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Are we living in an age of ‘new wars’?

Following the fall of the USSR and ending of the Cold War, the international system entered a period

of relative instability. Gone were the days of bi-polar geopolitics in which the USA and the USSR were

locked in continual struggle with one another. It was a ‘war’ centred on a most basic difference, a clash

of ideology. Since the early 1990s, the world has struggled to adapt to its new environment, the ordered

international system died with the USSR and now we are living in an age of geopolitical uncertainty.

With few nations able to seriously challenge the dominant USA, and without the black and white filter

the Cold War brought to international relations, we have seen greater confusion, greater autonomy and

greater inter-dependence across the globe. Nations that were previously shackled to one superpower or

another now find themselves having a degree of relative ideological freedom and an incentive to seek

greater inter-state co-operation.

This globalisation of world politics, economics and culture has characterised the post-Cold War period

and fundamentally changed conflict worldwide. It is this change in the nature of war that will be the

focus of this essay. It will argue that we are indeed living in an age of ‘new wars’ but that the changes

in the nature of conflict are different from those outlined by the new wars thesis. The most significant

and observable change is in terms of actors involved in war, and I will argue that post-Cold War

conflicts, as a result of globalisation, are subject to greater international involvement from a wider

variety of actors than ever before. Although this essay disagrees with the new wars thesis, it argues that

the new range and degree of involvement in contemporary conflicts is significant enough to classify

them as ‘new wars’ and that it is important to do so in order recognise the need for new policy solutions

to conflict.

This essay is divided into two parts. In the first it shall outline what the new wars thesis is, and in the

second it shall argue against four of the key concepts; levels of criminality, levels of support, levels of

violence, and motivations for conflict. The essay will include examples of both post-Cold War and

historical conflicts to compare the four concepts mentioned above and to argue that we are living in an

age of new wars although not in the way outlined by the new wars thesis.

What are ‘new wars’?

Since the end of the Second World War, 20 million people have died and 67 million have been forced

out of their homes by intra-state conflict and, from the end of the Cold War, the number of civil wars

has been steadily increasing (Fearon, 2004). In 1994, nearly 25% of the United Nations member states

were involved in internal armed conflict (Collier & Sambanis, 2005; Hegre, 2004). Independent studies

have confirmed that there has been a significant increase in the number of internal wars since the 1990s

(Chojnacki, 2006; Daase, 2001; Sarkees et al., 2003) and it was this alarming increase that prompted

civil wars to be deemed an international security issue, which in turn led to new research into the nature

of these conflicts (Mundy, 2011). Between 1998 and 2007, the Stockholm International Peace Research

Institute only recorded three conflicts fought between states, and 30 internally (Stockholm International

Peace Research Institute, 2008).

The new wars study was intended to provoke a policy debate around intra-state conflict but failed to

reach consensus on what civil war is (Mundy, 2011). Nevertheless, a new wars thesis emerged and it

attempted to highlight differences in the nature of intra-state conflict since the early 1990s. Adherents

to the ‘new wars’ thesis have an understanding that contemporary conflict is qualitatively and

quantitatively different to previous wars and argue that this warrants a new conceptualisation of warfare

(Daase, 1991; Gilbert, 2003; Kaldor, 1999; Münkler, 2002; van Creveld, 1991). According to Kalyvas,

the distinction between ‘new’ and ‘old’ wars is shown by three related dimensions; levels of support,

levels of violence and motivations (Kalyvas, 2001). In terms of support, at least one side in ‘old’ wars

was said to have enjoyed a broad base of popular backing from the local population (Kalyvas, 2011).

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This broad support could be in favour of either the state or the other warring party, but this assumes that

there is one actor that is seen as more legitimate than the other. In ‘new’ wars, the opposite is seen as

true and so, by implication, these wars command less legitimacy than ‘old’ wars (Kalyvas, 2011). ‘Old’

wars, it is claimed, were less violent than contemporary conflict, or at least it is believed that any

violence was more controlled and targeted (Kalyvas, 2011). The binary opposite is argued for ‘new’

wars. The theory states that contemporary intra-state conflict is subject to gratuitous violence,

administered by uncontrolled militias, rebels, and war lords even though this violence may have no

effect on the outcome of war (Kalyvas, 2011). Perhaps the most controversial argument is that ‘old’

wars were motivated by a collective grievance, be it political or ideological, and these causes are

considered to be more ‘noble’ and ‘just’ than the causes of ‘new’ wars (Kalyvas, 2011). In contrast,

‘new’ wars are believed to be motivated by a desire for private, material gain and as such are perceived

as greedy, or criminally motivated (Kalyvas, 2011). Wlaschütz expands on this point by adding that any

financial gains can prolong war because warlords, arms dealers and drug traffickers may seek to extend

conflict for its steady source of income (Wlaschütz, 2004). Kaldor highlights another difference

between ‘new’ and ‘old’ wars not mentioned by Kalyvas. She argues that ‘new’ wars have a

“destabilising and parasitic” globalised war economy that damages not only the warzone itself, but also

neighbouring regions (Shaw, 2000). Kaldor summarises that “the new type of warfare is a predatory

social condition” (Kaldor, 1999) and that old war is defined as absolute, Clausewitzian, focusing on a

trinity of state, people, and the army, and culminating in a decisive battle (Kaldor, 1999).

Throughout the new wars thesis, the romantic notion of heroic, legitimate or even justified war is

perpetuated in favour of old wars, suggesting a ‘rose-tinted’ perspective of the past. In contrast, ‘new’

wars are seen as illegitimate, violent, and lacking a certain degree of morality and civilisation believed

to be present in preceding conflicts. Even from such a simplified description of the new wars argument,

the scale of mass generalisation is evident. The theory suggests that since the end of the Cold War, not

only did the nature of war change, but so did the morality and ethics of those people involved in conflict

– as if belligerents suddenly warped into greedy, violent murderers who carry out acts of war based on

little more than a love of violence or a desire for monetary gain. The argument essentially comes down

to an assumption that human nature has sharply changed in the last 25 years. The ‘new wars’ thesis

creates an illogical line of separation along which no fundamental difference can be found (Gantzel,

2002; Kalyvas, 2001; Smith, 2003) which is partly as a result of a Euro-centric and utopian account of

history (Schlichte, 2006).

Are we living in an age of ‘new wars’?

Although there has been a shift from inter-state wars to intra-state since the 1990s, has there been a

change in the nature of warfare? Some scholars argue that there have been identifiable differences

between ‘new’ and ‘old’ wars. This section will argue against four specific claims made by proponents

of the ‘new wars’ thesis; criminality, levels of support, levels of violence and motivations for conflict,

and suggest that the only real difference lies in the range of actors involved in intra-state warfare.

As a result of globalisation, more and more nations stand to gain or lose relative power through the

affairs in countries across the globe. This power can manifest itself financially, culturally, ideologically,

and politically. With an increasingly liberalised global economy, trade between states is arguably more

important now than at any time in history, rarely have states ever been self-sufficient (therefore reliant

on foreign trade to some extent) but modern society relies on imported energy from the Middle East

and Russia, technology often built in Asia, financial services from Europe and the USA, raw material

from China, Brazil and Africa, and food grown across the globe. Nation states often project their

preferred ideology and cultural norms worldwide and in doing so measure their relative power based

on their success. The implications are that an event in one small part of globe may well have

international ramifications, which may in turn, lead to an international response. There is now a greater

incentive for foreign actors to intervene in domestic affairs, but these actors are not limited to the

militaries of nation states. They can include NGOs, multinational corporations, and international

organisations such as the UN, EU, NATO, IMF or World Bank. For example, the British Army alone

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is deployed in over 80 countries around the world (British Army, 2015), the Red Cross are now active

in 190 countries (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2015), and the

UNHCR operates in 125 countries with large operations in the Middle East, Africa, and South America

(UNHCR, 2016).

The range of actors involved in conflicts is not limited to foreign actors. Domestic political parties,

civil society, warring belligerents, terrorist groups and governments all contribute to an intra-state

conflict. Neighbouring countries are often dragged into contemporary conflicts because the non-

governmental forces may not recognise international boundaries, blurring the lines between intra-state

and extra-state conflict (Gleditsch, 2007). A good example of this can be found currently in Iraq and

Syria, with the expansion of the ‘Islamic State’ across the internationally recognised border, resulting

in involvement from Iran in Iraq and the US in Syria. This example can demonstrate that because non-

government combatants may not recognise borders, a wider variety of actors can become involved

purely because the conflict has spread to a country that directly impacts on the foreign policy of another

state. In the case of the ‘Islamic State’, foreign powers that are often on opposing sides have been

‘united’ against a common enemy. Within intra-state conflicts, increasing numbers of domestically

originating non-state actors are eroding the state’s monopoly over the use of force as a result of

weakening state structures (Daase, 1999; Münkler, 2002; van Creveld, 1991) - these actors can be

identified as insurgents, revolutionaries, rebels and paramilitaries (Mello, 2010). The combination of

all these actors is unprecedented. It would be incorrect to claim that the wars from the 17th century

through to the Second World War were void of any range of actors. Naturally, concerned states

intervened for self-gain or at the request of an ally, and domestic groups became involved out of a desire

to influence war prior to the 1990s but on a far more limited scale. The fact that World Wars 1 and 2

were named as such is testament to the scarcity of such large scale international involvement. It is the

norm in contemporary warfare, particularly after the Cold War, for there to be significant involvement

from a range of actors. In the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict from March 1992- October 1995 (Kaser,

2007), up to 83 separate combat units were believed to exist, ranging from paramilitaries, renegades,

foreign mercenaries, local militia and petty criminals (Heupel & Zangl, 2004).

In contemporary warfare, it is the range of actors involved that has drastically changed, as a result of a

more globalised world. This change is significant enough to merit the classification of this type of war

as a ‘new war’ in order to appreciate that a different set of policy decisions must be taken to combat

them. Applying ‘old’ war policies is not sufficient when dealing with the complex nature of

contemporary conflict.

The ‘new wars’ thesis argues that there are greater levels of criminal activity in ‘new wars’ than in ‘old’

wars. Kaplan (1994) describes intra-state conflict in Africa as a series of criminal actions by bandits on

drugs. The most common act of criminality observed in contemporary warzones is looting. According

to the ‘new wars’ thesis, there are higher levels of looting now than in previous conflicts. The causes

for looting are contested, with some arguing that it occurs as a motivation for conflict, “the pursuit of

diamonds, drugs, timber, concessions and other valuable commodities drives a number of today’s

internal wars” (Annan, 1999), with others (Kalyvas, 2001) arguing that looting is a by-product of

warfare. However, it is difficult to collect accurate data on the levels of looting in combat for a number

of reasons. Firstly, looting is a subjective term - when asking a victim of looting whether they were the

subject of criminal activity they will be inclined to agree, when asking a perpetrator of looting whether

they committed a criminal act they may consider it a ‘revolutionary tax’ (Kalyvas, 2001). Therefore, it

is entirely possible that any number of results could emerge as a result of biased data collection. Often,

in the pursuit of statistical data for contemporary conflicts, journalists and scholars will be unable or

(understandably) unwilling to travel to the ‘rebel’ areas on fact finding missions, meaning that most of

the data reported comes from uncritical and biased government sources with an interest in reporting

high crime rates in non-government controlled areas (Kalyvas, 2001). Secondly, it is not always clear

who is responsible for the looting (Kalyvas, 2001). It is difficult, in contemporary conflict, to

differentiate civilians from combatants (Mello, 2010) and so it is hard to accurately report who actually

committed the criminal acts. One opposition group may dress the same as another opposition group

and, as mentioned previously, with such multiplicity of actors involved in conflict this can complicate

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the process of reliable research. The assumption that ‘new wars’ have greater levels of criminality

oversimplifies the causes for many ‘criminal’ acts and ignores the high levels of criminal activity

through wars in history (Kalyvas, 2001). In many cases, criminal activity is not a ‘mindless act’ but

seen as a vital source of funding by many non-government groups. Münkler (2002) argues that there

has been a ‘re-sexualisation’ of violence observed in ‘new wars’ and this assertion is supported by

studies from the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict (Gow, 2007; Kaser, 2007). However, again this assertion

may not be as simple as first perceived. It would be wrong to argue that sexual criminality is a new

feature of conflict however, reporting of such crimes is a relatively modern phenomenon, and whilst

the evidence for its existence is clear, the argument that the levels of sexual violence are greater now

than in previous conflicts is both hard to measure and likely wrong. Finally, it is difficult to apply

international law to contemporary conflicts because the legal framework is designed for the

Westphalian system of nation states - a model that is ill fitted to the modern world, and intra-state wars

in particular, partly because of the cross-border nature of conflict but also as a result of belligerents not

recognising the nation state system (Mello, 2010). Modern day Libya can be used as an example of this

in which there are multiple warlords involved in the conflict, that prefer to identify along older

tribal/ethnic identities rather than recognise a national Libyan state (Al Jazeera, 2014). Issues of data

collection and biased information cloud the argument over levels of criminality in ‘new wars’, meaning

it is hard to fully measure any difference worthy of a re-classification of contemporary war.

Adherents to the ‘new wars’ thesis argue that the levels of support for contemporary conflicts are vastly

reduced when compared with ‘old’ wars. The thesis argues that ‘old’ wars grew out of mass grievances

(Kalyvas, 2001) and that ‘new wars’ are fought by niche political groups that use fear and hatred to gain

support (Kaldor, 1999). When discussing the Renamo in Mozambique, Nordstrom (1992) writes that

they are “a particularly lethal rebel movement that has virtually no ideology or popular support”,

similarly Pécaut (1999) argues that because there is a lack of support from the Colombian population,

the country is not in a civil war. In fact, these sorts of statements are also the victims of biased and

incomplete reporting (Kalyvas, 2001). Nordstrom’s account of Mozambique, for example, relies on

information gathered from interviews with people from areas recently freed from the control of the

Renamo by government forces and reports provided by pro-government organisations such as the

Organisation of Mozambican Women (Kalyvas, 2001). It is near impossible to collect data on levels of

support during intra-state conflict because researchers tend not to travel to the often rural areas that

support rebels and instead gain information from the typically pro-government cities (Kalyvas, 2001).

The evidence for popular support of ‘old’ wars is also controversial. During the Vietnam War, the

Vietcong relied on coercion to gain support from the civilian population (Pike, 1966), suggesting that

their support was not as popular as ‘new wars’ scholars suggest. It is also worth noting that levels of

support fluctuate throughout conflict (Kalyvas, 2001). When discussing the civil war in Ireland in 1923

(Kalyvas, 2001), Hart (1999) described the decision of which side to join as “shaped, as always, by

group loyalties and rivalries” (Hart, 1999: 220) rather than a strong affiliation with the ideology with

any particular belligerent. Because the information used by the ‘new wars’ thesis is not reliable, and

because there are examples in history of conflicts lacking popular support, this is not an effective means

of differentiating wars before and after the Cold War.

In ‘new wars’ it is argued that there are gratuitous levels of senseless and horrific violence carried out

by actors that do not even wish to win the war (Kaldor, 1999) whilst in ‘old’ wars rebels were controlled

by centralised political and military command structures (Enzensberger, 1994). However, horrific acts

of violence predate contemporary conflicts (Frijda, 1994) and “all civil wars are more or less similar in

their atrocity” (de Staël, 1798). It is important to understand that concepts of violence are culturally

defined (Zulaika, 1988), for example, in Western society, deaths caused by a machete are considered

more violent and depraved than deaths as a result of air strikes and so, with the changing levels of

technology in warfare, we have a different understanding of violence. Surely, if the West deems

machetes as violent weapons then levels of violence in conflicts that pre-date modern weaponry must

also be considered more violent? There is also considerable debate around the idea of ‘senseless’

violence. Atrocities are often planned and carried out against highly selective groups and is sometimes

designed specifically to battle harden new fighters (Kalyvas, 2001). The massacres of civilians in

Bosnia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo illustrate high levels of violence (Heupel

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& Zangl, 2004) but even proponents of the ‘new wars’ thesis question whether they were instances of

barbarism or part of a rational strategy (Heupel & Zangl, 2004; Kaldor 1999; Münkler, 2002).

According to Mello (2010), there are up to 300,000 child soldiers in use globally because they are ‘cost-

effective’ and more easily controlled than regular troops (Russmann, 2004). But the use of child soldiers

is not new and was a tactic deployed by the Afghan insurgency following the Soviet invasion (Borovik,

1991). Using subjective measures such as criminality and violence are an illogical means of classifying

contemporary conflicts because they cannot produce definitive results upon which a division would be

drawn. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that levels of violence have not changed over time and

therefore do not suggest a new classification of ‘new wars’.

Motivations for conflict are also said to have changed since the 1990s. Scholars in support of the ‘new

wars’ thesis contend that ‘old’ wars were fought over well-defined and clearly articulated ideas of social

change (Kaldor, 1999) whereas ‘new wars’ are motivated by “concerns that often boil down to little

more than simple private gain” (Kalyvas, 2001). Enzensberger (1994) states that “violence has been

freed from ideology” however such views may also be victim to biased reporting (Kalyvas, 2001).

Fieldworkers have described how these views pay “scant regard to the insurgents’ own claims

concerning the purpose of their movement … and [prefer] instead to endorse a view widespread among

capital city elites and in diplomatic circles” (Richards, 1996). Perhaps another reason for the beliefs

held by proponents of the ‘new wars’ thesis is that many contemporary ideological wars (particularly

in the Middle East) are not seen in this way because the west understands these views to be criminal.

Studies have shown that men in combat are motivated by processes involving; regard for their comrades,

respect for their leaders, concern for their own reputation and a desire to contribute to the success of a

group (Grossman, 1995; Laqueur, 1998). Support for ideology in wars tends to be superficial on a mass

level outside of the leadership (Kalyvas, 2001). Many academics point to ethnicity as a cause for modern

conflict and argue that ethnic heterogeneity makes a country more prone to violent outbreaks

(Enzelsberger, 1993; Kaplan, 2000; Smith, 1986), however this does not take into account the variation

in inter-ethnic relations across nations, peaceful periods of co-habitation or the emergence of new,

modern forms of collective identity (Mello, 2010). Instead, ethnicity is used as a tool to achieve a larger

objective (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Lake and Rothchild, 1998), for example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

evidence suggests that ethnic divisions were not as deep rooted as suggested and were largely used for

political purposes (Mello, 2010) and as an ‘ordering device’ but were not a motivator (Mueller, 2004).

Identity politics is used by elites to remain in power and to fill an absence of state structures with

national identity (Kaldor, 1999). In ‘old’ wars, the importance of ideology was overstated because it

was so heavily focused on by historians (Kalyvas, 2001). In other words, neither ideology nor a desire

for capital gain are the main motivators of conflict for the vast majority of people. Instead, scholars are

relying on inaccurate data and assumptions about the beliefs of people involved in conflict and

concluding generalisations and stereotypes. Without any reliable data, and with examples in ‘old’ and

‘new wars’ of a variety of motivating causes, this is not a rational measure to use to classify modern

intra-state wars.

Conclusion

The new wars thesis as a whole fails to take into account historical evidence and is inclined to disregard

cultural variation, often oversimplifying and making generalisations around complex issues. Many of

the differences between ‘new’ and ‘old’ wars highlighted by proponents of the ‘new wars’ thesis do not

stand up to scrutiny and are often generalisations based on inaccurate and biased data and an absence

of historical awareness. This essay has critically evaluated four key claims of the ‘new wars’ thesis;

criminality, levels of support, levels of violence and motivations for conflict, and argued that the range

of actors involved in conflict is the only viable means of classifying wars before and after the 1990s.

This range of actors naturally includes the role of foreign militaries but also NGOs, multinational

companies, international organisations, domestic political parties, civil society, warring belligerents,

and terrorist groups. It is wrong to claim that ‘old’ wars were well defined with limited numbers of

actors influencing the conflict but, as a result of an ever more interconnected and globalised world, the

scale with which contemporary conflicts are affected by multiple actors is unprecedented. Although this

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essay reasons against the ‘new wars’ thesis, it argues that we are living in an age of ‘new wars’ but

defined by the range of actors in conflict. This is an important distinction to make in order to help make

informed policy decisions that reflect how the nature of warfare has changed since the end of the Cold

War.

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