovhasreferredtotheprogrammebeingim-plementedbyRamzanKadyrovas“newnationalism”.89
86 ThishasbeenmentionedforinstanceinthemostrecentannualreportofHumanRightsWatch (World Report 2013): http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/russia?page=2
87 Since2010,newsoldiers forbattalionscome fromthedraft–Chechenrecruitshavenotserved inmilitaryunits outsideChechnya since 1992. Власти Чечни приняли решение о проведении осеннего призыва с 1 октября,Kavkaz-uzel,29.09.2013.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/230805/
88 Indoingthis,KadyrovdoesnotreferbacktothelegacyofImamShamil(anAvarbynation-ality),astheCaucasusEmiratedoes.Instead,heinvokesthelegacyofKuntaHaji,aChechenSufi sheikhwhoadvocated resisting tsaristRussiausingpeacefulmethods. It isnotablethatKadyrov’scatalogueofvaluesresemblestheinformal“conservative-Orthodoxproject”whichhasbeenundergoingimplementationinRussiasincethebeginningofVladimirPu-tin’sthirdterm(seetheRussianpresident’saddresstotheValdaiDiscussionClubon19Sep-tember2013:http://www.kremlin.ru/news/19243).
89 SergeyMarkedonov, A Patchwork Puzzle,The American Interest, 13.05.2013. http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1425
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Kadyrovhas introducedsomeelementsof theshariatotheChechenleg-islation and legal practice, including restrictions on the sale of alcohol(whichcanbebought legallyonlybetween8.00and 10.00a.m. ina few,selectedstores)andtheobligationfor femaleofficials, televisionanchorsand students towearheadscarves.Thereare two religiousacademies inChechnya,includingtheKuntaHajiRussianIslamicUniversityinGroznyand the Akhmad Kadyrov Islamic Institute in Kurchaloy), 20madrasas(high schools), aswell as fourhafiz schools, i.e. schools forQuran recit-ers(inOctober2013theconstructionofafifthwaslaunched).90Thereare700workingmosques inChechnya.Built in2008, the“HeartofChechn-ya”mosquementionedaboveisthelargestinRussia—itcanaccommodate10,000worshippers,anditsminaretsare62metreshigh.In2013Kadyrovputforwardthemosqueforanation-widecompetitionofnaturalorarchi-tecturalsymbolsofRussia.BymobilisingpeopleinChechnyaandpossiblyalso theneighbouringrepublics (thevotingwasperformedviae-mailortextmessage)themosquewasinthetoppositionforalongtimeandulti-matelymadeittothetopten.91
Due toactivityof this type, theChechen leaderenjoysgenuinepopular-ity among sections of theChechenpublic despite his heavy-handed rule(accordingtoAlexeiMalashenko,Kadyrovhasastablelevelofsupportofaround50%ofChechens92).Hecancertainlybecreditedforhavingrebuiltthecapitalandtheentirerepublic–todayitisdifficulttofindanytracesof
90 В Чечне начато строительство пятой школы хафизов,Kavkaz-uzel,8.10.2013.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/231283/
91 Theofficialwebsiteofthecompetitionis:http://10russia.ru/ Chechenofficialsweretaskedwithsendinge-mailsandtextmessagesforaspecifiednum-
berofhoursdaily.Whenthemosquefellintothesecondpositioninthefinalphaseofthecompetition’ssecondround,Kadyrovaccusedthetelecomoperatorsoffraud(allegingtheyhadbeenblockingtextmessagescomingfromtheCaucasus),saidhewouldwithdrawthe“HeartofChechnya”fromthecompetition,andthreatenedtoreferthecasetotheprosecu-tionauthorities(Илья Попов, Россия 10 лишилась„Сердца Чечни”, Московский Комсомолец,31.08.2013).Thecompetitionorganiserscavedinandthemosquefinallyfinishedinequalfirstplacewith thewinningKolomnaKremlin.Thecasemayhavehadabusinessback-ground:afterthejury’sfirstdecision,thestoresoftheall-RussiantelecomoperatorsweredemolishedinChechnyaandKadyrovannouncedthathewouldnotpickupcallsfromtheirsubscribers,tothebenefitofthelocalprovider,VainakhTelecom.
92 OSW interviewwithProfessorAlexeiMalashenko, June2011. It shouldbeexpected thatwhenthegenerationwhichdoesnotremembersthewar,i.e.thosebornafter2007,reach-esadulthood,therateofacceptanceofheavy-handedrulewillstarttodeclinenoticeably(OSWinterviewwithaChechenpoliticalscientist...,op. cit.;Муса Мусаев, От вайнахской стабилизации к дагестанской неопределенности, Kavpolit.com, 6.08.2013. http://kavpolit.com/ot-vajnaxskoj-stabilizacii-k-dagestanskoj-neopredelennosti/).
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wardamageinGrozny,andinvestments(inindustrialplants,gaspipelines,roadinfrastructure)arealsoreachingsmallertowns.Afternearlytwentyyearsofunrestandwar,Kadyrov’seffortstoprovidepeoplewithopportu-nitiestorelaxandentertainthemselvesatvariousfestivalsandanniversa-ries,towhichheinvitesworld-famousfilmstars,sportspeopleandsingers,alsoaddtohispopularity(inadditiontobeingameansofpropaganda).93TheinvestmentsandfestivitiesarelargelyfinancedfromgrantsfromthecentralbudgetofRussia;itisdifficulttoestimatethesumwhichisbeingdistributed through the Akhmad Kadyrov Foundation, which demon-stratestheefficacyoftheChechenleader’spolicy(inChechnyasomepeoplebelievethatthisprovesthatMoscowhasadmitteddefeatinthewar,sinceitisnormallytheloserwhopaysreparationstothewinner).
KadyrovhasbeenusingthefundsprovidedbyMoscowandhisexceptional(if informal)statusnotonly torebuildChechnya,butalso to furtherex-pandhisindependenceandreinforcehisposition.TheinternationalflightsfromGroznyairport,whichenabletheexportandimportofcommoditiespracticallybeyondanycontrolbytheRussiancustomsservices,areoneofthemeanstothisend.AnotherisKadyrov’sownhistoricalpolicy,oneofthemanifestationsofwhichconsisted in theunveiling,on 15September2013 (on the locally celebratedChechenWoman’sDay) of amonument totheCaucasusgirlswhodiedintheyears1817-1864.LocatedinthevillageofKhangish-Yurt,themonumentcommemoratesaneventin1819whenlocalgirlscapturedbyRussiansoldiersthrewthemselvesintotheTerekRiver,taking their captors with them. Commenting on themonument, AlexeiZhuravlyov,aRussiandeputytotheDuma,saidthatitwasananti-RussiangesturebytheChechenleadership.94Inanother,anarchisticandverywor-ryingsignofChechnya’sindependence,Kadyrov’spersonalbodyguardandfunctionaries of the Chechen InteriorMinistry can freelymove aroundRussiabearingarmsandconductingvariousoperationswithoutnotifyingthelocalsecurityforces,andenjoyde factoimpunity.95
93 TheactorStevenSeagal, theviolinistVanessaMaeandthe legendsofBrazilian football:Cafu,Bebeto,Dunga,RomarioandZicoareamongthecelebritieswhohavevisitedGrozny.WhenGérardDepardieuwasgrantedRussiancitizenship,KadyrovofferedtheFrenchac-toranapartmentinoneofthehigh-risebuildingintheGrozny-Citycompound.
94 Депутат Госдумы требует проверить законность установки в Чечне памятника девушкам, погибшим во время Кавказской войны,Kavkaz-uzel,21.09.2013.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/230424/.On3December2013ZhuravlyovwasphysicallyassaultedattheDumabyaChechendeputyAdamDelimkhanov,acloseassociateofRamzanKadyrov.
95 Novaya Gazeta reportedonacaseofagroupofsuch functionarieswhoweredetained in
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TheChechenleaderdeclaresloyaltytoRussia,ofwhichVladimirPutinisthepersonificationinhisview(themainalleyinGroznyissplitintotwosections,onenamedafterAkhmadKadyrov,theotherafterPutin),butatthesametimehemakessurehedemonstratesthatinChechnya,heisthemasterofthehouse.DuringPresidentDmitryMedvedev’svisittoGroznyKadyrovpickeduphisphoneandtalkedinChechenforseveralminutes,tothedismayoftheRussianpresidentandhisentourage.96SuchbehaviourisadmiredbysomeChechens,impressedbythefactthattheirleaderhasnosenseofinferiorityregardingRussia.
MoscowinitiallytoleratedKadyrov’smethods,regardingthehumanrightsviolationsasanecessarycostof thefightagainst terrorism(in theyears2004-2008Kadyrov indeedmanaged tocontain themilitants’operationsintosmallerareasandtosupresstheiractivitiesinChechnya),andthedis-playsofattachmenttonationaltraditionsandIslamasanecessarygesturetothemoderateseparatistsandadvocatesofsharialaw.Today,toleratingallthisisnolongerachoice,butratheranecessityforRussia.Thetwosideshavefoundthemselvesinstalemate—formallydependentontheKremlin,KadyrovhasbecomepracticallyimpossibletoremovebecauseChechnya’sstabilityrestsonhisshoulders.Heneverthelessenjoysfullpower intherepublicwhilealsodependingonmoneyfromMoscow.
RamzanKadyrovlikestospeakonbehalfoftheentireregionoftheNorthCaucasus.In2012theChechengovernmentfinancedaHajj(thepilgrimagetoMecca)for140-persongroupsfromtheneighbouringNorthCaucasusre-publics.97InAugust2013,twodemonstrationswereheldinGroznytopro-testagainstthediscriminationagainstpeopleoftheNorthCaucasusoriginincentralRussia.98KadyrovhasrepeatedlycalledforthereunificationofChechnyaandIngushetia,suggestingthathewouldseehimselfasthelead-erofthenewrepublic.WhentheIngushleaderYunus-bekYevkurovwasinhospitalinMoscowinsummer2009,recoveringfrominjuriessustained
Moscowonchargesofkidnappingandseverelybeatingaman.TheywereallegedlyreleasedattherequestoftheFSBafteritreceivedanorder“fromtheverytop”toleaveKadyrov’speo-plealoneuntiltheSochiOlympics.Сергей Канев, Москва-Юрт,Новая Газета, 25.03.2013.http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/57374.html
96 Afterhangingup,hesaiditwashismothercalling.Avideoofthisincidentisavailableonline.97 Паломники из Дагестана и Чечни готовятся к хаджу, Newsru.com, 25.09.2013. http://
newsru.com/religy/25sep2013/hajj.html98 В Грозном намечен пикет против дискриминации уроженцев Северного Кавказа
в регионах России,Kavkaz-Uzel,21.08.2013.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/228855/
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inanassassinationattempt,armedunitsoftheChechenInteriorMinistrycarriedoutoperationsagainstthearmedundergroundinIngushetia,ex-plainingthatinthecircumstancestheyhadtotakeresponsibilityforbothrepublics.TheraidoftheChechenpoliceintoArshtyinIngushetiainApril201399wasprobablyintendedtotesthowtheKremlinandtheIngushlead-ershipwouldrespondtoapotentialforcefulvariantofreunification.TheabsenceofafirmreactionfromMoscow,whichprobablyfearedanescala-tionintherun-uptotheSochiOlympics,willencouragetheChechenlead-ershiptomakenewattemptsinthedirectionoutlinedbythelaw,adoptedby the Chechen parliament in late January 2013 and signed byKadyrov,whichexpandsChechnya’sborderstoincludeanumberoftownsbelong-ingtoIngushetia.100RamzanKadyrovhasalsomentionedonseveralocca-sionsthatChechnyaneedsaccesstothesea,whichshouldbeinterpretedasterritorialclaimsbeingmadeagainstDagestan.UnlessMoscowcurbshisambitions,hewillpresumablyescalatehisclams.
*
TheabsolutecasualtynumbersinthearmedconflictinIngushetia arecom-parabletothefiguresforChechnya(134killedand192injuredin2010,70killedand38injuredin2011,84killedand83injuredin2012;and25killedand44in-juredbetweenJanuaryandJuly2013),butbearinginmindthatitspopulationisthreetimessmaller,Ingushetiashouldberegardedasthemostseverelyaf-fectedbytheconsequencesofthearmedconflict.
Inthefirsthalfof2013,theaveragemonthlysalaryintherepublicwasaslowas11,728roubles(aroundUS$360,thelowestfigureinRussia).Thepopulationwasgrowingatarateof16.6%(20.3birthsand3.7deathsperonethousandin-habitants).In2012theunemploymentrateof47.7%,thehighestinRussia,haddecreased slightly compared to the threeprecedingyears (48.2%, 49.7%and53.2%,respectively).IngushetiaranksinoneofthelowestpositionsinRussiaintermsofaccesstovariousconsumergoods.
99 SeethesectiononthesituationinIngushetiaformoreinformationonthisoperation.100 Сергей Маркедонов, Кадыров и Евкуров: спор соседей в контексте „пограничных”
проб лем, Caucasustimes.com, 13.08.2012. http://www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id = 21063; Евкуров: Су нженский район Ингушетии – неотъемлемая часть территории республики, Kavkaz-uzel, 13.03.2013. http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/221325/
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UnlikeinChechnya,theclanstructuresinIngushetiapersistandcontinuetoprovidethebasicformofsocialorganisation.Forthisreasontheclanleaders,usuallyverywealthypeople,enjoymuchgreaterauthoritythantheleaderoftherepublic,whoisnotinapositiontoprovidefinancialassistancetosome-onerequiringit(whilesuchassistanceisavailablefromtheclanleaders,andinChechnyadirectlyfromKadyrov).Accordingtoonesurvey,Yevkurov’sap-provalratingswereas lowas1.3%inthesummerof2013,101buttheapprovalratingsofpotentialcandidatestoreplacehimwerenotmuchhigher.Theonlyexception was Ruslan Aushev, the first president of Ingushetia (1993-2002)whohaswithdrawn fromactivepolitical life after leavingoffice,but is stillinvolvedinvariouspopularsocialinitiatives.Tohiscredit,Yevkurovhasman-agedtoreconcilethe86feudingfamiliesofIngushetia,whichwereobligatedtoabloodyvendettaunderthecountry’scustomarylaw.102UnlikeinChechnya,opposition isoperatingwithout impediment in Ingushetiaand it consistsofvariousorganisationsandsocialmovementswhichareable toconvenecon-gresses,holdmeetings,etc.
TenserelationswiththeneighbouringrepublicsofChechnyaandNorthOs-setiaareamajorproblemforIngushetia.Themostseriousincidentrecentlytookplaceon18April2013whenaround300ChechenpoliceofficersenteredthebordervillageofArshtyinhabitedmostlybyChechens.103Therootsoftheclashbetweenthetwoethnicallycloserepublicsdatebacktotheyears1944–1957whentheSovietauthoritiesfirstdisbandedtheChechen–IngushAuton-omousRepublicanddeported theChechensand the Ingush toCentralAsia,andthen,followingthereturnofthetwonationstotheCaucasus,restoredthecountrybutwithdifferentborders.104ForexamplethePrigorodnyDistrictnear
101 Блиц-опрос “ДОШ”: при прямых выборах глав Дагестана и Ингушетии люди голосовали бы против всех кандидатов, Kavkaz-uzel, 2.09.2013. https://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/arti-cles/229389/.
According to the same source (theDosh quarterly published inMoscow and inGrozny),Yevkurov’sapprovalratingswere8.7%in2011and4.8%in2012.
102 Евкуров поблагодарил представителей трех ингушских семей, простивших своих “кровников”,Kavkaz-uzel,15.03.2013.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/221446/.
103 Politicians, including theRussianStateDumadeputyAdamDelimkhanov, accompaniedthe police officers. The raid was carried out under the pretext of searching for DokkuUmarov,butaccording to theRussianauthorities therealpurposewas toholdarally inArshtytodemandthatthevillagebeincorporatedintoChechnya.Theincident,whichhadprobablybeeninstigatedbyRamzanKadyrov,metwithnoseriousreactiononthepartofthefederalgovernment.WojciechGórecki,Chechen-Ingushborderdispute,EastweekOSW,24.04.2013. http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-04-24/chechen-ingush-border-dispute
104 Seefootnote6.
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Vladikavkaz,whichwasmostlyinhabitedbytheIngush,remainedwithNorthOssetia(afterthebreak-upoftheSovietUnionthisledtotheIngush-Ossetianwar). The village ofArshty found itself in thenew republic Ingushetia (thesmallestFederationsubjectintermsofterritory)afterthe1992splitofChech-en-Ingushetia, but the border between the two republicswas not preciselydelineated.An escalation of theChechen-Ingush conflict could entailmajordisruptionfortheentireregion,withanewoutbreakoftheIngush-Ossetianconflictandspill-overeffectsintheneighbouringareasoftheNorthCaucasus.
*
ThesituationinNorth Ossetia isrelativelystable.Stillin2010,24peoplewerekilled and 171 wounded in the republic (most of this number were victimsof theattackona localmarket inVladikavkaz),but in2011only fourdeathswerereported(with10peoplewounded),andin2012,7peoplediedand7werewounded.Duringthefirstsevenmonthsof2013,no-onewaskilledorwoundedintherepublic.
NorthOssetia’seconomicperformanceisslightlybetterthanthatofitsneigh-bours.Therepublichadthehighestaveragemonthlysalaryintheentirefeder-aldistrictinthefirsthalf2013,althoughat16,833roublesamonth,i.e.aroundUS$520,itcorrespondedtolessthan73%oftheaveragemonthlysalaryforRus-sia.NorthOssetia’spopulationgrowthrateis3.7%(14.8birthsand11.1deathsperonethousandinhabitants).Theunemploymentratewas7.9%in2012and,likeintheneighbouringrepublics,hasbeendeclininginrecentyears(from9.7%in2010and8.2%in2011).
Duetoitslocationonimportanttransitroutes(NorthOssetiahastheonlyroadsconnectingRussiawith theunrecognisedSouthOssetia105 andwithGeorgia‘proper’,andonwardstoArmenia),therepublichasbeenstrugglingwiththeproblemofsmugglingandvariouskindsofcross-bordercrime,inadditiontothecorruptiontypicalofotherpartsoftheNorthCaucasus(whichinNorthOssetia’scaseismainlyrelatedtotheoperationofthealcoholicbeveragesin-dustry).DuetothefactthatSouthOssetiaisnotamemberoftheCustomsUn-ionofRussia,BelarusandKazakhstanandhassetmanyofitstariffsatlowerlevelsthantheCustomsUnion, it iscommonpracticetoregistercompanies,cars,etc.initsterritory,andtotransferfundsviaTskhinvali.Inthespringof
105 SouthOssetia(alongwithAbkhazia)hasbeenrecognisedasanindependentstatebyRus-sia,Nicaragua,Venezuela,NauruandTuvalu.
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2012, theRussianpresidentDmitryMedvedevappointedtheNorthOssetianleaderhisrepresentativeforSouthOssetia(thepostisindependentoftheRus-sianambassadortoTskhinvaliandtherepresentative’smaintaskistocontrolthebudgetsubsidiestransferredtoSouthOssetia).
NorthOssetiaistheonlyrepublicintheNorthCaucasusinwhichChristiansareamajority(alongsideAdygea,whichcontinuestobemainlypopulatedbyRussians).ThenumberofMuslimsintherepublichasbeengrowingforsever-alyears,though.Accordingtoestimates,Muslimscurrentlyaccountfor15%ofthepopulation,106andaseparateSpiritualBoardofMuslimsofNorth-Ossetia-Alaniaoperatesintherepublic.
*
Kabardino-balkariahasbeenthesceneofintensiveactivitybytheCaucasusEmirate,whichisreflectedinthenumberofterroristattacksandactsofvio-lence.Thearmedconflictclaimed79livesin2010,and82peoplewerewound-edinthatyear.In2011,129peoplewerekilledand44wounded,andin2012,107werekilledand49wounded.BetweenJanuaryandJuly2013,46werekilledand9wereinjured.
Inthefirsthalfof2013theaveragemonthlysalaryinKabardino-Balkariawas12,711roubles(aroundUS$390),makingitoneofthepoorestrepublicsofthere-gion(alongsideIngushetiaandKarachay-Cherkessia).Thepopulationgrowthratewas5.7%(14.8birthsand9.1deathsperonethousandinhabitants).Theunemploymentratereached8.9%in2012,havingdecreasedfrom12.7%in2010and10.6%in2011).
ThehistoryofSalafism inKabardino-Balkariadatesback to theearly 1990swhena groupof youngMuslims, graduates of religious schools in theArabstates,foundedtheIslamicCentre.Ithasbeenconceivedasanalternativetothe local Spiritual Board of Muslims, which represented traditional Islam,stronglyinfluencedbylocalbeliefsandcustomsinthispartoftheCaucasus.Thegroup,whichwasinitiallycommittedtooperatingwithintheboundsofthelaw,becameradicalisedovertimeandwentunderground(inpartbecauseof the state’s repressive policies after the outbreak of the Second Chechen
106 Noexactfiguresareavailable;theabovenumberhasbeenderivedfromestimatesquotedbyvariousresearchersincludingMikhailRoshchin,ArturTsutsiyevandRuslanBzarov.
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War).Thisprocessculminatedinthemilitants’attackonNalchikon13Octo-ber2005.107
The conflict between the titular nations of Kabardino-Balkaria also datesbacktotheearly1990s.Initially,itsnaturewasethnic-political(theambitionoftheBalkarcommunitieswastohavetheirownrepublic),butitiscurrent-lyeconomic—theKabardinbusinesses,whicharedominant inKabardino--Balkaria,havebeentryingtopushtheBalkarsawayfromthehighlandare-aswhichareattractivefortourism.Theconflicthasnotevolvedintoanopenconfrontationasyet,butitcouldpotentiallybecomeadestabilisingfactorfortherepublic,especiallysince the familyandthe innercircleof the formerrepublic’s leader,ArsenKanokov (aKabardin)constitute themost influen-tialbusinessgroupinKabardino-Balkaria,andKanokovhimselfisoneoftherichestpeopleinRussia.
SincethecivilwarbrokeoutinSyriainthespringof2011,activistsofvariousCircassianorganisationsfromtherepublicsoftheNorth-WestCaucasus(andAbkhazia)havebeenmakingeffortstorepatriateasmanyoftheCircassianslivingthereaspossible.108ThegovernmentsofKabardino-BalkariaandAdygeahavebeensupportingtheiractions,hopingtoboost theirownpopularity inthiswayandtoincreasetheproportionofCircassiansinthetotalpopulationsof these subjects of the Russian Federation.109 The Russian central authori-ties,ontheotherhand,havebeenlesswelcomingsincetheyfearasteppingupofCircassianprotestsagainst theOlympics inSochi110andareconcernedaboutapossibleescalationoftheKabardin-Balkarconflict.Hence,therepatri-atesonlyreceiveshort-termvisaswithwhichtheycannotsettle intheRus-sianFederation,theydonotgetresidencyregistrations,etc.Sofar,around700CircassiansfromSyriahaveresettledtoKabardino-Balkaria,andaround600
107 Wojciech Górecki, Przemiany islamu na Kaukazie Północno-Zachodnim w okresie po-radzieckim. Adygeja, Karaczajo-Czerkiesja, Kabardyno-Bałkaria i Osetia Północna. in:Okręt Koszykowa. ed. Jacek Borkowicz, Jacek Cichocki, Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz,Warsaw2007,p.217–241.
108 Thefirstwaveofrepatriationstookplaceafterthebreak-upoftheSovietUnionwithsev-eralhundredpeoplereturningtotheCaucasusfromcountrieswhichusedtobepartoftheOttomanEmpire.
109 TheauthoritiesofAbkhaziaarealsosupportingtherepatriations,asthecountryisdepopu-lating(theAbkhaziansareemigratingtoRussia).
110 Formoreinformation,seethesectiononGeorgiaandAzerbaijan.
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toAdygea.111 The repatriates are typically young peoplewho often establishasmallbusinessuponarrival.TheydonotusuallyspeakRussian.
*
TherepublicsofKarachay-cherkessia and adygeahavebeenaffectedbytheCaucasusarmedconflicttoarelativelysmalldegree.Intheformer,29peoplediedand16wereinjuredinattacksandterroristactsintheyears2010-2012,andinthefirstsevenmonthsof2013,4peoplewerekilledand2wereinjured.InAdygea,nocasualtieshavebeenreportedinthelastfouryears.
Theaveragemonthlysalary inKarachay-Cherkessiawas12,637roubles (lessthanUS$390) in thefirsthalfof2013.Thepopulationgrowthratewas3.6%(13.3birthsand9.7deathsperonethousandinhabitants).Unemploymentde-creasedslightlyin2012to8.9%(from10.35%in2010and9.8%in2011).
LikeKabardino-Balkaria,Karachay-Cherkessia isoften the sceneofvariousfrictionsbetween its titularnations (Karachays, i.e.CaucasusTurks,consti-tuteamajorityintherepublic),butpresentlytheclashesareusuallyrelativelymild.Aseriouscrisistookplaceinthepast,ontheoccasionofthe1999presi-dential election, inwhich theKarachay candidate,GeneralVladimir Semy-onov,defeatedtheCherkess,StanislavDerev.Derevdidnotacceptdefeatandhissupportersoccupiedthemainsquare intherepublic’scapital forseveralweeks.Karachay-Cherkessia is alsohome to some closely-knit communitiesofAbazins,apeoplerelatedtotheAbkhazians(andtraditionallyclosetotheCherkess),andofTurkicNogais,whosidewiththeKarachays.
InAdygea, the averagemonthly salarywas 16,670 roubles (overUS$ 510) inthefirsthalfof2013.Thepopulationgrowthratewasnegative(-1.4%,with11.7birthsand13.1deathsperonethousandinhabitants).Theunemploymentratein2012was8.1%,comparedto9.3%in2010and8.4%in2011.
AswiththesubjectsoftheRussianFederationwhichitneighbours,andespe-ciallyKabardino-Balkaria,forthelasttwoorthreeyears,Adygeahasbeenthesceneof increasingly frequent conflictsbetweenmembersof theCircassiannationsandtheArmenians,whocontinuetogrowinnumber(ArmeniansintheNorthCaucasusreporthigherpopulationgrowthratesthantheKabardins
111 В Адыгее более 90 детей сирийских черкесов пошли в школу,Kavkaz-uzel, 6.09.2013.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/229626/
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ortheAdyghes,andmuchhigherthantheRussians).Sofarmostofthesecon-flictshavebeenlimitedtoeverydaylifesituations,althoughcasesoffraysandlethalbeatingshavealsobeenreported.112
*
InStavropol Krai 37peoplewerekilledand88woundedinthearmedconflictintheperiodbetween2010and2012,and6peoplediedand2wereinjuredbe-tweenJanuaryandJuly2013.Inthefirsthalfof2013theaveragemonthlyincomewas16,802roubles(nearlyUS$520).Thepopulationgrowthratewasslightlynegativeat-0.1%(11.9birthsand12deathsperonethousandinhabitants).Theunemploymentratein2012wasclearlylowerthanintherepublics,andslightlylowerthantheRussianaverageat5.4%(6.9%in2010,and6%in2011).
Krasnodar Krai (whereSochiis located)haswitnessednoattacksorterroracts to date. The averagemonthly income of 19,821 roubles (nearlyUS$ 610)inthefirsthalfof2013wasconsiderablyhigherthanintheotherNorthCau-casussubjectsoftheRussianFederation.Liketheneighbouringareas,Kras-nodarKraireportsanegativepopulationgrowthrateat-1.1%(12.1birthsand13.2deathsperonethousandinhabitants).Theunemploymentratein2012was5.6%(6.7%in2010and5.9%in2011).
Noattacksorterroractshavetakenplaceintherostov Oblast,either.Inthefirsthalfof2013theaveragemonthlyincomeamountedto18,628roubles(morethanUS$570).Thepopulationgrowthratewasnegativeat-3.3%(10.9birthsand14.2deathsperonethousandinhabitants).Theunemploymentratein2012was6%(comparedto7.7%in2010and7.4%in2011).
Inthetwokrais andintheRostovOblast,therelationsbetweenthelocalSlavicpopulationandmigrantsfromthemountainousrepublicssettlingtherehavebeen amounting social problem, andpotentially themost serious sourceofconflicts.ThenewcomershavebeenarrivinginCiscaucasiaonalargerscaleforthelastseveralyears,andhavebeende factoslowlycolonisingtheareaandpushingouttheSlavicpopulation.Overtime,thismayresultinapermanentchangeoftheethniccompositionofthetwokraisand,toalesserextent,ofthe
112 AccordingtoaresearcherfromKabardino-Balkaria,forthetimebeingtheCircassiansandArmenianshaveasharedobjective,whichistomarginalisethelocalRussians.Theirstra-tegicinterestsare,however,divergent,e.g.bothgroupsseektocontrolthesamesectorsofbusiness.(OSWinterviewwitharesearcherfromKabardino-Balkaria,April2012).
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RostovOblast113(theeasternpartofStavropolKraihasbeenreceivingmainlyDagestanisandChechens,andtheregionofPyatigorskandtheCaucasusMin-eralnyeVody–mainlyKabardins,whileKrasnodarKraihasbeenthedestina-tionmainlyfornewcomersfromKarachay-CherkessiaandAdygea).Themi-grantsusuallycometoworkorstudy.Theyareeagertoworkinagriculture,takingoverbankruptkolkhozyandsovkhozy(whichisrelatedtoashortageofagriculturallandintherepublics),andarealsoactiveinsmallbusiness.Itisestimatedthataround50%ofstudentsinPyatigorsk(thecapitaloftheNorthCaucasusFederalDistrict)arenotethnicRussians.114 Inthespringandsum-merof2013,anumberofincidentsofanethnicnaturetookplaceinCiscauca-sia.Theseusuallyunfoldedalongsimilarlines:asinglecriminaloreconomiceventwouldmorphintoawider,ethnicallymotivatedclash.115Itistobeexpect-edthatincidentsofthiskindwillbecomemorefrequentandmorebrutal.ItisalsopossiblethattheSlaviccommunitieswillformvigilantegroups(eitherspontaneously,orwithin theexistingCossack formations,as theKrasnodarKraiCossacksarealreadycloselyco-operatingwiththelocalsecurityforcesunderspecialagreements116).
113 For example, 300 to 400 Slavic families permanently leave the Levokumsky District inStavropolKraieveryyear(thedistrict’stotalpopulationis40,000).Inthespringof2013,migrantsfromtheCaucasusrepublicsalreadyaccountedfor25%ofthepopulation,andcon-trolled70%ofthelocalbusinessesandland.InsomeplacesinStavropolKraithenewcomersalreadyaccountforasmuchas50%ofthepopulation,althoughintheentireCiscaucasia,changesintheethniccompositionarestillrelativelysmall.Игорь Кармазин, Ставрополье превращается в Косово: конфликты русских и мигрантов, Московский комсомолец, 12.04.2013. http://www.mk.ru/social/article/2013/04/11/839978-stavropole-prevraschaet-sya-v-kosovo-konfliktyi-russkih-i-migrantov.html
114 OSWinterviewwitharesearcherfromKabardino-Balkaria...,op. cit.115 Awell-knowncaseconcernstherapeofaRussianwomanon12August2013byNorthCau-
casusmigrantsinRostov-on-Don.Inresponse,theinhabitantsofRostovorganisedarally,callingfortheinfluxofmigrantstobecurbedandtherightsofthelocalpopulationtoberespected, and for anend to corruptionamong the security service andadministration,which allegedly tolerate abuse by thenewcomers. Similar rallies tookplace in the stan-itsaofVeshenskaya(on12August)andthestanitsaofBazkovskaya(on13August).Katar-zynaJarzyńska,WojciechGórecki,EthnictensionescalatesinCiscaucasia,EastweekOSW,28.08.2013. http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-08-28/ethnic-tension-escalate-ciscaucasia
116 Since1September2012,1,000CossacksinKrasnodarKrai(including150inKrasnodarit-self)havebeenpatrollingtownsandvillagesalongsidethepolice.В Краснодарском крае казаки приступят к совместному с полицией патрулированию населенных пунктовбKavkaz-uzel,1.09.2012.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/211993/
Since July2013,another300CossacksfromKrasnodarKraihavebeentakingpart inop-erations against illegal migrants along with the Federal Migration Service officers.Власти Краснодарского края решили привлечь казаков к рейдам против незаконных мигрантов,Kavkaz-uzel,25.07.2013.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/227602/
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AlexanderTkachev, a close associate of President Putin,whowas approvedforanotherfive-yearterminMarch2012,hasbeenthegovernorofKrasnod-arKraisince January2001.He isoneof thepeople inchargeof theOlympicpreparations,117andalsoservesasPutin’srepresentativeforAbkhazia(apostindependentoftheRussianambassadorinSukhumi).Tkachev’sstrongposi-tionseemsimpossibletodent;neithertheinefficacyofthecrisismanagementsystem,revealedduringthefloodinginJuly2012,northelinksofthelocalse-curityforcestothecriminalworld,whichpublicopinionlearntofinconnec-tionwith themassmurder in the stanitsa (rural locality)ofKushevskaya in2010,hadaneffect.118Thegovernorisalsoknownforhisharsh,almostxeno-phobicstatementsaboutmigrantsfromtheNorthCaucasusrepublics,whichfurtherexacerbatesthelocalSlavic-Caucasianrelations.
117 The question of theOlympic preparationswill be discussed in the section onMoscow’sstrategiestowardstheregion.
118 JadwigaRogoża,FloodingintheKuban:anaturaldisasterovershadowedbypolitics,East-week OSW, 11.07.2012. http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-07-11/flood-ing-kuban-a-natural-disaster-overshadowed-politics
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Iv. ThE rOlE OF azErbaIjaN aNd gEOrgIa
AzerbaijanandGeorgiahavebeenhavinganinfluenceonthesituationintheNorthCaucasus,albeittoalimitedextent.DuringtheFirstChechenWarthetwocountriesremainedneutral,althoughAzerbaijanunofficiallyco-operatedwith theseparatistsasaway toputpressureonMoscow.Georgiarefrainedfromsuchcontactsbecause,firstly,theChechenmilitantshadbackedtheAb-khaziansduringtheGeorgian-Abkhazianwarin1992–1993(asdidtheentireNorthCaucasus)and,secondly,becauseTbilisihopedthatMoscowwouldhelpit regaincontrolof thebreakawayprovincesofAbkhaziaandSouthOssetiaanddidnotwanttodamageitsthengoodrelationswithRussia.
During Chechnya’s quasi-independence (1996–1999), Baku and Tbilisi devel-opedintensivecontactswithGroznyastheirownrelationswithMoscowdete-riorated.InviewofRussia’sfiascointhewarandtheUSA’sheightenedinterestintheCaucasus,GeorgiaandAzerbaijanstartedlookingfornewformulasofcollectivesecurityintheregion,oneoftheresultsofwhichwastheutopianprojectofestablishinga“CaucasusOSCE”thatwouldincludeGeorgia,Azer-baijan,ChechnyaandDagestanandwhichwouldbeaimedatexcludingRussiafrom the regionalpeaceprocesses andwould thus furtherundermineMos-cow’spositionintheregion.
AftertheSecondChechenWarbrokeout,AzerbaijanandGeorgiaofferedsafehaventorefugeesfromtheconflictregion,includingAslanMaskhadov’sfam-ilyandaides.ThesonoftheChechenpresident(andthewidowofDzhokharDudayev)foundrefugeinBaku,andVakhaArsanov,thedeputypresidentoftheChechenRepublicofIchkeria,wasofferedanapartmentinTbilisiinwhichhe opened an informal embassy of Chechnyawith the knowledge and con-sentoftheGeorgiangovernment.Georgiadidnoteventrytoclosethemoun-tainpasseswhicharmedChechenmilitantswerereachingthePankisiGorgethrough,i.e.amountainareainGeorgiainhabitedbytheKistChechens,torestandtreatinjuries.ItisknownthatRuslan(Khamzat)Gelayev,oneofthemostprominentfieldcommanders,establishedabaseinPankisi.Tbilisirepeated-lyrejectedRussia’sdemandstohandoverthemilitantsandtoallowRussiantroopstocontroltheChechensectionoftheRussian-GeorgianborderontheGeorgianside.ThisprovokedstrongcriticismfromMoscow119andled,insev-
119 MoscowrepeatedlyaccusedGeorgiainparticularofaidingterrorists.Inlate2001theRus-sianForeignMinisterIgorIvanovsaidthatOsamabinLadenwasprobablyhidinginthePankisiGorge.
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eralcases,toGeorgianvillagesinthemountainsbeingbombed(allegedlybyaccident)bytheRussianairforce.
Asthewardraggedonanditscharacterchanged,thetwocapitals,andBakuinparticular,startedtograduallywithdrawtheirsupportforthemilitants(in2003–2004AzerbaijanbegantounofficiallyhandoversomeoftherefugeestoMoscowand forceothers to leaveusing administrativemethods).CurrentlyBaku’s focus isonsupportingtheAzerbaijaninationalminority insouthernDagestan(forexample,anAzerbaijanitheatreoperatesinDerbent)andonef-fortstoneutraliseRussianinfluenceontheDagestanidiasporasontheothersideof theborder (Baku fears thatMoscowmight fanseparatist sentimentsandradicalIslamicideasamongtheLezgiansandAvarslivinginAzerbaijan).In2013,attheinitiativeofBaku,oneofthestreetsinDerbentwasnamedafterHeydarAliyev (fatherof the currentpresident ofAzerbaijan,whoprecededhimas theheadofstate).Moreover,President IlhamAliyevmaintainsclosecontactswiththeDagestanileaderRamazanAbdulatipov.120
Georgianeverdecidedtoco-operatewithMoscowbyhandingoverrefugees.AftertheRoseRevolution(late2003and2004),itundertookaseriesofmeas-uresaimedatrevivingtraditionalsocial,economicandculturalcontactswiththeNorthCaucasuscountries(meaningdirectcontactsnotintermediatedbyRussianfederalagencies)andatbuildingtheimageofGeorgiaamongthelo-calauthorities,butespeciallyamongthepublic,asamodern,attractiveandfriendlystate.ThispolicywasfurthersteppedupandintensifiedafterMos-cowrecognisedAbkhaziaandSouthOssetiaintheaftermathofthe2008warandasdiplomaticrelationsbetweenthecountrieswerebrokenoff.Georgia’saimwas to foster the formationof akindofbufferbetween itself andcen-tralRussiaintheNorthCaucasus.InasignificantgestureGeorgialiftedthevisaobligationforRussiancitizenslivingintheNorthCaucasusrepublics,inordertofacilitatecontactsandtomakeGeorgia’sofferfortheregion(whichincludedattractivegrantprogrammesforstudents)moreaccessible.121Russiacriticisedthemove,labellingitprovocative(itrespondedinasimilarwaytoGeorgia’sunilateralliftingofvisasforallholdersofRussianpassportson29February2012).
120 OSWinterviewswithmembersoftheDagestanidiasporainMoscowintheyears2012–2013.121 TheabolitionofvisasfortheNorthCaucasus(on11October2010)couldalsoberegardedasGeor-
gia’slateresponsetoasimilargesturemadebyRussiatoAbkhaziaandSouthOssetia–Moscowexemptedtheinhabitantsoftheseparatistrepublicsfromtheobligationtoobtainvisasalreadywhenthevisaregimewasestablishedbetweenthetwostateson5December2000.
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Tbilisi’s special focushasbeenontwo interrelated issues– theSochiOlym-picsandtheso-called“Circassianproblem”.On25November2010theGeorgianparliamentappointedaspecialcommissiontoinvestigatewhetherRussiawasusingtheoccupiedterritoryofAbkhaziainordertopreparefortheOlympics122(whichwouldbeagainsttheprovisionsoftheOlympicCharter).Thecommis-sionwasalsotaskedwithcarryingoutanawareness-raisingcampaignintheglobalmediaagainsttheOlympicGames,whichwouldhighlight,amongotherissues,theenvironmentalthreatsandthehistoricalcontext,i.e.thefactthattheGameswilltakeplaceonasitewherenativeinhabitantsoftheselandswereexterminated123).TheCircassianproblem, i.e. therestorationof thememoryof theCircassians’ tragedyandreflectionaboutpossiblewaysofcompensat-ingit,wasthesubjectofanumberofinternationalseminarsandconferencesorganisedbytheIliaStateUniversityinTbilisiandtheUS-basedJamestownFoundationunder thepatronageof theGeorgiangovernment (with thepar-ticipationofthoseCircassiangroupsintheWestwhichopposedtheGames).Ultimately,on20May2011theGeorgianparliamentadoptedaresolutionrec-ognisingthemassacreoftheCircassiansinthe19thcenturyRussianEmpireasgenocide,andMikheilSaakashvili’sgovernmentdecidedtoboycotttheGames.TheGeorgianpointofviewwaspromotedbythePIKsatellitetelevisionchan-nel (PIK is the abbreviationof theRussian for FirstCaucasus InfoChannel,Первый Информационный Кавказский),whichbroadcastinRussianandwasalsoavailableinsouthernRussia,TurkeyandIran.MoscowsawTbilisi’ssup-portforthedemandsoftheradicalCircassiancommunities,itsdebasingoftheOlympics–aprojectinwhichpresidentPutin’spersonalprestigewasinvolved–andfinally,thecreationofthePIKtelevisionchannel,ashostileactionsandaformofinterferenceintheinternalaffairsofRussia.
Aftertheparliamentaryelectionson1October2012,whentheGeorgianDreamoppositioncoalitionledbyPrimeMinisterBidzinaIvanishvilitookoverrealpowerinGeorgia,thecountry’sactivitiesaddressedtotheNorthCaucasuslostmuchoftheirmomentum.ThePIKtelevisionstationwascloseddownandthedecisiontoboycotttheGamesreversedintwomoveswhichbecamesymbolsof
122 GeorgiahasconsideredAbkhaziaandSouthOssetiaoccupiedterritorysincethe2008warandsinceMoscowconcludedagreementswith the twopara-statesunderwhichRussianmilitarybaseswereestablishedinbothofthem.GainingfullcontrolofAbkhaziaandelimi-natingallpotential threats thatmightendanger theSochiOlympics fromthatdirection(e.g.Georgiansabotage)wasoneofMoscow’saimsinthatwar.
123 Seefootnote5.
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thechangeofcourse.124Inthissituationtheemergenceofsomepro-Georgiangroupsintheregion,madeupofuniversitygraduatesandotherbeneficiariesoftheGeorgianprogrammes,maybethemostdurableachievementofTbilisi’seffortsintheNorthCaucasusintheperiod2008-2012.
Forsecurityreasons,theborderbetweenRussiaandAbkhaziawillprobablybeclosedduringtheOlympicGames,at leastpartly(forcars).Moscowfearsthatitcouldbecomeagatewayforpotentialterrorists(inthemountains,theborderrunsonlyafewkilometresawayfromtheOlympicgrounds125).Moscowhas limitedconfidence inAbkhazia,which isade facto Russianprotectoratebut,unlikeSouthOssetia,hasbeentryingtopreserveamarginofindepend-ence.Thislackoftrustwasvisible,forinstance,whentheRussianministerofDefence,SergeiShoyguvisitedtheRussianmilitaryunitsstationedinthere-publicon14May2013anddecidednottoholdevenacourtesymeetingwiththepara-state’sleadership.126MoscowbecameevenmorewaryofAbkhaziaafteranunknowngunmanshotdowntheFirstSecretaryoftheRussianembassyinSukhumi,DmitryVishernev,on9September2013(severaldayslater,hiswifealsodiedinhospitalfrominjuriessustainedintheattack).Moscowmaytakeadvantageofthiscaseasapretexttoimplementadditionalsecuritymeasures(deploying additional units of special forces inAbkhazia before theGames,stepped-upchecks,alsoontheAbkhazianside,etc.).
124 TheargumentwasthatmostlikelynobodywouldjointheboycottandGeorgiawouldfinditselfisolatedintheinternationalarena.Thedecisionhasbeencontestedbyanumberofgroups including Saakashvili’s UnitedNationalMovement and the Left Alliance,whichcontinuetocallforaboycottoftheOlympics.
125 SinceMarch2011,RussiaandAbkhaziahavebeeninconflictoverthevillageofAibgawhichstraddlestheborderriverofPsou,verycloseKrasnayaPolyanawheresomeofthecompeti-tionsaretotakeplace(accordingtoGeorgiaandnearlyallothercountriesintheworld,therivermarkstheRussian-Georgianborder).
126 Ольга Алленова, Послевоенная пятилетка-2,Коммерсантъ Власть,26.08.2013.
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v. culTural aNd cIvIlISaTIONal chaNgES
The question of the cultural and civilisational changes that have been tak-ing place in theNorth Caucasus in recent years has already been signalledonmanyoccasionsinthispaper,butitissosignificant,especiallyforthefu-ture of the region, that itmerits a separatediscussion.Themost importantand seemingly irreversible process concerns the progressing Islamisation,whereinagrowingproportionofpeopleareembracingaMuslimidentityasoneofthemostimportantelements,ifnotthesinglemostimportantelement,oftheirself-identification.127Thismanifestsitselfnotonlyinregularreligiouspractice,butalsoinlivingaccordingtotheguidanceofIslam,votingforpoliti-cianswhoidentifythemselvesasMuslims,etc.Aswiththeotherprocesses,Islamisationimpactsdifferentpartsoftheregionindifferentwaysandwithvaryinglevelsofintensity(inadditiontohavingdifferentdirections,asitcanbeeither‘Salafist’or‘traditionalist’).Howeveritisverydifficulttomakeac-curatecomparisonssincenodetailedstudiesspanningtheentireregionareavailable at this time.One shouldhowevernote the term“ethnicMuslims”,whichispresentinresearchliteratureanddenotesallmembersofthenationstraditionallyprofessingIslam.Thetermisimprecise(e.g.theKabardinpopu-lationfromtheMozdokareabelievethemselvestohavebeenChristians“sincetimeimmemorial”;besidesthetermexcludesatheists),butisnonethelessuse-ful,aseventhosewhoidentifythemselvesasnon-believersusuallyobeysuchreligiouspractices as circumcisionor religiousmarriage ceremonies. In the1990s,thepercentageofbelieversamongthenativenationsoftheNorth-EastCaucasusrangedfrom81to97%(comparedto64%amongRussians),andthecurrentphaseofIslamisationcanbeinterpretedasthenaturalcontinuationofahistoricalprocessfirstinterruptedbytheOctoberrevolutionandtheBol-sheviks’risetopower,andthensuppressedbytheoutbreakofethnicconflictsinthedecadethatfollowedthebreak-upoftheSovietUnion(aroundtheyears1990–2000).128
InKabardino-Balkaria, one of the symptoms of Islamisation consists in thedecreasingnumberofofficially registeredmarriages (insteadof formalisingtheirunionsatregistryoffices,youngpeopleareincreasinglybeingmarriedby mullahs, sometimes even without their parents’ knowledge; such mar-riagesarenotincludedinthestatistics).Theproportionofwomen(especially
127 Accordingtoestimatesfrom2009,even10%ofyoungpeoplefromtheregiondeclaredtheywereof“Muslimnationality”.StatementbyaRussianexpert...,op. cit.
128 Алексей Малашенко, Исламские ориентиры Северного Кавказа, Москва2001,s.6,62.
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youngwomen)whowearheadscarvesorevenhijabshasalsoincreasedconsid-erably.129TheresearchofZaidAbdulagatov,conductedintheyears1996-2010,showsthedynamicsof Islamisationamongyoungpeople inDagestan.130Thepercentageofbelieversinthisgroupincreasedto95%intheperiodinques-tion.77.6%ofthemcanbecharacterisedas“fundamentalists”whobelievethatIslamshouldbeas itwas in the timesof theProphet (compared to 53.9% in2000),and9.6%maybetermed“modernists”whobelieveIslamshouldadapttothechangingworld.58.1%ofrespondentsintheformergroup(and26.9%inthelatter)believethatthenormsofshariaaresuperiortosecularlaw.30%ofallyoungbelieverswouldbepreparedtoprotestopenlyintheeventofaconflictbetweensecularandsharialaw(comparedto25.6%ofyoungpeoplestudyingatreligiousschools,whichcanbeexplainedbythefactthatreligiousschoolstudentsarealmostexclusivelytraditionalists,typicallymoreloyaltostatein-stitutionsthantheSalafis,eventhoseSalafiswhodistancethemselvesfromterrorismandtheCaucasusEmirate).Theprocessofshariatisation, i.e.thetendencytoresolveagrowingrangeofissuesanddailyproblemsbyreferencetotherulesofsharialaw,existsinDagestanaswellasChechnyaandIngushe-tia(aswasmentionedabove,someelementsofshariahavebeenincorporatedintoofficiallegislationinChechnya).
de-modernisation consists in the revival of traditional social institutionssuchascustomarylaw,vendetta,orcouncilsofelders(whichexistedbeforethearrivalofRussiansintheCaucasusandwerepreservedinresidualformintheSovietperiod).Italsoentailsreinforcementofthetraditionaldivisionofrolesinthefamilyandsexsegregation(e.g.atweddingswheremenandwom-encelebrateseparately),aswellasagrowingproportionofgirlswhogonotgotoschool.131Thisprocessisprogressingfasterinvillages(especiallyinthemountainareas)andintherepublicsofNorth-EastCaucasus.
WiththeexceptionoftheSlavicCiscaucasia,theentireregionisalsoexperi-encingde-russification,which involves theRussian languagebeingpushedoutbytheCaucasuslanguages,andthelevelofRussianlanguagecompetenceis
129 OSWinterviewwitharesearcherfromKabardino-Balkaria...,op. cit.130 Заид Абдулагатов, О влиянии религиозного фактора на экстремистское поведение
дагестанской молодежи, Социс,Issue1/2012,p.106–113(articleavailableonlineat:http://www.isras.ru/files/File/Socis/2012_1/Abdulagatov.pdf).
131 The transformations of the Caucasus customs and habits, which could even be termeda“conservativerevolution”,aredescribedinthebooksoftheyoungauthorAlisaGaniyeva(bornin1985);seee.g.hercollectionofshortstories:Алиса Ганиева, Салам тебе, Далгат!, Москва2010.
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decreasing.Thatprocessisrelated,inter alia,tothechangesintheethniccompo-sitionoftheregion’spopulation,i.e.emigrationoftheRussian-speakingSlavicpeople.Itisstillrelativelyinconspicuousinlargecities.Inruralareasandes-peciallyinethnicallyhomogeneousvillages,however,theRussianlanguageisoftenheardonlyontelevision.ReportsfromDagestanorIngushetiasometimesincludedescriptionsofvillageswhereno-oneornexttono-onespeaksRussian–themenwhospeakthelanguageareincentralRussiawheretheywork,whilethewomenwhoraisechildrenonlyunderstanditatbest.132Inoneillustrativecase,Nur-PashiKulayev,aChechenbornin1980whowastriedforinvolvementinthesiegeoftheschoolinBeslanon1September2004,askedthecourtforaninterpreterashedidnotunderstandeverythinginRussianandcouldnotaccu-ratelyexpresshimselfinthelanguage(therequestwasdeclined).133
Theproportionof ethnicRussians in the totalpopulation isdeclining inalltheNorthCaucasussubjectsoftheRussianFederationwiththeexceptionofKrasnodarKrai. In therepublics, theabsolutenumbersofRussiansarealsofallingasaresultofRussiansreportinglowerbirthratesthantheCaucasusnationsandemigratingfromtheregion.ThemostdramaticdecreasehasbeenobservedinChechnya:backin1989Russiansaccountedfor24.81%ofthepopu-lationof theChechenpartsofChechen-Ingushetia (269,130people),134butby2010thisproportionhadfallentojust1.92%(24,382people).Ingushetiaisthesubject secondmost affected by the process – its ethnicRussian populationhasdecreasedfrom24,641people,or13.25%,in1989to3,215people,or0.78%,in 2010. 29,587 people permanently emigrated from Kabardino-Balkaria intheyears2006-2011,including17,688Russians,4,887Kabardinsand1,381Bal-kars.135Between1989and2010thepercentageofRussiansinthatrepublicde-creasedfrom31.95%to22.46%(240,750peopleand193,155people,respectively).SeealsoAppendix4.
TheviewthatRussiashouldbeusedasameanstoanendandmadetogiveasmuchaspossible is thedominantviewamongtherulingelitesof theNorthCaucasus republics and has been gaining popularity among the intelligent-siaintheregion(especiallyamongpeopleuptotheageoffifty).Thisattitude
132 Seee.g.IwonaKaliszewska,MaciejFalkowski,Matrioszkawhidżabie,Warsaw2010.133 OliverBullough,Letourfamebegreat,JourneysAmongtheDefiantPeopleoftheCaucasus,
AllenLane,2010,p.385.134 In1989,Russiansaccountedfor23.12%(293,771people)oftheentirepopulationofChechen-
Ingushetia.135 OSWinterviewwitharesearcherfromKabardino-Balkaria...,op. cit.
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hasbeendescribedasfollowsbyaresearcherfromKabardino-Balkaria:“Itisawidespreadbeliefthat‘timeisonourside’,thatis,theNorthCaucasuswillseparatefromRussiasoonerorlater,eitherformallyorinformally,thereforeoneshoulddemandasmuchmoney,investmentandplacesatuniversitiesaspossiblefromMoscow,sothattheregioncandevelop.TheaimshouldalsobetomanasmanypositionsaspossibleintheRussianstructuresofpower,andfromtheretosupportone’srelativesandone’scountry.ThepeoplewhothinkthiswayareunitedintheopinionthatRussiaisacoloniserandhasdonetheCaucasusmoreharmthangood,butatthisstagethereisnopointinfightingitbecauseitistoostrong.Someofthosepeople,theyoungergeneration,alsobelievethattheCaucasuscouldmanagewithoutMoscowalreadynow,whiletheoldergenerationdisagrees”.136Inthiscontextitisworthquotingtheapho-rismattributedtoRasulGamzatov(1923–2003),adistinguishedDagestanipoetwritinginAvarandinRussian,that“DagestandidnotjoinRussiavoluntarilyandwillnotvoluntarilyleaveit”.
ThenumberofpeopleintheNorthCaucasuswhodonotconsiderRussiatobetheirhomelandhasbeengrowinginrecentyears,137whileRussianshavein-creasinglybeenviewingtheNorthCaucasusasakindof“foreignbody”withintheirstate.Researchcarriedoutin2013byVCIOM138attherequestoftheValdaiClubshowsthatthepercentageofpeoplewhobelieveCrimeatobeRussianter-ritory(56%)isgreaterthanthepercentageofthosewhothinkthesameaboutDagestan(41%)andChechnya(39%).Theoppositeopinion(i.e.thattheareasinquestionarenotRussia)hasbeenexpressedby39%,54%and57%,respectively.Only7%believethataChechen,aDagestanioranIngushcanbecalledaRus-sian(русский),evenifthepersoninquestionhasbeenlivingincentralRussiaformanyyears(while44%wouldusetheterm“Russian”foranUkrainianoraBelarusianinthesamecircumstances,and10%foranArmenian,aGeorgianoranAzerbaijani).139
136 Ibid.137 IslamTekushevwrote:“Duringthe15-yearlongconfrontation,theNorthCaucasushasbe-
comeahostilenear-abroadforamajorityofRussians.[…]Meanwhile,fortheinhabitantsoftheNorthCaucasus,RussiahasbecomeahostileterritorywhereCaucasusnationaldanc-es (lezginka)are treatedalmostasdemonstrationsofaggressionorsuperiority”. (Ислам Текушев, Теракт. А в ответ тишина...,Caucasustimes.com, 26.01.2011.http://www.cauca-sustimes.com/article.asp?id=20735).
138 Всероссийский центр изучения общественного мнения (Russian Public Opinion Re-searchCentre).
139 Современная российская идентичность: измерения, вызовы, ответы, Москва, сентябрь 2013.
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Around2010, reflections on thepossibility ofRussia givingupof theNorthCaucasusandtheconsequencesofsuchamove,whichhadbeenabsentfrompublicdebatesincethemid-1990s,startedtore-appearinthepressandexpertcommentaries.140
140 Forexample:Сергей Маркедонов, Уйти нельзя,Gazeta.ru,21.12.2010.http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2010/12/21_a_3472821.shtmlThequestionoftheattitudeofRussianstowardsaseparationoftheregionfromtheFedera-tionisdiscussedinthefinalchapter.
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vI. ThE NOrTh caucaSuS IN MOScOw’S POlIcIES
1. Strategies towards the region
Moscowhasnotdevelopedanycohesivestrategyfortheregionoverthemorethantwentyyearsfollowingthebreak-upoftheSovietUnion.during boris Yeltsin’s rule (1991–1999) its policies were reactive:anymeasuresthatweretakenwere in response to events in the region (starting the First ChechenWartocombatseparatistswasanexampleofthisreactiveapproach).during vladimir Putin’s two terms as president (2000–2008) russia implement-ed the force-based model of managing the region,whichrequiredmassivefinancialoutlaysandaconstantheavymilitarypresence(aftertheoutbreakoftheSecondChechenWar,Chechenaffairswerede factohandedovertotheMinistryofDefenceand,subsequently,totheFederalSecurityService).Thehighcostof this strategyand theabsenceofanyvisible results, i.e. the factthatMoscowfailedtoestablishfullcontroloftheregion, ledtheKremlintoadoptaslightlymoreflexiblepolicy(theabove-mentionedpolicyofChechenisa-tion, implementedsincemid-2002).dmitry Medvedev (2008–2012) tried to rebuild stability in the North caucasus using economic means,byinitiat-ingvariousinvestmentsintheregionandlaunchingfinancialtransfers.TheappointmentofAlexanderKhloponin,aneconomistrecognisedforhismana-gerialskills,asthepresidentialrepresentativeinthenewlycreatedNorthCau-casusFederalDistrictbecameasymbolofthischange.141However,corruptionimpededtheimplementationofthe‘economic’modelofmanagingtheNorthCaucasus–aconsiderableportionofthefundstransferredtotheregionwasembezzled. Moreover, many of the investments were aimed at developingtourismwhilethedemandfortouristservicesintheregionwasnegligibleduetothethreatofterrorattacks.launched at the onset of Putin’s third presi-dential term in 2012, the current policy is a combination of the Medve-dev approach, i.e. a continuation of the existing financial programmes supplemented by new ones that are launched, and ad hoc measures aimed at ensuring security for the Olympic games (tobediscussed later in thischapter),whileatthesametimeMoscowtendstorefrainfrominterveningintheregionifinterventioncouldescalatetensions—theabsenceofanyreactiontoRamzanKadyrov’saggressivemovesagainsttheneighbouringrepublicsisacaseinpoint.
141 WojciechGórecki,Managers instead of general-governors?Moscow s new tactics in theNorthCaucasus,OSWCommentary,Issue36,3.03.2010.
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Underlyingall those strategies is theconviction,also sharedbyRussianpublicopinion,thattheNorthCaucasusisaregionthatdiffersconsiderablyfromtherestofRussiaandrequiresnon-standardtreatment.Itseems,however,thatMoscowisstillyettotakethestrategicdecisiononwhethertointegratetheNorthCaucasus(understoodhereasthemountainrepublics,excludingthekraisandtheoblast)withtheRussianeconomic,socialandlegalspace,orwhethertoisolateitandaccepttheexistenceofaninformal“internalabroad”withinthecountry(atthelevelofofficialdeclarations,separationoftheregionisnotanoption)142.
Theabsenceofacomprehensivevisionfortheregion,aunifyingideaoraposi-tiveproposal(i.e.thethingswhichhaveparadoxicallybeenoffered,inreverse,bytheCaucasusEmirate),isvisibleevenintheprojectsinitiatedduringDmitryMedvedev’srule.Thetourismandwintersportsdevelopmentprogrammemayserveasanexample:firstly,itisaddressedonlytoafewselectedlocations,andsecondly,giventhelevelsofthecorruptionandcriminalisationoftheecono-my,findingseriousinvestorsisverydifficultandthepotentialprofitsarenotgoingtoimprovethelivesofthelocalpeopleanyway.Inthissense,MoscowiscontinuingthepolicyoftheSovietUnion,aimedatreinforcingthedivisionsexisting in the North Caucasus, especially ethnic divisions.143 Moscow alsoapproachestheNorthCaucasuswithdistrustorevenfear,whichisvisibleinthefactthatmilitarydraft isverylimitedintheregion:onlysinglesoldiersfromDagestanor Ingushetiamake it to theRussianarmy,andtheMinistryofDefenceadmits that it isunable toeffectivelycontrolconscripts fromtheCaucasuswhotendtoinformallysubordinatetheunitsinwhichtheyserve.144MeanwhileconscriptsfromChechnyadotheirmilitaryserviceexclusivelyintheterritoryoftherepublic.InthissituationMoscow’stacticofavoidingfric-tionandunconditionallysubsidisingthelocalbudgetsisbecomingitsstrategy.
142 Theterm“internalabroad”hasbeenpopularisedbytheGermanresearcherUweHalbach(UweHalbach,Russia’sInternalAbroad.TheNorthCaucasusasanEmergencyZoneattheEdgeofEurope,SWPResearchPaper2010/RP05,November2010.http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2010_RP_05_hlb_ks.pdf).
143 Oneresearcherevenmentionsa“dictatorshipofparities”, i.e. theconvictionthatall theCaucasusnationsshouldhaveproportionalrepresentationinthelocalgovernment.State-mentbyaRussianexpert...,op. cit.Oneexampleof the strengtheningofparticularismsat the expense of the idea of one, shared Caucasus consists in the deepening hostilityamongthefansofdifferentfootballclubs,whichleadstoclashesandriotsduringGames(amassfightbrokeoutbetweenthefansofAngushtNazranandAlaniaVladikavkazafteragameinIngushetiaon23October2013;theregion’sstrongestfootballteamsincludeAnzhiMakhachkalaandTerekGrozny).
144 Сергей Маркедонов: отказ от призыва в армию уроженцев Кавказа говорит о не-дееспособности государства, Kavkaz-uzel, 8.04.2013. http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/arti-cles/222549/.
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MoscowseldominterferesintheinternalaffairsoftheNorthCaucasusrepub-lics, leavingtheir leadershipsamarginoffreedomthatisrelativelylargebyRussianstandards.TheKremlinmainlyexpectsthelocalleaderstoensuresta-bilityintheirrespectiveFederationsubjects.Inthiscontext,predictabilityofthepoliticalandsocialsituation,keepingtheadministrationandpublicinsti-tutionsundercontrol,andensuringuninterruptedelectricity,gasandwatersuppliestohouseholdsaremoreimportantforMoscowthantheeffectivenessof thefightagainst terrorism. It is the federalagencieswhichareprimarilyresponsibleforthis,anyway.ItalsoappearsthatattheleveloftherepublicsMoscow is more likely to accept authoritarianmethods than an ostensiblyconciliatoryapproachinvolving,forinstance,peaceinitiativesindependentoftheKremlinorattemptsatbuildingcoalitionsoflocalpoliticalforces.Moscowmayconsidersuchinitiativestobesignsofdisloyalty.Oneillustrationofthispoint is servedby the fact that theChechen leaderRamzanKadyrovenjoysmuchgreaterindependencethantheotherleadersintheregion,totheextentthatonecouldevensaythatheisholdingMoscowhostage.
ThesaidmarginoffreedomenjoyedbythetopofficialsintheCaucasusisalsovisibleinthefactthatMoscowhasseldomresortedtodismissingarulingheadofaCaucasusrepublic(otherthaninStavropolKrai):theIngushleaderMuratZyazikovwasdismissedintheautumnof2008intheaftermathofmonths-longprotestscallingforhisresignation.BorisEbzeyev,theleaderofKarachay--Cherkessia,steppeddowninFebruary2011(formally,heresignedvoluntarily;accordingtopressreports theKremlinhadaccusedhimof incompetence ineconomicaffairs).InlateJanuary2013VladimirPutinacceptedtheresignationofthepresidentofDagestanMagomedsalamMagomedov(whichpresumablyhadalsobeenagreedinadvancewithMagomedov).ItseemsthatinthislastcasethereasonsconcernedMagomedov’sindependentinitiativessuchastheactivitiesoftheAdaptationCommission,whichenabledarapid“reintegration”ofmilitantswhohadsurrendered theirarms,andhis involvement in inter-Islamicdialogue.TheKremlinisopposedtoanytalkswiththemilitantsandatbestreluctanttoaccepttalkswiththeSalafis,andsomayhaveregardedthoseinitiativesasadangerousprecedent.Magomedovwas replacedbyRamazanAbdulatipov,anactivistandresearcherwellknowninRussia,whononethe-less has no political backing locally. This suggests thatMoscow’s intentionbehindthisnominationwastoestablishdirectcontrolofDagestanoneyearaheadoftheOlympics145(thesubsequentarrestofthemayorofMakhachkala,
145 Abdulatipovhasbeenadeputy,afederalministerforethnicpolicy,andRussianambassa-dortoDushanbe;hehasauthoredanumberofresearchpapersaboutethnicrelationsinthe
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thecapitalofDagestan,probablyservedthesamepurpose–thiswillbedis-cussedinmoredetaillaterinthischapter).ThelastcasewasthedismissalofArsenKanokov,theleaderofKabardino-Balkaria,inDecember2013.Itshouldbenotedthatallthedismissedpoliticianshavebeensubsequentlyappointedtohigh-rankingfederaloffices,provingthattheKremlinwascertainoftheirloyaltyandrewarded themfor it in thisway (e.g.Kanokovbecamea repre-sentativeofhisrepublictotheRussianFederationCouncil).146
ThefinancingoftheNorthCaucasusisaparticularlycontroversialissue,bothfortheRussianpoliticalclassandthepublic.Since2008,theregionhasbeenreceivingvery large, albeitdifficult toestimate, sumsofmoneyundervari-oustargetprogrammes,inadditiontonormalbudgetsubsidies(thebudgetsoftheNorthCaucasusrepublicsreporthighdeficits147).Thefundingisnotsubjecttotransparentsettlementprocedures,whichcreatestheimpressionthattheNorthCaucasusisaparasitefeedingontheRussianstate.148Thisimpressionisfurtherstrengthenedbypressreportsaboutluxuriousgoodspossessedbyleaders in theCaucasus, especiallyRamzanKadyrov, and thepompous life-stylesofthegrowingCaucasusdiasporasinMoscowandotherRussiancities.Itisagainstthisbackgroundthattheslogancallingforan“endtothefeedingoftheCaucasus”(Хватит кормить Кавказ!)emerged.IthasbeenpromotedbyoneoftheleadersoftheRussianprotestmovement,theanti-corruptionblog-gerAlexeiNavalny,andhasbeenembracedbylargeswathesofRussianpublicopinion–asmanyas51%ofrespondentsintheSeptember2013VCIOMsurveyquotedabovesupportedit(42%wereagainst,and7%expressednoopinion).149
CaucasusandinRussia.WojciechGórecki,TheKremlinincreasesitscontroloverDagest-an,EastweekOSW,30.01.2013.http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-01-30/kremlin-increases-its-control-over-dagestan
146 Theprincipleofloyaltyworksbothways.TheKremlinshowsloyaltytotheregionalleadersbyrefrainingfromofficialcontactswiththealternativeelitesintheirrespectiverepublics(suchasnon-governmentalorganisation,Salafireligiouscommunities,etc.).
147 Forexample,directsubsidiesfromthefederalbudgetaccountforaround90%ofthebudgetof Ingushetia.Theaimof thedevelopment strategy currentlybeing implemented in therepublic istoreducethisfigureto80%,butthisseemshardlytoberealistic(Екатерина Абрамова, Евкуров: За 20 лет...,op. cit.).
148 Thereport“Кто кого кормит?”(“Who sfeedingwhom?”)publishedbytheLenta.ruportalnoted that thefinancial relationsbetween theNorthCaucasusrepublicsand the federalgovernmentwereoneoftheprimeexamplesofthelackoftransparencyinRussia sbudgetpolicy(http://lenta.ru/articles/2012/12/14/enough/).
149 Современная российская идентичность…,op. cit.AccordingtotheLevadaCentre,asmanyas71%ofrespondentsagreedwiththesloganinOctober2013(including35%who“firmlysupported”it,and36%who“rathersupported”it).See:http://www.levada.ru/05-11-2013/rossiyane-o-migratsii-i-mezhnatsionalnoi-napryazhennosti
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Theoutrage,whichmorphsintoaversiontomigrantsfromtheCaucasusandleadstoethnicclashes,150 ismotivatednotonlybytheallegedembezzlementofsubsidies in theregion,butalsoby the“bossingaround”commonamongmigrantsfromtheCaucasusincentralRussia.151SomeofthefundingallocatedtotheNorthCaucasuspresumablyneverreachestheregionatall,someisin-terceptedbytheclansinpowerintherepublics,andsomeisspentoninvest-mentsoflittleusewhichfailtostimulatethelocaleconomies.ThepresidentofDagestan,RamazanAbdulatipovhasbeenquotedassayingwordswhicharecertainlyequally trueabout theother republics—that in recentyears “Dag-estanwasfed,butnothealed”anddidnotdevelop.152
Attheendofthefive-year“SouthofRussia”programmeinAugust2013,ameet-ingwasconvenedinPyatigorsk(thecapitaloftheNorthCaucasusFederalDis-trict)todiscusswhatresultshadbeenachieved.Inthecourseofthemeeting,theRussianministerforregionaldevelopmentIgorSlunyayevsaidthateventhough43.6billionroubles(aroundUS$1.34billion)hadbeenspentonvariousmeasurestoimprovethesocialandeconomicsituationintheregion,thelistofoutstand-ingproblemswasstillthesameasin2008.Healsosaidthatthemoremoneythatwasspentonfinancingtherepublics,thelessmarket-orientedtheirecono-miesbecame.SimilarobservationswereexpressedinPyatigorskbythefinanceministerAntonSiluanovwhosaidthatthelevelofsubsidiesforthebudgetsoftheNorthCaucasusrepublicswasgrowingseveraltimesfasterthanthefinanc-ingfortheothersubjectsoftheRussianFederation.Siluanovfurtherrevealedthatwhile theaveragenumberofstateofficialsperonethousandinhabitantsinRussiawas1.8, inChechnyaitwas3.5andinIngushetia,4.6.Healsocriti-cisedtheNorthCaucasusleadershipsforkeepingexcessivelylargecarfleets153
150 Forexample,anincidentofthiskindtookplaceon13October2013intheBiryulyovoZapad-noyedistrictofMoscow.ThelocalcommunitystagedviolentprotestsafterayoungRussianwaskilledbyapersonwitha“non-Slavic”appearance(theauthoritiesrevealedonlyadaylaterthat thesuspectwasanimmigrant fromAzerbaijan).Theprotestsmorphedintotoattacksagainststoresemployingmigrantsandclasheswiththesecurityservicesinwhichbetween ten and 20peoplewere injured.Katarzyna Jarzyńska, Ethnic riots inMoscow,EastweekOSW,16.10.2013.http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-10-16/eth-nic-riots-moscow
151 PubliccelebrationsofMuslimholidays(perceivedasademonstrationofpower),loudwed-dingswithcelebratorygunfire,night-timeridesacrosscitiesinmotorcadesofluxuriouscarsadornedwithflagsfromtheCaucasusrepublics,etc.Isolatedeventsofthiskindareseenasrepresentativeofthegeneralattitudeofthe,allegedlyhighlyassertive,Caucasusdiasporas.
152 Abdulatipovsaiditon15August2013duringameetingwithpresidentPutin.http://www.rbcdaily.ru/politics/562949988516522
153 Петр Нетреба, Дмитрий Бутрин, Премьер-министру показали горы проблем, Ком-мерсантъ, 20.08.2013. http://kommersant.ru/doc/2259319; Силуанов: Регионы Северного
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(usuallymadeupofluxuriousarmouredlimousines).Despiteallthosereserva-tions,lessthanamonthlatertheRussianSecurityCouncilapprovedadocumententitled“PrincipaldirectionsofstatepolicyintheNorthCaucasusFederalDis-trict”.40billionroubles(aroundUS$1.23billion)wasinitiallyearmarkedfortheimplementationofitsprovisions–themoneywillbedistributedunderanew,three-yearlongeditionofthe“TheSouthofRussia”programme.PresidentPutinsaidonthatoccasionthatthepriorityofthepolicytowardstheregionshouldbetofurtherincreasethepaceofthesocialandeconomicdevelopmentoftheNorthCaucasus since difficult living conditions there provided “nourishment forextremists”.154ThisdeclarationcanbeinterpretedasanindicationthattheRus-sianleadershipisgoingtokeepthecourseofitsCaucasusstrategyunchangedatleastuntiltheendofPutin’scurrentpresidentialterm,leadingtoapetrificationnotonlyofMoscow’srelationswiththeregion,butalsooftheinternalpoliticalandsocialsituationintheNorthCaucasusrepublics.
2. Operation Sochi 2014
By establishing the North Caucasus Federal District comprising seven Fed-erationsubjectswhichwerepreviouslypartoftheSouthernFederalDistrict(PresidentDmitryMedvedev’sdecisiontothiseffectwaspublishedon19Janu-ary2010),theRussianauthoritiessoughttosymbolicallyhighlightthatSochiwas not the Caucasus – Krasnodar Krai, where Sochi is located, remainedwithintheoriginalSouthernFederalDistrict.Thedecisionwasapsychologi-calandpropagandaexercise,whichinawaystigmatisedtheNorthCaucasusrepublics(withtheexceptionofAdygea),sincethenewFederalDistrictwastheonlyonetobecreatedbasedonethnicandreligiouscriteria.155StavropolKraiwasincludedintothenewDistrictalongwiththeIslamicrepublicsassociated
Кавказа могли бы сэкономить на автомобилях для чиновников, 1prime.ru, 19.08.2013.http://1prime.ru/Politics/20130819/765663024.html
154 Муса Мурадов, Северному Кавказу укажут новое направление, Коммерсантъ, 10.09.2013.http://kommersant.ru/doc/2275567
InDecember2011,whilehewasstillprimeminister,VladimirPutinsaidthatcuttingin-vestments in theNorthCaucasuswould lead to seriousdisturbances,whichmight evenresultinthebreakoutofwarasreducedsubsidieswouldresultingreateremigrationfromtheNorthCaucasustolargeRussiancitiesandtheensuingproblems.Headdedthat,shouldmigrationbecurbed,youngpeopleintheregionwouldjointhearmedundergroundandbacktheideatoseparatetheCaucasusfromRussia(Лучше поздно, чем никогда,Expert-club.ge,23.12.2011.http://rus.expertclub.ge/portal/cnid__10661/alias__Expertclub/lang__ru/tabid__2546/default.aspx).Thelocalelite’stakeonthequestionofsubsidiesisdiscussedinthesectiononthecivilwar.
155 С созданием нового федерального округа Северный Кавказ приобретает особый статус в России,Kavkaz-uzel,20.01.2010.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/164427
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withterrorismandIslamicfundamentalisminordertoavoidtheimpressionthatthenewdistrictwasa‘reservation’ofCaucasushighlanders(thiswasalsothereasonwhythenewdistrictwasnotformedconsistingexclusivelyofthemostunstablerepublicsofDagestan,Chechnya andIngushetia–firstly,therearehardlyanyethnicRussiansinthoserepublicsand,secondly,suchadeci-sionwouldleadtodisputesaboutwherethecapitalofsuchadistrictshouldbelocated).However,thenewfederaldistricthasfailedtostreamlinetheadmin-istrationoftheNorthCaucasus,oneofthereasonsforthisbeingtheconflictbetweenthepresident’splenipotentiaryrepresentativeAlexanderKhloponinandRamzanKadyrov.156
InordertoenforceloyaltyamongtheNorthCaucasusleadershipsintherun-uptoOlympicsandduringtheGames,Moscowdecidedtocarryoutaseriesofshowarrestsofhigh-rankingofficialsinDagestaninthesummerof2013.Themostwidelyknowncasewasseenon1 JunewiththearrestofSaidAmirov,thelong-timemayorofMakhachkala(since1998)andtheleaderoftheDagest-anibranchoftheUnitedRussiaparty,whohadbeenregardedasthesecondmost influentialpolitician in theregionafterKadyrov.Amirovwasaccusedofhavingcontractedamurder,andafterseveralmonthsofinvestigation,alsoofterrorismandarmstrafficking.157Hewasarrestedinadramaticoperationthat involved his fortress-like house being stormed by a special-forces unitsentfromMoscowandhimsubsequentlybeingevacuatedbyhelicopter.TheDagestaniInteriorMinistryhadnotbeennotifiedoftheoperation.ThosefactssuggestthatitwasadeliberatedemonstrationofMoscow’spoweranddeter-mination.ItwasapparentlysupposedtosendamessagetoelitegroupsintheCaucasus thatno-one isuntouchable.Thecampaignwasanad hocmeasureaimedatensuringpeacebeforetheOlympics,ratherthanimprovinginternalrelationsinDagestaninthelongerterm;besidesAmirov,nootherclanleaderswerearrested,andthosewhoremainatlargewillpresumablystartaturfwaraftertheOlympics(theotherdetainedofficialswereeitherAmirov’sassociates
156 Wojciech Górecki,Managers instead of general-governors?…, op. cit.;Wojciech Górecki,“Creeping’civilwar…,op. cit.RussianmediahavealsosuggestedthatKhloponinhadem-bracedtheclanwayofdoingpoliticsintheCaucasus,whichmanifesteditselfinter alia inthefactthatheappointedhisson-in-lawNikitaShashkinasdeputyactingdirectorgeneralof theNorth Caucasus Resorts company (ОАО „Курорты Северного Кавказа”) (Максим Гликин, Светлана Бочарова, Максим Товкайло, Развитие Кавказа стало семейным делом,Vedomosti.ru, 15.05.2013. http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/12025491/kavka-zskij_klan_hloponina
157 Саиду Амирову предъявлено обвинение в подготовке теракта,Kavkaz-uzel,28.10.2013.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/232422/
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orpeoplewhoplayednomajorroleintheinformalrelationsinDagestan,andtheirdetentionwasprobablyintendedsolelytoavoidtheimpressionthattheenforcementauthoritiesoperatedselectively).
ThemeasurestakenbyMoscowdirectlyaimedatensuringthesecurityoftheOlympicsresembletheplanningofaspecialoperation.DuringtheGames,ade factostateofemergencywillbeinforceinSochiandinthesurroundingarea.UnderPresidentPutin’sdecreewhichenteredintoforceon23August2013,onemonthbeforethestartoftheGames,i.e.asof7January2014,anymeetingsun-relatedtotheOlympics,includingralliesanddemonstrations,willbebanned.Therestrictionswillremaininforceto21March(i.e.thefifthdayaftertheendoftheParalympicswhicharetraditionallyheldaftertheOlympics).Whileitremainsinforce,thecitywillbedividedintoaccess-controlledzones(whichitwillbepossibletoenteronlyafterundergoingapolicecheck)andclosedzones(withaccessonlyforthecontestants,servicepersonnelandsportsfans).CarswithregistrationplatesfromotherregionswillnotbeletintoSochiwithoutspecialpasses.158TheareasurroundingtheOlympicgroundswill,practicallyspeaking,becordonedoff.SoldiersfromtheSochiOperationalGroupcreatedinAugust2012(militaryspetsnaz,morethan10,000troopsandofficers)willbepatrollingthemountainareas,pathways,gorgesandpassesinthestretchoflandfromAbkhaziatotheborderbetweenKarachay-CherkessiaandKabar-dino-Balkaria(around200kilometresfromtheOlympiccity).NotouristswillbeallowedintoresortssuchasArkhyzandTeberda,oreventhePrielbrusyearea,whichEmiratemilitantscouldtheoreticallyoperatefrom.159TheborderwithGeorgiaistoreceiveadditionalprotectionfromunitsofthe58thArmy.InSochiitself,42,000policeofficerswilldeployedduringtheGamesinadditionto24,500otherfunctionariesoftheInteriorMinistryand10,000soldiersoftheInternalTroops,160aswellasCossackdetachments.161
158 На время проведения Олимпиады в Сочи будут запрещены митинги, Kavkaz-uzel,24.08.2013.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/228995/;Лев Левинсон: в Сочи на время Олимпиады вводится режим чрезвычайного положения,Kavkaz-uzel,24.08.2013.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/229015/
159 TheSochiOperationalGroupincludestwospetsnazbrigadesoftheSouthernMilitaryDis-trict:the22ndBrigadeandthe10thBrigade.Алексей Михайлов, К защите Олимпиады в Сочи подключился армейский спецназ,Izvestia.ru,26.02.2013.http://izvestia.ru/news/543324
160 Колокольцев: МВД направит на Олимпиаду в Сочи дополнительные силы, Kavkaz-uzel,30.10.2013.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/232575/
161 Казаки встретят гостей Сочи на вокзалах, Vse-o-sochi.ru, http://vse-o-sochi.ru/news/city/1032-kazaki-vstretyat-gostey-sochi-na-vokzalah.html
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On10September2013,aspecialcommissiontaskedwithfindingandremov-ingillegalimmigrantsfromSochibeganoperation(manyillegalmigrantshadworkedontheconstructionoftheOlympicfacilities).OnlythoseholdingSochiresidencyregistrationswillbeallowedtostayinthecityduringtheGames(inadditiontotechnicalpersonnel,theOlympiansandthefans);162by22OctoberfunctionariesoftheFederalMigrationServicehadidentified1,800addressesofapartmentsoccupiedbyimmigrants.163
TheceremonyduringwhichrepresentativesofVancouver,thehostofthepre-viousWinterOlympics,handedovertheOlympicsymbolstothecityauthori-tiesofSochi,wasaperhaps insignificantbutnonetheless tellingexampleofhowMoscowcaresonlyaboutthepropagandaandpublicrelationssuccessoftheOlympics,anddoessoatanyprice,164inlinewiththemaximthattheendjustifiesthemeans,evenifthatinvolvesviolationsoftherightsoflocalpeopleanddisregard for thehistorical context.During the stageperformances ac-companyingtheceremony,the“nativeinhabitants”ofthehostcitywererepre-sentedbyaCossackchoir,whiletheCossackshadactuallybeenthevanguardoftheRussiantroopsthatconqueredtheCaucasusinthe19thcentury.Norefer-encewasmadetothefolkcultureoftheCircassians,therealnativeinhabit-antsoftheSochiarea,eitheronthatoccasionorwhentheOlympicmascotsandmerchandisingwerebeingdesigned,despitepleas fromrepresentativesoftheCircassiancommunitiesloyaltoRussiawhichrefrainedfromcallingforaboycottoftheGames.165
162 В Сочи с 10 сентября начинает работу комиссия по обнаружению нелегальных мигрантов,Kavkaz-uzel, 2.09.2013. http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/229406/; HumanRights Watch призвала МОК обратить внимание на задержания мигрантов в Сочи,Kavkaz-uzel,3.10.2013.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/231057/
163 Ткачев: ФМС Кубани выявила в Сочи 1800 «резиновых квартир», в каждой числятся более 10 человек, Kavkaz-uzel,23.10.2013.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/232155/
164 ForinformationaboutthecostoftheOlympics,seee.g.WacławRadziwinowicz,Igrzyskaoligarchijskie,Gazeta Wyborcza,28.10.2013.
165 Символика Олимпиады в Сочи должна отражать культуру черкесов, уверены представители адыгских организаций,Kavkaz-uzel,8.04.2010.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/167516/
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vII. cONcluSIONS aNd TENTaTIvE FOrEcaST: ruSSIa wIThOuT ThE caucaSuS?
RussiaconqueredtheNorthCaucasusinthe19thcenturyinordertomoreeffec-tivelyadministertheterritoriesoftoday’sGeorgia,AzerbaijanandArmenia,whichhadbeenincorporatedintotheRussianempireseveraldecadesbefore.Then,asnow,controloftheregionseemstobeaprerequisiteofRussiapre-servingitsinfluenceontheSouthCaucasus(andMoscowisindeeddeterminedtomaintainitsinfluencethere,asdemonstratedbyitsadoptionofamoreac-tivepolicytowardsAzerbaijanandArmeniainthespringandsummerof2013,aheadoftheEasternPartnershipsummitinVilnius166).ThepotentiallossoftheNorthCaucasuswouldseriouslyimpedeRussia’scontactswithitsallyArme-nia(theonlycountryintheSouthCaucasuswithaRussianmilitarybase,andtheonlyonetohavejoinedtheMoscow-controlledCollectiveSecurityTreatyOrganisation).ItwouldalsohindercontactswithAbkhaziaandSouthOssetia,thebreakaway republics thatRussiahas recognised, andwith Iran.Moreo-ver,energytransitroutesimportantforMoscowarealsolocatedintheNorthCaucasus,includingtheBaku–NovorossiyskoilpipelineandthegaspipelinetoArmenia,aswellasroadsandrailways.Theregionalsohostsimportantair-ports (the localhub inMineralnyeVody), theseaportsofNovorossiyskandMakhachkala, spas and resorts (Yessentuki,Kislovodsk, Pyatigorsk,Anapa,Sochi),andtheonlywintersportsresortsintheEuropeanpartofRussia(theSochiandPrielbrusyeareas).
Inviewofallthis,controloftheNorthCaucasustransportandtransitinfra-structuresandtheborderswithAzerbaijanandGeorgia(includingtheAbkha-zianandSouthOssetiansections)iscrucialforMoscow.Fromthisperspective,stability in theregion(whichcannotbeensured in the longer termwithoutfullintegrationoftheregionwiththerestofthecountry)isnotanendinitselfbutratherameanstofacilitatethecontrolMoscowneeds,orinfacttomakeitpossibleatall.Byanalogy,permanentinstabilityintheNorthCaucasuswouldthreatenthesecurityofthewholeofRussiatotheextentthatitwouldhinderthiscontrol,orspreadbeyondtheregion,asitdoesintheeventofEmirateter-rorattacksincentralRussiaorethnicclashesandconflictsinvolvingmigrants
166 AleksandraJarosiewicz,MoscowishagglingwithBakuaheadofthepresidentialelection,Eastweek OSW, 28.08.2013, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-08-28/moscow-haggling-baku-ahead-presidential-election; Szymon Ananicz, Armenia turnsawayfromtheEU,EastweekOSW,4.09.2013,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-ses/2013-09-04/armenia-turns-away-eu
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fromtheCaucasusinMoscowandothercities.ApotentialattackduringtheSochiOlympicswouldbeanextremecase,ablowtotheprestigeofRussiaandofPresidentPutinpersonally.Ifnotfortherealthreatofinstabilitybeing‘ex-ported’beyondtheNorthCaucasus,astateofcivilwarcouldevenbeprovi-sionallybeneficialtoMoscow(assumingtheconflictremainscontainedintheregionandisolated,inthesenseofbeingaconfrontationbetweenthemilitantsandthesiloviki,withnoattacksonciviliantargets),astheEmirateistheonlyrealoppositiontoRamzanKadyrovleftintheregion.Eliminationofthearmedundergroundwould further strengthen Kadyrov’s position againstMoscowbecausehewould thenno longerhave significant opponents andwouldnotneedthesupportofthefederalsecurityforces,asiscurrentlythecaseintheeventoflargerclasheswiththemilitants(forexampleinFebruary2012;nor-mally,however,thefederaltroopsseldomhavetoleavetheirbarracks).Withthemilitantsoutofthepicture,thefinancingthatChechnyareceivesfromthecentralbudgetwouldbeautomaticallyreduced(alargeportionofthefundingisearmarkedforthefightagainstterrorism,whichdoesnotnecessarilymeanitisspentasintended).Inasituationofthiskinditwouldbeeasytoimaginea scenario inwhichKadyrovbecomes the leaderofanew instalmentof thenationalliberationmovementandexploitstheadvantageswhichDudayevandMaskhadovdidnothave,suchastheabsenceofinternalopponents,theethnichomogeneityoftherepublic,considerablefinancialresourcesandthepoten-tialsupportofatleastpartoftheMuslimUmmah.
ThegrowingsenseofalienationexperiencedbyethnicRussiansinrelationtotheNorthCaucasusanditsinhabitantsandviceversamaybelikenedtothesituation in thefinaldecadesof the 19th centurywhen the region’s informalstatuswasthatofaninternalRussiancolony.IntheSovietperiodtheregionwas the poorest and themost under-invested part of the country,167 and af-ter1991thedifficultiesitexperiencedwereexacerbatedasaresultofthetwoChechenWarsandthevarioussmallerconflicts.ThesympathythatsectionsoftheRussianintelligentsiafeltforChechnya’sindependenceaspirationsintheearly1990sandduringtheFirstChechenWarhasbeenlargelyerodedbythe
167 IntheSovietperiod,so-calledhiddenunemploymentexistedintheNorthCaucasus,whichaffectedthenativeinhabitantsinparticular.Therearesomeindicationssuggestingthatinthe1960sto1980stheSovietauthoritiesdeliberatelystymiedtheregion’sdevelopmentinor-dertostimulateemigrationtocentralRussia,theUralsandSiberiaandinthiswaytocurbthedemographicadvantageoftheCaucasusnations–whichwerenottobetrusted–overtheSlavicpopulation,andtominimisetheriskofupheavalsandrebellions(inStalin’stime,deportationsplayedthesamerole).Moscow’sfearswerenotunfounded,asthelastunitoftheChechenanti-CommunistguerrillaledbyKhasukhaMagomadovwasdefeatedonlyin1976.
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attacksattributedtotheChechenscarriedoutonresidentialbuildingsandtheraid intoDagestanstagedbyBasayevandal-Khattabinthesummerof1999.AfterthesiegeoftheDubrovkatheatreinMoscowbythecommandoofMovsarBarayevinOctober2002andtheattackofterroristswithlinkstoShamilBa-sayevonaschoolinBeslaninSeptember2004,theCaucasusstartedtobeasso-ciatedsolelywithterrorismandreligiousfanaticism.CurrentlyonecanevenspeakofCaucasophobia inRussia,withtherapidlygrowing,assertiveCaucasusdiasporasinRussiancitiesasthemainobjectsofdistastefortheregion(whileat the same timenationalist groups are also growing in strength inRussia,whichexacerbatestheethnictensions168).
AsaconsequenceoftheNorthCaucasusbeingperceivedinthisway,agrow-ingnumberofRussianssupporttheideaofseparatingtheproblematicregionfromtheircountry.TheLevadaCentrehasbeenstudyingthistendencysince1996,pollingitsrespondentsontheirattitudetowardsthepotentialsecessionofChechnya. In June201312%oftherespondentsrepliedthatChechnyahadalreadyde facto secededand24%statedthattheywouldsupportit,while27%saidtheywouldnotbeparticularlyconcernedaboutit.13%saidtheywouldbeagainst it, 10%believedsucha scenario shouldbepreventedevenat theex-penseofwar,and14%hadnoopinion.InMay2011,thepercentageshadbeen11%,23%,28%,12%,13%and14%,respectively,andinApril2009–10%,14%,21%,19%,22%and15%169.Theseparationscenario,however,isnotamongtheoptionsconsideredbytheRussianleadership,at leastofficially.InhisaddresstotheValdaiClubinSeptember2013VladimirPutinsaidthattheintegrityofRussiawasoneofthe“redlines”which“no-oneisallowedtocross”,170buttheveryfactthattheissuewasdiscussedillustratestheuniqueandveryspecificplaceoftheNorthCaucasusintheRussianstate.
*
TheOlympicGamesinSochiareaveryimportantpointofreferenceforalltheactorsintheNorthCaucasus.Thecaucasus Emirate willpresumablyseekto
168 In lateOctober 2013 LevGudkov, director of the LevadaCentre, said he believedRussiawas on the verge of carrying out pogroms. Глава „Левада-Центра”: Россия находится в предпогромном состоянии – вопрос лишь, где рванет,Kavkaz-uzel, 25.10.2013.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/232217/
169 Отделение Чечни и Северный Кавказ, Levada.ru,1.07.2013.http://www.levada.ru/01-07-2013/otdelenie-chechni-i-severnyi-kavkaz
170 StatementbythePresidentofRussia…,op. cit.
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usethemasanopportunitytodemonstrateitspotentialandabilitytodesta-bilisethesituation(despitetheunprecedentedsecuritymeasuresundertakenbyMoscow).InviewofDokkuUmarov’sstatementof3July2013,inwhichhecalledonmilitantstodisrupttheOlympics,itcannotberuledoutthatattackswillbecarriedoutorattemptedbeforeorduringtheGames(especiallyasthemilitantshavenotshownanyactivitybeyondtheirrepublicssinceearly2011,whichmight suggest that they have been ‘gathering strength’ ahead of theOlympics).AttackscouldoccurbothinSochiorthesurroundingarea,andinotherplaces,andtheclosertotheOlympiccity,thesmallertheirscalewouldneedtobe;inSochiorinKrasnayaPolyanaevenasmallterrorattackwithoutcasualtieswouldguaranteeworldwidepublicityandpanicamongparticipantsattheOlympics,whileinRostov-on-DonorMoscowasimilareffectcouldonlybeachievedwithadramaticattackwithhundredsofvictims(theattackonabusinVolgogradinOctober2013doesnotseemtofollowthelogicofUmarov’sstatement).ButitisalsopossiblethattheEmiratenolongerhastherealpoweranddestructivepotentialitcertainlyhadin2009–2011;andthespeculationsaboutMoscow’sinfluenceonthearmedundergroundareimpossibletoverify.
ItshouldbeexpectedthatoncetheOlympicsareover,theEmiratewillresumethetacticsitemployedfrom2011to2013,i.e.combiningattacksonrepresenta-tivesofthesecurityforcesandstatebodiesintheCaucasuswith‘workatthefoundations’, i.e.promoting its ideasamongchildrenandyoungpeople, tak-ingovercontrolofmosquesthroughfriendlymullahs,andcombating‘pagan’customsandsecularlifestyles(inmid-October2013,theprosecutionauthori-tiescloseddownakindergarteninMakhachkalathatwasoperatingwithoutlicenceunderthename“Fatimka”andwasprobablyrunbySalafis171).
TheChechenleaderramzan KadyrovwillmostlikelytakenoactionaheadoftheOlympics,butitistobeexpectedthatoncetheGamesareover,hewillresumehisattemptsatextendinghisinfluenceatleastasfarastoIngushetia.ItwouldonlybepossibletostophimifMoscowmadeaconcertedeffortatin-tervention.Thiswouldnonethelessbedifficulttoimagineinthepresentcir-cumstances(eliminatingKadyrovwouldentailabrutalwaroverwhoshouldsucceedhim,andpossiblyevenanewRussian-Chechenwar).
In therun-up to theOlympics,Moscow (the federal government of rus-sia) willfocusonensuringthesecurityoftheGames,andsubsequentlywill
171 В Махачкале прокуратура закрыла детский сад, работавший без лицензии, Kavkaz-uzel,13.10.2013.http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/231601/
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probablycontinuetoimplementthe“Medvedev-Putin”strategyoftransfer-ringlargesumsofmoneytotheregionandmakingscatteredinvestmentsintheeconomiesoftheCaucasusrepublics,astheadoptionofthenewthree-year“SouthofRussia”programmeappearstosuggest.Anapproachof thiskindwillnotsolvetheproblemsfacedbytheCaucasusnorwillitguaranteesuccessinthefightagainstthemilitants.Itwill,however,makeiteasierforMoscowtopursuea“divideandrule”policybyreinforcingdivisionswithintheregion(therivalryofthelocalclansoveraccesstofundsfromthecentralbudget). This strategy requiresmoney, but force-basedmethods (the “firstPutin”strategyasapotentialalternative to thecurrentapproach)arealsoverycostlyas they involvekeepinga largemilitarypresence in theregionandwillinadditionprovokestrongerresistanceandgeneratemoreemigra-tionfromtheregion.
Inalessprobablescenario,Moscowmayattempttoultimatelyquashthere-bellionaftertheOlympicsandatthesametimedisciplineRamzanKadyrov.ThedeploymentoflargenumbersoftroopsinDagestaninthespringof2012,alreadymentionedinthispaper,maysuggestthatthisisindeedapossiblesce-nario.However,thisvariantwouldinvolvetheriskofextremedestabilisationin theregion (oneof thepossibilitiesbeing thatKadyrovcould turnagainstRussiainrebellion),andthepotentialsuccesscouldturnouttobeshort-livedasaSalafiIslamicrevolutioncouldbreakoutafterwards(andsucharevolu-tionisratherunlikelyatthismomentbecausemanySalafisdonotwanttobeassociatedwiththemilitants,intheeventofaconfrontationwiththeEmir-ate,whichtheCaucasusMuslimscouldperceiveasanattackontheirreligion,itcouldbecomearealisticpossibility).Nevertheless,itisindeedpossiblethatMoscowwill try to curb Kadyrov’s lawlessness outside the Caucasus (espe-ciallytheoperationsofhisbodyguardincentralRussia,undertakenwithoutMoscow’sconsent).
Irrespectiveofthevariantwhichisimplemented,MoscowmayfurtherisolatetheregionfromtherestofthecountrybytighteningtherulesonresidencyregistrationsinordertomakeitmoredifficultforpeoplefromtheCaucasustomovetotheotherFederationsubjects.Thiscouldbedonee.g.bysteppingupchecksattheexternalbordersoftheNorthCaucasusFederalDistrict.
The regional elites intheNorthCaucasuswillseektopreservetheexistingsymbiosis–whichisade factoparasiticrelationship–betweenthemselvesandthefederalcentre,becausetheyfindsuchanarrangementconvenient—inre-turnforloyaltyandfor“keepingorder”withintheirrepublics,theyreceivenot
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onlyguaranteedfinancialbenefitsfromMoscow,butalsosecurity.Itshouldbeexpected,however, that, following theOlympics,Moscowwillbecomemoredeterminedinitseffortstocurbthemostglaringcasesofabuseofpowerandcorruption.
In the foreseeable futureneitherazerbaijan nor georgia willplayamajorroleintheCaucasus.However,Abkhaziamayplaysucharoleonasmallscalefor theNorthWestCaucasusasacentre integrating theCircassiannationalmovements.Itsstatuswillbehelpfulinthis–whileithasbeenrecognisedbyonlyahandfulofstates,itsposition,evenaspartofGeorgia,isformallyhigherthanthatoftheCircassianrepublicsoftheRussianFederation.Sukhumicanfor instance organise larger-scale resettlement programmes for CircassiansfromtheMiddleEast(whocanfreelytraveltoRussiaoncetheyhaveAbkhaz-ianpassports).
The international situation may also influence developments in the NorthCaucasusandrelationsbetweenMoscowandtheregion.ShouldthecrisisoverIrandeteriorateorwarbreakoutagainbetweenAzerbaijanandArmeniaoverNagorno-Karabakh,thiswouldleadtoRussiasteppingupitspresence,includ-ingamilitarypresence,intheSouthCaucasus.InthiscaseMoscowwouldbemorelikelytoresorttoforcefulmethodsagainoratleasttodeploymajorpoliceandmilitaryforcesintheNorthCaucasusandtakeovercertaintasksfromthelocalsecurityforces,suchas:protectingtheinternalborders(betweenthere-publics),manningroadcheckpointsandcontrollingstrategicinfrastructure.Anycrisis inRussian-Georgianrelationsmayalso leadtoamilitarisationoftheregion.
***
On25October2013theRussianStateDumaadopteddraftamendmentstotheCriminalCodeandtheanti-terrorlaws(VladimirPutinsignedthedocumenton3November).Underthenewrules,notonlytheperpetratorsofterroractswill be financially liable for their consequences, but alsomembers of theirfamiliesandbroadlyunderstood“closepersons”,unless theycanprove thattheirassetswerenotgainedthroughterroractivities.Despitethatcaveat,theessenceoftheamendmentbringstheRussianlegislationclosertothepracticefoundintheNorthCaucasusandespeciallyinChechnyawhereinhousesbe-longingtothefamiliesofmilitantsaredemolishedinordertodissuadethemfrom participating in the armed underground. The adoption of the amend-mentshowsthatinsteadoftryingtoincorporatetheNorthCaucasusintothe
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Russianlegal,economicandsocialspace,MoscowitselfisadoptingsomeoftheprinciplesandrulesprevailingintheCaucasus(inthiscase,elementsofcol-lectiveresponsibility).Thisstemsfromthefederalleadership’shelplessnessinthefaceoftheproblemsposedbytheregionandisawaytoshirkoffsomeoftheresponsibilityforthefightagainsttheinsurgency.
The author would like to thank Ewa Fischer and Katarzyna Jarzyńska for their assistance.
wOjcIEch górEcKI
The text was closed on 24 December 2013.
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Appendix 1
Victims of acts of terrorism and clashes with the armed underground in the north Caucasus in the years 2010-2012, broken down by republic
victims of acts of terrorism and clashes with the armed underground in the North caucasus in the years 2010-2012
2010 2011 2012
DagestanKilled 378 413 405
Wounded 307 411 290
ChechnyaKilled 127 95 82
Wounded 123 106 92
IngushetiaKilled 134 70 84
Wounded 192 38 83
NorthOssetiaKilled 24 4 7
Wounded 171 10 7
Kabardino-BalkariaKilled 79 129 107
Wounded 82 44 49
Karachay-CherkessiaKilled 2 22 5
Wounded 2 12 2
StavropolKraiKilled 10 17 10
Wounded 79 7 2
Total North caucasusKilled 754 750 700
Wounded 956 628 525
Total (killed and wounded) 1,710 1,378 1,225
Source:Author’sowncalculationsbasedondatafromtheKavkaz-uzel.ruwebsite.
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Appendix 2
Victims of acts of terrorism and clashes with the armed underground in the north Caucasus in the years 2010-2012, in broken down by category
Lossesofsiloviki,mili-tantsandcivilians
2010
TotalkilledandwoundedAs%oftotalvictims
2011
TotalkilledandwoundedAs%oftotalvictims
2012
TotalkilledandwoundedAs%oftotalvictims
CiviliansKilled 180 669
(39.12%)
177 342(24.82%)
89 216(17.63%)Wounded 489 165 127
Functionariesofsecurityforces(siloviki)
Killed 225692
(40.47%)
190652
(47.31%)
211600
(48.98%)Wounded 467 462 389
MilitantsKilled 349 349
(20.41%)
384 384(27.87%)
409 409(33.39%)Wounded 254 370 14
Source:Author’sowncalculationsbasedondatafromtheKavkaz-uzel.ruwebsite.
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Appendix 3
Victims of acts of terrorism and clashes with the armed underground in the north Caucasus in 2013
victims of acts of terrorism and clashes with the armed underground in the North caucasus in 2013
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
DagestanKilled 10 31 26 22 38 26 23 nodata 32
Wounded 14 12 15 13 91 17 8 nodata 26
ChechnyaKilled 14 0 6 3 1 2 4 nodata 4
Wounded 8 2 7 6 1 15 7 nodata 8
IngushetiaKilled 0 5 7 8 3 0 2 nodata 2
Wounded 0 13 1 14 8 6 2 nodata 4
NorthOssetiaKilled 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 nodata 0
Wounded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 nodata 0
Kabardino-BalkariaKilled 12 1 7 1 3 9 13 nodata 6
Wounded 1 1 0 0 2 4 1 nodata 0
Karachay-CherkessiaKilled 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 nodata 0
Wounded 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 nodata 0
StavropolKraiKilled 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 nodata 0
Wounded 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 nodata 0
Total North caucasusKilled 39 37 47 34 45 39 46 42 44
Wounded 23 28 25 33 102 43 19 34 38
Total (killed and wounded) 62 65 72 67 147 82 65 76 82
Source:Author’sowncalculationsbasedondatafromtheKavkaz-uzel.ruwebsite.TotalinJanuary–June2013:495victimsincluding241killedand254wounded.Dagestan:315victims(nearly64%ofthetotalnumber)including153killedand162wounded.Chechnya:65victims(morethan13%)including26killedand39wounded.Ingushetia:65victims(morethan13%)including23killedand42wounded.Kabardino-Balkaria:41victims(morethan8%)including33killedand8wounded(thecountrywiththesecondlargestnumberofthosekilled).Karachay-Cherkessia:6victims(morethan1%)including4killedand2wounded.StavropolKrai:3victims(lessthan1%)including2killedand1wounded.
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Appendix 4
ethnic Russians in selected republics of the north Caucasus in the years 1989-2010
Years
RussianFederationSubjects
1989 2010
Totalpopula-tion
NumberofRus-sians
%ofRus-sians
Totalpopula-tion
NumberofRus-sians
%ofRus-sians
Dagestan 1,802,579 165,940 9.2% 2,910,249 104,020 3.57%
Chechnya* 1,084,433 269,130 24.82% 1,268,989 24,382 1.92%
Ingushetia** 185,996 24,641 13.25% 412,529 3,215 0.78%
NorthOssetia 632,428 189,159 29.9% 712,980 147,090 20.63%
Kabardino-Balkaria
753,531 240,750 31.95% 859,939 193,155 22.46%
Source:Author’sowncalculationsbasedonthe1989Sovietcensusandthe2010Russiancensus.*In1989-ChechenpartofthethenChechen-IngushASSR**In1989-IngushpartofthethenChechen-IngushASSR
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Map.AdministrativedivisionsoftheRussianNorthCaucasusandGeorgia
abberviations: N. O. − North Ossetia; S. O. − South Ossetia; INg. − Ingushetia
