News of the Israeli-Palestinian Confrontation

February 1-15, 2007

Contents

Overview

Important Events

Statistical Data

Internal Palestinian

Arena

Propaganda campaign against the archaeological earthworks at the Mugrabim ramp in Jerusalem

A stereotyped Jew, whose excavating near the Dome of the Rock will detonate the Middle East (Syrian daily Teshreen, February 11 copied by Hamas Websi February 15).

The Mecca Accord to end the violent confrontations between Fatah and Hamas and to establish a national unity government

Center for Special Studies Intelligence and Terrorism

Information Center

Overview

During the past two weeks the most important event on the internal Palestinian scene was the signing of the Fatah-Hamas Mecca Accord (February 8) to stop Palestinian bloodshed and to establish a national unity government. Hamas seems to have profited most from the accord because it enabled the movement to preserve most of its political assets without having to make ideological concessions or accept the Quartet’s conditions. Nevertheless, both Abu Mazen and Hamas expect to be able to market it to the international community, lift the economic siege and end the Palestinian Authority government’s isolation. In the meantime, difficulties have become apparent regarding the allocation of the new government’s ministries, especially the interior ministry.

The archaeological rescue earthworks which began on February 4 at the Mugrabim ramp (located outside the Temple Mount precinct) and the planned new bridge led to an extensive anti-Israeli propaganda campaign. Its most conspicuous leaders are Hamas and Ra’ed Salah, leader of the northern faction of the Islamic Movement of Israeli Arabs. The propaganda campaign is intended to channel internal Palestinian violence and rivalries against Israel. It has spread beyond the PA-administered territories and Israel to countries in the Arab-Muslim world.

The Palestinian terrorist organizations continued to violate the Gaza Strip ceasefire reached by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Abu Mazen on November 25 2006. During the first half of February there was an increase in the number of rockets fired at population centers in the western Negev, most of them launched by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

From left to right: Abu Mazen, King Abdallah, Khaled Mashaal and Ismail Haniya after the accord was signed (Souhib Salem for Reuters, February 8)

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Important Events1

Increase in rocket fire

During the first two weeks of February there was an increase in the number of

rockets fired at population centers in the western Negev. Twenty-three rockets

were identified as having hit Israel (as compared with 30 throughout January).

Most of the them were launched by the PIJ and the rest by elements of Fatah.

Hamas does not participate in rocket fire. Some of the launchings were

represented as retaliation for the earthworks carried out by Israel at the

Mugrabim ramp.

Side charge and exchanges of rocket fire near the fence in the northern Gaza Strip

On the morning of February 13 two terrorists were seen approaching the

security fence near the northern Gaza Strip. In the assessment of the IDF forces

on the scene they had come to lay a side charge. When they realized they had

been spotted, one of them detonated the charge and then opened fire on the IDF

soldiers. One terrorist was killed and the other escaped.

Attempted abductions of Israeli civilians prevented

On the evening of February 4 an attempt was made to abduct an Israeli

civilian at the Eli junction, north of Jerusalem. The civilian, who was waiting for a

ride, became suspicious when three Palestinians offered him a lift, and refused to

get into their car. The three then left the scene. IDF forces conducted a search of

the area and detained three Palestinians in a car of the same description near

Beir Zeit (north of Ramallah). Weapons were found in the car.

An investigation by the Israeli security forces revealed that the same terrorists

had previously attempted to abduct three yeshiva students who were waiting for a

ride at the Tapuah junction, south of Nablus. The students stated that the driver

1 As of February 15.

3

of the car had indicated that only one passenger could get into the car and they

declined to accept the ride.

Counterterrorism measures in Judea and Samaria

Israeli security force counterterrorism measures continue in Judea and

Samaria:

On February 1 security forces in Tulkarm detained Nasser ‘Amer

Mahmoud Muhammad Baraqeh, a senior Fatah-Tanzim operative. He was

active in developing rocket-launching capabilities, and planning and

carrying out attacks. He was recently involved in planning a suicide

bombing attack and to that end enlisted a potential suicide bomber and

manufactured a number of explosive belts. As he was being detained

another terrorist-operative was shot and killed; he had been involved in

shooting attacks and arms dealing.

On February 6 security forces in Nablus detained three Fatah-Tanzim

operatives. Two of them planned to attack Israeli civilians and IDF soldiers.

One of them was involved in planning a suicide bombing attack and in

laying a side charge in the region of Alon Moreh (near Jerusalem). An

additional detainee from the Tulkarm district was involved in an attempt to

smuggle an explosive device from Nablus.

On February 8 security forces in Ramallah detained Anwar Ahmad

‘Amir, a senior Hamas operative in Tulkarm and a Hamas leader in Judea

and Samaria. He was one of the Hamas activists deported to Marj al-Zuhur

in Lebanon in 1992 and has been wanted by the Israeli security forces since

2002.

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Lebanon

Explosive devices found near Avivim and a shooting incident with the Lebanese army

On the morning of February 5 IDF soldiers discovered a chain of 4-5 explosive

devices camouflaged as rocks near Avivim, a moshav on the Lebanese border.

They were laid in Lebanese territory near the Blue Line (the Israeli-Lebanese

boundary) north of the security fence.2 On-site examination revealed that despite

denials, Hezbollah apparently recently placed the charges.

One of the charges in situ (Photo courtesy of the IDF spokesperson)

On the night of February 8 the Lebanese army opened fire on IDF forces

operating in Israeli territory (south of the Blue Line) near the location where the

explosive devices had been discovered. The operations were designed to locate

other devices. The IDF returned fire, apparently hitting a Lebanese army APC.

2 For further information see our February 6 Bulletin entitled “A chain of explosive charges disguised as rocks laid the area of Avivim on the Israeli-Lebanese border: a Hezbollah test case for Israel, the first time since the second Lebanon war ,” at http://terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/hezbollah_060207e.htm and http://terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hezbollah_060207e.pdf.

One of the devices, detonated by the IDF (Photo courtesy of the IDF spokesperson)

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Inflammatory Palestinian propaganda campaign against earthworks at the Mugrabim

ramp in Jerusalem3 On February 4 the Israeli Antiquities Authority began rescue earthworks at

the Mugrabim ramp, which leads through the Mugrabim Gate of the Temple

Mount to the square in front of the Western Wall. Along with the rescue work,

which will continue into the next months, a new bridge is planned to replace the

old one. The Mugrabim ramp is part of an earthen embankment damaged by an

earthquake and the stormy winter of 2004, and is unsafe. The Mugrabim ramp is

not part of the Temple Mount precinct.

The crumbling embankment (Photo courtesy of the Foreign Ministry and the Antiquities Authority)

The reconstruction work on the Mugrabim Ramp has been exploited by

Palestinians of every political stripe to defame Israel by presenting the false claim

that the project is an Israeli attempt to destroy Al-Aqsa mosque. The propaganda

campaign is being led by Hamas and, among Israeli Arabs, by Ra’ed Salah, the

leader of the northern faction of the Islamic Movement. It is clearly meant to

exploit a sensitive topic to make personal and political capital and to channel the

current internal Palestinian violence and rivalries against Israel.

3 For further information see our February 8 Bulletin entitled “A Palestinian disinformation campaign led by Hamas claims renovation work done at the Mugrabim ramp in Jerusalem is an Israeli attempt to destroy Al-Aqsa mosque…” at http://terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/mugrabim.htm and http://terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/mugrabim.pdf.

Barclay’s Gate

The crumbling embankment

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On February 9 clerics delivering sermons in PA mosques exploited the

opportunity to incite their listeners against Israel. After the prayers, worshippers

took to the streets to hold protest demonstrations. There were rallies and

processions throughout Judea and Samaria (Nablus, Ramallah, Tulkarm and

Jenin) and in the Gaza Strip. Protests were also held in East Jerusalem and

Nazareth. On February 12 A mass rally was organized in Ramallah by the

Liberation Party (hezb al-tahrir)4, attended by 2000-3000 people under the

slogan “the Caliphate is Al-Aqsa’s only savior.”

A poster appearing on a PIJ Website. The inscription reads “Jerusalem is calling you” (February 15)

Anti-Israeli incitement and protests spread to Arab-Muslim states, including

Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iran. In Syria the incitement was both anti-Israeli and

anti-Semitic.5

4 An extremist Islamic party active in Judea and Samaria since the 1950s.

5 For further information see the English version of the Hebrew Bulletin about the hate industry in Syria which will appear shortly.

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Anti-Israeli cartoon published in Syria

Statistical Data

Monthly distribution of attacks

A stereotyped Jew excavating under the foundations of the Dome of the Rock (Teshreen, February 14)

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 -Feb 115

Grenades Explosive Charges Suicide Bombers Personal Assaults Anti-Tank Fire Small Arms Fire Rocket Fire

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Monthly distribution of rocket hits

Monthly distribution of Israeli casualties

פלסטיניתפלסטינית--הזירה הפניםהזירה הפנים

2330

50

157

524041

191

140

54

79

41

97

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb 1-15

30

14

3

18

47

3

3327

1

15

1

50

3

34

3

15

92

9

50

4

26

1

41

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb 1-15

Total Killed

Total Wounded

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The Internal Palestinian Arena

The Mecca Accord for establishing a Palestinian national unity government

Between February 6-8 negotiations between Fatah and Hamas were held in

Mecca. Among the participants were senior members of both organizations,

including Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and

Khaled Mashaal, head of Hamas’s political bureau.6

The negotiations, held under the auspices of King Abdallah of Saudi Arabia,

ending with the signing of the Mecca Accord, whose main points are:

Palestinian blood must not be shed. All steps must be taken to

prevent Palestinian bloodshed and to adopt the policy of dialogue as the

only means of settling political disputes.

A Palestinian national unity government is to be established on

the basis of the “detailed agreement” reached by Fatah and Hamas. (The

specifics were not mentioned.) It was decided that as soon as possible, both

sides would start implementing the necessary constitutional steps to form

the government.

Furthering proceedings were necessary to reorganize the PLO for

development and reform.

The objective of the accord was to enable both sides, Fatah and Hamas,

to turn their energy to “liberation from the burden of the occupation,” “and

6 For further information see our February 12 and 13 Bulletins entitled “Initial analysis of the accord reached at Mecca between Fatah and Hamas for the establishment of a Palestinian national unity government,” at http://terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/mecca_agreement.htm and http://terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/mecca_agreement.pdf, and “Hamas spokesmen stress that the Mecca Accord does not recognize Israel. Although the Accord does not meet the Quartet’s demands, Abu Mazen and Hamas expect it will be possible to market it to the international community with the help of Saudi Arabia,” at http://terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/mecca_b_e.htm and http://terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/mecca_b_e.pdf.

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first and foremost in matters concerning Jerusalem, the refugees, Al-Aqsa

mosque, the prisoners and detainees, the [security] fence and the

settlements.”

From left to right: Abu Mazen, King Abdallah, Khaled Mashaal and Ismail Haniya after the accord was signed (Souhib Salem for Reuters, February 8)

At the signing of the accord Abu Mazen charged Ismail Haniya with forming

the next Palestinian government during the period of time specified by the

Palestinian basic law and presenting it to the Palestinian Legislative Council for

ratification. He also called upon Ismail Haniya to honor legitimate international

decisions (i.e., those made by the UN) and agreements signed by the PLO. That

includes those made on the basis of by previous decisions made by the

Palestinian Legislative Councils, the “national reconciliation document” (i.e., “the

prisoners’ document”) and the decisions made at Arab summit meetings.

The underlying significance of the Mecca Accord: it primarily expresses

Fatah-Hamas interest to prevent a continuation and worsening of the violent

clashes between them. In effect, Abu Mazen and Fatah decided in favor of an

internal Palestinian reconciliation at the price of concessions to Hamas and

ignoring the demands of the United States and the Quartet. Hamas would seem

to have profited most from the Mecca Accord because it was able to preserve

most of its governmental assets without making ideological concessions with

regard to the continuation of terrorism against Israel.

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Returning to the PA-administered territories, both sides began steps in

preparation for implementing the accord. Ghazi Hamas, Hamas government

spokesman, announced that on February 15 Ismail Haniya would present Abu

Mazen with his resignation. Meanwhile “Palestinian sources” reported that there

were disagreements concerning specific ministers, especially the interior minister

(Y-Net, February 14).

Marketing the Mecca Accord to the international community

Hamas government spokesmen, among them political bureau chief Khaled

Mashaal, repeatedly stated that the Mecca Accord did not contain recognition of

Israel and that Hamas had no intention of altering its ideological position.

Nevertheless, Abu Mazen and Hamas expect that a massive propaganda

campaign, supported by Saudi Arabia, will make it possible to market the Accord

to the international community. Their objective is to lift the economic siege,

break out of their diplomatic isolation and deflect pressure exerted by the

international community from the Palestinians to Israel.7

Worsening of violent clashes in the Gaza Strip on the eve of the Mecca Accord

At the beginning of February another wave of Fatah-Hamas violence washed

over the Gaza Strip, worse than the preceding ones, which claimed the lives of 28

Palestinians, wounded approximately 250 and resulted in dozens of abductions.

Both sides attacked the other’s power bases.

Some of the more prominent incidents were: a Fatah supply convoy was

attacked, Fatah operatives broke into the Islamic University (a Hamas

stronghold), mortars were fired near the home of Abu Mazen, there was gunfire

at the Shifa hospital, a media office was shot at, the Gaza city municipality

property was looted, an Al-Quds Open University building was torched and the

headquarters of security forces in the Gaza Strip were attacked.

7 See Note 6.

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On February 1 members of the security forces loyal to Abu Mazen raided the

Islamic University in Gaza. A large cache of weapons was found, including

Kalashnikov rifles, RPG launchers and large quantities of ammunition. It was

also reported that many tunnels had been dug under the university and served as

laboratories for the manufacture of side charges and rockets, and which were also

used by Hamas operatives as underground passages.8

During and after the discussions in Mecca the violence in the Gaza Strip

abated, but Fatah-Hamas tension is still present under the surface.

8 After the raid, Fatah claimed that seven Iranian specialists had been caught. The claim has not been verified and was apparently untrue and issued only for purposes of propaganda.