NO. 134 JANUARY/ FEBRUARY 1999 - Department of Defence · 2017. 8. 16. · No. 134 January/February...

NO. 134

JANUARY/FEBRUARY1999

Australian Defence Force Journal

Board of ManagementBrigadier A.S. D’Hagé, AM, MC (Chairman)Captain J.P.D. Hodgman, RANLieutenant Colonel N.F. JamesGroup Captain C.A. BeattyMs K. Griffith

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© Commonwealth of Australia 1999ISSN 1320-2545Published by the Department of DefenceCanberra 1999

No. 134 January/February 1999

Managing EditorMichael P. Tracey

EditorIrene M. Coombes

Printed in Australia by National CapitalPrinting, Fyshwick, ACT 2609

Contributors are urged to ensure the accuracy of the informationcontained in their articles; the Board of Management accepts noresponsibility for errors of fact.Permission to reprint articles in the Journal will generally be readilygiven by the Managing Editor after consultation with the author. Anyreproduced articles should bear an acknowledgement of source.The views expressed in the articles are the author’s own and shouldnot be construed as official opinion or policy.

Contents

3. Letters to the Editor

5. Change, People and Australia’s Defence Capability forthe New CenturyAdmiral C.A. Barrie, AO, RAN, Chief of the Defence Force

17. Allocation and Retention in the Australian RegularArmyMajor Anne N. Goyne, AA Psych

25. The ABRI Intelligence ApparatusCorporal Matthew N. Davies, AUST INT

37. The Relevance of the Knowledge EdgeProfessor Paul Dibb, Australian National University

49. Simulation in a Tactical EnvironmentBrigadier Peter Leahy, Australian ArmyMick Reilly, DSTO

57. Planning for Military Operations Other Than WarDr Jennifer Morrison Taw, RAND

67. Book Reviews

Front CoverA “Dump and Burn” over Canberra tocelebrate the opening of the new galleries ofthe Australian War Memorial

Photograph bySergeant Gary Ramage, EMU

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Australian Defence Force Journal are far reaching.

THE SANDLINE AFFAIRDear Editor,

Lieutenant Ebbeck’s article (ADFJ 133,November/December 1998) was a most interesting,wide-ranging and informative discussion of themercenary phenomenon. I would like to add just threepoints about the Sandline contract with the PapuaNew Guinea Government for their illumination value.

The weaponry provided by Sandline suggests thatthe company’s concept of counter-insurgencyoperations is faulty. Attack helicopters and the sort ofindiscriminate firepower provided by air-launched57 mm rockets, automatic grenade launcher’s andheavy machine-guns also indicated a faultyappreciation of PNG’s physical environment and themobile and dispersed tactics of the insurgents. Onecould also conclude that the Sandline concept ofoperations, far from a commitment to InternationalHumanitarian Law, was indifferent to the need fordiscrimination between insurgents and neutral orfriendly non-combatants.

Secondly, Clause 4.3 of the Sandline contracteffectively indemnifies its employees from any actiontaken in pursuit of its objectives. Moreover thelanguage employed not only makes no mention ofIHL but describes its operations in such wide terms asto validate practically any action taken by a Sandlineoperative. Clause 4.5 then give any Sandlineoperative absolute freedom to leave PNG’sjurisdiction “free from hindrance at any time”.

Finally, the business elements of the contract areso widely drawn in Sandline’s favour that, in effect,the contract is open-ended as to cost to the PNGGovernment. As one example, the contract has a lifeof 90 days. If, after 45 days, the PNG Governmentdoes not formally advise its intention not to renew,the contract is automatically renewed for a further 90days on the same financial terms (Clause 1.2). Giventhat Sandline – or anyone else – would be incapableof either retraining the PNG Defence Force ordestroying the BRA forces in 45 (or even 90) days,this provision smacks of fraudulent misrepresentationof the company’s product and an attempt to extractsubstantial funds from a poor and inexperienced

government. Other provisions (e.g. Clause 4.7)commit the PNG Government to the provision ondemand of substantial additional services at costs notcovered by the contract.

Michael O’ConnorExecutive Director, Australian Defence Association

AIRBORNE FORCESDear Editor,

Major Basan’s article on airborne forces in yourNovember/December issue offers a simple argumentfor the continued importance of airborne forces. Thisargument reads something like: the new world is adangerous place, a crisis will occur and we will needforces a long way away quickly and thereforeairborne forces are needed to dominate the battlefieldsin these far off places. This argument fails becausethese crises only rarely require the use of airborneforces which are by definition ready to engage incombat immediately on leaving the aircraft(ADFP39). Major Basan cites a number of examplesof strategic deployment involving airborne forceswhich either were ably conducted by conventionallight infantry strategically deployed by air(Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda), or could have beenconducted by conventional infantry (Gulf War).Interestingly, the 82nd Airborne Division forcesdeployed to Saudi Arabia in 1990 as the lead forces ofDesert Shieldwere considerably heavier thanAustralian airborne forces yet anecdotally sawthemselves as nothing more than a “speed bump” ifthe Iraqis chose to invade.

Major Basan cites a number of past airborneoperations to support his argument that airborneforces “offer the optimum fighting systems for thisnew military political reality”. Many were outrightdisasters (Grenada, Holland 1944) and others werevery Pyrric in nature (Crete). It is interesting to notethe use of a Fallschirmjaeger quote at the beginningof the article. I assume this was formulated before theFallschirmjaeger were withdrawn from airborneoperations after Crete.

S. EdgarMajor

Letters to the Editor

Change, People andAustralia’s Defence Capability

for the New Century

BY

ADMIRAL C.A. BARRIE AO RAN Chief of the Defence Force

“Among all forms of mistake, prophecy is the most gratuitous and it is with nolittle humility that one approaches the task of describing tomorrow’s wars.”

George Eliot1

I made a number of key points at the NationalPress Club. Firstly, I said that it was my judgementthat Australia’s strategic circumstances haddeteriorated significantly over the preceding 12months due to the pressures generated by the financialand economic crisis in Asia, including particularly:the political consequences of the change of leadershipin Indonesia; the potential for uncontrolledproliferation of nuclear weapons following theunderground testing conducted in India and Pakistanin May 1998; the burdens created by the peaceprocess in Bougainville; and finally, Australia’scommitment to the elimination of weapons of massdestruction in Iraq.

Secondly, I said that all Australians could beproud of their Defence Force. Over the last eightyears or so, the ADF had repeatedly shown itself to bea highly professional military force which couldundertake a wide variety of tasks, including combatoperations (Gulf War), peace enforcement (Somalia),and peacekeeping (Cambodia/Bougainville). Theseactivities are quite apart from the spectacularSouthern Ocean rescue of Tony Bullimore, or thehighly successful law enforcement operation in thedeep Southern Ocean to help protect our PatagonianToothfish fishery. I also pointed out that the ADF hadestablished a unique reputation for itself in ourRegion. Not only was its military professionalismadmired, but also its capacity to undertakehumanitarian missions such as Tsunami relief nearAitape in PNG, or the drought relief operationsconducted separately in PNG and Irian Jaya. All ofthis has established a record of world-classperformance, which is based on the skills andcapabilities of Australia’s young people, and ourstrong motivation to do what we know is right.

Thirdly, I pointed out that, despite our wonderfulrecord in operations, there were still many things overwhich we could not feel the same sense of pride and

achievement. In the eyes of the Australiancommunity, matters such as our apparent inability todeal successfully with problems of sexual harassmentand unacceptable behaviour, the tragedies of theBlack Hawk and WESTRALIA accidents, and toomany stories of poor project management, waste andinefficiency, continue to diminish the value of ourfine operational record. Not only do I consider thesematters of concern to me as CDF, and I hope to allmembers of the ADF, but it is my view that they arematters of concern to the Government and the peopleof Australia as well.

Fourthly, I emphasised that the vision for my termin office was to create an Australian Defence Force ofwhich the whole Australian community could beproud. I wanted to capitalise on the brilliant record ofsuccess in operations and eliminate those hurtfulthings that damage and tarnish our image. To achievethis outcome would require strong committedleadership at all levels and a continuing emphasis onthe values which are so important to us:professionalism, fairness, quality and integrity. I alsoemphasised the importance of our people and theirindividual contributions to the overall objectives weset ourselves.

Finally, I announced that I would do my best toget around the ADF and speak about many of theseissues. By the end of 1998, the Secretary and I,together and separately, had spoken personally to overtwelve thousand members as part of our commitment.We have underscored the importance of the DefenceReform Program to the enhancement of our combatcapability, through finding efficiencies in ourorganisation. We need to do this to deliver upresources that can then be reallocated to higherpriority areas. We also spoke of the pain of change,and the need to ensure the highest qualitycommunications throughout the organisation as wellas resolving uncertainty, if we were to deal

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 134 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 19996

Introduction

When I took up the responsibilities of Chief of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) on 4 July1998, the Secretary of the Department, Mr Paul Barratt, and I gave a very high priority toestablishing a new frame of reference for the management of the Defence Force. At that time I alsocommitted myself to delivering a nationally televised address at the National Press Club on 22 July1998. This event was advertised widely in my assumption-of-command message, in the expectationthat those personnel who could watch ABC television on the day would want to see the presentationlive. I thought that I needed to deliver some key messages to all members of the ADF early in mytenure so that there could be no doubt about my agenda.

successfully with people’s concerns. We alsopromoted the need for us to become a high-performing organisation if we are to be successful indealing with the challenges ahead of us.

This contribution to the Australian Defence ForceJournal gives me the opportunity to emphasise onceagain the importance of our work to Australia’ssecurity and the need to be clear-sighted about thepriorities we have set ourselves. I want to encourageyou to think about the key issues and to make acontribution to the further development of theseimportant matters. As I have always said “the bestideas do not live in CDF’s head; often the best ideascome from the most unexpected sources, but mostlyfrom the people who work within the organisation!”And what better place to do this than in the pages ofthe Australian Defence Force Journal.

For most of our modern history, Australians havelooked at the geography of the Asia-Pacific regionand viewed it as a source of threat or insecurity. Thesize of Australia’s large continental landmass and its

isolation from Great Britain – what has beenmemorably called the “tyranny of distance” – wasseen as a point of vulnerability. Australia appeareddistant from friends and allies, alone in a region ofquite different ethnic and cultural composition, andwith relatively few people. Australian defence andsecurity policies sought to remedy thesevulnerabilities by promoting strong alliances withBritain and, after 1942, the United States. From theearly 1970s, contact with the countries of Asia wascautious and took a long time to grow.

In the post-Vietnam conflict era defence self-reliance became a central theme in Australian defenceplanning and the debate about military priorities hasbeen divided between those focussed on protectingthe mainland – “fortress Australia” – and advocates of“forward defence” who would fight off-shore toprevent any threats of invasion emerging. Throughoutmost of this time Australia maintained small forcesdesigned to fit in with larger coalition forces under thealliance in vogue at that particular instant. Theseforces performed well at the tactical level of war, butthere was very little experience in Australia ofstrategic and operational level decision making.

Australia has now moved the debate about ourstrategic policy beyond the confines of “forward

A Context for the Debate

CHANGE, PEOPLE AND AUSTRALIA’S DEFENCE CAPABILITY FOR THE NEW CENTURY 7

Personal contact with members of the Australian Defence Force is part of our commitment.

defence” versus “fortress Australia”. A number offactors – the last decade of policy thinking, the impactof globalisation, technological change and the effectof the Asian financial crisis – have combined to bringthe need for a radical recasting of our securityoutlook. Revolutions are easier to identify inhindsight and, as with all processes of sweepingchange, some caught up in these aspects ofAustralia’s defence revolution do not understand thescale and importance of these developments. Thetruth is that our defence policy is being significantlyrecast with the Government endorsement ofAustralia’s Strategic Policy2 in 1997, which Icommend to your reading. But there are likely to befurther changes needed if we are to capitalise on theopportunities opening up to Australia because of thesecontinuing developments in technology, and regionaland global security.

The process of change can be considered in fourrelated areas. First, there is the legacy of the lastdecade of policy development which has done muchto make the Australian Defence Force a flexible,modern and highly capable organisation. This is theDefence Force we have witnessed achieving highlevels of performance in operations over recent years.It is also a Defence Force more suited to Australia’sparticular circumstances than ever before.

Second, the impact of globalisation is making itpossible for Australia to define its future not by the“tyranny of distance” but by the opportunities to workwith partners created by new forms of commerce andcommunications. Globalisation is changing the wayAustralians work, think, learn and deal with eachother and the international community. At the sametime we have developed close ties with our regionalfriends and neighbours which now makes it possiblefor Australia to define its security in and with theAsia-Pacific, not separate from the region. Thesechanges create opportunities for the ADF to buildcloser links with our international partners, ourregional neighbours, and our own community.

The third area, technological change, willdramatically recast the way advanced countries equip,supply, command, and fight with their armed forces.It is a fact that Australia cannot match the UnitedStates in all the dimensions of the Revolution inMilitary Affairs (RMA). But we must think carefullyabout the RMA, for we can (and indeed must) exploitthe RMA to our own needs. We have securityresponsibilities for about one-tenth of the earth’ssurface and only a small population base, so we needto build a force which is as at home in cyber-space asit is on land, sea and in the air. The Government hasplaced a high priority on the RMA, and we must

carefully think through all the implications of theRMA for Australia, as we build our forces for thenext Century.

The last area is the impact of the Asian financialcrisis on regional security. There is no question thatthe Asia-Pacific has become less predictable andmore complex for defence planners over the last 18months or so. But this should not be taken to meanthat Australia’s security is under threat. Our militaryand other links in our region provide an opportunityfor Australia to play a major constructive role inhelping to build peace and stability – setting thefoundation for a region which is open, pluralist,focussed on growth and promoting common securityinterests.

Taking all these developments together we can becautiously optimistic about the future for Australia’ssecurity, with the ADF playing an enhanced role inpromoting peace and stability. It is our obligation toseek out and make the most of these opportunities.Australia, and Defence in particular, cannot afford toignore the impact of regional developments, the RMAor globalisation more generally. The penalty for doingso would be to undermine Australia’s security. Wemight consign the ADF to a lengthy period of relativedecline, particularly when our region regains itsprosperity. Despite the discomforts of significantchange these are the reasons why we must stay at theforefront of reform, if we are to perform our nationalrole of deterring or defeating attacks on Australia orits interests, and remain a vital national institution.

A turning point in changing the way Australianshave seen their security began in the mid 1980s. TheDibb Report3 and the subsequent Defence WhitePaper of 19874 were in many ways benchmarks, notonly in defence policy development but also inestablishing the potential of the politico-militarydimension in Australia’s international relations5. Avery significant aspect in these and subsequent policypapers however was the underpinning concept – thatdefence of Australia, as distinct from the requirementsof possible operations elsewhere, was the primarydriver of our force structure decisions.

Concurrent with these developments in oursecurity planning, Australia’s foreign policy began topursue a divergent path. On the one hand theGovernment sought to engage with the Region withall the resources it could bring to bear. While on theother hand we developed a security policy that

Current Security Policy – A StartingPoint


seemed to reinforce our traditional feelings ofinsecurity and vulnerability by concentrating on thedefence of Australia from behind the so-called moat –the sea-air gap.

The 1997 Defence Policy Paper Australia’sStrategic Policy, will be seen as an important turningpoint in the development of Australia’s securitypolicy. Paul Dibb’s view is that it “…reflects adifferent strategic approach by the HowardGovernment – which sees forward regional militaryoperations as more likely”.6 I would differ slightlywith this view – I think this change in policy reflects acertain degree of realpolitik7, and maturity in ourstrategic thinking. We now recognise the broaderrequirements of our security and the utility of a strongDefence capability within the broader canvas ofAustralia’s diplomatic dialogue, together with all theother resources we can bring to bear to safeguard ouraffairs in the Asia-Pacific Region. While there is nodoubt that our core business is to provide traditionalmilitary options to Government, the Defence Forcehas also become an important resource whichprovides Government with a range of options notassociated with force-on-force considerations. Theimportant issue for us now is to look to the future to

ensure the Defence Force is shaped appropriately tobe able to support a potentially broader range ofGovernment objectives.

The central role of the State in international affairshas come under increasing pressure since the end ofWWII. National interests are no longer solely definedin terms of territory or geography.8 Some experts suchas Jessica Mathews have suggested that theWestphalian system of States as the ultimaterepository of power is dissolving.9 Today we see arange of non-state players involved in various formsof organised crime including drug trafficking, large-scale illegal immigration, abduction for prostitution,illegal timber harvesting, gemstone collecting andfishing which is of increasing concern to states andtheir national interests. Other cross-border issuesinvolving violent acts, include ethnic conflict,environmental decline, poverty, state collapse, andgovernment corruption. Organised crime and crimes

A Step into the Future – The ChangingNature of War and Australia’s OperatingEnvironment


Combined Operations: An Indonesian General inspects the Australian contingent duringOperation Ausindo Jaya.

against humanity are of profound concern to alldecent people in the international community. Ibelieve this is of special concern to Australiansbecause so many of the victims of crime have not hada fair go.

In addition, the perfectly legitimate activities ofglobal corporations have also had a profound influenceon the affairs of states. This raises the other aspect ofour external environment which has an increasingpotential to contribute to inter-state tension – theimpact of globalisation and the role of the state versusthe corporation.10 The volatility in world capital flowsthat comes with the competitive environmentconcomitant with globalisation has produced thesituation in which the domestic economies in somecountries can be rapidly destabilised, thus affecting theeconomic and social stability of the nation-state. Thisleads to the kind of uncertainty we have witnessedrecently within our Region.

We need to be concerned that these potentialsources of instability are now being shaped byinfluences, which have little or no regard for politicalboundaries. Thus it could be argued that the traditional“state-on-state” approach to war which has providedthe analytical and policy foundation for defenceplanning for the greater part of this Century may nolonger be appropriate.11 I think it is too early to beabsolutely certain about how we should respond to thisphenomenon, but this general shift in the nature ofconflict will at some time challenge countries toexamine the basis upon which they structure theirmilitary forces, possibly in the near future.

To this challenge I would add the concern that theweapons that are used to wage war are also changingin capability and sophistication. They are alreadywidely available. Weapons distribution will continueto increase in the absence of global controls. Non-state players with sufficient funds will be able to buythe latest in weapons technology. On top of thispossibility, an issue of significant concern is that theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction andother forms of advanced technology will increase thepotential capability and influence of terrorist groupsand other criminals. The March 1995 sarin gas attackon the Tokyo underground railway by the AumShinrikyo Sect provides a graphic example of thispoint. Equally, the technical sophistication andmilitary capability of some of the South Americandrug cartels demonstrates the potential influence ofnon-state players with access to large amounts ofcapital. Another example is the Bin Laden network.

All this could mean that the type of conflict wemay need to deal with in the future will vary fromrelatively simple crime on a widespread scale to a

more sophisticated war-like action between well-armed groups. We will need flexible, but nonethelesscapable, systems to respond appropriately, especiallyif we are to remain the only legitimate users of armedforce to secure Australia’s interests.

The role of non-state players as a source of threatsmay continue to increase, while the traditional “state-on-state” wars may become localised, and betweensmaller states. The role of the UN, or other regionalbodies, as organisations who coordinate combinedresponses to “threats to international peace andsecurity” seems likely to remain, given the now well-established propensity of the Security Council todeclare a formal threat.12 Notwithstanding these shifts,military power will continue to be linked to nationalpower, which will be a significant driver of capability.As a consequence states will remain the globalentities most able to raise and sustain armed forces.13

For this reason, the capability of other states will havea continuing relevance to how we shape, equip andtrain the Australian Defence Force.

The implications for the design of military forcesto support the nature of future conflict will primarilycentre on the need to provide the widest range ofmilitary options to governments. Increasingly,governments will see a need to structure against abroader range of threats rather than focussing solelyon traditional “state-on-state” – based war.14 Whilethere will be a continuing need to respond to narrowlydefined national security needs,15 priority will begiven to broader national security requirements.Therefore it is likely that a country that seeks anongoing role as an international player would need toretain the ability to project flexible forces quickly andeffectively. The role of military forces is also likely toinclude constabulary type activities as an explicit taskeven though our focus will remain on high-endtechnology and power. Therefore the challenge willbe to design a force that is centred around the primaryrole of defending or deterring attacks againstAustralia or its interests, but which possess strategicreach so it can be deployed quickly to operate at otherlevels of conflict.

Within this context of future conflict Australia’sexternal environment has also shifted from one ofrelative predictability16 where planners couldconfidently place priorities on future forcedevelopment based on a relatively straight-lineassessment,17 to one of unpredictability. Economicpressures exacerbated by rapid shifts in currencyflows have quickly evolved into social and politicaltensions which in some situations have quicklythreatened the very political structures thatunderpinned much of the Region’s economic growth.


Australia has weathered the storm remarkably well,and through our financial support and advocacy toinstitutions such as the IMF on behalf of the Region,we are left well positioned to influence post-meltdown recovery within the Region.

Although there is a need to tightly focus forcestructure planning, the shape of future conflict willchallenge Australia’s traditional approach to forcestructuring. There is a growing urgency to balance theinvestment we make into the future force with whatwe invest in the current force of force-in-being. Theproposition of “structuring for war and adapting forpeace”, invites us to think carefully about how webalance these competing demands.

The challenge to achieve these dual demands willplace increasing demands on the budget. The JointStanding Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence andTrade’s investigation into the funding of Australia’sDefence recognised this challenge. It concluded thatfunding levels for Defence would need to be reviewedin the near future if the ADF was to be able to providethe range of capabilities that enabled it to provide thequality and timeliness of responses that we have cometo expect.18 In my view, the Australian people and theGovernment have the right to expect our high level ofperformance to continue, and we must work towardsmaking sure of this outcome.

Internal – Transitional ManagementAustralia’s domestic environment has also

changed in the last ten years and these changes haveimpacted on the way Defence is managed. The needto manage change, while preserving and enhancingoperational capabilities, is at the forefront of planningand administration with Defence. The demandsDefence is facing, in terms of budgetary pressures andthe ever-increasing demands for modernisingcapabilities, compel us to improve further the way wedo business, including the way we make decisions. Ithink that we have to do a great deal better with whatwe have got, and this would be a fundamentalprecursor to any future consideration of fundingincreases. People must come to see us as a value-for-money organisation.

Although leadership remains the fundamentalingredient in any defence force there is also a need torecognise that we need to make a number ofsignificant management decisions to ensure thatDefence is organised to achieve the best effect.

Leaders cannot remain good leaders for long if theylack good management skills. In our case we need toaddress the reality that we are facing “third wavedemands” in technology, strategy and organisationalstructures with a “first wave” approach tomanagement. Although we in Defence are nowfocussed on the management implications of issuessuch as globalisation, the private sector has beengrappling with them for over a decade.

The essence of the challenge for business hasbeen the ability to respond to the convergence ofpolitical, economic, and social forces that make up thephenomenon we now know as “globalisation”. Thereis a considerable body of literature indicating that themost significant impediment that these managersfaced was not the intellectual understanding of thenew environment they faced, but the incapacity oftheir organisations to implement the profoundchanges that were necessary for corporate survival. Inmy opinion, this has striking similarities to thechallenges facing Defence. Like private sectorexecutives worldwide, our leadership faces thechallenges of developing structures that will bestserve our strategy, while learning to assimilatefundamental shifts in technology, changes in ourgovernance framework, and rapidly shiftingrelationships with suppliers and partners. On top ofthese demands we all have the need to adjustpersonally to an information-intensive environment.The sad experience of many private corporations hasbeen that their managers were simply unable to adaptto these converging demands. When privateenterprise fails the firm goes to the wall in bankruptcyor takeover; when we fail we imperil the security ofour country, which could be very costly in people’slives.

In their research on this matter Bartlett andGhoshal concluded that the traditional strategy-structure-system doctrine of management hadestablished a culture within organisations whichencouraged rules and rigid control mechanisms ratherthan encouraging quite the opposite culture.19 In turnorganisations became fragmented by fundingspecialised units, justified by the continuousimprovement of ongoing operations. But keyquestions about ongoing operations were not asked.This is very much the difficulty we face in Defence.On one hand we have the critical need to encourageinnovation and adaptability which has been thehallmark of our operational reputation, but on theother hand we have to do it within a regulatorystructure which has evolved in response to thedemands of public sector accountability. To mythinking the solution to this problem seems to lie in a

A New Agenda – Some Initial Thoughts


more people-centric approach or a “purpose-process-people-based management philosophy”.20 Thisapproach recognises that in 21st Century organisationsthe scarce resources will be information, technologyand in Australia, people. One of the first steps toachieving this more people-centric approach will beundertaken in February 1999 when Defence’s seniorleadership group will be brought together in seminarto try and ensure that there is alignment for what weneed to do at the top, and create the sense of strongand committed leadership throughout the organisation.

Technology and PeopleBeyond these fiscal challenges which all defence

forces will face there is also the challenge, bothconceptually and intellectually, to set out ourwarfighting concepts for the next Century. Thisactivity would be a cornerstone of our doctrine, whichI believe must be developed to meet Australia’sunique circumstances. Warfighting concepts lie at theheart of our doctrine and they should act as a unifyinginfluence over all aspects of our efforts throughoutDefence. It is therefore important that these conceptsare not simply plagiarised from work done by otherdefence forces, but developed to take full account of

Australia’s geo-strategic situation, our smallpopulation, and the way we can use technology toovercome these difficulties. Much work has begun onthis front, but it must be an ongoing process.

Earlier I wrote about some of the challengesposed by the Revolution in Military Affairs. This wasthinking that came as one of the aftermaths of theGulf War with the belief that a new era in warfare hadcommenced. The RMA has been variously calledcyber warfare or Toffler’s Third Wave War, but therewas a genuine feeling that a new epoch wasunfolding. As a consequence, many defence forcessought a qualitative edge in capability based ontechnologies emanating from these and similarconcepts. The reality, however, is that few defenceforces will ever be in a position to gain anything likethe benefits promised by the US military academia.Alistair Irwin reinforces this point when he describesthe United States as the benchmark for information-age forces, but warns that “…surrounding thisadvanced epicentre is a mass of forces whoseorganisations and equipment owe more to the pastthan the future”.21 Australia simply cannot allow itselfto be one of these countries that have fallen behind.


The highest quality and most capable people will be our competitive edge.

In addition to the RMA, other concepts such asincreased tempo, demassification,22 and increasedagility are now military truisims that do little toprovide any framework for developing a long-termapproach to warfighting. It should be of no surprisetherefore that critics have suggested that the RMA andits descendent concepts have become nothing morethan military clichés which, rather than offering a realcapability edge, would result in wasted investment.

I believe this is a very important issue forAustralia. Given our budget pressures and themagnitude of the task we cannot afford to pursueoutcomes that promise much but deliver little in theway of real capability improvement. We have alreadyidentified the “Knowledge Edge” as a key element ofour defence strategy. Because we are a medium-sizedforce, and to do our job effectively, we will need to beable to produce the best intelligence possible, andfight smarter than any enemy we could possibly face.We need to have high technology equipment and touse it innovatively to even the odds. In simple termsour aim as a defence force is to be capable of rapidlydeploying joint forces and decisively applyingsuperior combat power where and when it is required.And we must do this better than anyone else.

In addition, a significant and often overlookedaspect of the knowledge edge is the quality of thepeople who ultimately direct and fight the battles. Theprivate sector is seeking ways to value the intellectualcapital of individuals as assets. This involvestransferring tactic knowledge – that is knowledge heldby the individual – into structural knowledge.23 Overthe years we have used instruments like doctrine as anattempt to capture individual experience. This hasserved us well, but I am of the view that it does not gofar enough in our present circumstances andunderestimates the importance of the skills and talentsof individuals in our organisation. The highest qualityand most capable people we can obtain and growthrough learning in the defence context will be ourcompetitive edge; we must ceaselessly explore newand innovative ways to maximise this potentialadvantage.

External – Regional LeadershipThe economic demands that have faced our

regional neighbours and the resultant pressures thatare now increasing on governance generally present anew set of challenges for Australia. These challengescentre on the issue of leadership and how we are


Over a number of years we have established a web of military-to-military relationships.

viewed within our Region. The appropriate style ofleadership will be one that is sensitive to the needsand norms of our region, yet is founded in theconfidence that we have the ability and capacity toassist others as a long-term friend. This approach goesto the heart of the broader definition of security – awhole of government approach. The security debatein Australia has had its limitations but since the early1980s I think it has matured considerably. It istherefore timely for us to think about using all themeans at our disposal in seeking to shape andinfluence post-meltdown regional development byunderstanding the importance of our militarycapability, and using it to best advantage.

A framework for this type of debate has threebasic elements I believe. The first is our domesticagenda. In my opinion there will always be two partsto this in peacetime. The first part will focus on theway in which the rule of law underpins our militaryprofessionalism. In this context I reiterate an earlierpoint that I made – members of the ADF are the onlypeople who can lawfully use force to secure ournational interests. The second part will always focuson the adequacy, or otherwise, of the defence budget.With today’s uncertainties, there is a growing focuson the needs of the force-in-being, which provides therange of options available to a government to supportits foreign policy needs. But this is a demand which isinevitably in conflict with the demands of investing inthe future force, especially against a limited overallbudget. We cannot have one without the other. Thereis little doubt that current capability is the foundationstone upon which our nation’s leverage will be built.The important issue is that any growth in the defencebudget will, in the end, turn on the public’srecognition and the government’s acknowledgementof the role of the military dimension of foreign policyto further advance Australia’s international position.

The second aspect of any potential regionalpositioning is to use the growing importance of thepolitico-military aspect of a “whole of government”approach to Australia’s relationships in our Region.Defence has over a number of years established a webof regional military-to-military relationships. Ourcredibility provides a reliable entrée which, whencoupled with a growing enthusiasm from the privatesector, provides the means for developing a moreforthright and well-accepted national approach withinthe Region. An example of this approach was the recentproposal from the Business Council of Australia to takea national approach to assisting Indonesia to rebuild itseconomy. Another example is the CDF/Pangab Forumto be conducted in Indonesia, which will be an

opportunity to discuss with our near neighbour theevolving role of military in the 21st Century.

The third aspect of our regional leadership is thesignificance of the linkage Australia can providebetween the US and regional militaries both on aregular basis and in any future coalition. This willprovide many leadership opportunities and very manychallenges. Amongst these challenges will be thepotential “gateway” we will be able to provide intothe US inner circle of planning and capability. Wealso provide a knowledge base for US involvementwithin the Region.

To summarise, we face a number of challenges.Firstly, we need to adjust our management approachto ensure the organisation is agile enough to adjust tothe ever-increasing and diverse demands of the future.This we began in mid 1998 and we will build on it inearly 1999 with the senior leadership gathering toensure a consistency of approach and a clear view ofthe future. All of you should be confident about yourparticipation in building our force for the future andability to make your contribution in practical waysduring your work, as well as by putting forward yourideas for consideration and debate. Secondly, we needto continue to investigate new and dynamicwarfighting concepts. This has been an on-going taskwith the development of Headquarters AustralianTheatre, but will take on more momentum with theestablishment of the Office of the Revolution inMilitary Affairs during 1999. We must have our ownAustralian doctrine that reflects our uniquerequirements. Lastly, we need to progress anddevelop new methods of ensuring our regionalparticipation is well placed as we enter the newcentury. This will be achieved through initiatives likethe CDF/Pangab Forum that will be conducted inIndonesia in March 1999.

In conclusion, we have come a long way in recentyears. The future is full of opportunities that we arewell positioned to exploit. I believe that the race toachieve our objective will be propelled by innovativeand enthusiastic people throughout the ADF and theDepartment.

NOTES1. Brian H. Reid, Military Power – Land Warfare in Theory and

Practice,(London, Frank Cass, 1997), p.228.2. Australia’s Strategic Policy (Canberra: Dept of Defence, Dec 1997).3. Paul Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities,

(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986).

Conclusion


4. The Defence of Australia 1987, (Canberra: AustralianGovernment Publishing Service, 1987).

5. The 1989 Ministerial Statement “Australia’s RegionalSecurity” (Canberra, DFAT, 1989) used the term politico-military capability to describe defence’s contribution toAustralia’s diplomatic efforts when it developed some of thethemes picked up in the 1987 White Paper.

6. Paul Dibb, The Relevance of the Knowledge Edge, (SDSCConference “Maintaining the Strategic Edge – Defence ofAustralia in 2015”, 21-23 Sep 98) p.4.

7. This policy recognised Defence’s already significantframework of security and military bilateral ties, and thegradual shift over time to a more forthright posture.

8. Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.36.

9. Jessica T. Mathews, “Power Shift”, Foreign Affairs,(January/February 1997), 50.

10. An issue discussed by Bruce C. Wolpe “Leaders who can’tcarry the tune” (The Australian Financial Review,Dec 31,1998 – Jan 3, 1999, p24) when he pointed out that theprescriptive recommendations made by the IMF and its non-elected principles to a number of Regional countries would inthe past have been articulated only by a head of state, much lessby the CEO of an international financial institution.

11. Holsti, 24.12. Since 1990 the Security Council had declared a threat to

international peace and security over 61 times compared to 6 inthe preceding 45 years. Mathews, 59.

13. Other writers that expand on this theme are; Holsti, Reid,English, Mathews.

14. These are also known as grey roles and can include counter-drug operations, immigration, and fisheries enforcement.

15. Security can be defined either narrowly or broadly. Whendefined narrowly it tends to focus primarily on security inmilitary terms. The contemporary approach is the broaderdefinition of security where military aspects are just one of anumber of facets of national security such as economic, trade,political relations etc. which can be conducted simultaneously.

16.In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign & Trade PolicyWhite Paper (Canberra, DFAT, Aug 1997) foreshadowed aRegion characterised by predictable economic growth andpolitical stability. The reality has been markedly different andthe circumstances that Australia faces, some 18 months later,challenges all facets of government.

17. Paul Dibb in a recent Strategic and Defence Studies CentreWorking Paper set out three different scenarios for Asia’sgeopolitical map. These scenarios consisted of: an optimisticscenario (a coherent geopolitical structure), a pessimisticscenario (a dysfunctional geopolitical structure), and a muddlethrough scenario (an asymmetric geopolitcal structure), PaulDibb, The Remaking of Asia’s Geopolitics, Working Paper No324, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1998.

18. Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence andTrade, Funding Australia’s Defence(Canberra, AGPS, Apr98), Recommendation 3, p.103.

19. Christopher Bartlett & Sumantra Ghosal, Beyond Strategy,structures, systems to purpose, process, people, Monash MtEliza Business Review, (Vol 1 /No 1), p.56.

20. Ibid p.59.21. Cited in Reid, p.229.22. Demassification can be described as the replacement of very

large commercial, political or military entities with small, moreflexible ones.

23. This is discussed further in an article by Peter Roberts, “It’s notwho you know…,” (The Weekend Australian FinancialReview,Oct 31–Nov 1 1998), p.28.


Admiral Chris Barrie was born in Sydney and received his secondary education at North Sydney Boys HighSchool before entering the Royal Australian Naval College in January 1961. His early training included servicein HMA Ships ANZAC, VAMPIRE and MELBOURNE which included involvement in the confrontationbetween Indonesia and Malaysia, and postings to the UK, to the Britannia Royal Naval College at Dartmouthand HMSEXCELLENT for Sub-Lieutenant’s courses.

Admiral Barrie has served at sea as commissioning crew HMASBRISBANE(1967-69), which included a tourof duty in Vietnam, Commanding Officer HMASBUCCANEER (1969-70), Operations and Navigating OfficerHMSEASTBOURNE (1971-72), HMASPERTH (1973-75) and HMASDUCHESS(1976) where he hadadditional responsibility as the Training Officer. He has also served as Executive Officer in HMASVAMPIRE

(1980) and later as Commanding Officer HMASSTUART which was recommissioned into service on 29 July 1983 following hermodernisation, and in January 1984 became the first destroyer to be home ported in Western Australia.

Ashore, Admiral Barrie has qualified as a navigation sub-specialist through the UK Long N (1970-71) and Advanced N Courses (1975).In addition, he has received qualifications from the Australian Army Staff College Queenscliff (1977); the Joint Services Staff College(1980); the RAN Staff College, where he served as Directing Staff (1981-82); and the International Fellows Program component of theNational Defence University, Washington DC in the United States of America (1986-87). He has held also the positions of Director,RAN Tactical School (1985-86), Force Development Planning Staff (1987-89) and served on Diplomatic posting as Defence Adviser,New Delhi, India (1990-91), and afterwards Director RAN Surface Warfare School and Commanding Officer HMASWATSON (1991-92). After this he served as Deputy Maritime Commander and Chief of Staff at Maritime Headquarters in Sydney (1992-95) and DeputyChief of Naval Staff (1995-96). Prior to his promotion to Admiral and assuming his current appointment on 4 July 1998, he served asVice Chief of the Defence Force since March 1997.

Through part-time study Admiral Barrie obtained a Bachelor of Arts degree with a special focus on International Relations and Politicsin 1983 and was awarded a Master of Business Administration degree in 1996, by Deakin University.

Admiral Barrie’s military service was recognised when he was made a Member of the Order of Australia (AM) in 1994, and promotedto an Officer of the Order of Australia (AO) in June 1998.

Major Anne N. Goyne, AA Psych

Since the announcement of the Force StructureReview (FSR) in May 1991, and the earlierintroduction of the Commercial Support Program(CSP), the Australian Army has gone from apermanent force of some 31,000 troops to around25,800 in financial year 95/96 (Defence PersonnelPicture, 1995-96). Recruiting increased slightly whenthe combination of FSR driven downsizing and theend of the recession resulted in more people opting todischarge in 92-93. However, the overall trend isclear. The Army, and the Australian Defence Forcegenerally, will continue to operate in a constrained,even declining manpower environment for theforeseeable future. More than ever before the Armymust act to reduce inefficiencies in its human resourcemanagement, and work to get the best possible valuefrom the people it enlists.

Although personnel are often described as theAustralian Army’s most valuable resource, the recentemphasis placed on downsizing has diverted attentionaway from how well the Army is performing as anemployer. Ironically, the value of our personnel hasnever been higher precisely because we now have toperform the same role with far fewer people. Yet theArmy tends to lose its most highly trained andemployable personnel, and continues to accept anunhealthily high wastage of trained junior soldiers.

The purpose of this article is to look at some ofthe human resource issues that concern soldiers, andparticularly soldiers who serve in combat units. Themaintenance of a high degree of combat effectivenessmust be the cornerstone of any assessment of whetherwe are getting the best value for our defence dollar.The fact that in the recent past we have had difficultyfinding sufficient soldiers to send one Infantrybattalion overseas, seems testament to the problemsbeing experienced at the sharp end. The recentDefence Efficiency Review and DefenceRestructuring Program have attempted to overcomethis problem. The “Army Plan” proposes to employ65 per centof the full-time personnel strength in the

Combat Force. However, if the underlying causes forhigher wastage in Arms Corps units are notaddressed, it is conceivable the rate of soldiers exitingthe Army is only likely to increase.

Various studies have tried to isolate exactly whatit is that encourages a young person to think about theDefence Force as a career. Bergin (1994), in his studyof enlistment trends, found that the majority ofapplicants were seeking occupational goals, such as agood job with good pay, with almost half(43 per cent) wanting to make the military theircareer. According to AMR:Quantum’s (1994)research into recruiting trends, the predominant“advantages” of joining the ADF were job security,career, excellent training, on the job experience, hightechnology, meeting people, travel, allowances, aswell as the more institutional factors such as doingsomething for the country, personal development andthe excitement of a soldiering career. Similarly, acontinuing study into enlistment motivation (andemployment motivation generally) sponsored by theDirectorate of Defence Force Recruiting, has foundthat the top motivators for a Defence Force jobinclude occupational training (84per centof top 5responses), some physical work (83per cent), beingable to work in a team (80per cent), opportunities tolearn leadership and management skills (79per cent)and opportunities for interstate travel (76per cent)(Rahmani, 1998)

Although various factors are linked to the decisionto enlist in the ADF, the importance of occupationaltraining, job security and job satisfaction arereinforced throughout the research. The fact thatoccupational training, whether on the job or viaformal courses, consistently appears very close to thetop of the motivational pile, emphasises the weightgiven to this aspect of service life by those whocontemplate enlisting. At the end of the day,applicants who join the ADF want to serve theircountry and do exciting things, but they also wantrecognisable skills, qualifications and experience asthe quid quo profor having served. It is debatable

Enlistment Motivation

Introduction

Allocation and Retention in the Australian Regular Army

whether four years service in combat employmentprovides the kind of training to meet this expectation.

One way of achieving a greater insight intoretention in the Australian Army, is to examine Armyseparation rates by corps, length of service prior todischarge, and reasons for leaving. Over the 10 yearssince financial year 87/88, RAInf has lost 1919soldiers who have served only 4 years or less (Figure1) (SCMA figures). When this is compared with therate of separation for junior soldiers in all other corps(see Table 1), it is evident that RAInf suffersmarkedly higher wastage of junior enlisted personnel.For example, until recently RAAOC has had acomparable personnel strength to RAInf (see Table1), yet RAAOC lost only 607 junior soldiers duringthis 10 year period. The significance of this differenceis highlighted when one considers that RAAOCemploys female soldiers. Female soldiers tend toserve for a shorter duration than men (approximately62 per centof female Army personnel serve for lessthan 10 years, compared to 50per centof malepersonnel who discharge in this time frame (DefencePersonnel Picture, 1995 -96)), thus a higher

separation rate in RAAOC would be expected. Thefact RAInf lost more than three times the number ofjunior personnel than RAAOC, only emphasises themagnitude of the problem.

It may be argued that the loss of these juniorcombat trained soldiers is not a complete waste to themilitary, because many may subsequently transfer toGeneral Reserves. However, this does not appear tobe supported by figures from SCMA. Although 3326soldiers with more than four years service havetransferred to the General Reserves since F/Y 92/93,only 184 soldiers with four years service or less havetransferred in this time. Only 12 of these were RAInfpersonnel (SCMA figures, 1998).

It could be the case that RAInf has a highpersonnel turnover because young people no longerenlist in the Army to become soldiers(i.e., a manwith a rifle as opposed to a uniformed tradesman).The 1995 results of the Soldier Attitude and OpinionSurvey (SAOS), specifically looking at careermanagement and job performance issues, found that40per centof private soldiers were either dissatisfiedor undecided about their corps allocation. The figurefor LCPL/CPL equivalents was 30per cent, forSGT/SSGT it was 26per centand for WO the ratewas 17per cent. The author of the survey concludedthat the comparatively high rate of indecision ordissatisfaction with corps allocation amongst juniorsoldiers, reflected the fact that “large numbers ofrecruits are placed in corps such as Infantry andArtillery which is often not the soldiers desiredpreference” (Salter, 1996).

Interestingly, however, this result contrasts withrecent allocation data from 1RTB held at 1 Psychresearch Unit (lPRU). Table 2 shows the percentageof soldiers who were allocated in accordance withtheir first preference in 1997 (lPRU GE data base).Leaving aside corps enlisted recruits (AABC andRAEME), over 80per centof recruits allocated toArms Corps’ (excluding AAAvn) had wanted thesame corps as their first preference. The corps’ withthe lowest proportion of soldiers who had chosentheir eventual allocation as a first preference wereRAAOC, AAAvn and RAAMC.

It is possible recruits are encouraged to choose acorps they are likely to be allocated to at 1RTB, eitherbefore they commence training or once they arrive.

Satisfaction with Allocation

Retention in the Australian Army


Soldier Asset for RAInf and RAAOC since FY 92/93

Corps 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96

RAInf 3,887 3,797 3,664 3,931

RAAOC 2,509 2,159 3,011 3,122

Table 1

Nevertheless, it is equally possible that many seekmore combat related employments when they enlist inthe Army. This latter alternative is supported by therange of first preference nominations for soldiersallocated to RAAOC. Although 127 recruits allocatedto this Corps wanted Ordnance as a first preference,16per cent(29 recruits) of RAAOC allocated recruitshad nominated an Arms Corps as their firstpreference. Overall, 63per centof soldiers allocatedat 1RTB in 1997 had an Arms Corps as their firstpreference, and 66per centof all soldiers wereallocated to an Arm. These results at least raise thepossibility that soldier dissatisfaction with corpsallocation is not solely due to being allocated to a jobthey didn’t want.

Percent of Soldiers Allocated to Their 1stPreference at 1RTB in

1997*

Corps %1st Number Corps %1st NumberPrefs allocated Prefs allocated

RAAC 80% 100 RAA 86% 117

RAE 92% 104 RASIGS 81% 115

RAINF 84% 561 AAAVN 75% 4

RACT 84% 136 RAAMC 77% 44

RAADC 100% 3 RAAOC 68% 185

RAEME 100% 101 AACC 93% 30

AABC 100% 4

Table 2

*lPRU figures

If combat soldiers are not discharging in largenumbers because they are dissatisfied with their corpsallocation, then we need to know what does promptthem to leave. In 1989, LT M.D. Collins a PlatoonCommander at 2/4 RAR, was sufficiently concernedabout the exceptionally high wastage rates at his unitto write a paper identifying potential causes. In a unitof only 700 men, 162 soldiers had discharged and 30more were applying for discharge (almost 30per cent

of the unit) in 18 months; 90per centof these menhad served a maximum of three years. Collins (1992)interviewed all 62 soldiers who discharged in 1990,and found that many of these soldiers had a poorunderstanding of the demands of life in an infantrybattalion prior to enlistment. Additionally, few weremotivated for this type of work, most could see littlefuture in remaining in RAInf, many were poorlyeducated and 11 were discharged because theircontinued service was not in the interest of the Army.

LT Collins (1992) discussed a number ofcomplaints the soldiers had about the Army. Theseconcerned boredom, poor resources (i.e. limitedammunition, etc.) and poor leadership. However, heconcluded that “the most common[my italics]complaint heard about the Corps, from the soldierwithin it, is that he has no qualifications for furtheremployment once he leaves it”. (Collins, 1992; p.14).This same conclusion was made by Graco (1978)almost 14 years previously in his report on theattitudes of RAInf Initial Employment Trainees(IET’s). He stated that “those trainees who initiallyhad a negative attitude [to being in RAInf ormaintained a negative attitude toward the Corps didso because they saw the training they were receivingas being worthless in regard to their future life”(Graco, 1978, p.19).

Previous Research on RAInf Discharges

ALLOCATION AND RETENTION IN THE AUSTRALIAN REGULAR ARMY 19

Five most frequently endorsed SSQ items that hada “very considerable influence” on the decision todischarge for soldiers aged between 18 - 26 years

% Endorsed

SSQ Items RAInf All Other Corps“To make a career change while still 64% 51%young enough” “Insufficient reward 55% 46%for overtime”“Lack of excitementand action in a 48% 16%peacetime Army”“Limited career 35% 21%opportunities”“Experience of abuse 35% 24%of power”

Table 3

For a number of years the Army has surveyedpersonnel who are exiting the service in order toidentify reasons for discharge. Although the SSQdoes not ask specifically about the desire to findcivilian recognised qualifications as a reason fordischarge, there are questions that give an indicationof this intention. Table 3 lists the five items mostfrequently endorsed by junior (between 18 - 26 years)RAInf soldiers discharging in 95/96, as having a“very considerable influence” on their decision toleave. For the 162 Infantry soldiers who completedthe SSQ in this period, the desire “to make a careerchange while still young enough” was the mostwidely endorsed reason for seeking discharge.Although this item does not specifically target a lackof satisfaction with current training, the desire tochange careers after only a short time in RAInf doesnot disconfirm the conclusions reached by bothCollins (1992) and Graco (1978).

One point that has not been dealt with thus far, isthe perception of increased risk of personal injury forcombat soldiers in the course of their normal duties.Many of the RAInf soldiers I have interviewed forcorps reallocation have stated, that although they enjoytheir combat careers, they cannot ignore the physicalrisks associated with their employment. This concernis not unfounded (Figure 2). Substantially moresoldiers are discharged as medically unfit from RA Infthan any other corps in the Army (SCMA figures).Although a number of these soldiers are removed fromInfantry Initial Employment Training (JET) due toinjury, Infantry work itself must also be viewed as anoccupational hazard. For a soldier who opts to remainin a combat unit longer than his initial engagement, theodds of eventually being injured will increase.

This is particularly the case for those soldiers whoserve in 3 RAR, where the risk of serious injury fromparachuting accidents is well known. These soldiers,and others I have spoken to over the years, are acutelyaware of the risks of serious injury. Those that areinjured, soon learn that corps reallocation for adowngraded “Grunt” is an up hill battle. For example,in 1997/98 104 junior (

The following sections of this article look at threedifferent approaches to dealing with allocationand wastage issues in the Army

Option 1. MusteringOne strategy being proposed by the Army as a

solution to problems with wastage, is to corps enlistrecruits along similar lines to the RAAF and Navy.Such a strategy would remove much of theuncertainty experienced by new recruits who enlistinto the Army. Nevertheless, there are potential costsfor the Army. At present all recruits who enlist aresoldiers first. They enlist in the knowledge that theycould be posted to a fighting unit and be deployed onoperations. Mustering risks undermining this aspectof service, in that applicants enlist to specific tradesand are more likely to see themselves in terms of thattrade. Although the importance of operational dutiescan be emphasised at recruiting, it is at leastconceivable that mustered soldiers will balk at havingto do duties they don’t perceive as part of their jobspecification.

At the heart of the move towards mustering is thebelief that soldiers become disillusioned with servicelife because they did not choose the corps they wereallocated to at basic training. However, as notedearlier in this article, dissatisfaction with one’s corpsallocation is only part of the problem facing militaryplanners. High wastage occurs amongst junior combatsoldiers because they are either injured in the courseof their duties (and are not subsequently rehabilitatedand reallocated), or because many see no future forthemselves in these trades. If the “Army Plan”succeeds in putting 65 per centof soldiers in theCombat Force, there seems little doubt that thenumber of soldiers leaving the Army will increase. Inthis scenario, it is very unlikely that mustering willovercome the problem of wastage; in fact, it is moreprobable that such an approach will reduce thenumber of available applicants for the combat arms.

Option 2. Payment of Retention BonusesThe Army could try offering retention bonuses to

soldiers at the point of discharge, to encourage themto stay. This system has been tried overseas (i.e. USArmy Retention Bounties), where defence budgetsare capable of funding such an approach. A similarsystem is used by the ADF to keep pilots in themilitary. Although retention bonuses are likely to bepopular with soldiers already intending to remain inthe service, it is doubtful whether they would be theapproach of choice for the ARA. Leaving aside thecosts involved, the choice to offer retention bonusesdoes not address the problems currently being faced

by combat soldiers. Individuals who are injuredwould still be discharged, and soldiers who fearbecoming financial conscripts are less likely to acceptfinancial inducements to stay. Furthermore, it may bethe case that the Army actually wants older soldiers toleave the Combat Arms anyway, retaining onlyyoung, fit soldiers in these employment areas.

Option 3. Mandatory Arms TrainingThe third proposal is to make initial service in the

Combat Arms mandatory for all GE applicants, priorto re-allocation to another corps (this would alsoapply to trade employments which would no longerbe offered to civilians). In other words, all soldiersjoining the Army (regardless of gender) would haveto be suitable for Arms training, be motivated for thistype of work, and be aware that this would be theirjob for a specified period. By marketing theexcitement of being a soldier early in a soldier’scareer (as was done for the Ready Reserves), theArmy would be cashing in on its high profile andwould also be able to advertise precisely what newrecruits would be expected to do. Soldiers who enlistunder this scheme would then be free to re-allocateafter they have completed their training. In the eventof injury, every effort toward rehabilitation in a lessphysical employment would be made. In this way theArmy meets it’s promise to provide occupationaltraining and a viable career.

The need to make enlistment to the Arms amandatory requirement for all GEs, is highlighted bythe experiences with a similar scheme in the CanadianForces (CF). The CF introduced the Land OperationsTrade Reassignment Program in the late 70s(subsequently called the Land Operations TransferProgram (LOTP)), in an effort to increase manpowerin combat units. This scheme promised preferentialtrade re-allocation to soldiers after four years in anarms corps role, however, it was less successful thanhoped and ultimately dropped as a form of enlistment.Basically, the LOTP was unsuccessful because not allCF enlisted personnel were recruited under thisscheme. When the young combat soldier reached thestage where he could re-allocate, ongoing shortages incombat personnel and the lack of vacancies in othertrade streams made re-allocation very difficult. Unitswere reluctant to part with their trained men, thusfinalising a transfer could take years. Furthermore,applicants were not always advised of theiremployment suitability at the time of enlistment.When they applied to re-allocate they were frequentlydisappointed by the choices on offer. In the end manyof the soldiers who enlisted under the LOTP felt


disgruntled and betrayed by the system (MacIntyre,1997).

Not only does the concept of mandatory Armsservice work to overcome the ongoing problem ofunder-manning in Arms Corps units, but it alsoensures a higher level of basic military skillsthroughout the Army. Given the fact that the numberof personnel in the Army is shrinking, it is imperativethat all soldiers have sufficient military skills todefend themselves. In a time of funding cuts anddownsizing, priority for field and weapons training isgenerally given to Arms Corps personnel. However,the recent employment of support troops forpotentially hazardous, international peacekeepingduties highlights the fact that these soldiers also needto feel confident in their military skills. Suchconfidence is only achieved through intensivetraining. It is doubtful whether soldiers who spend aminimum of time each year out bush or on the rangedevelop this confidence.

It may be argued that a scheme which definesArms Corps service as temporary may itselfundermine the morale and effectiveness of combatunits, and this issue must be addressed. There arepotential problems in employing everyone in acombat related role. Nonetheless, just as ReadyReserve soldiers saw their combat training as simplya phasein their careers, it is hoped that GEs will alsoadopt a phased careers approach. If soldiers are madeaware that their future employment opportunities(including retention in the Army) are dependent upontheir performance in their initial combat employment,morale and effectiveness may actually improve underthe proposed new scheme. Ultimately, continuedservice in an Arms Corps unit could become“selective”, thus, the general status of the Professionof Arms is likely to increase.

On the negative side, there is the issue of theadded expense of additional employment trainingafter the initial phase of combat service. However,this training would have been undertaken by newenlistees anyway so it is debatable if there would besignificant additional costs. Furthermore, mostsoldiers being trained on re-allocation would beseasoned troops with up to 2-3 years to decide ontheir future career. A number will already have begunpreparation for the Adult Trade Training Scheme,others may have participated in work experienceprogrammes to give them an insight into the variousjobs on offer. The very fact they have committedthemselves to completing combat service, wouldsuggest they are likely to need less overall training, bemore motivated and be capable of assimilatingtraining more readily than IETs direct from 1RTB.

Although the introduction of a mandatory Armstraining model would result in everyone enlistedbeing exposed to similar physical risks, the maindifference between this model and others is its focuson re-allocation. At present Infantry soldiers who areinjured are discharged in greater numbers thansoldiers in any other corps. Although this may reflectthe seriousness of the injuries suffered (or theseriousness by which they are judged by MedicalOfficers working within RAInf), it is also possiblethat other corps’ are reluctant to take on medicallydowngraded soldiers regardless of their ability to dothe job. In a mandatory Arms training model, medicalassessments would need to have a more globalapproach. Current and future capacities andincapacities would be taken into account, withattention paid to the individual’s options across theArmy. Wherever possible emphasis would be towardsretention, rehabilitation and re-allocation to the mostsuitable employment, either temporarily orpermanently. As injuries recover, movement backinto a career of the soldier’s choice should be madeavailable.

Certainly such an approach involves greaterexpense, administration and effort, there is noapology for this. However, one is compelled to askhow long can we continue to afford the alternative?In this author’s opinion, the benefits to be gained interms of increased morale and faith in the Army fromthe soldiers within it are beyond any price value. Fortoo long the phrase “our people are our greatest asset”has had a disturbingly hollow ring in the modernDefence Force. By taking better care of ordinarysoldiers the Army would demonstrate that loyaltyisn’t a one way street.

Combat effectiveness constitutes the onlycriterion by which any Defence Force can be judged.The cornerstone of this effectiveness is the quality ofthe personnel who do the fighting. Unfortunately, theARA appears to have substantial problems in theemployment of combat troops. Trained personnelleave the Army in unacceptable numbers, taking withthem the experience and expertise that are essential tothe maintenance of combat effectiveness. The mostevident problems seem to be the perception thatCombat Arms skills have a limited utility, and thatserving as an Arms Corps soldier is not a long-termcareer option (both because of the risks of injury andthe unlikely employment in a combat role in theforeseeable future).

Conclusion


The purpose of this article has been to discuss theintroduction of a radically new approach to theemployment of soldiers in Arms Corps units. Bymaking service in such units mandatory for all GEs,prior to re-allocation to a support role, the Armystands to gain in a number of ways. Not only willmanning in combat line units cease to be a problem,but the increased presence of better trained, andpotentially more dedicated soldiers in support unitswill enhance the combat effectiveness of the militaryas a whole.

There are potential costs of this programme,nevertheless, it is debatable whether the Army cancontinue to afford the unnecessary wastage of trainedsoldiers after only brief periods of service. Not onlyare the high costs of recruiting and recruit training aburden on the Defence Budget, but the potential badpress that results from dissatisfied enlistees mayeventually undermine the Army’s ability to attractfuture recruits. It is hoped that this proposal willstimulate debate, and hopefully encourage planners tolook more proactively at the problems facing today’sArms Corps.

NOTES1. The Ready Reserve Scheme involved one year of full-time

service in the Combat Arms, followed by three years part-timeservice in the General Reserves. Potential recruits were madewell aware at enlistment that they were most likely to beallocated to an Arms Corps. Because of the brief period of fulltime service involved, and the generous financial benefits forstudents who enlisted, the Ready Reserve scheme generallyattracted a healthy stream of applicants. These soldiers weretypically brighter and better educated than many GE applicants,and anecdotal evidence suggests that the majority enjoyed theirtwelve months full-time duty. Now that the scheme has beenabolished, it is difficult to determine the costs or benefits ofsuch an approach to the ADF.

BIBLIOGRAPHYAMR: Quantum ( 1994). Defence Force Recruitment Branch

Strategic Qualitative Research.Melbourne: AMR: Quantum.Collins, M. D.(1992). “The Infantryman-An endangered species”,

Australian Defence Force Journal, 92, 9-15.Graco, W.J. (1978). A preliminary report on the attitudes of Royal

Australian Infantry Initial Employment Trainees. (ResearchNote 8/76), Canberra, Australia: Department of Defence (ArmyOffice), 1st Psychological Research Unit.

MacIntyre, A.T. (1997). Personal Communication.Mattingly and Partners. (1991).Australia’s Defence Force: A

Communication Strategy for Defence Force Recruitment in the1990s,Vol. 1.

Moss, S. (Ed) (1994). Who Will Join: ADF Recruitment Policy tothe Year 2000.Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre.

New Focus (1997). Report on Community Attitudes TowardsCareers in the Defence Force: Executive Summary.DefenceForce Recruiting Branch: Department of Defence, Canberra.

Personnel Policy Branch. (1996).Defence Personnel Picture1995-1996.Canberra, Australia: Department of Defence,Personnel Policy Branch (Human Resources and ManagementDivision).

Rahmani, Z. (1998). Youth Attitudes Towards Defence Careers.Paper presented at the Support Command Reward andRecognition Workshop. Melbourne, Australia: Department ofDefence.

Salter, J.S. (1996) 1995 Soldier Attitude and Opinion SurveyMiscellaneous Issues(WP 14/95). Canberra, Australia:Department of Defence (Army Office), 1st PsychologicalResearch Unit.

Salter, J.S. (1996). 1995 Soldier Attitude and Opinion SurveyCareer Management and Job Performance Issues (WP 15/95).Canberra, Australia: Department of Defence (Army Office), 1stPsychological Research Unit.

Unauthored, (1992). “Low ADF ‘wastage’ brings recruiting to astandstill”. Australian Defence Report, 3,2, 12-13, 14.

Walker, D.A. (1985). “Servicemen of the future: Leaders or

technocrats”, Defence Force Journal, 50,54-6


Major Anne Goyne graduated from La Trobe University with a Bachelor of Behavioural Science (Hons) in 1982. She was firstcommissioned in April 1983 and served as a psychologist at 14 Psych Unit in Adelaide, 16 Psych Unit in Sydney, 11 Psych Unit inBrisbane and Det 11 Psych Unit in Townsville. She left the Army in 1990 to start a family and was re-commissioned in January 1995. Annethen served as a psychologist at 16 Psych Unit in Sydney. This was followed by two years as a research officer at 1 Psych ResearchUnit/Directorate of Strategic Personnel Planning and Research. She is currently SO2 Psych DPSYCH and is completing a Master ofClinical Psychology course at the Australian National University.

Images from the Back Seatis a collection ofsome of the more interesting airbornephotographs taken by Defence photographerDenis Hersey.

Some of the images portrayed in thispublication have been used for publicitypurposes. However, many have never beenpublished before.

The majority of the collection is of RoyalAustralian Air Force aircraft past and present.There is also a fine display of air-to-airphotographs of aircraft from the Army andNavy as well as aircraft from New Zealand,Britain, Italy, United States and Singapore.

The book is available from the office of theAustralian Defence Force Journalat a cost of $19.95.

Australian Defence Force Journal – Mail Order Form

IMAGES FROM THE BACK SEATPlease send order to Australian Defence Force Journal,

B-4-26, Russell Offices, CANBERRA ACT 2600

Name:

Address:

I enclose a cheque or money order payable to the Receiver of Public Monies for $ being payment for copies of Images from the Back Seat.

By Corporal Matthew N. Davies, AUST INT

Recent and ongoing unrest in our near neighbourIndonesia has given onlookers an unprecedentedamount of journalism touching on matters perhapsotherwise the preserve of government, defence anddiplomacy. Much of the televised and print mediahas saturated audiences with an often numbingredundancy of “news” and images, such as that cartonof mie instantnoodles pillaged at first in Bandung,and subsequently ad infinitum in TV networks andliving rooms around the world!

However, a new emphasis may have arisen in thecase of some media commentary which saw fit tospeculate on rumoured power struggles within thesenior echelons of Indonesia’s military. While suchspeculation may well have been just as unreal, or“hyperreal”, as the visual infotainment proper, itought well prompt a reappraisal of how ourneighbour’s military structure functions. In thecontext of emergency levels of civil disorder,Indonesia’s vast military intelligence apparatusdeserves our attention, just as it is no doubt givenspecial consideration by both its masters and subjectsin Indonesia itself.

This article is intended to provide a brief overviewof the structure and roles of intelligence functions andcommands of the Armed Forces of the Republic ofIndonesia (ABRI), early formative historicalinfluences, and some associated issues arising inrecent events. An effort will be made throughout toidentify the following key characteristics of ABRI’sintelligence apparatus:• Centralised Multiplicity of Bureaucracies /

Command & Control Mechanisms – Inexamining intelligence agencies, popular wisdomhas often preferred to highlight potential rivalriesin a perceived dualist bureaucratic structure, e.g.,KGB – GRU, FBI – CIA, Abwehr – SD, andBAKIN – BIA. However, ABRI intelligence (aswith other nations’ systems) has a greatercomplexity with several participating agencies, a

great many of their members and sources non-military, and all ultimately responsible to thePresidency itself.

• Intensive and Universal Engagement of Society– Intelligence tasks assume priority across allABRI commands and formations (there is nodistinct intelligence corps). The entire Indonesiansociety is targeted for involvement across allclasses via thorough infiltration amongst variousorganisations, most of which have no ostensibleintelligence function.

• Authority to Perform Activist / InterventionistFunctions – Domestic surveillance is a routineABRI task not usually requiring any outside“watchdog” check or approval from the judiciary,while interventionist operations in civil mattersreceive irregular judicial scrutiny. Generally,ABRI can carry out its missions of politicalintervention and repression within an environmentof internal hierarchical accountability.The driving purpose behind this account’s largely

descriptive treatment is to emphasise some strikingdifferences between ABRI’s evolving intelligenceinfrastructure and comparable Australian institutionswe know today, and to reaffirm the need to examineforeign orbat in the context of its own particular rolesand operational environment. Given the limited spaceavailable, any comparisons will be only cursory, andit is hoped that the target readership naturally makesits own more specific comparisons as part of a self-consciously reflective process.

Attention will focus on the army and police, by farthe two largest of ABRI’s four services. Air andnaval elements mostly contribute in a joint servicecapacity under the aegis of the various intelligencebureaucracies, besides their internal service roles.Not surprisingly, there are no detailed sourcesavailable on the subject of ABRI’s overseasintelligence resources, and references focus on themore intensive sphere of internal procedures andoperations. A glossary is attached to assist thoseunfamiliar with the more relevant terms from theacronym-rich ABRI lexicon.

Long before Australian involvement in counter-insurgency conflicts in Southeast Asia, theNetherlands East Indies had experienced Dutch

Introduction

The ABRI Intelligence Apparatus: A “Corps” of Many Lanyards

methods of suppressing internal uprisings and dissent.The Korps Marachausseerecruited native lineinfantry, scouts and agents from as far afield asSumatera and Ambon for the colonial war against theSultanate of Aceh, for example, earning themconsiderable infamy with the local populace and evenmetropolitan Holland.1 The KNIL (KoninklijkNederlands-Indisch Leger)had a direct influence untilJapanese occupation, with such notable members asthe junior officers A.H. Nasution and Kawilarang.2

KNIL NCO Suharto was one of the few exceptions toreceive both Dutch and Japanese training.3

Dutch rule is often described as having beencharacterised by “divide-and-rule” policies, especiallyalong lines of ethnicity, class and religion.4 TheDutch East Indies’ intelligence arm PID has beencredited with sponsoring youths to infiltrateIndonesian nationalist-Islamic groups such asMuhammadiyah.5 This volatility of social divisionshas persisted as a major issue in Indonesian politicaldiscourse, either in government rhetoric and actionpromoting unity and the Pancasila ideology, or inopposition criticism accusing the authorities ofmanipulating precisely such divisions.6

Generally keen to be regarded as the liberatorfrom colonial oppression, the invading Japanesemilitary commands established indigenous forces inaccordance with their pan-Asian militarist ideology,and the yet more pressing concerns of their war’sdefensive phase. Relatively broad volunteerparticipation was encouraged under the Japanese,especially in the more populous Java, Madura andBali,7 and in contrast with the more selective colonialDutch mercenary system.

The large proto-nationalist volunteer army Petawas itself the creation of the Japanese Beppanintelligence agency in Java, and intelligence trainingwas a feature from the start.8 The Japanese Armytrained Zulkifli Lubis in intelligence, prior to his workin establishing the Indonesian intelligence systemfrom 1945 – Lubis himself influential in this field intothe 1970s.9 Also, from 1943, the Kempeitai counter-intelligence body put to use local agents drawn fromHeiho auxiliaries.10 The post-war Indonesianequivalents of the Heiho formations are to be found inthe Hansip (Civil Defence) and Wanra (People’sResistance) auxiliaries, normally under control of theHome Affairs Ministry, but available to ABRIcommand when circumstances deem it necessary.11

In a more radical development from Dutchprecedents, the Japanese 16th Army Commandheadquartered in Bandung actively fostered thecreation of mass organisations such as the anti-colonial “Three A Movement”, the youth organisation

Putera, and Miai (later in the war to becomeMasjumi, an Islamic movement which survived intothe 1970s prior to incorporation into the PPP, orUnited Development Party, and currently undergoinga revival). Free of the European distrust and fear ofIslam or Hinduism, Shinto-Buddhist Japan converselymade no such collaborative efforts in the moreChristianised (and navy-controlled) eastern Indonesia,also assumed to be more sympathetic to the Dutchcolonizers.12

The local underworld, too, was not exempt fromthis active collaboration. Sendenbu, 16th Army’spsyops section, embraced indigenous, ethnic Chinese,and European-descended Indonesians to form secretguerilla groups with the sinister names “Black Fan”,Chin Pan,and “Black Snake”, respectively.13

Japanese manipulation of street-gang thugs andvagabonds clearly anticipated the present era’sshadier side of Indonesia’s internal security, whenmany accept as fact claims that some ABRI elementsregularly exploit such an unscrupulous humanresource to create sensational “diversions”, or toeffect more openly harsh and violent repression ofdissent.14 The ABRI influence is sometimes quiteobvious. In 1990s Jakarta, gang members releasedfrom prison are known as newly-promoted“corporals”, while many associates of a well-knownEast Timorese PPM thug, are themselves formerarmy auxiliaries once used in operations in thetroubled eastern province.15

As an adjunct to the Peta army, which trained somany future Indonesian leaders, this extra socio-political and para-military emphasis by the Japanesein central Indonesia could be said to have had a widerand more profound impact on the development of adistinctly Indonesian intelligence culture. Nowadaysthese “ground-level” organisations, with their lessformal hierarchies, aid and augment military andpolice elements, and can provide quite vast networksof human intelligence (HUMINT). Although hastilyconceived and activated during wartime occupation,they may even be Imperial Japan’s most enduringlegacy in Indonesia. This possibility was apparent inthe creation of the Hizbullah movement by First TaskForce guerilla command and Sendenbu.16 Fifty-thousand strong by 1945, Hizbullah earned areputation as some of the most unrelentingindependence fighters against the Dutch.

The history of ABRI intelligence in the Soekarnoera deserves a whole separate treatment. As part ofABRI’s post-war development, rather than earlyformative influences,it will not be examined in thisarticle. Some aspects of recent New Order history tobe mentioned in passing are: the political tensions

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