NO. 133 NOVEMBER/ DECEMBER 1998 - Department of Defence · 2017-08-16 · 4 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE...

NO. 133

NOVEMBER/DECEMBER1998

Australian Defence Force Journal

Board of ManagementBrigadier A.S. D’Hagé, AM, MC (Chairman)Captain J.P.D. Hodgman, RANLieutenant Colonel N.F. JamesGroup Captain C.A. BeattyMs K. Griffith

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© Commonwealth of Australia 1998ISSN 1320-2545Published by the Department of DefenceCanberra 1998

No. 133 November/December 1998

Managing EditorMichael P. Tracey

EditorIrene M. Coombes

Printed in Australia by National CapitalPrinting, Fyshwick, ACT 2609

Contributors are urged to ensure the accuracy of the informationcontained in their articles; the Board of Management accepts noresponsibility for errors of fact.Permission to reprint articles in the Journal will generally be readilygiven by the Managing Editor after consultation with the author. Anyreproduced articles should bear an acknowledgement of source.The views expressed in the articles are the author’s own and shouldnot be construed as official opinion or policy.

Contents

3. Letters to the Editor

5. Mercenaries and the “Sandline Affair”Lieutenant Genevieve Ebbeck, RANR

25. Should NATO Enlarge? The Pros and ConsDr Johanna Granville, Clemson University, USA

35. Airborne Forces: The Twenty-First Century’s RapidDominance SolutionMajor T. Basan, RA Inf.

41. A Re-evaluation of the Role of the Australian TaskForce in VietnamMajor Andrew Drayton, RAEME

49. Book Reviews

51. IndexFront Cover

In Flanders’ Fields by John McCraeFrom: Australians on the Western Front

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Letters to the Editor

Restructuring the Australian ArmyDear Editor,

Restructuring the Australian Army: The Seeds ofFuture Crisis, by Major C.J. Shine in the July/Augustissue of the Journal was a most impressive article.Not only was it well written and researched, but moreimportantly it presented some very thoughtful andappropriate arguments.

The key as the article points out, is to accuratelydetermine for what circumstances the Army is beingrestructured. If we adopt the narrow focus, to use theauthor’s terminology, we will inevitably end up withthe wrong structure and less effective unit and taskforce organisations. On the other hand, a broad focus,which encompasses the capacity to deploy into theregion as the most likely requirement, at the sametime adequately addressing the defence of continentalAustralia, should produce effective and responsiveorganisational structures from the current trials.Development of organisations compatible with thoseof our principal allies is essential in any circumstancesas the article points out.

At the same time the capacity to mobiliseadequately needs to be revisited. Planning costs little,but the price of planning failure is incalculable.

Major Shine has presented an interesting andaccurate assessment of the current situation and hasdone much to further this most important debate.

A. Clunies-Ross

Air PowerDear Editor,

I read with interest Wing Commander Steinbach’sarticle in your July/August edition. Althoughappreciating the author’s focus on the parliamentarydebate on air power, the reader might easily be leftwith a rather lop-sided view of threats to Australiaand the birth of the Royal Australian Navy. Expertopinion consistently argued that Australia’s interestswere most vulnerable – and could be attacked by ahostile power most decisively – through theinterdiction of maritime commerce. It followed thatAustralia’s overriding defence concern was not localmeasures within sight of the coast – where land-basedaircraft might play a role – but the blue-waterprotection of her seaborne trade. Although local portsmight be subject to raids, invasion was always highlyunlikely.

The linkage between the RAN and “dreadnoughts”is also misleading. Armoured and unarmouredcruisers formed the core of the Fleet Unit and actingalone or in conjunction with the Imperial Fleet thesewere designed to ensure the safety of Australia’scommerce against hostile cruisers. The cruisers werein turn supported by destroyers and submarines, andthese were suitable for local defence. Acting together,the Fleet Unit was expected to make the possibility ofan enemy threatening Australia’s ports ‘so remote asto be hardly worth considering’. As subsequentevents proved, merely the existence of the RAN’sfirst flagship, HMAS Australia, deterred the GermanPacific Squadron from carrying out its pre-war plansfor commerce warfare on the Australia Station.Australia, it could be argued, repaid her investmentmany times over, and without firing a shot.

Finally, it would be wrong to think that the RANwas ignorant of aircraft capabilities. Accepting thatexisting machines had neither the range, armament,nor manoeuvreability to threaten vessels at sea in1913 the naval staff instead developed plans to use“water planes to act as the eyes of the fleet”. In 1914the RAN took a keen interest in the trials of the firstfloat plane in Australia, and in November that yeartwo machines were embarked in HMAS Una forcombined operations in German New Guinea.

David StevensMaritime Studies Program

Command and LeadershipDear Editor,

Whilst agreeing with some of the leadershiprequirements detailed by Lieutenant-Colonel DavidG. Blackwell (ADFJ No.130 May–June 1998), Ithink that his prediction “Australia has not had a warfor over 30 years and the possibility of being involvedin a major conflict is diminishing as time goes by” isnot consistent with the “offensive spirit” which is theprerequisite of any effective army. What’s the pointof training combat troops and telling them at the sametime they’re not likely to be involved in battle?

As a former businessman, frankly I don’t think thetop executive in civilian life necessarily has anythingto offer the army in leadership training. The bestbusiness leader does not make decisions when underimmediate threat and in personal physical danger.

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 133 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 19984

In any sub-unit of an infantry battalion, thecommander has to be totally fit, dogged, able to leadby personal example, sum up his options in secondsand determine tactics that will succeed. He doesn’tneed a tertiary education, nor can he worry about“achieving quiet pride and personal satisfaction”, norcan he afford to learn from his mistakes, as very oftenhis first mistake is his last.

Surely our army must be training for war. Combatunits should be subjected to constant, intensiveweapon training and using them in field operationswhere a risk factor is every present. Exercises undernear-battle conditions can help in the selection ofjunior officers and NCO’s with the right leadershipqualities. Such a leader may well have little formaleducation, his grammar may be imperfect, but he willbe intelligent, aggressive, decisive and courageous.Because he leads from the front, always givesencouragement and cares for the welfare of his menunder all conditions, they will follow him anywhere.The ultimate test of leadership training is in battle –theories end there.

M. L. RobertsCaptain (Retired)

Laws of the EnvironmentDear Editor,

I would wish to approach Major Sharp’s article on“International Peacetime Laws of the Environmentand the Australian Defence Force” from the maritimeviewpoint that Defence and Navy particularly mightbe considered as being in the vein of environmentalprotection and precaution – rather than “dragging thechain” in many activities as might be inferred fromthe article.

There are many classic examples of environmentalconsiderations and procedures eg, Modernisation ofGarden Island Dockyard NSW; Construction of theFleet Base at Woolloomooloo Bay Sydney;Construction of the Fleet Base at HMASStirlingGarden Island at Cockburn Sound WA,Modernisation of HMASWaterhen Waverton NSW;the as yet unresolved issue of a new Armament depotreplacing some of those facilities in and aroundmetropolitan Sydney – Point Wilson; Eden;Gladstone…; and undoubtedly other but omittedexamples of environmental issues.

From a marine standpoint the article appears todiscount MARPOL 73/78 with its carriage intodomestic legislation as “Protection of the Sea(Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act No 411983” as amended; addressing in various Annexes –Oil; Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk; HarmfulSubstances Carried by Sea in Packaged Form;Sewage (not yet in force internationally); Garbage;and more recently new proposed/agreed Annexes onEmissions from Ships; and Ballast Water; with furtherdevelopments on ship anti-fouling paints. Now whilstMARPOL 73/78 is by Convention Article3 notapplicable “to any warship…” and this exemption hasbeen consciously carried through to the Act; Navy hasa stringent Defence Instruction [DI(N)Ops 19-1]which clearly details CN’s requirements forcompliance with the substance of relevant MARPOL73/78 Annexes and the enjoinder at ConventionArticle 3 (3).

A significant capital equipment project (SEA1160) has been underway for some years retrofittingships in service to achieve compliance in Oil;Garbage; and the not yet in force Annex IV Sewage.New ships and ships being modernised/converted arealso built to achieve compliance.

Navy ABR 6111 (2 volumes) RAN EnvironmentalManual also provides wide direction and guidance onenvironmental matters and this is not confined tomaritime issues. Maritime operations can place shipsin adjacent compliance/behavioural regimes ofdiffering requirements/limits; and for theseconsiderations one need not go too far pastQueensland State; Queensland Ports; GBRMP Act;and the “nearest land” aspects of MARPOL 73/78 asat Annex I Reg 1(9); Annex IV Reg 1(5) and AnnexV Reg 1 (2).

Major Sharp may wish to consider these points in alater article outlining progress on the ADF approachto Environmental compliance and friendliness in theADF operations.

John FerrierAssistant Director Marine Pollution Control

Directorate of Naval Platform Systems EngineeringNaval Materiel Requirements BranchSupport Command Australia – Navy

The Board of Management and Staff of the Australian Defence Force Journal

Wish you a Merry Christmas and a Happy and Prosperous New Year

By Lieutenant Genevieve Ebbeck, RANR

It’s a messy world out there. Since the cold war’sdemise, there’s been no end to conflict. FromAzerbaijan to Zaire, disorganised military forcesneed help. And for second-rate dictators trying toextend their reigns or Third World countriestrying to protect first-class mineral deposits, themarket for private military assistance isballooning.1

In May 1997, Time magazine reported that themarket for private military assistance is ballooning.

However, whilst demand for their services might beon the increase, the use of mercenaries remainsunacceptable to many Governments. Australia is not acountry which has experienced major difficulties withthe activities of mercenary soldiers; there have beenonly a handful of Australian citizens/residents whohave been convicted in the last two decades for takingpart in, or making preparations for the taking part in,hostile activities within foreign countries.2 However,despite the seeming unimportance of mercenarieswithin the Australian context, in July 1997 theAustralian Government announced that Australiawould take steps to accede to the InternationalConvention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financingand Training of Mercenaries (“the MercenariesConvention”).3 This Convention establishes aframework of international cooperation for preventingthe recruitment and use of mercenaries.

The Australian Government’s announcementgives rise to a number of questions.• Has Australia shown world leadership in rejecting

the “dogs of war”, or is its action merely a knee-jerk response to the recent Sandline/ExecutiveOutcomes mercenary crisis in Papua New Guinea?

• Aside from Australia’s position on the issue,should the mercenaries, or “military consultants”of the 1990s be outlawed?

• If the answer is “yes”, they should be outlawed –will the Mercenaries Convention be an effectiveweapon against mercenary soldiers and corporatemercenary organisations?

This article examines the position of themercenary soldier within the framework of the rulesof International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”). Broadlyspeaking, the term “IHL” is used to refer to the rulesof international law governing the means andmethods of warfare and the protection of victims ofarmed conflict.4 These rules are said to have derived“from established custom, from the principles ofhumanity and from the dictates of publicconscience”.5 Briefly, it can be said that the rulesgoverning the means and methods of warfare provide:1. There is an overriding principle of necessity and

proportionality – the right of Parties to a conflictto choose their means and methods of warfare islimited to that which is necessary andproportionate to a legitimate military objective;6

2. There is a prohibition on using weapons andmethods of warfare which cause superfluousinjury or unnecessary suffering;7

3. A distinction must be drawn between the civilianpopulation and combatants, and between militaryand civilian objectives;8

4. It is prohibited to employ means and methods ofwarfare which cause widespread, long-term andsevere damage to the natural environment.9

The rules governing the protection of the victimsof armed conflict deal specifically with combatantswho are wounded, sick and/or shipwrecked, withprisoners of war and with civilians. Fundamentally,such persons are to be respected and treatedhumanely.10

Within this broad framework of the regulation ofarmed conflict, mercenary soldiers have beenparticularly singled out for “special treatment”. Thisarticle examines why it is that mercenaries have beenisolated, and considers the international legal regimegoverning the recruitment and use of mercenaries.The legitimacy of the on-going treatment ofmercenaries is questioned. It is argued that theattempted outlawing of mercenary soldiers by theinternational community (and African nations inparticular) has been a failure. It is also argued that themercenary soldiers of the 1990s, if they are attachedto high profile corporate mercenary organisations, aremore likely than not to be in the position of being ableto actively promote compliance with IHL whilsttraining the armed forces of client-states. It is thussubmitted that the regulation, rather than the

Introduction

Mercenaries and the “Sandline Affair”

outlawing, of mercenary organisations is preferable ifthose mercenary organisations are clearly identifiableand willing to take responsibility for compliance withthe rules of IHL.

Before analysing the legal regime applicable tomercenaries, it is necessary to define what is meant bya “mercenary”. The colloquial meaning of“mercenary” is reasonably clear; very broadly, theterm refers to a volunteer who fights in a foreignconflict or within a foreign armed force for monetaryreward or other private gain. Legal definitions of a“mercenary” are, however, quite technical. Article 47of Additional Protocol 1 defines a mercenary to beany person who: 1. is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to

fight in an armed conflict; 2. does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;3. is motivated to take part in the hostilities

essentially by the desire for private gain and, infact, is promised by or on behalf of a Party to theconflict, material compensation substantially inexcess of that promised or paid to combatants ofsimilar ranks and functions in the armed forces ofthat Party;

4. is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor aresident of territory controlled by a Party to theconflict;

5. is not a member of the armed forces of a Party tothe conflict; and

6. has not been sent by a state which is not a Party tothe conflict on official duty as a member of itsarmed forces.These six criteria are cumulative. The definition

of “mercenary” in Article 47 is thus very narrow. Thefirst requirement operates so as to exclude volunteerswho enter service on a permanent or long-term basisin a foreign army, such as members of the FrenchForeign Legion or the Ghurkhas who serve with theBritish Army. By virtue of the second requirement,foreign advisers and military technicians are excludedfrom the definition of “mercenary”. The fourthrequirement enables foreign residents of a countrywho fight in an armed conflict to avoid beingconsidered mercenaries. In addition, there are otherways in which “private soldiers” who in a broad sensewould be considered mercenaries can avoid beingfound to be mercenaries under Article 47. One can,for example, escape meeting the definition ofmercenary by adopting the nationality of a Party to

the conflict (thereby not meeting the fourthrequirement of the definition) or by nominallybecoming a member of the armed forces of a Party tothe conflict (thereby not meeting the fifth requirementof the definition).

There is a major incentive for soldiers to avoidbeing classified as mercenaries within the meaning ofArticle 47: Article 47(1) provides that a mercenarydoes not have the right to be a combatant or Prisonerof War. Thus, for example if a mercenary soldier iscaptured by a state in circumstances where Article 47is relevant and applicable, that mercenary soldier isdenied the fundamental rights accorded to prisonersof war. Prisoners of War possess a number of rightsunder IHL, encompassing rights to humane treatment,to protection against acts of violence, to retain theirpersonal property, to be interned in certain quarters, toreceive sufficient food and clothing rations, etc.11

Denial of these rights is extremely significant, andwould have an enormous impact upon capturedmercenaries.

The key features of the Article 47 definition arenationality and motive. Placing to one side the abilityto evade the definition, one of the major criticisms ofthe definition is the emphasis on motivation. Thecriticism arises largely because of the difficulties withproof.12 The 1976 Diplock Report,being a report ofthe Privy Council commissioned to inquire into therecruitment of mercenaries, considered that anydefinition of mercenary which required positive proofof motivation would either be unworkable or sohaphazard in its application between comparableindividuals as to be unacceptable.13

Despite such criticisms, all but one feature ofArticle 47’s definition of “mercenary” weremaintained in the Mercenaries Convention of 1989.Article 1(1) of that Convention defines a mercenary inprecisely the same terms as does Article 47, exceptthat the requirement “does, in fact, take a direct part inthe hostilities” is omitted.

In addition, Article 1(2) of the MercenariesConvention provides that a mercenary is also anyperson who, in any other situation:1. is specially recruited locally or abroad for the

purpose of participating in a concerted act ofviolence aimed at:(i) overthrowing a Government or otherwise

undermining the constitutional order of astate; or

(ii) undermining the territorial integrity of a state;2. is motivated to take part therein essentially by the

desire for significant private gain and is promptedby the promise or payment of materialcompensation;

Meaning of the Term “Mercenary”


MERCENARIES AND THE “SANDLINE AFFAIR”

3. is neither a national nor a resident of the stateagainst which such an act is directed;

4. has not been sent by a state on official duty; and5. is not a member of the armed forces of a state on

whose territory the act is undertaken.This additional definition broadens the concept of

“mercenary” to include persons recruited by, forexample, secessionist groups or revolutionaries whointend to use violence to achieve their ends.

These strict definitions of “mercenary” can becontrasted with the much broader definition adoptedby the Member States of the Organisation of AfricanUnity (“OAU”) in their OAU Convention for theElimination of Mercenaries in Africa 1972. As isdiscussed later, mercenaries proved to be a particularproblem in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s; theMember States of the OAU perceived mercenaries torepresent a grave threat to their “independence,sovereignty, territorial integrity and harmoniousdevelopment”. Accordingly, the OAU determined to“eradicate from the African continent the scourge thatthe mercenary system represents”.14

Article 1 of the OAU Convention classified amercenary to be:

anyone who, not a national of the state againstwhich his actions are directed, is employed,enrols or links himself willingly to a person,group or organisation whose aim is:(a) to overthrow by force of arms or by any other

means the government of that Member Stateof the Organisation of African Unity;

(b) to undermine the independence, territorialintegrity or normal working of the institutionsof the said state;

(c) to block by any means the activities of anyliberation movement recognised by theOrganisation of African Unity.”

The OAU thus targeted any non-national who wasinvolved with certain persons, groups andorganisations regardless of whether or not the non-national purported to enlist in any armed forces andregardless of whether or not the non-national wasmotivated by financial gain. Adoption of such a broaddefinition certainly overcomes some of the difficultieswith the Article 47/Mercenaries Conventiondefinition. However, its breadth was driven by theparticular problems faced by African countries duringthe 1960s and by the linkage of mercenaries withracism and neo-colonialism. Such a definition wasquite properly not adopted in Additional Protocol 1,in light of the consequence of being found to be a

mercenary (namely a denial of the status of combatantand the status of Prisoner of War). If theconsequences of being found to be a mercenary are tobe so severe, then a precise definition of whatconstitutes a mercenary is warranted. More is saidabout Article 47 later in this article.

A brief consideration of the history of mercenariesis also beneficial to a subsequent analysis of theMercenaries Convention. Mercenaries “have beenused in wars down the centuries, and until the growthof the modern nation state with its standing army anduniversal conscription they were an essentialcomponent of any war”.15 They were, for example,used on a large scale by the Roman Empire and bythe Byzantine Empire; individual princes and noblesused mercenaries to fight their wars during the MiddleAges; and the English used mercenary soldiers duringthe Revolutionary War with America. Mockler tracestheir decline in status to the French Revolution whenover a million Frenchmen took up arms in fourmonths. “Until the French Revolution it had seemedboth logical and acceptable that the professionalsoldier should fight while the ordinary citizen stayedat home… After the French Revolution it wasconsidered correct that every man should fight for hisown country and dishonourable that a man shouldserve under another flag.”16

Over the course of the nineteenth century, thenotion of universal conscription spread, and thecitizen-soldier replaced the hired soldier. The use ofmercenary soldiers came to be rejected as their use“outrages the basic myth of the nation state thatpatriotism is the only justification for taking uparms”.17 One can of course question the assumptionthat only a standing army, identified with a state, ismorally supportable; but whether or not one agreeswith the assumption, it is fundamental to understandthe almost universal dislike of mercenaries.

International attention came to focus uponmercenary activities during the 1960s and 1970s, asthey resurged in strength particularly in Africa. Thedevelopment of large-scale mercenarism in Africa

The 1960s and 1970s - GrowingInternational Condemnation of Mercenaries

An Ancient “Profession”

7

coincided with the process of decolonisation.18

Mercenary forces were used by ex-colonial powers,often against national liberation movements, and thusmercenaries came to be identified with racism andneo-colonialism.

Mercenaries were used by various politicalfactions fighting for control of the Congo – they wereutilised not only to support a secessionist movement,but by the central government to put down achallenge by an extremist faction and, in addition,were employed in an attempt to overthrow the centralgovernment itself.19 Many of the same mercenariesfought in all three operations, which tended tohighlight their lack of “moral commitment” to astruggle and their financial motivation forinvolvement. The mercenaries were successful in theCongo because of superior training, organisation andweaponry. When they were finally beaten, it was byforces enormously superior both in numbers andequipment.20

Mercenaries played a more minor, yet stillsignificant, role in the Yemen and Biafra. WhiteFrench mercenaries assisted the Royalists in theYemeni civil war.

“[T]he mercenary in the Yemen never exercisedthe sort of influence that they did in the Congo; theywere specialists whose job it was to train the Royalistforces in the use of modern weapons, much in theway of an ordinary military mission such as anymajor military power might send to help train thearmy of an underdeveloped country – though indeedsuch military missions do not usually make theirappearance at the height of a civil war.”21

The role played by these French mercenaries issimilar to that undertaken by the military consultantof the 1990s – specialist training for a Party’s armedforces. The more limited role of the training specialistwas not, however, the usual role adopted bymercenaries in the 1960s and 1970s. It is this limitedspecialist role which could be utilised to promote theprinciples of IHL, as is discussed later.

By contrast with the mercenaries in the Yemen,the mercenaries employed in Biafra were directlyinvolved in the fighting. Biafra seceded from theFederation of Nigeria on 30 May 1967 and fightingbroke out five weeks later.22 The Biafrans hiredFrench mercenaries, an experience which “cost Biafradear both in lives and money, and was a total failurethroughout”.23 Swedish mercenaries subsequentlyhired proved to be more successful, as they broughtwith them sophisticated aircraft for use in the fighting.

The most widely reported case of the use ofmercenaries occurred during the Angolan Civil Warat the end of 1975, in which over 1000 mercenaries,

from the United Kingdom, United States and SouthAfrica, were recruited to fight against the PopularMovement for the Liberation of Angola (“MPLA”).24

The MPLA received significant arms support fromthe Soviet Union and combat troops from Cuba.25

Western countries including the United States andBritain provided financial, material and militarysupport for the two other major political groupsfighting in the war, the National Front for theLiberation of Angola (“FNLA”) and the NationalUnion for the Total Independence of Angola(“UNITA”). Mercenaries enlisted by the FNLA andUNITA to fight against the MPLA were reportedlypaid in “crisp, consecutively numbered American$100 bills”.26 The internal struggle was thus a strugglebetween the Cold War superpowers.

The Soviet/Cuban backed MPLA won the civilwar, and thirteen white soldiers were publicly tried forbeing mercenaries. Tried before the People’sRevolutionary Court of Angola were nine British, oneIrish and three American soldiers. All were convicted;four were sentenced to death and subsequently shotby a firing squad, and the remaining nine men weresentenced to prison terms ranging from 16 years to 30years.27

George Lockwood QC was a Canadian who wasinvited to be a member of the InternationalCommission of Enquiry on Mercenaries, which wasconvened by the Angolan Government to, inter alia,observe the trial of these mercenaries in Angola.Upon his return to the United States Lockwoodpublished an individual report on the trial.28 Heconcluded that, from a purely procedural point ofview, the trial was fair.29 However, he thought thatmuch of the evidence was hearsay, irrelevant and/orworthless. Lockwood formed the view that two of thedefendants were “properly convicted of murder”.30

Interestingly, they had participated in the murder of13 British mercenaries who, upon their arrival inAngola, had sought to return to the United Kingdom.Perhaps the most contentious charge against all menwas the (alleged) crime of being mercenaries. Astrong argument could be mounted that the crime ofbeing a mercenary did not exist in Angolan Law, andhence all the defendants were unjustly convicted onthat count.31

The Angolan mercenaries were tried in June1976. One year later, in June 1977, AdditionalProtocols 1 and II to the Geneva Conventionswere

The Next Development: Article 47 ofAdditional Protocol 1



adopted. As mentioned previously, Article 47(2) ofAdditional Protocol 1 defines a mercenary, whilstArticle 47(2) states that a mercenary shall not havethe right to be a combatant or a Prisoner of War. Thedenial of the benefit of this aspect of IHL has beenstrongly criticised.

To forbid the right to be a combatant or Prisonerof War to an individual or a group is the mostsevere sanction of international law in armedconflict.In the main it was African nations which pursued

the policy of isolating mercenaries during thenegotiations of the Protocols. Some academics havebeen particularly critical of the motives of the Africannations which fought so hard to distinguishmercenaries from guerrillas and terrorists. Armstrongwrites:

It is clear… that the initiators and supporters ofArticle 47 anticipated that the national liberationmovements involved would have views politicallycompatible with their own, and that allmercenaries would probably belong to a partyadverse to the national liberation movements.32

He argues,In an era in which the Third World is advancingthe claim that guerrilla and terrorist freedomfighters should benefit from the extension ofhumanitarian law to all kinds of conflicts and toall groups of belligerents, one should be scepticalof proposed reductions.33

On the other hand, however, it must beacknowledged that mercenarism has been a peculiarlyAfrican problem in recent decades, and Africancountries “have suffered considerably as a result ofthe activities of mercenaries”34 The question whicharises is whether the outlawing of mercenaries is theappropriate response to the problem.

Criticism can also be made of Article 47 on thebasis that it flies in the face of the general trend forhumanising the laws of armed conflict. Denial of thestatus of combatant/Prisoner of War hardlyencourages mercenary forces to comply with the rulesof IHL. There is a need to offer incentives to suchirregular movements to encourage their compliancewith IHL.35

Perhaps the greatest concern surrounding Article47 lies in its precedent value. Article 47 operates tocreate two classes of participants in an armed conflict,with there being a denial of certain basic rights to oneof those classes. Now that the precedent has been set,the denial of certain basic rights can be extended toothers in an armed conflict. Differentiation need notstop at combatants, either; it can extend to victims of

an armed conflict. For this reason, and also bearing inmind the need to encourage all participants to complywith IHL, it is submitted that Article 47 should beabandoned.

Article 47 targets individual mercenaries, andaims to both penalise existing mercenaries (bydepriving them of certain protections) and to deterothers from becoming mercenaries. It can thus have asignificant impact upon the treatment meted out toindividuals. Its focus is, however, limited toindividuals and does not extend to affecting states.The International Commission which observed thetrial in Angola, which was comprised of 51Commissioners drawn from 37 different countries,published the Declaration of Luandaon 10 June1976. The Declaration states,

It is clear that the recruitment, travel andequipment of mercenaries could not beaccomplished without the tacit agreement of thegovernments in the countries where they arerecruited and equipped. More particularly, in asmuch as the intervention of the mercenary isdirected against the liberation of peoples fromcolonial and neo-colonial domination, there canbe no doubt that they act in the service of thosewho would like to suppress or prevent theirliberation.36

The concern about repression of nationalliberation movements, and the use of mercenaries toprop up colonial governments, was highly topical inthe 1960s and 1970s whilst the decolonisation ofAfrica was occurring. It is clearly of far lesssignificance in the 1990s – which is also a reason forconsidering whether a departure from the policy ofoutlawing mercenaries is now warranted. In anyevent, what remains relevant in this extract from theLuanda Declarationis the recognition of the need forcountries to prevent recruitment of their nationals, andto refrain from using mercenary forces, if anyoutlawing of mercenaries is to be effective. Article 47did not address this matter; the broader movementagainst mercenaries, incorporating obligations uponstate Parties, was subsequently addressed in theMercenaries Convention of 1989.

Articles 3 and 4 of the Mercenaries Conventionare, like Article 47 of Additional Protocol 1, aimed atindividual mercenaries. Article 3 provides that amercenary (as defined) who participates directly inhostilities or a concerted act of violence commits an

The Mercenaries Convention

9

offence. Article 4 then makes it an offence to attemptto participate in hostilities or a concerted act ofviolence, and also makes it an offence to be anaccomplice to someone who commits such anoffence. The rest of the Convention, however, isaimed at state Parties:• Article 5 provides that state Parties shall not

recruit, use, finance or train mercenaries and shallprohibit such mercenaries; it also specificallyprovides that state Parties shall not recruit, use,finance or train mercenaries for the purpose ofopposing the legitimate exercise of the inalienableright of peoples to self-determination asrecognised by international law. The latter aspectof Article 5 reflects the on-going concern ofAfrican and other developing nations to ensuremercenaries are not used by colonial and neo-colonial powers.

• Article 6 provides that state Parties shall take allpracticable measures to prevent preparations intheir respective territories for the commission ofsuch offences, whether within or outside theirterritories, including prohibiting the illegalactivities of persons or groups that encourage,instigate, organise or engage in the perpetration ofsuch offences.

• Article 7 provides that state Parties shall co-operate in taking the necessary measures for theimplementation of the Convention.

• Article 8 obliges any state Party having reason tobelieve one of the aforementioned offences hasbeen, is being or will be committed, shallcommunicate the relevant information to the stateParties affected.

• Article 9 requires state Parties to take suchmeasures as may be necessary to establish itsjurisdiction over any of the aforementionedoffences which are committed in its territory or onboard a ship or aircraft registered in that State, orby any of its nationals, or where an allegedoffender is present in its territory.

• Article 10 provides that a state Party in whoseterritory an alleged offender is present shall takehim/her into custody or take such other measuresas are necessary in order to enable proceedingwith criminal or extradition proceedings. Certainrequirements to notify other relevant state Partiesare imposed. The offences created by thisConvention are deemed to be included asextraditable offences in any extradition treatyexisting between state Parties: Article 15.

• Article 12 provides that, if a state Party choosesnot to extradite an alleged offender, it shall beobliged “without exception whatsoever and

whether or not the offence was committed in itsterritory” to submit the case to its competentauthorities for the purposes of prosecution.

• Article 13 obliges state Parties to afford oneanother the greatest measure of assistance inconnection with criminal proceedings brought inrespect of offences under the Convention,including the supply of all evidence at theirdisposal necessary for the proceedings.

• Article 14 obliges the state Party where thealleged offender is prosecuted to communicate thefinal outcome of the proceedings to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.Certain rights are afforded an alleged offender.

Article 10 provides that a person taken into custody isgiven the right to communicate with a representativefrom his/her state Party, and with the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross. Article 11 provides thatpersons in respect of whom proceedings are beingcarried out shall be guaranteed at all stages of theproceedings “fair treatment and all the rights andguarantees provided for in the law of the State inquestion”. Applicable norms of international law arealso to be taken into account.

Article 16 (b) provides:“The present Convention shall be applied without

prejudice to:…(b) The law of armed conflict and international

humanitarian law, including the provisionsrelating to the status of combatant or ofprisoner of war.”

The Mercenaries Convention is thus clearlyintended to supplement Article 47 of OptionalProtocol 1. Article 47’s denial of the status ofcombatant and Prisoner of War to mercenaries ispreserved.

The Mercenaries Convention was opened forsignature in 1990. To date, only 11 states havebecome Parties to it – Barbados, Cameroon, Cyprus,Georgia, Italy, Maldives, Seychelles, Surinam, Togo,Ukraine and Turkmenistan. No major power hasbecome a Party. The Convention will not come intooperation until 22 states have become Parties. Thereasons underlying the lack of interest in theConvention are, no doubt, varied. The issue ofmercenaries may be only of remote relevance andinterest to some countries. The AustralianGovernment only announced its intention to takesteps to become a Party shortly after the Sandlineincident in Papua New Guinea (discussed later); therewas no obvious commitment to the Convention in theperiod from 1990 to early 1997. Certain countrieshave an on-going use for mercenary troops, and hencebecoming a Party to the Convention would hardly



seem attractive. Finally, the above-mentionedobligations imposed by the Conventions on stateParties may appear to be unduly onerous vis-a-vis theminor/non-existent difficulties mercenaries cause inmany countries.

Underlying the idea of state responsibilityencapsulated in the Mercenaries Convention is theconcept of territorial sovereignty. A sovereign statepossesses rights of independence and territorialintegrity; however, the corollary to possession ofthese rights is the obligation to respect and protectthose same rights possessed by other states.37 In otherwords, if a state wishes to have its independence andterritorial integrity respected, it must accord the samerespect unto other states. Furthermore, it is recognisedthat the actions of individual members of a countrycan impact upon these sovereign rights of other states.The activities of mercenaries are said to violate theindependence and territorial integrity of those stateswithin which they operate.

Also underlying the idea of sate responsibility isthe assumption that the governments of states havethe capacity to police activities within their ownborders.38

The obligation on a state to respect theindependence and territorial integrity of other states issaid to extend to require a state to control the activitiesof its nationals, both within and outside its ownterritory. However, the degree of responsibility placedupon states whose nationals are found to haveengaged in mercenary activities overseas, inparticular, is quite contentious. It is one thing for astate to control activities which occur within its ownterritory; however it is more difficult for a State tocontrol the activities of its nationals overseas.

It is often said that mercenaries are a threat to thesovereignty of states. This is a difficult issue. Whenmercenaries are used in an internal conflict, by rebelsagainst the lawful Government, then the threat tosovereignty is obvious. However, this is not obviouslythe case if a state’s Government chooses to usemercenaries.

In his September 1996 Report to the UN GeneralAssembly, Mr Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, theSpecial Rapporteur on the question of the use ofmercenaries, referred to the use of mercenaries byprivate security companies contracting with AfricanGovernments, and wrote:

If such contracts are, indeed, being concluded, theGovernments signing them must be doing so on

the basis of a sovereign decision; but is notresponsibility for a country’s internal order andsecurity an inalienable obligation that a Statefulfils through its police and armed forces? Is itnot a grave infringement of that State’ssovereignty to hand over such responsibilities tocompanies registered in third countries which sellsecurity services staffed by foreigners, presumablymercenaries, who are recruited for operations incountries with which the company has signedcontracts? Who will be responsible for anyrepressive excesses that the security company maycommit against the civilian population, especiallywhere representatives of the political oppositionare concerned? Who will take responsibility forany violations of international humanitarian lawand of human rights that they may commit?Ballesteros looks at sovereignty in terms of

responsibilities as well as rights. His approach tosovereignty is, in this respect, unusual. Sovereignty istraditionally conceptualised in terms of plenarypower, and the ability to do certain things (as opposedto the inability to do certain things).39 It is certainly notusual to mount an argument which purports to bebolstering a state’s sovereignty by reference toobligations requiring a state only to provide policingand security by particular means (namely through itsown police and armed forces and not by the voluntaryhiring of privatised forces). Indeed, the notion ofresponsibility has increasingly been relied upon tocurb sovereign power in domestic contexts.

One could argue that Ballesteros’ reasoning iscontrary to ordinarily understood notions ofsovereignty; and adopting Starke J’s formulation inPolites v Commonwealth,

[s]o to limit the constitutional power of sovereignStates or their subordinate authorities denies thesupremacy of those States within their ownterritory, which is contrary to the principles of thelaw of nations itself.40

To criticise Ballesteros’ reasoning is not to denythat there are sovereignty considerations underlyingthe international concern about mercenaries.However, the international concern should perhaps beunderstood as, very simply, the desire to preserve tostates the right to wage war, to raise armies, and tohire and use soldiers. In the midst of a growing movetowards according non-states a personality, this is aprovince which states wish to retain unto themselves.

From the end of World War II there has been agrowing emphasis placed on the role of internationalorganisations and individuals in international law. In1946, for example, the International Military Tribunalat Nuremberg asserted that “crimes against

Considerations of Sovereignty

11

international law are committed by men, not abstractentities”.41 There has not been just a focus on theobligations imposed on individuals by internationallaw. International attention has also increasinglybecome directed towards the rights of individuals,with (for example) formal statements such as theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 and,later, treaties imposing obligations concerning humanrights. Under the First Optional Protocol to theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,42

individuals even have the right (in countries whichhave acceded to the Protocol) to communicatedirectly with the Human Rights Committee, allegingdenial of certain human rights.

In contrast with the trend particularly in the sphereof human rights law, there has been a steadfast refusalto recognise a role for individuals and privatemilitary/security organisations such as, for example,Executive Outcomes (discussed later) in the sphere ofthe law of armed conflict and internationalhumanitarian law.

The question which must be asked is whether thewish of some states to outlaw private armies andmercenary soldiers is, objectively, a goal whichshould be pursued. The question is raised: whichwould better serve the goals of IHL – the outlawing ofmercenaries and private armies, or their regulation?

“International Humanitarian Law is the collectionof rules for humanising the brutality of war.”43 As abody of law, IHL,

intends to impose limits on the use of violence,even in times of armed conflict, by insisting oncertain basic humanitarian principles whichprotect those not directly engaged in hostilities(civilians, Prisoners of War and so on), allow thesick and wounded to be collected and cared for,prohibit weapons or methods of warfare thatcause unnecessary losses or excessive suffering,and contain the effects of violence in theattainment of the military objectives of theconflict.44

Will the banning of mercenaries be effective inensuring the protection of civilians, Prisoners of Warand the injured, and in ensuring prohibited weaponsare not used and methods of warfare which causeunnecessary losses or excessive suffering areavoided? Or are these goals more achievable if theinternational community recognises certainmercenary organisations and works with them topromote IHL? These questions necessitate anexamination of the mercenary of the 1990s.

Mercenaries have existed for thousands of years.Mockler argues that “any attempt to ban mercenariesor mercenary recruitment appears doomed to beineffective ... the mercenary world is permanentlyawash with activity.”45 One must,

reflect on the extraordinary flexibility of thisprofession, which has always known how toadjust itself to meet new market requirementscaused by the evolution of the art of war and ofpolitical relations, also in the most backwardcorners of the earth.46

The name a mercenary may now choose to beknown by is that of “military consultant”, or even“privatised peacekeeper”. The 1990s have seen theproliferation of private military companies staffed by(in the main) men who conduct their business in thelanguage of private enterprise, investment andefficiency, and who reject the comparison with the“old style” mercenaries of Africa in the 1960s.

Perhaps the most well-known modern mercenaryarmy is Executive Outcomes (“EO”), a South Africancompany which was established in 1989. In itsInternet “Homepage”, EO describes itself as being acompany “made up of men and women who share acommon vision – to ensure that EO remains the mosteffective company of its kind in the world”.47 Themen employed by EO are primarily ex-South AfricanDefence Force (SADF), ex-South African NationalDefence Force (after 1994), ex-South African Police(SAP) and ex-African National Congress (ANC)members. The EO Homepage states that the criteriafor prospective employees are that they must:• have had military or police training;• be South African citizens or have served in the

SADF, SAP or ANC’s military wing;• have been honourably discharged;• have no criminal record or criminal investigation

pending; • be prepared to work outside of South Africa;• carry “no political baggage”; • be prepared to work in high-risk environments; and• remain loyal to the company and its clients.

In the main, EO’s officers are white and itssoldiers are black. This fact does tend to be usedagainst EO, raising the question of continuing racismwithin mercenary organisations.

EO claims that, due to the massive “down-sizing”of the South African Armed Forces, it can draw on alarge professional workforce and can call on over2,000 men at very short notice.

Today’s Mercenary Soldiers



EO’s first major contract was Angola in 1993. EOwas initially approached to provide a security team toprotect the on-shore oil facilities in the coastal town ofSoyo whilst millions of dollars worth of oil-drillingand related equipment was being recovered. EO wasthen awarded a contract by the Angolan Governmentto train the Angolan Armed Forces, which had beenfighting a long battle against the rebel forces ofUNITA (the National Union for the TotalIndependence of Angola).48

From Angola, EO moved into Sierra Leone toparticipate in the country’s bloody civil war. Theconflict was being waged by the RevolutionaryUnited Front (RUF), against the National ProvincialRuling Council (NPRC). By January 1995, the RUFhad overrun the three most important mining sites inthe country. The rebels had also attacked churchmissions, aid organisations and threatened to execute17 Western hostages.49

In spite of military assistance from Nigeria,Ghana and Guinea, the undisciplined, untrainedand often unpaid 12,000-strong Republic ofSierra Leone military forces (RSLMF) provedincapable of halting, much less reversing, RUFgains. Exacerbating the already chaotic securitysituation were bands of army deserters, known tohave been responsible for looting villages andmassacring the inhabitants under the guise ofRUF rebels. Desperate to halt the spreadinganarchy, the NPRC approached a number ofprivate security companies to provide assistance.50

EO arrived in Sierra Leone in April 1995,reorganised the RSLMF into a proper militarystructure and retrained the soldiers. The RSLMF wasin serious need of attention. Following significantRUF gains in late 1994 and early 1995, thousands ofyouths had been conscripted by the Government toserve in RSLMF units. They were sent to fightingunits after only a few days basic training. To makematters worse, RSLMF conscripts received a dailyration of marijuana and local rum.51

RSLMF units trained and advised by EO inflictedmore losses on the RUF in 5 months than in thepreceding 3.5 years.52 With military successes givingthem credibility, the potential must surely haveexisted for EO to combine its military training ofRSMLF soldiers with training in the rules of IHL.Such training was certainly needed. The RUF hadgained a reputation for committing atrocities. Venterwrote in November 1995,

Terror has played a significant role in this war.Unquestionably, government successes, to date,have stemmed from rebel excesses. The RUF hassubjected the civilian population to wicked

brutality. Few civilians who have been caught inthe cross-fire have been spared. Tortures inflictedby Sankoh’s peoples routinely involved the cuttingoff of hands, arms, ears and genitals, or thegouging out of eyes. Many victims have beeneaten.One young RUF rebel captured in battle in theeast and interviewed on television said he had noidea how many people he had killed and that hehad eaten the livers and hearts of some of hisvictims. He was barely 14 years old.53

Ignored by Western nations, fighting a warinvolving child soldiers and faced with rebelscommitting such atrocities, an untrained nationalarmy and insufficient and ineffective military aidfrom Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea, is it any wonderthat the Government of Sierra Leone turned to EO formercenary assistance?

EO remained in Sierra Leone until February 1997.Their departure was in accordance with a peace dealsigned in November 1996, between the RUF leaderand the elected Sierra Leonean President. EO’sdeparture was not welcomed by all; many peopleattributed the relative calm experienced in theirdistricts to the presence of the mercenaries. Onediamond miner is reported to have said,

Never did rebels attack Komo district in all theyears that Executive Outcomes were here.54

EO rejects claims that its role in these Africanconflicts mirrors that of the mercenaries of the 1960s.EO’s managing director, Eeben Barlow, claims,

We are a professional military advisory group ...working only for recognised governments. Ourcompany’s goal in Sierra Leone – as it was inAngola – is to give support to a country movingtowards democracy. No one can dispute that wehave been a stabilising factor in Africa.55

Barlow states that, were EO to participate in anykind of anti-government revolt, either actively or bytraining rebels, it would immediately be labelled a“renegade organisation”.56 Those who defend EO’sright to offer private military assistance placeemphasis on its stated policy of only fighting forsovereign governments. [It should be noted, however,that the issue of the legitimacy of a government is initself a very complex issue.57] Also standing in EO’sfavour is the fact it has a better record for upholdinghuman rights (i.e. complying with internationalhuman rights norms) than that of the African armiesof many countries. If EO were to be “accepted” by theinternational community (or at least tolerated, if notapproved of), its role in promoting IHL and educatingthe forces of client-states could be explored.However, the existence of provisions such as Article

13

47(1) of Additional Protocol 1 are instead likely to actas a disincentive to mercenary forces to impose limitsupon the means and methods of warfare they adoptand train others to use.

Despite EO’s claims to legitimacy, there are manycritics of the organisation. EO is apparently boundinto a larger network of companies and the parentcompany is the South African “Strategic ResourceCorporation”. EO’s most important corporaterelationship is with a mining company called “BranchEnergy”, which has interests in oil and preciousstones.58 Whilst EO itself has nothing to do withmining, Eeben Barlow remains coy about the interestsof shareholders or directors of EO in mining activitiesor mining companies.59

EO’s ties with mineral exploration companieshave,

been likened to a modern version of the BritishEast India Company that employed its ownsecurity force to protect its economic interests inIndia during the eighteenth century.60

EO’s economic success is also seen to be a causefor concern because of the potential it gives EO forexercising real power within African counties, “evento the extent of keeping military regimes in being”61

[Cynically, of course, one can identify the interest ofmajor powers in preserving to themselves the right tohave influence within developing countries.]

It is undoubtedly very expensive to hiremercenaries such as EO. The Sierra LeoneanGovernment signed three security contracts with EOover the period they were in the country, for a total of$35 million. On average, EO was paid more than $1.5million cash per month for its time and efforts inSierra Leone.62 For a price, EO can supply a clientwith significant military weaponry, including combataircraft and helicopters. Ground maintenance crewsare also available.

There is little incentive for a mercenaryorganisation to prolong its stay if its client is unable topay. Once a private army/security company leaves,the potential always exists for the gains made to belost. Of course the same can occur if allied countriescease to provide assistance to a government introuble. EO left Sierra Leone in February 1997. Threemonths later, the Sierra Leonean army ousted theGovernment, which had been democratically electedjust one year earlier. The army invited the RUF, withwhom they had been fighting for the past three years,to join them.63 The military overthrew the governmentbecause it believed its position had been underminedby the use of EO. As is discussed later in this article,the military in Papua New Guinea also “turned on its

political masters”64, ostensibly because of the use ofmercenaries.

EO is only one of a number of “militaryconsultancy” organisations. Military ProfessionalResources Inc (MPRI) is an American company thathas privatised training services traditionally offeredby the US military and is exporting its expertise togovernments around the world. MPRI was founded in1987 by retired senior US officers. In the past threeyears, MPRI has begun to train the armies of foreigncountries to fight a war. MPRI claims it can,

“help a foreign army restructure its defenceministry, create a non-commissioned officer corps,conduct war games, and provide instruction on howbest to position artillery or operate a tank”.65

MPRI advertises itself as a business characterisedby:• values learned and practiced in the military• professionalism• integrity and a strict code of business ethics• customer service through quality performance,

responsiveness, contractual flexibility, empathyand loyalty

• respect for democratic principles.It claims, “our integrity is our most treasured

asset”.66 Amongst its most prominent, executives isretired four-star General Carl Vuono, who was incharge of the US Army during Operation DesertStorm.67 Its “Internet marketing” does not expresslystate that it promotes the values of IHL; however, onecan hope that the US forces are aware of, and trainedin, the rules of IHL. One can therefore hope that thepractice of teaching “values learned and practiced inthe military” encompasses the rules of IHL. In anyevent, if formal regulation were to be imposed inrelation to organisations such as EO and MPRI,certain standards could be set in relation to thepromotion of the principles of IHL and the carryingout of practical exercises to demonstrate itsapplicability

Interestingly, MPRI claims to receive USGovernment approval for its foreign activities. Allmilitary training contracts are apparently licensed bythe US State Department.68 MPRI also claims that itwill not accept a job that conflicts with US policy. In1996, MPRI was awarded a renewable 13 monthcontract with the Federation of Bosnia andHerzegovina to train and restructure the Bosnianarmy. The contract, valued by Bosnia’s UNAmbassador at “tens of millions of dollars”, wasapparently financed by a number of Islamiccountries.69 The contract was approved by the USGovernment. MPRI currently advertises on theInternet for anticipated Bosnian vacancies.



It is notable that articles discussing the legitimacyand role of MPRI do not focus criticism on the cost ofhiring MPRI or the neo-colonialist aspect of a UScompany gaining economic power in Bosnia. Instead,there is an equating of MPRI with the USGovernment, no doubt because of the StateDepartment’s role in overseeing contracts. Criticismsinstead focus upon MPRI and other suchorganisations being vehicles for the US Governmentto pursue its foreign policy without takingresponsibility for the consequences of MPRI’sactions.

This is the age of privatisation. All acrossAmerica, communities are hiring for-profit firmsto perform the tasks that have traditionally fallento government – educating children, runningprisons, even building and maintaining highways.There is one job, though, that seems to be anunlikely candidate for outsourcing: executing theforeign policy of the US. If that is not the businessof the Federal Government, what is? In Bosnia,however, the US has a problem: there is oneparticular aspect of its mission that is crucial butthat it is loath to carry out. So the very 1990’ssolution is likely to be hiring a private company todo the job instead… By hiring consultantmercenaries to do a messy job, it is easier forWashington to ignore the consequences and fudgethe responsibility.70

There is also a suggestion that the USGovernment has promoted the use of MPRI in certaincountries. It has been said,

The US government has played a direct role inlobbying the Angolan government on behalf ofMilitary Professional Resources Inc. A US officialfamiliar with the deal said that the US Embassy inAngola pressed Luanda to hire the Virginiacompany… The Angolan government of PresidentJose Eduardo dos Santos first got theprivatisation bug after hiring a South Africancompany, Executive Outcomes, to reverse themilitary gains of Jonas Savimbi’s rebel UNITAarmy. At a reported cost of about $60 million,Executive Outcomes helped the government putthe rebels on the defensive. But while the companywas viewed as a saviour in the capital of Luandathe US government charged that the organisationwas little more than a well organised band ofmercenaries. They pressured the Angolan andSouth African governments to kick the companyout of Angola. In the meantime, they have soughtto bring in the private American contractor.71

MPRI has not received the same level of criticismas has EO. The criticism levelled at EO may, or may

not, be justified. Certainly, however, there are somemercenary organisations which have received almostuniversal condemnation. In October 1996, Zaire’sPresident Mobutu sought the assistance ofmercenaries to suppress a Tutsi rebellion. Amercenary force known as the “White Legion” washired; it comprised two distinct elements, an extremeright French element and a larger Bosnian Serbianelement. A Frenchman, Tavernier, had overalloperational command of the force. The Bosnian Serbcomponent was commanded by Lieutenant Milorad“Misa” Palemis.72 Palemis had commanded,

a controversial commando unit during theYugoslav Civil War… [which] allegedly took partin the massacre of civilians in Srebrenica in 1995,although Palemis has said he was not inSrebrenica at the time due to injury.73

Whilst there is relatively little criticism of themilitary competence of organisations such as EO andMPRI, questions were certainly raised about thecompetence of many recruited for the White Legion.The money on offer, “while a small fortune in Serbia,was modest by French standards”.74 The war materielimported into Zaire was primarily of EasternEuropean manufacture. Serb instructors gave coursesin unarmed combat, the use of small arms, mortarsand rocket launchers.

The instructors were under the command of aman calling himself Colonel Dominic Yugo. ASerb from the Kosovo region, Yugo fought in thecivil war in former Yugoslavia as an officer in theBosnian Serb forces. He was based at Lukavicabarracks on the southern outskirts of Sarajevoand took part in the siege of that city. He has beenaccused of carrying out atrocities in theKisangani area, including the murder of twoevangelical pastors.75

From a military perspective, the mercenary forcewas a failure. The rebels marched inexorably towardsstrategic towns and the Serbian mercenariesultimately fled.

If mercenary organisations were to be regulatedby the international community, those such as the“White Legion”would probably be outlawed. Itsconduct appears questionable, and the record ofcertain officers highly suspect. The setting of rigorousstandards which must be met, in order for amercenary organisation to fall within the scope oflawful organisations under a regulatory regime, could“weed out” such organisations. Whilst difficultieswould still exist in terms of enforcing their outlawing(just as such difficulties now exist), the ability to hireother, more acceptable alternatives may result in

15

disreputable mercenary organisations being “forcedout of business”.

Furthermore, permitting “legitimate” mercenaryorganisations to operate might make it far moredifficult for individual mercenaries to obtain work.The use of individuals is almost impossible to police,which is particularly unfortunate. Many suchindividuals seeking to work as mercenaries are thosewith criminal backgrounds (and hence are unwillingor unable to obtain employment with organisationssuch as EO or MPRI), or are desperate for money –and hence are often the least likely persons to complywith the rules of IHL.

The PNG Government’s recent foray into the useof mercenaries was also a spectacular failure,although for political and not military reasons. InFebruary 1997 it became public news that Sir JuliusChan’s PNG Government had engaged mercenariesto deal with the long-running secessionist movementin Bougainville.The mercenaries hired were from EO,which in turn had been sub-contracted by SandlineInternational, the principal contractor with the PNGGovernment.76 Sandline appears to act as a broker forEO, sub-contracting military personnel andequipment for particular projects.77

The agreement had been signed on 31 January1997; it provided that Sandline,

a company specialising in rendering military andsecurity services of an operational, training andsupport nature, particularly in situations ofinternal conflict and only for and on behalf ofrecognised Governments, in accordance withinternational doctrines and in conformance withthe Geneva Convention, [emphasis added]

was to be paid $US36 million tax exempt to,train the Papua New Guinea’s Special ForcesUnit (SFU) in tactical skills; gather intelligence tosupport effective deployment and operations;conduct offensive operations in Bougainville inconjunction with PNG defence forces to renderthe BRA military ineffective and repossess thePanguna Mine,

and to provide follow-up operational support.78

On 17 March 1997, Brigadier-General JerrySingirok, commander of the PNG defence force,announced on national radio that he would no longercooperate with the Government’s deal with Sandline.He called for the resignation of the Prime Minister SirJulius Chan and the appointment of a caretaker

government whilst an independent Commission ofInquiry investigated the dealings with Sandline. Chanpromptly sacked Singirok, accusing him of treason.After days of rioting and demonstrations, Chanstepped aside. What was to be the first Commissionof Inquiry commenced on 1 April 1997. It ultimatelyexonerated the political leaders of any seriouswrongdoing. In the general elections held shortly afterthe inquiry, however, Chan and a number of otherministers lost their seats. A second Commission ofInquiry was commenced.

Appearing before the first Commission of Inquiryin Port Moresby in April 1997, Sandline director TimSpicer described his company as offering militaryconsultancy and related services. Spicer is a formerLieutenant Colonel in the Scots Guard, “withextensive operational experience in Northern Ireland,the Falklands and the Gulf War, as well has havingbeen a senior UN peacekeeper in Bosnia”.79

Was the PNG Government doing something“wrong”, or “reprehensible”, in hiring Sandline/EO?Clearly the Australian Government thought so; PrimeMinister Howard strongly condemned the use ofmercenaries. However, Chan disagreed. Prior toSingirok’s rebellion, Prime Minister Chan defendedhis use of mercenaries, preferring to call them“trainers”. He is reported to have said,

yes there is training going on at the moment –training for our under-equipped, under-trainedand under-resourced Security Forces… I’m sickand tired of our boys coming back in body bags.This means only one thing – that it is about timeour troops were equipped physically andpsychologically to deal with the rigours of combatsituations. The team we have hired to train oursecurity force members are not cowboys – theyare a reputable professional company, who arepart of our many faceted strategy to reach alasting solution to this particular crisis, as well asother matters of national security.80

Chan is also reported to have stated,We have requested the Australians support us inproviding the necessary specialist training andequipment… They have constantly declined andtherefore I had no choice but to go to the privatesector.81

The war on Bougainville has been going on fornine years. It owes its origins to three basic factors:• The people of Bougainville ethnically identify

more with the people of the neighbouring westernSolomon Islands than with the people of PNG;

• Many Bougainvilleans feel inadequatelycompensated for the presence of the giantPanguna copper mine, operated by the UK based

Sandline and Papua New Guinea



Rio Tino Zinc (RTZ)’s Australian arm, ConzincRio Tinto Australia (CRA); and

• Ecological degradation has been attributed to themine and to the large number of non-Bougainvilleans recruited to run it.82

For ordinary Bougainvilleans,“there have been noessential government services for nine years: no lawand order, no medical treatment and no medicines”.83

During those nine years the PNG Defence Forceproved to be unable to secure the Panguna mine or todefeat the rebels. There has been loss of life on bothsides, and also significant civilian casualties. Inaddition, the war has deprived PNG of significantrevenue from the copper mine.

Chan considered he was entitled to seek militarytraining and other assistance on the “open market”.Ironically, the PNG Defence Force will now receivethe training Chan considered necessary, through“traditional channels”. In the aftermath of the“Sandline affair”, the Australian Governmentannounced that the Australian Defence Force wouldprovide the PNG Defence Force with training inmilitary planning, management and basic skills, at acost of more than $13 million.84

As highlighted, Sandline/EO contracted toprovide military training and assistance “inaccordance with international doctrines and inconformance with the Geneva Convention”. It thusexpressly contracted to comply with the principlesand rules of IHL as encapsulated in the GenevaConventions.To what extent should one therefore becritical of the use of these mercenaries, particularlygiven the reports of atrocities having been committedby both sides to the conflict in the past.85 If membersof the PNG Defence Force have breached the rules ofIHL, then there is a need to educate and retrain themquickly. Sandline/EO could well have provided sucha service.

The “Sandline Affair” predated the AustralianGovernment’s announcement of its intention tobecome a Party to the Mercenaries Convention. Nodoubt the events in PNG encouraged Australia to takesteps to become a Party. However – to what extentwould the Mercenaries Convention have beenapplicable, in any event, had PNG itself been a Partyto it?

As discussed earlier, Article 1(2) of theMercenaries Convention defines a mercenary toexclude a person who is “a member of the armedforces of a Party to the conflict”. The term “armedforces” is not defined in the Mercenaries Convention;it is, however, defined in Article 43(1) of AdditionalProtocol as follows:

The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consistof all organised armed forces, groups and unitswhich are under a command responsible to thatParty for the conduct of its subordinates, even ifthat Part is represented by a government or anauthority not recognised by an adverse Party.Such armed forces shall be subject to an internaldisciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforcecompliance with the rules of international lawapplicable in armed conflict.Article 43(3) contemplates a Party to a conflict

incorporating a paramilitary or armed lawenforcement agency into its armed forces.

The contract document governing the use of theSandline/EO mercenaries in PNG revealed that theywere to be “sworn in as police officers but givenmilitary rank”.86 As a consequence, the Sandline/EOmercenaries would not have met the legal definitionof mercenaries contained in Article 1(2), as theywould have fallen within Article 43 of AdditionalProtocol 1’s definition of “armed forces”. Thecombining of PNG police forces and defences forceswas not in itself unusual;

the military and civilian arms of Papua NewGuinea’s security forces have periodically workedtogether on internal security matters, includingcrime control operations… This has included thedeployment of police mobile squads onBougainville during the current crisis.87

As Dinnen notes, “the joint deployment of thepolice and defence force has increased openings formilitary contractors by eroding operationaldistinctions between these two branches of thesecurity forces”.88

By the relatively simple step of having theSandline/EO operatives sworn into the PNG policeforce, and by incorporating the police force and theregular defence force in a combined operation, therequirements of “mercenary” as defined by theMercenaries Convention were avoided. TheSandline/EO “affair” highlights the weaknesses of theMercenaries Convention.

It was not difficult for the PNG Government toavoid its hired soldiers being labelled “mercenaries”for the purposes of the Mercenaries Convention.Another simple way to avoid meeting the criteriacontained in the definition of a mercenary in Article1(2) of the Mercenaries Convention is for the hiring

The Regulation of Mercenary Forces

17

state to confer citizenship upon foreign soldiers, evenif that citizenship is later to be renounced.

Arguably, the Mercenaries Convention could be asuccess if it results in a state Party taking steps toavoid its operation by enlisting mercenaries in itsarmed forces or police force, or even conferringcitizenship. At least when these steps are taken, theresponsibility for violations of IHL can then be laid atthe “doorstep” of that state Party. The supposedinability to hold mercenaries responsible forviolations of the principles and rules of IHL is one ofthe fundamental reasons for the condemnation ofmercenaries. However, one could argue that, withhigh profile corporate mercenary organisations suchas EO and MPRI, the potential exists for ensuringthey take responsibility for IHL violations.

As mentioned earlier, international law isincreasingly recognising that individuals and non-state organisations have a role to play in internationallaw, which extends to possessing rights and beingsubject to obligations. A more effective method forensuring compliance with IHL and the disseminationof information/provision of training about IHL mightbe for the international community to recognise andoffer an incentive to those “military consultant”organisations which expressly recognise IHLprinciples and act in accordance with them. The mostobvious incentive would be to extend to the membersof those organisations the status of combatant andPrisoner of War. Another incentive might be to offerpeacekeeping work to those organisations.

EO, MPRI and other organisations are keen toobtain peacekeeping work with the United Nations. Inits Internet Homepage, EO states:

A word wide tendency is currently theprivatisation of security/policing services. This ismainly due to the scaling down ofmilitary/peacekeeping budgets by not only themajor powers but also by countries across theglobe.It is therefore foreseen that futurepeacekeeping/refugee protection operations willbe conducted more and more by companies suchas EO.EO sees itself as a major role player in thesedevelopments due to its previous experience andtrack record in such types of operations.The major advantage of making use of companiessuch as EO is one of impartiality. Organisationssuch as the UN and OAU can make use of EOwithout fear of having the possibility of partialitynegating the speedy resolution of conflict in acountry. Companies such as EO will becontracted for a specific task and will have no

hidden agendas or vested interest as is more thanoften found when a regional force/military isemployed for such a task.The employees of EO are loyal to the companyand not to any party involved in a conflict.International organisations will have no need tokeep a large manpower and capital intensiveforce available as this can be provided bycompanies such as EO.In short, a company such as EO will be able toprovide a professional, cost effective force tocarry out a totally unbiased peacekeeping/conflictresolution service throughout the worId.89

The fundamental puzzle of mercenaryorganisations such as EO is whether they represent“the privatisation of peacekeeping” or “theprivatisation of war”.90 It is possible that these privatearmies can operate as a peacekeeping force of thekind the international community has struggled toitself provide? Shearer writes,

In Sierra Leone there is considerable evidencethat EO brought stability and the chance ofnegotiations. Condemnation needs to be temperedwith the more tragic episodes in UNpeacekeeping, notably the behaviour of Canadian,Italian and Belgian soldiers in Somalia. It alsocompares favourably with ECOMOG efforts inneighbouring Liberia, where 150,000 died. Butneither is it a panacea for all conflict.91

It is beyond the scope of this article to analyse theconduct of UN peacekeeping troops, except to brieflyelaborate on the above quote. In Somalia, forexample, there were serious disciplinary problemsexperienced with certain of the Canadian peace-keeping sub-units. A subsequent Board of Inquiryinto the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group(CARBG) revealed the existence of “challenges to theauthority of unit and sub-unit formal leadership,inappropriate initiation rituals, racist attitudes andpractices, steroid usage and a tendency to unharnessedaggression”.92 The orders issued by the Canadiancommanding officer included, for example, theinstruction that any Somali caught in the perimeterstealing equipment was to be shot – those individualswere usually teenaged Somalis.93 The experiences inSomalia taught the UN some valuable lessons. Onesuch lesson was obviously that members of the armedforces of States were capable of actinginappropriately, if not criminally. This should beborne in mind when one evaluates theappropriateness, or inappropriateness, of using privatemilitary consultants" for such peacekeeping work.

If states are left to negotiate with mercenaryorganisations themselves, keeping details of any deals



quiet in order to avoid international condemnation,mercenary organisations arguably have greaterpotential to seek payment in forms which gives thema permanent role in a client-state. The diamondconcessions gained in Africa by Branch Energy, acompany closely related to EO, have been mentionedearlier. There are also suggestions that Sandline/EOsought to obtain mineral concessions in PNG inrelation to the Panguna copper mine. If there wereinternational regulation of mercenary organisationsand strict control of the terms and conditions ofpayment, such forms of payment could perhaps beavoided.

It has been argued that the MercenariesConvention is doomed to failure. There are currentlyvery few countries that have become Parties to it, andaccordingly it is not yet operational. Even if it doesbecome operational, it is not difficult for mercenarysoldiers to avoid meeting the technical requirementsof the Convention’s definition of “mercenary”. As analternative to the current Mercenaries Convention, anew Convention regulating the recruitment and use ofMercenaries is proposed. The following points aresuggested as being appropriate for inclusion within anew Convention (formulated as rough draftinginstructions):• the express purpose of the Convention should be

compliance with, and the promotion of, the rulesof IHL by all participants within an armedconflict, including mercenaries (as defined);

• an obligation is to be imposed on all participantsin an armed conflict to comply with the GenevaConventionsand the Additional Protocols thereto;an obligation is to be imposed on all participantsto an armed conflict to comply with the provisionsof the certain weapon-specific conventions (egdealing with chemical weapons, biologicalweapons, nuclear weapons)

• provision is to be made for a mechanism wherebyadditional obligations can be imposed on allparticipants, to comply with the provisions offuture conventions (e.g. dealing with landmines)when a sufficient number of state Parties so agree;

• a definition of a “mercenary” is required;• definitions of “mercenary organisations” and

“accredited mercenary organisations” arerequired;

• a mechanism is to be established for theaccrediting of mercenary organisations

(accreditation being selected as a tool for“approving” mercenary organisations);

• Parties to the Convention undertake to only usemercenaries from accredited organisations, andnot to use individual (“freelance” mercenaries) orunaccredited mercenary organisations;

• a mechanism is to be established whereby non-state bodies, such as the United Nations itself orInternational Committee of the Red Cross, can usemercenaries from accredited organisations forpeacekeeping missions or for security of theirmembers;

• the minimum standards which must be met, inorder for a mercenary organisation to be entitledto be accredited, must be prescribed;

• the minimum standards met are to includeexpress, and on-going, commitment to furtheringthe principles of the Geneva ConventionsandAdditional Protocols thereto;

• reporting mechanisms are to be established,imposing obligations on accredited mercenaryorganisations to provide on-going evidence oftheir compliance with the Geneva Conventionsand the Additional Protocols thereto; suchreporting mechanisms are to include provision ofinformation about members, recruitingprocedures, training provided to recruits, militaryaction undertaken by the organisation, weaponsused;

• there is to be provision for independent scrutiny ofmercenary organisations by the UN;

• breach of a provision of the Geneva Conventions,the Additional Protocols thereto or weapon-specific conventions is declared to be an offence;

• such an offence can be committed by anindividual mercenary soldier, a mercenaryorganisation and/or a state Party which uses theoffending mercenary/mercenary organisation;

• penalties for offences must be prescribed;• jurisdiction to try offences must be conferred;• an obligation on state Parties to deal with

mercenaries or mercenary organisations breachingprovisions of the Convention is to be imposed.A specialist Commission or organisation could be

established, with the function of accreditingmercenary organisations. Consideration could also begiven to other clauses, dealing with (for example) thetypes of payments which can lawfully be made to amercenary organisation by a state Party. There hasbeen concern expressed at the conferral of mineralrights to EO by certain African nations. Payments ofthis nature could be forbidden. On the other hand,however, sovereign nations arguably have the right todetermine the type of payments their nations can

Suggestions for a New ConventionRegulating the Use of Mercenaries

19

afford and are willing to pay – and hence it can beargued that there should be no such restriction upontypes of payments.

Despite the Australian Government’s recentannouncement of support for the MercenariesConvention, it has received little supportinternationally. There is indeed evidence to suggestthat the United States Government takes an active rolein supporting US mercenary organisations such asMPRI whilst taking a somewhat hypocriticalapproach to other mercenary organisations which arenot US organisations.

It appears to be relatively easy for a state to hiremercenary soldiers and to avoid having those soldierslabelled mercenaries for the purposes of Article 47 ofAdditional Protocol 1 and Article 1 of theMercenaries Convention.

There are high profile corporate “militaryconsultant” organisations operating around the globe,which profess adherence to IHL. The training of theirmercenary soldiers in the theory and practice of IHLmay indeed be significantly superior to that of thearmed forces of many client-states. There are othermercenary soldiers and organisations which continueto fit the mould of the 1960s and 1970s mercenaries,with highly questionable records in relation toadherence to the Geneva Conventionsand AdditionalProtocols. Currently, a state seeking to hiremercenaries is equally discouraged by theinternational community from hiring from both broadcategories of mercenaries.

Furthermore, there is currently no incentiveoffered to mercenary soldiers to adhere to the GenevaConventionsand Additional Protocols. Indeed, thedenial of the status of combatant/Prisoner of War mayresult in mercenaries adopting means and methods ofwarfare which are contrary to IHL principles, in orderto avoid capture by the enemy.

In light of these factors, it is suggested that Article47(2) of Additional Protocol 1 be abandoned, and thatserious consideration be given to the option ofregulating mercenary organisations. Thoseorganisations which comply with the GenevaConventionsand the Additional Protocols theretocould instead be recognised. New developments inIHL, such as those evolving in relation to the banningof land-mines, could also ultimately be incorporatedinto the regulation of mercenaries. Those mercenaryorganisations which are not clearly identifiable and

accountable for their actions, and which do not meetthe requisite standards of IHL, should be outlawed.

Finally, consideration should be given to theoption of using mercenary soldiers for peacekeeping.Even if the option is to be soundly rejected, itwarrants exploration. To date, this exploration has notoccurred.

The effective regulation of mercenaries will not beeasy to achieve. There will, no doubt, always beviolations of the rules of IHL regulating the means andmethods of warfare, both by mercenary soldiers andby regular forces. If such violations are theresponsibility of recognised mercenary organisations,issues will arise surrounding the sanctions availablefor non-compliance. It will also be difficult to policethe membership of private armies, in order to ensurecriminals and those suspected of abuses of humanrights are not recruited, without the cooperation of theorganisations themselves. Fundamental questions willarise in relation to the use of mercenaries by non-stateParties, for example rebels fighting an incumbentgovernment. However: such groups do, already, usemercenaries and have done so in the past. Ifmercenaries are to be used, it is preferable that they befrom organisations that respect the principles of IHL.

Many of the objections to the use of mercenarieswill remain, even if their use is to be regulated ratherthan outlawed. The cost of hiring organisations suchas EO and MPRI runs into the millions, and theirsoldiers will only stay within a client-state whilstfunds keep flowing. In addition, as has been identifiedin relation to the use of MPRI, mercenaryorganisations staffed by ex-soldiers from majorpowers can be used by those powers to achievepolitical ends without the shouldering ofresponsibility.

However: the mercenary soldier has adapted tomajor changes over the centuries. The response tomercenaries since the 1960’s has been theiroutlawing. The response has largely failed.Accordingly, perhaps another response is nowappropriate.

NOTES1. Adam Zagorin, “Soldiers for Sale” 149(21) Time,26 May

1997.2. The relevant Australian legislation governing the use and

recruitment of mercenaries is the Crimes (Foreign Incursionsand Recruitment) Act 1978 (Cth). This Act makes it an offencefor an Australian citizen or resident to engage in hostileactivities in a foreign state, to enter a foreign state with intent toengage in a hostile activity or to do any acts or take any stepspreparatory to or for the purpose of engaging in such hostileactivities, or to train for such activities. The Act has a broadapplication, to mercenaries, volunteers and others. Statisticsprovided courtesy of the Information and Security Law

Conclusion



Division of the Commonwealth Attorney-General’sDepartment indicate that, since the Act’s enactment in 1978,only eight persons have been convicted for offences under it.The first such conviction occurred in October 1981, wherein aperson was convicted of being present at a training assembly forthe purpose of preparation for engaging in hostile activities.Since that first conviction, seven other persons have beenconvicted, for offences ranging from recruiting, receivingmoney and doing preparatory acts. As at November 1997, oneother individual has been committed to stand trial forstockpiling arms. It is important to note that, in relation to theseoffences. It was not a prerequisite that the person be a“mercenary” (however defined). Regardless of motive, the Actapplies to Australian citizens and residents.

3. The announcement was made in a Joint Statement issued by theMinister for Foreign Affairs and the Attorney General on 14July 1997.

4. A distinction is traditionally drawn between the rules governingthe means and methods of war, on the one hand, and the rulesgoverning the protection of the victims of armed conflict on theother hand. The former is largely, although not exclusively,codified in the main Hague Conventionsof 1899 (e.g. theHague Declarationconcerning expanding bullets, 29 July1899), mostly replaced and completed by the HagueConventionsof 1907 (e.g. the Hague Conventionrelative to thelaying of automatic submarine contact mines, 18 October 1907;the Hague Declarationprohibiting the discharge of projectilesand explosives from balloons, 18 October 1907), and also in theRules of air warfare drafted at The Hague in 1923 and in thevarious treaties relating to specific weapons (such as chemical,biological, nuclear and laser/blinding weapons): Frederic DeMulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces(ICRC, 1987), 4. The latter is largely, although not exclusively,codified in the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906 and 1929,now replaced and/or completed by the Geneva Conventions of1949: De Mulinen, 4. The four Geneva Conventionsof 1949(and the Additional Protocols thereto) are of most importance tothis article; they are the Convention for the amelioration of thecondition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field,Geneva, 12 August 1949; the Convention for the ameliorationof the condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members ofarmed forces at sea, Geneva, 12 August 1949; the Conventionrelative to the treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva,12 August 1949; the Convention relative to the protection ofcivilian persons in time of war, Geneva, 12 August 1949.

5. Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventionsof 12 August1949, and relating to the protection of victims of internationalarmed conflicts (Additional Protocol l), Geneva, 8 June 1977,Article 1(2). [The other Additional Protocol is known as theProtocol additional to the Geneva Conventionsof 12 August1949, and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Additional Protocol 2), Geneva, 8June 1977.]

6. See for example Article 35(1).7. See for example Additional Protocol 1, Article 35(2).8. See for example Additional Protocol 1, Article 48.9. See for example Additional Protocol 1, Articles 35(3) and

55(1).10. This philosophy underlies the Geneva Conventionsof 1949 and

the two Additional Protocols thereto, amongst otherinternational instruments dealing with armed conflict.

11.The rights of Prisoners of War in international conflicts are setout in the Geneva ConventionRelative to the Treatment ofPrisoners of War of August 12, 1949; the rights of Prisoners ofWar in internal conflicts are set out in the Protocols Additional tothe Geneva Conventionsof 12 August 1949… of 8 June 1977.

12. See for example the criticism by James Taulbee in “Myths,Mercenaries and Contemporary International Law” (1985) 15California Western International Law Journal339, 352.

13. Noted in Henry Burmester, “The Recruitment and Use ofMercenaries in Armed Conflict” (1978) 72 American Journalof International Law 37, 37-38.

14. See the Preamble to the OAU Convention for the Eliminationof Mercenaries in Africa 1972.

15. Burmester, 40.16. Anthony Mockler, Mercenaries (1969), 14-15. 17. Mockler, 16.18. Edward Kwakwa, “The current status of mercenaries in the law

of armed conflict” (1990) 14 Hastings International &Comparative Law Review67, 75.

19. Taulbee, 341.20. Mockler 194 21. Mockler, 256. 22. Mockler, 257. 23. Mockler, 268.24. Kwakwa, 76.25. Mike J. Hoover, “The Laws of War and The Angolan Trial of

Mercenaries: Death to the Dogs of War” (1977) 9 CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law Review323,325.

26. Hoover, 326.27. Hoover, 327-329.28. George H. Lockwood QC, “Report on the trial of Mercenaries:

Luanda, Angola, June 1976” (1977) 7(3) Manitoba LawJournal183. Lockwood practiced as a lawyer, was a part-timeprovincial judge, and a prominent member of AmnestyInternational.

29. Lockwood, 193.30. Lockwood, 194, 200.31. See Lockwood at 194-197. See also Hoover, who concludes at

352 that “the procedural fairness of the trial was commendable,but the countervailing substantive unfairness resulted in amiscarriage of justice”.

32. Commander Arthur John Armstrong, JAGC, USN,“Mercenaries and Freedom Fighters: The Legal Regime of theCombatant Under Protocol Additional to the GenevaConvention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protectionof Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1)”(Winter 1978)JAG Journal 125, 148.

33. Armstrong, 16434. Kwakwa, 88.35. Kwakwa, 69.36. Article III of the Declaration of Luanda, contained in Hoover

(as Appendix VII), 4 02.37. Taulbee, 356. 38. Taulbee, 357.39. See for example Starke J in Polites v Commonwealth(1945) 70

CLR 60, 75, where he refers to the authority of Australia being“as plenary and as ample within the limits prescribed by theConstitution as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of itspower possessed or could bestow”.

40.Polites v Commonwealth(1945) 70 CLR 60, 75.41. Dan O’Connell, International Law(2nd ed, 1970) Vol 1, 106.42. First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights 1966.43. Dorab Patel, “Comment – the significance of international

humanitarian law – priorities” contained in William Maley (ed),Proceedings from the Second Regional Conference onInternational Humanitarian Law entitled Shelters from theStorm: Developments in International Humanitarian Law(Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1995), 21.

21

44. Duncan Kerr, “Opening remarks”, Second RegionalConference on IHL entitled “Shelters from the Storm:Developments in IHL”, 2-3.

45. Anthony Mockler,The New Mercenaries (1985), 462-463. 46. Gianandrea Gaiani, “Mercenaries of the Twenty-First Century”,

(Aug/Sept 1990) Defence Today232. 47. “What is Executive Outcomes?” Homepage, The Internet

http://www.eo.com/about/pl.html48. EO Homepage, Internet.49. Jim Hooper, “Sierra Leone – the war continues”, (Jan 1996)

Jane’s Intelligence Review41.50. ibid.51. Al J. Venter, “Sierra Leone’s mercenary war – battle for the

diamond fields” (11/1995) International Defence Review65.52. Hooper, 42. 53. Venter, 68.54. “SA Mercenaries leave Sierra Leone with mixed feelings”

Electronic Mail & Guardian,11 February 1997; Internetreference http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/97feb1/11feb-sleone.html

55. Hooper, 43.56. Al Venter, “Gunships for hire”, (21-27 August 1996) Flight

International 32.57. Major Michael J. Kelly, Peace Operations – Tackling the

Military, Legal and Policy Challenges(1987), chapter 1 page10. Kelly notes that “the question of the legitimacy of agovernment goes back to the Age of Enlightenment and theoriesof natural law, inherent rights and the legal foundation ofgovernment expounded upon by philosophers such as Locke”.

58. “Background Briefing – Diamond Mercenaries of Africa”, ABCRadio National Transcipts,interview broadcast Sunday 4August 1996 with (inter alia) Jeremy Harding (whoinvestigated the mercenary business for the London Review ofBooks); Internet reference http://www.abc.net.au/rntalks/bbing/bb960804.htm

59. “Background Briefing – Diamond Mercenaries of Africa”,interview with (inter alia)Eeben Barlow.

60. David Shearer, “Dial an Army” (Aug-Sept 1997) 53(8-9) TheWorld Today203.

61. “Africa’s new-look dogs of war” Johannesburg Weekly Mailand Guardian, Jan 24, 1997; Internet referencehttp://wn.apc.org/wmail/issues/970124/NEWS65.html

62. Shearer, 205.63. Shearer, 203.64. Shearer, 205.65. Colum Lynch, Globe Correspondent, “For US firms war

becomes a business” The Boston Globe,February 1, 1997;Internet reference http://www.mpri.com/current/nr021897.htm

66. MPRI Homepage, Internet reference http://www.mpri.com/current/nr021897.htm

67. Mark Thompson, “Generals for hire” (Jan 15, 1996)147(3)Time Magazine.

68. MPRI Homepage, Internet.69. “Private US companies train armies around the world” (Feb 8,

1997) US News and Word Report;Internet referencehttp://www.mpri.com/current/nr020897.htm

70. Thompson (no page number available on Internet).71. “Private US companies train armies around the world” (Feb 8,

1997) US News and Word Report;Internet referencehttp://www.mpri.com/current/nr020897.htm

72. Sean Boyne, “The White Legion: mercenaries in Zaire”(June 1997) 9(6)Jane’s Intelligence Review278, 278-279.

73. Boyne, 279. 74. ibid.75. Boyne, 280.

76. Sinclair Dinnen, “A Fatal Attraction? Private MilitaristicSolutions and Internal Security in Papua New Guinea”, 1; essaycontained in a forthcoming publication. Dinnen is attached tothe Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, AustralianNational University.

77. Dinnen, 4.78. Graham Hassall, “Developments – South Pacific – Papua New

Guinea” (September 1997) 8 Public Law Review205, 206,quoting from the agreement signed between Sandline and theState of PNG.

79. Dinnen. 3.80. David Robie, “Chan blasts media over mercenaries” Asia

Pacific Network 24/2/97, Internet referencehttp://www.magna.com.au/~sashab/report/0297/24029707.htm

81. Quoted in The Independent (UK) 13 March 1997 at 11; referredto in Dinnen, 14.

82. Peter Lewis Young, “Bougainville conflict enters its ninth year”(June 1997) Jane’s Intelligence Review282.

83. ibid.84. Scott Monk, “PNG defence ties renewed” The Advertiser,

Friday 7 November 1997, 29. 85. Peter Lewis Young, “Bougainville – the seven-year war” 7(8)

Jane’s Intelligence Review375, 377.86. Peter Lewis Young, “Bougainville conflict enters its ninth

year”, 285. 87. Dinnen, 13. 88. Dinnen, 14.89. EO Internet Homepage, “Future View”; Internet reference

http://www.eo.com/about/p8.html90. “Africa’s new-look dogs of war”, Johannesburg Weekly Mail

and GuardianJanuary 24, 1997. 91. Shearer, “Dial an army”, 205. 92. Major Michael J. Kelly, chapter l0 page 16 footnote 44.

93 Kelly, chapter 10, page 17, footnote 44 (cont).

BIBLIOGRAPHYBooks and Journal, Magazine and Newspaper Articles“Africa’s new-look dogs of war” Johannesburg Weekly Mail

and Guardian, Jan 24, 1997; Internet referencehttp://wn.apc.org/wmail/issues/970124/NEWS65.html[no author named].

Armstrong Commander Arthur John, JAGC, USN, “Mercenariesand Freedom Fighters: The Legal Regime of the CombatantUnder Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventionof 12August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims ofInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1)” (Winter 1978)JAG Journal 125.

Background Briefing – Diamond Mercenaries of Africa”, ABCRadio National Transcripts, interview broadcast Sunday 4 August 1996; Internet referencehttp://wwvv.abc.net.au/rntalks/bbing/bb960804.htm.

Boyne Sean, “The White Legion: mercenaries in Zaire” (June1997) 9(6) Jane’s Intelligence Review278.

Burmester Henry, “The Recruitment and Use of Mercenaries inArmed Conflict” (1978) 72 American Journal of InternationalLaw37.

Dinnen Sinclair, “A Fatal Attraction? Private MilitaristicSolutions and Internal Security in Papua New Guinea”, 1;essay contained in a forthcoming publication. [Dinnen isattached to the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies,Australian National University.]

Durham Helen, “Mercenaries – Why and What?”, Paperpresented at the Australian New Zealand Society ofInternational Lawyers Conference, May 1997.

Gaiani Gianandrea, “Mercenaries of the Twenty-First Century”,(Aug/Sept 1990) Defence Today232.


MERCENARIES AND THE “SANDLINE AFFAIR” 23

Hassall Graham, “Developments – South Pacific – Papua NewGuinea” (September 1997) 8 Public Law Review205.

Hooper Jim, “Sierra Leone – the war continues”, (Jan 1996)Jane’s Intelligence Review41.

Hoover Mike J., “The Laws of War and The Angolan Trial ofMercenaries: Death to the Dogs of War” (1977) 9 CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law Review323.

The Independent(UK) 13 March 1997 (extract thereof, referred toin Dinnen; no further details available).

Kelly Major Michael J., Peace Operations– Tackling theMilitary, Legal and Policy Challenges(1987)

Kerr Duncan, “Opening remarks”, Second Regional Conferenceon IHL entitled “Shelters from the Storm: Developments inIHL”.

Kwakwa Edward, “The current status of mercenaries in the law ofarmed conflict” (1990) 14 Hastings International &Comparative Law Review67.

Lockwood George H. QC, “Report on the Trial of Mercenaries:Luanda, Angola, June 1976” (1977) 7(3)Manitoba LawJournal 183.

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Mockler Anthony, Mercenaries (1969).Mockler Anthony, The New Mercenaries (1985).Monk Scott, “PNG defence ties renewed” The Advertiser,Friday

7 November 1997, 29.De Mulinen Frederic, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed

Forces (ICRC, 1987).O’Connell Dan,International Law(2nd ed, 1970) Vol 1.Patel Dorab, “Comment – the significance of international

humanitarian law – priorities” contained in William Maley(ed), Proceedings from the Second Regional Conference onInternational Humanitarian Law entitled Shelters from theStorm: Developments in International Humanitarian Law(Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1995), 21.

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Shearer David, “Dial an Army” (Aug-Sept 1997) 53(8-9) TheWorId Today203.

Taulbee James, in “Myths, Mercenaries and ContemporaryInternational Law” (1985) 15 California WesternInternational Law Journal 339.

Thompson Mark , “Generals for hire” (Jan 15, 1996) 147(3) TimeMagazine.

Venter Al J., “Sierra Leone’s mercenary war – battle for thediamond fields” (11/1995) International Defence Review 65.

Venter Al J., “Gunships for hire”, (21-27 August 1996) FlightInternational32.

“What is Executive Outcomes?” Homepage, The Internethttp://www.eo.com/about/pl.html.

Young Peter Lewis, “Bougainville – the seven-year war” 7(8)Jane’s Intelligence Review375.

Young Peter Lewis, “Bougainville conflict enters its ninth year”(June 1997) Jane’s Intelligence Review282.

Zagorin Adam, “Soldiers for Sale” 149(21) Time,26 May 1997.

CASESPolites v Commonwealth(1945) 70 CLR 60.

LEGISLATION AND TREATIESProtocol additional to the Geneva Conventionsof 12 August

1949, and relating to the protection of victims of internationalarmed conflicts (Additional Protocol 1), Geneva, 8 June 1977.

Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventionsof 12 August1949, and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Additional Protocol 2), Geneva,8 June 1977.

First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights 1966.

Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the woundedand sick in armed forces in the field, Geneva, 12 August 1949.

Convention for the amelioration of the condition of wounded,sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea,Geneva, 12 August 1949.

Convention relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva,12 August 1949.

Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time ofwar, Geneva, 12 August 1949.

Hague Conventionrelative to the laying of automatic submarinecontact mines, 18 October 1907.

Hague Declarationprohibiting the discharge of projectiles andexplosives from balloons, 18 October 1907.

Hague Rules of Air Warfare, 1923.International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use,

Financing and Training of Mercenaries 1989.OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa

1972.Rules of air warfare drafted by a Commission of Jurists at the

Hague, December 1922, February 1923.

Lieutenant Ebbeck is a Legal Officer in the Royal Australian Navy Reserve. She obtained her doctorate in 1997 at theUniversity of Adelaide in the field of constitutional law. She is currently studying for a masters in International Law.


The Churchill Trust invites applications from Australians,of 18 years and over from all walks of life who wish tobe considered for a Churchill Fellowship to undertake,during 2000, an overseas study project that will enhancetheir usefulness to the Australian community.No prescribed qualifications are required,merit being theprimary test, whether based on past achievements ordemonstrated ability for future achievement.Fellowships are awarded annuallyto those who have alreadyestablished themselves in their calling. They are not awardedfor the purpose of obtaining higher academic or formalqualifications.Details may be obtainedby sending a self addressed stampedenvelope (12x24cms) to:The Winston Churchill Memorial Trust 218Northbourne Avenue, Braddon, ACT 2612or from: http://sunsite.anu.edu.au/churchill fellowshipsCompleted application forms and reports fromthree referees must be submitted by Sunday29 February, 1999.

By Dr Johanna Granville, Department of PoliticalScience, Clemson University, USA

On 9 July 1997, NATO formally invited Poland,Hungary, and the Czech Republic to become

members of the alliance by the year 1999 (NATO’s50th anniversary), thereby attempting, some say, toeliminate the last traces of the Iron Curtain and extendsecurity commitments to former Warsaw Pactcountries. This article analyses the advantages anddisadvantages of NATO enlargement after brieflyreviewing events that placed NATO at this criticaljuncture in its history.

The 1949 North Atlantic Treaty (known as theTreaty of Washington)established NATO, originallywith twelve members. NATO was to provide acollective military defence for its members; an attackagainst one was to be considered an attack against all.Although ostensibly formed with no named adversary,the alliance planners hoped to contain an aggressiveSoviet Union. As permitted by NATO’s Article Ten,other nations joined later, by the unanimous consentof the original NATO members: Greece and Turkeyin 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982.NATO currently has sixteen members.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, NATObegan adapting to the end of the Cold War. Officialsat NATO’s 1990 London Summit declared thatRussia was no longer considered an adversary. InCopenhagen, in 1991, the NATO alliance met tocreate a “whole and free Europe”. At the RomeSummit the same year, the alliance adopted a newstrategic concept, which reaffirmed the importance ofcollective defence, but also moved toward newsecurity challenges such as out-of-area missions andpeacekeeping. Members also created the NorthAtlantic Cooperative Council, which provided aframework for security cooperation between NATOand former Warsaw Pact nations.

Finally, and most importantly, the BrusselsSummit in 1994 launched the Partnership for Peace(PfP) program, which provides for intense military-to-military cooperation between NATO and formerenemies and neutrals, and is considered a first step tomembership. Moreover, at this time NATO decidedto consider admitting new members. It commissioneda study, completed in September 1995, on expansion,setting forth the rationale and process to be used. In

December 1995, NATO began discussions witheleven nations which had expressed an interest inmembership. At the Madrid Summit, in July 1997,NATO declared that Poland, Hungary, and the CzechRepublic (the so-called “Visegrad countries”) wouldbe the first three states invited to join, but also statedthat other countries could join if they could meetNATO’s stringent requirements. Under NATO rules,admission can be granted only by the unanimousconsent of all existing members. NATO officials hopethat all members will ratify the decision, and thatadmission will be granted in 1999 in celebration ofNATO’s fiftieth anniversary.

NATO expansion, to include former Warsaw Pactnations, could be the most important event in U.S.and European history since the end of World War IIand have far-reaching effects in the next century.Enlarging NATO’s membership could result in astronger, more peaceful Europe and could preventwars both within the NATO alliance and outside it.But it could also destabilise Russia, create newdividing lines in Europe, and ignite a new Cold War.

Many commentaries and official pronouncementslack dispassionate analysis of the pros and cons ofNATO expansion. Indeed, President Clinton has yetto make a speech to the country or Congress devotedto the issue, stating explicitly the reasons why NATOexpansion is in the U.S. national interest. One mustrely on his occasional impromptu comments to themedia.

On the positive side, according to the ClintonAdministration, enlargement could improve relationsamong Central and Eastern European countries,respond to requests by former Warsaw Pact countrieswhich NATO should not ignore, avoid a securityvacuum in Central Europe, and exploit a temporarilyweak Russia. Enlargement may also invigorate amoribund NATO.

Europe has exploded into world war twice in thiscentury. Those conflicts cost America the lives ofover half a million citizens. The Cold War also startedin Europe, and involved an expenditure of over $13trillion. According to Deputy Secretary of State

The Case for Enlargement

Should NATO Enlarge? The Pros and Cons

Strobe Talbott, the enlargement of NATO is a keypart of America’s strategy to ensure that Europe is amore peaceful place in the twenty-first century. IfEurope is safer and more prosperous, then the UnitedStates will be too.1

This article will address a few key arguments forenlargement. First, NATO enlargement may improverelations among Central and East European countries.Often, the debate about NATO expansion erroneouslyreduces the alliance’s history to a one-dimensionalpicture that downplays its relevance to today’schallenges in Europe. While NATO’s Cold Warmission was to contain the Soviet Union, that is notall it did. According to U.S. Secretary of StateMadeleine Albright, it provided the environment andsecurity that weak states needed to rebuildthemselves. As she stated,

It helped France and Germany becomereconciled, making European integrationpossible. With other institutions, it brought Italy,then Germany and eventually Spain back into thefamily of European democracies. Itdenationalised allied defence policies. It hasstabilised relations between Greece and Turkey.All without firing a shot.2

Now an expanded NATO can do for EasternEurope what the older NATO did for the West:“vanquished old hatreds, promote integration, create asecure environment for prosperity, and deter violencein the region where two world wars and the Cold Warbegan.”3 In fact, this is already happening. Just thepossibility of membership in NATO has alreadyencouraged positive trends in Central Europe.4 As aresult of their desire to join NATO, numerous CentralEuropean states have accelerated their internal reformsand improved their relations with each other. Recently,a plethora of agreements have been concluded amongthese states and other NATO allies, “which will helpensure stable borders, promote inter-state cooperationand address mutual concerns on the treatment ofminorities.”5 Examples of harmonious agreementsinclude the creation of a joint peacekeeping battalionby Poland and Lithuania, the agreement on historicallydivisive issues like border recognition and the rights ofethnic minorities between Hungary and Romania,Romania and Ukraine, and Germany and the CzechRepublic.6 Other noteworthy agreements include thePolish-Lithuanian treaty of 1994, the Hungarian-Slovakian treaty of 1996, several agreements betweenPoland and Ukraine in 1996, the treaty betweenHungary and Romania of 1996; and the treaty betweenGermany and the Czech Republic of 1996 concerningSudetanland and other issues. The past achievementsand ongoing negotiations provide strong reasons for

believing expansion will continue to encourageimproved relations between Central and EasternEurope.7

A second argument for enlargement is that therefusal to admit Central European states into NATOmay alienate them. As former Secretary of StateHenry Kissinger, pointed out, “The expansion issuefirst arose because Hungary, Poland, the CzechRepublic, and Slovakia – all victims of Sovietoccupation – first sought NATO membership.”8 Notonly the leaders of the Visegrad states, such as Czechpresident Vaclav Havel and former Polish presidentLech Walesa, but also other Central European leadershave now requested admission to NATO. They haveemphasised the implications for credibility in theprocess.9 Not to act positively on such requests couldundercut these reform leaders. It could suggest thatthe West does not empathise with the vulnerablesituation of these states, and that the West does notview these states as important members of theEuropean community.

Peter Rodman, a former member of the NationalSecurity Council under four presidents, said, “Thenewly independent Central European states –particularly Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic andSlovakia – consider themselves part of the West; theycategorically refuse to be relegated to a Russiansphere of influence or to a no-man’s land betweenWestern Europe and Russia. After a 60-yearnightmare, they have finally had the chance to expresstheir free sovereign will: they are morally andpolitically partners of the West, seeking membershipin the European Union for their economic well-beingand in the Atlantic Alliance for their security.”10

Moreover, according to Assistant DeputySecretary of State Strobe Talbott, we must considerthe impact on transatlantic security if we did notenlarge the alliance. We would send the message thatwe permanently endorse the dividing line Stalincarved across Europe in 1945 and enforced throughoccupation and terror thereafter. We would beimplying that, having been subjugated in the past,these states are now disqualified for security in thefuture – “an unconscionable form of doublejeopardy.”11 Furthermore, how can we say to Polandor Hungary or the Czech Republic that Belgium,Holland and Luxembourg are welcome members ofNATO because they were lucky enough to be on theright side of the Iron Curtain at the end of World WarII, but that these Visegrad countries are foreverbanned because they happened to be on the otherside?12 Also, we can reverse a millennial trend thatrelegated Poland to a mere road between Moscow andGermany.


SHOULD NATO ENLARGE? THE PROS AND CONS

A third argument for enlargement is that it isneeded to fill the security vacuum in Central Europethat resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Itwould be wise to include Central European states inNATO rather than leaving them in a strategic “no-man’s-land” where they might tempt Russia orGermany to reassert their influence in the area. Thus,expansionists argue, NATO enlargement can providestability to a vital area that has seen many warsthroughout the centuries, especially with the East.13

According to the retired Lieutenant General Odom,former director of the National Security Agency,conflict in Europe is already at hand and can be seenin the fratricidal wars in the former Yugoslavia. Thehistorical focus of these struggles is mastery ofEurope; powerful countries tend to exploit theirneighbour’s weaknesses. Odom identifies Germanyas historically the main target of Western securityalliances. The main problem has traditionally beennot that Germany has been too strong, but that herneighbours have been weak. Thus, instability andpower vacuums have been the real culprits.14

Henry Kissinger also cautioned against allowing avacuum “to develop between Germany and Russia,which has tempted so many previous conflicts”. Hecontinued, “If this request is rejected and the statesbordering Germany are refused protection, Germanywill sooner or later seek to achieve its security bynational efforts, encountering on the way a Russiapursuing the same policy from its side.”15 Accordingto Rodman, “If the history of this century provesanything, it is that ambiguity about the status of thesesmall Central European states [ever since the collapseof the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy] isexceedingly risky for peace. It would only invitefuture revisionist temptations. In the interest ofEuropean stability, the uncertainty should beforeclosed by their admission to the alliance.”16

Fourthly, some argue that it would be much easiernow to expand NATO, while Russia is relativelyweak and preoccupied with issues at home and in thenear abroad, and while there is a relativelycooperative leadership in Russia. Most believe it willbecome much more difficult to pursue NATOexpansion if leaders that are more anti-Westernshould come to power in Russia or if Russia were tobecome more assertive and powerful.17 HenryKissinger believes that if NATO expansion is delayeduntil an acute Russian threat does appear, “Pressureagainst NATO expansion will grow more insistent atthat point, compounded by the fact that a skilfulRussian challenge will be made to appear ambiguous.It is not wise to defer obtaining fire insurance until thehouse is actually on fire.”18

Also, former National Security Advisor ZbigniewBrzezinski argues that “Westernists” are not gainingin Russia and that a group is rising in Russia thatbelieves, “Russia is destined to exercise geopoliticalsway over Eurasia.” This group also believe thatRussia’s “special political status must be asserted –directly in Eurasia and indirectly in Central Europe.”19

Finally, former Senator Sam Nunn points out thatin the long term we cannot dismiss the possibility of aresurgent and threatening Russia. Russia still possessesover 20,000 nuclear weapons, at least 40,000 tons ofchemical weapons, plus the scientists and techniciansskilled in manufacturing weapons of mass destruction.He further points out that Russia has inherited the stilldangerous remnants of the Soviet war machine, andpoints out that, “even in its currently weakenedcondition, Russia possesses great potential in humanand material resources. By virtue of its size andstrategic location, Russia exerts considerable weight inEurope, Asia, and the Middle East. Meanwhile, Russiahas inherited the Soviet Union’s veto power in theU.N. Security Council and therefore has a major voicein multilateral decision making.”20 Peters adds, “Forthe [Visegrad] states, the security guarantee in Article5 is a much-sought-after hedge against the re-emergence of Russian imperialism.”21

A fifth, and final argument for NATO expansion,is that it can re-energise the NATO alliance. Withchanges in the European community, the allianceneeds an infusion of new ideas and strategies that canbe gained by the admission of new allies. One of themost important aspects of NATO is the interactionwith the most important allies of the United States.This interaction takes place on a daily basis and keepsNATO vibrant. The infusion of new Eastern Europeannations into the alliance can give NATO planners anew perspective and stimulate new strategies.

Peters states that there is some agreement withinthe Atlantic Alliance that NATO must “go out of areaor go out of business.” He sees the out-of-areacapability as essential if the allies are to have acredible raison d’etre.22 According to Strobe Talbott,NATO does not need an enemy. Rather, it needs anenduring purpose, “to undergird transatlantic security,to provide mechanisms for coordinating mutualdefence, and to maintain the collective will andcapability to meet new threats.” He claims that U.S.policymakers should want to do for the CentralEuropeans what they did for Western Europe: tomake war in Europe impossible. This was the historicproject U.S. leaders started in 1949. Talbottconcludes, “If NATO did not take in new members,the alliance would weaken as the Central and EastEuropean countries scrambled to jury-jig security

27

arrangements, no doubt often at each others expense –and to the detriment of the continent as a whole,certainly to the detriment of EU integration.23

Zbigniew Brzezinski recently stated that, “Theabsence of a long-range design for Europe coulddeprive it (NATO) of its historic reason for being.Hesitation, inconsistency, and weakness will not onlydiscredit American leadership, but probably doomNATO altogether.”24

Some analysts have concluded that much of theintensity for NATO expansion comes from aconviction by friends of NATO that the alliancecannot survive the Cold War’s demise, unless it findsa new and compelling mission. “Without a newpurpose, the transatlantic alliance is in danger ofdrifting apart, especially because of the growingeconomic friction among its members.”25 Secretary ofState Albright warned that a post-Cold War decisionto simply stand pat on its own ground would risk aNATO, “stuck in the past, risking irrelevance andeven dissolution.”26

In sum, proponents of NATO expansion wouldsummarise their position as follows. NATOexpansion is a positive move for the United States andEurope because it would improve relations amongCentral European countries, reassure the newlyindependent allies about possible threats from theEast, avoid a security vacuum, and revitalise thealliance itself. The alliance needs to expand now,before Russia can possibly rise again.

On the other hand, Albright, Kissinger, Rodman,Talbott, Odom, Lugar, Brzezinski, and othersdownplay or ignore key points that would suggestNATO expansion is not in the U.S. national interest.

Handled incorrectly, expansion could lead to anew Cold War. Forty-eight years ago thirteen nationsbanded together to create NATO as a shield againstSoviet military aggression. Despite the breakup of theSoviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, NATO is nowdetermined not only to maintain its preeminent role inEurope but to expand eastward. This is a provocativeand dangerous policy.

Again, this article will address only a few of manyrelevant arguments against enlargement. First,expanding NATO could have a negative impact onRussia’s relations with the West, both in military matterssuch as ratifying treaties, causing instability in Europe,or threatening the fledgling democracy in Russia.Second, modernising the Central Europeans’ militaries

would be very costly for NATO members. Third,NATO expansion could create a new dividing line inEurope between Russia and NATO, and between thenewly invited members and the excluded countries.Fourth, the United States might bear the largest burdenin an alliance with junior partners, with much lesspolitical, economic, and military power. Thus, admittingweak states would not necessarily increase the securityof the other NATO members. Finally, the decision toadmit more member countries will commit the UnitedStates and other NATO countries to defend places thatthey might not care to defend.

To take the first point, NATO expansion couldcreate negative repercussions for the West such as theredeployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons,placing in jeopardy the ratification of the StrategicArms Reduction Talks (START II) and theConventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Thealienation of Russia could jeopardise peace in Europe,and could weaken and perhaps destroy the fledglingdemocracy in Russia. According to European Affairsspecialist Steven Woehrel, Russian policy towardNATO expansion has taken two approaches. One hasbeen to warn the West of its negative relations withRussia and threaten measures include “non-ratification of the START II treaty, abrogation of theCFE Treaty, increased defence spending, stationing oftactical nuclear weapons on Russia’s borders,targeting new NATO members with strategic nuclearweapons, establishing a Commonwealth ofIndependent States (CIS) defence union or at least aRussia-Belarus defence union, and forging allianceswith China, India, Iran, or other countries.27 A closerexamination of four of these areas should giveexpansionists sufficient pause.

One potential cost that most advocates of enlargingNATO are reluctant to consider is the possibility thatmoving NATO closer to Russia’s border will triggerthe redeployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons.Nikolai Sokov, an arms-control expert from Russia’sMinistry of Foreign Affairs, said “There is a very clearperception in Russia that under current conditions theonly feasible military response to NATO expansion isthe deployment of additional numbers and types oftactical nuclear weapons.28 Russian analysts haveconcluded that the addition of Poland, Hungary, andthe Czech Republic to NATO will increase its combatpotential up to 20 per centand place key Russianmilitary facilities within range of conventionalPrecision Guided Munitions (PGMs) launched fromthe territory of new NATO members. This presentsRussian planners with the problems of a NATOconventional capability against targets once onlyvulnerable to nuclear weapons. In the Russian

The Case Against Enlargement



parliament, suggestions to meet NATO expansionwith the deployment of Russian tactical nuclearweapons in Belarus, Kaliningrad, and in the RussianBaltic Fleet have great support. Senior Russianofficials have also suggested retargeting some strategicnuclear forces against NATO’s new members.29

The threat of NATO expansion is seen by Russiaas a violation of agreements that ended the Cold Warand thus could jeopardise START II and CFE. Abroad political consensus exists in Russia, according toAlexei Arbatov, deputy chairman of the DefenceCommittee in the State Duma, that NATO expansionruns counter not only to Russian security interests, butalso violates the agreements upon which the Cold Warended. Arbatov believes that nobody took the troubleto warn Russians that NATO, probably the mostpowerful military alliance in the world, would startmoving toward Russian borders. Meanwhile, Moscowwas “agreeing to the reunification of Germany and itscontinued membership in NATO, to disbanding theWarsaw Pact and then the very Soviet Union, todeeper reductions of nuclear and conventional forcesthan in the West, to the hasty withdrawal of half amillion troops from comfortable barracks in CentralEurope to tent camps in Russian fields.30

According to analyst Jeffrey Record, the RussianDuma (lower house of parliament) is “estranged byNATO enlargement, and many Russiansunderstandably regard enlargement as a functionalviolation of the CFE Treaty because of that treaty’simplicit assumption that the then extant line of East-West military division in Europe would remain intact.31

Susan Eisenhower, granddaughter of the latepresident, maintains that, “The spirit of the Two PlusFour Treaty, which unified Germany, implied thateastward expansion of the Western alliance wouldstop there. As the Warsaw Pact was still in place atthe time, the Soviets did not think to seek furtherassurances. The Russians now know, to their chagrin,that agreements with the West are worth nothingunless every contingency is spelled out in writing.32

Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev thinksthat START II ratification is threatened by NATOexpansion since it is “a fundamental violation ofWestern guarantees after Russia dissolved theWarsaw Pact and agreed to German reunification.”33

An unratified START II Treaty, according toRecord, might begin a partial resumption of a nucleararms race. Such an endeavour would be bounded bySTART I and thus present perhaps an incentive toreturn to the START process. However, according toa 1996 RAND report, a breakdown of the CFE“would destroy the unique legacy that holds the post-Cold War European security regime in place, and the

consequent damage done to mutual confidencebetween Russia and the West in the wake of itsabandonment would be extremely difficult torepair.”34 Michael Mandelbaum, a professor ofAmerican foreign policy at the Johns Hopkins Schoolof Advanced International Studies, sums up theproblem nicely in stating, “NATO expansion” runsthe risk of creating a consensus within Russia that notonly this particular measure but the entire post-ColdWar settlement is arbitrary, unfair, and anti-Russian.35

Next, expansion could weaken and possibly causeto collapse the fledgling democracy in Russia.According to scholar Michael Miller, NATOexpansion could strengthen the position of radicalnationalist and political opportunists, who could useNATO’s expansion to discredit the current leadershipand its pro-Western position. This could improve theopposition’s chances of seizing power, either througha coup or through the electoral process. It is no secretthat many of Russia’s leading figures and some of itsmilitary leaders do not have a deep and abiding faithin democratic rule. A return to authoritarianism couldconsequently be more likely.36 Miller’s opinion isshared by pro-Western Andrei Kozyrev, formerRussian Foreign Minister, who pointed out thatNATO expansion would delay the democraticexperiment in Russia.37

According to Woehrel, the most pessimisticscenario would involve the “discrediting of reformersand the eventual rise to power of leaders hostile to theWest.” While NATO expansion would not likelycause such a change in leadership it could form partof the opposition’s indictment against reformers. Ananti-reform movement made up of Communists,nationalists, and industrialists might see domesticpolitical gains in trying to isolate Russia, despite thelong-term consequences. This policy could “involvebuilding up Russian military forces to the extentpossible and sharply increasing political, economicand even military pressure against the Baltic states,Ukraine and other former Soviet republics.”38

The prospects for the Russian democratic reformprocess are at best uncertain. Given Russia’s longhistory of authoritarian rule, it would not be safe toassume that democracy will win. However, there is stilla chance it can win. Miller argues that the fate of thereform process will be determined mainly by thedomestic situation, but external actions could play arole as well. He continues with, “NATO expansion,which would be characterised by radical nationalistsand opportunists as a devastating blow to Russiannational security and yet another humiliation of a once-great power, could play an important role in thestruggle for power in Moscow. In the absence of a

29

military threat, it would be foolhardy for NATO to takesteps that will hurt democracy’s chances in Russia.” Heconcludes “If NATO enlargement brings radicalnationalists to power, they will by definition adopt amore confrontational stance towards the West.”39

A letter from the Russian Duma to PresidentKarsten Voigt of the North Atlantic Assembly,NATO’s legislative counterpart, stated, “We willconsider an enlargement of NATO as an unfriendlymove toward Russia.”40 According to Record, thepresent rush to enlarge NATO, by alienating Russia,will threaten to undermine the current peace andstability Europe has experienced during the last tenyears.41 This position is clearly backed to the extremeby Aleksandr Lebed of the Congress of RussianCommunities, who said that if NATO expands“World War III would begin and both civilised andnon-civilised states would disappear.”42

The fact that peace in Europe could be jeopardisedis affirmed by a 1995 report in KomosomolskayaPravda,in which the Russian General Staff composeda new draft military doctrine in part as a response tothe threat of NATO military expansion. The draftdoctrine foresees the immediate deployment ofRussian troops into Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania ifNATO confers membership on the Baltic states.43

What this really means is best summed up by formerSenator Sam Nunn who said, “We will not be doinganyone in Europe a favour if, by taking certain actionsregarding NATO expansion, we end up giving an edgein the political process to the most extremist elements inRussia. Although the West cannot control events inRussia, and probably can assist political and economicreform there only on the margins, as the medical doctorssay, our first principle should be to do no harm.”44

NATO expansion would also come with asizeable price tag. Alliance officials includingSecretary General Javier Solana and President Clintonhave judiciously avoided this one point ever sinceNATO leaders decided to expand the alliance. In atime of downsizing, budget cuts, and “peacedividends”, expansion to the east is going to costNATO membership billions of dollars that must comefrom somewhere.

How much the expansion of NATO will costdepends on whom one asks. Various estimates haveput the total cost of bringing three new members intothe alliance at anywhere from a low of $35 billionover 13 years, which is the Clinton Administration’sestimate, to a high of $125 billion, which is theCongressional Budget Office (CBO) estimate.45 Ofcourse, if other new members are brought in duringthose years, as the United States assumes, the pricewill go up. Whatever the real cost, it is significant

enough to have caused the weapons makers to startlobbying Congress for expansion. The next logicalquestion is: what is included in these estimates?

The three main areas of costs, according to a U.S.State Department report of NATO expansion, will be:1. new member costs for military restructuring;2. NATO regional reinforcement capabilities; and3. direct enlargement costs.

The first area includes modernisation and changingweapons systems from Warsaw Pact systems toNATO systems. The Administration estimates this at$1 billion per year.46 The second area is the regionalreinforcement capabilities. Current NATO membersmay incur some costs to reinforce new members’ owndefences in case of an external threat. This wouldcover deployability, logistics, and sustainmentshortfalls. The estimated cost is $8-10 billion over tenyears.47 Finally come the direct enlargement costs.Costs directly tied to expansion would fall into twoareas: costs incurred to get initial capability by 2001and costs incurred to achieve mature capability by2009. Things included in the initial capabilities willinclude command, control, communications andinformation (C3I) and reinforcement receptionfacilities, air command and control, and logistics.These also would include air traffic controlcapabilities, education in NATO languages,interoperable aircraft avionics and interoperable fuelfacilities. The areas needing improvement in themature capabilities include improved communicationsinterfaces, a weapons engagement capability, andimprovements to airfields, road and rail links, portsand staging areas, and enhanced fuel storage. If onemultiplies by four, the estimated cost is $9-12 billion.48

The cost amounts to between $1-3 billion per year, butwho is going to pay this bill?

Many believe the United States will end uppaying the lion’s share of the cost of expansion. TheDepartment of Defense assumes that 40 per centofdirect enlargement enhancements will be paid fornationally and 60 per centwould be common-funded.This breaks down to new members paying 35 percent, current (non-U.S. members) about 50 per cent,and the U.S. 15 per cent.49 There are only twoproblems with this idea. First, where are the newNATO members going to come up with the dollarsnecessary to pay this bill when they are trying torebuild economies shattered by 50-odd years ofcommunism? The second problem is getting currentNATO members to pay their share. Germany andFrance, while embracing expansion, have said theywill not contribute funds. We should find smallcomfort that the uncertainty in price is matched onlyby the uncertainty of payment.



Instead of moving toward a united and free Europe,NATO enlargement that includes some but not all ofCentral Europe could cause a new dividing line thatmay result in the excluded countries either rearming,being pushed back into a Russian sphere of influence,or becoming weaker and needing even more NATOsupport. NATO expansion will create dividing linesbetween those admitted and those left out. ScholarCharles Kupchan believes that moving NATO’sboundaries eastward has the promise of resurrectingEurope’s dividing lines, not erasing them. ScholarMichael Brown concurs, stating, “A new line would bedrawn in Europe; a new Cold War would ensue, andthe West would have itself to blame for bringing thisabout.”50 While allowing Poland to enter NATO wouldcertainly help the Poles feel more secure, Polishmembership would not reassure the Baltic states, giventheir proximity to Russia. Senator Kay BaileyHutchison summed it up, saying, “The people of thesecountries are unlikely to feel more secure if NATOexpands eastward, but stops short of their borders, ineffect, placing them in a buffer zone between anenlarged NATO and a more paranoid Russia.”51

One possible result of being on the wrong side ofthe dividing line is forced rearmament. GueorgiAanie, Bulgarian Defence Minister, believes that theexcluded countries would become victims of anti-integration processes which could bring aboutunpredictable consequences.52 Allistair Millar claimsthis could cause an arms race in Central and EasternEurope, citing a senior Romanian defence ministryofficial who said, “failure to be admitted to NATOwould force Romania to revert to a national ratherthan a cooperative defence strategy. This meansdiverting many more resources into building nationalarmed forces and away from where they are badlyneeded: the welfare of the people.53 Creating a newdividing line could result in non-NATO membersbeing forced into a Russian sphere of influence.Michael Brown believes that the eight states left outof NATO would find themselves the victims of risingRussian pressure: to join the Russian federation oreven to facilitate the federalisation of theCommonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Many,and perhaps all, of the states on the wrong side of thedividing line could be drawn into Russia’s orbit inways that should be avoidable.54 NATO fought forfifty years to pull away the iron curtain. Ironically,NATO expansion could stitch a new one for the East.

Moreover, a new dividing line could causecountries on the wrong side to deteriorateeconomically, necessitating more aid from NATOand the United States in particular. The further thesestates fall behind their neighbours economically, the

more help they will need later to stay free of Russianinfluence and to eventually join NATO. Meanwhile,new investment in Central Europe will naturally flowinto the states which will be under the US nuclearumbrella and NATO security guarantees. Someinvestors may choose to invest in new NATOmembers because of the perceived higher status, thenuclear umbrella of the U.S., or simply as part of themilitary build-up, which is already under way in somecandidate states. U.S. aid programs will probablyfavour the new NATO members.

Some observers do not think NATO shouldexpand by inviting weak members. Recent examplessuggest this is a bad idea. Moreover, it violates thecardinal principle of strategy. Finally, it always coststhe stronger members more. When great powersacquire allies, the tug is going to be more on thesuperior member than on the weak allies. Thesestronger members inherit all the risks, instabilities andliabilities of the weak allies, and one will have tomake good on these problems or face seriousconsequences.55 Slowly the strength seeps away fromthose who once possessed it.

Recent examples suggest it is not a good idea to getinto alliances with weak states. In the past, makingalliances with weak nations has proven disastrous forthe superior nation. One does not have to look very farback in history to see the results. Germany’s allianceswith Austria-Hungary in World War I and with Italy inWorld War II resulted in the diversion of significantresources from both the Eastern and Western fronts toshore up weaknesses created in the weak ally. PerhapsGermany could have won World War I and evenWorld War II had valuable resources not been divertedto weaker allies. In the course of supporting a weak allyin the Vietnamese civil war, the United States spent$120 billion, lost 58,000 human beings, and tarnishedits international reputation.56

In addition, allying with a weak state violates acardinal principle of strategy, namely minimising thenumber of your enemies. Allies add to an alliance’senemies. One inherits an ally’s enemies, and theirproblems become your problems. This also includesinternal enemies and problems. Since an alliance is alegal arrangement with a governing structure, youmust pledge to support that structure. If the governingstructure changes – if the regime of one of the alliancemembers changes – the alliance may take on adifferent character. One’s credibility could now bediminished, depending on one’s stance.57

Furthermore, alliances with weak states usuallycost the preeminent members more politically,economically, and militarily. In the political arena,weak states are more likely to get involved in both

31

internal and intra-alliance disputes. The likelihood ofdisputes increases as membership grows. Even indefensive alliances such as NATO, alliance membersmust decide if they will get involved, and on whoseside. One is forced to take sides, which can weakenthe alliance internally. And if hostilities break outwithin an alliance, regional or global conflicts canquickly ensue. Furthermore, economically, alliancescan be likened to blank cheques: somebody else fillsin the amount to pay and the due date, but it is yourcredit rating that is at stake. In short, the larger thealliance and the number of weak states in it, thegreater the risk to the alliance’s survival, especially toits strongest members.

Finally, it is doubtful that members of the armedforces of the United States and other current NATOcountries would be willing to risk their lives forHungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, not tomention the Soviet successor states.

Thus, opponents of NATO expansion wouldsummarise their views as follows. Expansion poses anunnecessary risk at present. It threatens to poison U.S.-Russian relations. The venture could cost as much as$125 billion at a time of shrinking budgets. It maycreate a new dividing line in Europe. It violates a keystrategic rule of not allying with weak states. And it isunrealistic to expect citizens of the United States andother NATO countries to risk their lives for countrieslike Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic.

Probably the two most important argumentsagainst NATO expansion are the possible negativeimpact on Russia both political and military, and thehigh costs of expansion. These are the argumentsfound in most literature and speeches by opponents ofNATO enlargement. With regard to U.S.-Russianrelations, critics of NATO expansion fear thepotential redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons inRussia, a delay in ratification of the START II andCFE treaties, and potential disruption ofdemocratisation in Russia. While it is true that mostRussian leaders oppose NATO expansion, theyagreed to sign the “Founding Act on MutualRelations”, which among other things creates a newforum for arms control called the NATO-RussiaPermanent Joint Council. This document alsoreiterated NATO’s promise not to deploy nuclearweapons on the soil of new members and articulatedthe desire to foster closer military-to-militarycooperation, as is the case in Bosnia. Recently,

President Yeltsin announced a cut in defencespending from 5 per centto 3.5 per centof GDP anda cut in nuclear weapons. These events could signalthat Russian leaders do not intend to escalatemilitarily to counter NATO expansion.58 In alllikelihood, the success or failure of Russiandemocracy will depend more on the state of theeconomy, than on NATO expansion. Recent opinionpolls show that Russian citizens remain relativelyindifferent toward NATO expansion and do not viewit as very important.

The second major argument critics raise – the costis often countered by the assertion that collectivedefence is more cost-effective than national defence.Alliances can often save money. As Vaclav Havel putit during a visit to Washington, “Even the most costlypreventive security is cheaper than the cheapestwar.”59 Moreover, peace and security do not comewithout a cost. Expansion requires NATO to extendserious security guarantees to new allies. Current costestimates range from $35 billion to $125 billion overthirteen years. NATO has not provided an officialestimate yet, but has promised to have one completedby the end of this year and has hinted that the costcould be far less. Nevertheless, even when oneaccepts the high estimate, which could amount toroughly $3 billion per year, the U.S. share would be15 per centor approximately $450 million per year.That is less than two-tenths of one per centof the totalU.S. defence budget over this period, expansionadvocates claim, and it is a small price to pay forincreased security and peace in Europe. But criticssay they fear the United States will have to pay thelion’s share of the cost, much the same way theUnited States is expected to pay larger dues to theUnited Nations.

In short, there are strong reasons for and againstNATO expansion. This topic should be studiedthoroughly by policy makers and citizens to ensurethat a correct decision is made. Just as decisions madeduring World War II had lasting effects for forty-fiveyears, the decision about NATO enlargement couldhave the same impact.

NOTES1. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, prepared statement

on NATO enlargement at Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C.,May 20, 1997, 4. A few years earlier, Senator Richard Lugarexpressed similar ideas: “The United States cannot afford toallow Europe to unravel for the third time this century.Projection of stability to the East is a prudent investment tosecure the peace in Europe.” Senator Richard Lugar, “AdmitPoland as a NATO member?” The Washington Times,September 19, 1993, B4.

2. Madeleine Albright, “Why Bigger is Better,” The Economist342, no. 8004 (February 15, 1997): 21.

Conclusions



3. ibid.4. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, “The Case for

Expanding NATO,” Time 150, no. 2 (July 14, 1997): 60.5. Department of State, Report to the Congress: Enlargement of

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits,Costs, and Implications(Washington, D.C.: GovernmentPrinting Office, 1997), 17.

6. Talbott, “After the Madrid Summit,” 15.7. Department of State, 7.8. Henry Kissinger, “Expand NATO Now,” The Washington

Post,December 19, 1994, A27.9. James W. Morrison, NATO Expansion and Alternative Future

Security Alignments,McNair Paper 40 (Washington, D.C.:National Defence University, April 1995), 29.

10. Peter W. Rodman, “4 More for NATO,” The Washington Post,December 13, 1994, A27.

11.Talbott, “Speech on NATO Enlargement at Atlantic Council,” 5.12. Talbott, “A NATO Expansion Architect Makes His Case,”

Christian Science Monitor,October 27, 1997, 15.13. Morrison, 30. RAND analysts also posit that the security

vacuum [between Germany and Russia] “threatens to undercutthe fragile new democracies in East-Central Europe byrekindling nationalism and reviving old patterns of geopoliticalcompetition and conflict, thereby endangering the historic gainsof the end of the Cold War.” See Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L.Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, “NATO Expansion: The NextSteps,” Survival 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 9.

14. Maj. Gen. Edward B. Atkeson, “NATO Expansion,” Army46,no. 1 (June 1996): 38.

15. Kissinger, op. cit.16.Rodman, op. cit. John Peters, a researcher at the RAND

Corporation, also argues that it is reassuring to states in“historically disputed territories” that others support theirexistence and continued independence. See John F. Peters,“Issues of Alliance Expansion for NATO: Growing Membership,Changing Needs,” Strategic Review, Fall, 1995, 19.

17. See, for example, William Safire, “Strategic Dilemma,” NewYork Times,December 1, 1994, 32. Safire asserts that “the timeto push the protective line eastward is now, while Russia is weakand preoccupied with its own revival, and not later, when such amove would be an insufferable provocation to a superpower.”

18. Kissinger.19. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “NATO – Expand or Die,” New York

Times,December 28, 1994, 15.20. Sam Nunn, “The Future of NATO in an Uncertain World:

Expansion Deserves Thorough and Careful Consideration,”Vital Speeches61, no. 19 (July 15, 1995): 583.

21. Peters.22. Peters.23. Talbott, “Speech on NATO Enlargement at Atlantic Council.”24. Brzezinski, op. cit.25. See, for example, Jeffrey Record and Julia Woodbury,. NATO

Enlargement: Two Views(Atlanta, Ga.: Georgia Tech ResearchCorporation, 1997), 30.

26. Albright.27. Steven Woehrel, NATO Enlargement and Russia,CRS Report

for Congress (Congressional Research Service: The Library ofCongress, May 28, 1997), 2

28. Quoted in Tim Zimmermann, “Russia’s Ace in the Hole,” U.S.News and World Report 122, no. 21 (June 2, 1997): 43.

29. ibid.30. Alexei Arbatov, “As NATO Grows, Start 2 Shudders,” New

York Times, August 26, 1997, 4.31. Record and Woodbury, op. cit., p. 42.32. Susan Eisenhower, “Russia and the Cold War Warhorses,”

Washington Post, March 20, 1997, sec. A.33. Record, op. cit., 42.34. ibid., 43.35. ibid.36. Michael E. Brown, “The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion,”

Survival 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 41.37. Maj. Gen. Edward B. Atkeson, “NATO Expansion,” Army 46,

no. 1 (June 1996): 34.38. Woehrel, 5-6.39. ibid.40. Atkeson.41. Record, 41.42. Atkeson.43. Stephen J. Cimbala, “NATO Enlargement and Russia,”

Strategic Review24, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 53.44. “NATO Expansion: Flirting with Disaster,” The Defense

Monitor 24, no. 9 (November/December 1995): 4.45. Bruce W. Nelan, “Nyet to a New NATO,” Time149, no. 13

(March 31, 1997): 49.46. One should add a factor of four to match the CBO estimate.47. Again, one should multiply by a factor of four to reconcile

Administration and CBO estimates.48. Department of State, Report to the Congress: Enlargement of

the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Rationale, Benefits,Costs, and Implications (Washington, D.C.: GovernmentPrinting Office, 1997), 17.

49. ibid.50. Michael E. Brown,“NATO Expansion: Wait and See,” The

Washington Post, December 26, 1994, A29.51. “NATO Expansion: Flirting With Disaster,” 5.52. Allistair Millar, “NATO Expansion and the Excluded

Countries: A New Division of Europe,” Global Beat,July1997, http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nato/nets.html.

53. ibid.54. Brown, “The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion,” 41.55. Grant T. Hammond, Air War College, interviewed by author,

November 5, 1997.56. ibid.57. ibid.58. Michael R. Gordon, “Yeltsin Dismisses Top Defense Aides for

Resisting Cuts,” New York Times,May 23, 1997, p.A1.59. Quoted in speech by Madeleine Albright before the Senate

Appropriations Committee on October 21, 1997 in WashingtonD.C., “NATO Expansion: A Shared and Sensible Investment.”See U.S. Department of State Dispatch,November 1997, Vol.8, issue 9, p.12.

33

Johanna Granville rceived her B.A. from Amherst College and MA and PhD from Tufts University (The Fletcher School of Lawand Diplomacy). She received the American Council of Teachers of Russian Grant (1992-3) and a Fulbright Grant(1994-5) to conduct research in the former Soviet Union. She is one of the first American scholars to work in the CommunistParty Central Committee archives in Moscow. Her work focuses on international security, diplomatic history, and foreign policyof the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Her dissertation examined Soviet military decision making in Hungary (1956),Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979). She is currently working on a book on the Soviet intervention in Hungary.


HERITAGE OF THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE1999 ANNUAL RAAF HERITAGE AWARDS

In 1912, just nine years after the Wright Brothers made the first powered, heavier-than-airflight, Australia’s military aviation heritage began with the formation of the Central FlyingSchool (CFS) at Point Cook, just outside Melbourne. Part of the Army, CFS was renamedthe Australian Flying Corps (AFC) in 1914, and during World War I fought in Mesopotamia,Egypt and on the Western Front.

Shortly after the War, the Government decided a separate, independent Australian Air Forceshould be established in recognition of the growing importance of air power in armedconflict. Thus, on 31 March 1921 the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) was formed.

At the outbreak of World War II the RAAF comprised only about 3,000 men and a handfulof obsolete aircraft. By the end of hostilities, however, it had become the fourth largest airforce in the world (after the USSR, USA and United Kingdom), with about 180,000 men andwomen, and 5,500 aircraft. Australian airmen and airwomen had fought with distinction inalmost every theatre of the War, and had suffered almost 14,000 casualties.

Major actions since 1945 have included the Occupation of Japan, the Berlin Airlift, theMalayan Emergency, the Korean War, the Vietnam War and numerous demanding anddangerous “peacekeeping” operations with the United Nations. In peacetime, the RAAF hasserved the nation and Australia’s neighbours in natural disaster relief, aeromedicalevacuations, search and rescue and other similar activities.

Artistic, photographic and written records have formed an integral part of the RAAF heritagesince 1921. To enhance the existing records of its activities and to foster and encourageinterest in its heritage, the RAAF has established the Annual Heritage Awards. Through theacquisitive nature of the Awards, the RAAF has added many paintings and photographs to itscollection, and numerous manuscripts have been published as books.

There are three categories of Heritage Awards – Art, Literature and Photography – with prizemoneys totalling $12,000.

Entries for the 1998 RAAF Heritage Awards close on 31 January 1999. Winning entries willbe announced in March 1999 during Air Force Week. Entry forms are available bycontacting the RAAF Air Power Studies Centre as follows:

Air Power Studies Centre Tel: (02) 6287 6563RAAF Base Fax: (02) 6287 6382FAIRBAIRN ACT 2600 E-mail: [email protected]

By Major T. Basan, RA Inf

“You must grasp the full purpose of everyenterprise so that if your leader be killed you canyourself fulfil it.”

Ten Commandments of a Fallschirmjaeger

Airborne forces made their first combatappearance during the Second World War. From

that moment, the ability to “leap” or verticallyenvelope an enemy or terrain has provided nationswith the means to suddenly and decisively, confuseand confound an adversary’s system of war. Airbornetroops have demonstrated their capability to act inconcert with ground forces or to conduct independentoperations. When cooperating with ground forces,airborne forces can vertically envelop to seize andhold decisive terrain; for example, the Germanoperations in Holland in 1940, the German operationto seize the Corinth Canal in 1941, the Allied landingsin Sicily in 1943, and the Allied landings inNormandy in 1944. Independent operations or actionsthat are only loosely linked to a campaign areillustrated by the German capture of Crete in 1941;the Australian/USA operations in the MarkhamValley, New Guinea in 1943 and the British raid onBruneval in 1942.1

In more modern times airborne forces have struckat Kolewsi, Congo; Cassinga, Angola; Grenada,Panama and the 1990-91 Gulf War. The key toairborne operations is the technological, tactical andvisionary ability to undertake strategic air transportand landings with units ready for combat, units thatpossess high mobility, adequate protection andoverwhelming striking power. Airborne Forces offergovernment the ideal capability to undertake militarymissions in support of national political objectives,within very short time frames. By using the ability ofairborne troops to deploy rapidly over long distances,free from the interference of terrain or man-madeobstacles, governments can selectively dominate anypoint of direct military interest on the globe.

This article discusses the relevance of airborneforces on the modern battlefield. The article willcover the changing world security environment, thecharacteristics of airborne forces and the four keyaspects of airborne forces: the ability to act effectivelyin crisis situations; rapidly dominate a selected pointof direct military interest; conduct close cooperationwith other military actions; and the ability to conductindependent operations, to seize a fleeting politico-military opportunity.

For government, defence of our territory andinterests is the first priority.2 Australia’s defencepolicy, capability, organisations and training has to berelevant to the strategic circumstances at the time.With the end of the Cold War the strategiccircumstances have changed. Unfortunately, forAustralia these changes have not necessarily made theAsia-Pacific region a safer place.3 The current, andforeseeable environment is full of uncertainty, chaosand the knowledge that current solutions are notnecessarily relevant.4 The last ten years has seen a risein non-state war and is predicted to continue andeventually be the primary reason for armed conflict,whilst, state versus state war will probably decline, asthe likely reason for armed forces to fight.5

Since the Cold War, we have seen armed conflictoccur from the Atlas Mountains of Central Asia to theAndes of South America. Even the streets of majorcities have seen organised combat, though at lowlevel of intensity and tempo. The main protagonisthave been ethnic groups, gangs, tribal clans, and othernon-state groups who are willing to wage war againstall. There seems to be no shortage of people willing totake up arms for a cause, and to fight to the death,often as unpaid volunteers. This has placed the soldierof the major powers in a position of uncertainty,unfamiliarity and danger.6 For Australian troops,recent experiences have brought home the reality ofthe new security environment. Personnel deployed toSomalia and Rwanda experienced the conditions of

Changing World Security Environment

Introduction

Airborne Forces: The Twenty-First Century’s RapidDominance Solution

clan warfare, and witnessed the raw violence of gangsand tribal conflict.

The transition from a bi-polar world, where eachsecurity bloc held some sway over its members, to amulti-polar world, where states are freer to act in theirown interest has created the situation where armedconflict becomes a more attractive option. This hasbeen reinforced by the proliferation of all types ofweapons due to the breakdown of various statecontrols and the selling of excess weapons,ammunition and equipment. Within our region, MIGaircraft are being procured by the Malaysians; shipsexcess to German requirements, by the Indonesians;and surplus F111s by Australia. Though acquisitiondoes not singularly indicate a threat, these and otherregional acquisitions will increase the potential scaleof any future conflict within our region.7

Given the changes in the geopoliticalenvironment, the amount of warning time, assessed tobe available, before conflict starts has undergonerenewed analysis. When the current securityenvironment is integrated with the state oftechnological development, it is possible to suggestthat the time is ripe for a new optimisation of fightingsystems. This has lead to the formation of rapiddeployment forces amongst the major nations of theworld, such as the German Crisis Reaction Forces andthe American Rapid Deployment Force. Within theADF, warning time considerations have lead to theintroduction of the concept of short-warning conflict.8

Unfortunately, Defending Australia 1994onlyfocuses on the warning time that will be available forthe direct defence of the nation; however, similarconsiderations apply to our greater security interests.Our deployments to Somalia and Rwanda, are interestbased deployments rather than defence based; andoccurred with limited notice and preparation. Theintensity, tempo and duration of conflict has changed.Therefore, the force mix best suited to deal withconflict is also changing. Conceptually, airborneforces inherent flexibility now offer the optimumfighting systems for this new military reality.

An “Airborne Force” is defined in AustralianDefence Force Publication 39as “a force composedprimarily of grounds and air units organised,equipped and trained for airborne operations”; and“Airborne Operations” is defined as “an operationinvolving the movement of combat forces and theirlogistic support into an objective area by air for the

execution of a tactical or strategic mission, when theforces involved may be required to engage in combatimmediately on leaving the aircraft.9 Or moresimplistically – air and ground units raised, organised,equipped, trained and ready for immediate combatafter air transportation.

Airborne forces are characterised by their abilityto move rapidly from a remote location to anobjective. This enables the application of decisiveforce at an enemy’s centre of gravity.10 To achievemission success, airborne forces must focus on sixkey issues: air superiority; highly trained, motivatedand led fighters; organised, manned, equipped andactive in peace, rapid mission execution; missiontemplates; and meteorological support.11 Airsuperiority is critical to the success of the airtransportation phase. Ideally, air superiority should beachieved early and maintained throughout theconflict. However, it is only essential for airsuperiority to be achieved at those critical times andplaces required by the operation.12 Airborneoperations require superb soldiers eager for action,able to act independently and toughened for combat.The intense conditions found in airborne operationsand the possibility that support may be unable toarrive necessitates combatants of the highest calibre.13

Fighting power is an important issue in airborneforces. Due to weight, space and material limitationsof the air element, most airborne ground combatelements are light in striking power, protection andmobility.14 This is essentially a technical problem, onethat can be overcome. An excellent example ofovercoming technical restrictions, is the Germandevelopment of the Wiesel family of vehicles, combatvehicles specifically designed for air transportation,landing and mechanical ground combat. Sinceairborne forces require specialised training,equipment and organisation it is essential that they arefully formed during peace. In this way, the skills,knowledge and attitudes required to conduct airborneoperations will not be lost and only later recoveredthrough hardship and blood.15 Airborne operations,whilst rapid in striking an objective consumesignificant amounts of time in preparation. They arealso difficult to change once launched. To minimisethese issues, detailed planning in peace and thedevelopment of templates for all conceivableoperations, which can be modified as required by thedetail of the situation, will reduce the launching timeand enhance operational flexibility.16 Metrologicaldata is critical to all forms of airborne operation and isoverlooked at one’s peril.17 Weather cannot bedefeated, but can be avoided by reconnaissance,surveillance and long-range forecasting.

Airborne Forces Characteristics


AIRBORNE FORCES: THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY’S RAPID DOMINANCE SOLUTION

To achieve excellence in each of the sixcategories consumes vast resources, but produces aflexible, long-reaching and permanent landdominance option for government.

A strong airborne capability allows the military tosupport national objectives within very short timeframes, by utilising the ability to deploy rapidly overlong distances, free from man-made and terrainobstacles, to selectively dominate any point of directmilitary interest. There are three significant strengthsthat an airborne force has in comparison to the otherpotential combat mixes. They are the ability to beemployed quickly as a crisis action force; the abilityto rapidly dominate a battle area through airtransportation, and the capacity to act in close co-operation with other naval, military or air actions in acombat theatre.

Issues requiring a military response can arisequickly.18 Military action is initiated by a range ofpolitical, economic, military, and or social forces,which are affected by deliberate planning,miscalculation or natural disaster. With the changingnature of the geopolitical environment, crisis actionoperations are both conceivable and likely.19 At thelower end of the conflict spectrum, these missions canbe either United Nations initiated, such as Rwanda;multinational, such as Somalia; or independentlyinitiated, such as the evacuation from Cambodia in1997. Whilst the higher end of the spectrum is amplydemonstrated by the Gulf War. Since it appears likelythat there will be many crisis action missions in thefuture; forces will need to be structured, organised,equipped and trained to deal with short noticesituations. These units must be maintained at highstates of personnel readiness and equipped withexcellent materiel, in order to deal with actionthroughout the spectrum of conflict.20

Since crisis actions are both conceivable andlikely, preliminary planning and the development ofcontingency blueprints is necessary. The key todealing with crisis situations is to think and act interms of time rather than space.21 Time is of theessence in order to recover from a surprise. AsSuvorov stated “I act not by laws, but by minutes”.22

With the current world security environment, the idealforce to act by “minutes” is an airborne force.Airborne forces are able to operate at speeds, ordersof magnitude faster than other forces, offering theability to quickly concentrate, to deal with the crisis.An example of the use of airborne forces in a crisissituation was the early deployment of the US 82ndAirborne Division to Saudi Arabia during the 1990-91 Gulf War.23 The US 82nd provided an immediateresponse, when no other permanent presence optionwas available. The Australian operation to facilitatethe evacuation of prescribed persons from Cambodiaalso illustrates the flexibility of airborne forceelements.

The capacity of airborne forces to deploy rapidly,in crisis situations, is enhanced by their ability tooverfly ground obstacles. This is especially importantin areas with poor road networks or infrastructure.Additionally, air transportation offers 360 degrees ofapproach to an objective, whilst ground based supportis restricted to relatively obvious lines ofcommunications. When resupply needs to occurunder the threat of direct fire, air transportation’svulnerability to air-defence weapons is apparent.However, the exposure to this danger can beminimised by mission planning, advanced counter-measured suites and using the aircraft’s characteristicsof speed, range and approach flexibility. The result isless troops and equipment required to face the danger,thus minimising the number of possible casualties.The growing number of humanitarian missions canalso be handled by a force that can move, strike ordefend rapidly.

With the heightened probability of crisissituations, a rapid reaction component is needed todeal with the situation. The crisis situations that haveoccurred around the globe, have not required the fullweight of military power, but the selective displayand use of force. Airborne forces are especially suitedto undertake these missions. They have the ability toconcentrate fighting power in time and space, as noother forces can. This ability to act promptly has seentheir use in combat situations by French, American,Soviet and South African forces since the end of theSecond World War and has established them as thelead elements of rapid deployment forces.24

Permanent dominance of a land mass is theunderlying mission of armies. Dominance can beachieved through the use of a number of military

Rapid Dominance

Crisis Action

Relevance to the 21st CenturyBattlefield

37

techniques. Techniques that vary in time, space andresources. In those instances where rapid dominanceof an objective area is essential, air transportation ofground forces offers the ability to rapidly dominate.To achieve this form of dominance the airborneforce’s structure must be such that it is able to rapidlydominate its battlespace. In order to rapidly dominatebattlespace, force packaging is critical and mustsuccessfully cross all battle operating systems togenerate a self-contained fighting system. Rapiddominance requires the ability to generate a highorder of mobility to concentrate rapidly andeconomically at the decisive point in both time andspace.25 Airborne forces offer the ideal vehicle toachieve rapid dominance of an objective.

Rapid dominance of an objective is gainedthrough the free manoeuvre of combat functions;permitting asymmetric attack, defence or movement;in order to impose one’s will on an adversary, throughawe of our capability and shock in our actions.26 Anexcellent example of this philosophical approach isthe US invasion of Panama, in which simultaneousattacks across the entire country and throughout therange of centres of gravity paralysed the Panamanianforces.27 Simultaneous rather than sequential actionoffers the potential to confound an enemy’s commandsystem. The capacity to simultaneously concentrate intime and space on a number of objectives withoverwhelming force, both physical and psychological,generates the awe necessary to deter potentialadversaries from acts of aggression or considering thepossibility of interfering with our aims. When combatis necessary, the inherent reach of air transportation,striking power of the weapon systems and protectionthrough manoeuvre, creates sufficient shock tosurprise an adversary. The key to achieving shock andawe in an adversary is the ability to conductasymmetric action, that is, to render his actions orstrengths irrelevant to the situation. A simple exampleis the defeat of Crassus’ Roman Legion by Parthianarchers. Crassus’ homogenous force was destroyed bya complex mixed force, because he was unable to dealwith the combat dilemma that he faced.28 Modernexamples are the ability of attack helicopter todisproportionately kill armour and an airborne force’sability to render conventional ground obstaclesobsolete through vertical envelopment. Thus, thecombined effect of both material and psychologicalfactors can reduce the potential for conflict orminimise the cost of any combat.

The higher order of mobility generated byairborne forces allows for the rapid movement offighting power. An airborne force can simultaneouslystrike a number of objectives separated by

considerable space. This ability to strike and moverapidly, across considerable distance within shortspaces of time, generates the surprise essential torapidly dominate an adversary.

Close cooperation with naval, military or airactions is a common role for airborne forces. Fromtheir beginning airborne forces offered theopportunity for vertical envelopment. Verticalenvelopment was seen as a solution to the problemsof horizontal envelopment. Modern mass armies areable to fix their flanks on difficult terrain, makinghorizontal envelopment near impossible. Verticalenvelopment offers the opportunity to surprise anadversary in time and space, and thus defeat likelycountermeasures. The consequent psychologicalimpact is immense.29

Close cooperation is considered the most decisiveuse of airborne forces.30 Seven key tasks have beenidentified linking airborne operations to terrestrialaction: seize and hold decisive terrain, attacks in rearareas, disrupt enemy reserves, pursue fleeing forces,and reinforce ground forces.31 When launched, thesetasks exploit the power of surprise and the very threatof launching has the positive effect of locking uplarge bodies of enemy reserves.32

Seizing and holding decisive terrain is a coreairborne force task. By seizing decisive terrain anadvance can be accelerated by aiding a breakout orcontrolling defilades vital to the operation. Actionssuch as the German capture of the Belgian forts in1940 or the Allied landings in Holland in 1944illustrate this task. Attacks in rear areas focuses ondisrupting the command, control and logisticarrangements of an army. The best illustration is theGerman landings in Holland in 1940. Pre-emptiveaction to disrupt enemy reserves was the task of theAllied landings in Normandy in 1944. By dislocatingthe German reserves the Allies protected their flanksand allowed the sea landings to develop successfully.Pursuing and overtaking a fleeing force has been aproblem that an advancing force has had difficulty inovercoming. Airborne action offers the capability toout pace the fleeting force and fixing them in order tofinish their combat effectiveness. The German assaulton the Corinth Canal illustrates this option. Thereinforcement of ground forces, when hard pressed orsuccessful has presented a commander with adilemma. The fly-in of reinforcements to exploit anopportunity was used successfully by the Germans in

Close Cooperation with Ground Action


AIRBORNE FORCES: THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY’S RAPID DOMINANCE SOLUTION

Crete in 1941, whilst, reinforcing hard pressed troopswas conducted by the Allies in Salerno in 1943.33

Even in modern times, the possibility still existsfor airborne forces to cooperate with naval, military orair action. The US landings in Grenada and Panamaclearly illustrate this potential.

Independent action, is military operations notclosely related in place and time to other groundactions, but only bound to the latter by the generalconnection existing between all military operations ina theatre of war.34 Independent actions are closelyrelated to crisis action operations.

The significant difference is in the focus; theability to seize opportunities, to be pro-active and thusto shape the combat environment to one’s favour. Inconventional war, independent missions attempt toexploit an opportunity by using surprise to reduceenemy interference. They seek to concentrate in timeand space faster than an adversary, to capture centresof gravity in difficult terrain before an adversary canmanoeuvre, reinforce or withdraw. Historically,airborne forces have captured islands under the coverof air superiority or operated in difficult terrain whereenemy resistance is ineffective.35

Independent missions can be divided into fivemain types: seizing centre of gravity, raiding,harassment, internal security, and political impact.Seizing and holding centres of gravity against lightopposition is the primary independent mission. This ischaracterised by the capture of Crete in 1941, whereair superiority allowed a parachute assault to seizeobjectives and the defender was restricted fromgenerating sufficient combat effect fromreinforcements and reserves, by the terrain. Airborneforces are an excellent vehicle to conduct raids. Theirinherent range and speed, allows an insertion, strikeand withdrawal, whilst an adversary is still overcomeby shock. Airborne forces have raided to rescueprisoners, capture material and to destroy installations.Harassing is generally considered a special forces task,however, airborne elements can support guerillacampaigns, if required. Strategic mobility allowsairborne forces to be held centrally and deployed whenrequired. The UK Middle East Land Forces developedextensive plans to use this option. When heldcentrally, airborne forces can generate greatermomentum and attack from any direction, in starkcontrast to similarly positioned ground bound forces.Political impact can be generated by airborne forces

seizing a fleeting opportunity, in order to gain asignificant political advantage. Examples of this typeof action are the capture of Athens in 1944, thesecuring of Copenhagen in 1945, and the occupationof Tokyo in 1945.36

During independent missions airborne forces arereliant on their own capacities. In order to beeffective, self-contained fighting packages having theright mix of combat, combat support and combatservice support are essential. The mix must also becomplex in the number and type of fighting systems,to allow a commander the potential to conductasymmetric attack, defence or movement; to achievethe objective. These capabilities must then be capableof rapid transition from aerial to land manoeuvre andreturn, to be time efficient and generate timedominance over an adversary.

Airborne forces are still relevant, and willcontinue to be so, under the current geopoliticalsituations. They can rapidly dominate an adversary,undertake independent operations and conduct crisisaction missions at long range and short notice.Airborne forces offer the capacity to attack from anydirection; in order to strike otherwise inaccessibleobjectives, by over-flying ground obstacles in theirpath – thus achieving surprise. The ability to rapidlydeploy permits concentration of force in both timeand space, at the decisive point. Complete airborneforces provide a flexible, full-spectrum combatcapability, designed for aerial movement to undertakeclose combat tasks throughout the range of conflict,levels of warfare and geopolitical situations. Such aforce must take into account national geographicreality, demographic dispersal, level of nationalpower, treaty obligations, national political objectivesand geo-political factors. Given these factors, only anairborne force offers this capability.

Since it is likely that future wars will no longer beconfined to the customary state versus state conflict, achange in military emphasis is required. Battle willfeature opposing idealogies such as: nationalmovements, resistance movements, revolutionaryorganisations, issue motivated groups or anarchistelements, which in an age of dying nationalism cutthrough all states. These changes create favourableconditions for large-scale airborne landings deep inthe enemy’s hinterland and for maintaining thosebases. Assuming that there is a sufficiently strong airtransport force, the future of airborne landings by

Conclusion

Independent Action

39


large bodies of troops for independent missions is thefuture of airborne warfare. With proper preparationand modern technology, it is possible to form basesby airborne landings far in an enemy’s safe area, inareas where no threat from ground troops is expectedand from which independent military operations, ofany scope, can be undertaken. To supply the logisticsrequirements, by air, for the necessary time isessentially a technical problem, which can be solved.37

The independent commitment of tough, resoluteand well equipped airborne soldiers offersgovernment an effective method of suddenly anddecisively defeating the enemy’s system of war.

NOTES1. UK War Office Publication, Part II, Land/Air Warfare

Pamphlet No.4 Airborne and Airtransportation Operations1953, pp. 5-6.

2. Howard J. Australia’s Defence Policy Lessons from the Past;Principles for the Future, Defender, Vol 1, xxii, no 4, Summer1995/96, p. 4.

3. ibid, pp. 4-5.4. ibid, pp. 4-5.5. Remarks made by historian, Martin Van Creveld during a

presentation to AHQ staff and visitors on the 28 May 1997.Detailed analysis is contained in his book The Transformationof War.

6. Unknown Author, Operational Manoeuvre From the Sea,Surface Warfare,Vol 2, no 4, Jul/Aug 96, pp. 7-13.

7. Commonwealth of Australia, Defending Australia: DefenceWhite Paper 1994, AGPS, Canberra, 1994, pp. 24-25.

8. ibid.9. ADFP 39, Operations Series, Airborne Operations, Glossary.10. ibid, para 201.11. http:www.army.mil/CMH-PG/104-13.HTM, Airborne

Operations: A German Perspective. p. 43.12.ADFP 39,para 206.13. German Perspective, op citp. 43.14.ADFP 39,para 211.15. German Perspective, op citp. 43.16. ibid.17.ADFP 39,para 62018. Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Strategic Planning in

the 1990s, AGPS, Canberra, 1989, pp. 23-25.19. Fell R. Equipping the German Army, Military Technology,

6/96, 1996, pp. 59-62.20. ibid.21. Leonhard R.R. Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War,

Praeger, Connecticut, 1994, p. xviii.22. ibid, p. xi.23. Commonwealth of Australia, ADF Gulf War Study: The Gulf

War August 1990-March 1991, DPUBS, Canberra, 1991,pp. 8-9.

24. Most degrees of notice to move are classified, however, it isreasonable to expect that airborne units and in particularparachute units are on very short notices to move. This is thepublic position within the ADF.

25. MLW Part 1, Volume 1, Pamphlet 1, Fundamentals of LandWarfare, 1992, p. 29.

26. US Army, FM 100-5 Operations, 1993, pp. 6.3-6-4.27. Art of War in the Western World.28. German Perspective, op citp. 42.29. UK, Pamphlet No. 4, p. 6.30. ibid.31. ibid, p. 1.32. ibid, p. 6.33. German Perspective, op citp. 3 of 36.34. UK, Pamphlet No. 4, p. 6.35. ibid.36. German Perspective, op citp. 3 of 36.37. This article was produced prior to SR 97 being released.

BIBLIOGRAPHYBooksCreveld Van M. Fighting Power – German and US Army

Performance, 1939-45, Greenwood, Westport, 1983.Dunningan J.F. Dirty Little Secrets: Military Information You’re

Not Supposed to Know, Morrow, New York, 1990.Leonhard R.R. Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War,

Praeger, Connecticut, 1994. Art of War in the Western World.Lind W.S. Manoeuvre Warfare Handbook, Westview Press,

Boulder, 1985.Tsouras P.G. (ed) Fighting in Hell: The German Ordeal on the

Eastern Front, Greenhill, 1995.Military PublicationsADFP 39, Operations Series, Airborne Operations, Glossary.ADF, ADF Gulf War Study: The Gulf War August 1990-March

1991, DPUBS, Canberra, 1991.MLW Part 1, Volume 1, Pamphlet 1, Fundamentals of Land

Warfare, 1992.US Army, FM 100-5 Operations, 1993.US Marine Corps, FMFM1, Warfighting, 1989.UK War Office Publication, Part II, Land/Air Pamphlet No.4

Airborne and Airtransportation Operations, 1953.Official PublicationsCommonwealth of Australia, Defending Australia: Defence White

Paper 1994, AGPS, Canberra, 1994.Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Strategic Planning in the

1990s, AGPS, Canberra, 1989.ArticlesHoward J. Australia’s Defence Policy Lessons from the Past;

Principles for the Future, Defender, Vol 1, xxii, no 4, Summer1995/96.

Fell R. Equipping the German Army. Military Technology, 6/96,1996.

Mettler W. LTCOL. The German Airborne Antitank Battalion, andthe Wiesel Armoured Weapon Carrier, Infantry, Jan/Feb, 1995.

Mueller B. COL Airborne Brigade 31, NATO Sixteen Nations, No1/96, 1996.

Unknown Author Concept of Operation, NATO Sixteen Nations,No 1/96, 1996.

Unknown Author, Operational Manoeuvre From the Sea, SurfaceWarfare, Vol 2, no 4, Jul/Aug 96.

Other Sourceshttp:www.army.mil/CMH-PG/104-13.HTM, Airborne Operations:

A German Perspective.

Major Thomas Basan enlisted in the Army in January 1980 and was posted to 2/4 RAR as an infantryman. He served withSASR before graduating from RMC in June 1989. After commissioning has had postings to 3 RAR, School of Infantry, PilbaraRegt, 3 Training Group and Army Headquarters. He is currently OC Administration Company, 3 RAR.

By Major Andrew Drayton, RAEME

Small in numbers and well-trained, particulary inanti-guerrilla warfare, the Australian Army wasmuch like the post-Versailles German Army inwhich even men in the ranks might have beenleaders in some less capable force

General William WestmorelandCommander US Forces Vietnam until 1969

Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War beganin July 1962 when 30 instructors, the Australian

Army Training Team Vietnam, AATTV, werecommitted to help train the armed forces of theRepublic of Vietnam (RVN). This commitmentoriginated from the desire of the AustralianGovernment to support and encourage USinvolvement in Vietnam. After the initial deploymentof the AATTV, the size of Australia’s contributionprogressively increased. In May 1965, the FirstBattalion, Royal Australian Regiment, was deployedand operated as a part of the US Army’s 173rdAirborne Brigade.

In May 1966, the Australian Governmentincreased the size of the force to a Task Force,including two infantry battalions, Australian and NewZealand artillery units, armoured personnel carriers,elements of the Special Air Service, and a squadron ofhelicopters from the RAAF. It was considered that aTask Force of this size would be able to operate as anindependent tactical unit controlling operations in anindependent area of operations. An area of operationswas selected and the Australian Task Force (ATF)commenced operations in, and assumed militaryresponsibility for, the province of Phouc Tuy. At notime did the ATF become responsible for the civiladministration of the province. The ATF was themajor Australian contribution to the Vietnam War interms of the number of men involved and theresources expended. It became the main focus of theAustralian effort.

Since the end of the Vietnam War there has beenconsiderable debate about the role of the ATF inVietnam. This debate has revolved around two issues:firstly, whether the role assigned to the Task Forcewas too ambiguous or just plain flexible; andsecondly, whether the Task Force actually achievedanything during its time in Vietnam. This article willevaluate the role of the ATF in relation to these twoquestions. It will argue that the role was bothambiguous and flexible and that this combinationallowed Task Force Commanders the ability tochange the focus of the Task Force as thecircumstances dictated. It will also argue that eventhough the Task Force accounted for itself well on thebattlefields, the long term benefits of these effortsneeds to be considered in the overall context of theVietnam War.

The Australian Task Force carried out operationsin Vietnam from May 1966 to November 1971 duringwhich time there was three distinct phases. The firstphase, from May 1966 to the end of 1967, was aperiod during which a two-battalion sized Task Forceoperated almost entirely in Phuoc Tuy province itself.During this phase, the Task Force primarilyconcerned itself with “pacification”. The centralobjective was to provide security to the mainpopulated areas. The second phase, from January1968 to May 1969, saw the size of the Task Forceincreased by a further battalion. In this phase, theTask Force operated for considerable periods of timeoutside the province of Phuoc Tuy and becameinvolved in operations against the National Front forthe Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) and thePeople’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) main force units.The third phase, commenced in June 1969 and endedwith the withdrawal of the Task Force in November1971. This phase saw the Task Force return to similarduties as were carried out during phase one and onceagain the Task Force operated mainly in Phuoc Tuyprovince against smaller guerrilla units. It also startedto train RVN forces in order to allow the RVN to takeover control of the province upon the ATF’s

The Role Assigned to the AustralianTask Force - Ambiguous or Flexible?

Introduction

A Re-evaluation of the Role of the Australian Task Forcein Vietnam

departure from Vietnam. This latter process, knownas “Vietnamisation”, brought the ATF’s involvementin the war to an end. Throughout the period of theTask Force’s involvement in Vietnam it is thereforeclear that the Task Force performed a number ofdifferent tasks.

Many Australian military historians have arguedthat the role given to the ATF in Vietnam was anextremely ambiguous one. This ambiguity causedmany problems for the commander of the ATF as heattempted to fulfill competing and often divergentoperational requirements. According to DavidHorner, once the Task Force had established itsoperational base at Nui Dat it was required to conducttwo types of operations, conventional andpacification, both requiring a major effort from theATF. The conventional operations were more likelyto be directed by the US II Field Force and conductedin the less populated areas of the province, whilst thepacification operations had to be conducted inconjunction with the South Vietnamese authorities,and took place around the towns and villages. Therequirement to carry out both of these tasks causedproblems. Frank Frost and Greg Lockhart agree withthis assessment.

On the other hand, Ian McNeill argues that therole of the ATF should not be described as ambiguousbut as inherently, and deliberately, flexible. Eventhough commanders had to make compromises aboutwhich tasks they would pursue because they did nothave sufficient forces to carry out all taskssimultaneously, the role afforded a significant amountof autonomy to the commander on the ground so thatpriorities could be altered as circumstances changed.The general nature of the directive given tocommanders was welcomed as they sought as muchindependence as possible. The change of focus of theoperations of the Task Force over the years it spent inVietnam, as described in the introduction, illustratethis flexibility afforded to the ATF.

Like all questions about military history andpolitics, there are various different opinions about thesuitability of the role of the ATF in Vietnam. In orderto evaluate the role of the ATF it is thereforenecessary to define what that role was, and it is alsonecessary to consider how the proponents of each sideof the argument have derived their conclusions. Byconsidering both sides of the argument a judgmentcan be made about whether the role of the ATFshould be seen as being ambiguous or flexible.

Most references to the Task Force’s involvementin the Vietnam War refer to the following passagewhen defining the role of the ATF:

The general mission of the ATF will be to carryout operations in coordination with and in support ofthe Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and theUnited States Forces. ... Any of the following tasksmay be assigned to units under your command:

Australian Task Force (1) To secure anddominate the assigned tactical area ofresponsibility in the Phuoc Tuy Province; (2) Toconduct operations related to the security ofHighway 15 as required; (3) To conduct otheroperations in Phuoc Tuy Province as required;(4) To conduct operations anywhere in the Armyof the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) III CorpsTactical Zone and subsequently in the area of theadjacent Province of Binh Thuan in the ARVN IICTZ as agreed between yourself andCOMUSMACV.

(F. Frost, 1987, pages 64/65)

This passage is derived directly from the directivegiven to the Commander, Australian Force Vietnamby the Chiefs of Staff Committee, signed by theChairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee on the20th January 1969.

Debate about the role of the ATF revolves aroundthe question of whether or not this role wassufficiently precise and whether it clearly delineatedexactly what was required of the Task Force on theground. An evaluation of the role given to the TaskForce can be based upon answering whether the rolegave rise to problems because of ambiguity, orwhether this role provided flexibility.

Frank Frost argues that many of the dilemmasconfronting the ATF in Vietnam arose directly fromthe fact that forces were deployed with an impreciserole into an environment which was not adequatelyunderstood. He argues that the reason why the rolewas so imprecisely defined was that Australia’sdecision to deploy forces was based upon the desire toextend diplomatic and political support to the US andRVN Governments rather than because of concernover a direct military threat to Australia. Australianforces were expected to make a useful contributionbecause of their tactical skill, training and experiencein operations in South East Asia, however, theseforces in themselves were never regarded as being ofdecisive military importance in the overall conflict.The political decision to deploy forces to Vietnam inthe interests of Australia’s perceived security and

An Element of Both?


A RE-EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF THE AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE IN VIETNAM

foreign policy interests did not readily translate into acoherent or effective military role on the ground inPhuoc Tuy. To support his arguments, Frost refers toa number of pieces of evidence, each of which areoutlined below.

Firstly, Frost highlights the fact that an officialaccount of the Task Force’s role in Vietnam given bythe Defence Minister, Mr Fairhall, in his statement of9 August 1966 neglected to define in military termsexactly what the area of operations of the ATF was inPhuoc Tuy and that it failed to indicate what theprecise military role was to be:

... the Task Force was now responsible for itsoperational base area in the South-Westernportion of Phuoc Tuy province, together with asurrounding tactical area agreed with theAmerican and Vietnamese authorities.Domination of this tactical area of responsibilityby the Task Force would contribute to the securityof the port of Vung Tau, and several keycommunications routes, and would protect themore populated areas of the province.

(F. Frost, 1987, page 64)

He also argued that the official directive issued tothe overall Australian commander in South Vietnam(COMAFV) by the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff,outlined above, was also very broad and failed toprovide any definitive direction to the commander ofthe Task Force. He says that this directive, and oneother relating to the requirement to implement a civicaction program “subject to operational requirements”were the only two directives given to the Task Forcecommander. Neither directive succinctly identifiedthe primary role of the Task Force.

Frost also cites criticism of the AustralianGovernment made by Peter Samuel, an Australianjournalist, as support for his argument. Samuelconcluded that:

The Australian Government would appear neverto have thought in depth about the role ofAustralian forces or formulated a strategy for theTask Force in particular.

(F. Frost, 1987, page 65)

Frost refers to interviews with one of the TaskForce Commanders, General Pearson, (Commander 1ATF - October 1968 to August 1969) to supportmuch of his argument about the ambiguity of the rolegiven to the Task Force. He says that General Pearson“felt that the Government’s failure to develop adetailed concept for a specific function for the TaskForce was indeed a substantial problem”. He quotesPearson as saying that the Government had three

main options when deploying the Task Force: toconduct operations in depth against the NorthVietnamese Army and Viet Cong mainforce units; toconduct pacification operations in and around thevillages to secure them from local Viet Cong units; orto conduct a combination of both. According toPearson, any of these options would have required afar larger force and the Government should havespecifically directed the Task Force to carry outspecific operations rather than provide such a broadmandate.

Finally, according to Frost, not only was the roleof the Task Force ill-defined but the Government’slack of understanding of the situation confronting theAustralian forces also contributed to the difficultiesthey faced. The Australian Government’sunderstanding of the situation in Vietnam wassimplistic - that the south faced a communist threatfrom the north. The role of the Task Force wastherefore to counter this threat. This failed to take intoaccount the reality that Phuoc Tuy province had beenthe scene of many years of resistance againstcolonialism and that much of the threat to the SouthVietnamese Government came from within thevillages themselves. As Robert O’Neill explains,“guerrilla warfare had flourished in Phuoc Tuyprovince since 1945 such that by the time of thearrival of the Australian Task Force, most of theprovince ... was in communist hands”. The NationalFront for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) hada well-established political organisation with cadresand adherents in almost every village.

Greg Lockhart seems to have agreed with Frost’shypothesis about the lack of a clear role given to theATF. He highlights the manner in which the TaskForce was given its directive. He explains that thecommand relationship was arranged such that the firstTask Force Commander, Brigadier Jackson, took hisdirectives from the Commander of the American IIField Force who simply told him to “take over PhuocTuy”. Lockhart also highlights General Pearson’sobservation that Vietnam was the first war ‘withoutan aim’. He quotes Pearson as having said that “thegovernment’s failure to develop a clear concept of theTask Force’s functions was a serious problem”.According to Lockhart, the instruction that outlinedthe tasks envisioned for the Task Force by Canberrawas not very meaningful because of the unworkablerelationships the Task Force had with both theAmericans and the local authorities.

In addition to these arguments, Lockhart says thatthe Government’s refusal to acknowledge the natureof the war never permitted it to clarify properly theArmy’s role in Vietnam. In summing up the

43

ambiguity of the situation facing the Task ForceCommanders, Greg Lockhart states in VietnamRememberedthat Commanders were “caught in aweb of strategic dilemmas” .

In summary, these arguments were used toconvey the picture that there was a large degree ofambiguity in the role assigned to the Task Force. Anevaluation of the role given to the Australian TaskForce in Vietnam based on these arguments wouldsuggest that the role was poorly defined, that theGovernment failed to consider in any detail how theTask Force would operate, and that the Governmentwas more concerned about securing diplomaticrelations with America than it was about committingmilitary forces.

Despite these arguments there is at least onehistorian who disagrees with the assertions made byFrost and Lockhart. An earlier work by Ian McNeillwritten in 1980 for the Defence Force Journal, “AnOutline of the Australian Military Involvement inVietnam, July 1962-December 1972”, suggests heagreed whole-heartedly with Frost and Lockhart.However, McNeill’s later publications suggestsotherwise.

In 1991 McNeill wrote an essay for a book calledVietnam Days: Australia and the Impact of Vietnam,in which he contests that the role given to the TaskForce was “appropriate...and that sufficient freedomof action was given to Commanders who sought asmuch independence as possible and found satisfactionwith the operational flexibility” afforded them.McNeill argues that many of the assertions made byFrank Frost were overstated and derived from amisunderstanding of his interviews with one of theTask Force Commanders, General Pearson. McNeillsays that Frost misquoted Pearson when he said therewere three options available to the Government inrelation to the role allocated to the ATF during theVietnam conflict. According to McNeill, bothPearson and his predecessor, Brigadier Hughes, hadno difficulty working with the directives given tothem.

The central theme of McNeill’s thesis is thatwhilst the role given to the Task Force may have beensomewhat open-ended, the generalised nature of thedirective given to ATF Commanders actuallycontributed to the effectiveness of the Task Force.Whilst there had been a number of different tasks thatthe Task Force could be required to carry out as apart of its role, the Task Force was never asked totake on the full responsibility for all for thesefunctions - a compromise would have to be made bytaking an area role which involved both mainforceand pacification roles. Furthermore, McNeill argues

that this arrangement was in keeping with theagreements made between Vietnam and its allies,whereby the Vietnamese would retain fullresponsibility for the populated areas.

McNeill also refutes Lockhart’s argument that theTask Force was caught in a “web of strategicdilemmas.” He says that Lockhart refers to a one lineextract from the writing of Captain Robert O’Neill, ahistorian who served as the Intelligence Officer in 5RAR during its tour to Vietnam in 1966. Lockhartrelates an observation of O’Neill’s that scarcely aweek goes by during which his commanding officer,Lieutenant Colonel J.A. Warr, “did not ask me whatour aim in Phuoc Tuy was and then proceed to debatethe matter for half an hour or so”. McNeill argues thatLieutenant Colonel Warr’s constant debate focusedon the problem of finding the most appropriatemethods of bringing the war to an end in the shortestpossible time with the least number of casualtiesrather than debate over the role of the force, and thatO’Neill had been misquoted.

McNeill summarises his thoughts about the roleallocated to the commander of the Australian TaskForce during Vietnam by saying that:

Within the considerable latitude he was given, thecommander had to choose between operationsagainst the mainforce, pacification operations, orif the conditions were propitious, a combination ofboth tasks. It devolved upon the Task ForceCommander to establish his priorities withoutinterference from his national headquarters inSaigon or from Canberra. He was the man on thespot. The exception to this was when the TaskForce was ordered on specific operations outsidethe province by Commander II Field ForceVietnam

(I.McNeill, 1991, page 57)

In summary, McNeill argues that the ATF’s rolewas well defined and that even though there mayhave been difficulties, the Commander of the ATFhad sufficient flexibility to carry out the tasks thatwere most appropriate at the time. He says that theATF managed to carry out all of the tasks assigned toit with a good deal of success. McNeill goes as far asquoting the last Commander, Australian ForceVietnam (COMAFV), Lieutenant General D.B.Dunstan who said in reference to the achievement ofthe Australian war effort that “Undoubtedly we hadachieved a great deal... and undoubtedly we made amajor contribution to the security of the people ofPhuoc Tuy”.

In considering the pertinence of the role assignedto the ATF, it seems that an element of ambiguity was


A RE-EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF THE AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE IN VIETNAM

associated with the role. However, this ambiguityallowed a certain amount of flexibility forcommanders. It would be wrong to say that theGovernment totally neglected to consider the role ofthe Task Force, rather, the Government understoodthe constraints that it placed upon the Task Forcewhen it limited the Task Force’s role and numbers.The Government made its decisions about the role ofthe Task Force based upon the desire to gain politicalleverage over the United States at the same time asattempting to attend to the military needs of the TaskForce.

Having explained the two opposing views aboutthe role assigned to the ATF in Vietnam it is nowtime to consider what the Task Force actuallyachieved during its time in country. Once again thereis considerable debate about what the Task Forceactually achieved. Was the Australian effortworthwhile or was it futile? Consideration of thisquestion will provide an evaluation of what the ATFachieved as a part of its role.

The concluding remarks made by Frost in hisbook, Australia’s War in Vietnam, leave the reader inno doubt about Frost’s thoughts on the achievementsof Australia’s involvement in Vietnam:

The Australian forces operated with cohesion andwithstood the many difficulties involved butprofessional military skills could not transcendthe political problems and dilemmas of operationsin the environment of Phuoc Tuy. Ultimately, theonly conclusive way of avoiding these problemswould have been not to have deployed the forcesin the first place.

(F. Frost, 1987, page 182)

According to Frost, although the ATF may havemade a contribution to the war effort, none of thegains made by the ATF were long-lasting orsustainable. Frost argues that no sooner had the ATFwithdrawn from Phuoc Tuy, the PAVN and NLFforces took control of the province. The ATF clearlyexperienced considerable success in its tacticalengagements with the NLF and PAVN forces and itcaused severe losses to local NLF units in Phuoc Tuy.However, the outcome of the Task Force’s operationswas strongly affected by its allied relationships.Whilst the ATF conducted many proficient operationsagainst the armed units of the NLF and PAVN, no

concerted allied operations confronted the NLF’scadres.

Frost argues that the commitment of the ATF toPhuoc Tuy embodied a series of intractable problems.Accordng to Frost, any valuation of the role of theTask Force must take into consideration the context inwhich the Task Force operated. Firstly, the absence ofany effective RVN program in the province allowedthe NLF to maintain its political organisation.Secondly, the ATF was restricted in its ability todevelop close and effective contacts with the localadministration and the local forces by its ownresource limitations and by the need to coordinatewith the US advisory structure. Finally, Frost arguesthat the Australian effort in Vietnam was ultimatelyfutile because the size of the Australian contributionwas too small to affect the outcome of the war greatlyone way or the other. Ultimately, the fate of PhuocTuy was to be determined by forces outside theprovince.

In summary, Frost argues that the ATF may haveachieved success in confrontations with NLF andPAVN units and it may well have restricted theinfluence of the communist forces in Phuoc Tuyduring its deployment. However, the success of theseactions was short-lived. According to Frost, anyevaluation of the ATF’s role must take intoconsideration the eventual outcome of the war and thecircumstances surrounding the ATF’s efforts. Frostcites a comment made by one officer in relation to thesituation in April 1972, who served with the TaskForce in 1966 and who witnessed the decline ofgovernment control in this period,

it was for all the world to see as it had been in1966 at the very beginning...as if we had neverreally been there

(F. Frost, 1987, page 162)

Ian McNeill argues otherwise and says that it iswrong to judge the efforts of the ATF in relation tothe overall outcome of the war. He says that anassessment of the contribution made by the TaskForce can only be made in relation to the tasks that itwas given. He argues that an evaluation of the role ofthe Task Force should consider the effectiveness ofthe Task Force. McNeill refers to the specific tasksgiven to the Task Force in the original directive fromthe Chiefs of Staff Committee, outlined above, andsuggests that the Task Force performed well andachieved the required results in relation to all of itsassigned tasks.

In relation to the responsibility of securing anddominating its Tactical Area of Responsibility inPhuoc Tuy province, the Task Force achieved

What Did the ATF Achieve in Vietnam?

45

resounding victories such as Long Tan and Binh Bawhich forced the enemy away from the battlefield. Inrelation to the task of securing Highway 15, McNeillsays that the opening of Highway 15 was a notablefeature of the security of Phuoc Tuy. The conduct ofoperations outside Phuoc Tuy province under thedirection of Commander II Field Force Vietnam alsoallowed the ATF to display its strength and capability.

Finally, in order to provide the security necessaryfor the South Vietnamese Government to reassertcontrol over the province, the Task Force also made asignificant contribution. Even though the Task Forcecould not wipe out communist influence altogetherand it could not eradicate the Viet Cong cadre in thevillages, it nevertheless greatly reduced the influenceof the Viet Cong during its operations. McNeillquotes the commander of the D445 Battalion in 1969,Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Duc Thu, as having saidthat “with the presence of the Australian andAmerican troops in Phuoc Tuy, the Government ofSouth Vietnam in Phuoc Tuy province managed tocontrol the population. But after the withdrawal ofthese troops we turned the tables”.

In summary, according to McNeill it is unfair tojudge the role carried out by the ATF in terms of howmuch influence it had over the overall outcome of thewar. Any judgement about the Task Force should notbe based upon factors beyond its control, because thisadds little understanding of any distinctive part theTask Force may have played.

In considering the achievements of the Task Forcein Vietnam, Frost and McNeill have highlightedimportant issues. However, both tended to argue theextreme case. Frost highlighted the fact that the TaskForce was never in a position to make a significantcontribution to the war effort but draws theconclusion that given that this was the case, the TaskForce should never have been deployed in the firstplace. This evaluation neglects to consider thecontribution the Task Force may have made insecuring American support to Australia in the future.McNeill focusses on the achievements of the TaskForce in a task orientated fashion within a limitedframework and draws the conclusion that both therole of the Task Force and the way it fulfilled that rolewere appropriate. This evaluation fails to consider thefact that in the end Phouc Tuy province and the rest ofVietnam fell into communist control despite the factthat over five hundred Australians lost their livesattempting to prevent such an occurrence. Thisanalysis would suggest that an evaluation thatconsiders both view points provides a morecomprehensive understanding of the role of the TaskForce.

The role assigned to the ATF was ambiguous butat the same time provided a degree of flexibility forthe commander of the day. On the one hand, theGovernment did not spell out in any great detail theexact role that the Task Force was to play and thiscaused some difficulties for the Task Force, especiallyin dealing with allied forces and when trying to fulfillcompeting tasks. On the other hand, this flexibilityafforded the various commanders of the Task Forcean opportunity to adapt to changing and variablecircumstances. Whilst one commander chose topursue elements of the enemies main force unitsduring one period, another commander chose thepacification role during another period.

In evaluating the achievements of the Task Forceit is therefore reasonable to conclude that the TaskForce achieved limited overall success in the longterm. This assessment must be balanced against theTask Force’s short-term victories. The Task Forcewas never large enough to be able to exert any realinfluence over the outcome of the war but for themost part the Task Force carried out its activities verywell. Frank Frost concluded that the only way ofavoiding the problems the Task Force faced wouldhave been not to deploy the forces in the first place.This solution neglects the Government’spreoccupation with the long-term security of Australiaand the perceived need to keep a powerful friendengaged in the region. Ian McNeill’s assessment ofthe situation is probably focussed too narrowly on theshort term military successes of the Task Force andfails to take into consideration the fact that in the endover five hundred Australians were sacrificed.

BIBLIOGRAPHYAustralia’s Military Commitment πto Vietnam, . Paper tabled in

accordance with the Prime Minister’s statement in the House ofRepresentatives on May 13, 1975

P. Edwards with G. Pemberton, Crises and Commitments: ThePolitics and Diplomacy of Australia’s Involvement in SoutheastAsian Conflicts, 1948-1965.. The Official History of Austalia’sInvolvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1975. Sydney:Allen & Unwin, 1992. 292-302, 332-340, 344-347, 351-362and 367-375

F. Frost, Australia’s War in Vietnam, Sydney: Allen & UnwinAustralia, 1987

F. Frost,’Australia’s War in Vietnam’, in Peter King, ed.,Australia’s Vietnam: Australia in the Second Indo-China War.Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1983. Chapter 4. 57-71

P. Gration, ‘Reflections on 1ATF in Vietnam’ in the Journal of theAustralian War Memorial, Number 12, April 1988, pp..45-46

J. Grey and J. Doyle, Vietnam: War, Myth and Memory, Sydney:Allen & Unwin Australia, 1992

Conclusion


A RE-EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF THE AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE IN VIETNAM 47

D.M. Horner, Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam War,Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence Number 40,Canberra: The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, AustralianNational University 1986

G. Lockhart, ‘Into Battle: Counter-Revolution’ inVietnamRemembered, (ed. G Pemberton), Sydney: Lansdowne, 1990

I. McNeill, ‘An Outline of the Australian Military Involvement inVietnam, July 1962-December 1972’, Defence Force Journal(September-October 1980), No.24, 42-53

I. McNeill, ‘The Australian Army and the Vietnam War’ inVietnam Days: Australia and the Impact of Vietnam, Ringwood

Victoria: Penguin, 1991J. Murphy, Harvest of Fear: A History of Australia’s Vietnam War,

Sydney: Allen & Unwin Australia, 1993G. Odgers, Diggers: The Australian Army, Navy and Air Force in

Eleven Wars, Sydney: Lansdowne, 1994R. O’Neill, ‘Australian Military Problems in Vietnam’ in

Australian Outlook Volume 23 Number 1, April 1969pages..46-57

G. Pemberton, All the Way: Australia’s Road to Vietnam, Sydney:Allen & Unwin Australia, 1987. 298-328

Major Drayton graduated from the Royal Military College in 1985 having completed a Bachelor of Science degree withhonours in Physics. Upon graduation he was allocated to RAEME and has served in a variety of positions including OfficerCommanding, Technical Support Squadron, 2/14 Light Horse Regiment and the Officer Commanding, TechnicalAdministrative Support Squadron, 1st Aviation Regiment. In 1992 he was also posted as the ADC to the Minister for DefenceScience and Personnel.


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I enclose a cheque or money order payable to the Receiver of Public Monies for $ being payment for copies of The Flight of the Pig.

TO THE LAST RIDGE by W.H. Downing, TowerBooks, RRP $16.95, 220 pages

“The Australian equivalent of All Quiet on the WesternFront.”Patsy Adam-Smith, The ANZACS.

This book contains the moving World War Imemoirs of Walter Downing, a Melbourne law studentwho fought on the Western Front, last published in1920. Unlike most such memoirs, these are extremelywell written and avoid excesses of enthusiasm. Theyprovide a direct and disturbing account of the horrorsand heroism of the ordinary soldier’s experience of thetrenches. This is far more than just another Anzac Daybook.

Downing was involved in most of the battlesAustralians fought in France. The book contains anappendix with the names of all the men who fought inDowning’s 57th Battalion.

Downing’s book is possibly the best account ofAustralians at war. The experience of France washorrific, and not just because of the fighting.

“In that dark winter the armies thought mud, atemud, lived in a sea of hundreds of square miles ofit. Europe failed many times to break the hearts ofthe men of the Antipodes, but was never nearersucceeding than then… A greatcoat, wet andmuddy, weighed forty pounds or more. Soakedequipment laden with one hundred and seventyrounds of ammunition and two or three bombs feltlike the load of Atlas. The rifle-sling over thechest, when the rifle was carried diagonallyacross the back, strangled our panting breath. Ifhung from the shoulder, the strap repeatedlyslipped to the forearm, the butt bumpedawkwardly against the legs, and fell continually inthe mud. At the most inconvenient moments riflesbecame entangled in the thousands of oldtelephone wires festooned across and along thetrench in a mesh of tentacles which reached outand grasped the labouring men, becameentangled in the equipment, knocked helmets inthe slime, caught men under the chin and trippedtheir feet as they lifted them within the mud. Theway was complicated by coils of barbed wireunwound beneath the surface of the slush, whichtore flesh and clothes.”When arriving at a new trench, his battalion found:

“The dead lay everywhere. The deeper one dug,the more bodies one exhumed. Hands and facesprotruded from the slimy, toppling walls oftrenches. Knees, shoulders and buttocks pokedfrom the foul morass, as many as the pebbles of abrook.”After the battle:“The bays and traverses were jammed with deadand wounded lying head to foot for two miles, in atreble row, on the fire steps, beneath them, andbehind the blockhouses. Wounded came crawlingin, rolling over the parapet and sprawling to thebottom. A white-faced boy, naked to the waist,was being led along the trench, a hole in his side.He cracked some joke, then, ‘I think I’ll spell aminute; it’s all going dark.’ He sat down. An hourlater someone shook him, but he was stiffand cold.”“And the sandbags were splashed with red, andred were the firesteps, the duckboards, the bays.And the stench of stagnant pools of the blood ofheroes is in our nostrils even now.”To the Last Ridgeprovides a moving account of

one of the high points in Australian history. In thewords of Downing’s commander, Brigadier-GeneralHarold “Pompey” Elliott, it provides: “The truepicture – the monument we still want for our ‘richdead’ whose memory is ours and our children’sgreatest heritage.”

SHIPMATES. Illustrated tales of the Mascotscarried in RAN Ships and Establishmentsby Vic CassellsReviewed by Lieutenant Commander Greg Swinden

While many Naval historians are concentrating onthe larger issues of maritime policy, doctrine or wherethe Navy fits into the big picture, there are others whoare looking at the minor details. Vic Cassells recentlypublished book on the mascots carried in RAN shipsand establishments is certainly one of the latter. Hisbook describes in detail the many and varied animalswhich have seen “service” in the RAN particularlyduring World War II.

The carrying of mascots in ships has now becomevery much a bygone event as the nature of modernwarfare and minimum manned ships effectivelyprevents this type of activity, although mascots inShore Establishments have persisted until fairly recenttimes. Up until the end of World War II, however, no

Book Reviews


self-respecting cruiser, destroyer or corvette went to seawithout some form of mascot, which was often carriedas a good luck charm. In fact the attempts by HMASPerth’s ships cat “Redlead” to leave the ship, just priorto the cruiser being sunk in the Battle of Sunda Straitwith the loss of over half the ship’s company, wereseen by many onboard as a very bad omen.

Vic’s book lists the mascots in ship alphabeticalorder and is very well illustrated with over 200interesting photographs and contains a wealth ofinformation on the mascots which have “served” theRAN well. These include the standard Naval issuebulldogs, cats, birds, a plethora of monkeys and theoccasional koala and crocodile.

Shipmates is an A4 laminated paperback bookavailable for $30.00 (which includes postage) from theauthor Vic Cassells PO Box 229 Paradise Point QLD4216 and cheques/money orders should be madepayable to Vic Cassells. This book is another welcomeaddition to the rich and varied history of the RAN andone that all keen Naval historians should invest in.

THE VUNG TAU FERRY, HMAS SYDNEY andEscort Ships (Vietnam 1965-72) by Rodney Nottand Noel Payne

Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Greg Swinden

1998 has certainly been a bumper year forAustralian Naval histories concerning the VietnamWar. Firstly we had In the Oceans Dark EmbracebyLex McAulay which described the role of ClearanceDiving Team 3. Then came Up Topby Jeffrey Grey(the RAN’s history as part of the Official History ofAustralia in South East Asian Conflicts series) and lastbut by no means least The Vung Tau Ferry. Effectivelythe number of books written about the RAN in theVietnam War has doubled in the space of a year.

The Vung Tau Ferrydetails the involvement of theFast Troop Transport HMASSydney in her 25

voyages to South Vietnam between May 1965 andNovember 1972. The book also includes details on herescort ships (Frigates or Destroyers) and the voyagesmade by the MV (later HMAS) Boonaroo and the MV(later HMAS) Jeparit.

This history describes the events which lead up toSydney being used as Fast Troop Transport, her time inSouth Vietnamese waters and there are a number ofinteresting stories from several of her crew and soldierswho were transported to and from Vietnam. The bookalso goes into depth concerning the lengthy fight, bythe Vietnam Logistic Support Group, to gain officialrecognition for the role played by Sydney, and herescorts, which culminated in the issue of the VietnamLogistic and Support Medal in 1992.

This later fight for official recognition makesinteresting reading and reminds me of a story told tome by one of my high school teachers who had servedin Sydney as a Naval Reservist. He claims that severalSydney sailors attempted to have Australian troopsashore fire on the vessel, in order to strengthen futureclaims that the ship had served in a “War Zone”. Whoknows, but why in this case, let the truth spoil a goodstory.

This hardcover book is well illustrated with severalinteresting and very clear photographs and alsoincludes a comprehensive list of all personnel whoserved in the RAN during Logistic Support Operationsduring the period 1965-72.

The Vung Tau Ferryis available for $29.95 (whichincludes postage) from the author R.T. Nott of6 Shillington Place, Wishart QLD 4122 and cheques/money orders should be made payable to R.T. Nott.This book is an excellent addition to the Navy’s historyof the Vietnam War and one which all keen Navalhistorians, and those interested in Australia’s role in theVietnam War should have on their bookshelves.

Q

INDEX

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL

INDEX

1998No. 128 January/February 1998 – No. 133 November/December 1998


TITLE INDEX

TITLE ISSUE PAGE

Airborne Forces: The Twenty-First Century’s Rapid Dominance Solution 133 Nov/Dec 35

Air Defence in the Amphibious Tactical Lodgement: The Role of GBAD 131 Jul/Aug 19

Australasian Defence 2048 - An Alternative Future 132 Sep/Oct 3

Australian Indonesian Security Agreement, The 132 Sep/Oct 33

Australian Society: Vanguard or Rearguard? 130 May/Jun 19

Australia’s Human Rights Obligations and ADF Operations 131 Jul/Aug 41

Ceiling Rank for Part-Time Army Officers: Need for review? 131 Jul/Aug 35

Changing Nature of NBC Defence, The 130 May/Jun 55

Command and Leadership in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 23

Common Induction Training 129 Mar/Apr 27

Computer Crime and the Impact of Interfering with RAAF Information Systems 130 May/Jun 13

Dreadnoughts. Pacifism, Poising and Procrastination - A Parliamentary Pre-History of Air Power in Australia 1904-14 131 Jul/Aug 45

First AIF Enlistment Patterns and Reasons For Their Variation 132 Sep/Oct 61

Framework for a Unified Decision Making Process, A 132 Sep/Oct 41

Future Tank Capability for Australia, The 130 May/Jun 29

Harnessing the News Media During Conflict 129 Mar/Apr 43

How Sharp a Sword? 132 Sep/Oct 21

Impact of the Revolution in Military Affairs on the Australian Defence Forces, The 128 Jan/Feb 41

Influence of the Army Reserve in Facilitating Social Change Within the Australian Defence Force, The 129 Mar/Apr 19

Intelligence and National Security 129 Mar/Apr 5

International Peacetime Laws of the Environment and the Australian Defence Force 132 Sep/Oct 13

Junior Leadership Training and Development in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 39

Laser Protection: The Need for a Coordinated Approach 131 Jul/Aug 31

Laverton: A Historic and Significant Airfield 129 Mar/Apr 53

Learning to Lead 129 Mar/Apr 31

Lessons from the Experiences of Coalition Prisoners of War During the Gulf War 128 Jan/Feb 47

Maritime Casualty Estimation 129 Mar/Apr 13

Mercenaries and the “Sandline Affair” 133 Nov/Dec 5

New Tools for an Old Job 128 Jan/Feb 27

Re-evaluation of the Role of the Australian Task Force in Vietnam, A 133 Nov/Dec 41

Relevance of the Defence Cooperation Program Between Australia and Indonesia, The 130 May/Jun 49

Restructuring the Australian Army: The Seeds of Future Crisis? 131 Jul/Aug 5

Road to Basra: Did the Gulf War Coalition Violate International Humanitarian Law?, The 128 Jan/Feb 55

Role of C.E.W. Bean in Australian Historiography of the First World War, The 131 Jul/Aug 53

ROMINS – Repertoire of Missions: A Mission Oriented Path to Managing Military Capability 128 Jan/Feb 5

Separation for a New Career – Military or Community Responsibility? 130 May/Jun 5

Should NATO Enlarge? The Pros and Cons 133 Nov/Dec 25

INDEX 53

SUBJECT INDEXTITLE ISSUE PAGE

ADMINISTRATIONAustralasian Defence 2048 - An Alternative Future 132 Sep/Oct 3Australian-Indonesian Security Agreement: Where Did it Come From – Where is it Going?, The 132 Sep/Oct 33Australian Society: Vanguard or Rearguard? 130 May/Jun 19Australia’s Human Rights Obligations and ADF Operations 131 Jul/Aug 41Ceiling Rank for Part-Time Army Officers: Need for Review? 131 Jul/Aug 35Command and Leadership in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 23Common Induction Training 129 Mar/Apr 27Computer Crime and the Impact of Interfering with RAAF Information Systems 130 May/Jun 13First AIF Enlistment Patterns and Reasons For Their Variation 132 Sep/Oct 61Framework for a Unified Decision Making Process, A 132 Sep/Oct 41Harnessing The News Media During Conflict 129 Mar/Apr 43Impact of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) on the Australian Defence Forces (ADF), The 128 Jan/Feb 41Influence of the Army Reserve in Facilitating Social Change Within the Australian Defence Force, The 129 Mar/Apr 19Intelligence and National Security 129 Mar/Apr 5International Peacetime Laws of the Environment and Australian Defence Force 132 Sep/Oct 13Junior Leadership Training and Development in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 39Learning to Lead: A Contextual Model for Educating and Training Leaders 129 Mar/Apr 31New Tools for an Old Job: Planning Reconnaissance Company Pull Operations in an Army 21 Mechanized Infantry Battalion 128 Jan/Feb 27Re-evaluation of the Role of the Australian Task Force in Vietnam, A 133 Nov/Dec 41Relevance of the Defence Cooperation Program Between Australia and Indonesia, The 130 May/Jun 49Restructuring the Australian Army: The Seeds of Future Crisis? 131 Jul/Aug 5ROMINS-Repertoire of Missions: A Mission Orientated Path To Managing Military Capability 128 Jan/Feb 5Separation for a New Career – Military or Community Responsibility? 130 May/Jun 5

AIR MATTERSAirborne Forces: The Twenty-First Century’s Rapid Dominance Solution 133 Nov/Dec 35Air Defence in the Amphibious Tactical Lodgement: The Role of GBAD 131 Jul/Aug 19Australasian Defence 2048 - An Alternative Future 132 Sep/Oct 3Australian-Indonesian Security Agreement: Where Did it Come From – Where is it Going?, The 132 Sep/Oct 33Changing Nature of NBC Defence and the Implications for the ADF, The 130 May/Jun 55Common Induction Training 129 Mar/Apr 27Computer Crime and the Impact of Interfering with RAAF Information Systems 130 May/Jun 13Dreadnoughts, Pacifism, Poising and Procrastination – A Parliamentarian Pre-History of Air Power in Australia 1908-14 131 Jul/Aug 45Influence of the Army Reserve in Facilitating Social Change Within the Australian Defence Force, The 129 Mar/Apr 19Laverton: A Historic and Significant Airfield 129 Mar/Apr 53Learning to Lead: A Contextual Model for Educating and Training Leaders 129 Mar/Apr 31Lessons from the Experiences of Coalition Prisoners of War During the Gulf War 128 Jan/Feb 47Re-evaluation of the Role of the Australian Task Force in Vietnam, A 133 Nov/Dec 41Relevance of the Defence Cooperation Program Between Australia and Indonesia, The 130 May/Jun 49Restructuring the Australian Army: The Seeds of Future Crisis? 131 Jul/Aug 5Road to Basra: Did the Gulf War Coalition Violate International Humanitarian Law?, The 128 Jan/Feb 55Should NATO Enlarge? The Pros and Cons 133 Nov/Dec 25

EDUCATIONAustralasian Defence 2048 - An Alternative Future 132 Sep/Oct 3Australian-Indonesian Security Agreement: Where Did it Come From – Where is it Going?, The 132 Sep/Oct 33Australian Society: Vanguard or Rearguard? 130 May/Jun 19Ceiling Rank for Part-Time Army Officers: Need for Review? 131 Jul/Aug 35Command and Leadership in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 23Computer Crime and the Impact of Interfering with RAAF Information Systems 130 May/Jun 13Framework for a Unified Decision Making Process, A 132 Sep/Oct 41Impact of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) on the Australian Defence Forces (ADF), The 128 Jan/Feb 41Junior Leadership Training and Development in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 39New Tools for an Old Job: Planning Reconnaissance Company Pull Operations in an Army 21 Mechanized Infantry Battalion 128 Jan/Feb 27ROMINS-Repertoire of Missions: A Mission Orientated Path To Managing Military Capability 128 Jan/Feb 5Separation for a New Career – Military or Community Responsibility? 130 May/Jun 5

GULF WARHarnessing The News Media During Conflict 129 Mar/Apr 43Lessons from the Experiences of Coalition Prisoners of War During the Gulf War 128 Jan/Feb 47Road to Basra: Did the Gulf War Coalition Violate International Humanitarian Law?, The 128 Jan/Feb 55

HISTORYAirborne Forces: The Twenty-First Century’s Rapid Dominance Solution 133 Nov/Dec 35Australasian Defence 2048 - An Alternative Future 132 Sep/Oct 3Australian-Indonesian Security Agreement: Where Did it Come From – Where is it Going?, The 132 Sep/Oct 33Australian Society: Vanguard or Rearguard? 130 May/Jun 19Australia’s Human Rights Obligations and ADF Operations 131 Jul/Aug 41


Common Induction Training 129 Mar/Apr 27Dreadnoughts, Pacifism, Poising and Procrastination – A Parliamentarian Pre-History of Air Power in Australia 1908-14 131 Jul/Aug 45First AIF Enlistment Patterns and Reasons For Their Variation 132 Sep/Oct 61Framework for a Unified Decision Making Process, A 132 Sep/Oct 41Impact of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) on the Australian Defence Forces (ADF), The 128 Jan/Feb 41Influence of the Army Reserve in Facilitating Social Change Within the Australian Defence Force, The 129 Mar/Apr 19Intelligence and National Security 129 Mar/Apr 5International Peacetime Laws of the Environment and Australian Defence Force 132 Sep/Oct 13Laverton: A Historic and Significant Airfield 129 Mar/Apr 53Learning to Lead: A Contextual Model for Educating and Training Leaders 129 Mar/Apr 31Lessons from the Experiences of Coalition Prisoners of War During the Gulf War 128 Jan/Feb 47New Tools for an Old Job: Planning Reconnaissance Company Pull Operations in an Army 21 Mechanized Infantry Battalion 128 Jan/Feb 27Re-evaluation of the Role of the Australian Task Force in Vietnam, A 133 Nov/Dec 41Relevance of the Defence Cooperation Program Between Australia and Indonesia, The 130 May/Jun 49Restructuring the Australian Army: The Seeds of Future Crisis? 131 Jul/Aug 5Road to Basra: Did the Gulf War Coalition Violate International Humanitarian Law?, The 128 Jan/Feb 55Role of C.E.W. Bean in Australian Historiography of The First World War, The 131 Jul/Aug 53ROMINS-Repertoire of Missions: A Mission Orientated Path To Managing Military Capability 128 Jan/Feb 5Separation for a New Career – Military or Community Responsibility? 130 May/Jun 5Should NATO Enlarge? The Pros and Cons 133 Nov/Dec 25

HUMAN BEHAVIOURAir Defence in the Amphibious Tactical Lodgement: The Role of GBAD 131 Jul/Aug 19Australasian Defence 2048 - An Alternative Future 132 Sep/Oct 3Australian-Indonesian Security Agreement: Where Did it Come From – Where is it Going?, The 132 Sep/Oct 33Australian Society: Vanguard or Rearguard? 130 May/Jun 19Australia’s Human Rights Obligations and ADF Operations 131 Jul/Aug 41Ceiling Rank for Part-Time Army Officers: Need for Review? 131 Jul/Aug 35Changing Nature of NBC Defence and the Implications for the ADF, The 130 May/Jun 55Command and Leadership in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 23Computer Crime and the Impact of Interfering with RAAF Information Systems 130 May/Jun 13Dreadnoughts, Pacifism, Poising and Procrastination – A Parliamentarian Pre-History of Air Power in Australia 1908-14 131 Jul/Aug 45First AIF Enlistment Patterns and Reasons For Their Variation 132 Sep/Oct 61Framework for a Unified Decision Making Process, A 132 Sep/Oct 41Harnessing The News Media During Conflict 129 Mar/Apr 43How Sharp a Sword? Defining Legitimacy in Offensive Capabilities 132 Sep/Oct 21Impact of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) on the Australian Defence Forces (ADF), The 128 Jan/Feb 41International Peacetime Laws of the Environment and Australian Defence Force 132 Sep/Oct 13Junior Leadership Training and Development in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 39Laser Protection: The Need For a Coordinated Approach 131 Jul/Aug 31Learning to Lead: A Contextual Model for Educating and Training Leaders 129 Mar/Apr 31Lessons from the Experiences of Coalition Prisoners of War During the Gulf War 128 Jan/Feb 47Maritime Casualty Estimation 129 Mar/Apr 13Mercenaries and the “Sandline Affair” 133 Nov/Dec 5New Tools for an Old Job: Planning Reconnaissance Company Pull Operations in an Army 21 Mechanized Infantry Battalion 128 Jan/Feb 27Re-evaluation of the Role of the Australian Task Force in Vietnam, A 133 Nov/Dec 41Relevance of the Defence Cooperation Program Between Australia and Indonesia, The 130 May/Jun 49Restructuring the Australian Army: The Seeds of Future Crisis? 131 Jul/Aug 5Road to Basra: Did the Gulf War Coalition Violate International Humanitarian Law?, The 128 Jan/Feb 55Role of C.E.W. Bean in Australian Historiography of The First World War, The 131 Jul/Aug 53ROMINS-Repertoire of Missions: A Mission Orientated Path To Managing Military Capability 128 Jan/Feb 5Separation for a New Career – Military or Community Responsibility? 130 May/Jun 5

INTELLIGENCEAir Defence in the Amphibious Tactical Lodgement: The Role of GBAD 131 Jul/Aug 19Australasian Defence 2048 - An Alternative Future 132 Sep/Oct 3Australian-Indonesian Security Agreement: Where Did it Come From – Where is it Going?, The 132 Sep/Oct 33Computer Crime and the Impact of Interfering with RAAF Information Systems 130 May/Jun 13Dreadnoughts, Pacifism, Poising and Procrastination – A Parliamentarian Pre-History of Air Power in Australia 1908-14 131 Jul/Aug 45Harnessing The News Media During Conflict 129 Mar/Apr 43Intelligence and National Security 129 Mar/Apr 5Lessons from the Experiences of Coalition Prisoners of War During the Gulf War 128 Jan/Feb 47Mercenaries and the “Sandline Affair” 133 Nov/Dec 5New Tools for an Old Job: Planning Reconnaissance Company Pull Operations in an Army 21 Mechanized Infantry Battalion 128 Jan/Feb 27Re-evaluation of the Role of the Australian Task Force in Vietnam, A 133 Nov/Dec 41Relevance of the Defence Cooperation Program Between Australia and Indonesia, The 130 May/Jun 49Road to Basra: Did the Gulf War Coalition Violate International Humanitarian Law?, The 128 Jan/Feb 55Role of C.E.W. Bean in Australian Historiography of The First World War, The 131 Jul/Aug 53Should NATO Enlarge? The Pros and Cons 133 Nov/Dec 25

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Australasian Defence 2048 - An Alternative Future 132 Sep/Oct 3Australian-Indonesian Security Agreement: Where Did it Come From – Where is it Going?, The 132 Sep/Oct 33Australia’s Human Rights Obligations and ADF Operations 131 Jul/Aug 41

INDEX 55

Changing Nature of NBC Defence and the Implications for the ADF, The 130 May/Jun 55Harnessing The News Media During Conflict 129 Mar/Apr 43Intelligence and National Security 129 Mar/Apr 5International Peacetime Laws of the Environment and Australian Defence Force 132 Sep/Oct 13Lessons from the Experiences of Coalition Prisoners of War During the Gulf War 128 Jan/Feb 47Mercenaries and the “Sandline Affair” 133 Nov/Dec 5Re-evaluation of the Role of the Australian Task Force in Vietnam, A 133 Nov/Dec 41Relevance of the Defence Cooperation Program Between Australia and Indonesia, The 130 May/Jun 49Road to Basra: Did the Gulf War Coalition Violate International Humanitarian Law?, The 128 Jan/Feb 55Should NATO Enlarge? The Pros and Cons 133 Nov/Dec 25

LAWAustralasian Defence 2048 - An Alternative Future 132 Sep/Oct 3Australian-Indonesian Security Agreement: Where Did it Come From – Where is it Going?, The 132 Sep/Oct 33Australian Society: Vanguard or Rearguard? 130 May/Jun 19Australia’s Human Rights Obligations and ADF Operations 131 Jul/Aug 41Changing Nature of NBC Defence and the Implications for the ADF, The 130 May/Jun 55Computer Crime and the Impact of Interfering with RAAF Information Systems 130 May/Jun 13Dreadnoughts, Pacifism, Poising and Procrastination – A Parliamentarian Pre-History of Air Power in Australia 1908-14 131 Jul/Aug 45Harnessing The News Media During Conflict 129 Mar/Apr 43How Sharp a Sword? Defining Legitimacy in Offensive Capabilities 132 Sep/Oct 21International Peacetime Laws of the Environment and Australian Defence Force 132 Sep/Oct 13Lessons from the Experiences of Coalition Prisoners of War During the Gulf War 128 Jan/Feb 47Mercenaries and the “Sandline Affair” 133 Nov/Dec 5Re-evaluation of the Role of the Australian Task Force in Vietnam, A 133 Nov/Dec 41Relevance of the Defence Cooperation Program Between Australia and Indonesia, The 130 May/Jun 49Road to Basra: Did the Gulf War Coalition Violate International Humanitarian Law?, The 128 Jan/Feb 55Separation for a New Career – Military or Community Responsibility? 130 May/Jun 5Should NATO Enlarge? The Pros and Cons 133 Nov/Dec 25

LEADERSHIPAustralasian Defence 2048 - An Alternative Future 132 Sep/Oct 3Ceiling Rank for Part-Time Army Officers: Need for Review? 131 Jul/Aug 35Command and Leadership in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 23Common Induction Training 129 Mar/Apr 27Framework for a Unified Decision Making Process, A 132 Sep/Oct 41How Sharp a Sword? Defining Legitimacy in Offensive Capabilities 132 Sep/Oct 21Influence of the Army Reserve in Facilitating Social Change Within the Australian Defence Force, The 129 Mar/Apr 19Junior Leadership Training and Development in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 39Learning to Lead: A Contextual Model for Educating and Training Leaders 129 Mar/Apr 31New Tools for an Old Job: Planning Reconnaissance Company Pull Operations in an Army 21 Mechanized Infantry Battalion 128 Jan/Feb 27Re-evaluation of the Role of the Australian Task Force in Vietnam, A 133 Nov/Dec 41Restructuring the Australian Army: The Seeds of Future Crisis? 131 Jul/Aug 5ROMINS-Repertoire of Missions: A Mission Orientated Path To Managing Military Capability 128 Jan/Feb 5

LOGISTICSAirborne Forces: The Twenty-First Century’s Rapid Dominance Solution 133 Nov/Dec 35Air Defence in the Amphibious Tactical Lodgement: The Role of GBAD 131 Jul/Aug 19Australasian Defence 2048 - An Alternative Future 132 Sep/Oct 3Changing Nature of NBC Defence and the Implications for the ADF, The 130 May/Jun 55Computer Crime and the Impact of Interfering with RAAF Information Systems 130 May/Jun 13Future Tank Capability for Australia, The 130 May/Jun 29How Sharp a Sword? Defining Legitimacy in Offensive Capabilities 132 Sep/Oct 21Impact of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) on the Australian Defence Forces (ADF), The 128 Jan/Feb 41Laverton: A Historic and Significant Airfield 129 Mar/Apr 53New Tools for an Old Job: Planning Reconnaissance Company Pull Operations in an Army 21 Mechanized Infantry Battalion 128 Jan/Feb 27Re-evaluation of the Role of the Australian Task Force in Vietnam, A 133 Nov/Dec 41Restructuring the Australian Army: The Seeds of Future Crisis? 131 Jul/Aug 5

MANAGEMENTAir Defence in the Amphibious Tactical Lodgement: The Role of GBAD 131 Jul/Aug 19Australasian Defence 2048 - An Alternative Future 132 Sep/Oct 3Ceiling Rank for Part-Time Army Officers: Need for Review? 131 Jul/Aug 35Command and Leadership in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 23Computer Crime and the Impact of Interfering with RAAF Information Systems 130 May/Jun 13Framework for a Unified Decision Making Process, A 132 Sep/Oct 41Future Tank Capability for Australia, The 130 May/Jun 29How Sharp a Sword? Defining Legitimacy in Offensive Capabilities 132 Sep/Oct 21Impact of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) on the Australian Defence Forces (ADF), The 128 Jan/Feb 41Junior Leadership Training and Development in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 39Learning to Lead: A Contextual Model for Educating and Training Leaders 129 Mar/Apr 31Restructuring the Australian Army: The Seeds of Future Crisis? 131 Jul/Aug 5ROMINS-Repertoire of Missions: A Mission Orientated Path To Managing Military Capability 128 Jan/Feb 5


MEDICALAustralia’s Human Rights Obligations and ADF Operations 131 Jul/Aug 41Changing Nature of NBC Defence and the Implications for the ADF, The 130 May/Jun 55Laser Protection: The Need For a Coordinated Approach 131 Jul/Aug 31Learning to Lead: A Contextual Model for Educating and Training Leaders 129 Mar/Apr 31Maritime Casualty Estimation 129 Mar/Apr 13

MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM Airborne Forces: The Twenty-First Century’s Rapid Dominance Solution 133 Nov/Dec 35Air Defence in the Amphibious Tactical Lodgement: The Role of GBAD 131 Jul/Aug 19Australasian Defence 2048 - An Alternative Future 132 Sep/Oct 3Australian Society: Vanguard or Rearguard? 130 May/Jun 19Australia’s Human Rights Obligations and ADF Operations 131 Jul/Aug 41Ceiling Rank for Part-Time Army Officers: Need for Review? 131 Jul/Aug 35Changing Nature of NBC Defence and the Implications for the ADF, The 130 May/Jun 55Command and Leadership in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 23Common Induction Training 129 Mar/Apr 27Computer Crime and the Impact of Interfering with RAAF Information Systems 130 May/Jun 13Dreadnoughts, Pacifism, Poising and Procrastination – A Parliamentarian Pre-History of Air Power in Australia 1908-14 131 Jul/Aug 45Framework for a Unified Decision Making Process, A 132 Sep/Oct 41Future Tank Capability for Australia, The 130 May/Jun 29Harnessing The News Media During Conflict 129 Mar/Apr 43How Sharp a Sword? Defining Legitimacy in Offensive Capabilities 132 Sep/Oct 21Impact of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) on the Australian Defence Forces (ADF), The 128 Jan/Feb 41Influence of the Army Reserve in Facilitating Social Change Within the Australian Defence Force, The 129 Mar/Apr 19Intelligence and National Security 129 Mar/Apr 5International Peacetime Laws of the Environment and Australian Defence Force 132 Sep/Oct 13Junior Leadership Training and Development in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 39Laser Protection: The Need For a Coordinated Approach 131 Jul/Aug 31Learning to Lead: A Contextual Model for Educating and Training Leaders 129 Mar/Apr 31Lessons from the Experiences of Coalition Prisoners of War During the Gulf War 128 Jan/Feb 47Maritime Casualty Estimation 129 Mar/Apr 13Mercenaries and the “Sandline Affair” 133 Nov/Dec 5New Tools for an Old Job: Planning Reconnaissance Company Pull Operations in an Army 21 Mechanized Infantry Battalion 128 Jan/Feb 27Re-evaluation of the Role of the Australian Task Force in Vietnam, A 133 Nov/Dec 41Relevance of the Defence Cooperation Program Between Australia and Indonesia, The 130 May/Jun 49Restructuring the Australian Army: The Seeds of Future Crisis? 131 Jul/Aug 5Road to Basra: Did the Gulf War Coalition Violate International Humanitarian Law?, The 128 Jan/Feb 55ROMINS-Repertoire of Missions: A Mission Orientated Path To Managing Military Capability 128 Jan/Feb 5Separation for a New Career – Military or Community Responsibility? 130 May/Jun 5Should NATO Enlarge? The Pros and Cons 133 Nov/Dec 25

NAVAL MATTERSAir Defence in the Amphibious Tactical Lodgement: The Role of GBAD 131 Jul/Aug 19Australasian Defence 2048 - An Alternative Future 132 Sep/Oct 3Australian-Indonesian Security Agreement: Where Did it Come From – Where is it Going?, The 132 Sep/Oct 33Maritime Casualty Estimation 129 Mar/Apr 13Relevance of the Defence Cooperation Program Between Australia and Indonesia, The 130 May/Jun 49Should NATO Enlarge? The Pros and Cons 133 Nov/Dec 25

ORGANISATIONAir Defence in the Amphibious Tactical Lodgement: The Role of GBAD 131 Jul/Aug 19Australasian Defence 2048 - An Alternative Future 132 Sep/Oct 3Australian-Indonesian Security Agreement: Where Did it Come From – Where is it Going?, The 132 Sep/Oct 33Australian Society: Vanguard or Rearguard? 130 May/Jun 19Australia’s Human Rights Obligations and ADF Operations 131 Jul/Aug 41Ceiling Rank for Part-Time Army Officers: Need for Review? 131 Jul/Aug 35Command and Leadership in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 23Common Induction Training 129 Mar/Apr 27Computer Crime and the Impact of Interfering with RAAF Information Systems 130 May/Jun 13Dreadnoughts, Pacifism, Poising and Procrastination – A Parliamentarian Pre-History of Air Power in Australia 1908-14 131 Jul/Aug 45Framework for a Unified Decision Making Process, A 132 Sep/Oct 41Future Tank Capability for Australia, The 130 May/Jun 29Harnessing The News Media During Conflict 129 Mar/Apr 43Impact of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) on the Australian Defence Forces (ADF), The 128 Jan/Feb 41Influence of the Army Reserve in Facilitating Social Change Within the Australian Defence Force, The 129 Mar/Apr 19Junior Leadership Training and Development in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 39Learning to Lead: A Contextual Model for Educating and Training Leaders 129 Mar/Apr 31Re-evaluation of the Role of the Australian Task Force in Vietnam, A 133 Nov/Dec 41Relevance of the Defence Cooperation Program Between Australia and Indonesia, The 130 May/Jun 49Restructuring the Australian Army: The Seeds of Future Crisis? 131 Jul/Aug 5ROMINS-Repertoire of Missions: A Mission Orientated Path To Managing Military Capability 128 Jan/Feb 5Separation for a New Career – Military or Community Responsibility? 130 May/Jun 5

INDEX 57

PEACEKEEPINGAustralia’s Human Rights Obligations and ADF Operations 131 Jul/Aug 41International Peacetime Laws of the Environment and Australian Defence Force 132 Sep/Oct 13Should NATO Enlarge? The Pros and Cons 133 Nov/Dec 25

PLANNINGAirborne Forces: The Twenty-First Century’s Rapid Dominance Solution 133 Nov/Dec 35Air Defence in the Amphibious Tactical Lodgement: The Role of GBAD 131 Jul/Aug 19Australasian Defence 2048 - An Alternative Future 132 Sep/Oct 3Australian-Indonesian Security Agreement: Where Did it Come From – Where is it Going?, The 132 Sep/Oct 33Australian Society: Vanguard or Rearguard? 130 May/Jun 19Ceiling Rank for Part-Time Army Officers: Need for Review? 131 Jul/Aug 35Command and Leadership in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 23Computer Crime and the Impact of Interfering with RAAF Information Systems 130 May/Jun 13Dreadnoughts, Pacifism, Poising and Procrastination – A Parliamentarian Pre-History of Air Power in Australia 1908-14 131 Jul/Aug 45Framework for a Unified Decision Making Process, A 132 Sep/Oct 41Future Tank Capability for Australia, The 130 May/Jun 29Impact of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) on the Australian Defence Forces (ADF), The 128 Jan/Feb 41Intelligence and National Security 129 Mar/Apr 5International Peacetime Laws of the Environment and Australian Defence Force 132 Sep/Oct 13Junior Leadership Training and Development in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 39Learning to Lead: A Contextual Model for Educating and Training Leaders 129 Mar/Apr 31Mercenaries and the “Sandline Affair” 133 Nov/Dec 5New Tools for an Old Job: Planning Reconnaissance Company Pull Operations in an Army 21 Mechanized Infantry Battalion 128 Jan/Feb 27Re-evaluation of the Role of the Australian Task Force in Vietnam, A 133 Nov/Dec 41Relevance of the Defence Cooperation Program Between Australia and Indonesia, The 130 May/Jun 49Restructuring the Australian Army: The Seeds of Future Crisis? 131 Jul/Aug 5ROMINS-Repertoire of Missions: A Mission Orientated Path To Managing Military Capability 128 Jan/Feb 5Separation for a New Career – Military or Community Responsibility? 130 May/Jun 5

POLICYAirborne Forces: The Twenty-First Century’s Rapid Dominance Solution 133 Nov/Dec 35Air Defence in the Amphibious Tactical Lodgement: The Role of GBAD 131 Jul/Aug 19Australasian Defence 2048 - An Alternative Future 132 Sep/Oct 3Australian-Indonesian Security Agreement: Where Did it Come From – Where is it Going?, The 132 Sep/Oct 33Australian Society: Vanguard or Rearguard? 130 May/Jun 19Australia’s Human Rights Obligations and ADF Operations 131 Jul/Aug 41Ceiling Rank for Part-Time Army Officers: Need for Review? 131 Jul/Aug 35Changing Nature of NBC Defence and the Implications for the ADF, The 130 May/Jun 55Command and Leadership in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 23Computer Crime and the Impact of Interfering with RAAF Information Systems 130 May/Jun 13Dreadnoughts, Pacifism, Poising and Procrastination – A Parliamentarian Pre-History of Air Power in Australia 1908-14 131 Jul/Aug 45Framework for a Unified Decision Making Process, A 132 Sep/Oct 41Future Tank Capability for Australia, The 130 May/Jun 29Harnessing The News Media During Conflict 129 Mar/Apr 43How Sharp a Sword? Defining Legitimacy in Offensive Capabilities 132 Sep/Oct 21Impact of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) on the Australian Defence Forces (ADF), The 128 Jan/Feb 41Intelligence and National Security 129 Mar/Apr 5International Peacetime Laws of the Environment and Australian Defence Force 132 Sep/Oct 13Junior Leadership Training and Development in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 39Mercenaries and the “Sandline Affair” 133 Nov/Dec 5Re-evaluation of the Role of the Australian Task Force in Vietnam, A 133 Nov/Dec 41Relevance of the Defence Cooperation Program Between Australia and Indonesia, The 130 May/Jun 49Restructuring the Australian Army: The Seeds of Future Crisis? 131 Jul/Aug 5ROMINS-Repertoire of Missions: A Mission Orientated Path To Managing Military Capability 128 Jan/Feb 5Separation for a New Career – Military or Community Responsibility? 130 May/Jun 5Should NATO Enlarge? The Pros and Cons 133 Nov/Dec 25

POLITICSAustralasian Defence 2048 - An Alternative Future 132 Sep/Oct 3Australian-Indonesian Security Agreement: Where Did it Come From – Where is it Going?, The 132 Sep/Oct 33Australian Society: Vanguard or Rearguard? 130 May/Jun 19Changing Nature of NBC Defence and the Implications for the ADF, The 130 May/Jun 55Dreadnoughts, Pacifism, Poising and Procrastination – A Parliamentarian Pre-History of Air Power in Australia 1908-14 131 Jul/Aug 45Harnessing The News Media During Conflict 129 Mar/Apr 43How Sharp a Sword? Defining Legitimacy in Offensive Capabilities 132 Sep/Oct 21Intelligence and National Security 129 Mar/Apr 5International Peacetime Laws of the Environment and Australian Defence Force 132 Sep/Oct 13Lessons from the Experiences of Coalition Prisoners of War During the Gulf War 128 Jan/Feb 47Mercenaries and the “Sandline Affair” 133 Nov/Dec 5Re-evaluation of the Role of the Australian Task Force in Vietnam, A 133 Nov/Dec 41Relevance of the Defence Cooperation Program Between Australia and Indonesia, The 130 May/Jun 49Road to Basra: Did the Gulf War Coalition Violate International Humanitarian Law?, The 128 Jan/Feb 55Separation for a New Career – Military or Community Responsibility? 130 May/Jun 5Should NATO Enlarge? The Pros and Cons 133 Nov/Dec 25


RECRUITINGCeiling Rank for Part-Time Army Officers: Need for Review? 131 Jul/Aug 35Common Induction Training 129 Mar/Apr 27Influence of the Army Reserve in Facilitating Social Change Within the Australian Defence Force, The 129 Mar/Apr 19Junior Leadership Training and Development in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 39Learning to Lead: A Contextual Model for Educating and Training Leaders 129 Mar/Apr 31

SECURITYAir Defence in the Amphibious Tactical Lodgement: The Role of GBAD 131 Jul/Aug 19Australasian Defence 2048 - An Alternative Future 132 Sep/Oct 3Australian-Indonesian Security Agreement: Where Did it Come From – Where is it Going?, The 132 Sep/Oct 33Australia’s Human Rights Obligations and ADF Operations 131 Jul/Aug 41Changing Nature of NBC Defence and the Implications for the ADF, The 130 May/Jun 55Computer Crime and the Impact of Interfering with RAAF Information Systems 130 May/Jun 13Dreadnoughts, Pacifism, Poising and Procrastination – A Parliamentarian Pre-History of Air Power in Australia 1908-14 131 Jul/Aug 45Harnessing The News Media During Conflict 129 Mar/Apr 43How Sharp a Sword? Defining Legitimacy in Offensive Capabilities 132 Sep/Oct 21Intelligence and National Security 129 Mar/Apr 5Laverton: A Historic and Significant Airfield 129 Mar/Apr 53Lessons from the Experiences of Coalition Prisoners of War During the Gulf War 128 Jan/Feb 47Mercenaries and the “Sandline Affair” 133 Nov/Dec 5Re-evaluation of the Role of the Australian Task Force in Vietnam, A 133 Nov/Dec 41Relevance of the Defence Cooperation Program Between Australia and Indonesia, The 130 May/Jun 49Restructuring the Australian Army: The Seeds of Future Crisis? 131 Jul/Aug 5Road to Basra: Did the Gulf War Coalition Violate International Humanitarian Law?, The 128 Jan/Feb 55ROMINS-Repertoire of Missions: A Mission Orientated Path To Managing Military Capability 128 Jan/Feb 5Should NATO Enlarge? The Pros and Cons 133 Nov/Dec 25

STRATEGYAirborne Forces: The Twenty-First Century’s Rapid Dominance Solution 133 Nov/Dec 35Air Defence in the Amphibious Tactical Lodgement: The Role of GBAD 131 Jul/Aug 19Australasian Defence 2048 - An Alternative Future 132 Sep/Oct 3Changing Nature of NBC Defence and the Implications for the ADF, The 130 May/Jun 55Dreadnoughts, Pacifism, Poising and Procrastination – A Parliamentarian Pre-History of Air Power in Australia 1908-14 131 Jul/Aug 45Future Tank Capability for Australia, The 130 May/Jun 29How Sharp a Sword? Defining Legitimacy in Offensive Capabilities 132 Sep/Oct 21Laser Protection: The Need For a Coordinated Approach 131 Jul/Aug 31Laverton: A Historic and Significant Airfield 129 Mar/Apr 53Lessons from the Experiences of Coalition Prisoners of War During the Gulf War 128 Jan/Feb 47Mercenaries and the “Sandline Affair” 133 Nov/Dec 5New Tools for an Old Job: Planning Reconnaissance Company Pull Operations in an Army 21 Mechanized Infantry Battalion 128 Jan/Feb 27Re-evaluation of the Role of the Australian Task Force in Vietnam, A 133 Nov/Dec 41Relevance of the Defence Cooperation Program Between Australia and Indonesia, The 130 May/Jun 49Restructuring the Australian Army: The Seeds of Future Crisis? 131 Jul/Aug 5Road to Basra: Did the Gulf War Coalition Violate International Humanitarian Law?, The 128 Jan/Feb 55ROMINS-Repertoire of Missions: A Mission Orientated Path To Managing Military Capability 128 Jan/Feb 5Should NATO Enlarge? The Pros and Cons 133 Nov/Dec 25

TECHNOLOGYAir Defence in the Amphibious Tactical Lodgement: The Role of GBAD 131 Jul/Aug 19Australasian Defence 2048 - An Alternative Future 132 Sep/Oct 3Australian-Indonesian Security Agreement: Where Did it Come From – Where is it Going?, The 132 Sep/Oct 33Changing Nature of NBC Defence and the Implications for the ADF, The 130 May/Jun 55Computer Crime and the Impact of Interfering with RAAF Information Systems 130 May/Jun 13Dreadnoughts, Pacifism, Poising and Procrastination – A Parliamentarian Pre-History of Air Power in Australia 1908-14 131 Jul/Aug 45Future Tank Capability for Australia, The 130 May/Jun 29How Sharp a Sword? Defining Legitimacy in Offensive Capabilities 132 Sep/Oct 21Intelligence and National Security 129 Mar/Apr 5Laser Protection: The Need For a Coordinated Approach 131 Jul/Aug 31Laverton: A Historic and Significant Airfield 129 Mar/Apr 53Maritime Casualty Estimation 129 Mar/Apr 13New Tools for an Old Job: Planning Reconnaissance Company Pull Operations in an Army 21 Mechanized Infantry Battalion 128 Jan/Feb 27Restructuring the Australian Army: The Seeds of Future Crisis? 131 Jul/Aug 5

TRAININGAir Defence in the Amphibious Tactical Lodgement: The Role of GBAD 131 Jul/Aug 19Ceiling Rank for Part-Time Army Officers: Need for Review? 131 Jul/Aug 35Command and Leadership in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 23Common Induction Training 129 Mar/Apr 27Computer Crime and the Impact of Interfering with RAAF Information Systems 130 May/Jun 13Dreadnoughts, Pacifism, Poising and Procrastination – A Parliamentarian Pre-History of Air Power in Australia 1908-14 131 Jul/Aug 45Framework for a Unified Decision Making Process 132 Sep/Oct 41Future Tank Capability for Australia, The 130 May/Jun 29Harnessing The News Media During Conflict 129 Mar/Apr 43

INDEX 59

Impact of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) on the Australian Defence Forces (ADF), The 128 Jan/Feb 41Influence of the Army Reserve in Facilitating Social Change Within the Australian Defence Force, The 129 Mar/Apr 19Junior Leadership Training and Development in the Australian Army 130 May/Jun 39Laser Protection: The Need For a Coordinated Approach 131 Jul/Aug 31Laverton: A Historic and Significant Airfield 129 Mar/Apr 53Learning to Lead: A Contextual Model for Educating and Training Leaders 129 Mar/Apr 31Maritime Casualty Estimation 129 Mar/Apr 13New Tools for an Old Job: Planning Reconnaissance Company Pull Operations in an Army 21 Mechanized Infantry Battalion 128 Jan/Feb 27Re-evaluation of the Role of the Australian Task Force in Vietnam, A 133 Nov/Dec 41Relevance of the Defence Cooperation Program Between Australia and Indonesia, The 130 May/Jun 49Restructuring the Australian Army: The Seeds of Future Crisis? 131 Jul/Aug 5

VIETNAMLaverton: A Historic and Significant Airfield 129 Mar/Apr 53Re-evaluation of the Role of the Australian Task Force in Vietnam, A 133 Nov/Dec 41

WORLD WAR IFirst AIF Enlistment Patterns and Reasons For Their Variation 132 Sep/Oct 61Intelligence and National Security 129 Mar/Apr 5Role of C.E.W. Bean in Australian Historiography of The First World War, The 131 Jul/Aug 53

WORLD WAR IIAirborne Forces: The Twenty-First Century’s Rapid Dominance Solution 133 Nov/Dec 35Intelligence and National Security 129 Mar/Apr 5Laverton: A Historic and Significant Airfield 129 Mar/Apr 53

BOOK REVIEWSTITLE ISSUE PAGEAmong the Carrion Crows 131 Jul/Aug 60Australian Partisan a True Story of Love and Conflict 132 Sep/Oct 71Bitter Waters: Life and Work in Stalin’s Russia 129 Mar/Apr 67Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, The 132 Sep/Oct 67Close Quarter Battle 129 Mar/Apr 67Diggers’ Songs 132 Sep/Oct 67Future of Capitalism, The 128 Jan/Feb 62In Search of a Maritime Strategy: The maritime element in Australian defence planning since 1901 128 Jan/Feb 63Kokoda Trail – A Walk in Their Footsteps 129 Mar/Apr 68Lavarack: Rival General 132 Sep/Oct 70Nation at War, Australian Politics, Society and Diplomacy during the Vietnam War, 1965-75, A 130 May/Jun 61Ocean Bridge - The History of RAF Ferry Command 131 Jul/Aug 59Peace Operations: Tackling the Military Legal and Policy Challenges 128 Jan/Feb 62RAAF in Russia, The 131 Jul/Aug 63Sharp End, The: The Trauma of a War in Vietnam 130 May/Jun 64Shipmates 133 Nov/Dec 50200 Shots: Damien Parer, George Silk and the Australians at War in New Guinea 132 Sep/Oct 69Soldiers, Citizens & the Symbols of War, From Classical Greece to Republican Rome, 500 - 167 B.C. 131 Jul/Aug 60To the Last Ridge 133 Nov/Dec 49Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding US Special Operations Forces 130 May/Jun 63United Nations and Changing World Politics, The 131 Jul/Aug 62‘Victor Two’ Inside Iraq – The Crucial SAS Mission 132 Sep/Oct 71Virtual Republic, The: Australia’s Culture Wars of the 1990s 130 May/Jun 62Voyage With an Australian Sailor, A 131 Jul/Aug 59Vung Tau Ferry, HMASSydney and Escort ships 133 Nov/Dec 50Warrior Generals, The: Combat Leadership in the Civil War 131 Jul/Aug 62War Torn 131 Jul/Aug 61


AUTHOR’S INDEX

AUTHOR ISSUE PAGE

Basan, Major T., RAInf. 132 Sept.Oct 41

Basan, Major T., RAInf. 133 Nov/Dec 35

Blackwell, Lieutenant Colonel David, RAInf. 130 May/Jun 23

Boyd, S.B. and Burman, N.M., DST Department of Defence 129 Mar/Apr 13

Calder, Peter, DSTO 130 May/Jun 55

Connery, Major D.K., RAA 131 Jul/Aug 19

Crowhurst, Group Captain Brenton, RAAF 132 Sept/Oct 33

Darby, T.J. & Spencer, J.D. 130 May/Jun 5

Davies, M.J., Aust Int. 128 Jan/Feb 41

Dowse, Wing Commander A.E. 129 Mar/Apr 43

Drayton, Andrew 133 Nov/Dec 41

Dugdale, Major M.J., RA Sigs. 131 Jul/Aug 53

Ebbeck, Dr Genevieve 133 Nov/Dec 5

Granville, Dr Johanna, Department of Political Science, Clemson University, USA 133 Nov/Dec 25

Hinge, Lieutenant Commander Alan, RAN 128 Jan/Feb 5

Hodge, Lieutenant Colonel T.P., RFD 129 Mar/Apr 19

Jobson, Colonel K.H., AM 132 Sept/Oct 61

Kuric, Major Anton, RAInf. 128 Jan/Feb 27

McKay, Dr T. and Craig, Dr J., DSTO 131 Jul/Aug 31

Moor, Major R.C., RAInf. 130 May/Jun 39

Orme, Lieutenant Colonel C.W., RAAC 129 Mar/Apr 5

Niessl, Lieutenant R.A., RAInf. 130 May/Jun 49

Plunkett, Captain A., RAInf. 131 Jul/Aug 35

Rogers, Lieutenant F., RAN 131 Jul/Aug 41

Sharp, Major R.G., RAE 131 Sept/Oct 13

Shine, Major C.J. 131 Jul/Aug 5.

Smith, Lieutenant Colonel A.J., RAE 132 Sept/Oct 21

Smith, Professor Hugh, Australian Defence Force Academy 130 May/Jun 19

Steinbach, Wing Commander J.W., RAAF 131 Jul/Aug 45

Stevenson, Major E.J., RAAC 129 Mar/Apr 31

Thomas, Major Jason, ARMD REGT, and De Marchi, Lieutenant Stephen, 3TP BSQN 130 May/Jun 29

Weller, Melissa, RAAF Museum, Point Cook 129 Mar/Apr 53

Wing, Lieutenant Colonel Ian, Aust Ind. 128 Jan/Feb 47

Wing, Lieutenant Colonel Ian, Aust Ind. 132 Sept/Oct 3

Worswick, Captain R.J. 129 Mar/Apr 27

Wythes, Wing Commander Peter, RAAF 130 May/Jun 13

Yates, J.A. WA State Emergency Service 128 Jan/Feb 55

NO. 133 NOVEMBER/ DECEMBER 1998 - Department of Defence · 2017-08-16 · 4 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE...

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Transcript of NO. 133 NOVEMBER/ DECEMBER 1998 - Department of Defence · 2017-08-16 · 4 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE...