New New Security Strategy for America. ISBN 0-8157-1308-8 · 2016. 7. 7. · 215 Book Reviews A.B....

215 Book Reviews A.B. Carter, W.J. Perry

Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry(1999). Preventive Defense: ANew Security Strategy forAmerica.

Washington: Brookings InstitutionPress. pp. 243. ISBN 0-8157-1308-8

The United States of America is found-ing its national security and military strate-gies on three groups of activities, calledpreparing, shaping and responding.Responding capability refers to currentreadiness of the armed forces to engageand successfully annihilate open threats tonational security. That readiness wasassessed during the nineties according tothe military capability in successfully wagingand winning two almost simultaneous majortheater wars, like the one in Korea and inThe Gulf. The preparing aspect of the strat-egy refers to modernization, restructuringand continuous adaptations of the nationalsecurity system, in order to maintain its highreadiness and effectiveness against possiblefuture challenges. The development, acqui-sition and exploitation cycle for majorweapon systems lasts for twenty to thirty ormore years. That is only one of the manyreasons why today’s decisions have far-reaching consequences for the capabilitiesof the armed forces in the next decades.Environment shaping, sometimes calledluck management, is also a way to preparefor the future. It consists of active engage-ment in world affairs to prevent the devel-opment of new major threats to Americanand international security.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall the onlythreat from the ’A-list’ disappeared. The ’A-

list’ contains the most dangerous threats tothe existence of the USA and Westernworld. The former Soviet Union had thecapability to destroy Western values andWestern order, but such an enemy to theWest no longer exists. The major part of USdefense planning is now directed towardsmaintaining the capability to wage twomajor theater wars. Such regional contin-gencies might endanger American interestsand security, but would not question theexistence of the United States. Therefore,wars of this type can be categorized inbelonging to the ’B-list’ of threats. Publicinterest seems to be oriented mostlytowards the activities that deal with the ’C-list’ of threats, like those in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo. However, the ’A-list’ may not remain clear forever. One ofthe most important goals of the Americansecurity system is to keep the ’A-list’ clearas long as possible. Dr Perry and Dr Carterargue that this is the essential element ofthe preventive defense strategy, which theytheoretically developed at Harvard andStanford universities and practicallyapplied during their terms in the US gov-ernment.

Questions such as How might thepost-cold war era end? How can theUnited States prolong this period ofpeace and influence? How can weensure that if it must end, it ends grace-fully, without cataclysm? and What isthe character of the era that will followit? define the fundamental long-termstrategic challenges of the post-cold warera. The authors have identified five chal-lenges of that type, which might evolve intothe ’A-list’ of threats. They defined thesedangers as follows:

- Russia might descend into chaos, iso-lation, and aggression as Germany didafter World War I;- Russia and the other Soviet successor

216 NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FUTURE 1(1) 2000.

states might lose control of the nuclearlegacy of the former Soviet Union;- China could grow hostile rather thanbecoming cooperatively engaged inthe international system;- Weapons of mass destruction willproliferate and present a direct militarythreat to the United States; and- “Catastrophic terrorism” of unprece-dented scope and intensity might occuron US territory. If the US responds to these dangers in

the right manner, it will be possible to real-ize George C. Marshall’s vision of theworld not of threats to be deterred, but of aworld “united in peace, freedom, andprosperity.” This is where the sixth keythreat to American security lies. That threatlies in ignoring the previously identified fivepotential dangers because of temporarilyadvantageous power relations in the world.

Each chapter in the book is dedicatedto one of the six security challenges. Thechapters start with vivid and lively memo-ries of Mr Perry at an event during his termas the Secretary of Defense, which is rele-vant to the topic. The main part of eachchapter consists of the problem analysis,investigation of possible preventive strate-gies, description of already taken steps,and recommendations for future action.These discussions are case studies of pre-ventive defense mechanisms. To be suc-cessful, preventive defense must combineall the instruments of foreign policy: politi-cal, economic and military. The exact typeof actions and means used in a particularsituation will depend on the circumstances,but because of the character of activitiesand capabilities of the American armedforces, preventive defense falls primarilyinto the military domain.

In the case of Russian and CentralEuropean stabilization, preventive defense

requires fostering military-to-military coop-eration, promotion of the Partnership forPeace Program, careful NATO enlarge-ment, officer education, and appropriateeconomic assistance. In the case of pre-venting nuclear technology proliferationfrom the former USSR, the expert and eco-nomic assistance offered through theNunn-Lugar program provided for denu-clearization of the Ukraine, Belarus andKazakhstan. Intercontinental ballistic mis-siles are dismounted, nuclear material iscentrally stored, and employment pro-grams for nuclear scientists are launched.An important element of these efforts isarms control negotiations, which resultedin START treaties. These negotiationsshould be continued.

American relations with China are notsufficiently developed. Under the preven-tive defense agenda, direct military cooper-ation with China should be initiated, andChina should be more actively involved inthe search for solutions to global securityissues. Preventive defense against weaponsof mass destruction should rely not only oninternational anti-proliferation treaties,inspections and sanctions for those who donot obey prescribed norms of behavior.Active and passive defense measures mustbe developed, and unstable regions shouldbe stabilized to decrease the incentive forproliferation and acquisition of nuclear,chemical or biological weapons.

Regarding the prevention of cata-strophic terrorism, the intelligence collec-tion system should be restructured, newanalytical capabilities established, and newand more effective methods for trackingand prevention of that dangerous threatinvented. Finally, preventive defenseapplied to the American armed forces isembodied in the preparing activities. Theimportant role in that area is technologicalmodernization coupled with appropriate

217 Book Reviews A.B. Carter, W.J. Perry

doctrine improvements and force restruc-turing (which together forms the revolutionin military affairs). Equally important arethe changes in management of defenseassets (so called revolution in businessaffairs), and sustainment of personnelquality, training and motivation.

The book deserves careful reading,because the problems described do notonly influence United States security, butthe stability of the whole international com-munity as well. The book will have signifi-cant impact because of the high-qualityanalysis provided and because of personalinfluence of its authors. Dr Perry and DrCarter today jointly lead a research projectat Harvard and Stanford universities onpreventive defense. Apart from being dis-tinguished professors, they share significantexperience in public service, industry andacademia. It should be mentioned thatWilliam Perry served as the US Secretary ofDefense from 1994 to 1997, and that DrCarter acted as Assistant Secretary forDefense Policy in the same term. It was thetime when the first Quadrennial DefenseReview was prepared, which defined pre-ventive actions aimed at shaping securityenvironment as one of the three pillars ofnational security strategy.

The book is also thought provoking forreaders from a small country such as theRepublic of Croatia. The book shows howa global power like the United States viewsits own and global security in the comingdecades. Due to the power and influenceof the United States in the internationalcommunity, its positions often define theframe for political activities to other play-ers. In that sense, the authors’ observationson NATO enlargement and the role of thePartnership for Peace are especially inter-esting. The authors pledge for theincreased role of the PfP, which is too mar-ginalized, and for the slower enlargement

of NATO. In their view, that would help toavoid additional complications in relationswith Russia, while at the same time providesome of the advantages that easternEuropean countries expect from gainingNATO membership.

However, a more profound lesson ofthe book may be in the method that theauthors use to contemplate strategic prob-lems of national security. Elements of thisapproach are: the classification of threats;focus on those threats that might cause themost serious consequences; the assess-ment of shaping options and means; ana-lytical thinking; integration of all elementsof national power; and long-term planning.Such an approach is applicable to improvethe international and national security ofmany countries in different positions, andnot only of a global power such as theUnited States.

Prof. dr. sc. Krešimir Æosiæmr. sc. Dra en Penzar

Institute for Defense Studies,Research and Development

Ministry of Defense, Republic of Croatia

Bijenièka 46, 10000 Zagreb, Croatiae-mail: [email protected]


Robert M. Hayden (1999).Blueprints for a House Divided:The Constitutional Logic of theYugoslav Conflicts.

Ann Arbor: The University ofMichigan Press. pp. 298, ISBN 0-472-11066-7.

Robert M. Hayden’s Blueprints for aHouse Divided: The Constitutional Logicof the Yugoslav Conflicts sets out toanalyse the logic of the collapse of the for-mer Yugoslav federation and the causes ofthe ensuing war(s). Hayden identifies twosources of disintegration. Firstly, he sug-gests that the federation collapsed becauseof the triumph of central European nation-alism and concepts such as the nation-state, pursued primarily by the Slovenesand Croats. Secondly, Hayden maintainsthat the disintegration of Yugoslavia fol-lowed a firm logic of constitutional propos-als based on exclusionist, nationalist claimsthat undermined the authority of the feder-ation and produced structures of instability.According to Hayden, the collapse of theformer Yugoslavia and the structures of theresulting conflicts can all be explained asthe logical consequence of the adoption ofcertain constitutional concepts.

The logic of disintegration according toHayden followed the pattern of constitu-tional proposals by Slovenia and Croatia,initially in the form of amendments to the1974 Constitution of the SocialistFederative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY),and then through the proposals for thetransformation of Yugoslavia as a confed-eration or alliance of sovereign states. Theformer he believes led to the deconstitutionof the federation, while the latter was sim-

ply a ruse or a constitutional sham aimedat reducing the power of the centre. Hethen proceeds to critique the proposals fora new constitutional arrangement and ter-ritorial delimitation for the Republic ofBosnia and Herzegovina under the aus-pices of the international peace confer-ence. Hayden lucidly but one-sidedlyexamines the sequence from the EuropeanCommunity’s proposals for cantons, theVance and Owen proposals for provinces,the Owen and Stoltenberg proposals forrepublics, and finally the Washingtonagreements and the Dayton accords thatestablished entities and provisions for spe-cial parallel relations. Hayden’s discussioncontains no distinction between the aggres-sor and the victim, or any critique of theSerbian imperative to use force to imposetheir will and a political solution in Croatiaor Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The underlying basis of Hayden’s thesisis the belief that crosscutting ties madeYugoslavia a viable political community,exemplified mainly by interethnic-mar-riages. Although Hayden dismisses theclaim that the nations that constituted for-mer Yugoslavia were afflicted with inherentincompatibilities that ultimately led to thedisintegration of the federation, he doessuggest the following:

What did prove to be incompatiblewere republics based on the principleof the sovereignty of the majority ethnic“nation” (narod), formulations of theessence of the state entered into theconstitutional systems of theserepublics beginning in 1989.” (p. 3)Hayden believes that a system of con-

stitutional nationalism, underpinning con-stitutional amendments and proposals bothat the level of the republic and the federa-tion, institutionalised a division betweenthose who are of the sovereign nation, eth-nically defined, and those who are not.

219 Book Reviews R. M. Hayden

Under such circumstances, the latter mayhold citizenship but cannot aspire to equal-ity. Constitutional nationalism is defined asa concept or process by which constitution-al and legal structures privilege the mem-bers of one (ethnic) nation over those of anyother resident in a particular state (p. 68). Astate or republic, which adopts constitution-al nationalism, envisions a state in whichbasic sovereignty resides with a particularnation (narod), the members of, which arethe ones who can decide fundamentalquestions of state form and identity. Ofcourse, under Hayden’s analyses, theSlovenes and Croats are guilty of institu-tionalising constitutional nationalisms thatultimately led to the disintegration of thefederation and produced systems ofinequality and discrimination of minorities.Hayden uses Croatia as a case study todemonstrate how the Serbian minority wasalienated and discriminated in the newConstitution (1990) and by the new demo-cratic government. Indeed, the Croatiangovernment may be accused of not doingenough, but the question is what could ithave done to avoid the Serbian rebellionand Yugoslav army intervention? Too manySerbian leaders have stated that they didnot want to live in an independent Croatianstate, and that the symbolism of Croatiawas not a factor, but an excuse. Indeed,Jovan Raškoviæ had complained after thedemocratic elections that politics and socie-ty in Croatia were “Croatocentric.” Thisabsurd proposition could not be understoodexcept by the need to repress any manifes-tation of Croatian identity and nationalawareness that had been marginalized orcriminalized under the previous regime asanti-state activity or hostile propaganda.Indeed, Hayden does not discuss the effortsof Croatia to bring the Serbian minority intoparliamentary and local representation.And there is a huge gap in understanding

the mechanisms adopted by Croatia toprovide for local autonomy and humanrights for all its minorities under the aus-pices of the Constitutional law on nationalminorities. Indeed, the entire negotiatingprocess after the adoption of the Vanceplan and the UN protected areas, theUNCRO mandate and the implementationof the UNTAES temporary authority is leftout. Croatia’s position was that theSerbian minority could not secede fromCroatia, and that they could aspire togreater political representation accordingto the 1991 census both at the nationaland local levels. To exhaust the omissions,Hayden does not examine the process thatled to the Zagreb 4 (Z4) agreement, whichin effect created a state within a state.Croatia only took this proposal as a basisfor discussion, but it clearly was unwork-able. It did, however, demonstrate theextent to which the Serbs (in the occupiedareas) would go to rejecting peaceful inte-gration and the level of autonomy that theywould accept.

After reading Hayden’s analyses, one isleft with the impression that the Westernrepublics, namely Slovenia and Croatia, bypursuing their objectives in transformingthe federation into a modern, confedera-tion or alliance of sovereign states, set offan unstoppable process of disintegration.The book suffers from historical myopia,because there is no discussion of the histo-ry of Yugoslavia’s battle to define itselfinternally. There were protracted debatesabout whether the first Yugoslavia would bedefined as a republic or a kingdom, orwhether it would be the State or Kingdomof the Serbs, Slovenes and Croats, or justof Yugoslavia. And then the debates overthe banovina, decentralisation and cen-tralisation/unitarism, and the Croatianbanovina. Hayden also fails to discuss theZAVNOH and AVNOJ principles that con-


solidated the federal basis of post-warYugoslavia. While his initial purpose maynot be to write a history of constitutionalismin former Yugoslavia, eliding over theseimportant debates and formulations seri-ously distorts the picture of a snap-shot of1989 and beyond. At that point, and underthe successive constitutions after the SecondWorld War, the republics were definedunder the republican and federal constitu-tions as states whose borders were unableto be changed without the ratification of theParliaments of the republics.

Hayden also neglects the complexnegotiations between Croatia and Sloveniaover the formulation of the joint confedera-tion proposal. And he also neglects to dis-cuss the exhausting negotiations betweenthe republican leaderships that workedtowards articulating the extent to which theydisagreed over the future of Yugoslavia.Indeed, the Presidency of the SFRY mandat-ed the republics to present their visions of anew relationship, and special workinggroups were established to examine pro-posals for resolving the constitutional andpolitical crisis that emerged after the col-lapse of communism.

It is interesting to note that Haydenspends too much time defending his schol-arship and perspective. Indeed, three yearsin Belgrade does not equip one with anyspecial understanding of the crisis, particu-larly not of the perspective as seen bySlovenes, Croats, Muslims qua Bosniacs,Macedonians or the Kosovo Albanians.And most fundamentally, Hayden does notask the basic question about the axis of ten-sions and competing visions. Why are all,and now including the Montenegrins, thenations aspiring to their own political auton-omy or independence from Serbia? Byomitting to discuss the Serbian perspectiveand role in the disintegration of the federa-tion (for example the influence over the mil-

itary, incursions into Yugoslavia’s monetarysystem for exclusively Serbian purposes,unilateral abolition of the autonomy ofVojvodina and Kosovo, and failing toaccept the Croatian delegate in the SFRYPresidency according to the principle ofrotation, amongst others). Indeed, there islittle or no discussion of the Memorandumof the Serbian Academy of Science andArts, a document that is widely viewed asthe blueprint for the destruction ofYugoslavia.

When Hayden discusses the constitu-tional proposals for the reorganisation ofYugoslavia, one is left wondering why theproposal for a modern federation submit-ted by Serbia and Montenegro is omitted.This proposal is interesting for many rea-sons, especially because it outlines Serbia’sposition on a new Yugoslavia. For consti-tutional lawyers, it is interesting thatCroatia and Slovenia proposed not ’seces-sion’, but disassociation and association asmechanisms for negotiating a confedera-tion of sovereign states. The Serbian pro-posal, however, explicitly defines therepublics as states which exercise some oftheir sovereign rights in the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia and are independ-ent in discharging the rights and dutiesestablished in their constitutions and inorganising state government of their territo-ries. Under article 10 of the Serbian pro-posal, every “republic has the right, on thegrounds of the will expressed by the citizensin a referendum, to decide to secede fromthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” Theproposal also spells out the mechanismsfor secession, which is an odd provision asthe official representatives of Serbia claimthat they tried to save Yugoslavia from the’separatist’ Slovenes and Croats.Interesting enough, a special workinggroup of experts formed by the Presidencyof the SFRY at the end of February 1991,

221

prepared a draft document on the constitu-tional crisis, as well as a draft constitutionaland legal procedure for secession fromYugoslavia. The latter document spelledout that the right of nations to self-determi-nation is one of the universal rules of mod-ern law that is also enshrined in theYugoslav Constitution. However, the draftnoted that the Constitution does not specifythe rule or operational procedure for imple-menting the right of nations to secede fromthe SFRY. The draft suggested amendmentsto the Yugoslav Constitution, which includ-ed, inter alia, the following provisions:

The right of initiative for secession isvested in the Parliaments of theRepublics.The decision on an initiative will go to areferendum by all the citizens of therepublic.The referendum is valid if over half thetotal electorate has opted in its favour.In the republics inhabited by membersof several Yugoslav nations the neces-sary majority is likewise determined foreach Yugoslav nation in particular. Ifone of the Yugoslav nations declaresitself against, all settlements where thisnation is in the majority, and which bor-der on the other part of Yugoslav terri-tory and may therefore constitute acompact territory, remain within thestructure of the SFRY.If the result of the referendum is nega-tive, the same issue may be brought upagain only after the expiry of a period offive years.Under this procedure, the Federal

Executive Council would draw up a balanceof division of jointly created assets andproperties of the federation, as well as drawup proposals for territorial delineation anddetermine the frontiers of the future statesand other questions of importance to thedetermination of the act of secession.

These provisions for secession wereclearly drawn up for Croatia with a view toparts of the republic seceding to remain inthe federation. The big question was thefuture status of the Republic of Bosnia andHerzegovina, which could also withdrawwhile parts of its population and territoryjoin the Yugoslav federation. Ironically, theBosnian Muslims and Serbs in July 1991proposed the resolution of the crisis basedon an “historical agreement.” The Muslimsproposed to the Serbs—without informingor including the Croats—that they are“interested in a democratic solution to thestatus and rights of the Serbian nation inCroatia, and that we support their effortsfor autonomy, as we support autonomy forthe Muslim/Bosniac nation in Sand ak. Tothe extent that the Serbian nation express-es, and realises it legitimately, a desire notto live within the framework of a Croatianstate, and expresses a desire for the KninKrajina to join Bosnia and Herzegovina, weshall then raise the issue of enjoining bothSand aks with Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

The most interesting aspects ofHayden’s examination is the role of essen-tially European concepts of the nation-stateand the role of the international communi-ty in “imposing” from outside values, ideasand concepts that are foreign to the“locals.” However, Hayden does not dealwith these issues with any depth or con-vincingly. Had he tried to grapple withthese issues rather than place the blamewith the Slovenes, Croats and Muslims inwanting to reorganise a failed state struc-ture according to modern European demo-cratic standards and processes, scholars ofinternational relations and constitutionallaw would be better served in understand-ing the logics of disintegration of the for-mer Yugoslav federation.

Marijan Gubiæ, Zagreb, Croatia

Book Reviews R. M. Hayden


Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1998).Secrecy: The AmericanExperience.

Introduction by Richard GidPowers. New Haven & London: YaleUniversity Press. 262 pages,Bibliography, Index. $22.50ISBN: 0-300-07756-4.

Secrecy is for losers. For peoplewho do not know how important theinformation really is. -

Daniel P. Moynihan

In his book Secrecy, US Senator D.P.Moynihan sharply criticises the Americangovernment’s secrecy. Drawing on the his-tory of this institution’s development,Moynihan attacks its legal framework andits function within the American politicalsystem, viewing it as one of the key char-acteristics of the governing methods of theexecutive. His work is a plea for abandon-ing the current situation, which he calls the”Culture of Secrecy”, and for the establish-ment and acceptance of the alternative,”Culture of Openness”.

However, Moynihan does not entirelydiscard the need for a certain degree ofsecrecy in a state’s affairs and claims hisintention is not to abolish secrecy, which isindeed “sometimes legitimate and neces-sary”. Why then does Moynihan so force-fully attack and destructively criticize theinstitution of secrecy?

First, Moynihan does not attack theconcept of secrecy as such, which would bein the least impractical. However, he doesattack secrecy in its bureaucratised form

and manifestations as the institution of amodern democratic state. Second, hisharsh criticism, which arises in part from hisgeneral view on freedom and democracyas well as from the dubiousness of the rela-tionship between secrecy and freedom, hasone concrete practical dimension; namely,the expensive American bureaucratisedsecrecy system and the intelligence-securityLeviathan which rests on it have not,according to Moynihan, fulfilled their onlypurpose in the second half of the twentiethcentury: correctly assessing the degree ofthreat to American national security from itsmain Cold War enemy, the USSR.Continual intelligence overestimates ofSoviet strength and then being caughtunprepared by its dissolution are the cardi-nal sins which lie in the most distortedaspect of the ”Culture of Secrecy”; in otherwords, the withholding of information forreasons of scientific pretensions; that is tosay, closed intelligence analyses andassessments which did not allow for expertdialogue and criticism. Moynihan, who isnot only a politician but also a social sci-entist, shows us how contradictory secrecyis to the essence of scientific discourse.

Moynihan’s likeable style of describingvarious episodes from America’s mostrecent history helps to illustrate his basicarguments. The making of the modernAmerican secrecy system during WW I; theextent of Soviet espionage before, duringand after WW II; ominous complementari-ty of the concepts of secrecy, conspiracyand loyalty, and the expansion of the secre-cy system with the onset of the nuclear age;the Pentagon Papers; the Iran-Contra affairare just a few of the elaborated themes.One of the most fascinating and, from theperspective of the American reception ofMoynihan’s work, the most controversialparts of the book, is the author’s presenta-tion of the current decline in the quality of

223 Book Reviews D. P. Moynihan

strategic analysis regarding the Soviet threatto American national security. Moynihanbelieves that George F. Kennan’s article,“The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, whichwas published in Foreign Affairs in July1947, is the best insight of its kind or, rather,“the most prescient position paper in thehistory of modern American diplomacy.”Moynihan also covers various classifiedassessments inaccessible to expert criticismand discussions, assessments which havefor decades served as a basis for politicaldecision-making, and which vastly exagger-ated the power of the USSR, until the finaldebacle: being caught unprepared by thebreakdown of the Soviet empire.

Moynihan simultaneously follows twoprocesses, illustrating them with numerousexamples - on the one hand the process ofestablishing and developing an Americansecrecy system, and on the other hand, theparallel battle of the public and the parlia-ment to restrain this institution; that is, todefine the level of regulation which wouldserve to effectively resist an enemy, butwhich at the same time would not be usedagainst one’s own citizens and their liber-ties, whether it be in the form of bureau-cratic inertia or political misuse.

In places where Moynihan the socialscientist argues for demolishing the“Culture of Secrecy” and developing a“Culture of Openness”, Moynihan thepolitician demands the establishment of anew, more stable model of decision-makingin the area of national security. The oldmodel, grounded on secrecy, with its legacyof intelligence failures and ill-conceivedpolitical moves, must yield to a new way ofaddressing the national security issue; thatis, shifting the emphasis from secrecy toanalysis. Because he has confidence in thebeneficial effects of the “Information Age”in which we live, the civilizational founda-tion of a “Culture of Openness”, Moynihan

is thus confident in the intelligence value ofopen sources.

He is of course practical and hencedoes not rely solely on invisible historicalpowers, but on the legislative activity of ademocratic state as well: the manner inwhich one must restrain a “Culture ofSecrecy” and allow for the development ofa “Culture of Openness” is a law thatwould clearly define and limit the area ofsecrecy.

To be sure, we must allow for the pos-sibility that there exist authors, mostlyAmerican, who would successfully opposesome of Moynihan’s arguments and show,on the basis of thorough analysis of intelli-gence assessments, that their history is notentirely comprised of dramatic failures.

However, a critical approach toMoynihan’s work, as well as to his lack ofmodesty (he presents his former scepticismin regard to the long-term survival of com-munist totalitarianism as one of the rarebright spots in the darkness of delusionsabout Soviet strength and invincibility) donot lessen the value of Moynihan’s otherarguments, his support for a ”Culture ofOpenness” and his strong, morally andintellectually principled stands in thedefence of democracy and civil liberties.

Moynihan’s text is preceded by anexcellent introduction by Richard GidPowers, in which he sketches Moynihan’spolitical portrait and interprets the meaningof his efforts in light of critical considerationof the Cold War’s tangle of facts and illu-sions wrapped in a veil of secrecy, and theepochal clash of the two superpowers overthe shortage of valid information-basedhysterias - the right wing ideology of anti-communism and the left ideology of anti-anti-communism, as one of the main char-acteristics of modern American history.

However, even though he looks atsecrecy from the perspective of an


“American experience”, Moynihan’s work isof exceptional value for the non-Americanreaders too, especially those in the CentralEastern European “transitional laboratory”.Namely, while the American reader findsthis book predominantly, although notsolely, polemical and politically provoca-tive, for this other group of potential read-ers the book is first of all didactic, since thisis the area where there are deep structuralchanges being undertaken in all aspects ofsocial life, and thus the reconsideration ofthe concept of national security and thereorganising of systems and mechanismsfor its protection are underway. For all that,in areas where a fundamental breakdownof the old totalitarian system and a rejec-tion of its methods in the area of nationalsecurity are occurring (that is, in the bestcase scenario), some of the already existingmodels from the West are being acceptedas an alternative, and the very fact that theyare western models necessarily assumesthe democratic legitimation of these mod-els and methods. Moynihan’s work implic-itly reminds us of the important historicallesson that when “human affairs” are inquestion, there are no ready-made andself-explanatory solutions; that when it isonce achieved, democracy is not a self-maintaining “natural state” but ratherneeds continual nurturing, and, finally thatany measure of freedom, regardless of theform it might take, should always be foughtfor. Therefore Moynihan’s concern forAmerican democracy is a concern fordemocracy in general.

Stribor Kikerec, Zagreb, Croatia

Compilation of Papers andStudies (1997). GeopoliticalReality of the Serb Nation.

Belgrade: Institute for GeopoliticalStudies. pp. 606.ISBN 86-82985-02-0.

“Geopolitical Reality of the SerbNation” is a compilation of essays andstudies presented at the Round Table dis-cussions entitled “The Serb Nation in theNew Geopolitical Environment” held inPetrovaradin in January 1997, organizedby the Institute for Geopolitical Studies. Itcontains 66 contributions written and/orpresented by Serb philosophers, econo-mists, sociologists, experts in political sci-ences, geography, demography, law, theol-ogy, ethics, and professional military per-sonnel from FRY and Republika Srpska,and other academic institutions. Eventhough three years have passed since thissymposium was held, the views expressedby Serb political and academics draw notonly on the spirit of that time but also showthe habitual thinking of the Serb politicalelite.

These works have been divided into thefollowing four chapters: The influence ofgreat powers on the position of the Serbnation; Positioning the Serb nation in rela-tion to their direct geopolitical surround-ings; Assessments relating to the influenceof domestic factors on the overall Serbposition; Serb responses to their geopoliti-cal challenges.

In his introduction Radovan Radinoviætouches on the central thesis of these works- the view that Serbia is in its currentlyunfavourable position as a direct result of

225 Book Reviews Geopolitical Reality ..

America’s desire to dominate Europe andthe Balkans. Radinoviæ describes anothergeopolitical theory that the newly unitedGermany in its attempt to counteract theTurkish expansion towards Europe and theBalkans, is itself trying to expand its influ-ence towards the Middle East. The authorsare united in viewing Russia as the only Serbally, but all agree that in its present form istoo weak to resist Western powers.Radinoviæ views the states surroundingSerbia, namely Albania, Croatia, andBosnia and Herzegovina, as being anti-Serborientated. For the majority of authors, thebreak up of the former Yugoslavia hasresulted in the loss of “Serb ethnic territory”,and has thus reopened the Serb nationalistquestion. Furthermore, they conclude thatthe only answer to this question is the cre-ation of a Serb national country. The disin-tegration of the former Yugoslavia for theseauthors does not represent the final step inthe Balkanisation process, contending thatgeopolitical tailoring is still ongoing.According to the authors the process hasnot been completed due to the varyinggeopolitical concepts in the internationalcommunity regarding the division of theBalkans. In addition, they note that eachchange in relations between these powersplaces the Balkans deeper into their “whirl-wind of contradicting interests” (SmiljaAvranov p. 49).

The authors also allege that the greatpowers, in their view had by the UnitedStates, are endeavouring to minimalize thegeopolitical importance of Serbia.Radinoviæ states that America is the mainobstacle in establishing a Serb state andrealizing their national interests. He lists theDayton agreement, Croatia’s military oper-ation “Storm” and western support of“Kosovo Albanian separatist ambitions” asarguments supporting this view. Radinoviædefines Bosnia and Herzegovina in this

post-Dayton era as “an American multieth-nic fixation” (p.29). Smilja Avranovdescribes the United States, France andGreat Britain as new enemies of the Serbnation emerging from the newly strength-ened ties between the United States and theVatican. The United States and the Vatican,according to Avranov, are together deci-sively anti-communists coupled with theVatican’s anti-Orthodox stand.

Mihail Markoviæ describes the currentglobal situation after the fall of the USSR asthe “New World Order” (NWO), which hasallowed the Americans to dominate, shapethe world and exploit the world’s resources.In establishing the NWO the United Stateshave attempted to create smaller statesincapable of fending off political domina-tion and economic exploitation. DragoKalajiæ holds that Serb territory will eventu-ally play the key role in determing the suc-cess of the NWO, in other words, the rul-ing of the “Third American Imperial” (p.63). Text contributors criticise the SouthEuropean Cooperation Initiative (SECI) asan attempt by the United States to separateSouth Eastern Europe and bring it closer tothe demographically larger Turkey and theIslamic world (pp. 68-69). Markoviæ alsomaintains that the United States is empha-sising a “Hegemony” period due to their“painful losses in Vietnam as a leadingworld military power making them ill pre-pared to handle even the smallest loss ofhuman life and thus, if the problem is notsettled by bombing they retreat in front of adecisive resistance,” (p. 57).

Ratibor Grujiæ maintains that the“most painful point in Serb history is theresistance by the great powers towardsunited Serbs and their desire to form a unit-ed Serb state” (p. 72). Marko Markoviæclaims that the aim of the NWO is todestroy Yugoslavia, Russia and otherOrthodox countries and Orthodoxy as a


whole. This NWO would not allowEuropean countries their independencebecause “American domination does notonly mean death to a country’s independ-ence but death to its rights and democra-cy,” (p. 86). Following the destabilisation ofRussia, Markoviæ predicts that the nextstage involves the spread of “Pan-Islamism”to the rest of Europe. Rajko Gnjato believesthat Russia is not only disoriented and lack-ing the power to stop the execution ofNWO politics, but is also too weak tosecure it’s own interest within the NWO.

According to Dragoljub R. ivojinoviæ,the Vatican is high on the list of Serb rivals,who have been striving to regain theirdominant religious, political and socialpower in Europe since the fall of the USSR.

When discussing international rela-tions, the authors often stress the inferiorityof the European countries in respect to theUnited States. Marko Markoviæ deems thatEurope no longer exists but is rather agroup of nations under American control.Slobodan Samard iæ emphasises that theEuropean Union through bad arbitrationhas disqualified itself as a competent ele-ment in the Yugoslavia crisis. Contrary toEurope’s strategy, the “American military-political strategy is comprised of a mixtureof ideological multiculturalism and realpolitics fuelling the (Yugoslav) crisis at lowintensity.” Thus the United States holdsstate-territorial and international minoritydisputes in regions such as Bosnia andHerzegovina, Sand ak, Kosmet and west-ern Macedonia as “principally unresolv-able”.

Turkey’s influence in the Balkans hasalso significably destabilised Serbia.Miloljub Jevtiæ describes “Pan-Turkism” asthe concept of a Greater Turkey, whereTurkey with the support of the United States,enters the Balkans, destabilizes first Serbiaand then Europe. In this case Kosovowould serve as the primary foothold for

“Pan-Turkism” while Albania would supplythe second stepping stone, partly becauseof their historical ties to Turkey and partlydue to the several million Turks of Albaniandescent.

Yugoslavia’s neighboring countries arehabitually seen as threats to the Serb state.Miloš Kne eviæ states that the Serb nationhas the historical fate of suffering “stress-generating geography”. Kne eviæ furtherclaims that the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia (FRY) has been forced into theonly remaining portion of the Serb ethnicarea located in the eastern part of the for-mer Yugoslavia. The geopolitical insecurityof Serb territory lies, amongst other factors,in the their neighbor’s varied ultranational-ist goals of revision, territorial demandsand spiritual retaliation. These countriesare viewed as Austro-Hungarian andTurkish political proxies.

Miloš Kne eviæ states that the Serbquestion has not been addressed and thatthe division of former Yugoslav territory intosecessionist new states has not been com-pleted. (Unlike the Badinteur Commissionreport which concluded that dissolution offormer Yugoslavia as succession, theauthor claims that it is secession.) Kne eviæbelieves the emergence of smaller Balkanstates is in the face of the two century oldSerb geopolitical goal of reclaiming con-trol of the “Serb ethnic area” (SEA). TheSEA is wider, as constantly described intheir papers, than the currently held territo-ries of Serbia and Montenegro. “Thustoday’s confused situation is not in accor-dance with the traditional Serb territoriesof FRY and Republika Srpska, and in thisform geopolitically unnatural and in thelong term unviable,” (p. 211). Kne eviæstates that the Serb area has been reducedby Croatia (the so called Krajina) by17,000 km2 and by 10,000 km2 in westernBosnia (p. 211). Kne eviæ states that theSEA is incomplete because the Serb nation


lacks political integrity and strength.The authors see Croatia in an incon-

venient geopolitical position with character-istics of “being exposed and attractive fortake-overs” (p. 231). In short they viewCroatia as being unjustly interested in con-trolling the Danube right bank. They go onto term the Croatia’s Danube Region (whichwas peacefully integrated in 1996-1997after the signing of the basic agreement inwhich the UNTAES aided) as the Srijem-Baranja region and treat it as a temporaryneighbour. Drago M. Njegovan stresses theimportance of the Danube right bank for theFRY, referring to it as part of the “SerbDanube Region”. According to Njegovan,the “Serb Danube Region” is wider byincluding the Danube bank in both Croatiaand Romania (p. 334). The Serbs figuredthat in the event of Yugoslavia’s break upthe Croatian Danube region would beincluded in Serbia, however this plan is tem-porarily unachievable. “The alternativewould be to retain the status quo, which inthe right circumstance would allow for theaforementioned plan.” The authors con-clude that Serb weakness and powerless-ness has resulted in Croatia’s superiority inthe South Slav area.

Albania is defined as an “undesirableBalkan infant”, a “Balkan geopolitical neu-rotic”, and most expressively as the “BalkanBanana Republic”. The new Serb geopoliti-cal enemy has emerged as a result of theseparatist movement by the “unloyalAlbanian minority” living on Serb territory.An additional problem is the fact that“Serbia was unable to create a state pro-gram that would adapt and include theKosovar Albanians in the Serb nationalstate” (p. 215). The problem according tothe authors is not in international relationsbut rather highlighting the “Albanian” terror-istic, criminal, mafia and political activities.

Macedonia is seen as a markedly weak

state incapable of sustaining itself inde-pendently. In order to retain it’s own state,Macedonia would have to enter into afavorable alliance or succumb to the pro-tection of a stronger state. MilovanRadakoviæ claims that Albania andMacedonia are prospective for thestrongest American military bases inEurope. From these bases the United Stateswould have the capability of provoking lowintensity conflicts if they assess that politi-cal, economic and military integration isnot heading in a favourable direction, or ifa united Europe starts to jeopardiseAmerican interests (p. 350).

The authors allege that Bosnia andHerzegovina does not have a foundationoutside of Yugoslavia. According toRadinoviæ, Bosnia is the “Balkan blackhole” (p. 226) whose solution lies in a newmilitary conflict and not a peaceful agree-ment where the Serbs would have todefend minimal national and state inter-ests. Bosnian-Muslims are seen as tempo-rary neighbors while Republika Srpska isseen as an apparent neighbor (p. 195).FRY-Republika Srpska relations are termedas an issue of domestic nature rather thanforeign affairs. This question must beanswered in such a way as to “name andconfirm it as a complete national and stateunity. The same nation resides in the FRYand Republika Srpska in this continuousSerb territory” (p. 226). From the Serbstandpoint, according to Rajko Gnjata,Republika Srpska is the only bright out-come from the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

Problems in relations with neighbour-ing states lie primarily in defining the Serbethnic area (SEA). Jovan Iliæ claims that theSEA is constituted by the following borderlimits: Draè-Struga-Prilep-Veleška Klisura-Osogovske mountains to the south theexisting Bulgaria-Serbian border (StaraPlanina)-Ðerdap; Èerne gorge-Mureš near


Arada - Baja - Meèek - Drava at Barèa -west Bilogora; Èazma - Sava upstreamfrom Sisak - Vukomerièke Gorice -

umberaèka Gora (Gornjaci) - GornjaKupa - Gorski Kotar - Rijeka - Adriatic Sea.According to the authors, the SEA encom-passed over half of Bosnia andHerzegovina and a fourth of Croatia at thebeginning of the 90s. During the war they“lost” approximately 12,000 km2 inCroatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, anda grand total of 25,000 km2 after the rein-tegration of the Croatian Danube region.Radinoviæ goes on to describe the SEA asincluding Serbia, Montenegro, RepublikaSrpska (before NATO bombing around 70percent of Bosnia and Herzegovina) andthe Republika Srpska Krajina, with the Srem- Baranja region (the entire area in theRepublic of Croatia controlled by the JNAand rebel Serbs during 1991-1995). “Inthe forthcoming period, the Serbian militaryelite and the entire Serb nation will have toinvest an enormos amount of effort toregain this lost area and resettle it withSerbs,” (p. 411).

Serbs do not have the strength, statedesire, nor the external geopolitical condi-tions to return the “lost Serb kingdom” to itsentirety in the near future. “Regardless ofthis, no one is allowed, not even the rulingSerb elite, to permanently re-enunciatetheir right to that area and to view this lossas definite,” (p. 286). The Serb nation mustcontinue to regard this area as an inalien-able historical right, and this stand mustalso be pursued by Serb diplomacy in theirinternational political and diplomaticstrategies.

Samard iæ views the uniting of the FRYand Republika Srpska as a kind of nationalgoal unimplementable today, but whichmust be projected as a strategic nationalinterest (p. 130). Ðorðe B. Popoviæ thinksthat Serbia, to change its position, mustwait for a change in international relations.

Serbs in Croatia, Macedonia and Bosniaand Herzegovina “have to try to survive”until the FRY regains its strength to thepoint where they can influence the Serbpeople in those areas. However, until then,it is important to work on the return ofrefugees, “without whom all talks of Serbland and demands for it’s future are point-less” (p. 139-140).

The most worrisome issues for theauthor’s are Serbia’s domestic problems.Popoviæ specifies the 700,000 refugees inSerbia over the Drina and the additionalproblem of 200,000 military draftees whofled to the West, as further worsening thegeopolitical position of the FRY. MilenaSpasovski claims that Serbia’s naturalgrowth is almost all attributed to Muslimresidents (Muslim, Albanians, Gypsies, andTurks). The Serbs who have settled between1991 - 1995 have only a short-term influ-ence and in the long run they would notsignificantly improve the currently negativedemographic development trends.

Miloš Kne eviæ states that FRY is lack-ing in political, ideological, national, partyand geopolitical consensus regardingimportant issues for their future. The Serbpolitical pseudoelite, instead of represent-ing Serb integrity, represent “A Serb basedYugoslav integrity” (p.197). DragoljubKojèiæ suppresses that the most importantgoal is to strengthen their Serb nationalsovereignty and consequently establish aSerb national state (p. 271). eljkoPoznanoviæ stresses the importance of theSerb Orthodox Church as a vital internal-integral Serb leader. Poznanoviæ maintainsthat their religious belief cannot be sepa-rated from the national, and thus the Serbnation receives “Godly dimensions throughthe national auto cephalic church” (p. 305-306). Petar Stojiæ holds Kosovo andSand ak as priceless to the FRY and thatthey must be maintained at all costs, evenif that means war. He suggests that they are


threatening war in light of the direct tiesbetween the ever increasing aggressiveIslam and “Albanian” terrorism.

The FRY when speaking of Kosovo andSand ak must not allow itself to succumb tothe demands of the international communi-ty because that would mark the end of itsnational and state politics. Kosta Èavoškisees the role of the international communi-ty in Kosovo as supporting Albanians intheir aim of achieving political autonomyand separation from the FRY, and not asprotecting human rights. The Serb politicalcorpus is deeply divided and shatteredaccording to Andrej Miletiæ (p. 371).

Radovan Radinoviæ sees their goal ofdefining the SEA as the greatest challengeconfronting Serbs. Their aim is to create aunique area of Serb land and then stabilis-ing social development, demographic revi-talisation and spiritual renewal. It alsoimproved integral security system whosenew doctrine includes the capability ofoffensive responses against all aggressors,and even against multinational powers withthe support of a strong ally. Radinoviæ feelsthat the first step is to clear up the questionof the SEA borders and the Serb state. Thementioned area has external pressures that“refer to it in different terms, but the areahas to be seen as a unique ethnic area, withmutual territorial connections, and entiretywith clear aspirations that would one day beincluded in the unique Serb state” (p. 488).Radinoviæ asserts that minorities in this statewould not have the right to claim their ownnational state nor political autonomy.Forcefully taken and abducted, Serb territo-ry must be viewed as a temporary loss andthus Serbs must continue to base theirhopes on their historical rights and demandthe return of these areas from the interna-tional community when the momentbecomes visible for favorable Serb strategicmoves.

The authors hope that Russia willremain/become a military ally of the FRYand secure a guarantee for their smalleststrategic interests (p. 497). “Alliance withRussia is a necessary requisite for avoidinga most unfavorable military situation of amultinational military NATO or WEU inter-vention” (p. 497). Without this kind ofalliance the FRY would be lost in such amilitary conflict, having to deal with a largenumber of casualties, material losses anddestruction (p. 497). In 1999, FRY leadersobviously did not heed this warning.

Branislav Ðorðeviæ summarizes that theSerb state is surrounded by hostile coun-tries, of which the Repulic of Croatia wouldalways play the role of mediator in a war ofgreat powers against the FRY. However,Albania is viewed as the next Serb oppo-nent. Serb countries outside of the FRYmust serve the role of vital subsystems forthe defence of the FRY and vice versa.

The Yugoslav Army (JA) must be capa-ble of starting and concluding a war, andalso be prepared for war activities in neigh-boring territories who are conductingarmed aggression on the FRY (p. 496). Themilitary doctrine should allocate means fordevastating attacks to all vital facilities ofneighboring countries if the Serb nation isthreatened. The JA must be prepared toattack all vital facilities of the aggressorand facilities of neighboring countriesinvolved. The FRY must have a suitable allyderived from perhaps the Balkan Alliance,Partnership for Peace or the Alliance ofOrthodox countries in Eastern Europe (p.571).

Most of this compilation is persuadeddominated by theories of American con-spiracy sparsed with German and Vaticanactivities directed against the Serb people.Their feelings of endangerment are height-ened by Russia’s weakness. The authorsmaintain that the Serb people are victims


due to their geopolitical, transit and reli-gious uniqueness, which subjects them tothe bullying of great powers. Almost all oftheir neighbors are now controlling at leastsome section of the SEA, while the nation-al minority in FRY is attempting to dividethe remaining areas and annex them totheir base states. The Serb political elite isobviously still dealing with the after conse-quences of the disintegration of the formerYugoslavia and the fact that this state hasshrunk in size. However, their aspirations ofconstructing a united Serbia using a some-what smaller area of the former Yugoslaviastill exists. Regardless of their embittermenttowards a number of member countries ofthe international community, the Serbs feelthat it is important to obtain support fromthe world’s central power because it is theonly “just solution to the Serb nationalquestion” (p. 430). Even though the actual-ization of a new Serb state uniting the SEAterritory (returning parts of Croatia, Bosniaand Herzegovina, Macedonia andAlbania, etc.) is not possible right now intheir new geopolitical state, this idea muststill remain the key geopolitical aim of theSerb political elite and therefore theirefforts must be directed towards this objec-tive.

Josip Esterajher, Zagreb, Croatia

Blaskovich J. Anatomy of Deceit.An American Physician s First-hand Encounter with theRealities of the War in Croatia.

New York: Dunhill Publishing, Co.,1997. pp. 247, hard cover. Price: US$24.ISBN 0-935016-24-4.

During the last couple of years, severalbooks on the war in former Yugoslaviawere published in the United States.However, all those books offered only one-sided descriptions of the war. Blaskovich’sbook is the first one to present the otherside of the story.

Dr Jerry Blaskovich was born inChicago, Illinois. In 1960, he started study-ing medicine at the Zagreb UniversitySchool of Medicine. He specialized derma-tology in the United States where he alsogot his master’s degree, but in a complete-ly different field – the history of Islamic art.Until 1994, he lectured on dermatology atthe University of Southern California. He isa veteran of the Korean War and the fieldof his special interest is chemical warfare.Since the beginning of the conflict in formerYugoslavia, he visited combat zones sever-al times, evaluating the medical services,visiting the refugee camps, and talking tothe victims of rape. He wrote numerous let-ters and articles on the war in Croatia andBosnia and Herzegovina, which were pub-lished in American journals and newspa-pers, and he held many lectures. On thebasis of his own experience, he wrote abook “Anatomy of Deceit – An AmericanPhysician’s First Hand Encounter with theRealities of the War in Croatia”, publishedin the United States in July 1997.

231

“Anatomy of Deceit” is divided in four-teen chapters, and the Croatian edition hasa special preface written by Prof. AndrijaHebrang, MD, PhD, Minister of Health dur-ing the war. It is written for an Americanreader – short, straightforward, “CNN-look-a-like”. However, the Croatian reader willfind it interesting, too. It shows how factsabout the war in Croatia can be stated in asimple and well-documented way, and dis-closes some, previously unpublished, factsabout the work of international community.

In the introductory chapter, “My RudeAwakening: December 15, 1991,”Blaskovich remembers his first “war-time”visit to the homeland of his parents(although the first few paragraphs are toodramatic). Blaskovich was invited by ForeignPress Bureu to evaluate the work of medicalservices and to investigate the rumors aboutthe use of chemical weapons. He reviewsthe news on the situation on the territory offormer Yugoslavia those days, as well as thesituation in Zagreb – the first air raids,sniper fire, bombing of the Banski dvori(Office of the President).

At the beginning of the following chap-ter, “Legend-Induced Paranoia of the Serbsand the Hits and Myths of the Croats,”Blaskovich criticizes the lack of well-designed media promotion of Croatia.Croatia’s politicians wasted a lot of energyretelling the Croatian history to the foreign-ers “from the seventh century”, instead ofanswering the simple question: “What canwe do?” or “What would you like us to do?”Since the book was written for the Americanaudience, Blaskovich summarizes historicalfacts, crucial for the understanding of eventsin former Yugoslavia, as well as the devel-opment of the idea of “Greater Serbia”from Garašanin’s “Naèertanije”, throughmurder in Parliament, up to the SANUMemorandum (“the Serbian equivalent ofMein Kempf”).

The third chapter, “The Road to Voæin”,describes Tito’s Yugoslavia with specialfocus on the late 1980s and the beginningof 1990s. Blaskovich criticizes the blind-ness of the international community, andespecially the Bush administration which,believing in the survival of Yugoslavia,reacted mildly on the conflict in Sloveniaand the foundation of the SerbianAutonomous District in Croatia. One partof this chapter is dedicated to the siege ofDubrovnik in October 1991, when themedia started asking questions on themotivation of the Serbian military activities.

The following two chapters, “WhatHappened in Voæin” and “Post Mortems ofSlaughter: The Autopsies,” deal with thebest forensically documented crime perpe-trated on the territory of former Yugoslavia.On December 13, 1991, the members of“Beli Orlovi,” Serbian para-military troops,destroyed the eight centuries old church ofOur Lady in Voæin and massacred the civil-ians. The post-mortal remains (I choose notto use the word “body”) of 58 victims werefound, while the remains of many others,including children, were missing.Blaskovich’s description of autopsiesbegins with the statement that “even thetoughest pathologist is on his knees whenhe deals with burned victims.” The sum-maries of the forensic reports are given.Tomislav Martinkoviæ, Katica Martinkoviæ,Marija Šimiæ, Ivan Šimiæ, Marija and FranjoMatanèiæ, and Stojan Nenadoviæ (a Serb!)were horrendously tortured before theywere burned alive. The only comfort is thefact that the tragedy in Voæin was the firstmassacre noticed by the media, after fourdozen previous slaughters were ignored.

In chapter 6, “The Devastation ofOsijek and the Smoldering Ashes ofVukovar,” Blaskovich remembers his visit toWest Slavonia. He witnessed the fight forOsijek, and the heroic work of the staff in

Book Reviews J. Blaskovich


the Osijek General Hospital. Four fifths ofthe hospital as ruined and the staff wasmoved to the cellar. However, they man-aged to maintain the rate of secondarywound infections below 1.7%*. Perhaps themost tragical fact is that the YugoslavPeople’s Army severely devastated the hos-pital during the seize of fire (sic!) inSeptember 1991, bombarding from theneighboring base.

Blaskovich reconstructs the siege ofVukovar, the turning point of the war, on thebasis of his conversations with eyewitness-es. He describes the work in the basementof the Vukovar General Hospital. I wouldlike to point out two, almost unbelievable,acts of enemy troops: artillery attacks to thecentral sterilization facility (guided by the“insiders”), and the attacks on the vehicleswhich were taking away the dead to thecemetery! Part of the chapter describesforensic work on the identification of thecorpses of the wounded who were taken tothe concentration camps after the fall ofVukovar. Many of them didn’t survive thetorture.

Chapter 7, “The Media Deception,”deals with the role of the media in the warin Croatia. We can learn that the authors ofnumerous articles on the war in theBalkans, published between 1990 and1995, were “in love” both with formerYugoslavia and everything it represented.Press agencies used those articles as abasis for a number of their reports pub-lished in the early 1990s. In addition,Blaskovich describes the excellent work ofSerbian propaganda including hiring manyindependent public-relations companies.For example, General Lewis MacKenzie,the highest ranking United Nations officeron the territory of former Yugoslavia, wasdonated USD 150,000 by SerbNet, theofficial Serbian lobby association in theUnited States, during his talks with the rep-

resentatives of the United States Congress.In the eighth chapter, Blaskovich tries

to answer the question from his introduc-tion: “Who committed a greater crime –the one who actually did it or the one whoignored it?” Trying to expose different liespublished in foreign press, Blaskovich visit-ed many medical institutions in Croatia. Hedescribes his experience in working withrefugees and displaced persons. The cru-cial part of the chapter is the testimony ofFadila, a woman from Brèko, about thedestruction of that Bosnian city and themassacre of civilians in Brèko carried outby the Serbian troops.

“The Infant Democracy’s First Steps” isthe title of chapter 9. Here, Blaskovichdeals with the confusion of the Croatianpress in 1990 and 1991, and with the workof the Foreign Press Bureau – “the onlybright spot” in Croatia those days.Although the Foreign Press Bureau con-tributed significantly in fighting prejudicesagainst Croatia that were present in themedia, it became the victim of the conflictof interests of Croatia’s officials. After that,Blaskovich describes the work of Croatianassociations in the United States whose dif-ferences eventually led to the loss of bothresources and energy in the fight for domi-nation.

Chapter 10, “Physicians, Leaders byDefault”, deals with physicians and theirrole in the war in Croatia and Bosnia andHerzegovina. It is very unusual that in sucha short period several physicians made it tothe top of Croatia’s politics. For example:Zdenko Škrabalo, Branimir Jakšiæ, IvicaKostoviæ, Andrija Hebrang, Mate Graniæ,Goran Dodig, Juraj Njavro, Ivica Kraèun,Franjo Golem … It is unbelievable coinci-dence that, at the same time, some leadersin other parts of Yugoslavia were physicianstoo: Milan Paniæ, Milan Babiæ, RadovanKarad iæ … Moreover, Lord David Owen is

233 Book Reviews J. Blaskovich

a physician himself. But, one must agreewith Blaskovich that Owen and Karad iæmust have been absent when it was time totake the Hippocratic oath.

Chapter 11, “Conflicts of Interest”,contains some facts not so known inCroatia. Lawrence Eagleburger, formerUnited States Minister of Foreign Affairs,was very intimate with Yugoslav financialcircles. Lord Peter Carrington became man-ager and representative of “Kissinger andAssociates,” which transferred hundreds ofmillions of American investments inYugoslavia. However, neither of themthought that their financial interests wouldinterfere with their ability to make objectivejudgments about former Yugoslavia.Blaskovich explains the basis of the embar-go on the import of weapons to Croatiaand characterizes it as one of the most per-vert political decisions during the war inCroatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Healso describes the economic sanctionsagainst Yugoslavia imposed by the UnitedNations, as well as Russia breaking thesanctions and shameless role of Russianpeace keeping forces in Croatia. One oftheir most profitable actions was smugglingoil. The United Nations ignored the smug-gling, afraid that the Russians might with-draw from the forces. While talking aboutthe United Nations, Blaskovich describesthe slaughter of Muslims in Gora de, thecenter of the UN security zone. He cites thearticle from the Los Angeles Times, describ-ing how the UN gave the Serbs UN uni-forms and vehicles. Disguised as UN sol-diers, the Serbs caught Muslims hiding inthe woods after they fled from Srebrenica.All those refugees were executed!

In the 12th chapter, “Croatia’s GrowingPains,” Blaskovich analyzes the failure of theUNPROFOR mandate in Croatia and theZ–4 Plan. He analyzes events in 1995, themilitary actions “Flash” and “Storm”, whichbrought down the Serbian autonomous dis-

trict “Krajina,” and the importance of thefailure of the siege of Bihaæ as well asCroatia’s involvement in the war in Bosniaand Herzegovina. In introductory para-graphs, he reviews the history of Bosniaand Herzegovina, “the small Yugoslavia.”He deals with the blindness of the Bosnianstate politics and its total unpreparednessfor the conflict. Although he is not trying tominimize the sufferings of Muslims duringthe war, he explains why the Croats are themain loosers in the war in Bosnia andHerzegovina. He also analyzes the reasonsMuslims turned against the Croats. At theend of the chapter, all the sufferings of thepeople of Bosnia are summarized in poemby Enes Kiševiæ, “Hava’s Plea”.

In the final, fourteenth chapter,“Dayton: Peace for Our Time?” Blaskovichdescribes the Dayton Peace Agreement. Hecharacterizes the Agreement as a requiemfor Bosnia and Herzegovina, and definesSerbs as the only winners. He accuses theinternational community and the West forhorrors committed on the territory of formerYugoslavia.

Although it is written for the Americanaudience, I can recommend “Anatomy ofDeceit” to the readers from Croatia andneighboring countries. It is simple, butinteresting. Blaskovich dissects the way pol-itics and media can manipulate the infor-mation. He discloses all the hypocrisy ofthe international community which didn’tstop the war, although it was able to,because it was partly seduced by theancient myths about the Serbian militaryglory and partly corrupted with Serbianmoney.

Ivan Krešimir LukiæCroatian Medical Journal

* Janoš K, Lovriæ Z. War Surgery in OsijekDuring the 1991/92 War in Croatia.Croatian Medical Journal 1995;36(2):104-107.


Report of the InternationalCommission on the Balkans(1996). Unfinished Peace.

Washington: Carnegie Endowmentfor International Peace. pp. 222.ISBN 0-8700-3118-X

/Croatian edition: Izvješće Međunarodne komisijeza Balkan (1997). Zagreb:Hrvatski helsinški odbor za ljudskaprava i Pravni centar FOD BiH. pp.205. ISBN 953-96343-5-0/

“Unfinished Peace” is the title of astudy, or rather a Report, published by theInternational Commission for the Balkans,which comprises of a group of eminentauthors. The Report was issued in theCroatian language in 1997 in Zagreb bythe Croatian Helsinki Committee forHuman Rights FOD B-H. The originalReport was published by the CarnegieEndowment for International Peace, 1996,Washington.

The Report claims to be an analysis ofthe situation and suggests its own kind ofintegral strategy for the international com-munity toward the area which it calls the“Balkans”, which incorporates Croatia,Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia,Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greeceand Turkey. However, Montenegro andRomania are hardly mentioned in theReport. Some countries mentioned in theReport are discussed in elaborate detail asopposed to others because those countriesrepresent the two epicentres of conflict inthe Balkans. The first is considered as

“being in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whichincorporates wider Croatian-Serbian rela-tions,” and the other being in Kosovo,which is “directly related to Serbia, Albaniaand Macedonia… and potentially incorpo-rates Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey.”

The Report also gives 57 recommen-dations relating to the conduct of theabove mentioned countries with respect tothe activity of the UN, NATO members, theUS, various bodies of the European Unionand international non-government organi-zations. The declared wish of the authors ofthe Report is for their recommendations tobe completely realized, bringing lastingpeace and prosperity to the Balkans.

Two hundred pages of text are struc-tured in a number of sections. The Reportcontains an introduction by Lea Tindemans,the President of the InternationalCommission for the Balkans, a summarythe Report, an introduction and four chap-ters entitled, “Balkan Troubles,” “War andthe Reactions of the United Nations”, “Thesituation in the Countries, Trends andRecommendations,” and “The Region –Conclusions and Recommendations.”Annexed to the Report are easy-to-surveymaps, a supplement about the study mis-sion and encounters by the InternationalCommission for the Balkans, and the epi-logue by Ivo Banac contained in theCroatian edition.

The first chapter, metaphorically titled“Balkan Troubles,” considers the causes ofthe recent war, or rather a review of the his-torical development of the state of affairs inthe countries of the former Yugoslaviawhich led to war. As for the historical reviewof the events in the Balkans up until theSecond World War given in that chapter,we cannot help but feel that the Report issubject to prejudices similar to those thatwe come across in literature such as “GreyFalcon and White Lamb” by Rebecca West.As for the analysis of the causes for the

235 Book Reviews Unfinished Peace

recent war in Croatia and Bosnia andHerzegovina given in the same chapter, theReport does not consider the relevant for-eign factors for its outbreak, and all themore categorically states that “the causes ofthis war were not outside of the Balkans,rather inside of it.” The main culprits for thewar, according to the Report, were old“inherited hatreds”, which due to changinginternational surroundings, given the disin-tegration of communist systems, broughtabout crude nationalism. The Report rejectsthe thesis about a “conflict of civilizations,”and accepts that nationalist politicians skil-fully used, rather abused, the Church andreligious symbols for their own aims.According to this, the Serbs and Croatswere ascribed to as being nationalisticpoliticians, whilst the Moslems “despite alltheir shortcomings and mistakes, came theclosest to defending European principles oftolerance and open societies from thosewho, in the name of Christian Europe,endeavoured to exterminate them,” (p. 22).The authors of the Report do not mentionnor attempt to explain the phenomena thatduring the war in Bosnia and Herzegovinathe Moslems fled in the hundreds of thou-sands to those “who endeavored to exter-minate them,” i.e., Croatia, which unselfish-ly sheltered them. We believe that the failureto mention this is not accidental as it ques-tions Croatia’s tolerance and openness.

The second chapter, entitled “The Warand the Reactions of the InternationalCommunity,” analyses the course of the warin Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovinaand the endeavours of the internationalcommunity to end it. It is telling that theaggression in Croatia is depicted verybriefly and bleakly, without mention of thedestruction (apart from Vukovar andDubrovnik), while the number of killed (only2,000 dead in Vukovar is mentioned) andexiled (only 247,000 is mentioned) Croats

is decreased. Particularly unrealistic andbiased is the part of the Report about theoperations that liberated the occupiedregions of the Republic of Croatia, whichthe Report describes as “attacks onKrajina” that was followed by “a campaignof ethnic cleansing” (p. 41). Most spaceand statistics in this chapter of the Report isdedicated to the military conflict in Bosniaand Herzegovina. As a whole, given theway in which the Report presents the courseof the war, it is hard not to think that thispart of the Report more intensely blamesthe Croats for the fighting in Bosnia andHerzegovina, while it marginalizes the con-tribution of the Croatian Army in liberatingBihaæ and parts of Bosnia and Herzegovinafrom the Serbian aggressors, which werethe preconditions for the Dayton Accords.

The description of the internationalcommunity’s efforts is reasonably objective,and at times even overtly critical of Westerncountries. The events in Slovenia that pre-ceded the aggression in Croatia are lucid-ly assessed as being the intentions of theSerbian politicians in allowing the inde-pendence of Slovenia, in relation to thenature of the 1991 Brioni Declaration as ameans for gaining time for the deploymentof the Yugoslav Army in Croatia and Bosniaand Herzegovina, i.e. preparing for anaggressive war and the EuropeanCommunity’s failure to recognize thenature of the problems. An objective butbrief depiction is given of the endeavoursof the United Nations between 1992 and1994 in Croatia, i.e. during the period ofthe so-called Vance Plan (the UN SecretaryGeneral’s envoy, former US State Secretary,Cyrus Vance), rather the origins of the Z-4plan (the draft agreement on Knin, south-ern Baranja and western Srijem) which theSerbian side rejected.

The war and participation of the inter-national community in Bosnia and


Herzegovina is discussed much more wide-ly and is given much more importance,which is best evidenced in the statement,“the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina pro-voked the most serious crisis in trans-Atlantic relations since the Suez crisis…” (p.55). With geographical maps, all initiativeswere reviewed, from the Vance-Owen planfrom January 1993, the Owen-Stoltenbergplan from July 1993, the Contact Groupplan from July 1994, to the Dayton Accordfrom November of 1995. Nevertheless, theentire chapter leaves the perception of agreater contribution by NATO compared tothe inefficiency of the EU, rather the EC.Significant criticism is given of westerncountries in not recognizing the aggres-sion, the indecisiveness and use of forceand generally for inaction in preventing theconflict. Criticism for belated action in lightof defending safe areas is clear butremains fairly unclear in light of the state-ment given in the Report; “no attention wasdirected toward constructive ideas fortransforming Yugoslavia from a communistfederation to a democratic one…” (p. 56)and even the hypothesis that Croatia wasrecognized prematurely as “recognitionexcluded from play the important lever withwhich Croatia could have been restrainedin its conduct toward the Serbs in Krajina”(p. 60). Does this mean that the authors ofthe Report consider that Yugoslavia couldhave been, with more determined partici-pation from the West, safeguarded fromdisintegration?

It is particularly worth highlighting thelack of recognising the decisive role of theCroatian Army operation in 1995 inachieving the Dayton Accord. This mostlikely stems from not knowing the principlefacts, for how can one explain formulationssuch as “the successful offensive of Bosnianand Croatian forces in Western Slavonia”(p. 73).

The third chapter, “The Situation in theCountries, Trends and Recommendations”,together with the fourth chapter, “TheRegion Conclusions and Recommen-dations”, are the most important and mostpretentious parts to the Report. Thesechapters, along with an analysis of the sit-uation and detailed explanations, give 57explicit recommendations concerning thefunction of the UN, NATO, the US, and var-ious bodies of the European Union, inter-national non-government organizationsand the countries in the “region” them-selves. All the recommendations in theReport can be organized in a number ofgroups; security, reconstruction and devel-opment, democracy (civil society andmedia), inter-ethnic relations and conducttoward minorities, and regional coopera-tion. The recommendations in the thirdchapter are directed individually toward thecountries in the region, while the recom-mendations in the fourth chapter are main-ly directed toward the region as a whole. Itis interesting that, judging by the numberand content of the recommendations givenin the third chapter, the Report considersBosnia and Herzegovina and the Republicof Croatia as being the most problematiccountries.

Ten recommendations directly concernBosnia and Herzegovina. In stating that inthe Dayton solution “there exists a hiddencontradiction” as it “accepts the ethnic divi-sion of Bosnia and Herzegovina which wasachieved with the help of military force”and at the same time wishes to “protectand reintegrate the pre-war multiethnicBosnia” (p. 78), the Report also reveals themeaning of some recommendations asbeing a means for supplementing, ratherredefining, Dayton. The final aim of therecommendations is the entire reconstruc-tion of multiethnic Bosnia, i.e. avoiding thepossibility of separating the three sides in


Bosnia and Herzegovina into three separatestates. With this end in mind, the Report rec-ommends the military presence of the inter-national community, supporting joint institu-tions, i.e. non-government organizations,complying to the obligations of the tribunalin The Hague, freedom of the media, theeconomic reconstruction of the country,strengthening the civil aspect of the West’spresence, achieving the right of refugees forreturn, etc.

Five recommendations relate to theRepublic of Croatia. Following a very criticalexposition on Croatia, broad assessmentsand inaccurate consternations, the Reportconcludes how “much more stringent meas-ures must be applied to this country” (p.106). The recommendations suggest thatthe US Government demand(s) of theRepublic of Croatia an improvement in itsrelations toward minorities, the return ofrefugee Serbs, the complete freedom of themedia, decentralization and regionalism,and dissolving Herceg-Bosna along with“taking a share of the economic recovery ofBosnia and Herzegovina.”

Serbia is termed as the “most importantstate in South-eastern Europe” and is givensurprisingly little recommendation. TheReport suggests the implementation of theDayton Accords, extraditing war criminals,accepting the draft agreement on succes-sion, freedom of the media, and devisingthe western strategy for recognizing a newYugoslavia and its inclusion in internationalinstitutions.

Four recommendations are dedicatedto Kosovo. They encompass the return ofautonomy, abstaining from independenceand a start to negotiations, and the return ofnormal civil life through the work of non-government organizations.

Three recommendations pertain toAlbania: pro-western orientation, the build-ing of infrastructure and joining with the

Balkans and not Islamic countries.Macedonia must increase the propor-

tion of Albanians in its government, decen-tralize, and retain UNPREDEP so as todecrease the tensions around the universityin Tetovo.

As for Montenegro, Bulgaria, Greeceand Turkey, there are no particular recom-mendations. Romania is not at all men-tioned.

It can be concluded that in its review ofthe situation in individual countries in theregion, i.e. before drafting the recommen-dations, the Commission acted with biasand impartially. How else can the consider-ably more critical stance toward somecountries in comparison to others beexplained, that is passing over in silencethe evident violations of human rights per-petrated by some and magnified in others.Why is it that for some countries, whereeven laymen can perceive great problems,no recommendations are given at all?

The 28th recommendation given in thefourth chapter is dedicated to the region asa whole. It relates to the problems ofregional cooperation, economic coopera-tion, reconstruction and development,democracy in relation to civil society andthe media, multi-ethnic relations and con-duct toward minorities, and security, i.e. thecontrol of armaments. All imply the impor-tance of creating a regional framework forresolving potentially dangerous issues andcontroversies, i.e. the need to strengthenthe role of non-government organizationsin the region.

Concerning the abovementioned rec-ommendations, from today’s perspective,four years after the first Report was issued,importance is drawn to the fact that never-theless the conduct of the internationalcommunity toward the countries encom-passed in the Report coincide in some ele-ments with the recommendations given in


this Report. Realized in particular are rec-ommendations concerning the reinforce-ment of “civil society,” that is the role ofnon-government organizations. This indi-cates that the recommendations of theCommission are taken seriously. We won’tdwell on the question why this is so. Whatare the consequences of the moves takenunder those recommendations provokesanother question.

It is particularly important to emphasizethe relatively mild judgements and smalldemands made upon the Serbs in compar-ison to the very sharp judgment of Croatia.In this light it would be very revealing, in aseparate study, to compare the first Reportof the International Commission for theBalkans of the Carnegie Foundation from1914 with the events that transpired later inthe “Balkan” region in the context of theFirst and Second World Wars. The authorsthemselves in the introduction to this Reportrecognize the fact that the views of the firstand second Commissions are similar.

The first Report from 1914 and this onepublished in 1996 are equally concernedand have the justified conclusion (and theirlack of will) of the urgency for the timelyengagement of Europe and the US inresolving problems in the Balkans.

Unfortunately, those who share consid-eration of the civilizational superiority,rather intellectual arrogance, prevent anobjective, empathetic perception of theproblems in the countries of the region.What to say about the first Report whichstates that the “civilization layer is very thinand that the liberation of the beast in manis always possible when force turns patriot-ism into crime and heroism into savagery,”but that they were prophetic, not only in therelations in the Balkans but in the relationsof all participating countries of the First andSecond World Wars. The objective percep-tion of the Balkan issues can only be

shaped by a commission that accepts the“thin civilizational layer” as inherent inevery man in every country in the world,even (as was shown by the events duringthe two world wars) in the developed West.

In any case, the individual movesmade by the international community after1996, intentional or accidental, coincidewith the recommendations in the Report. Atthe same time, some important moves bythe international community, such as thebombing of Serbia because of the events inKosovo, are not at all predicted nor sug-gested in the Report.

Generally viewed, the Report is super-ficial where the Republic of Croatia is con-cerned. For example, the Report correctlyconcludes that “leading international pow-ers, up until the summer of 1995, were notprepared to convincingly threaten force soas to enforce a solution”, that is that theywere late. However, the aforementioned iswritten in the context of the killings inSrebrenica, whilst it does not mention therecent war crimes during the aggressionagainst Croatia. Already in this approachto the problem, it is evident that Croatia isconsidered within a welter of Balkan eventsand whose politics primarily bring aboutthe consequences in the Balkans, in com-parison to Slovenia (which is altogether notmentioned in the Report). Croatia is notconsidered as a country that has powerfulroots and powerful contacts in the CentralEuropean region. Croatia is not perceivedas a bridge between Europe and theBalkans, rather only as an integral part ofthe Balkans. This sort of considerationabout Croatia does not give the true pic-ture and does not find a useful solution, notonly for Croatia, but also for the entireBalkans and the Central European region.

In considering the reasons as to whatprompted the establishment of this study, byall means assuming the commendable


desire to assist the region, the thesis on thepossible influence of fighting in the regionand the events in other countries in EasternEurope and the former USSR mentioned inthe introductory summary of the Report itselfmust also be taken into consideration: “Theworsening multi-ethnic relations and theever worsening situation for nationalminorities in the Balkans would have nega-tive consequences in other parts of EasternEurope and the former Soviet Union, wheredemography does not coincide with politi-cal borders. Moreover, the fate of theMuslims – their political integration or isola-tion – could become an acid test of rela-tions between Europe and the Islamicworld.” Not disputing the justification of thisargument, it is nonetheless difficult, fouryears after the end to the serious fighting inthe region and writing of this Report, to notea more serious link between the events inBosnia and Herzegovina and current eventsin Chechnya.

In any case, most likely the importantreason for writing the Report lies also in theconcern for possible implications of theevents in Bosnia and Herzegovina with animportant NATO member – Turkey. TheReport itself states that the “Bosnian issuehas become the powerful weapon in thehands of Turkish Islamists who at presenthave the position of presidency in the gov-ernment and, who have achieved successupon success on the domestic politicalstage, which is without precedence inTurkish contemporary history” (cit. summaryXXVI).

Numerous incorrect citations in theReport are most likely the fruit of a numberof previously shaped strong stances, sostrong that they have become the prejudg-ment and limit the scope, and inhibit thefreedom and innovation, of the recommen-dations themselves.

The first is the strong beliefs in the inca-

pability of the countries in the region tosolve their mutual problems on their own,that is the belief that they cannot solvethose problems without various forms,including military, of western intervention.The Report even directly suggests the “unin-terrupted and consistent military arrange-ment of NATO” up until the establishmentof the “Balkan Partnership for Peace asso-ciation.” This stance is expressed at the verybeginning of the Report, already in the sec-ond paragraph of the summarised reviewin the introduction. Namely, the statementthat, “this Commission believes that, if wepretend that we do not see the problems inthe Balkans, it will be shown that it will bethe equally successful recipe for a catastro-phe at the end to the twentieth century as itwas at its start. Foreign sponsors and eventhe factors which forcefully impose peacewill have to remain in that region for a longtime,” clearly shows that the Commissiondoes not wish to recognise that the maincause of the problems in the region evenprior to the outbreak of World War Onewas not only the historical inheritance ofthe peoples in the region, rather the“Balkan ethnic conflicts,” but that that to alarge extent was the interests of factors out-side the region, primarily the Ottoman andAustrian empires and up until the presentday, which obstructs free individualizationand development of the countries in theregion.

The Report foresees that almost all theconflicts in the region were quickly initiat-ed, primarily at the times of confrontationof the great powers in this region. In thatcontext it is completely correct to state thatthis region is an eternal battleground forthe interests of the great powers, and whenthese battles come ablaze they remind usof Samuel P. Huntington’s “conflict of civi-lizations”. As opposed to that, the Reportrelativises the aforementioned by stating


that “renewed nationalistic conflicts reflectthe ambitions of the great powers to rein-state their sphere of influence in theBalkans,” merely as an “attitude in whichmany in the Balkans believe.” At the sametime the theory that “the issue deals with aresurgence of ancient hatred and a resur-gence of repressed nations” is given as an“interpretation that is widespread in theWest.”

Subsequently the authors of the Reportsynthesize the aforementioned by stating,“there is some truth to all of this andnobody should underestimate the impor-tance of history in the Balkans. However,the main reasons for this war were that thesparks of aggressive nationalism werestirred by those political leaders of theYugoslav federation who, in their desire torealize their own nationalistic aims,appealed to ancient hatreds and whointentionally set in motion their own propa-ganda machinery…” (cit. summary p. XVI).

The second prejudice emanates fromthe first, which is the belief in equal guilt forthe fighting in the region. One would haveto be truly blind not to be able to differen-tiate between the aggressor (Serbia) andthe victims (Croatia, Bosnia andHerzegovina), or not be able to recognizewhich of the countries of the formerYugoslavia had the necessary means foraggression (armament) at the beginning ofthe nineties and the aspiration for domina-tion over others (the ideology of GreaterSerbia). There is no differentiation betweenthe negative aggressive nationalism thatwas based on a desire to conquer anddominate over others, and nationalism asa defensive reaction to protect one’s ownexistence from the aggression of the other.

The third prejudice is the belief that thesynthesis, rather various forms of linkingand integration as opposed to the sover-eignty of states in the region, automaticallycontributes to solving the problem. History

tells us otherwise; the bloodiest conflictsoriginated directly from the downfall of oldor the formation of new – either forcefullyor artificially created – ’integration’ entitiesin this region (Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungary, both Yugoslav states).

Nonetheless, in regards to regionalcooperation the Commission recommends,but also doubts, in the “possibility of main-taining an international conference onsecurity in the Balkans, and even an ambi-tious conferences that would have the aimof creating a south-Balkan confederation,”(p. 140). The Commission recommendsthe formation of “free trade zones” asbeing the most realistic and economicallymost useful solution, which would in theend become a part of CEFTA.

It is even more uncertain of how theyplan on implementing one of the key pro-posals in the Report in regards to creating“a Partnership for Peace Balkan associa-tion” and its “linking to the broader struc-tures of NATO,” (recommendation No. 53,p. 170).

Instead of the conclusion, let’s return tothe beginning, the title; “Report of theCommission for the Balkans.”

When we state “Report” we ask – forwhom? Normally, for those who paid. Inthis case, among others, the CarnegieFoundation and the Open Society Institute.Neither is a government organization orinstitute, which opens a series of interestingquestions on the mutual relations of thementioned non-government organizationsand the governments of specific countries,and even the possible influences of theseorganizations on the governments them-selves.

When we state “commission” we ask –what kind? This one is comprised ofundoubtedly eminent experts, intellectualsand politicians (Leo Tindemans - President,Lloyd Cutler, Bronislaw Geremek, JohnRoper, Theo Sommer, Simone Veil, David


Anderson). Our questions in an atmosphereof support for multiculturalism, equality andobjectivity are: why is it that not one of theseven members of the Commission on theBalkans does not originate from theBalkans, and why is it that only one of theCommission’s 21 advisors originates fromthe countries of the former Yugoslavia?

When we state “Balkans” we ask – whatis it and where is it? This Report does noteven attempt to differentiate between whereAsia begins and where the Balkans ends,but it does suggest that Europe ends andthe Balkans begins at the Slovenian-Croatian border. This is an assertion withwhich numerous Croats would not agree,and which could evoke antagonism towardthe Report, regardless of the value of thework of the Commission and the usefulnessof individual recommendations, notwith-standing a certain intellectual arrogancewithin the Commission.

Predrag Haramija, Zagreb, Croatia

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