Kant (So Far)

The attempt to protect science as well as protect and promote human freedom through the defense of reason

For a frame of reference - working definitions of some key terms

Rationality – the ability to respond to the environment in ways that maximize the satisfaction of needs and desires.

Reason – actively making sense of things through proper inference (in accordance to logic - laws of thought) of available evidence.

The attempt to avoid Humean skepticism without relying upon the critical excesses of metaphysics

Metaphysics would concern topics such as causality, substance, the universe as a whole, free will, the immortal soul, and God.

Hume’s Objections

1. Metaphysical claims are not expressed in analytic a priori judgments, or judgments whose predicate is contained in their

subject and which can be discovered without the use of concrete experience. (266)

2. Metaphysical claims are not expressed in synthetic a posteriori judgments, or judgments whose predicate adds something to the

subject and which are only discovered through concrete experience. (266)

In Kant's viewHume decisively showed that we have neither synthetic a posteriori

(empirical) nor analytic a priori knowledge of causation

Kant’s Method = PhenomenologyKey strategy of Kant’s critical idealism - the distinction between the

phenomenal and the noumenal

Kant’s distinctions between the phenomena and noumenal ‘realms;’ between the empirical (phenomenal) and noumenal selves; between

theoretical and practical reason

In the attempt to provide the complete solution to the problem regarding the possibility of synthetic a priori propositions

Phenomena are "things of sense, or appearances." Phenomena can be known, i.e., subsumed under the a priori concepts of understanding.

Noumena are "things of the understanding, which make up an intelligible world."

About noumena, we neither know nor can know anything determinate whatever.

In the phenomenal realmExperience necessarily consists of both intuitions, which

belong to sensibility, and judgments, which are entirely the work of the understanding.

A judgment, according to Kant, is a movement in thought in which two items are brought together and combined.

Transcendental Aesthetic The necessary conditions of sense experience

Capacity of receptivity Space and time – pure intuitions

Individuation and succession

Transcendental AnalyticThe necessary conditions of intelligibility

Power of spontaneityCategories of Understanding

QuantityQualityRelationModality

A human being's "intuition" can anticipate the actuality of a [sensible] object, because it supplies "the form of sensibility, which in me as

subject precedes all the actual impressions through which I am affected by objects."

The forms of sensuous intuition do not enable us to know things [as they are] in themselves; we know things only as they appear to us, as

phenomena

The faculty of a priori intuition contain only the form of phenomena, not their matter or sensuous content

Some judgments rest directly on the a priori forms of intuition: that (complete) space has three dimensions; that a straight line can be

drawn to infinity

The Case of GeometryKant asserts that pure mathematics is an example of synthetic a priori knowledge. Mathematical knowledge can proceed only by construction of concepts, in a mentally purified field of space and/or time. With the

geometrical proposition "the whole is greater than its part," the predicate is necessarily joined to the subject and the mind brings in a

purified intuition of space

Geometry is based upon the form of intuition we call space and arithmetic is based upon the form of intuition we call time

Kant notes that right hand and left hand gloves, each the mirror of the other, are incongruent but indistinguishable except in terms of right and left, which are spatially relative to perceivers. He takes this as proof that space and time are not aspects of things in themselves

NatureKant understands "nature" as the existence of things, so far as it is

determined according to universal laws. Nature is knowable a posteriori, so Kant cannot mean by nature "what things are in

themselves."

He says "we possess a pure natural science . . . a priori . . . "; it consists of propositions regarding nature independent of any

experience of nature whatsoever and therefore independent of particular sensory observation. Its laws include: "substance is

permanent" and "every event is determined by a cause according to constant laws.

JP vs. JE

Kant distinguishes judgments of perception (JP), judgments that are valid to me because they correspond to how things are connected in my perception, from judgments of experience (JE), which result when JP's are transformed: This happens when JP's are be subsumed under the law that, whenever an event is observed, it is always related to some antecedent, which it follows according to a universal rule. In

other words, JE's are formed when to the JP certain special concepts are added, e.g., that of the universal cause-effect connection

The objectively valid character of the JE signifies its necessary universal validity, i.e., its objective validity for all subjects constituted

as we are. 

Without the imposition of concepts of the understanding all our objectively valid synthetic judgments would be impossible.

Kant claims he has derived a complete list of the pure a priori concepts of the understanding, without which experience would not be possible.

He works from a list of the general attributes of judgments and applies them to the forms of intuition that create space and time. Causality is the reflection of the hypothetical judgment (the conditional, or if-then

proposition) as applied to space and time

Experience consists of intuitions, which belong to sensibility, and judgments, which are entirely the work of the understanding.

The pure concepts of the understanding" are those under which all perceptions must first be subsumed before they can serve for judgments of experience, in which the synthetic unity of the

perceptions is represented as necessarily and universally valid.

Two Basic Questions Answered1. The first "How is nature possible in general in the material

sense?"

Answer: by means of the constitution of our sensibility

3. The second "How is nature possible in the formal sense, as the totality of rules under which all appearances must come in order to be thought as connected in an experience?" is

Answer: by means of the constitution of our understanding, according to which all the representations of sensibility (percepts) are necessarily referred to a consciousness, and

by the peculiar way in which we think (the a priori concepts).

According to Kant, there is a position more absurd than claiming to know something about noumena: that is to deny the existence of

things in themselves and declaring our [human] experience to be the only possible way of knowing things.

Kant’s transcendental method results in Intention Conception Perception

how can we know

Perception Conception Intention* Conception Perception

*()

Ethics

By the end of the first critique, Kant offers a proof that one of the things we can know is that we cannot know whether or not we are free.

Kant famously claims his agnostic position as “limiting knowledge to make way for faith.”

Not knowing one way or the other gives us license to think and act as if certain things were true, so long as they are not logically impossible.

Free will is theoretically possible but definitively not demonstrable.

Free will is necessary to our experience of moral obligation.

Reason is not merely an instrument for finding the best means to satisfy our desires but it is itself capable of setting goals and

motivating us to pursue them.

Freedom and autonomy of the will rest on the foundation of pure practical reason

THERE IS A MORAL LAW

In order to do what is right you have to use reason

Key principles of morality: An action has moral worth only if it is done from duty; an action done from duty derives its moral worth not

For Kant, intention is established through the nature of the self whose essence is free which requires the use of reason to

actualize

according to the purpose for which it is done but rather from the maxim from which it is done; duty is the necessity of an action that is

done out of respect for law.

The only thing good in itself is a good will; nevertheless the virtues should be cultivated because they make it easier for us to resist

temptation and to act in accordance with moral law.

Morality is independent of inclination (feelings, emotions, desires, & impulses)

The Good Will A good will is the will that exercises pure practical reason. What we will, that is, what we try to do, is wholly within our

control. Reason serves the purpose of instructing our will in our duty.

“The notion of duty includes that of a good will” A good will subjects itself to rational principles.

Rational principles = moral laws Action in accordance with such laws that alone makes a person

good.

Hypothetical Imperatives vs. Categorical ImperativesOur personal discovery of ‘oughts’ from our socialization into a

community is not enough to guide human conduct as the foundation of morality.

Hypothetical imperatives = any if/then formulations expressing contingent ‘oughts’ as modes of conduct understood as appropriate

means to realize a non-moral and/or immediate objective.

Example: If I want the respect of my parents, then I, at least, need to finish my undergraduate degree.

Categorial Imperative the general formulation of Kant’s notion of duty

demand that one ‘do this’ or ‘don’t do this’ – regardless of circumstance

three formulations

A. I should never act in such a way that I could not wish that my maxim should be a universal law without contradiction.

B. Treat all persons, including yourself, as ends always, and never as means

C. Act always as though you were both subject and sovereign in a kingdom of ends

We are only free when we will ourselves to be ruled by reason. This maxim is a subjective rule of action, or what we would call an

intention.

If the exercise of reason is the only means of becoming free whereby reason entails the pursuit of universal necessity in the realms of

knowledge and ethics then the influence of our particular circumstance and desires might become collateral damage. Being good, reasonable

and free might very well come at the expense of happiness.

some problems with Kant’s conception of morality

1. It may be too strict: the idea that morality and duty have nothing to do with our personal desires or inclinations seems to make moral life undesirable

2. Kant gives us no adequate way of choosing between moral imperatives that conflict