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Problem Oriented Policing and Open Air Drug Markets: Examining the Pulling Levers Strategy in Rockford, Illinois

Nicholas Corsaro Southern Illinois University-Carbondale

Edmund F. McGarrell Michigan State University

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Executive Summary

In 2007, the Rockford Police Department, in cooperation with other city agencies, the State’s Attorney and U.S. Attorney’s Offices, and community leaders, launched an innovative effort to eliminate open-air drug dealing and thereby significantly reduce crime in the ADP West Neighborhood. The initiative drew upon the experience of a similar effort in High Point, North Carolina as well as promising efforts to reduce gun crime that have been part of the national Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) program. The national research team for PSN from Michigan State University, including faculty at Southern Illinois University, were invited by the Rockford Police Department to conduct an independent evaluation of the initiative. The Strategy The goal of the initiative is to break the cycle whereby drug dealers are arrested and prosecuted only to be replaced by another group of dealers. Rather, the strategy seeks permanent elimination of the drug dealing with corresponding reduction in crime and improvement in the quality of life within the neighborhood. The strategy involved a three-stage process. The initial phase known as the Identification stage involved systematic analysis of crime data indicating specific areas within Rockford that were victimized by high levels of drug dealing and associated crime. Two areas were identified and the ADP West neighborhood was chosen for the intervention (the program has since been implemented in the second neighborhood, ADP East). Following selection of the neighborhood, the RPD narcotics unit conducted an undercover investigation. Twelve individuals were identified as being actively involved in drug sales. Evidence was gathered with the result of very strong prosecutorial cases being established against the twelve. Of the twelve, seven were deemed to be chronic and serious offenders with involvement in violence. These individuals were prosecuted. The other five, however, were judged less serious offenders and were offered a second chance. The second stage involved notification whereby the five offenders were informed that they could be prosecuted but were going to be offered a second chance with the contingency that drug dealing in ADP West stops and that the individuals remain crime free. The notification included participation of the offender’s families as well as neighborhood residents who expressed their desire to live in a safe environment as well as their desire to see the five individuals become productive members of the community. A variety of social services and social support were offered to the offenders. The final phase consisted of resource delivery and follow-up to provide support intended to help the five drug dealers avoid a return to drug dealing and crime. Additionally, a variety of efforts were taken to improve the appearance and quality of life within the neighborhood. The Impact The evaluation consisted of comparing the trend in property crime and violent crime during the eleven months prior to the intervention and the fourteen months following the intervention. Using a systematic time series analysis, the findings revealed a 31 percent decrease in property

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crime and a 15 percent reduction in violent crime. Both decreases were statistically significant. During this same period, the rest of the city experienced a six percent decline in both property and violent crime. Thus, it appears that the drug market intervention had a significant impact on crime in the ADP West neighborhood. Additionally, four of the five drug dealers who were offered a second chance have remained crime free. The one who did re-offend was arrested for a theft. Finally, although this was not studied systematically, community members report a dramatic improvement in the quality of life in the ADP West neighborhood.

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Introduction

Since the surge in drug-related crime due to the crack epidemic in the mid-1980s, a large

number of law enforcement agencies have implemented strategies specifically targeted at drug

hot spots (Coldren and Higgins, 2003; Green, 1995; Kennedy, 1993; Weisburd and Green, 1995).

Indeed the use of proactive, problem-solving initiatives to deal with specific types of drug related

crime has been implemented in a number of criminal justice organizations (Goldstein, 1990).

The current study evaluates a “pulling levers” strategy used by the Rockford Police Department

(RPD) in Northern Illinois that was specifically designed to address open-air drug markets and

related offending in a small, high-crime neighborhood within the city.

The City of Rockford: A Contextual View

Rockford is a medium sized city located in Northern Illinois, roughly one hour northwest

of Chicago. Housed within Winnebago County, which is the sixth largest county in the state, the

municipality is home to roughly 150,115 inhabitants according to the 2000 U.S. Census. The

city has a total of 56.7 square miles and inhabits roughly 2,680 people per square mile. In terms

of demographics, residents in Rockford are roughly 72.8 percent white, have a median home

income of $37,600, and nearly 77.8 percent graduated from high school.

In terms of the organizational structure of local law enforcement, the RPD employs 305

police officers, 33 civilians, and operates on an annual budget of $40.5 million in 2008. Chief

Chet Epperson was appointed command of the RPD in April 2006. The RPD closely follows an

approach first introduced by Herman Goldstein (1990) by using strategic and proactive initiatives

to combat crime in the city. Officials report that the city of Rockford has strong inter-agency

cooperation between police officers, city building inspectors, social support services, and

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community development leaders to identify and manage individuals who participate in criminal

offending.

Crime in Rockford

RPD went through major organizational and leadership changes in 2006. Consequently,

we examined crime measures from 2005 as a way of understanding the context that the new

leadership faced in 2006. Rockford placed in the second-highest quartile, or the top 50 percent,

of all U.S. cities with a population over 100,000 for property crime offenses according to the

2005 Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). Comparatively, the city placed in the lowest-quartile (the

bottom 3 percent) of all large U.S. cities in terms of their violent index crimes, which is a

composite measure of all homicides, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults. Thus, while

Rockford was one of the least violent American cities in 2005, it was among one of the higher

ranking cities in terms of property crimes.

A volume of criminological research suggests a robust connection between drug markets

and property crime. Rengert and Wasilchick (1989) found that the ‘anchor point’ for drug-

dependent property offenders is often the locale where they purchase illegal substances. Thus,

while drug distributors may attempt to keep their sales a secret, they have little control over their

customers’ activities (Rengert, 1996: p. 92). Research suggests that users who engage in

burglary in order to obtain the means necessary to purchase drugs often orient their criminal

activity in the direction of their drug distributor, to save time and effort (Pettiway, 1995; Rengert,

1996). The drug market-property crime connection is also seen as the cause behind the high

property crime specifically in Rockford, Illinois. According to a high-standing police official in

the RPD, “the drug markets are driving the crime in Rockford.”

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The Rockford Response to Open-Air Drug Markets: The Pulling Levers Strategy

One problem-oriented strategy that has gained popularity over the past decade has been

the use of a pulling levers strategy, which was established in Boston as a vehicle to reduce youth

homicide and gun violence (Braga et al., 2001; Kennedy et al., 1997). In general, pulling levers

employs a focused deterrence approach that uses a variety of sanctions to sway groups of chronic

offenders from continuing their pattern of violent behavior. In addition, pulling levers strategies

also include community-based action, social service, and opportunity provision components.

Pulling levers strategies have previously targeted gangs and networks of chronic, violent

offenders and frequently involve the use of interagency cooperation among practitioners from

various criminal justice agencies and researchers alike. Key criminal justice agency leaders

cooperate to inform identified offenders of the sanctions they face if they continue to engage in

violent crime (Kennedy, 1997). Offenders are informed that there will be high inter-agency

cooperation to seek the maximum penalty for continued offenses. Crackdowns on gang

members and offenders that continue to engage in violent and gun crime have often been used in

combination with the deterrence-based meetings to increase the perceived threat of sanctions for

illegal gun carrying and use (Braga et al., 2001; Kennedy and Braga, 1998; McGarrell et al.,

2006).

The use of a crackdown in conjunction with the pulling levers strategy often serves as

evidence of the seriousness and commitment by key criminal justice officials. From a theoretical

perspective, pulling levers as an intervention strategy can be considered a focused deterrence

approach based on the characteristics associated with offending and the criminal justice system

response to offending. Since the strategy is both implemented and supported by a multi-agency

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working group there are a variety of sanctions available that can be used against offenders.

Thus, the involvement of many agency members focused on a specific problem should increase

the severity and certainty of penalties, leading to alterations in perceptions about sanctions and

risk. Deterrence scholars discuss how offenders are constantly revising their perceptions of the

risks and rewards of criminal behavior based on new information (Horney and Marshall, 1992;

Nagin, 1998). The pulling levers meetings and an affirmative follow-up response are the types

of new information that may cause offenders to reassess the risks of committing gun crime.

In addition to the deterrence component, the pulling levers strategy also includes the use

of prosocial groups, such as community and church leaders as well as social service providers to

provide offenders a variety of positive program and lifestyle alternatives in addition to the

deterrent message. The use of positive social groups is designed to reduce defiance (Sherman,

1993) and make offenders aware that their former actions are the target of the task force, not

themselves personally. In addition, Rosenfeld and Decker (1996) proposed that the reliance on

community members in a strategic program sends a clear message that continued offending

would not be tolerated when agents of the community are involved. Additionally, the prosocial

groups attempt to link participants to legitimate services (e.g., employment, housing, mentors,

drug treatment) and thus represent a form of social support (Cullen, 1994).

While the pulling levers approach originated in Boston (see Braga et al., 2001, for a

discussion) as a vehicle to reduce violent, firearm offenses, and youth homicide, the strategy has

since been replicated in other U.S. cities including Baltimore, MD (Braga et al., 2002), Chicago,

IL (Papachristos et al., 2007), High Point, NC (Coleman, 1999), Indianapolis, IN (McGarrell et

al., 2006), Los Angeles, CA (Tita et al., 2003), Lowell, MA (Braga et al., 2008), Minneapolis,

MN (Kennedy and Braga, 1998), and Stockton, CA (Braga, 2008; Wakeling, 2003). At the

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national level, Dalton (2002) describes how the pulling levers framework has been applied in a

large number of U.S. cities and federal districts through the Strategic Alternatives to Community

Safety Initiative (SACSI) and Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN).

The previously listed studies suggest pulling levers has shown great promise to reduce

gang, firearm, and overall violent crime, to this point most of the pulling levers strategies are

relatively untested where non-violent, open-air drug markets are the focus of the strategy. One

of the cities to use this approach to reduce open-air drug markets and related offenses was High

Point, North Carolina, where the preliminary results appear promising (Frabutt et al., 2006).

Certainly, there has been a host of problem oriented policing interventions designed to reduce

drug markets and related crime. Indeed the strategy employed in Rockford was similar to other

problem oriented policing initiatives such as the forging of police, citizens, and building

inspectors used in the Jersey City Drug Market Experiment (Weisburd and Green, 1995;

Mazzerrole et al., 2006), Oakland’s Beat Health Program (Mazerolle and Ransley, 2006), and the

Drug Nuisance Abatement Program in San Diego (Clarke and Bichler-Robertson, 1998).

However, along with High Point, the city of Rockford is among one of the first communities to

combine the pulling levers approach with related problem oriented policing tactics to address

their unique and relatively non-violent drug-market problem. We examine the processes

employed as well as the changes in crime related to the intervention strategy adopted by the RPD

to address open-air drug markets in a targeted community. The purpose of this paper is to assess

whether the pulling levers strategy has the potential to reduce non-lethal crime related to drug

markets.

Rockford, IL Drug Market Initiative Strategy

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The Rockford Police Department (RPD) generally followed the nine-step High Point

Drug Market Intervention approach as described in the following stages: 1) Identification, 2)

Notification, and 3) Resource Delivery. The identification stage details the data-driven

procedural analysis used by the RPD to determine the neighborhood for the intervention and the

individuals identified as chronic drug market distributors. The notification stage details both the

crackdown operation, which was the sweep of individuals who were the target of the crackdown,

as well as the notification meeting at which the ‘zero-tolerance/social support’ message was

delivered to individuals who would be provided the opportunity to participate in the ‘last chance’

program. Finally, resource delivery stage was particularly concerned with providing those

individuals included in the notification meeting with positive support mechanisms, a critical

component of the mixed deterrence-social support strategy.

Identification

The identification stage was a key element in the strategic response to illegal drug

markets in Rockford. In late February 2007, research analysts at the Rockford Police

Department examined a composite measure of index offenses, drug arrests, and drug complaints

for the entire city. Relying on spatial-mapping software, two major hot spots were identified:

Alternative Drug Program1 (ADP) West and ADP East. ADP West consists of two sub-beats (37

and 41) and ADP East consists of four sub-beats (131, 132, 175, and 176). In terms of choosing

the locale for the proposed strategy, law enforcement agents decided to focus on APD West as

their initial target given that area was a small residential area rather than a business-commerce

area, as was the case with ADP East.i

1 The Alternative Drug Program (ADP) was the inter-departmental title of the program described here used by the RPD.

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In terms of intelligence gathering, a Narcotics Unit Officer was in command of the

information gathering on individuals responsible for selling drugs in open-air drug markets in the

APD West neighborhood. Relying on multiple data sources including cooperating witnesses,

narcotics complaints, and police surveillance, officers spent roughly four weeks gathering

information on illegal drug distributors in the neighborhood. Thus, narcotics detectives

conducted a modified incident review of all known offending in APD West. All reports and

contacts with police (including intelligence gathered from cooperating witnesses) were

examined. Ultimately, the narcotics unit ultimately identified twelve individuals who were

chronic, persistent narcotics distributors in the neighborhood. It is important to note that the unit

did not limit their focus strictly on individuals who resided in the drug hotspot area, but rather

focused on individuals who were selling drugs in this area, regardless of where they lived.

For nearly eight weeks, the narcotics unit used cooperating witnesses (i.e., individuals

eligible to testify in court) to make controlled buys from the twelve identified individuals in the

ADP West area. The officers used a variety of tactical strategies to build cases that would stand

up in court. For one, the unit relied upon surveillance equipment, both still- and video-

photography to record the drug transactions. In addition, officers commonly photographed the

money (i.e., the serial numbers) they would use in an upcoming transaction, and then reclaim the

money from the dealer after the sale through consent searches near the location of the sale. In

short, the officers spent roughly two months building cases against the twelve individuals for

illegal drug distribution.

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DMI Eligibility

After the investigation was complete, the lead Narcotics Officer, Assistant State

Attorney, the Deputy Chief, and the Assistant U.S. Attorney combined to create a committee

designed to review the cases made against the twelve individuals. The group examined the

criminal histories for each person and determined those who would be eligible for participation

in the Drug Market Initiative (DMI) and those who were ineligible for the ‘last-chance’ call-in.

The main criterion for the inclusion/exclusion decision was the presence and volume of previous

violent and weapons charges in each person’s criminal history. Ultimately, the committee

decided to invite five of the twelve individuals for the DMI initiative because of their minimal

and/or non-violent criminal histories, while the other seven individuals were arrested and

charged with multiple counts of drug offenses at a time that corresponded with the intervention

strategy.

Notification

On Monday May 7, 2007 RPD called a community services meeting at a local parochial

school in the ADP West neighborhood where they informed residents that the department had

been engaging in a drug enforcement strategy over the past six weeks, and that continued efforts

were immediately forthcoming. On the same day, as well as the following day, May 8, 2007,

RPD arrested the seven individuals that were classified as ineligible for the notification. They

subsequently requested and were granted bonds of $500,000 on each person. During these same

two days, RPD reached out to ADP West residents to make them aware of the upcoming

notification meeting on Wednesday May 9, 2007 using a variety of contact strategies such as

their automated telephone line, often referred to as ‘reverse-911’ (i.e., an automated telephone

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system designed to contact residents’ land-based telephone lines) as well as hand delivering

printed fliers to residents.

RPD also worked diligently on May 7 and May 8 to ensure that the five offenders that

were being called into the lever-pulling notification knew about and would be present at the

Wednesday May 9 meeting. Along with police-initiated contact, they relied on assistance from a

local church pastor to aid in contacting offenders and their families to ensure them that they

would not be arrested (i.e., that this was not a sting-operation). The Chief of Police wrote a letter

to each of the individuals stating the department was aware of their previous illegal activities and

provided an assurance that no arrests would be made at the May 9 meeting. In one case, RPD

provided travel funds to an individual who was out-of-town so he could attend the meeting. All

five individuals were present at the notification hearing, along with their families, local residents,

and a variety of criminal justice agents and service providers.

The meeting occurred in the gymnasium of a local parochial school. First, the residents

were asked to discuss the impact of crime and drug dealing in their neighborhoods. Next,

community organization leaders raised their concerns that the persistent drug selling was

intolerable because it was making the neighborhood unsafe. A recurring theme was that the

current environment was unfair to the children in the neighborhood, who deserved to be raised in

surroundings that did not include drug dealing, prostitution, and crime. After this community-

driven message, all community residents were dismissed except for the five individuals, their

families, key criminal justice personnel, and the service providers.

The five notified offenders were taken collectively into a small classroom, where each

was presented with a bound notebook. In the each offender’s notebook there were photographs

capturing his/her participation in drug dealing and an unsigned warrant identical to those issued

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against the seven offenders who were arrested within the past 48 hours. The Chief of Police

warned the group ‘this is the last day you are going to sell drugs here.’ Deputy Chief Michael

Booker notified the offenders that they were very lucky to get this opportunity, but it was not a

‘free ride’ and that each person was expected to give back to the community where he or she had

caused harm. Representatives from other criminal justice agencies including a local and federal

prosecutor also spoke at the meeting. The United States Attorney notified the group that he

would assign a federal prosecutor specifically to their case if they continued to participate in any

future criminal offending. Also present in the classroom were photographs of the seven

offenders that were arrested within the past two days, serving as a deterrent warning and to the

sincerity of the notice.

Finally, the social-support component of the strategy ended the notification meeting.

Each offender underwent an immediate needs assessment with the Director of the Human

Services Department in Rockford, each lasting roughly 15-20 minutes in length. The purpose of

the immediate assessment was to ensure that each participant understood the coalition was going

to allocate both time and human resources to each person’s specific needs.

Resource Delivery, Follow-Up, and Continued Efforts

In terms of individual-level resource delivery, all five participants reported to probation

within 24 hours of the notification hearing, which was a stipulation of their participation. Within

two weeks each participant had a more detailed need assessment performed. Human Services

wanted to evaluate each person’s specific needs, which varied by individual. Some had an

immediate need for housing, while others needed assistance in locating employment, improving

life and social skills, and many needed counseling.

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In terms of a neighborhood level follow-up, RPD organized a strategically crafted

response to assist in ‘cleaning up’ the ADP West area on Thursday, May 10. In particular, RPD

seized three housing units where drug sales were a persistent problem in the neighborhood. In

addition, building code officials seized an additional two buildings from the same neighborhood

for code violations, again where drug offending had been well known. Human Services

participated in the housing seizure process, providing immediate shelter for residents within the

homes who were not involved in illegal drug distribution at the seized homes, providing

assistance with moving, and giving each family their first month’s rent at their new housing

location.

A mobile command unit was also placed in the streets of the ADP West area from 8am

through the late evening hours. Police initiated a neighborhood sweep with community

development officers focusing mainly on maintenance code citations for weed and lawn care,

parking, litter, and trash violations in the neighborhood. Finally, RPD had a street-sweeper clean

the streets throughout the neighborhood as a symbolic gesture that a change was indeed

occurring.

In terms of a deterrent response to the participants, one of the notified offenders

reoffended roughly seven weeks after the notification meeting. While working at a local

convenient store, she was arrested and charged with theft. Consistent with their ‘last-chance’

message, the RPD executed the arrest warrant they had been saving and she was charged with

multiple counts of illegal drug-distribution, and subsequently received a $500,000 bond. She

was convicted on multiple counts of drug dealing several months later. As of 18 months post

call-in, the other four participants have not re-offended.

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RPD continues its commitment to reduce the likelihood of a replacement effect in the

ADP West neighborhood. First, community resource officers and local residents involved in the

block watch program stay in direct communication about the state-of-affairs in the

neighborhood. Second, RPD continues intensive patrols through the area on a daily basis.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, RPD has made it an organizational priority to respond

immediately to any illegal drug sales in the area. More specifically, RPD administrative leaders

have conveyed the importance of an immediate response to drug dealing to all officers

responsible for patrolling this area. Taken together, these strategies show a committed and

continued focus on reducing the likelihood that drug sales will re-emerge in the ADP West

neighborhood. We summarize the action plan, or process component, of the Rockford DMI in

Figure 1.

Figure 1: Drug Market Intervention Action Plan Implemented by the Rockford Police Department

Strategy Description

Identification (February, 2007)

Research analysts at RPD mapped index offenses, drug arrests, and drug complaints for the entire city.

Mobilization (March, 2007)

Law enforcement officials determined that the ADP West neighborhood, consisting of two sub-beats, would be the ideal locale for the DMI intervention.

Intelligence Gathering

(March, 2007)

A narcotics unit officer at RPD supervised intelligence gathering on individuals who engaged in chronic drug dealing in the APD West neighborhood.

Incident Review

(March, 2007)

Narcotics detectives conducted a complete incident review of all known offending in APD West. All reports and contacts with police (including intelligence gathered from cooperating witnesses) were examined. Twelve persistent offenders were identified.

Undercover Investigation

(March-April, 2007)

Narcotics detectives made controlled buys from the twelve identified drug dealers over the course of eight weeks. Surveillance equipment was used to record the purchases, as was the use of cooperating witnesses.

A multi-agency committee reviewed the cases made against the twelve

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DMI Eligibility Meeting

(April, 2007)

individuals and relied upon the use of criminal histories (e.g., the number of violent offenses and the total number of offenses) to identify five dealers who would be eligible for the pulling levers meeting.

Notice to Residents

(May 7, 2007)

RPD notified residents at a local community meeting that an undercover investigation had been conducted over the past couple of months and that an immediate response was about to take place.

Sweep of Violent Offenders (May 7 & 8, 2007)

Within 48 hours of the May 7, 2007 notification meeting, the seven violent offenders who were ineligible for the DMI strategy were subsequently arrested and received $500,000 bonds.

Contact with Eligible Offenders’ Families (May 7 & 8, 2007)

RPD made phone calls, and relied upon a pastor at a local church to notify offenders of the call-in by contacting their families. Chief Epperson also wrote a letter to each offender guaranteeing they would not be arrested at the meeting. The RPD provided assistance for those out of town to ensure their attendance.

The Call-In

(May 9, 2007)

The offenders, their families, key criminal justice personnel, and community members attended the notification hearing. First, residents spoke of the harm that drug dealing caused in their community. Next, offenders and their families received the deterrent message from multi-agency members that continued offending would not be tolerated. Finally, an immediate needs assessment was made by social support services, followed by a more detailed assessment in the following weeks. Offenders were given 24 hours to report to probation and all met this requirement.

Community Follow-Up

(May 8, 2007)

RPD and housing inspectors seized five housing complexes where prior drug offending had been prominent. Social service officials assisted in moving residents who did not previously engage in illegal drug distribution into new homes. Maintenance code citations (e.g., lawn, trash, and poor fencing) were written for violations throughout the neighborhood. A street-sweeper cleaned the streets to symbolize the change that was occurring.

Long Term Follow-Up

RPD continues routine and saturated patrols in the neighborhood. Community source officers and community leaders maintain communication for up-to-date information on neighborhood issues. The department has made responding to drug distribution in this neighborhood an immediate priority to reduce the likelihood of the market re-emerging.

Impact Evaluation Michigan State University assessment finds a 31 percent decrease in property crime and a 15 percent reduction in violent crime. Both decreases were statistically significant. During this same period, the rest of the city experienced a six percent decline in both property and violent crime. Thus, it appears that the drug market intervention had a significant impact on crime in the ADP West neighborhood.

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Analytic Framework

Ultimately, the goal of the DMI campaign was to reduce criminal offending and to make

the ADP West neighborhood more inhabitable. The current investigation is designed to assess

the impact of strategies implemented in Rockford by examining whether changes in criminal

offending occurred in both the neighborhood as well as the overall city at the time of the

intervention that was implemented by the task force.

Table 2 displays key demographic characteristics of residents and households in the ADP

West neighborhood as well as the overall city of Rockford. Measures captured are the total

population, percent male, percent white, the median home income, average educational

attainment of inhabitants, and measures of residential stability. The measures displayed here

were taken from both block group and overall city data available from the 2000 U.S. Census.

The ADP West neighborhood comprises roughly 1.7 percent of the Rockford population and is

generally one of the more poverty-stricken neighborhoods within the city.

Table 2: Demographic Characteristics of Residents: Comparison Between ADP Neighborhood Area and Overall City of Rockford

Census Measure ADP West Neighborhood Overall City of Rockford

Population (2000) 2,681 total people 150,115 total people Percent Male 47 percent 48.2 percent Percent White 46 percent 72.8 percent Median Income $13,284 $37,667 High School Graduates (persons 25 and older) 33.3 percent 77.8 percent

Renter Occupied Units 84.4 percent 38.9 percent

Data Source

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Our data includes all offenses reported over a two-year period in the city of Rockford.

Offense data were aggregated into a monthly format starting in June 2006 through June 2008.

Each month’s crime measure was operationalized as a composite variable, running from its first

through its last day, of all offenses that occurred during this period. Offense data from the RPD

are more reliable than conventional calls to service data due to the fact that law enforcement

officers enter information on the offense into an onboard computer system in their patrol cars

after investigation, detailing the circumstances of the event. The categorization of offenses is

subjected to an internal reliability check since all officers that are apart of an investigation are

expected to contribute to the report. Thus, we rely on the use of offense data in our study in

order to take advantage of this reliability check that is a product of the infrastructure of the RPD.

Table 3 displays the offenses that were aggregated in order to create the composite

measures of violent and non-violent crimes for the purpose of a more detailed statistical analysis.

In terms of the violent crime variable, nine offenses were selected to create an overall index

measure where the victim of the harm is a person. Violent offenses were roughly .7 percent

homicides (murder and non-negligent manslaughter), 1.5 percent rapes, .2 percent kidnappings

(kidnapping, abduction, and unlawful restraint), 11 percent robberies, and 86.6 percent assaults

(simple and aggravated) over a two-year span. Similarly, nine offenses were used to create the

non-violent crime measure, which is a composite of drug and narcotic offenses, nuisance

offenses (including prostitution and vagrancy), and property offenses. The non-violent crime

measure is comprised of roughly 63.1 percent property damage (stolen and destruction of

property and vandalism), 15.9 percent drug violations (including equipment), and 21 percent

nuisance offenses (prostitution, curfew violations, vagrancy, and disorderly conduct).

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Table 3: Description of Violent and Non-Violent Offenses in Rockford

Violent Offenses [Offenses Against Persons]

Non-Violent Offenses [Nuisance, Drug, & Property Crimes]

Murder Stolen Property Non-Negligent Manslaughter Destruction of Property Rape Vandalism Kidnapping Drug/Narcotic Violations Abduction Drug Equipment Violations Unlawful Restraint Prostitution Robbery Violation of Curfew Aggravated Assault Vagrancy & Loitering Simple Assault Disorderly Conduct

As an initial step, we examined the percentage changes in violent and non-violent

offenses for the ADP West Neighborhood, the remainder of Rockford, and the overall city of

Rockford before and after the pulling levers strategy. Since the number of pre-intervention and

post-intervention periods is not equivalent (i.e., 11 months pre-intervention, 14 months post-

intervention), we examined the average percentage change in the number of offenses per month

across the city. Table 4 shows that the ADP West neighborhood experienced an average decline

of 24.10 percent in non-violent offenses and a 14.29 percent reduction in violent offenses

between the pre- and post-intervention periods around the May 2007 call-in. Comparatively, the

remainder of the city (i.e., the overall city – ADP West neighborhood) also experienced a decline

in both non-violent offenses (-9 percent) as well as violent offenses (-2.29 percent). Ultimately,

we see that a decline in both violent and non-violent crime occurred in the city of Rockford

before- and after the May 2007 strategy used in ADP West. However, we also see that the

decline throughout the remainder of the city was not similar in terms of magnitude for either

offense type, and that the decline in both violent and non-violent crime for the entire city of

Rockford was likely influenced by the specific declines in the ADP West neighborhood.

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Table 4: Changes in Non-Violent and Violent Offenses in Rockford Before and After May 2007 Call-In Location

Number of Offenses Per Month

(Pre-Intervention)

Number of Offenses Per Month

(Post-Intervention)

Average Percentage

Δ ADP Neighborhood Non-Violent 29 22 -24.10 Violent 21 18 -14.29 Remainder of City Non-Violent 944 859 -9.00 Violent 567 554 -2.29 Overall City Non-Violent 1013 881 -13.03 Violent 588 573 -2.55

We next proceeded with a more detailed analysis of the crime trends by examining the

monthly trend for violent and non-violent crimes for the ADP West neighborhood and the entire

city of Rockford. We treated May 2007 as the intervention date because it was during this month

when the RPD: 1) Facilitated a number of arrests for violent-offenders who participated in open-

air drug trafficking, 2) Conducted the ADP West call-in, bringing community and key criminal

justice officials together to impact non-violent drug offenders in a positive and pro-social

manner, and 3) Performed extensive community-altering strategies including the closure of five

housing units with a history of illegal drug distribution and worked with community

development officers to improve the neighborhood by issuing citations for maintenance code

violations.

In terms of analysis, one of the most widely adopted statistical procedures in

econometrics and criminal justice used to determine the impact of programs and public policies

is time series analysis. This type of procedure is also referred to as “impact assessment”

(McCleary and Hay, 1980). McCleary and Hay state “the widest use of the time series design

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has clearly been in the area of legal impact assessment” (1980:141). Consistent with this

approach, we relied upon Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) time series

models for subsequent analyses. Time series analysis, in this illustration, is the analysis of both

violent and non-violent crime trends over time in the overall city of Rockford and the specific

ADP West neighborhood. As with most analytic approaches, the series of trends must conform

to a number of statistical rules, or assumptions. The most important is the assumption of mean

and variance stability, or stationarity, over time. To illustrate, if a crime reduction strategy were

implemented at an ideal time when crime rates were already on the decline, it would be likely for

researchers to inaccurately claim ‘success’ because the trend was already on a decline at the start

of the intervention. However, if the series conform to these critical assumptions, then this type

of analytic approach can control for the pre-existing trends in the data (i.e., autocorrelation and

seasonality) and the full impact parameter in the model can be empirically tested (McCleary and

Hay, 1980), which in this case is the May 2007 strategic intervention. Here, the intervention

component is a dichotomous variable (0 for pre-May 2007 and 1 for post-May 2007).

We examined the trend data for both violent and non-violent offenses in the ADP West

neighborhood, the remainder of the city, and the overall city of Rockford. It became apparent

that the series did not conform to the assumption of stationarity (i.e., they were unstable) over the

time period examined here. Specifically, the Augmented Dickey Fuller Unit Root Test indicated

the presence of a unit root, which means that a drift (or trend) existed in the original series. To

address the variance instability that offenses were ‘regressing toward the mean’ at the time of the

intervention, the series were transformed using the natural logarithm of each month’s value in

subsequent ARIMA models as a way to control for the instability in the series (McCleary and

22

Hay, 1980). Figure 1 displays the trend in the logged-offenses for both violent and non-violent

crime in the ADP West neighborhood.

Figure 1: Violent and Non-Violent Offense Trends in ADP West Neighborhood

Although this strategy addressed the variance instability in the series, the data still did not

conform to all assumptions of ARIMA modeling. Specifically, examination of the

autocorrelation function (ACF) and partial autocorrelation function (PACF) indicated that both

an autoregressive (AR) parameter and a seasonal parameter needed to be included in each model

in the identification process. Consistent with prior research (see Cohn, 1990; Lab and Hirschel,

1987; Tennenbaum and Fink, 1994), crime in Rockford was higher when the weather was

warmer (i.e., in summer months). There were correlations every sixth-lag (or month) in the

series meaning that clear ‘seasonality’ existed in Rockford. After adding the appropriate

parameters to the model, the trends of offense data met the appropriate ARIMA assumptions as

they were reduced to a white-noise process, as indicated by the Box-Ljung Q-statistic for each

model’s series of residuals (p > .05 in all models).

23

Table 5 presents the impact assessment of the call-in intervention strategy for the ADP

West Neighborhood, the remainder of Rockford, and the overall city of Rockford. Specifically,

non-violent offenses experienced a statistically significant decline (p < .05) of 30.6 percentii

following implementation, meaning the observed reduction was highly unlikely due to chance.

Violent offenses in the ADP West area experienced a marginally significant decline (p < .10) of

roughly 15.4 percent, meaning we are moderately confident the reduction in violence following

the call-in was not due to chance. Comparatively, the remainder of Rockford experienced a

decline of roughly 6 percent for both violent and non-violent offenses during this period, and

these declines did not approach statistical significance in either offense-types. The overall city

of Rockford (i.e., ADP West neighborhood + remainder of the city) experienced a decline in both

offense types of offenses of roughly 7 percent, but again these declines were not statistically

significant. Given the relative small geographic area of the ADP West neighborhood (i.e.,

roughly 1.7 percent of the overall city’s population is housed here), it would be somewhat

unexpected for changes in this area to have a pronounced effect in the overall city immediately

following implementation. However, these results indicate that the neighborhood had

significantly fewer offenses following implementation. Additionally, the fact that the trends in

both violent and non-violent crimes were going down throughout the remainder of the city

suggests there is little evidence of a displacement effect.

Table 5: Time-Series Analyses for Offense Types in Rockford, Illinois

Offense Type Pre-intervention

Mean

Post- intervention

Mean

ARIMA Model

Intervention Coefficient

(s.e.)

p-value

AIC

p d q

ADP West Violent Offenses (Ln)

2.96 2.85 1 (6)

- - -.168 (.101)

.096 20.5

24

Non-Violent Offenses (Ln)

3.32 2.99 1 (6)

- - -.365 (.161)

.023 26.0

Remainder of Rockford

Violent Offenses (Ln)

6.32 6.30 1 (6)

- - -.066 (.049)

.175 22.3

Non-Violent Offenses (Ln)

6.88 6.74 1 (6)

- - -.060 (.118)

.608 21.2

Overall City of Rockford

Violent Offenses (Ln)

6.36 6.33 1 (6)

- - -.070 (.049)

.155 22.0

Non-Violent Offenses (Ln)

6.91 6.76 1 (6)

- - -.071 (.118)

.546 21.5

Discussion

Our results indicate that criminal offenses in the ADP West neighborhood experienced a

significant decline following the May 2007 DMI strategy. Controlling for seasonal effects, we

found that non-violent offenses had a statistically significant decline of over 30 percent while

violent offenses experienced a marginally significant decline of roughly 15 percent.

Comparatively, the remainder of Rockford experienced a decline of roughly 6 percent in both

violent and non-violent crimes during this same period, and these declines did not approach

statistical significance. Thus, we believe this strengthens the conclusion that the pulling levers

intervention strategy had a significant and pronounced effect on crime in the ADP West

neighborhood.

Although the current evaluation did not systematically address neighborhood perceptions

of the impact of the intervention, conversations with neighborhood leaders and city officials

report a dramatic improvement in the quality of life. Open drug dealing is reported to have been

25

eliminated and social and physical disorder reduced. Further investigation of these impressions

are planned to be implemented by the research team.

Additionally, there are several limitations of the current study that should be noted. We

would ideally have control site data available in order to compare offense trends in order to

minimize the concern that the observed reductions in crime in the ADP West neighborhood were

due to external factors. Indeed, the uses of experimental or quasi-experimental designs are well-

suited methodological strategies for program assessment (Cook and Campbell, 1979).

Unfortunately, only one other area in Rockford was similar in terms of being a ‘hotspot’ of

similar criminal activity. We did not conduct separate and comparable analyses for trends in this

area because after observing the utility and the impact of the DMI strategy in the initial

neighborhood, the RPD performed a similar strategy in the comparable target area. Thus, only

six months of post-intervention data exists in the APD East neighborhood to use as a control

site.iii Given the findings that crime in Rockford varies as a function of seasonality, comparisons

made during this period would have too many factors that cannot be controlled for with such few

observations.

We also note that we would ideally have more observations of monthly data for our

statistical analysis. We rely on two years worth of data of comparable pre-post intervention

periods, but note this limitation. On the one hand, lower degrees of freedom make it more

challenging to reject the null hypothesis, which is true of most quantitative techniques (Cook and

Campbell, 1979). The fact that we observed a significant reduction in non-violent crime in the

ADP West neighborhood gives us more confidence that a reduction in crime existed. In a related

manner, the marginally significant decline in violent crime is also impressive given this

limitation. However, we also note the flip side to the coin by wondering if the observed impact

26

would have been as pronounced over multiple years worth of data. We cannot rule out this

limitation ecause the RPD went through a data-management change in 2006 and prior years

worth of data are very different than those compiled today. While we do not believe the

relatively short-term data we used here is a insurmountable limitation, we do note its potential

limits.

In order to address the concerns raised by some researchers that time series models are

‘more art than science’ (Kleck, 1997), we followed Cochran et al’s (1994) assertion that the

functional form of an intervention being modeled should be explored empirically as well as

theoretically, we estimated both zero-order and first-order transfer functions. Results indicated

that the zero-order transfer function were the most parsimonious models and fit our data best.

Crime in the ADP West neighborhood experienced a significant and sharp decline following

implementation, after controlling for seasonal effects.

These limitations aside, in terms of contributions to the literature, the use of the pulling

levers strategy is well established in the criminal justice literature as a promising problem

oriented policing strategy, particularly well suited to reduce gun, gang, and lethal violence. The

RPD and its subsequent social and justice organizations implemented the strategy in a rigorous

and detailed manner that was consistent with the traditions of the approach. In fact, prior to

implementation the city relied on consultation from David Kennedy, one of the pioneers of the

strategy who was implemental in its inception in Boston (see Braga et al., 2001; Kennedy, 1997)

and in many additional cities since. Thus, research from this particular study has great promise

to amplify the growing body of research designed to assess the utility of the pulling levers

strategy. In addition to its promise as a strategic response to reduce violence, homicide, and gun-

crime (see Braga 2008; Braga et al., 2001, 2002, 2008; Kennedy, 1997; Kennedy and Braga,

27

1998; McGarrell et al., 2006; Papachristos et al. 2007), results from our study indicate that the

pulling levers strategic intervention has great promise to reduce non-lethal crime related to open-

air drug markets. Our research indicates that crime associated with open-air drug markets

significantly reduced following its implementation in Rockford. Future research, particularly

those that can utilize experimental or quasi-experimental research designs, is much needed to

assess the utility of the pulling levers approach to reduce and eliminate open-air drug markets in

additional cities.

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i We note that the RPD chose ADP West as the initial neighborhood, but committed and eventually implemented a similar strategy in ADP East within one year. ii In order to calculate the estimated percentage change, we use exponentiation on the logged-coefficient (e.g., exp(-.365) – 1.00 = - 30.6 percent). iii Preliminary analysis of the ADP East intervention appears promising. For example, drug crime has declined in this neighborhood from 10.57 drug offenses per month prior to the second DMI strategy to 4.5 drug offenses per month following implementation. However, additional data and more detailed analyses are necessary in order to assess the impact of the ADP East intervention.