New Evidence on the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises

COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 355

New Evidence on 1953, 1956 Crises:

CONFERENCES IN BUDAPEST, POTSDAMSPOTLIGHT COLD WAR FLASHPOINTS

In the autumn of 1996, the Cold WarInternational History Project and theNational Security Archive, along withEuropean partner institutions, co-spon-sored and jointly organized two majorinternational scholarly conferences atwhich scholars presented and debatednew evidence from both Eastern andWestern archives and sources concern-ing two major Cold War episodes inEurope: the 1953 East German Upris-ing (and the post-Stalin successionstruggle in Moscow), and the 1956 Pol-ish and Hungarian crises.

The conference, “Hungary and theWorld, 1956: The New Archival Evi-dence,” took place in Budapest on 26-

29 September 1996, and was hosted bythe Institute for the History of the 1956Hungarian Revolution and the Hungar-ian Academy of Sciences. The interna-tional symposium on “The Crisis Year1953 and The Cold War in Europe” con-vened in Potsdam, Germany, on 10-12November 1996, and was hosted by theCenter for Contemporary History Re-search (Zentrum fur ZeithistorischeForschung).

Both conferences grew out of the“Cold War Flashpoints” Project of theNational Security Archive, a non-gov-ernmental research institute and declas-sified documents repository based atGeorge Washington University. Previ-ous activities of the Project, undertakenby the Archive in close cooperation withCWIHP and Czech and Polish partners,included the holding of a major inter-national conference in Prague in April1994 on new evidence on the 1968Prague Spring and the Soviet invasionof Czechoslovakia and a scholarlyworkshop in Warsaw in August 1995 onnew sources on the 1980-81 Polish Cri-sis, as well as meetings with scholarsin Bucharest and Sofia in October 1996on possibilities for collaborative re-search in Romanian and Bulgarian ar-chives on Cold War topics.

Future meetings are also scheduled.In June 1997, the “Flashpoints” Projectplans to hold an oral history conferencein Poland on the 1980-81 crisis, gath-ering key participants, scholars, andsources from Poland, Russia, the UnitedStates, and elsewhere, and the Projectis also working with various scholars,archives, and scholarly institutions andprojects toward the holding of a seriesof meetings to present new evidence onthe End of the Cold War, including the1989 revolutions in Europe, the collapseof the Soviet Union, and the transfor-

mation in U.S.-Soviet relations.The Budapest and Potsdam confer-

ences, like others in the “Flashpoints”series, offered a venue for dozens ofAmerican, Russian, Central-East Euro-pean, and other scholars to present newevidence from Western and Eastern ar-chives, and in some cases for formerparticipants in the events to recall theirexperiences. Key topics covered atBudapest included the Polish upheav-als, which immediately preceded theHungary invasion; Soviet policy toward

MORE ON THE MALIN NOTES

The publication in this issue of theCWIHP Bulletin of the full translation of theMalin Notes on the 1956 Polish and Hun-garian Crises marks their first complete ap-pearance in English. However, versions ofthem were published in 1996 in Russian andHungarian by the Russian scholarVyacheslav Sereda and the Hungarianscholar Janos M. Rainer: in a two-part se-ries presented by Vyacheslav Sereda in Nos.2 and 3 (1996) of the Russian journalIstoricheski Arkhiv [Historical Archives],and in a book entitled Dontes a Kremlben,1956: A szovjet partelnokseg vitaiMagyarorszagrol [Crisis in the Kremlin,1956: The Debates of the Soviet Party Pre-sidium on Hungary] (Budapest: 1956-osIntezet, 1996), published by the Institute forthe History of the 1956 Hungarian revolu-tion. In addition, two important analyses ofthe notes have appeared in English: JanosM. Rainer’s two-part series, “The Road toBudapest, 1956: New Documentation of theKremlin’s Decision To Intervene,” in TheHungarian Quarterly 37:142 (Summer1996), 24-41, and 37:143 (Autumn 1996),16-31; and Mark Kramer, “New Light Shedon 1956 Soviet Decision to Invade Hun-gary,” Transition 2:23 (15 November 1996),35-40.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THEHUNGARIAN CRISIS OF 1956:

THE DOCUMENTARY ANTHOLOGY

A group of Russian and Hungarian schol-ars and archivists has cooperated to preparefor publication a Russian-language anthol-ogy of archival documents—many of themnever previously published—on Sovietpolicy and the events in Hungary in 1956.The Soviet Union and the Hungarian Crisisof 1956: The Documentary Collection isscheduled for publication in 1997. Amongthe Russian academic and archival institu-tions collaborating to produce the volumeare the Institute for Slavonic and BalkanStudies (Russian Academy of Sciences) andthe Institute of History (Russian Academyof Sciences); the Archive of Foreign Policy,Russian Federation; the Archive of the Presi-dent, Russian Federation; and the Center forthe Storage of Contemporary Documenta-tion. Co-editors include: V.Y. Afiani, B.Zhelizki, T. Islamov, S. Melchin, I.Morozov, V. Sereda, A. Stykalin, I. Vash, I.Vida, E. Dorken, T. Haidu. Financial sup-port for the publication was provded by theNational Security Archive and the Cold WarInternational History Project and East Eu-ropean Program of the Woodrow WilsonCenter. For ordering and publication infor-mation, please contact the editors.

356 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

both crises; the impact of the invasionon Eastern Europe; the Western re-sponse; China’s shifting position on thecrises; and Radio Free Europe’s contro-versial role. A number of participantsin the uprising itself spoke either aspanelists or as members of the audience,and several witnesses to the revolutionled a “walking tour of revolutionaryBudapest” to scenes of the street battles40 years earlier.

Among the most noteworthy find-ings of the Hungary Conference werepresentations and analyses of notesfrom Soviet Presidium meetings in fall1956 taken by V.N. Malin, head of theCPSU General Department. Thesenotes constitute the only known con-temporaneous record of the key sessionsof late October and early November atwhich Kremlin leaders went back andforth over whether to pull out fromHungary or reintroduce new troops. Acomprehensive analysis of the signifi-cance of the Malin Notes and other re-cent evidence on Soviet policy towardthe 1956 Poland and Hungary crises,along with a translation and annotationof the Malin Notes themselves, has beenprepared for the Bulletin by Mark

Kramer of Harvard University; it ap-pears immediately following this ar-ticle.

In Potsdam, sessions examined theorigins and consequences of the June1953 East German uprising; the “BeriaAffair” and post-Stalin successionstruggle in Moscow; Soviet policy to-ward Germany before and after June 17;Stalin’s death and East Central Europe;and the West’s position and actions in1953. Both conferences ended withroundtables on the long-term signifi-cance of the abortive revolts of 1953and 1956, particularly for the 1989 col-lapse of communism in Eastern Europeand for contemporary Germany andHungary.

Both conferences generated consid-erable public as well as scholarly atten-tion. As might be expected, local inter-est in the Budapest gathering, comingon the eve of the revolution’s 40th an-niversary, was intense. The main hallof the elegant Academy of Sciencesbuilding on the banks of the Danubewas filled on the conference’s openingday, and Hungarian media coveragethroughout was extensive. Overseasinterest was evidenced by three articles

and an editorial in The New York Times,as well as pieces in The WashingtonPost and numerous European publica-tions. Timothy Garton Ash, who deliv-ered the concluding remarks for the con-ference, wrote up his reflections in the14 November 1996 edition of The NewYork Review of Books.

The Potsdam Conference, for itspart, resulted in an Associated Pressreport, carried in many major newspa-pers, on newly declassified U.S. docu-ments obtained by the National Secu-rity Archive on the EisenhowerAdministration’s reactions to the events,including a 29 June 1953 report ap-proved by the National Security Coun-cil (NSC 158) which, among other ac-tions, declared that one official policyobjective was to “Encourage elimina-tion of key puppet officials.”

CWIHP is pleased to note the effortsof major contributors to the success ofboth conferences: Christian F. Oster-mann, a scholar based at the NationalSecurity Archive and the new Associ-ate Director of CWIHP; the Director ofthe 1956 Institute, Dr. Gyorgy Litvan,and its Research Director, Csaba Bekes;at the ZZF in Potsdam, Director Prof.Dr. Christoph Klessman, and AnkeWappler; at the National SecurityArchive, Malcolm Byrne, Pete Voth,and Vlad Zubok; and at the Wilson Cen-ter, Jim Hershberg and Michele Carus-Christian. Many scholars assisted inobtaining key documents and in otherways for the conferences. Principal fi-nancial supporters for both meetingsincluded the Open Society Institute; theJohn D. and Catherine T. MacArthurFoundation; and the Smith RichardsonFoundation. Additional support for theBudapest meeting came from the Com-mittee for Research on ContemporaryHistory, Hungarian Academy of Sci-ences; Europa Institute, Institute of His-tory, Central European University, andOpen Society Archives, all in Budapest;and the Stalin Era Research and Ar-chives Project, University of Toronto;additional backers of the Potsdam sym-posium included the Stiftung Volks-wagenwerk (Hannover) and theBradenburg Center for Political Educa-tion (Potsdam).

Since one key purpose of the “Cold

OSTERMANN WINS GERMAN STUDIES AWARDFOR ARTICLE ON 1953 EAST GERMAN UPRISING

The Cold War International History Project is pleased to note that Christian F. Ostermann,a doctoral candidate at Hamburg University currently based at the National Security Archivein Washington, D.C. (and CWIHP’s new Associate Director), has received an award fromthe German Studies Association for best article published in German Studies Review inHistory and the Social Sciences for the period 1994-1996. Drawing on newly-opened EastGerman sources as well as declassified U.S. government documents obtained by the au-thor through the Freedom of Information Act, the article—”‘Keeping the Pot Simmering’:The United States and the East German Uprising of 1953,” which appeared in GermanStudies Review, vol. XIX, no. 1, February 1996, pp. 61-89—was originally published, inslightly different form, in December 1994 as Working Paper No. 11 of the Cold War Inter-national History Project; the author had presented an earlier draft at CWIHP’s conferenceon “New Evidence on the Cold War in Germany” at the University of Essen in June 1994. The award is supported by the German Academic Exchange Service (DeutscherAkademischer Austausch Dienst). The award citation notes that Ostermann’s article “con-tributes signifantly to our understanding of a crucial moment in the Cold War. On the basisof thorough research in recently opened archival sources of the former German Demo-cratic Republic and the United States, Ostermann subjects conventional ideological inter-pretations to sustained and critical scrutiny. His analysis of complicated episodes, forexample, the American food program, sheds light on the development of Cold War poli-cies as a whole. Ostermann’s clear prose, deliberate form of expression, and balancedjudgments on highly controversial issues are qualities that make this an article of outstand-ing scholarly merit.”


War Flashpoints” Project is to gathernew archival materials from all sides ofthe events, the conference organizersprepared “briefing books” of recentlydeclassified U.S., Russian, and Euro-pean documents for both conferences:Christian F. Ostermann, ed., The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and the 17June 1953 Uprising in East Germany:The Hidden History—DeclassifiedDocuments from U.S., Russian, andOther European Archives (Washington,D.C.: CWIHP/National SecurityArchive); and Csaba Bekes, MalcolmByrne, and Christian F. Ostermann, ed.and comp., The Hidden History of Hun-gary 1956: A Compendium of Declas-sified Documents (Washington, D.C.:

National Security Archive, 1996).These briefing books, in turn, accel-

erated the process toward the ultimatepreparation and publication by the con-ference organizers of edited volumes ofpapers and documents emerging fromboth the Potsdam and Budapest meet-ings. In addition, the Cold War Inter-national History Project, which has pre-viously published East-bloc documentson all of the major “Flashpoint” crises,plans to publish selected materials fromboth the Potsdam and Budapest gather-ings in forthcoming Bulletins, WorkingPapers, and in electronic form.

For more information on theBudapest or Potsdam meetings, contactMalcolm Byrne or Christian F.

TOGLIATTI ON NAGY,30 OCTOBER 1956:

MISSING CABLE FOUND

In the midst of the deliberations on 31October 1956 leading to a decision to in-vade Hungary to crush the revolution andthe government led by Imre Nagy, theCommunist Party of the Soviet UnionCentral Committee (CPSU CC) Pre-sidium approved a secret message to Ital-ian Communist Party Secretary PalmiroTogliatti. Clearly responding to an ear-lier communication, the Soviet leadershipexpressed agreement with Togliatti thatevents in Hungary was heading in a “re-actionary” direction and that Imre Nagywas “occupying a two-faced position” and“falling more and more under the influ-ence of the reactionary forces. This cable,a revealing indication of the hardeningstand being taken inside the Soviet lead-ership at this critical juncture, was declas-sified by Russian authorities in 1992 inconjunction with President Yeltsin’s visitto Hungary and presentation of a collec-tion of documents on the 1956 events; anEnglish translation of the message toTogliatti appeared in the CWIHP Bulle-tin 5 (Spring 1995), p. 33. However, only recently has the earliercommunication from the Italian CP leaderto the Soviets giving the negative assess-ment of Nagy emerged; although schol-ars had been unable to locate it in the ar-chives of the Italian Communist Party, acopy of Togliatti’s message, dated 30October 1956, was located in the Archive

of the President of the Russian Federa-tion (APRF) in Moscow. It was first pub-lished in the Italian newspaper La Stampaon 11 September 1996, and presented byProf. Federigo Argentieri (Centro Studidi Politica Internazionale Studisull’Europa Centro-Orientale, Rome) tothe conference on “Hungary and theWorld, 1956” in Budapest, 26-29 Septem-ber 1996, organized by the National Se-curity Archive, the Institute for the His-tory of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution,and the Cold War International HistoryProject. Togliatti’s cable, translated from theItalian original by Doc and Claudia Rossi,appears below:

Hungarian events have created a heavysituation inside the Italian labor move-ment, and in our Party, too. The gap between [Secretary General ofthe Italian Socialist Party Pietro] Nenniand ourselves that seemed to be closingafter our initiatives is now rudely and sud-denly acute. Nenni’s position on Polishevents coincides with that of the SocialDemocrats. In our Party, one can see twopolarized and inappropriate positions. Onone extreme there are those who declarethat the responsibility for what happenedin Hungary is due to the abandoning ofStalinist methodology. At the other ex-treme are those groups who are accusingthe Party leadership of not taking a posi-tion in favour of the insurrection inBudapest and who claim that the insur-rection was justly motivated and should

have been fully supported. These groupsfirmly insist that the entire leadership ofour Party be replaced, and they believe[Italian trade union leader Giuseppe] DiVittorio should become the new Partyleader. They are based on a declarationof Di Vittorio that did not correspond tothe Party line and was not approved byus. We are going to fight against thesetwo opposing positions and the Party willnot give up the battle. Although I assure you that Hungarianevents have developed in a way that ren-der our clarifying action in the Party verydifficult, it also makes it difficult to ob-tain consensus in favour of the leadership.When we defined the revolt as counter-revolutionary, we had to face the fact thatour position was different from that of theHungarian Party and of the HungarianGovernment, and now it is the same Hun-garian Government that is celebrating theinsurrection. I think this is wrong. Myopinion is that the Hungarian Govern-ment—whether Imre Nagy remains itsleader or not—is going irreversibly in areactionary direction. I would like toknow if you are of the same opinion or ifyou are more optimistic. I would like toadd that among the leaders of our Partythere are worries that Polish and Hungar-ian events could damage the unity of theleadership of your Party Presidium, as wasdefined by the 20th [CPSU] Congress. We are all thinking if this occurs, theconsequences could be very serious forthe entire movement.

Ostermann at the National SecurityArchive in Washington, D.C., tel.: (202)994-7000, fax: (202) 994-7005, or bye-mail: [email protected];on the Budapest Conference, informa-tion can also be obtained from CsabaBekes at the 1956 Institute in Budapest:(36-1) 322-5228; e-mail:[email protected]. More informationon the programs and papers for theBudapest and Potsdam meetings is alsoavailable via the National SecurityArchive/CWIHP home page on theWorld Wide Web at http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive

—Malcolm Byrne, Jim Hershberg, andChristian F. Ostermann


SPECIAL FEATURE:NEW EVIDENCE ON SOVIET

DECISION-MAKING AND THE 1956POLISH AND HUNGARIAN CRISES

by Mark KramerThe overlapping crises in Hungary

and Poland in the autumn of 1956 poseda severe challenge for the leaders of theSoviet Communist Party (CPSU). Af-ter a tense standoff with Poland, theCPSU Presidium (as the Politburo wasthen called) decided to refrain frommilitary intervention and to seek a po-litical compromise. The crisis in Hun-gary was far less easily defused. For abrief moment it appeared that Hungarymight be able to break away from theCommunist bloc, but the Soviet Armyput an end to all such hopes. Soviettroops crushed the Hungarian revolu-tion, and a degree of order returned tothe Soviet camp.

Newly released documents fromRussia and Eastern Europe shed valu-able light on the events of 1956, per-mitting a much clearer and more nu-anced understanding of Soviet reac-tions. This article will begin by discuss-ing the way official versions of the 1956invasion changed—and formerly secretdocuments became available—duringthe late Soviet period and after the So-viet Union disintegrated. It will thenhighlight some of the most importantfindings from new archival sources andmemoirs. The article relies especiallyheavily on the so-called Malin notes,which are provided in annotated trans-lation below, and on new materials fromEastern Europe. Both the article andthe documents will show that far-reach-ing modifications are needed in exist-ing Western accounts of the 1956 cri-ses.

OFFICIAL REASSESSMENTSBEFORE AND AFTER 1991

The advent of glasnost and “new

political thinking” in the Soviet Unionunder Mikhail Gorbachev led to sweep-ing reassessments of postwar Soviet tieswith Eastern Europe. As early as 1987,an unofficial reappraisal began in Mos-cow of the Soviet-led invasion ofCzechoslovakia in August 1968. Ini-tially, these reassessments of the 1968crisis did not have Gorbachev’s overtendorsement, but the process gained anofficial stamp in late 1989 once Com-munism had dissolved in Eastern Eu-rope. Soon after the “velvet revolution”engulfed Czechoslovakia in November1989, the five states that took part inthe 1968 invasion—the Soviet Union,Poland, Hungary, East Germany, andBulgaria—issued a collective statementdenouncing the invasion and repudiat-ing the Brezhnev Doctrine. In addition,the Soviet Union released its own dec-laration of regret over the “erroneous”decision to intervene in 1968.1

Curiously, though, Gorbachev wasmuch less willing to proceed with a re-evaluation of the Soviet invasion ofHungary in November 1956. Not untilOctober 1991, two months after theaborted coup in Moscow had severelyweakened the Soviet regime, didGorbachev finally provide an officialapology for the 1956 invasion.2 Untilthat time, official judgments about So-viet actions in 1956 had been left pri-marily to Soviet military officers, whoroutinely glorified the invasion of Hun-gary as an example of “the internationaldefense of socialist gains” and of “trans-forming socialist internationalism intoaction.”3 A senior officer on the So-viet General Staff argued in 1987 thatthe “suppression of counterrevolution-ary rebellion,” as in Hungary in 1956,should still be among the chief military

missions of the Warsaw Pact.4 Thesame theme was expressed the follow-ing year in a Soviet book about the“Military Policy of the CPSU,” whichreceived admiring reviews in Sovietmilitary journals and newspapers.5

When political reforms began tosweep through Hungary and Poland inlate 1988 and 1989, signs of uneasesoon cropped up in Soviet military writ-ings. In September 1989, a prominentarticle by one of the top Soviet com-manders in Hungary in October-No-vember 1956, Army-General PyotrLashchenko, offered extravagant praisefor the Soviet invasion.6 Very few ar-ticles devoted solely to the Hungariancrisis had ever appeared in Soviet mili-tary journals (particularly after “normal-ization” began in Hungary in the late1950s), so there was no doubt that thepublication of Lashchenko’s analysishad been carefully timed. Severalmonths before the article went to press,Imre Pozsgay and other top officials inthe Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Partyhad publicly declared that the events of1956 were a “popular uprising againstan oligarchical regime that was humili-ating the nation.”7 By contrast,Lashchenko still insisted that the eventsof 1956 were merely a “counterrevolu-tionary rebellion that was actively sup-ported by the most reactionary forcesof international imperialism.” Thisharsh assessment was clearly intendedto help prevent the political changes inHungary from endangering the raisond’etre of Soviet military deploymentsin Eastern Europe.

Unease within the Soviet militaryregarding the 1956 invasion continuedeven after the upheavals of late 1989.In contrast to the official Soviet state-


ment condemning the 1968 invasion ofCzechoslovakia, no such statement wasissued about the intervention in Hun-gary. Although numerous Soviet offi-cials, such as deputy foreign ministerAnatolii Kovalev, later denounced theinvasion of Hungary, the Soviet HighCommand apparently blocked efforts torelease a statement about 1956 compa-rable to the one about 1968. Moreover,in August 1990, the same journal thathad published Lashchenko’s 1989 ar-ticle featured another essay, by a Hun-garian lieutenant-colonel, that was evenmore scathing in its assessment of the“counterrevolution” of 1956; thejournal’s editors highly recommendedthe article to their readers. Althoughsenior officials on the CPSU CentralCommittee staff were secretly orderedin November 1990 to begin studyingarchival materials from 1956 and pre-paring an assessment for the CPSUleadership, this effort was intendedmainly to find ways of deflecting pres-sure from the Hungarian government,and no public Soviet statements re-sulted.8 Even when the last Soviettroops were pulled out of Hungary inJune 1991, Gorbachev still declined tocondemn the 1956 intervention.

The Soviet leader’s belated apol-ogy in October 1991 was soon over-taken by the collapse of the Soviet re-gime. The new government in Russiaunder President Boris Yeltsin proved farmore willing to reevaluate and condemncontroversial episodes in Soviet rela-tions with Eastern Europe. As a result,a large quantity of Soviet documenta-tion about the 1956 Hungarian crisis andMoscow’s response has recently be-come available. Yeltsin turned over apreliminary collection of declassifiedmaterials to the Hungarian governmentin November 1992, which are nowstored at the Institute for the Study ofthe 1956 Hungarian Revolution inBudapest. These documents were allpublished in Hungarian translation in1993 as a two-volume collection.9 Afew of the items had appeared earlierin the original Russian,10 and in 1993most of the others were published inRussian with detailed annotations in athree-part series.11 Subsequently, a fewadditional Soviet documents were re-

leased, most of which are now avail-able in Fond 89 (the declassified col-lection) of the Center for Storage ofContemporary Documentation in Mos-cow, the former archive of the CPSUCentral Committee. As valuable asthese initial items were, they providedonly a few tantalizing details about So-viet decision-making in 1956. Someaspects of Soviet decision-making hadbeen revealed in memoirs by NikitaKhrushchev and other former officials,but in the absence of primary documen-tation it was difficult to know how ac-curate the memoirs were.12

Fortunately, that gap in the histori-cal record has now been at least partlyclosed. In mid-1995, the Russian ar-chival service finally released the“Malin notes” from the October-No-vember 1956 crisis. Verbatim tran-scripts of CPSU Presidium meetingswere not kept in the 1950s, but VladimirMalin, the head of the CPSU CC Gen-eral Department during the entireKhrushchev period, took extensivenotes of all Presidium meetings. Hishandwritten notes, stored in the former

Politburo archive (which is now underYeltsin’s direct control), were all sup-posed to be declassified by the end of1996, but regrettably only the ones per-taining to the Hungarian and Polish cri-ses of 1956 have been released so far.13

The initial batch of Malin notes wereprovided to a Russian historian,Vyacheslav Sereda, and to researchersat the 1956 Institute in Budapest, whohad exclusive access to the materialsuntil the spring of 1996, when the fullset were published in Hungarian trans-lation.14 Since then, other scholars—both Russians and foreigners—havebeen permitted to study the originaldocuments. Malin’s notes about theHungarian crisis were published in Rus-sian in the summer and fall of 1996, andthe notes about the October 1956 crisisin Poland were published in Moscowat the end of 1996.15 (The portionsabout Poland had already appeared inthe Hungarian translation.)

For an understanding of Sovietpolicy during the crises in Hungary andPoland, the Malin notes are by far themost valuable items that have surfaced.Although other important documentsabout the events of 1956 may eventu-ally be released from the Russian Presi-dential Archive, the former KGB ar-chives, and the Russian military ar-chives, the Malin notes are enough toshed extremely interesting light on So-viet decision-making during the crisis.Moreover, the Malin notes can besupplemented with a vast number ofrecently declassified materials from theEast European archives as well as newfirst-hand accounts. Of the East Euro-pean documents, an especially notewor-thy item is the handwritten Czech notesfrom a Soviet Presidium meeting on 24October 1956, as the crisis in Hungarywas getting under way.16 Of the newmemoirs, perhaps the most valuable isan account published in serial form inlate 1993 and early 1994 by a high-rank-ing Soviet military officer, EvgeniiMalashenko, who helped command theoperation in Hungary in 1956.17 To-gether, all these materials permit a muchbetter understanding of why and howthe Soviet Union responded with mili-tary force in one case but not in theother.

THE MALIN NOTES:AN ELECTRONIC SYMPOSIUM

Readers interested in further analy-ses and commentary on the notes by V.Malin on Kremlin decision-making onthe 1956 Polish and Hungarian crisescan find them on the Internet: the ColdWar International History Project andthe National Security Archive, U.S. co-sponsors and organizers of the Septem-ber 1996 Budapest Conference on“Hungary and the World, 1956: TheNew Archival Evidence,” plan topresent commentaries on the signifi-cance of the Malin Notes, as well asother materials on the 1956 events, viaCWIHP’s website on the Archive’shome page on the World Wide Web:http://www.nsarchive.com. Commentators will include Russianand Hungarian scholars such asVladislav Zubok, Janos Rainer,Vyacheslav Sereda, and Vitaly Afiani.Articles on China’s position on the 1956crises in Eastern Europe by Chen Jianand L.W. Gluchowski will also be avail-able.


NEW FINDINGS

One of the intriguing things aboutthe new evidence is that it tends to bearout much of Khrushchev’s brief ac-counts of the Hungarian and Polish cri-ses. Khrushchev’s reminiscences weretendentious (as most memoirs are) andhe was confused about a number ofpoints, but overall his account, includ-ing many of the details, holds up re-markably well. At the same time, thenew documentation provides insightabout many items that Khrushchevfailed to discuss, and it also allows nu-merous mistakes in the record to be setright. Although it is impossible in abrief article to provide a comprehensivereview of the latest findings, it is worthhighlighting several points that cast newlight not only on the events of 1956, buton the whole nature of Soviet-East Eu-ropean relations.

Soviet Responses to the Polish Crisis

New evidence from the Russianand East-Central European archiveshelps explain why the Soviet Uniondecided to accept a peaceful solution inPoland but not in Hungary. Poland wasthe initial focus of Soviet concerns. Aseries of events starting in June 1956had provoked unease in Moscow aboutgrowing instability and rebellion. ThePoznan riots, on 28-29 June, came as aparticular shock. Workers from theZISPO locomotive factory and otherheavy industrial plants in Poznan stageda large protest rally on 28 June, whichsoon turned violent. The Polish armyand security forces managed to subduethe protests, but the two days of clashesleft 53 dead and many hundredswounded. It is now known that somePolish officers tried to resist the deci-sion to open fire, but their oppositionproved futile because the security forceswere willing to carry out the orders andbecause Soviet commanders (and theirPolish allies) still dominated the Polishmilitary establishment.18 Soviet lead-ers were taken aback by the events inPoznan, fearing that the unrest wouldflare up again and spread elsewhereunless strict ideological controls were

reimposed. At a CPSU Presidium meet-ing shortly after the riots, Khrushchevclaimed that the violence had been pro-voked by the “subversive activities ofthe imperialists” and was aimed at “fo-menting disunity” with the Soviet blocand “destroying [the socialist countries]one by one.”19 These assertions ech-oed the public commentaries that So-viet leaders issued right after the riots.20

The measures adopted by Polishofficials to alleviate public discontentand prevent further disorders had onlya limited and transitory effect. By thelate summer and early fall of 1956 a newcrisis was gathering pace, which soonled to a tense standoff with the SovietUnion.21 In early October, one of themost prominent victims of the Stalinistpurges in Poland in the late 1940s andearly 1950s, Wladyslaw Gomulka, tri-umphantly regained his membership inthe Polish United Workers’ Party(PZPR) and was on the verge of re-claiming his position as party leader.The Soviet authorities feared that ifGomulka took control in Warsaw, hewould remove the most orthodox (andpro-Soviet) members of the Polish lead-ership and steer Poland along an inde-pendent course in foreign policy. So-viet concerns were heightened byGomulka’s demand that Soviet militaryofficers serving in the Polish army, in-cluding Marshal KonstantinRokossowski, the Polish-born Sovietofficer who had been installed as Pol-ish defense minister and commander-in-chief in November 1949, be with-drawn. This demand came after thePZPR Politburo had already (in Sep-tember 1956) requested the pull-out ofall Soviet state security (KGB) “advis-ers” from Poland.

To compel Gomulka and his col-leagues to back down, Soviet leadersapplied both military and political pres-sure. On 19 October, as the 8th Ple-num of the PZPR Central Committeewas about to convene to elect Gomulkaas party leader and removeRokossowski from the PZPR Politburo,Khrushchev ordered Soviet army unitsin northern and western Poland to ad-vance slowly toward Warsaw. Shortlythereafter, a delegation of top Sovietofficials, including Khrushchev,

Vyacheslav Molotov, Nikolai Bulganin,Lazar Kaganovich, and AnastasMikoyan, accompanied by the com-mander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact,Marshal Ivan Konev, and 11 other high-ranking Soviet military officers, paid asurprise visit to Warsaw. In a hastilyarranged meeting with Gomulka andother Polish leaders, the CPSU del-egates expressed anxiety about upcom-ing personnel changes in the PZPR andurged the Poles to strengthen their po-litical, economic, and military ties withthe Soviet Union.22 Gomulka, for hispart, sought clarification of the statusof Soviet troops in Poland and de-manded that the Soviet Union pledgenot to interfere in Poland’s internal af-fairs. Although he reaffirmed his in-tention of staying in the Warsaw Pact,he emphasized that Poland “will notpermit its independence to be takenaway.”23 Gomulka also renewed hiscall for the withdrawal of all or most ofthe Soviet Union’s 50 “advisers” inPoland, and again insisted thatRokossowski and other top Soviet of-ficers be removed from the Polish army.The Soviet delegation responded byaccusing the Poles of seeking to get ridof “old, trustworthy revolutionaries whoare loyal to the cause of socialism” andof “turning toward the West against theSoviet Union.”24

During these tense exchanges,Gomulka was suddenly informed byone of his aides that Soviet tank andinfantry units were advancing towardWarsaw. This large-scale mobilizationof Soviet troops, though intended as aform of coercive diplomacy rather thanto provoke an immediate confrontation,gave the crisis a new edge.Rokossowski and dozens of other So-viet commanders (and their Polish al-lies) who were still entrenched in thePolish officer corps were able to keepthe Polish army from preparing to de-fend Gomulka against incoming Sovietforces.25 Rokossowski’s influence,however, did not extend to many of thePolish troops from the Internal Secu-rity Corps (KBW) and other combatpersonnel under the aegis of the PolishInternal Affairs Ministry (MSW), whowere fully willing to fight on behalf ofthe new Polish regime. These units took


up strategic positions all around War-saw and called in reinforcements asSoviet columns were reported to bemoving in.26 In this game of political-military brinkmanship, a clash seemedto be looming between the KBW troopsand Soviet forces, and an even moreexplosive situation emerged within thePolish military establishment, pittingKBW units against troops from theNational Defense Ministry underRokossowski’s command. Thus, for abrief while, Poland appeared to be onthe verge of civil war as well as a con-flict with the Soviet Union.

The latent danger of a clash be-tween Soviet forces and the KBW—adanger that loomed large even thoughneither side wanted a direct confronta-tion—spurred Khrushchev andGomulka to make a renewed effort tofind a peaceful solution. After beinginformed about the troop movements,the Polish leader requested that the So-viet units be pulled back; andKhrushchev, after some hesitation,complied with the request, orderingKonev to halt all troop movements.27

Although Khrushchev assuredGomulka that the deployments had sim-ply been in preparation for upcomingmilitary exercises, the intended messagewas plain enough, especially in light ofother recent developments. The exist-ence of Soviet “plans to protect the mostimportant state facilities” in Poland,including military garrisons and linesof communication, had been deliber-ately leaked to Polish officials earlierin the day; and Soviet naval vessels hadbegun holding conspicuous maneuversin waters near Gdansk, keeping the Pol-ish Navy at bay.28 Despite these vari-ous forms of pressure, the Polish au-thorities stood their ground, and themeeting ended without any firm agree-ment. The official communique merelyindicated that talks had taken place andthat Polish leaders would be visitingMoscow sometime “in the near fu-ture.”29 In most respects, then, the ne-gotiations proved less than satisfactoryfrom the Soviet standpoint.

Shortly after the Soviet delegatesreturned to Moscow on 20 October, theybriefed the other members of the CPSUPresidium on the results of the trip.30

By this point they knew that the PZPRCentral Committee had reconvenedearly on the 20th and had electedGomulka first secretary and droppedRokossowski and several neo-Stalinistofficials from the PZPR Politburo.Khrushchev made no attempt to con-ceal his disappointment, arguing that“there’s only one way out—by puttingan end to what is in Poland.” He indi-cated that the situation would get muchworse if Rokossowski were not permit-ted to stay as Poland’s defense minis-ter. Khrushchev lay a good deal of theblame for the crisis on the Soviet am-bassador in Poland, PanteleimonPonomarenko, who, according toKhrushchev, had been “grossly mis-taken in his assessment of [Edward]Ochab and Gomulka.” (Khrushchevdeclined to mention that he himself—and the rest of the Soviet leadership—had “grossly” misjudged the situationin Poland over the previous fewmonths.31)

The Presidium adoptedKhrushchev’s suggestion that a meet-ing be held soon in Moscow with lead-ing representatives from Czechoslova-kia, Hungary, Romania, East Germany,and Bulgaria. Khrushchev also pro-posed that they consider sending a fewsenior officials to China “for informa-tional purposes.” In the meantime, thePresidium resolved to “think carefully”about additional measures, includingnew military exercises and the forma-tion of a “provisional revolutionarycommittee” that would displaceGomulka. In addition, Khrushchev au-thorized a new campaign in the press,building on an editorial in the 20 Octo-ber issue of Pravda, which had accusedthe Polish media of waging a “filthyanti-Soviet campaign” and of trying to“undermine socialism in Poland.”32

These charges, and subsequent accusa-tions, prompted vigorous rebuttals fromPolish commentators.

Strains between Poland and theSoviet Union remained high over thenext few days as tens of thousands ofPoles took part in pro-Gomulka ralliesin Gdansk, Szczecin, and other cities on22 October. Even larger demonstra-tions, each involving up to 100,000people, were organized the following

day in Poznan, Lublin, Lodz,Bydgoszcz, Kielce, and elsewhere. Inthe meantime, joint meetings of work-ers and students were being held allaround Poland, culminating in a vastrally in Warsaw on 24 October attendedby some 500,000 people. Althoughthese events were intended mainly as adisplay of unified national support forthe new Polish leadership in the face ofexternal pressure, some of the speak-ers, particularly at a rally in Wroclawon the 23rd, expressed open hostilitytoward the Soviet Union.

As tensions mounted on 20 and 21October, Soviet leaders reexamined avariety of economic sanctions and mili-tary options, but again they found thatnone of these options seemed the leastbit attractive. At a meeting on the 21st,the CPSU Presidium unanimously de-cided to “refrain from military interven-tion” and to “display patience” for thetime being.33 The rationale for thisdecision remained just as compelling insubsequent days, as Khrushchev em-phasized to his colleagues and to otherEast European leaders during an ex-panded Presidium meeting on theevening of 24 October: “Finding a rea-son for an armed conflict [with Poland]now would be very easy, but finding away to put an end to such a conflict lateron would be very hard.”34 The stand-off on 19 October had demonstrated tothe Soviet leadership that most of thePolish troops who were not underRokossowski’s command, especially inthe KBW, were ready to put up stiff re-sistance against outside intervention.Khrushchev and his colleagues alsoseem to have feared that Polish leaderswould begin distributing firearms to“workers’ militia” units who could helpdefend the capital. (Gomulka laterclaimed that arms were in fact dissemi-nated, but the evidence generally doesnot bear out these assertions.35 Theimportant thing, however, is that Sovietofficials assumed that Gomulka wouldproceed with this step.)

Khrushchev’s reluctance to pursuea military solution under such unfavor-able circumstances induced him to seeka modus vivendi with Gomulka wherebyPoland would have greater leeway tofollow its own “road to socialism.”


Gomulka reciprocated by again assur-ing Khrushchev that Poland would re-main a loyal ally and member of theWarsaw Pact. The Polish leader dem-onstrated the credibility of his promisesby ordering Polish officers to cease con-sidering the prospect of a completewithdrawal of the Soviet NorthernGroup of Forces from Poland.36 (On21 October, as the crisis with Moscowbegan to abate, a number of Polish com-manders, led by General WaclawKomar of the Internal Army and Gen-eral Wlodzimierz Mus of the KBW, hadthought it was the right moment to pressfor a total Soviet withdrawal, and theystarted drafting plans to that effect.Gomulka put an immediate end to theiractivities.) Gomulka also adopted a farmore conciliatory line in public, as re-flected in his keynote speech at the rallyin Warsaw on 24 October.37 The Pol-ish leader not only called for strongerpolitical and military ties with the So-viet Union and condemned those whowere trying to steer Poland away fromthe Warsaw Pact, but also urged his fel-low Poles to return to their daily workand to refrain from holding any addi-tional rallies or demonstrations.

Over the next few days, Sovietleaders became annoyed whenGomulka insisted that Rokossowski beremoved from the national defense min-istry (as well as from the PZPR Polit-buro), a demand that perplexed evenChinese officials, who overall werestaunchly supportive of Gomulka.38

Had the crisis in Hungary not intervenedon 23 October, Soviet leaders mightwell have been inclined to take a firmerstand against Rokossowski’s dismissalfrom the ministry. But by the timeGomulka began pressing this demandon 26 October, the deteriorating situa-tion in Hungary gave Khrushchev astrong incentive to prevent renewed dif-ficulties with Poland. Having been re-assured that Gomulka would keep Po-land in the Warsaw Pact and retain So-viet troops on Polish soil, Khrushchevreluctantly acquiesced in Rokos-sowski’s ouster. In mid-November,Rokossowski was recalled to Moscow,where he was appointed a deputy de-fense minister.

Early in the crisis, some members

of the Soviet Presidium, especiallyVyacheslav Molotov and KlimentVoroshilov, had strongly opposed theleeway granted to the Poles, but by thetime the Presidium met on 21 October,as noted above, all members agreed thatit was best to eschew military interven-tion and to “display patience,” at leastfor a while.39 Nor were any majorsigns of dissent evident at the Presidiummeeting on 23 October.40 Participantsin the meeting emphasized the “funda-mental difference” between the situa-tion in Poland and the emerging crisisin Hungary. Gomulka’s speech on 24October and his follow-up discussionswith Khrushchev further convinced theSoviet leader that Poland would remaina loyal member of the “socialist com-monwealth” and Warsaw Pact.41

This did not mean that all tensionswith Poland were instantly dissipated.In addition to continued bickering overRokossowski’s status, Khrushchev re-mained concerned about the “unaccept-able” views espoused by certain PZPRofficials, including some who allegedlywanted to assert territorial claimsagainst the USSR.42 Soviet leadersalso were disturbed by reports that aninfluential PZPR Secretary, WladyslawMatwin, had given a speech in Poznanon 10 November in which he con-demned recent “abnormalities in Pol-ish-Soviet relations” that had “raiseddoubts about the sovereignty of ourcountry.”43 Nevertheless, these fric-tions did not detract from the basic as-surances that Gomulka had provided toKhrushchev. By late October and earlyNovember 1956 the two sides hadreached a broad accommodation thatwas able to withstand occasional dis-ruptions.

Gomulka’s determination to pre-serve a Communist system in Polandand to remain within the Warsaw Pacthad a strong bearing on Soviet policyduring the Hungarian revolution. Theoutcome of the Polish crisis demon-strated that some Soviet flexibilitywould continue and that a return to full-fledged Stalinism was not in the offing,but it also set a precedent of what wouldbe tolerated. Had Gomulka not beenwilling to keep Poland firmly within theSoviet bloc, a military confrontation

might well have ensued. The contrastwith Hungary was telling. Early on,Soviet leaders may have hoped that theycould rely on Imre Nagy to do in Hun-gary what Gomulka had done in Poland,but the Soviet Presidium soon con-cluded that there was “no comparisonwith Poland” and that “Nagy is in factturning against us.”44

The Onset of the Hungarian Crisis

Social pressures had been buildingin Hungary since the spring of 1955,when the reformist prime minister ImreNagy was dislodged by the old-lineStalinist leader Matyas Rakosi, who hadbeen forced to cede that post to Nagyin mid-1953. The earlier transfer ofpower from Rakosi to Nagy, and theshift back to Rakosi, were both effectedunder Moscow’s auspices. In June 1953the Soviet authorities, led by GeorgiiMalenkov and Lavrentii Beria, hadsummoned Rakosi and other Hungar-ian officials to Moscow for a secretmeeting. During three days of talks,Malenkov and his colleagues stressedthat they were “deeply appalled” byRakosi’s “high-handed and domineer-ing style” in office, which had led tocountless “mistakes and crimes” andhad “driven [Hungary] to the brink of acatastrophe.”45 They ordered Rakosito relinquish his prime ministerial du-ties to Nagy. Although Rakosi was al-lowed to remain First Secretary of theHungarian Workers’ Party (HWP), theoffice of prime minister at the time wasseen as more important than the topparty position.

By early 1955, however, the politi-cal calculus in both Moscow andBudapest had changed. The First Sec-retary of the CPSU, Khrushchev, hadgradually eclipsed prime ministerMalenkov, enabling the CPSU to regainits predominant status in Soviet politics.Khrushchev sought to reinforce his vic-tory by prodding the East Europeancountries to halt their New Courses (i.e.,the reforms they had adopted whenMalenkov was the top figure in Mos-cow) and to give renewed emphasis tothe “leading role” of their Communistparties. This political reconfigurationcame at the same time that Soviet lead-


ers were concerned (or claimed to beconcerned) that Nagy’s policies weregiving impetus to “rightist deviation-ists” and “opportunists” in Hungarywho were seeking to realign their coun-try with Yugoslavia or the West. As aresult, in March 1955 the CPSU Pre-sidium again summoned top Hungarianofficials, including Nagy and Rakosi,to Moscow for secret talks; and a high-level Soviet delegation then traveled toHungary to oversee the reversal ofNagy’s New Course and the elevationof Rakosi’s protege, Andras Hegedus,to the post of prime minister. This“friendly interference in [Hungary’s]internal affairs,” according to a seniorCPSU Presidium member, KlimentVoroshilov, provided “a model for ourrelations with all the People’s Democ-racies.”46

Nevertheless, these fluctuationswere bound to spark social unrest inHungary. The appointment of Nagy asprime minister in 1953 had helped staveoff further disorders of the sort that oc-curred in Csepel, Ozd, and Diosgyor inthe spring of 1953; but the reascendanceof Rakosi in 1955-56 brought all thoseearlier grievances back to the surface.In the past, Rakosi had been able to relyon mass repression to stifle popular dis-content, but by 1956 his options werefar more limited because of the post-Stalin “thaw” and de-Stalinization cam-paign that Khrushchev had launched atthe 20th Soviet Party Congress. Thosedevelopments created greater leewayfor the expression of pent-up grievancesin Hungary; and they also helped trans-form the Petofi Circle, an entity set upby Rakosi in March 1956 as a debatingforum for Party youth, into a prominentorgan of the anti-Rakosi opposition. Inlate April 1956, the Soviet ambassadorin Budapest, Yurii Andropov, informedthe CPSU Presidium about the “far-reaching impact” of the Soviet PartyCongress on the public mood in Hun-gary and about the Hungarian regime’slackluster response:

Through demagoguery and provoca-tions, the right-wing opportunists andhostile elements have managed to cre-ate an impression [among ordinary Hun-garians] that the Hungarian Workers’

Party leadership, in its current form, isnot doing what is needed in Hungary tocarry out the decisions of the XX CPSUCongress because some of the old mem-bers of the [Hungarian] Politburo areputting up resistance against these de-cisions and the younger comrades aretoo inexperienced to proceed with therequired work. This impression is do-ing great damage to the authority of the[Hungarian] Politburo in the eyes of theparty aktiv and a large segment of theworkers.47

Andropov urged the Soviet Presidiumto give greater support and assistanceto Rakosi to prevent the anti-Rakosiforces from extracting further “majorconcessions to rightist and demagogicelements.”48

This cable stirred apprehension inMoscow, and the CPSU Presidium de-cided in early May to send one of itsmembers, Mikhail Suslov, to Budapestfor discussions with Andropov and withleaders of the HWP.49 It took severalweeks, however, before Suslov actuallyleft for Budapest. Despite the growingturbulence in Hungary, high-level atten-tion in Moscow was distracted by othermatters. When Suslov finally arrivedin Budapest on 7 June, his weeklongvisit did little to help the situation. Incontrast to Andropov’s more alarmingreports, Suslov assured the CPSU Pre-sidium that there was no real disaffec-tion in Hungary with the HWP leader-ship. The opposition to Rakosi, he ar-gued, was confined to the HWP Cen-tral Committee (formally known as theCentral Leadership), where a group sup-porting Imre Nagy had joined forceswith “politically immature and unprin-cipled officials.”50 Suslov claimed thatthe problem could be eliminated if “realHungarian cadres” were “promotedmore vigorously” to diminish the“hugely abnormal” representation of“Jewish comrades” in the HWP Cen-tral Leadership. He took a number ofsteps to bolster Rakosi’s position andto forestall any potential challenges toRakosi at a crucial plenum of the HWPCentral Leadership scheduled for mid-July. Suslov’s strong backing forRakosi at this point was in line with theviews of the entire CPSU Presidium.Later on, Khrushchev privately ac-

knowledged that it had been a “greatmistake” to “rely on that idiot Rakosi,”but in the first half of 1956 no one onthe Soviet Presidium seriously ques-tioned the policy.51

The assurance of strong, visiblesupport from Moscow (and fromAndropov) enabled Rakosi to counterhis rivals within the HWP by depictingtheir criticism as “directed also againstthe Soviet comrades.”52 Ordinarily,this might have been enough to keepRakosi in power for another severalyears, but two unforeseen events in lateJune 1956 changed the political balanceof forces in Hungary. The first devel-opment, on 27 June, was a highly pub-licized meeting of the Petofi Circle,which featured sweeping criticisms ofthe regime’s policies, condemnations ofRakosi for his role in the Stalinist re-pressions of the late 1940s and early1950s, and renewed calls for “full free-dom of the press.” In response, Rakosipersuaded the HWP Central Leadershipto adopt a resolution on 30 June thatbanned the Petofi Circle and explicitlydenounced “anti-party elements” andthe “anti-party views” of “a certaingroup which has formed around ImreNagy.”53 The HWP Central Leader-ship also reprimanded HWP memberswho had shown “insufficient vigilance”against “hostile, demagogic attacks,”rescinded the party membership of twoprominent writers (Tibor Dery andTibor Tardos) who had “espoused bour-geois and counterrevolutionary views,”criticized the HWP newspaper SzabadNep for its “misleading and unprin-cipled” coverage of the meeting, andprohibited any further gatherings ofopposition forces.

This resolution was adopted onlyhours after another event occurred thathad profound implications for Hungary:the outbreak of riots in Poznan, Polandon 28-29 June. Many Hungarians, par-ticularly university students, intellectu-als, and a substantial number of HWPmembers, came to see the Petofi Circlemeeting and the Poznan riots as indica-tions that neo-Stalinist regimes through-out the Soviet bloc were suddenly vul-nerable. Rakosi hoped to dispel anyimpression of weakness by returning tohis earlier policy of “stern measures”


against “hostile” and “anti-socialist”forces. This marked a reversal of hisapproach over the previous few months,when he had grudgingly put up with alimited thaw in the wake of the 20thCPSU Congress. At a meeting of theBudapest party aktiv on 18 May, Rakosihad even reluctantly acknowledged hispart in the “unjust repressions” of theStalin era. These concessions, limitedthough they were, raised public expec-tations in Hungary; but the increaseddefiance of the Petofi Circle and the ri-ots in Poznan spurred Rakosi to try toreassert an “iron hand.” Within theHWP, however, this move was far fromuniversally welcomed. A large numberof officials, especially in the HWP Cen-tral Leadership, concluded that the realproblem in Hungary was not the oppo-sition forces or the Petofi Circle, butRakosi himself.

The mounting disaffection withRakosi was duly noted by Andropov ina cable to the CPSU Presidium on 9July.54 Andropov reported that “hos-tile elements and the intra-HWP oppo-sition have embarked on an open andintensive struggle” against Rakosi. Heemphasized that some prominent oppo-sition figures had begun calling for an“independent national policy” and a“national Communist movement,”which would “permit the Hungarians toresolve their own affairs independently,‘rather than on the basis of Soviet in-terference.’” Andropov also noted thatGero saw “few ways, unfortunately, toovercome the situation that hasemerged.” Although Gero believed thatthe HWP Central Leadership plenum on18 July might “restore solid unity” atthe top levels of the party, he was con-cerned that “severe complications couldemerge unexpectedly” at the plenum. Inthis connection, Andropov reported thatthe former head of state security inHungary, Gabor Peter, had written a let-ter from prison accusing Rakosi of di-rect personal complicity in the Rajktrial. Andropov warned that “if this let-ter is read out at the plenum, Cde.Rakosi’s plight will be enormously ag-gravated.” Andropov underscoredGero’s hope of receiving “concrete ad-vice from the CPSU CC,” and he addedthat “Cde. Gero’s alarm about the situ-

ation is fully understandable.” Theambassador expressed misgivings of hisown about the “indecisiveness, feebleactions, and inadequate vigilance of theHungarian comrades in the struggleagainst hostile influences within theparty and among workers,” and he rec-ommended that the CPSU leadershipissue a clear-cut endorsement of theHWP resolution of 30 June “as well asof all the measures needed to strengthenthe [Hungarian] party’s unity and to in-tensify the struggle against hostileforces.”

Andropov’s cable served as thebasis for a CPSU Presidium meeting on12 July 1956, which focused on the lat-est events in both Hungary and Poland.Malin’s notes from the meeting showthat Khrushchev and his colleagues stilldid not want to come to grips with theunderlying sources of political unrest inHungary.55 To be sure, the events inPoznan had provoked “alarm [in Mos-cow] about the fate of Hungary” as wellas of Poland: “After the lessons ofPoznan we wouldn’t want somethingsimilar to happen in Hungary.”56 So-viet leaders went so far as to character-ize the discussions of the Petofi Circleon 27 June as “an ideological Poznan,without the gunshots.”57 Nevertheless,they displayed little understanding ofthe pressures that had given rise to suchincidents. Khrushchev attributed therecent turmoil in Hungary (and Poland)exclusively to “the subversive activitiesof the imperialists,” who, he claimed,“want to foment disunity” within thesocialist camp and “destroy the social-ist countries one by one.”58 The Pre-sidium ordered that a lengthy editorialbe published in Pravda reaffirmingMoscow’s “internationalist solidaritywith efforts to rebuff the enemy.”59

The appearance of this article on 16 Julywas intended as a warning that theCPSU leadership would “not permit thedissolution of the unity of the socialistcamp under the pretext of respect fornational particularities or the extensionof democracy.”60

The Soviet Presidium also desig-nated one of its members, AnastasMikoyan, to visit Hungary for a first-hand assessment of the disarray withinthe Hungarian leadership and the grow-

ing ferment in Hungarian society. Uponhis arrival in Budapest on 13 July,Mikoyan met with Rakosi and threeother senior Hungarian officials (ErnoGero, Andras Hegedus, and Bela Veg).These preliminary talks convincedMikoyan that the situation would im-prove only if Rakosi stepped down.Having been authorized by the CPSUPresidium to do whatever was neces-sary to “restore unity in the HWP lead-ership,” Mikoyan bluntly informedRakosi that it would be best if someoneelse took over as HWP First Secre-tary.61 Rakosi had been hoping to gainSoviet backing for his proposal to“smash the Nagy conspiracy” once andfor all—a proposal that envisaged thearrest of Nagy and several hundredother “conspirators,” as well as abroader crackdown—and thus he wasstunned by Mikoyan’s recommenda-tion. Nevertheless, Rakosi had littlechoice but to accept the Soviet “advice.”Mikoyan then turned to the question ofa successor. He proposed Erno Gero asa replacement for Rakosi, but Gero ini-tially claimed that it would be better ifa “Hungarian official” (i.e., a non-Jew)took over. These demurrals were notentirely sincere, as Mikoyan soon real-ized, and the matter was settled over thenext few days at two emergency ses-sions of the HWP Politburo. Mikoyantook part in the first session on 13 Julyand was kept closely informed about thesecond, on 16 July.62 As he had pro-posed, the HWP Politburo endorsedGero as the new First Secretary. Thetransition to a post-Rakosi regime wasformally approved by the HWP CentralLeadership plenum on 18 July, in whichMikoyan played a crucial role.63

Mikoyan’s efforts to promotegreater political stability in Hungarycame at the same time that a group ofhigh-ranking Soviet officers were vis-iting Hungary to inspect Soviet forcesbased there (the so-called SpecialCorps).64 The officers, led by GeneralMikhail Malinin, a first deputy chief ofthe Soviet General Staff, discovered thatthe command staff of the Special Corpshad not yet worked out a secret plan toprepare for large-scale internal distur-bances in Hungary. (In the wake of the1953 East German uprising, the com-


manders of all Soviet forces in EasternEurope had been ordered by the CPSUleadership to devise appropriate plansfor anti-riot and counterinsurgency op-erations.) When this omission was re-ported to Soviet defense minister Mar-shal Georgii Zhukov, he ordered that therequisite documents be compiled imme-diately. The visiting Soviet generalshelped the commander of Soviet forcesin Hungary, General Lashchenko, puttogether a “Plan of Operations for theSpecial Corps to Restore Public Orderon the Territory of Hungary,” which wassigned on 20 July.65 This plan,codenamed “Volna” (Wave), envisagedthe use of tens of thousands of Soviettroops at very short notice (within threeto six hours) to “uphold and restorepublic order” in Hungary. The plan re-quired a special signal (known as“Kompas”) to be put into effect, but theformulation of “Volna” at this stage in-dicates that Soviet leaders wanted a re-liable fall-back option in case their at-tempts to bolster political stability inHungary did not pan out.

The growing reservations in Mos-cow about Hungary’s political futureturned out to be far more justified thanSoviet leaders had hoped. Although theouster of Rakosi eliminated the mostexigent problem in Hungary, it washardly sufficient to put more than a tem-porary check on the growth of socialdiscontent. Gero was widely perceivedto be of the same mold as Rakosi. Norwas the situation helped any by the“comradely advice” that Gero receivedfrom his Soviet counterparts when hetook office:

The relaxation of international tensionsand the slogan of coexistence [as pro-claimed at the 20th CPSU Congress] donot presuppose but, on the contrary, ex-clude ideological concessions and anyaccommodation to hostile views. Thatis why you must eliminate all factorsresponsible for the collapse of partyconduct in Hungary, restore disciplineamong CC members and the party’srank-and-file, and launch a fiercestruggle on the ideological front.66

These suggestions were of little rel-evance to the turbulent political scenein Hungary. By early September, Gero

privately acknowledged that he was stillfinding it “enormously difficult to fos-ter unity within the party’s leadership”and to overcome “sharp disagreementsabout certain fundamental issues.”67

The lack of “a unified position amongthe members of the Politburo,” Gerobelieved, was exacerbating the “danger-ous and unstable situation in the coun-try as a whole.”

Gero’s awareness of these prob-lems makes it especially difficult tounderstand why he was willing to beabsent from Hungary over the next sev-eral weeks. During most of Septemberand the first week of October, he wason vacation in the Soviet Union (mainlyin the Crimea). According to Andropov,“Gero openly acknowledged, when hewas setting off on his trip, that he wasnot at all sure whether ‘things wouldbe okay’ while he was gone.”68 WhenGero finally returned to Budapest inOctober, he met again with Andropovand told him that “unfortunately, nowthat I’m back in Hungary, I can see thatthe situation in the country has becomemuch worse and more turbulent than Ihad imagined while I was in theUSSR.”69 Problems within the HWP,according to Gero, had “gravely dete-riorated,” and “acute discontent [had]spread throughout the country.”

Even Gero’s efforts to allay publicunrest were widely construed as littlemore than admissions of weakness. On6 October, while Gero was still in Mos-cow, the remains of Laszlo Rajk andthree other high-ranking victims of theStalinist purges were reinterred inBudapest as a crowd of several hundredthousand looked on. Rajk had been sen-tenced to death on trumped-up chargesin October 1949 and was then posthu-mously rehabilitated in March 1956,despite Rakosi’s initial objections.When Rakosi announced the rehabili-tation on 28 March, he made no men-tion of his own culpability and tried togloss over the whole affair; but Gerowas not as closely identified with theRajk trial, and therefore was willing topermit the reburial. Gero viewed themeasure as a convenient way to ingra-tiate himself with Tito (whom he hadmet in the Crimea at the beginning ofOctober) as well as a means of defus-

ing internal tensions, but he failed toanticipate what a profound effect theceremony would have. As soon as Geroreturned to Hungary, he realized theimplications of what he had done. On12 October, he confided to Andropovthat “the reburial of Rajk’s remains hasdealt a massive blow to the party lead-ership, whose authority was not all thathigh to begin with.”70 Gero also con-ceded that the ceremony was likely toprovoke “even greater insolence” on thepart of opposition forces, who will now“openly demand the return of ImreNagy to the Politburo.”

Gero’s misgivings proved well-founded. A rapid sequence of events inthe second and third weeks of Octobergave rise to a full-fledged crisis. TheHWP Politburo had tried to curb popu-lar ferment by readmitting Imre Nagyinto the party on 13 October, but thatstep, if anything, merely emboldenedthe regime’s opponents. To make mat-ters worse, Gero decided once again totravel abroad at a critical moment.From 15 to 22 October he was in Yugo-slavia. Although the main purpose ofhis trip was to hold negotiations withTito and other senior officials, he ex-tended his stay to take a vacation on theYugoslav coast. While he was away,the situation in Hungary grew ever moreturbulent, spurred on in part by the con-current events in Poland.

The surge of discontent in Hungaryreached the breaking point on 23 Octo-ber (just hours after Gero had returnedfrom Yugoslavia), when a huge dem-onstration was organized in downtownBudapest by students from a localpolytechnical university who wanted toexpress approval of the recent develop-ments in Poland and to demand similarchanges in their own country.71 TheHWP authorities initially tried to pre-vent the demonstration, but their effortsproved futile, as several hundred thou-sand people gathered in the capital.After a preliminary march to the statueof Josef Bem (a hero from the Polishrevolution of 1830 and the Hungarianrevolution of 1848), the demonstratorssplit into several large groups andmoved to key points in the city, wherethey voiced demands for “national in-dependence and democracy.” A huge


statue of Stalin in the center of Budapestwas torn down. Similar rallies wereheld in other Hungarian cities, wherethousands of protesters called on thegovernment to resign. Faced by thisgrowing wave of unrest, Gero desper-ately tried to regain control of the situ-ation, but the protests continued tomount.

Gero’s plight was made immeasur-ably worse later in the evening whenHungarian state security (AVH) forces,acting without authorization, openedfire on unarmed demonstrators outsidethe main radio station in Budapest whowere seeking to enter the building tobroadcast their demands. The shootingsprecipitated a chaotic rebellion, whichwas much too large for the Hungarianstate security organs to handle on theirown. Soviet “advisers” and militarycommanders in Hungary had been try-ing since early October to convinceHungarian officials that stringent secu-rity precautions were needed to copewith growing unrest; but, as one of thetop Soviet officers later reported, “theleaders of the [Hungarian] party andmembers of the [Hungarian] govern-ment did not adopt the measures calledfor by the urgency of the situation.Many of them were simply incapableof evaluating the state of things realis-tically.”72 As a result, the violent up-heavals on the evening of 23 Octoberquickly overwhelmed the Hungarianpolice and security forces and causedwidespread panic and near-paralysisamong senior Hungarian officials.

The Intial Soviet Intervention inHungary

Until very recently, nothing wasknown about decision-making in Mos-cow on the evening of 23 October 1956,when the first reports came in about theHungarian revolution. Some gaps in thestory persist, but a reasonable accountcan be pieced together on the basis ofnew sources, including the Malinnotes.73 It is now known that despitethe growing turmoil in Budapest, Gerodid not even mention what was goingon when he spoke by phone withKhrushchev on the evening of the 23rd.Gero’s evasiveness during that conver-

sation is hard to explain. By that pointhe had already transmitted an appeal forurgent military assistance to the mili-tary attache at the Soviet embassy, so itis unclear why he would not want toraise the matter directly withKhrushchev. Gero’s behavior in the twomonths prior to the revolution, when hechose to be out of the country at criticalmoments, was odd in itself; but his re-action on 23 October seems even morepeculiar.

Despite this strange twist, informa-tion about the rebellion quickly madeits way to Moscow. When the Sovietattache received Gero’s request, he im-mediately passed it on to Andropov,who telephoned the commander of So-viet troops in Hungary, GeneralLashchenko. Lashchenko respondedthat he could not comply with the re-quest without explicit authorizationfrom political leaders. Andropov thencabled Gero’s appeal directly to Mos-cow, which prompted Khrushchev tocontact Gero by phone for the secondtime that evening. Khrushchev urgedGero to send a written request for helpto the CPSU Presidium, but the Sovietleader soon realized, after the brief con-versation ended, that events in Budapestwere moving too fast for him to waituntil he received a formal Hungarianrequest (which, incidentally, did notarrive until five days later).74 A SovietPresidium meeting had already beenscheduled for the 23rd to discuss othermatters, and Khrushchev abruptlychanged the agenda to focus on the situ-ation in Hungary.

The newly declassified notes fromthe 23 October meeting show that theCPSU Presidium could not reach aunanimous decision on whether to sendin troops.75 Khrushchev and all but oneof the other participants strongly sup-ported the introduction of Soviet forces,but a key Presidium member, AnastasMikoyan, opposed the decision, argu-ing that “the Hungarians themselveswill restore order on their own. Weshould try political measures, and onlythen send in troops.” Despite the pro-intervention consensus among all theother participants, Mikoyan held firmin his opposition. The Presidium there-fore had to adopt its decision without

unanimity, an unprecedented step forsuch an important matter. The Pre-sidium also decided to send Mikoyanand Suslov to Budapest along with theKGB chief, Ivan Serov, to provide on-the-scene reports, following up on thetasks they had accomplished in Hungaryearlier in the year (see above). In themeantime, Khrushchev authorized So-viet defense minister Zhukov to “rede-ploy Soviet units into Budapest to as-sist Hungarian troops and state securityforces in the restoration of public or-der.”76 Khrushchev’s directive waspromptly transmitted to Lashchenko bythe chief of the Soviet General Staff,Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, who speci-fied that the bulk of the Soviet troopsin Hungary were to be used in “estab-lishing control over the most importantsites in the capital and in restoring or-der,” while others were to “seal offHungary’s border with Austria.”77

Having finally received due autho-rization, Lashchenko was able to set towork almost immediately. The troopsunder his command had been prepar-ing since late July to undertake large-scale operations aimed at “upholdingand restoring public order” in Hungary(see above). In accordance with the“Volna” plan, Soviet forces in Hungaryhad been placed on increased alert inmid-October, and were brought to fullcombat alert on 19-21 October at thebehest of the Soviet General Staff.78

Hence, when the mobilization ordersarrived from Moscow on the night ofthe 23rd, the response on the groundwas swift, despite dense fog that ham-pered troop movements. By the earlymorning hours of the 24th, thousandsof soldiers from the USSR’s two mecha-nized divisions in Hungary (the SpecialCorps) had entered Budapest, wherethey established a command center atthe main building of the HungarianNational Defense Ministry. They weresoon joined by thousands of additionalSoviet troops from a mechanized divi-sion based in Romania and two divi-sions (one mechanized, one rifle) fromthe Transcarpathian Military District inUkraine.79 The combined inter-ventionary forces were placed under thecommand of General Malinin, whomaintained constant liaison with an


“emergency operational group” of some80 high-ranking officers from the So-viet General Staff and the main staffsof the Soviet ground and air forces. Alltold, some 31,500 Soviet troops, 1,130tanks and self-propelled artillery, 380armored personnel carriers, 185 air de-fense guns, and numerous other weap-ons were redeployed at short notice toBudapest and other major cities as wellas along the Austrian-Hungarian border.Two Soviet fighter divisions, totaling159 planes, were ordered to performclose air-support missions for theground forces; and two Soviet bomberdivisions, with a total of 122 aircraft,were placed on full alert at airfields inHungary and the Transcarpathian Mili-tary District.

For the task at hand, however, thismassive array of firepower was largelyirrelevant. The intervention of the So-viet Army proved almost wholly inef-fectual and even counterproductive.Gero himself acknowledged, in a phoneconversation with Soviet leaders on 24October, that “the arrival of Soviettroops into the city has had a negativeeffect on the mood of the residents.”80

Soviet armored vehicles and artillerywere sent into the clogged streets ofBudapest without adequate infantryprotection, and thus became easy tar-gets for youths wielding grenades andMolotov cocktails. Although Hungar-ian soldiers were supposed to operatealongside Soviet units, troops from theHungarian state security forces, police,and army proved incapable of offeringnecessary support, and some defectedto the side of the rebels.81 As a result,the fighting merely escalated. By mid-afternoon on the 24th, at least 25 pro-testers had been killed and more than200 had been wounded. The mountingviolence, as Mikoyan and Suslov re-ported back to Moscow, “caused furtherpanic among senior Hungarian officials,many of whom fled into undergroundbunkers that were unsuitable for anywork.”82

Early Rifts Within the Soviet Lead-ership

The Malin notes confirm that thepost-Stalin succession struggle in Mos-

cow, which was not decisively resolveduntil June 1957, had a strong effect onSoviet policy toward Hungary. As theHungarian crisis escalated, splits withinthe Soviet leadership came to the sur-face. Mikoyan and Suslov, who wereboth close to Khrushchev, had beensending a flurry of emergency cablesand reports back to Moscow from thetime they arrived in Budapest on 24October.83 These messages were dis-cussed at length by the other membersof the CPSU Presidium. At a sessionon the evening of 26 October, numer-ous members of the Presidium voicedcomplaints about Mikoyan, arguing thathe “is acting improperly and is pushingus toward capitulation.”84 The hardlineopponents of Khrushchev—notablyVyacheslav Molotov, KlimentVoroshilov, and Lazar Kaganovich—clearly were hoping to use these criti-cisms against Khrushchev himself.Khrushchev responded by defending hiscolleague: “Mikoyan is acting just ashe said he would. Cde. Mikoyan sup-ported a position of non-intervention”on 23 October. Although Khrushchevstrongly disagreed with Mikoyan’s non-interventionist stance, he was not aboutto let the verbal attacks go unanswered.

At the next session of the Pre-sidium on 28 October, Molotov andVoroshilov stepped up their cam-paign.85 Voroshilov charged thatMikoyan and Suslov were “poorly in-formed” and were “unable to carry out[their] work properly.” Molotov allegedthat Mikoyan and Suslov were provid-ing “calm reassurances” while “the situ-ation deteriorates and is gradually mov-ing toward capitulation.” Other offi-cials, including Zhukov and GeorgiiMalenkov, defended Mikoyan andSuslov, arguing that “we shouldn’t layblame for the situation on our com-rades” and that it was “unfair to con-demn [Mikoyan] right now.” These ar-guments, however, failed to deterVoroshilov from voicing even harshercomplaints: “The American secret ser-vices are more active in Hungary thanCdes. Suslov and Mikoyan are. We sent[Suslov and Mikoyan] there for noth-ing.” Khrushchev and numerous otherofficials, including Nikolai Bulganin(who initially was critical of Mikoyan),

reproached Voroshilov for his remarks,and they urged that the Presidium fo-cus on what to do next, rather than sim-ply engaging in recriminations. Anuneasy lull thus ensued. Later thatevening, when Suslov returned tempo-rarily from Budapest to give a detailedbriefing to the Presidium, Voroshilovand Molotov refrained from any explicitcriticisms.

The emergence of pronounced riftswithin the Soviet leadership, at a timewhen the Presidium needed to reach aunified position, clearly hinderedMoscow’s response to the crisis. Oneof the reasons that Soviet officials wa-vered so much during the crucial daysof 30-31 October (see below) is thatthey were aware of the domestic politi-cal repercussions of their actions.

Zig-Zags in Decision-Making

The Malin notes reveal that as thesituation in Hungary deteriorated in lateOctober, the CPSU Presidium had greatdifficulty in deciding how to respond.On 28 October, senior Hungarian offi-cials began insisting that all Soviettroops would have to be withdrawnfrom Hungary, a demand that causedalarm in Moscow. At a lengthy meet-ing of the Presidium on 28 October, allthe participants agreed that “we mustnot withdraw troops” and must instead“act decisively against the centers ofresistance.”86 They voiced dismay that“Nagy is speaking against us,” and theyexpected that Nagy’s call for the with-drawal of Soviet troops would soon befollowed by “a demand for [Soviet] ca-pitulation.” The Hungarian govern-ment’s announcement on 28 Octoberthat the recent events had been a “na-tional-democratic uprising” rather thana “counterrevolution” sparked particu-lar consternation among Soviet Pre-sidium members, who insisted that “wecannot and will not retreat.”

At the same time, Khrushchev andhis colleagues recognized that Sovietoptions were limited by the sheer paceof events, which had already resultedin the deaths of hundreds of Soviet sol-diers and Hungarian civilians. The cur-rent Hungarian leaders, Nagy and JanosKadar, were being challenged by more


radical elements in Hungary, whowanted to overthrow the existing re-gime. Although Soviet leaders weredetermined to adhere to a “firm line”and put an end to Nagy’s and Kadar’s“flip-flops,” they reluctantly agreed thatthey had little choice but to support thecurrent government and to be preparedto withdraw troops from Budapest(though not from Hungary as a whole).

By 30 October, however, the moodwithin the Soviet Presidium had takena surprising turn. All the members, in-cluding Molotov and Voroshilov, hadreached a consensus—ephemeralthough it may have been—that the So-viet Union should forgo large-scalemilitary intervention in Hungary.87

Marshal Zhukov conceded that the So-viet Union had to be ready, if necessary,to withdraw all Soviet troops from Hun-gary, viewing this as “a lesson for us inthe military-political sphere.” Othersreluctantly concurred. Khrushchev andhis colleagues were well aware that thesituation in Hungary had continued todeteriorate, and had taken on distinctlyanti-Soviet overtones. Even so, theyunanimously agreed to adopt whatKhrushchev described as “the peacefulpath—the path of troop withdrawalsand negotiations”—rather than “themilitary path, the path of occupa-tion.”88

This decision seems to have beenpredicated on an unrealistic expectationof what could be achieved by the So-viet government’s “Declaration on thePrinciples of Development and FurtherStrengthening of Friendship and Coop-eration Between the USSR and OtherSocialist Countries,” issued on 30 Oc-tober.89 A draft of the statement, pre-pared by high-ranking CPSU CentralCommittee officials, was reviewed atlength and edited by the CPSU Pre-sidium just before it was released. Thedeclaration acknowledged that Soviet-East European relations had beenplagued by “egregious mistakes” in thepast, and that Moscow had committedrampant “violations of the principle ofequality in relations between socialistcountries.” It pledged that in the futurethe Soviet Union would scrupulously“observe the full sovereignty of eachsocialist state” and reexamine the basis

for its continued troop presence in theWarsaw Pact countries (other than EastGermany), leaving open the possibilityof a partial or total withdrawal. Mostof the Presidium members seemed toview the declaration as a viable way of“extracting us from an onerous posi-tion” and of “putting an end to thebloodshed.”90 Any hopes they mayhave had, however, were quicklydashed. Had the declaration been is-sued several months earlier, it mighthave prevented all the subsequent tur-moil, but by the time the statement wasbroadcast over Hungarian radio on 30October, events in Hungary had alreadyeluded Soviet control. Moscow’s ver-bal promises were no longer sufficientto contain either the wave of popularunrest or the actions of Nagy’s govern-ment. Although the declaration causeda stir in most of the East-bloc countries,its effect in Hungary was limited. Manyof the insurgents were determined toachieve their goals immediately, ratherthan settling for ill-defined negotiationsthat, once under way, would be subjectto delay or derailment.

Nevertheless, even if Soviet hopesabout the declaration were misplaced,the decision to forgo intervention wasstill remarkable at this late stage. Itsuggests that for a brief while—a verybrief while—the Soviet Presidium ac-tually may have been willing to acceptthe collapse of Communism in Hun-gary.

The unanimity of the Presidium’sdecision to eschew military force be-lied the inherent fragility of that posi-tion, especially after Khrushchev andhis colleagues realized that the 30 Oc-tober declaration would not have thedesired effect. Ominous reports fromHungary, including cables and securephone messages from Mikoyan andSuslov that were much more pessimis-tic than their previous dispatches, con-tinued to flow in. Earlier in the crisis,Mikoyan and Suslov had hoped thatthey could induce Nagy to restore or-der and achieve a satisfactory politicalsolution, but by the end of October theyhad markedly changed their tone. In aphone message to Moscow on 30 Oc-tober, they warned that the uprisingcould be ended only through the use of

force and that the Hungarian army prob-ably was not up to the task:

The political situation in the country,rather than improving, is getting worse.. . . The peaceful liquidation of the re-maining centers [of resistance] can ef-fectively be excluded. We will try toliquidate them using the armed forcesof the Hungarians. But there is a greatdanger in this: The Hungarian army hasadopted a “wait-and-see” position. Ourmilitary advisers say that the attitude ofHungarian officers and generals towardSoviet officers has deteriorated in recentdays, and that there is no longer the trustwhich existed earlier. It may well bethat if Hungarian units are used againstthe uprising, they will go over to the sideof the insurgents, and it will then benecessary for the Soviet armed forcesto resume military operations.91

Subsequent messages from Mikoyanand Suslov were gloomier still, in partbecause they sensed that their worstfears were coming true. Within hoursafter their initial message on the 30th,they learned that an angry mob hadlaunched a bloody attack on theBudapest party committee’s headquar-ters in Republic Square. The grisly re-prisals that some of the attackers car-ried out against disarmed AVH troopscame as a shock not only to Mikoyanand Suslov, but to most Hungarians (in-cluding many rebel leaders, whostrongly criticized the actions and ap-pealed for calm). The attack causedeven greater alarm in Moscow, wherescenes of the violence were being fea-tured on newsreels when the CPSU Pre-sidium met on 31 October. Equally dis-concerting was the very fact that themob had been able to seize the build-ing. Three Hungarian army tanks,which had been sent to help the defend-ers of the site, ended up defecting to theinsurgents, just as Mikoyan and Suslovhad feared. The siege in RepublicSquare proved to be an isolated case(and actually helped stabilize the situa-tion a good deal by spurring both thegovernment and the rebels into seekinga peaceful settlement), but amid thegeneral turmoil in Budapest at the time,it initially seemed—at least fromMoscow’s perspective—to portend the“deterioration” that Mikoyan and


Suslov had been predicting.Concerns about the internal situa-

tion in Hungary were reinforced by thelatest news about international devel-opments, particularly the start of Frenchand British military operations in theMiddle East and the increasing signsthat unrest in Hungary was spilling overinto other Warsaw Pact countries. Eachof these factors is important enough towarrant a separate discussion below.Not only were the Suez Crisis and thefears of a spillover crucial in their ownright; they also magnified the impor-tance of Hungary’s status in the War-saw Pact. The prospect of an “imperi-alist” victory in the Middle East and ofgrowing ferment within the bloc madeit all the more essential to keep Hun-gary within the Soviet camp; but on thisscore, too, there seemed increasinggrounds for pessimism. By late Octo-ber it was clear that momentum forHungary’s withdrawal from the WarsawPact was rapidly building. One of themembers of Nagy’s new “inner cabi-net,” Bela Kovacs, explicitly called fora “neutral Hungary” and the end ofHungary’s “ties to military blocs” in aspeech he delivered on 30 October.92

That same day, Nagy himself endorsedthe goal of leaving the Warsaw Pact, andhe opened talks about the matter (andabout the withdrawal of all Soviettroops from Hungary) with Mikoyanand Suslov, who promptly informedtheir colleagues in Moscow about thediscussions.93 It seems likely thatNagy’s expressed desire to renounceHungarian membership in the WarsawPact was one of the factors that inducedthe CPSU Presidium on 31 October toreverse its decision of the previous day.To be sure, Nagy had spoken manytimes in earlier years (especially afterhe was abruptly removed from powerin 1955) about the desirability of Hun-garian neutrality, but his decision toraise the issue with Mikoyan and Suslovat this delicate stage must have comeas a jolt in Moscow.94 Once Sovietleaders were confronted by the starkprospect of Hungary’s departure fromthe Warsaw Pact, they realized howmuch their influence in Hungary hadwaned.

The confluence of all these circum-

stances was bound to spur a reassess-ment of Moscow’s non-interventioniststance. Khrushchev later recalled thathe regretted the 30 October decisionalmost as soon as the Presidium adoptedit.95 At short notice on 31 October, heconvened another emergency meetingof the Presidium to reconsider the wholematter.96 The notes from the meetingreveal that Khrushchev was not the onlyone who had misgivings about the pre-vious day’s decision. With one excep-tion, all the participants strongly en-dorsed Khrushchev’s view that “wemust revise our assessment and mustnot withdraw our troops from Hungaryand Budapest. We must take the initia-tive in restoring order in Hungary.” Theonly dissenting voice was MaksimSaburov, who argued that “afteryesterday’s session this discussion is allpointless. [Full-scale intervention] willmerely vindicate NATO.” His asser-tions were disputed by Molotov andnumerous others, who insisted (not en-tirely convincingly) that the previousday’s decision had been “only a com-promise.” After further persuasion,Saburov finally came around to supportthe interventionist position.

With that, the Presidium unani-mously approved the full-scale use ofmilitary force “to help the working classin Hungary rebuff the counterrevolu-tion.”97 This action brought an end tothe long period of indecision and wa-vering in Soviet policy.

Even so, the reversal on 31 Octo-ber should not detract from the impor-tance of the consensus on the 30th. TheMalin notes suggest there was a chance,if only a very slender one, that theevents of 1989 could actually have oc-curred 33 years earlier.

The Effect of the Suez Crisis

On 26 July 1956 the new Egyptianleader, Gamel Abdel Nasser, announcedthat he was nationalizing the Suez Ca-nal Company. Over the next fewmonths the British, French, and U.S.governments tried to persuade (and thencompel) Nasser to reverse his decision,but these diplomatic efforts were of noavail. In late October, Israel beganmobilizing its army, and on the 29th

Israeli troops moved into Egyptian ter-ritory, an action that was broadly coor-dinated with France and Great Britain.On 30 October the French and Britishgovernments sent an ultimatum toNasser — which the Egyptian leaderpromptly rejected — and early the nextday they joined the Israeli incursions bylaunching air raids against Egyptian cit-ies and imposing a naval blockade.98

Western analysts have long speculatedabout the role of the Suez Crisis in So-viet decision-making vis-a-vis Hungary,but until recently there was no real wayto know. The new evidence, particu-larly the Malin notes, does not resolveall the ambiguities, but it does shed agood deal of light on the matter.

On the whole, the Malin notes andother new materials indicate that theSuez Crisis gave Soviet leaders a pow-erful incentive to resolve the situationin Hungary as soon and as decisivelyas possible. For one thing, the pro-longed diplomatic wrangling over Suezinduced the Soviet Presidium to be waryof becoming embroiled in lengthy po-litical disputes the way the French andthe British had. Khrushchev raised thispoint at the Presidium’s meeting on 28October, the day before military actionbegan in the Middle East: “The Englishand French are in a real mess[zavarivayut kashu] in Egypt. Weshouldn’t get caught in the same com-pany.”99 By this, he evidently meantthat if the Presidium allowed the Hun-garian crisis to drag on indefinitely,things would only get worse and theSoviet Union would be left facing thesame intractable dilemma that theFrench and British were encounteringin Suez.

The start of fighting in the MiddleEast on 29-31 October, which leftMoscow’s political ally Egypt in a pre-carious state, caused even greater com-plications for Soviet leaders. Theyworried that a failure to act decisivelyin Hungary would compound the dam-age to Soviet foreign policy. This fearwas particularly acute after the Frenchand British launched their military op-erations in the early morning hours of31 October. When the Soviet Presidiummet later that day to reach a final deci-sion about Hungary, reports were al-


ready flooding into Moscow about thespectacular “successes” that the French,British, and Israeli forces were suppos-edly achieving. It soon turned out thattheir joint military efforts got boggeddown (for want of U.S. support) and astalemate ensued, but Khrushchev andhis colleagues could not have foreseenthat when they met on 31 October be-cause they automatically assumed—ina classic case of misperception—thatthe United States would back the alliedincursions. Khrushchev himself ex-pressed the dominant sentiment at thePresidium meeting:

If we depart from Hungary, it will givea great boost to the Americans, English,and French—the imperialists. They willperceive it as weakness on our part andwill go onto the offensive. We wouldthen be exposing the weakness of ourpositions. Our party will not accept itif we do this. To Egypt [the imperial-ists] will then add Hungary.100

Khrushchev’s subsequent commentsabout Suez, especially at a Presidiummeeting on 4 November, show that hebelieved the decision to intervene inHungary would help, rather than hurt,Moscow’s policy vis-a-vis Suez. Thedistraction posed by Hungary, he im-plied, had prevented an effective re-sponse in the Middle East. Now that afirm decision to suppress the uprisinghad been adopted, the Soviet Unionwould be able to “take a more activepart in the assistance to Egypt.”101

In another respect as well, Sovietpolicy in Hungary was linked—if onlyinadvertently—to the Suez Crisis. Thesudden conflict diverted internationalattention from Poland and Hungary tothe Middle East. Because the UnitedStates refused to support the Israeli andFrench-British military operations, thecrisis generated a deep split among theWestern powers at the very momentwhen they needed to show unity in re-sponse to the events in Hungary. Theintra-NATO rift engendered by the SuezCrisis was not a critical factor inMoscow’s response to the Hungarianuprising—after all, the rift was not yetfully evident when the Soviet Presidiummet for its fateful session on 31 Octo-ber—but it did, as Khrushchev pointed

out at the time, provide a “favorablemoment” for the Soviet Union to un-dertake a large-scale military operationin Hungary.102 The French and Brit-ish governments, he noted on 2 Novem-ber, “are bogged down in Suez, and weare stuck in Hungary.”103

The invasion of Hungary undoubt-edly would have been approved even ifthere had been no Suez Crisis, but So-viet fears of “imperialist” successes inthe Middle East and the sudden emer-gence of a divisive row within NATOclearly expedited Moscow’s decision.

Fears of a Spillover

New evidence confirms that Sovietleaders feared the Hungarian revolutionmight spread into other East Europeancountries and possibly into the USSRitself, causing the whole Communistbloc to unravel. Warnings to that effecthad been pouring in throughout the cri-sis from the Soviet embassy inBudapest, from KGB representatives inHungary, and from three former Hun-garian leaders (Rakosi, AndrasHegedus, and Istvan Bata) who had fledto Moscow after being ousted. Con-cerns that the Hungarian revolutionwould spill into other Warsaw Pactcountries were heightened by a seriesof intelligence reports from neighbor-ing Romania and Czechoslovakia.Khrushchev later recalled he hadlearned from KGB sources that “theresidents of the border areas in Hungaryhad begun seeking contacts with [resi-dents in] the border areas of Czecho-slovakia and Romania to gain directbacking from them.”104 Archival ma-terials fully bear out his recollections.

From Romania, Soviet leaders re-ceived word that students in Bucharestand in a large number of Transylvaniancities (Cluj, Tirgu Mures, Timisoara,Baia Mare, and Oradea, among others)were holding demonstrations in supportof the Hungarian revolution, and thatdisturbances were spreading around thecountry. As early as 24 October, thePolitburo of the Romanian Workers’Party (RWP) felt the need to imposeemergency security measures and visaregulations along the border with Hun-gary, effectively sealing it off to all traf-

fic.105 The Romanian authorities alsoestablished rigorous, comprehensivescreening of mail and publications ar-riving from and going to Hungary. Asa further precaution, the RWP Politburoordered the state security forces(Securitate) to reinforce their defensesaround key buildings, including trans-port stations, communications andbroadcasting facilities, university com-plexes, and Communist party and gov-ernment offices. Leaves and furloughsfor soldiers and state security troopswere cancelled.106 Over the next fewdays, Romanian leaders also took stepsto alleviate economic grievances andboost living standards, but overallRomania’s efforts to prevent a spilloverfrom Hungary were geared predomi-nantly toward increased vigilance andpreparations for a large-scale crack-down.107

Despite these precautions, the Ro-manian authorities were soon con-fronted by renewed “agitation and dem-onstrations by student groups and hos-tile elements” in many parts of the coun-try, especially Transylvania andBucharest.108 Officials who were dis-patched to Cluj reported scenes of“mass confusion and unrest.”109 Anunofficial student movement, formed atBolyai University on 25 October, at-tracted hundreds of members andgained support from much of the fac-ulty, including many who belonged tothe RWP. Romanian officials in the areaemphasized that “party members ofHungarian origin” were especiallylikely to succumb to “hostile” elements,and that ethnic Hungarian studentsthroughout Transylvania were “singingHorthyite and chauvinistic songs.”110

Most worrisome of all were reports thatyoung people in Baia Mare and Careiwere “intent on joining the Hungarianarmy,” and that Romanian army troopsand security forces in the border regionwere being swayed by the demonstra-tors’ “tendentious” and “inimical” pro-paganda.111 To combat the growingunrest, the RWP Politburo on 30 Octo-ber set up a “general command staff,”consisting of four senior Politburomembers (Emil Bodnaras, NicolaeCeausescu, Alexandru Draghici, andLeontin Salajan), who were given ex-


traordinary powers, including the rightto issue shoot-to-kill orders and to de-clare a state of emergency.112 Thecommand staff was successful in itstask, but the very fact that this sort ofmeasure was needed was a disconcert-ing reminder to Soviet leaders that theevents in Hungary, if left unchecked,could prove contagious.

Equally disturbing reports flowedinto Moscow from Czechoslovakiaabout student demonstrations inBratislava and other cities amidst grow-ing “hostility and mistrust toward theSoviet Union.”113 The Czechoslovakauthorities denied most of these reports,but they acknowledged that the eventsin Hungary were having “deleteriouspsychological effects” and creating a“hostile, anti-socialist mood” amongsome of the Czechoslovak troops whohad been sent to reinforce the 560-kmborder with Hungary.114 SeniorCzechoslovak military officials warnedthat the confusion might even “temptthe counterrevolutionary forces [inHungary] to penetrate into our countryand stir up a rebellion in Slovak terri-tory,” especially in the southern areasinhabited mainly by ethnic Hungar-ians.115 They also warned that the dan-ger would increase “if Soviet and Hun-garian units are withdrawn” from north-ern Hungary, since “it is unlikely that[Czechoslovakia’s] existing combatforces will be enough to prevent incur-sions by counterrevolutionarygroups.”116 The risk of a spillover intoCzechoslovakia was explicitly cited bySoviet leaders when they approved afull-scale invasion: “If we don’t em-bark on a decisive path, things inCzechoslovakia will collapse.”117 Itis unclear whether the actual danger wasas great as they feared, but the impor-tant thing at the time was the percep-tion in both Moscow and Prague that afailure to act would have ominous con-sequences.

The growing concerns about aspillover were shared in East Europeancountries further away from Hungary,notably East Germany. Initially, theEast German leader, Walter Ulbricht,mainly feared that the return of Nagymight presage a similar turn of eventsin the GDR.118 Once the Hungarian

revolution broke out, apprehension inEast Berlin rapidly increased. A topEast German official, Otto Grotewohl,warned that “the events in Hungary andPoland show that the enemy looks forweak spots in the socialist camp, seek-ing to break it apart.”119 He and otherEast German leaders were acutelyaware that the GDR itself was one ofthese “weak spots.” Soviet officials,too, were worried that developments inHungary could undermine their positionin East Germany, which by this pointwas closely tied to Ulbricht. Soviet for-eign minister Dmitrii Shepilov warnedthat certain elements in East Germanymight exploit the crisis to launch a cam-paign against the “Ulbricht clique.”120

Quite apart from the threat of aspillover into Eastern Europe, Sovietleaders were aware of serious problemsin the USSR itself. The inception ofde-Stalinization had spawned numerousinstances of public disorder and unrest.Mass disturbances erupted in Tbilisi andother Georgian cities in early March1956, as students, workers, and intel-lectuals joined together to protest thegrowing criticism of “our great leaderStalin.”121 These demonstrationsmarked the first time that “anti-Sovietactivities” had occurred in Georgiasince Communist rule was established,and Soviet leaders responded by impos-ing martial law.122 Very different chal-lenges arose elsewhere in the SovietUnion, where intellectuals and someother groups took advantage of the op-portunity to voice long-suppressedgrievances. Criticism of Stalin and ofthe “cult of personality” opened the wayfor broader complaints about the natureof the Soviet regime itself. Soviet lead-ers tried to regain control of the de-Stalinization campaign by issuing adecree that specified what was permis-sible and what was not, but this docu-ment failed to put an end to dissidents’activities.123 Thus, when the revolu-tion began in Hungary, Khrushchev andhis colleagues were concerned that in-tellectuals in the Soviet Union might tryto provoke similar disturbances athome. The Soviet authorities saw dis-turbing parallels between the burgeon-ing dissidents’ movement in the SovietUnion and the activities earlier in the

year of the Petofi Circle in Hungary.They feared that the use of repressivemeasures might not be enough to restoretight discipline, just as Rakosi’s andGero’s efforts had failed in Hungary.124

These concerns seemed to gain cre-dence when protests cropped up bothbefore and after 4 November at highereducational institutions in the USSR,including Moscow State University(MGU). State Security (KGB) troopswere dispatched to MGU to arrest stu-dents and faculty who had staged ral-lies “denouncing the Soviet militaryintervention” and had put up “anti-So-viet slogans and posters.”125 The KGBalso cracked down harshly on demon-strations in Yaroslavl and other citieswhere students organized demonstra-tions and carried banners demanding thewithdrawal of Soviet troops from Hun-gary.126 These incidents underlined theconcerns that had prompted the CPSUPresidium’s decision on 4 November to“purge all higher educational institu-tions of unsavory elements.”127 To de-ter further protests, the authorities or-dered the arrests of other presumed dis-sidents in late 1956 and 1957, but somesenior party officials wanted to under-take much more drastic action, launch-ing a crackdown reminiscent of theStalin era.128 Their proposals werenever formally adopted, but the distur-bances in 1956 were enough for Sovietleaders to feel that the invasion of Hun-gary had narrowly averted a muchworse spillover into the USSR.

A number of Western analysts,such as Charles Gati, had long sus-pected that concerns about a spilloverfrom Hungary were one of the majorfactors in Soviet decision-making dur-ing the 1956 crisis.129 The new evi-dence has amply corroborated that view.

Mikoyan’s Continued Objections

The pro-intervention consensus on31 October was formed without the par-ticipation of Mikoyan and Suslov, whowere still in Budapest. When the twoofficials returned to Moscow on theevening of the 31st to present their con-clusions, they discovered that the mat-ter had already been settled withoutthem. Suslov evidently agreed with the


decision, but Mikoyan was dismayed byit, opposing it just as strongly as he hadresisted the original decision on 23 Oc-tober. Mikoyan pleaded with Khrush-chev to call another meeting of theCPSU Presidium to reconsider the mat-ter, but Khrushchev refused. Accord-ing to Khrushchev’s memoirs—whichseem eminently plausible on thispoint—Mikoyan even threatened tocommit suicide if Khrushchev did notreconvene the Presidium.130 Khrush-chev responded that it would be the“height of stupidity” to behave so “ir-rationally,” and he set off to take careof the final political and military prepa-rations for the invasion. Had it not takenthe CPSU Presidium so long and beenso politically costly to reach a final de-cision about Hungary, Khrushchevmight have been willing to comply withMikoyan’s request; but Khrushchevexplained to Mikoyan that he was loathto “resume fruitless discussions” and“destroy our whole plan” now that “ev-erything has been decided and a time-table has finally been laid out.”131

Despite these explanations,Mikoyan remained deeply upset by thedecision, as he indicated at the Pre-sidium meeting on 1 November (whenKhrushchev had already headed off toBrest to inform the Polish leadership ofthe decision).132 Mikoyan insisted that“the use of force now will not help any-thing,” and that “we should enter intonegotiations instead.” Although heagreed that “we cannot let Hungary es-cape from our camp,” he argued that itwas still possible to wait 10-15 days tosee how the situation would unfold: “Ifthings stabilize by then, we can decidewhether to pull out our troops.” Theother participants disagreed withMikoyan, but he held his ground, argu-ing that an invasion was “inappropriatein the current circumstances.” In pub-lic, however, Mikoyan did not displayany qualms. The first time thatMikoyan’s objections were revealedwas in Khrushchev’s memoirs, and theMalin notes fully bear out Khrushchev’saccount.

Interestingly enough, in later yearsMikoyan tried to gloss over his anti-in-terventionist stance in October 1956,arguing that the decision to send in

troops was unanimous.133 Technically,this assertion was correct because theparticipants in the 31 October meetingdid indeed approve the decision unani-mously. What Mikoyan failed to pointout is that if he had been present, thedecision would not have been unani-mous, just as he dissented from theoriginal decision to send in troops onthe night of 23-24 October. In spite ofthis subsequent backtracking,Mikoyan’s position in October-Novem-ber 1956 was in fact both courageousand consistent.

Janos Kadar’s Trip to Moscow

It had previously been known thatJanos Kadar and Ferenc Munnich werespirited to Moscow aboard a Sovietmilitary aircraft on the evening of 1November, and were brought back withSoviet troops after 4 November to beinstalled as the prime minister anddeputy prime minister of a “ProvisionalRevolutionary Workers’ and Peasants’Government.” Nothing was known,however, about what Kadar was doingin Moscow on 2 and 3 November. Al-most all Western accounts of the Hun-garian crisis have assumed that Kadarwas duplicitous and supportive of So-viet military intervention from the out-set. The Malin notes provide a morecomplex picture, offering the first solidevidence of Kadar’s and Munnich’sroles in the establishment of a post-in-vasion regime.

Both Kadar and Munnich took partin sessions of the CPSU Presidium on2 and 3 November, though Kadar didmost of the talking.134 (On the 2ndthey were joined by another Hungarianofficial, Istvan Bata, one of four seniorfigures who had been transported toMoscow several days earlier, on theevening of 28 October. On the 3rd, theywere joined by Imre Horvath, who tookdetailed notes of the session.) On 2November, Khrushchev and Malenkovwere still away conferring with the lead-ers of other Warsaw Pact countries andwith Tito, but the rest of the Presidiummembers met at length with Kadar andMunnich. On 3 November, Khrushchevand Malenkov joined in as well.

The notes from the two sessions

indicate that even though Kadar hadbeen willing to travel surreptitiously toMoscow at a critical moment, he did notfavor large-scale Soviet military inter-vention in Hungary. Nor did he arrivein Moscow intent on becoming the headof a new, post-invasion government. Atthe session on 2 November, Kadarwarned that “the use of military forcewill be destructive and lead to blood-shed.” Such an outcome, he added,would “erode the authority of the so-cialist countries” and cause “the moraleof the Communists [in Hungary] to bereduced to zero.”135 The next day,Kadar’s tone had changed somewhat,though not drastically. He highlightedthe existing government’s failure to pre-vent the “killing of Communists,” andsaid he “agreed with [Soviet officials]”that “you cannot surrender a socialistcountry to counterrevolution.” Kadaralso asserted that “the correct course ofaction [in Hungary] is to form a revo-lutionary government.” But even then,he implied that a Soviet invasion wouldonly make things worse—”The with-drawal of Soviet troops from Hungarywill be of great significance”—andwarned that “the [revolutionary] gov-ernment must not be puppetlike; theremust be a [popular] base for its activi-ties and support among workers.”136

In this respect, his views differedsharply from those of Bata, who insistedthat “order must be restored through amilitary dictatorship” imposed by theSoviet Army.137

It is also interesting that even onthe 3rd, Kadar did not portray the re-cent events in Hungary in a uniformlynegative light. Although he claimedthat “Nagy’s policy has counterrevolu-tionary aspects” and that “hour by hourthe situation [in Hungary] is movingrightward,” he urged the Soviet leader-ship to recognize that the uprising hadstemmed from genuine popular discon-tent and that “the HWP has been com-promised in the eyes of the overwhelm-ing masses.” He argued that “the en-tire nation took part in the movement”to “get rid of the Rakosi clique.”138

Kadar’s perspective at this time was farmore nuanced and insightful than therigid formulas adopted by his govern-ment in December 1956, which char-


acterized the whole uprising as no morethan a “counterrevolution” instigatedand supported by the West.

One other surprising aspect ofKadar’s remarks is that he made littleeffort to gloss over his own actions orto downplay the negative influence ofSoviet policy. He gave a detailed ac-count of the meetings of the Hungarian“inner cabinet” on 1 November, notingthat he “was a supporter of the view thatno sorts of steps should be taken with-out having spoken with Andropov.”This position, however, did not reallydistinguish Kadar from Nagy, who him-self had summoned Andropov to theevening session for urgent consultationsabout Soviet troop movements.139

Moreover, Kadar acknowledged thatwhen the consultations were over, hejoined the other members of Nagy’scabinet in voting for the declaration ofneutrality, the appeal to the United Na-tions, and the resolution demanding animmediate withdrawal of Soviet troopsfrom Hungary. On both the 2nd and3rd of November, Kadar spoke harshlyabout past Soviet “mistakes” in Hun-gary, and was far more critical aboutRakosi than about Nagy. His commentson this topic were echoed by Munnich,who argued that the fundamental“source of anti-Soviet sentiments” inHungary was the population’s “cer-tainty that the [Communist] regime ex-ists and is preserved only through thesupport of the USSR.”

None of this is to imply thatKadar’s stance in early November wasgreatly beneficial to Hungary. Kadarwas hardly naive, and the fact that hewas willing to come to Moscow sug-gests that he advocated more forcefulSoviet action. Nevertheless, the Malinnotes do not bear out the notion thatKadar was a quisling from the very start.He took on that function after 4 Novem-ber, but it was not the role he wanted orenvisaged when he arrived in Moscow.

The Invasion

The CPSU Presidium’s abrupt shiftin favor of all-out intervention on 31October, after more than a week of vac-illation, left many political and militarytasks to be carried out. Shortly before

the Presidium meeting, Khrushchev hadspoken by phone with Gomulka, and thetwo men had arranged to meet the nextday (1 November) in Brest, along theSoviet-Polish border. The Presidiumdesignated Malenkov and Molotov toaccompany Khrushchev to Brest. ThePresidium also authorized Khrushchevand Malenkov to hold negotiations withTito so they could try to gain at leasttacit support from the Yugoslav leader.In addition, the Presidium approvedKhrushchev’s suggestion that they “in-form the Chinese comrades, the Czechs,the Romanians, and the Bulgarians”about the upcoming invasion.140

When the Presidium meeting ad-journed, Khrushchev first contacted LiuShaoqi and other senior Chinese offi-cials who had been in Moscow for con-sultations since 23 October. The mem-bers of the Chinese delegation, who hadkept in close touch with Mao Zedongduring their visit, were getting set toreturn to Beijing on the 31st.Khrushchev wanted to inform themimmediately about the new decision,rather than having them find out aboutit second-hand back in China. The en-tire CPSU Presidium traveled toVnukovo Airport on the 31st to meetwith the departing Chinese officials andsmooth over any ruffled feathers.141

Khrushchev was concerned that LiuShaoqi might be upset when he learnedabout the sudden change in Sovietpolicy. During consultations with theSoviet leadership over the previousweek, Liu Shaoqi had consistently ex-pressed Mao’s view that the “workingclass of Hungary” must be permitted to“regain control of the situation and putdown the uprising on its own,” withoutfurther Soviet interference. As late as30 October, the Chinese delegates hadcalled for Soviet relations with all othersocialist states, including Hungary, tobe based on the five principles ofPancha Shila: mutual respect for sov-ereignty and territorial integrity; non-aggression; non-interference in internalaffairs; equality and mutual benefit; andpeaceful coexistence.142 The Sovietdecision on 30 October seemed to be infull conformity with these principles,but the volte-face on 31 October raiseddoubts about Chinese reactions.

It turned out, however, that thetalks with Liu Shaoqi were much lessonerous than expected. AfterKhrushchev explained why the Sovietleadership had reversed its position, theChinese delegates condoned the changeand promised to go over the matter care-fully with Mao. Even before the del-egation returned to China, Mao’s ownview of the situation was graduallychanging as a result of intelligence re-ports and diplomatic cables flowing intoBeijing. It is unclear precisely whenMao shifted unambiguously in favor ofthe invasion, but the last-minute con-sultations at Vnukovo Airport may wellhave been decisive in allowing the So-viet Union to gain strong Chinese back-ing.143

With that task accomplished,Khrushchev and Malenkov were ableto set off a few hours later for their rapidseries of top-secret meetings with lead-ers of the other Warsaw Pact coun-tries.144 At the first such meeting, inBrest, Khrushchev and Malenkov werejoined by Molotov for talks with a Pol-ish delegation consisting of Gomulka,Jozef Cyrankiewicz, and EdwardOchab. This meeting was regarded asparticularly sensitive and unpredictablebecause the political situation in Polandwas still so turbulent. The three Sovietnegotiators hoped to defuse most ofGomulka’s objections, but their effortsin this regard were largely unsuccess-ful. Although the Polish leader agreedthat the “counterrevolution” in Hungaryhad to be suppressed, he strongly ob-jected to the use of Soviet military force.Khrushchev soon realized that he wouldnot be able to convince Gomulka thatdirect intervention was necessary, andthe Soviet leader was not even sure bythe end of the meeting whetherGomulka would refrain from publiclycriticizing the action.145

Khrushchev’s concerns were notentirely unfounded. Shortly afterGomulka and his colleagues returned toWarsaw, they convened an emergencysession of the PZPR Politburo, which“expressed opposition to the USSR’sarmed intervention in Hungary.”146

The Polish Politburo also endorsed thepublication of a statement affirming thatthe crisis should be resolved “by the


Hungarian people alone and not by for-eign intervention.” This statement ap-peared (in slightly modified form) in thePZPR newspaper Trybuna Ludu the fol-lowing day.147 Moreover, on 2 No-vember, Gomulka publicly offered War-saw as a forum for Soviet-Hungariannegotiations, which he (and Imre Nagy)hoped would “lead to the settlement ofproblems in bilateral relations.”148

When Gomulka’s last-ditch effortsproved futile and the invasion began asscheduled on 4 November, the Polishleader briefly considered voicing his ob-jections openly. After further thought,however, Gomulka decided that heshould maintain a discreet public stanceto avoid undue antagonism with Mos-cow.149 At his behest, the PZPR Po-litburo instructed the Polish envoy at theUnited Nations to vote against a U.S.-sponsored resolution condemning theSoviet invasion.150 Gomulka re-mained distinctly uneasy about thewhole matter, but he kept his reserva-tions out of public view. To that extent,the Soviet consultations with Polishofficials in Brest on 1 November werea qualified success. Had Gomulka notbeen informed at all about the invasionbeforehand, he might well have beeninclined to adopt a much less accom-modating position when Soviet troopsmoved in.

The Soviet consultations after theBrest meeting went far more smoothly.Molotov returned to Moscow on the 1stso that he could inform the other mem-bers of the CPSU Presidium aboutGomulka’s reaction. In the meantime,Khrushchev and Malenkov traveled toBucharest, where they spoke with topRomanian, Czechoslovak, and Bulgar-ian officials. Not surprisingly, the del-egations from all three East Europeancountries vehemently endorsed the So-viet decision. The Czechoslovak leader,Antonin Novotny, and the Romanianleader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, reem-phasized the concerns they had beenexpressing over the past several daysabout the growing spillover from therevolution. They were joined by theBulgarian leader, Todor Zhivkov, in ar-guing that “it is essential to adopt ev-ery appropriate measure, including mili-tary intervention, as soon as possible”

to combat “imperialist intrigues” and“preserve the system of people’s de-mocracy in Hungary.”151

On 2 November, Khrushchev andMalenkov flew to Yugoslavia, wherethey met with Tito at his villa on theAdriatic island of Brioni from 7 p.m.until 5 a.m. the following day.152

When the two Soviet leaders were enroute to Brioni, they were apprehen-sive—particularly after the recent ses-sion in Brest with Gomulka—that Tito,too, would strongly oppose the Sovietdecision; but their concerns proved tobe unwarranted. During the ten hoursof talks, Khrushchev declined to pro-vide Tito with a precise timetable forthe invasion, but he made clear thatSoviet troops would soon be interven-ing in Hungary to “defend socialism”and “halt the killing of honest Commu-nists.” The Yugoslav leader, for his part,left no doubt that he agreed with theSoviet decision, if only because it wasthe sole remaining way to “crush thecounterrevolution” and “prevent therestoration of capitalism in Hungary.”Tito’s earlier support for Nagy had es-sentially disappeared by this point.153

When the question came up of whoshould be brought in to replace Nagy,Khrushchev mentioned that JanosKadar and Ferenc Munnich were theleading candidates, with a decided pref-erence for the latter. Tito and otherYugoslav officials at the talks (EdvardKardelj, Aleksander Rankovic, and theYugoslav ambassador to Moscow,Veljko Micunovic) argued that it wouldbe better to go with Kadar because ofhis credentials as a prisoner during theStalin-era purges, and the Soviet lead-ers readily agreed. Tito also urgedKhrushchev and Malenkov to be surethat the new “Provisional Workers’ andPeasants’ Government” would con-demn the Rakosi era and adopt reformsneeded to win popular support.Khrushchev assented to these propos-als (except for Tito’s suggestion that thenewly-formed workers’ councils inHungary be preserved), and in returnTito pledged to use his special contactswith Geza Losonczy (a close aide toNagy) to try to persuade Nagy to stepdown immediately, before Soviet troopsentered. That way, the existing Hun-

garian government would collapse, andthe Soviet intervention would not ap-pear to be directed against a specificleader.154 It turned out that Tito wasunable or unwilling to fulfill his prom-ise—a failure that caused great irrita-tion in Moscow later on—butKhrushchev did not foresee that whenhe left Brioni.155 Even if he had fore-seen it, the very fact that Tito was sofirmly supportive of the upcoming in-vasion was enough for Khrushchev toregard the talks as a “pleasant sur-prise.”156

On the morning of 3 November,Khrushchev and Malenkov returned toMoscow having largely accomplishedtheir task of overcoming any reserva-tions that allied Communist states (withthe exception of Poland) might haveabout the impending military action.Khrushchev had ample reason to bepleased when he briefly presented theresults of the talks at a CPSU Presidiummeeting later that day.157

The military side of the invasionproceeded just as rapidly as the politi-cal consultations. On 1 November,Marshal Konev was appointed the su-preme commander of Soviet forces inHungary. That same day, tens of thou-sands of Soviet troops, who had sup-posedly been withdrawing from Hun-gary, instead received orders to moveback into Budapest to quell the upris-ing. They were reinforced by many tensof thousands of additional Soviet troopswho had been congregating in Roma-nia and the Transcarpathian MilitaryDistrict, along Hungary’s southern andeastern borders.158 Some consider-ation was given to having Romanianand Bulgarian soldiers take part along-side the Soviet forces and to havingCzechoslovak troops move in simulta-neously from the north.159 Romanianand Bulgarian leaders had toldKhrushchev that “they wanted to havetheir own military units participate in. . . the struggle against the Hungariancounterrevolution,” and the Czechoslo-vak Politburo likewise expressed its“readiness not only to support interven-tion, but also to take an active part init.” 160 In the end, however,Khrushchev and his colleagues decidedthat the invasion should be carried out


exclusively by Soviet troops. Althoughone might have thought that MarshalKonev, as commander-in-chief of theWarsaw Pact, would have preferred ajoint operation with the East Europeanarmies, he in fact was among those whorecommended that the task be left to theSoviet Union alone.

To ensure that mistakes made dur-ing the initial Soviet intervention in lateOctober would not be repeated, Konevmet with General Lashchenko and otherSoviet officers who had been in Hun-gary from the outset.161 For a varietyof reasons, as one of Lashchenko’s aideslater explained, the Soviet Union’schances of success were much greaterduring the second intervention:

In November our combat operationstook place under more auspicious cir-cumstances than at the end of October.Budapest was already under martial law;armed groups were less successful incarrying out sudden attacks; and ourtroops controlled the situation on thecity streets. We also had a lot moreforces and equipment at our disposalthan in October. In addition, our troopswere no longer hampered by contradic-tory directives issued by the Hungariangovernment (whether and when to openfire, etc.), which had seriously impededour troops’ actions and resulted in need-less casualties. . . . The considerableexperience acquired by our units in Oc-tober also contributed to the greater suc-cess of our subsequent operations.162

In addition to helping out with the finalmilitary plans, Lashchenko retained akey command role in Budapest. Re-sponsibility for operations elsewhere inHungary was assigned to GeneralMikhail Kazakov and General MikhailMalinin, both of whom had played a keypart in the earlier intervention.

One of Kazakov’s first tasks wasto ensure that enough Soviet troopswere deployed along the border withAustria to forestall any prospect ofWestern intervention. Soviet leadersdecided to err on the side of caution inthis regard, not least because Nagy andhis colleagues had made a last-ditch at-tempt on 1 November to obtain mili-tary support from either the United Na-tions or NATO by combining Hungary’sformal withdrawal from the Warsaw

Pact and its declaration of neutralitywith an appeal to the UN General As-sembly.163 Any hopes of receiving out-side support, however, were quicklydashed. The United States expresslyprohibited NATO forces from takingany actions that might be deemed at allprovocative.164 Once it was clear thatthe “imperialist” armies would not beintervening, Konev and his subordinateswere able to concentrate their planningand resources on Budapest and othercities where the revolution was at itsheight.

The West’s failure to intervene leftNagy’s government in a hopeless situ-ation. Although Hungarian army unitshad been fighting mainly on the side ofthe rebels since 28 October (when aceasefire was declared and a NationalGuard was formed), the military over-all could no longer function as a cohe-sive whole.165 In early November,Hungarian defense minister Pal Maleterbegan preparing as best he could to de-fend against a Soviet attack, but in theabsence of Western military supportNagy was reluctant to order large-scalearmed resistance, for fear of precipitat-ing mass bloodshed without any possi-bility of victory.166 Among otherthings, Nagy was well aware that theSoviet Union had systematically pen-etrated the Hungarian military establish-ment from the late 1940s on. He fearedthat dozens of Soviet agents who werestill entrenched in the Hungarian officercorps and national defense ministry, aswell as a “field staff for Soviet troopsin Budapest that operated in direct con-tact with the Hungarians” from the out-set of the crisis, would prevent most ofthe Hungarian army from being used tosupport the government.167 As a re-sult, the majority of Hungarian troopsremained confined to their barracks on4 November and were systematicallydisarmed by Soviet forces that reenteredBudapest.168 Although some middle-and lower-ranking Hungarian officers,conscripts, and reservists, under theleadership of General Bela Kiraly, tookup arms in a last-ditch defense of theuprising, their efforts could not makeup for the inaction of most Hungariansoldiers.

Early in the morning of 4 Novem-

ber, a final signal was given for Opera-tion “Whirlwind” (Vikhr’—the code-name of the invasion) to commence.The fighting in Budapest and manyother cities on 4, 5, and 6 Novemberwas intense, and even in a small townlike Dunapetele the defenders managedto hold out for four days despite beinghopelessly outnumbered.169 Eventu-ally, though, Soviet forces crushed theresistance and installed a pro-Sovietgovernment under Kadar and Munnich.Officials in Moscow were able to main-tain direct contact with the new Hun-garian government via Leonid Brezh-nev and Anastas Mikoyan, who hadbeen sent to Budapest on 3 Novemberfor precisely that reason.170 Some lim-ited fighting continued in Hungary un-til 11 November, especially in areas welloutside Budapest (notably in Pecs,where some 200 fighters held out untilthe 14th), but the revolution was effec-tively over by the 8th. Marshal Konevhad promised Khrushchev on 31 Octo-ber that it would take Soviet troops threeto four days to “destroy the counterrevo-lutionary forces and restore order inHungary,” and his forecast was largelyborne out.171

Further Rifts Within the Soviet Lead-ership

Even after the final decision to in-tervene on a massive scale was adoptedon 31 October, the leadership strugglecontinued to buffet Soviet deliberationsabout Hungary. This was evident notonly at the Presidium meeting on 1November, when Mikoyan (having justreturned to Moscow) tried to undo thedecision to invade, but also at the meet-ings held during the first few days ofthe invasion, on 4-6 November.172

Molotov and Kaganovich disagreedwith the others about the best way tohandle the post-invasion regime in Hun-gary. Initially, Molotov had wanted theformer prime minister Andras Hegedus,who had escaped to Moscow on 28October, to be made the head of a new“Provisional Workers’ and Peasants’Government.” Such a step, Molotovclaimed, would simply amount to thereinstatement of Hegedus’s governmentas the legitimate authority in Hungary.


(Hegedus had been prime minister inthe government that immediately pre-ceded Nagy’s return to power in Octo-ber 1956.) Molotov averred that JanosKadar was still a furtive supporter ofNagy and should not be given any toppost. Although Molotov eventuallybacked down on this issue, he contin-ued to insist that it was improper forKadar’s new government to condemnthe “Rakosi-Gero clique” and to give anew name to the revived HungarianCommunist party. These differencesproduced a number of acerbic ex-changes with Khrushchev and otherPresidium members. On 4 November,Khrushchev declared that he “simplycannot understand Cde. Molotov; healways comes up with the most perni-cious [vredneishie] ideas.” Molotovresponded by telling Khrushchev thathe “should keep quiet and stop beingso overbearing.”173

The exchanges became even moreacrimonious at the session on 6 Novem-ber, where Molotov brought a flood ofcriticism upon himself by declaring his“vehement objection” to Khrushchev’sideas about the regime that Janos Kadarwas establishing in Hungary. MaksimSaburov accused Molotov andKaganovich of being “rigid and dog-matic,” and Mikoyan insisted that “Cde.Molotov is completely ignoring the con-crete situation and is dragging us back-ward.” Averki Aristov noted that “Cdes.Molotov and Kaganovich were alwaystransfixed by Stalin’s cult, and they arestill transfixed by it.” Severest of allwere the criticisms that Khrushchevhimself expressed, accusing Molotovand Kaganovich of wanting to indulgein “screeching and face-slapping.” Heexpressed particular disdain forKaganovich, asking him “when are youfinally going to mend your ways andstop all this toadying [to Molotov]?”

In June 1957, when the leadershipstruggle reached its peak, the Hungar-ian crisis resurfaced. One of the accu-sations leveled by Molotov and othermembers of the “Anti-Party Group”against Khrushchev was what they de-scribed as his mismanagement of intra-bloc affairs. Molotov argued thatKhrushchev had committed “dangerouszigzags” vis-a-vis Eastern Europe and

had “ignored the impact of [the SovietUnion’s] actions on other socialist coun-tries”—charges that were not entirelywithout merit.174 Khrushchev man-aged to deflect those allegations and tooust his opponents, but the events inboth Hungary and Poland in 1956 hadhighlighted the risks of allowing de-Stalinization in Eastern Europe to movetoo fast. Although Khrushchev ce-mented his status as the top leader in1957, he pursued a much more cautiouspolicy in Eastern Europe from then on.

Consequences and Costs

By reestablishing military controlover Hungary and by exposing—moredramatically than in 1953—the empti-ness of the “roll-back” and “liberation”rhetoric in the West, the Soviet inva-sion in November 1956 stemmed anyfurther loss of Soviet power in EasternEurope. Shortly after the invasion,Khrushchev acknowledged that U.S.-Soviet relations were likely to deterio-rate for a considerable time, but he in-dicated that he was ready to pay thatprice because the Soviet Union “hadproved to the West that [it is] strong andresolute” while “the West is weak anddivided.”175 U.S. officials, for theirpart, were even more aware than theyhad been in 1953 of how limited theiroptions were in Eastern Europe. Seniormembers of the Eisenhower adminis-tration conceded that the most theycould do in the future was “to encour-age peaceful evolutionary changes” inthe region, and they warned that theUnited States must avoid conveying anyimpression “either directly or by impli-cation . . . that American military helpwill be forthcoming” to anti-Commu-nist forces.176 Any lingering U.S.hopes of directly challenging Moscow’ssphere of influence in Eastern Europethus effectively ended.

Despite these obvious benefits forSoviet policy, the revolts in both Polandand Hungary in 1956 had demonstratedserious weaknesses in the region thatwould continue to endanger Soviet con-trol. The bloodiness of the three-dayconflict in Hungary, in which roughly22,000 Hungarians and nearly 2,300Soviet soldiers died or were wounded,

underscored the extent of popular op-position both to the Communist regimeand to the Soviet role in Eastern Eu-rope.177 Two years of intensive “nor-malization,” including wholesalepurges, arrests, deportations, and execu-tions, culminating in the executions (byhanging) of Nagy and Pal Maleter inJune 1958, were carried out to elimi-nate the most active opposition toKadar’s regime. By the time the pro-cess was completed, more than 100,000people had been arrested, 35,000 hadbeen tried for “counterrevolutionaryacts,” nearly 26,000 had been sentencedto prison, and as many as 600 had beenexecuted.178 Similarly, in Poland thePoznan riots and the mass protest ral-lies that preceded and accompaniedGomulka’s return to power were indica-tive of widespread disaffection with theextant political system. That discontentmerely festered in subsequent years, asGomulka gradually abandoned the re-formist mantle and reverted to an or-thodox Communist approach. Ironi-cally, it was Kadar, not Gomulka, whoended up pursuing a more relaxed po-litical and economic line once he hadconsolidated his hold on power; and asa result, Hungary experienced no fur-ther instances of violent upheaval andmass disorder. By contrast, Gomulka’seschewal of genuine reform left Polandas politically unstable as ever by thetime he was forced out in December1970.

The events of 1956 also made So-viet leaders aware of the urgent needfor improved economic conditions inEastern Europe, insofar as the unrest inboth Poland and Hungary—and in EastGermany three years earlier—hadstemmed, at least initially, from eco-nomic discontent. The danger of allow-ing “basic economic and social prob-lems to go unresolved” was one of themain lessons that Khrushchev empha-sized to his colleagues from the verystart: “Ideological work alone will beof no avail if we do not ensure that liv-ing standards rise. It is no accident thatHungary and Poland are the countriesin which unrest has occurred.”179

Khrushchev also concluded that the rec-tification of “certain inequalities in oureconomic relations with the fraternal


countries” would be “crucial to the pro-cess of normalization” in both Polandand Hungary.180 Although Kadar waseventually able to redress some of themost acute economic grievances inHungary through the adoption of a NewEconomic Mechanism in 1968 andother reforms in subsequent years, hisretention of state ownership and cen-tralized economic managementthwarted any hope of genuine prosper-ity. This was even more the case inPoland, where, despite some leewaygranted for private activity (especiallyin agriculture, retail trade, and light in-dustry), the economic policies underGomulka and his successors spawnedperiodic outbreaks of widespread pub-lic unrest. No matter how often thePolish authorities claimed that theywould pursue drastic economic im-provements, they always proved unwill-ing to accept the political price that suchimprovements would have necessitated.

From a purely military standpoint,the invasion in November 1956achieved its immediate goals, but in thelonger term it exacted significant costs.When the revolution was crushed bySoviet troops, the morale and fightingelan of the Hungarian armed forceswere bound to dissolve as well. Theremains of the Hungarian army wereregarded by Soviet commanders (andby Kadar) as politically and militarilyunreliable. More than 8,000 officers,including a large number who had at-tended Soviet military colleges andacademies, were forced out of the Hun-garian armed forces in late 1956 and1957.181 The country’s army thus es-sentially disintegrated and had to be re-built almost from scratch, leaving a gapin Warsaw Pact military planning andcombat preparations for many yearsthereafter.

From a diplomatic standpoint aswell, the invasion entailed significantcosts, at least in the short term. Thelarge-scale use of force in Hungaryalienated numerous Third World coun-tries that had been sedulously courtedby the Soviet Union. A top-secretmemorandum prepared in December1956 by Igor Tugarinov, a senior offi-cial at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, ac-knowledged that there had been a “sig-

nificant increase in hostile statementsabout the Soviet Union” in key SouthAsian countries, including India, Paki-stan, Burma, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka),and Indonesia.182 Tugarinov noted thatthe governments in these countries, andeven many leftist commentators there,were publicly “drawing an analogy be-tween the English-French-Israeli ag-gression in Egypt and the participationof Soviet troops in the suppression ofthe counterrevolutionary uprising inHungary.” The report cited an officialprotest from the Indian government inmid-December which declared that “theevents in Hungary have shattered thebeliefs of millions who had begun tolook upon the USSR as the defender ofpeace and of the rights of the weakestpeople.” What was even more disturb-ing, according to Tugarinov, was the“increased prestige that the UnitedStates had derived from recent eventsin Hungary and the Near East.” WhileAsian officials were condemning Soviet“aggression” in Hungary as “a directviolation of the spirit and letter of theBandung Conference declaration,” theywere making “extremely favorable” ref-erences to the “U.S. position in bothHungary and Suez.” Tugarinov re-ported that some Indian officials hadeven begun insisting that “it makessense for India to reorient its foreignpolicy more closely toward the UnitedStates.” This raised the “distinct possi-bility,” in Tugarinov’s view, that “therewill be a major improvement in Indo-American relations, with a detrimentalimpact on India’s relations with theUSSR.” Although the adverse effectsof the 1956 invasion on Soviet-ThirdWorld relations proved, for the mostpart, to be relatively ephemeral, the sup-pression of the uprising did cause atleast temporary disruption inKhrushchev’s strategy vis-a-vis theNon-Aligned Movement.

Finally, the fact that an invasionhad been necessary at all underscoredthe dangers of Moscow’s incoherentand drifting policy in Eastern Europefollowing Stalin’s death. Khrushchevwas well aware of the potential for re-criminations, as he indicated during hisconversation with Tito in early Novem-ber:

[If we had failed to take action], thereare people in the Soviet Union whowould say that as long as Stalin was incommand, everyone obeyed and therewere no great shocks, but now that[these new bastards] have come topower, Russia has suffered the defeatand loss of Hungary.183

This point was further highlighted bythe acrimonious exchanges during theCPSU Presidium meetings in earlyNovember (see the previous section)and by the accusations which the Anti-Party Group lodged against Khrushchevin June 1957, as cited above. Ulti-mately, Khrushchev was able to over-come the political fallout from the twocrises, but the events of 1956 clearlytook their toll on the process of de-Stalinization in Eastern Europe. Eventhough Khrushchev suspected that theWarsaw Pact countries would remainvulnerable to recurrent crises unless theindigenous regimes became more “vi-able” and the Soviet Union forged amore equitable relationship, he was de-termined to proceed far more cautiouslyin the future.184 Repressive leaders inEastern Europe, such as Walter Ulbrichtin East Germany, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in Romania, Todor Zhivkov in Bul-garia, and Antonin Novotny in Czecho-slovakia, were able to win even stron-ger backing from Khrushchev becausethey convinced him that their presencewas the only safeguard against “unex-pected developments” of the sort thatoccurred in Hungary and Poland. Whenfaced with a tradeoff between the “vi-ability” of the East European regimesand the “cohesion” of the Eastern blocafter 1956, Khrushchev consistentlychose to emphasize cohesion, thus fore-stalling any real movement toward amore durable political order.185

* * * *

This brief review of some of thelatest findings about the 1956 crisesleaves numerous topics unaddressed,but it should be enough to indicate thatthe new archival evidence does not justconfirm what everyone knew all along.More often than not, the new evidenceundercuts long-established views and


reveals unknown events. Disagree-ments about how to interpret the pastwill persist even if all the archives aresomeday open, but the new documen-tation is enabling scholars to achieve afar more accurate and complete under-standing not only of specific episodes(e.g., the Soviet Union’s responses tothe Polish and Hungarian crises) but ofthe entire course of the Cold War.

1 “Zayavlenie rukovoditelei Bolgarii, Vengrii,

GDR, Pol’shi, i Sovetskogo Soyuza” and

“Zayavlenie Sovetskogo Soyuza,” both in Pravda

(Moscow), 5 December 1989, p. 2.2 F. Luk’yanov, “Vengriya privetsvuet zayavlenie

Moskvy,” Izvestiya (Moscow), 24 October 1991,

p. 4.3 See, e.g., Army-General A.D. Lizichev,

“Oktyabr’ i Leninskoe uchenie o zashchite

revolyutsii,” Kommunist (Moscow), No. 3 (Feb-

ruary 1987), p. 96; Admiral A. I. Sorokin, ed.,

Sovetskie vooruzhenye sily na strazhe mira i

sotsializma (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), p. 254; V.

V. Semin, ed., Voenno-politicheskoe

sotrudnichestvo sotsialisticheskikh stran (Mos-

cow: Nauka, 1988), esp. pp. 127-141, 181-220;

and the interview with Army-General V. N. Lobov

in “I tol’ko pravda ko dvoru,” Izvestiya (Mos-

cow), 8 May 1989, pp. 1, 3.4 Colonel I.A. Klimov, “KPSS ob ukreplenii

edinstva i boevogo sotrudnichestva vooruzhenykh

sil sotsialisticheskikh stran,” Voenno-istoricheskii

zhurnal (Moscow), No. 5 (May 1987), p. 80.5 V.F. Khalipov, Voennaya politika KPSS (Mos-

cow: Voenizdat, 1988), esp. pp. 256-257.6 Army-General P. I. Lashchenko, “Vengriya,

1956 god,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Mos-cow), No. 9 (September 1989), pp. 42-50.7 Budapest Domestic Service, 28 January 1989.8 “TsK KPSS: Ob izuchenii arkhivov TsK KPSS,

kasayushchikhsya sobytii 1956 g. v Vengrii,”

Report No. 06/2-513 (Secret), from R. Fedorov

and P. Laptev, deputy heads of the CPSU CC

International Department and CPSU CC General

Department, respectively, 23 November 1990, in

Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii

(TsKhSD), Moscow, Fond (F.) 89, Opis’ (Op.) 11,

Delo (D.) 23, List (L.) 1. The memorandum

warned that the “new Hungarian authorities” were

“clearly intending to use this question [i.e., the

1956 invasion] as a means of pressure against us.”

For the article praising the invasion, see Lieut.-

Colonel Jozsef Forigy, “O kontrrevolyutsii v

Vengrii 1956 goda,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal

(Moscow), No. 8 (August 1990), pp. 39-46. This

article was explicitly intended to counter the “trai-

torous revisionists” in Hungary who had claimed

that the events of 1956 were a “popular uprising”

and who in 1989-90 were carrying out a second

“counterrevolution.” The article was unstinting

in its denunciation of the “traitors” led by Imre

Nagy and of the “new counterrevolutionaries in

our midst today who regard themselves as the

heirs of 1956.” The chief editor of the Soviet

journal, Major-General Viktor Filatov, endorsed

the Hungarian author’s arguments and warmly

recommended the article to his readers. Filatov

added that “upon reading the article, one cannot

help but notice features of that [earlier] counter-

revolutionary period that are similar to the

changes occurring in the East European countries

at the present time.”9 Jelcin-dosszie Szoviet dokumentumok 1956 rol.

Budapest: Dohany, 1993); and Hianyzo Lapok:

1956 tortenetebol: Dokumentumok a volt SZKP

KP Leveltarabol (Budapest: Zenit Konyvek,

1993).10 “O sobytiyakh 1956 goda v Vengrii,”

Diplomaticheskii vestnik (Moscow), Nos. 19-20

(15-31 October 1992), pp. 52-56.11 “Vengriya, aprel’-oktyabr’ 1956 goda:

Informatsiya Yu. V. Andropova, A. I. Mikoyana i

M. A. Suslova iz Budapeshta”; “Vengriya,

oktyabr’-noyabr’ 1956 goda: Iz arkhiva TsK

KPSS”; and “Vengriya, noyabr’ 1956-avgust 1957

g.,” all in Istoricheskii arkhiv (Moscow), Nos. 4,

5, and 6 (1993), pp. 103-142, 132-160, and 131-

144, respectively.12 See, in particular, the segment of Khrushchev’s

memoirs published in “Memuary Nikity

Sergeevicha Khrushcheva,” Voprosy istorii (Mos-

cow), No. 4 (1995), pp. 68-84. Another extremely

useful account is available in the memoir by the

former Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, Veljko

Micunovic, Moscow Diary, trans. by David Floyd

(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980). Because

of his fluency in Russian and close ties with Tito,

Micunovic regularly had direct contacts with

Khrushchev and other senior figures. Less reli-

able, but potentially illuminating (if used with

caution), are the relevant portions of the memoir

by the police chief in Budapest during the revo-

lution, Sandor Kopacsi, Au nom de la classe

ouvriere (Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1979),

which is also available in English translation un-

der the same title (In the Name of the Working

Class). Kopasci ended up siding with the insur-

gents and was arrested in November 1956. He

was sentenced to life imprisonment in June 1958,

but was granted amnesty in 1963. In 1974 he

was permitted to emigrate to Canada.13 A few well-connected Russians have had privi-

leged access to Malin’s notes from the Presidium

meetings dealing with Khrushchev’s secret speech

at the 20th CPSU Congress, but these notes have

not been made more widely available. See V. P.

Naumov, “K istorii sekretnogo doklada N. S.

Khrushcheva na XX s”ezde KPSS,” Novaya i

noveishaya istoriya (Moscow), No. 4 (July-Au-

gust 1996), pp. 147-168; Vladimir Naumov,

“‘Utverdit’ dokladchikom tovarishcha,’”

Moskovskie Novosti, No. 5 (4-11 February 1996),

p. 34; and Aleksei Bogomolov, “K 40-letiyu XX

s”ezda: Taina zakrytogo doklada,” Sovershenno

sekretno (Moscow), No. 1 (1996), pp. 3-4.14 Vyacheslav Sereda and Janos M. Rainer, eds.,

Dontes a Kremlben, 1956: A szovjet partelnokseg

vitai Magyarorszagrol (Budapest: 1956-os

Intezet, 1996).15 The notes about Hungary appeared in two parts

under the title “Kak reshalis’ ‘voprosy Vengrii’:

Rabochie zapisi zasedanii Prezidiuma TsK KPSS,

iyul’-noyabr’ 1956 g.,” Istoricheskii arkhiv (Mos-

cow), Nos. 2 and 3 (1996), pp. 73-104 and 87-

121, respectively. The notes about Poland ap-

peared in Issue No. 5 of the same journal.16 See the assessment of this meeting and the

annotated translation of the Czech notes by Mark

Kramer, “Hungary and Poland, 1956:

Khrushchev’s CPSU CC Presidium Meeting on

East European Crises, 24 October 1956,” Cold

War International History Project Bulletin, Issue

No. 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 50-56. The Czech

document, “Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24.

rijna 1956 k situaci v Polsku a Mad’arsku,” 25

October 1956, in Statni Ustredni Archiv (Praha),

Archiv Ustredniho Vyboru Komunisticke Strany

Ceskoslovenska (Arch. UV KSC), Fond (F.) 07/

16 — A. Novotny, Svazek (Sv.) 3, was compiled

by Jan Svoboda, a senior aide to the then-leader

of Czechoslovakia, Antonin Novotny, who at-

tended the CPSU Presidium meeting.17 Lieut.-General E. I. Malashenko, “Osobyi

korpus v ogne Budapeshta,” Voenno-istoricheskii

zhurnal (Moscow), Nos. 10, 11, and 12 (Octo-

ber, November, and December 1993) and No. 1

(January 1994), pp. 22-30; 44-51, 33-37, and 30-

36, respectively.18 See the analysis and valuable collection of

declassified documents in Edward Jan Nalepa,

Pacyfikacja zbuntowanego miasta: Wojsko

Polskie w Czerwca 1956 r. w Poznaniu w swietle

dokumentow wojskowych (Warsaw:

Wydawnictwo Bellona, 1992). For broader over-

views of the crisis, see Jan Ptasinski, Wydarzenia

poznanskie czerwiec 1956 (Warsaw: Krajowa

Agencja Wydawnicze, 1986); Jaroslaw

Maciejewski and Zofia Trojanowicz, eds.,

Poznanski Czerwiec 1956 (Poznan:

Wydawnictwo Poznanskie, 1990); and Maciej


Roman Bombicki, Poznan ‘56 (Poznan: Lawica,

1992).19 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK

KPSS, 9 i 12 iyulya 1956 g.,” 12 July 1956 (Top

Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D.1005, Ll. 2-

2ob.20 “Pol’skii narod kleimit organizatorov

provokatsii,” Pravda (Moscow), 1 July 1956, p.

6.21 The best overview of the events in Poland in

1956 is Pawel Machcewicz, Polski rok 1956 (War-

saw: Oficyna Wydawnicza, 1993). Leszek

Gluchowski has done excellent work on the So-

viet-Polish crisis; see, for example, his “Poland,

1956: Khrushchev, Gomulka, and the ‘Polish Oc-

tober’,” Cold War International History Project

Bulletin, Issue No. 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 38-49.

See also Jerzy Poksinski, “Wojsko Polskie w 1956

r. — problemy polityczne (1) i (2),” Wojsko i

Wychowanie (Warsaw), Nos. 1-2 (1992), pp. 40-

78; and Robert Los, Pazdziernik 1956 roku w

perspektywie stosunkow polsko-radzieckich,

Ph.D. Diss., University of Lodz, 1993. For a

sample of other perspectives on the 1956 Polish

crisis, see Zbyslaw Rykowski and Wieslaw

Wladyka, Polska proba Pazdziernik ‘56 (Krakow:

Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1989), pp. 232-234;

Sprawozdanie z prac Komisii KC PZPR

powolanej dla wyjasnienia przyczyn i przebiegu

konfliktow spolecznuch w dziejach Polski

Ludowej, special issue of Nowe Drogi (Warsaw),

September 1983, see esp. pp. 21-32; Benon

Dymek, ed., Pazdziernik 1956: Szkice

historyczne (Warsaw: Akademia Nauk

Spolecznych, 1989); Bogdan Hillebrandt, ed.,

Ideowopolityczne kontrowersje i konflikty lat

1956-1970 (Warsaw: Akademia Nauk

Spolecznych, 1986); Grzegorz Matuszak, Kryzysy

spoleczno-polityczne w procesie budowy

socjalizmu w Polsce Ludowej (Warsaw:

Akademia Nauk Spolecznych PZPR, 1986); and

Antoni Czubinski, “Kryzys polityczny 1956 roku

w Polsce,” in Antoni Czubinski, ed., Kryzysy

spoleczno-polityczne w Polsce Ludowej (Warsaw:

Instytut Podstawowych Problemow Marksizmu-

Leninizmu, 1983), pp. 80-114.22 “Zapis’ besedy N. S. Khrushcheva v

Varshave,” No. 233 (Special Dossier — Strictly

Secret), notes by A. Mikoyan, 19-20 October

1956, in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii

(APRF), F. 3, Op. 65, D. 2, Ll. 1-14. Further

details about this meeting are contained in

“Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956,”

Ll. 1-4.23 Ibid.24 Ibid. and “Zapis’ besedy N. S. Khrushcheva v

Varshave,” L. 4.

25 At the time, there were still 79 Soviet officers,

including 28 generals, serving in the Polish army.

See Edward Jan Nalepa, Oficerowie Radziecky w

Wojsku Polskim w latach 1943-1968: Studium

historyczno-wojskowe (Warsaw: Wojskowy

Instytut Historyczny, 1992), p. 43. For a valu-

able discussion of the military confrontation, see

“Wojskowe aspekty pazdziernika 1956 r.,” Polska

Zbrojna (Warsaw), 18-20 October 1991, p. 3.26 This account is based on documents recently

declassified at the Internal Military Service

Archive (Archiwum Wojskowej Sluzby

Wewnetrznej, or AWSW) and the Central Mili-

tary Archive (Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe, or

CAW) in Warsaw, which were provided to the

author by Leszek Gluchowski. See, in particu-

lar, the two reports compiled by Major Witold

Osinski, deputy chief of the 2nd Section of the

KBW’s Military Counterintelligence Directorate,

in AWSW, sygn. 2859/20/K and CAW, sygn.

1812/92/8. See also the invaluable first-hand

account by Wlodzimierz Mus, the KBW com-

mander at the time, “Spor generalow o

Pazdziernik 1956: Czy grozila interwencja

zbrojna?” Polityka (Warsaw), No. 42 (20 Octo-

ber 1990), p. 14.27 “Zapis’ besedy N. S. Khrushcheve v

Varshave,” L. 4.28 Comments by Stefan Staszewski, former

PZPR CC Secretary, in Teresa Toranska, ed., Oni

(London: Aneks, 1985), p. 148.29 “Komunikat o naradach Biura Politycznego

KC PZPR i delegacji KC KPZR w Warszawie,”

Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), 20 October 1956, p. 1.30 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK

KPSS, 20 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” 20 October 1956

(Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005,

Ll. 49-50.31 This was evident, for example, when Ochab

stopped in Moscow in September 1956 on his way

back from Beijing. See “Priem Posla Pol’skoi

Narodnoi Respubliki v SSSR tov. V.

Levikovskogo, 10 sentyabrya 1956 g.,” 11 Sep-

tember 1956 (Secret), memorandum from N.

Patolichev, Soviet deputy foreign minister, in

Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii

(AVPRF), F. Referentura po Pol’she, Op. 38, Por.

9, Papka, 126, D. 031, L. 1.32 “Antisovetskaya kampaniya v pol’skoi presse,”

Pravda (Moscow), 20 October 1956, p. 1.33 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK



L. 2.34 “Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna

1956,” L. 8.35 Jacek Kuron, Wiara i wina: Do i od

komunizmu (Warsaw: BGW, 1990), p. 119.36 Mus, “Czy grozila interwencja zbrojna?” p.

14.37 “Przemowienie towarzysza Wladyslawa

Gomulki,” Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), 25 October

1956, p. 1, which appeared under the banner head-

line “Ponad 300 tysiecy warszawiakow na

spotkaniu z nowym kierownictwem partii.”38 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK



L. 53.39 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK

KPSS, 21 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” L. 2.40 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK



Ll. 4-4ob.41 Compare Khrushchev’s account in “Memuary

Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva” with Molotov’s

less favorable reminiscences in Feliks Chuev, ed.,

Sto sorok besed s Molotovym (Moscow: Terra,

1991), p. 113.42 Khrushchev’s comments, as recorded in

Micunovic, Moscow Diary, p. 139.43 “Telefonogramma po VCh,” 15 November

1956 (Top Secret), from I. Maslennikov of the

Soviet embassy in Warsaw, in AVPRF, F.

Referentura po Pol’she, Op. 38, Por. 20, Pap. 127,

D. 178, Ll. 32-33.44 Quotations are from “Rabochaya zapis’

zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 23 oktyabrya

1956 g.,” L. 4; and “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya

Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 28 oktyabrya 1956 g.,”

28 October 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3,

Op. 12, D. 1005, L. 58.45 For the full transcript of these sessions, see

“Jegyzokonyv a Szovjet es a Magyar part-es

allami vezetok targyalasairol,” 13-16 June 1953

(Top Secret), in Magyar Orszagos Leveltar, 276,

F. 102/65, oe. The document was declassified in

1991 and published the following year in the Hun-

garian journal Multunk. A preliminary translation

by Monika Borbely was included in Christian F.

Ostermann, ed., The Post-Stalin Succession

Struggle and the 17 June Uprising in East Ger-

many: The Hidden History, a compendium of

documents prepared by the Cold War International

History Project (CWIHP) and the National Secu-

rity Archive for a November 1996 international

conference (hosted by the Center for Contempo-

rary History Research in Potsdam) on “The Cri-

sis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe.”46 “Plenum TsK KPSS — XIX Sozyv:

Stenogramma chetyrnadtsatogo zasedaniya 12

iyulya 1955 g. (utrennego),” July 1955 (Top Se-

cret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 176, L. 143.


47 “Shifrtelegramma,” Special Nos. 316-319/No.

16595 (Strictly Secret), from Yu.V. Andropov to

the CPSU Presidium and CPSU Secretariat, 30

April 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 1, L. 2.48 Ibid., L. 5.49 “Vypiska iz protokola zasedaniya Prezidiuma

TsK KPSS ot 3 maya 1956 g.,” No. P13/XXIII

(Strictly Secret), 3 May 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op.

64, D. 483, L. 133.50 “Telefonogramma iz Budapeshta v TsK

KPSS,” 13 June 1956 (Top Secret), from M. A.

Suslov to the CSPU Presidium and Secretariat,

in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 146-149.51 “Zapis’ besedy N. S. Khrushcheva s kitaiskimi

tovarishchami 2 oktyabrya 1959 g. v Pekine,” 2

October 1959 (Top Secret/Special Dossier), in

APRF, F. 3, Op. 65, D. 331, L. 12. For other

disparaging remarks by Khrushchev about

Rakosi, see Micunovic, Moscow Diary, pp. 135-

136, 140.52 See Janos Kadar’s remarks to this effect in

“Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK

KPSS, 3 noyabrya 1956 g.,” 3 November 1956


Ll. 31-33ob.53 The resolution was broadcast on Hungarian

domestic radio on 30 June and published in

Szabad Nep the following day. For an English

translation, see Paul E. Zinner, ed., National Com-

munism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe:

A Selection of Documents on Events in Poland

and Hungary, February-November 1956 (New

York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 328-

331.54 “Shifrtelegramma,” from Yu. V. Andropov to

the CPSU Presidium and Secretariat, 9 July 1956

(Special Dossier — Strictly Secret), in APRF, F.

3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 151-162. All quotations in

this paragraph are from Andropov’s cable.55 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK

KPSS, 9 i 12 iyulya 1956 g.,” Ll. 2-2ob.56 “TsK KPSS,” 18 July 1956 (Strictly Secret —

Urgent), Osobaya papka, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64,

D. 483, L. 231.57 Ibid., L. 232.58 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK

KPSS, 9 i 12 iyulya 1956 g.,” L. 2.59 “Vypiska iz Protokola No. 28 zasedaniya

Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 12 iyulya 1956 g.,” 12

July 1956 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op.

14, D. 41, Ll. 1-2.60 “Rastut i krepnut mezhdunarodnye sily mira,

demokratii i sotsializma,” Pravda (Moscow), 16

July 1956, pp. 2-3.61 “Zapis’ besedy A. I. Mikoyana s Matyashem

Rakoshi, Andrashem Hegedushem, Erne Gere i

Beloi Vegom, 13 iyulya 1956 g.,” 17 July 1956

(Secret), compiled by Yu. V. Andropov, in APRF,

F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 186-190.62 “Zapis’ vystuplenii na zasedaniya Politbyuro

TsR VPT, 13 iyulya 1956 g.,” 17 July 1956 (Se-

cret), compiled by Yu. V. Andropov, in APRF, F.

3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 191-205; and “TsK KPSS,”

16 July 1956 (Strictly Secret — Urgent), Osobaya

Papka, APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 183-185.

See also “Zapis’ besedy A. I. Mikoyana s

Yanoshem Kadarom, 14 iyulya 1956 g.,” 17 July

1956 (Top Secret), compiled by Yu. V. Andropov,

in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 206-215.63 “TsK KPSS,” 18 July 1956 (Strictly Secret —

Urgent), Osobaya papka, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64,

D. 483, Ll. 225-236. On the eve of the plenum,

Mikoyan also held talks with key members of the

HWP Central Leadership to ensure that Gero’s

candidacy would be supported.64 Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne

Budapeshta” (Part 1), pp. 23-24.65 “Plan deistvii Osobogo korpusa po

vosstanovleniyu obshchestvennogo poryadka na

territorii Vengrii,” 20 July 1956 (Strictly Secret),

as recorded in Tsentral’nyi arkhiv Ministerstva

oborony (TsAMO), F. 32, Op. 701291, D. 15, Ll.

130-131.66 “TsK KPSS” (cited in Note 63 supra), L. 231.67 “Zapis’ besedy s Erno Gere, 2 sentyabrya 1956

g.,” 27 September 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD,

F. 5, Op. 28, D. 394, Ll. 254-256.68 Ibid., L. 256.69 “Shifrtelegramma,” 12 October 1956 (Strictly

Secret — Urgent — Special Dossier), from Yu.

V. Andropov to the CPSU Presidium, in APRF,

F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 64-75.70 Ibid., L. 71.71 Countless books and articles about the Hun-

garian revolution have been published since 1956.

For a vivid and well-researched account of the

events of 23-24 October, see Bill Lomax, Hun-

gary 1956 (London: Allison & Busby, 1976), esp.

pp. 106-123. For other useful perspectives, see

Ferenc A. Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Na-

tionalism versus Communism (Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press, 1961); Paul

Kecskemeti, The Unexpected Revolution: Social

Forces in the Hungarian Uprising (Stanford:

Stanford University Press, 1961); Charles Gati,

Hungary and the Soviet Bloc (Durham, NC: Duke

University Press, 1986); and Paul E. Zinner, Revo-

lution in Hungary (New York: Columbia Uni-

versity Press, 1962). Until recently, reliable Hun-

garian-language accounts were relatively few in

number, but that has changed dramatically since

Communism ended. The large number of publi-

cations put out in Budapest by the Institute for

the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution are

a particularly rich source, as are some of the

monographs sponsored by the Institute of His-

tory at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Re-

assessments of the 1956 crises, based on newly

declassified materials and new memoirs, were

presented at a landmark international “Conference

on Hungary and the World, 1956: The New Ar-

chival Evidence,” which was organized in

Budapest on 26-29 September 1996 by the Na-

tional Security Archive, the CWIHP, and the In-

stitute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian

Revolution.72 Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne

Budapeshta” (Part 1), pp. 24-25.73 Other key sources are “Zprava o jednani na

UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956,” Ll. 8-14; Malashenko,

“Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta” (Part 1), pp.

22-30; and “TsK KPSS,” Memorandum from

Marshal Georgii Zhukov, Soviet minister of de-

fense, and Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, chief of

the Soviet General Staff, 24 October 1956

(Strictly Secret — Special Dossier) to the CPSU

Presidium, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 85-

87.74 The written request, dated 24 October 1956

and signed by then-prime minister Andras

Hegedus, was transmitted by Andropov in a ci-

phered telegram on 28 October. See

“Shifrtelegramma” (Strictly Secret — Urgent), 28

October 1956, from Yu. V. Andropov, in AVPRF,

F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D. 5, L. 12. [Ed. note: For an

English translation, see CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring

1995), p. 30.]75 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK

KPSS, 23 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” Ll. 4-4ob.76 “Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna

1956,” L. 9.77 Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne

Budapeshta” (Part 1), p. 27.78 The preliminary directives are recorded in

TsAMO, F. 32, Op. 701291, D. 15, Ll. 130-131.79 “TsK KPSS,” Memorandum from Marshal

Georgii Zhukov, Soviet minister of defense, and

Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, chief of the Soviet

General Staff, 24 October 1956 (Strictly Secret—

Special Dossier) to the CPSU Presidium, in APRF,

F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 85-87. This memoran-

dum lays out in detail the complexion and assign-

ments of the Soviet ground and air forces.80 “Shifrtelegramma iz Budapeshta,” Cable from

A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov to the CPSU Pre-

sidium, 24 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in

AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, Pap. 6, D. 5, L. 2. [Ed.

note: For an English translation, see CWIHP Bul-

letin 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 22-23, 29.]81 The Soviet defense ministry’s complete list of

Hungarian army units that defected to the insur-


gents was recently declassified at the main Rus-

sian military archive, TsAMO, F. 32, Op. 701291,

D. 17, Ll. 33-48.82 “Shifrtelegramma iz Budapeshta,” Cable from

A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov to the CPSU Pre-

sidium, 25 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in

AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, Pap. 6, D. 5, L. 8.83 Important samples of these messages, declas-

sified in 1992, are available in “Vengriya,

oktyabr’-noyabr’ 1956 goda: Iz arkhiva TsK

KPSS,” Istoricheskii arkhiv (Moscow), No. 5

(1993), pp. 132-141.84 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK

KPSS, 26 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” Ll. 62-62ob.85 Citations here are from “Rabochaya zapis’

zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 28 oktyabrya

1956 g.,” Ll. 54-63.86 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK

KPSS, 28 oktyabrya 1956,” 28 October 1956 (Top

Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll.

54-63.87 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK



Ll. 6-14.88 Ibid., L. 14.89 “Deklaratsiya o printsipakh razvitiya i

dal’neishem ukreplenii druzhby i sotrudnichestva

mezhdu SSSR i drugimi sotsialisticheskimi

stranami,” Pravda (Moscow), 31 October 1956,

p. 1. For the CPSU Presidium decision to issue

the declaration, see “Vypiska iz Protokola No. 49

zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 30

oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” No.

P49/1 (Strictly Secret), 30 October 1956, in APRF,

F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 25-30.90 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK

KPSS, 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” Ll. 9, 10.91 “TsK KPSS,” High-Frequency Transmission,

30 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F.

89, Op. 45, D. 12, L. 2.92 Kovacs’s remarks, at a meeting of the Inde-

pendent Smallholders Party in Pecs, were reported

in the first issue of the revived party newspaper

Kis Ujsag (Budapest), 1 November 1956, p. 2.93 See the first-hand comments by Gyorgy G.

Heltai, the Hungarian deputy foreign minister

under Nagy’s government, “International As-

pects,” in Bela K. Kiraly and Paul Jonas, The

Hungarian Revolution of 1956 in Retrospect, East

European Monograph No. XL (Boulder, Col.:

East European Quarterly, 1978), esp. pp. 52-53.

The negotiations are also briefly recounted in

Tibor Meray, Thirteen Days That Shook the Krem-

lin: Imre Nagy and the Hungarian Revolution,

trans. by Howard L. Katzander (London: Thames

and Hudson, 1959), pp. 163-165; and “Szemtol-

szembe Mikojannal es Szuszloval,” Igazsag

(Budapest), 1 November 1956, p. 1.94 The theme of Hungarian neutrality was em-

phasized in several of Nagy’s essays in On Com-

munism: In Defense of the New Course (Lon-

don: Thames and Hudson, 1957). The Soviet

Union’s backing for Rakosi against Nagy in

March-April 1955 was clearly one of the factors

that prompted Nagy to consider the prospect of

neutrality.95 Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha

Khrushcheva,” pp. 73-74.96 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK

KPSS, 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” Ll. 15-18ob.97 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya

Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.:

O polozhenii v Vengrii,” No. P49/VI (Strictly

Secret), 31 October 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64,

D. 484, L. 41.98 For a detailed survey of the crisis as recorded

in declassified U.S. documents, see U.S. Depart-

ment of State, Foreign Relations of the United

States, 1955-1957, Vol. XVI: Suez Crisis, July

26-December 31, 1956 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1990).99 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK

KPSS, 28 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” L. 61.100 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma

TsK KPSS, 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” 31 October

1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D.

1006, Ll. 15-18ob. If Khrushchev had been privy

to secret U.S. deliberations, he would have real-

ized that the United States had no intention of

directly supporting the French-British-Israeli op-

eration, either militarily or diplomatically. See,

for example, “Memorandum of a Conference with

the President, White House, Washington, 30 Oc-

tober 1956, 10:06-10:55 am,” in FRUS, 1955-57,

Vol. XVI, pp. 851-855.101 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma

TsK KPSS, 4 noyabrya 1956 g.,” L. 34. On this

same point, Sandor Kopasci recounts a very in-

triguing comment that Ivan Serov, the head of

the Soviet KGB, allegedly made when he was

arresting Kopasci just after the invasion: “Suez

caught us [in Moscow] by surprise. We were com-

pelled to resort to military measures in the Danube

Basin because of that area’s strategic importance

to any operations we might conduct in the Near

East.” See Kopasci, Au nom de la classe ouvriere,

p. 201. If Kopasci recorded Serov’s statement

accurately, and if—assuming the statement is ac-

curate—Serov was being sincere, this passage

sheds valuable light on Khrushchev’s remarks.102 Micunovic, Moscow Diary, p. 136.103 Ibid.104 Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha

Khrushcheva,” p. 73.105 “Protocol No. 54 al sedintei Biroului Politic

al CC al PMR din 24 oct. 1956,” 24 October 1956

(Top Secret), in Arhiva Comitetului Central al

Partidului Comunist Roman (Arh. CCPCR),

Bucharest, F. Biroul Politic, Dosar (Do.) 354/56,

ff. 1-5. This document is included in the valu-

able new collection edited by Corneliu Mihai

Lungu and Mihai Retegan, 1956 Explozia:

Perceptii romane, iugoslave si sovietice asupra

evenimentelor din Polonia si Ungaria (Bucharest:

Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 1996).106 Ibid.107 “Protocol No. 55 al sedintei Biroului Politic


(Top Secret), in Arh. CCPCR, F. Biroul Politic,

Do. 355/56, ff. 1-5.108 “Protocol Nr. 58 al sedintei Biroului Politic


(Top Secret), in Arh. CCPCR, F. Biroul Politic,

Do. 358/56, ff. 3-5.109 “Stenograma conferintei organizatiei

regionale al CC al PMR,” 23 November 1956

(Top Secret), in Arh. CCPCR, F. 85, Do. 84/56,

Ff. 1-8. This report is not included in the Lungu/

Retegan volume. I am grateful to Mihai Retegan

for providing me with a copy of the document.110 Ibid.111 Ibid. See also Constantin Botoran, “National

Interest in Romanian Politics During the Cold

War” (Bucharest: Institute for Military Theory

and History, Romanian Ministry of Defense,

March 1994), pp. 7-8.112 “Protocol Nr. 58 al sedintei Biroului Politic

al CC al PMR din 30 oct. 1956,” ff. 3-5.113 “Stenograficky zapis ze zasedani UV KSC,”

5-6 December 1956 (Top Secret), in SUA, Arch.

UV KSC, F. 07, Sv. 14, Archivna jednotka (A.j.)

14.114 “Zabezpeceni klidu na uzemi CSR a statnich

hranic s Mad’arskem,” Report from Col.-General

Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Czechoslovak

General Staff, and Lieut.-General Jaroslav

Dockal, chief of operations, 29 October 1956 (Top

Secret), in Vojensky historicky archiv (VHA)

Praha, Fond Ministra narodni obrany (MNO)

CSR, 1956, Operacni sprava Generalniho stabu

cs. armady (GS/OS), 2/8-39b.115 Ibid., p. 5.116 “Souhrn hlaseni operacniho dustojnika

Generalniho stabu cs. armady,” Notes from Col.-

General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Czecho-

slovak General Staff, to the KSC Central Com-

mittee (Top Secret), 27 October 1956, in VHA

Praha, F. MNO, 1956, GS/OS, 2/8-49b.117 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma

TsK KPSS, 1 noyabrya 1956 g.,” 1 November



1006, L. 22.118 Wilfried Otto, ed., “Ernst Wollweber: Aus

Erinnerungen — Ein Portraet Walter Ulbrichts,”

Beitraege zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung

(Berlin), No. 3 (1990), pp. 365-367.119 Speech by Grotewohl to the CC plenum of

the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), 13

November 1956, in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien

und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv,

Zentrales Parteiarchiv (Berlin), DY 30/IV 2/1/

166, p. 247.120 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma

TsK KPSS, 4 noyabrya 1956 g.,” L. 35ob. For

illuminating analyses of the impact of the 1956

events on the East German authorities, see Hope

M. Harrison, “The Effect of the 1956 Hungarian

Uprising on the East German Leadership,” and

Christian F. Ostermann, “East Germany and the

Hungarian Revolution, 1956,” both presented at

the “Conference on Hungary and the World,

1956.”121 For a detailed, top-secret account of the dis-

orders, see “Zakrytoe pis’mo,” 12 March 1956

(Top Secret), from S. Statnikov, Tbilisi correspon-

dent for Trud, to the CPSU Central Committee,

in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 140, Ll. 53-67.122 “Prikaz No. 14 Nachal’nika Tbilisskogo

garnizona,” from Major-General Gladkov, com-

mander of the Tbilisi garrison, 9 March 1956, in

TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 140, L. 68.123 “O kul’te lichnosti i preodolenii ego

posledstvii,” in KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i

resheniyakh s”ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK,

8th ed. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1978), Vol. 7, p.

212.124 For a cogent analysis of this matter based on

newly declassified materials, see M. R. Zezina,

“Shokovaya terapiya: Ot 1953-go k 1956 godu,”

Otechestvennaya istoriya (Moscow), No. 2

(1995), esp. pp. 129-133.125 See the first-hand account by the former KGB

deputy director, Filipp Bobkov, KGB i vlast’

(Moscow: Veteran MP, 1995), pp. 144-145.126 “TsK KPSS: Informatsiya,” 7 November

1956 (Top Secret), from regional KGB stations

to the CPSU Presidium, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30,

D. 141, L. 67.127 “Rabochaya zapis’zasedaniya Prezidiuma



1006, L. 36ob.128 Bobkov, KGB i vlast’, p. 145. On the new

arrests, see Zezina, “Shokovaya terapiya,” p. 130.129 Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc, p. 153.130 Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha

Khrushcheva,” p. 76.

131 Ibid.132 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma



1006, Ll. 19-22.133 See, for example, Mikoyan’s comments dur-

ing the secret proceedings of the June 1957 CPSU

CC plenum (which removed the Anti-Party

Group), in “Plenum TsK KPSS, iyun’ 1957 goda:

Stenograficheskii otchet,” No. P2500 (Strictly

Secret), 22-29 June 1957, in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op.

1, D. 259, Ll. 27ob-28ob.134 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma



1006, Ll. 23-29; and “Rabochaya zapis’

zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 3 noyabrya

1956 g.,” 3 November 1956 (Top Secret), in

TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 31-33ob.135 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma

TsK KPSS, 2 noyabrya 1956 g.,” L. 24ob.136 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma

TsK KPSS, 3 noyabrya 1956 g.,” L. 32.137 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma

TsK KPSS, 2 noyabrya 1956 g.,” L. 29.138 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma

TsK KPSS, 3 noyabrya 1956 g.,” Ll. 31-33.139 In addition to Kadar’s account in “Rabochaya

zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 2

noyabrya 1956 g.,” see the cable sent to Moscow

by Andropov on 1 November—

”Shifrtelegramma,” 1 November 1956 (Strictly

Secret), in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D. 5, Ll.

17-19—which provides valuable corroboration of

Kadar’s remarks.140 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma

TsK KPSS, 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” Ll. 15-18ob.141 Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha

Khrushcheva,” pp. 74-75.142 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma

TsK KPSS, 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” in TsKhSD,

F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 6-14. The principles of

Pancha Shila were endorsed in a joint statement

by Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai and In-

dian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru in New

Delhi on 28 June 1954. The five principles were

intended to “guide relations between the two

countries” as well as “relations with other coun-

tries in Asia and in other parts of the world.” For

the full text of the statement, see G. V. Ambekar

and V. D. Divekar, eds., Documents on China’s

Relations with South and South-East Asia (1949-

1962) (New York: Allied Publishers, 1964), pp.

7-8.143 In addition to Khrushchev’s account of the

airport meeting, see the contemporary observa-

tions recorded by Micunovic in Moscow Diary,

pp. 132 and 138, which fully bear out

Khrushchev’s version. Unfortunately, all Chinese

archives that might shed greater light on China’s

role in the 1956 events are still closed. For an

assessment based on Chinese-language evidence

that has surfaced to date—largely memoirs

(whose reliability is questionable) and published

compilations of documents selected and edited

by Chinese authorities—see Chen Jian, “Beijing

and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956,” presented at

the “Conference on Hungary and the World,

1956.” Chen Jian and other scholars are seeking

additional evidence on this matter, and their find-

ings will appear in future CWIHP publications.144 First-hand accounts of the meetings are avail-

able in Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity

Sergeevicha Khrushcheva,” pp. 75-77, which

have been well corroborated by other sources,

including Khrushchev’s observations at the time,

as recorded in Micunovic, Moscow Diary, pp.

135, 138-139. Newly declassified documents

pertaining to the meetings are cited below.145 See “Zapis’ telefonogrammy,” c. 1 Novem-

ber 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, L.

66.146 “Protokol Nr. 135 posiedzenia Biura

Politycznego w dn. 1.XI.1956 r.,” 1 November

1956 (Top Secret), in Archiwum Akt Nowych

(AAN), Warsaw, Archiwum Komitetu

Centralnego Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii

Rabotniczej (Arch. KC PZPR), Paczka (Pa.) 15,

Tom (T.) 58, Dokument (Dok.) 134. This proto-

col is included in the valuable collection of de-

classified Polish documents edited by Janos

Tischler, Rewolucja wegierska 1956 w polskich

dokumentach, Dokumenty do dziejow PRL No.

8 (Warsaw: Instytut Studiow Politycznych,

1995).147 “Odezwa Komitetu Centralnego Polskiej

Zjednoczonej Partii Rabotniczej do klasy

robotniczej, do narodu polskiego,” Trybuna Ludu

(Warsaw), 2 November 1956, p. 1.148 “Rozmowy radziecko-wegierskie,” Trybuna

Ludu (Warsaw), 3 November 1956, p. 1.149 Gomulka’s conflicting thoughts about the

matter can be seen in “Stenogram Krajowej

Narady Aktywu Partyjnego odbutego w dn. 4

listopada 1956 r.: Wystapenia W. Gomulki,” 4

November 1956 (Top Secret), in AAN, Arch. KC

PZPR, 237/V-241.150 “Protokol Nr. 136 posiedzenia Biura

Politycznego w dniu 4 listopada 1956 r.,” 4 No-

vember 1956 (Top Secret), in AAN, Arch. KC

PZPR, Pa. 15, T. 58, Dok. 135.151 “Usneseni 151 schuze politickeho byra UV

KSC k bodu 1: Udalosti v Mad’arsku,” 2 No-

vember 1956 (Top Secret), in SUA Praha, Arch.


UV KSC, F. 02/2—Politicke byro UV KSC 1954-

1962, Sv. 120, A.j. 151.152 Khrushchev’s account of this meeting tallies

well with the much more detailed first-hand ac-

count in Micunovic, Moscow Diary, pp. 131-141.

Micunovic’s account is based on notes he com-

piled right after the negotiations, but unfortunately

those notes have not yet turned up in the Yugoslav

archives. (Another document in the former

Yugoslav Central Committee archive refers to the

notes, so it is possible that they still exist some-

where; but the location has not yet been pin-

pointed.) Newly declassified correspondence be-

tween Tito and Khrushchev in early 1957, now

stored in the former CPSU Central Committee

archive, bears out Khrushchev’s and Micunovic’s

memoirs very well, but it also shows that the

memoirs omit a few key details, which are men-

tioned below. See “Pis’mo Tsentral’nogo

Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo

Soyuza ot 10 yanvarya 1957 goda Tsentral’nomu

Komitetu Soyuza Kommunistov Yugoslavii/

Pis’mo Tsentral’nogo Komiteta Soyuza

Kommunistov Yugoslavii ot 7 fevralya 1957 goda

Tsentral’nomu Komitetu Kommunisticheskoi

Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza,” No. P295 (Top Se-

cret), February 1957, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45,

D. 83, Ll. 1-12 and D. 84, Ll. 1-18. John Lampe,

the director of the East European Program at the

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Schol-

ars, reported at the “Conference on Hungary and

the World, 1956,” that he had recently obtained

an official summary of the Brioni meeting from

a colleague who had found it in the papers of

Tito’s biographer, the late Vladimir Dedijer,

among materials evidently intended for a fourth,

never-completed volume. An English translation

of this Yugoslav record of the Brioni talks, with

Lampe’s commentary, is slated for publication in

the next issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.153 For a very useful collection of newly declas-

sified materials tracing Yugoslav-Hungarian re-

lations in late October and early November 1956,

see Jozsef Kiss, Zoltan Ripp, and Istvan Vida,

eds., Magyar-Jugoszlav Kapcsolatok 1956:

Dokumentumok (Budapest: MTA Jelenkor-kutato

Bizottsag, 1995), esp. pp. 125 ff.154 Until recently, this arrangement had not been

disclosed, apart from a few vague references in

Micunovic’s memoirs (Moscow Diary, pp. 137-

138). The first direct revelation of the deal came

in the early 1990s when the top-secret correspon-

dence between Tito and Khrushchev from early

1957 was declassified. See “Pis’mo

Tsentral’nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi

Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza ot 10 yanvarya 1957

goda Tsentral’nomu Komitetu Soyuza

Kommunistov Yugoslavii,” L. 4.155 For Tito’s explanation of why the promise

could not be fulfilled, see “Pis’mo Tsentral’nogo

Komiteta Soyuza Kommunistov Yugoslavii ot 7

fevralya 1957 goda Tsentral’nomu Komitetu

Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza,”

Ll. 17-18.156 Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha

Khrushcheva,” p. 75.157 See Imre Horvath’s handwritten summary (in

Hungarian) of Khrushchev’s remarks, in Magyar

Orszagos Leveltar, XIX J-1-K Horvath Imre

kulugyminiszter iratai, 55, doboz. For some rea-

son, Malin did not record Khrushchev’s speech

in the notes from the full session (“Rabochaya

zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 3

noyabrya 1956 g.,” Ll. 31-33ob.158 A detailed first-hand account of the military

operations can be found in Malashenko, “Osobyi

korpus v ogne Budapeshta” (Part 3), pp. 33-37

and (Part 4), pp. 30-36.159 See, e.g., “Zprava o opatrenich k zesileni

bojove pohotovosti vojsk,” Report from Col.-


slovak General Staff, and Lieut.-General Evzen

Chlad, chief of the Main Logistical Directorate,

to the MNO Collegium (Top Secret), 31 October

1956, in VHA Praha, F. MNO, 1956, GS/OS 2/8-

49b. See also “Rozkaz k provedeni vojenskych

opatreni na hranicich s Mad’arskem,” from Col.-


slovak General Staff, to the 2nd Military District

in Trencin (Strictly Secret), 28 October 1956, in

VHA Praha, F. MNO, 1956, GS/OS, 2/8-2b.160 “Usneseni 151 schuze politickeho byra UV

KSC k bodu 1,” pt. 1.161 Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne

Budapeshte” (Part 3), p. 33.162 Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne

Budapeshta” (Part 4), pp. 32-33.163 Nagy’s cable to UN Secretary-General Dag

Hammarskjold can be found in UN Doc. A/3251.

The appeal and declaration of neutrality were

broadcast on Budapest radio on the evening of 1

November. According to Kadar’s detailed expla-

nation at a CPSU Presidium meeting on 2 No-

vember, Zoltan Tildy was the one who came up

with the idea of a declaration of neutrality. All

the members of the Hungarian cabinet ultimately

voted in favor of it. See “Rabochaya zapis’

zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 2 noyabrya

1956 g.,” Ll. 23-29.164 Micunovic, Moscow Diary, p. 156.165 “Stav Mad’arske lidove armady a priciny

jejiho rozkladu,” Report compiled by KSC CC

Department No. 14 for the KSC CC Politburo, 9

April 1957, in SUA, Arch. UV KSC, F. 100/3 —

Mezinarodni oddeleni UV KSC 1954-1962, Sv.

110, Ar. Jed. 371. For a thorough survey of the

role of the Hungarian army in 1956, see Imre

Okvath, “Magyar tisztikar a hideghaboru

idoszakaban, 1945-1956,” Uj Honvedsegi szemle

(Budapest), No. 1 (1994), pp. 14-27, which is

based on documents from the 1956 collection

(1956-os Gyujtemeny) of the Military History

Archives of the Hungarian National Defense

Ministry (Hadtortenelmi Leveltar, Honvedelmi

Miniszterium). A recent volume by Miklos

Horvath, 1956 katonai kronologiaja (Budapest:

Magyar Honvedseg Oktatasi es Kulturalis

Anyagellato Kozpont, 1993), also draws on these

documents. For a useful first-hand account, see

Bela Kiraly, “Hungary’s Army: Its Part in the

Revolt,” East Europe, Vol. 7, No. 6 (June 1958),

pp. 3-16. Kiraly, as commander of Hungarian

troops in Budapest at the time, led the armed re-

sistance against the invasion.166 On the preparations by Maleter, see Miklos

Horvath, Pal Maleter (Budapest: Osiris/

Szazadveg/1956-os Intezet, 1995), esp. pp. 223-

228.167 “Stav Mad’arske lidove armady a priciny

jejiho rozkladu,” Ll. 4-5. The quoted phrase is

from “Shifrtelegramma iz Budapeshta,” Cable

from A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov to the CPSU

Presidium, 24 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in

AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, Pap. 6, D. 5, L. 2.168 On the disarming operations, see

“Informatsiya o polozhenii v Vengrii po

sostoyaniyu na 21.00 4 noyabrya 1956 goda,”

Report No. 31613 (Top Secret), from Soviet de-

fense minister G. Zhukov to the CPSU Presidium,

and “Informatsiya o polozhenii v Vengrii po

sostoyaniyu na 9.00 5 noyabrya 1956 goda,” Re-

port No. 31614 (Top Secret), from Soviet defense

minister G. Zhukov to the CPSU Presidium, both

in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, Ll. 102 and 103-

104, respectively. See also Malashenko, “Osobyi

korpus v ogne Budapeshta” (Part 3), pp. 34, 37.169 “Informatsiya o polozhenii v Vengrii po

sostoyaniyu na 21.00 6 noyabrya 1956 goda,”

Report No. 31618 (Top Secret), from Soviet de-

fense minister G. K. Zhukov to the CPSU Pre-

sidium, in AVPRF, F. 0536, Op. 1, P. 5, D. 65, L.

63. Among the other cities in which Soviet troops

encountered fierce resistance were Budaorsi,

Csepel, Jaszberenyi, Kaposvar, Kecskemet,

Kobanya, Komlo, Mezokovesd, Miskolc, Obuda,

Pecs, Soroksar, Szolnok, Szombathely, Thokoly,

Ulloi, and Veszprem.170 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma

TsK KPSS, 2 noyabrya 1956 g.,” L. 30.171 Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha

Khrushcheva,” pp. 77-78.


172 Quotations here and in the following para-

graph are from “Rabochaya zapis’zasedaniya

Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 4 noyabrya 1956 g.,” Ll.

34-36ob; and “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya

Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 6 noyabrya 1956 g.,” 6

November 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3,

Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 41-45ob. This bickering was

first described by Khruschev in his memoirs

(“Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva,”

pp. 77-78), and a few additional details (not men-

tioned in Malin’s notes) came to light in the re-

cently declassified transcript of the June 1957

CPSU Central Committee plenum (“Plenum TsK

KPSS, iyun’ 1957 goda,” Ll. 27ob-28ob). The

Malin notes confirm and add a great deal to these

earlier sources.173 The Russian phrase that Molotov used

(odernut’ nado, chtoby ne komandoval) is slightly

awkward in the original, but it can be roughly

translated as it is here.174 See “Plenum TsK KPSS, iyun’ 1957 goda,”

Ll. 2, 25. The charge of “dangerous zigzags” was

leveled by Molotov at a CPSU Presidium meet-

ing a few days before the Central Committee ple-

num.175 Micunovic, Moscow Diary, p. 156.176 “Memorandum from the Director of Central

Intelligence to the President,” 20 November 1956

(Secret), in U.S. Department of State, Foreign

Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vol.

XXV: Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 473, 475.

This FRUS volume contains a large number of

documents essential for understanding the U.S.

government’s response to the events in Poland

and Hungary in 1956, although many other ma-

terials have since been declassified through the

Freedom of Information Act. A collection of

newly declassified materials is available to re-

searchers at the National Security Archive in the

Gelman Library of the George Washington Uni-

versity in Washington, D.C.177 Data on Hungarian and Soviet casualties

come, respectively, from Peter Gosztonyi, “Az

1956-os forradalom szamokban,” Nepszabadsag

(Budapest), 3 November 1990, p. 3; and

“Sobytiya v Vengrii 1956 g.,” in Col.-General G.

A. Krivosheev, ed., Grif sekretnosti snyat: Poteri

vooruzhenykh sil SSSR v voinakh, boevykh

deistviyakh i voennykh konfliktakh: Statist-

icheskoe issledovanie (Moscow: Voenizdat,

1993), p. 397. The number of Soviet deaths was

720, the number of Soviet wounded was 1,540.

The number of Hungarian deaths was 2,502, and

the number of Hungarian wounded was 19,226.178 Attila Szakolczai, “A forradalmat koveto

megtorlas soran kivegzettekrol,” in Evkonyv, Vol.

3 (Budapest: 1956-os Intezet, 1994), pp. 237-

256. Szakolczai provides a considerably lower

figure (229) for the number of executions. The

figure of 600 comes from Maria Ormos, “A

konszolidacio problemai 1956 es 1958 kozott,”

Tarsadalmi Szemle, Vol. 44, Nos. 8-9 (1989), pp.

48-65. See also Janos Balassa et al., eds.,

Halottaink, 2 vols. (Budapest: Katalizator, 1989).179 “Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna

1956,” L. 12.180 Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha

Khrushcheva,” p. 81.181 Testimony of former national defense minis-

ter Lajos Czinege in Magyar Orszaggyules, A

Honvedelmi Bizottsag 1989 oktoberi ulesszakan

letrhozott vizsgalobizottsag 1989 december 11-i,

1990 januar 3-i, 1990 januar 15-i, 1990 februar

6-i ulese jegyzokonyvenek nyilt reszlete, 5 vols.

(1994), Vol. 1, p. 261.182 “Tov. Orlovu A.L.,” Memorandum No. 1869/

2 (Top Secret), 28 December 1956, transmitting

a report prepared by I. Tugarinov, deputy head of

the Foreign Ministry’s Information Committee,

in AVPRF, F. Referentura po Vengrii, Op.36,

Por.9, Pap.47a, D.110, Ll.11-18. An English

translation of this document, as well as an insight-

ful commentary by James Hershberg, can be

found in the Cold War International History Bul-

letin, Issue No.4 (Fall 1994), pp.61-64.183 Micunovic, Moscow Diary, p. 134.184 Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha

Khrushcheva,” pp. 80-82.185 The notion of a tradeoff between “cohesion”

and “viability” is well presented in James F.

Brown, Relations Between the Soviet Union and

Its East European Allies: A Survey, R-1742-PR

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1975).

Mark Kramer, a scholar based at the DavisCenter for Russian Studies at Harvard Uni-versity, is a frequent contributor to theCWIHP Bulletin.

FUNDS SOUGHT TO PROCESSRADIO FREE EUROPE TAPESON 1956 HUNGARIAN EVENTS

For forty years, various politicians,historians, and public figures have de-bated the existence of Radio FreeEurope’s tapes of broadcasts made dur-ing the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.In the summer of 1995, Mr. GyorgyVamos, Director of Documentation forHungarian National Radio, and JudyKatona, M.A., A.B.D., researcher andjournalist, found the recordings in Ger-many—over 500 hours of tape, whichreveal what was broadcast and raiseserious questions concernig policy andintent. These holdings constitute a uniqueand invaluable record for the study ofHungarian history, the role of the UnitedStates and American radio in the 1956Hungarian Revolution, and in general,the role of U.S. media abroad in pro-moting ideology, and internal divergen-cies which led broadcasters to conveymessages about American intentionswhich were at odds with the actual in-tentions of top policy makers during thistense period of the Cold War. We are seeking support of US

$50,000 to finance critical research, in-volving processing of the tapes thatwere previously believed lost and/ormissing, and acquisition of additionalmaterials from other foreign radios andarchives. The sources and the profes-sional contacts are already established. Processing the collection andcomplementing it with additionalbroadcast and recorded materials, willcreate a basis for a meaningful and ob-jective analysis of the American andWestern policies of the time. All mate-rials, of course, would be made freely,equally, and openly available to re-searchers. In the future, in a second phase ofthe research, a major English languagesource document can be published withcontent analysis of the broadcasts, foot-notes, and detailed references. In the first phase of the implemen-tation of the project, money would bespent on researchers’ stipends, transla-tions, acquisition of materials, transcrip-tion, duplications, and travel. For further information, contact JudyKatona at (703) 913-5824 (telephone)or [email protected] (e-mail).


TRANSLATOR’S NOTE:

The translated items below are in chronological order. They include Vladimir Malin’s notes of CPSU Presidium meetings thatdealt with the events in Hungary and Poland in 1956. The notes are supplemented by several other newly released documents thatshed direct light on portions of the notes. Most of the documents, including Malin’s notes, were translated from Russian, but twodocuments (both from the Hungarian National Archive) were translated from Hungarian.

Extensive annotations have been included because of the idiosyncratic style of the notes and the large number of references (toevents, individuals, etc.) that may not be familiar to most readers. Rather than putting in separate annotations to identify specificpersons, I have compiled an identification list of all individuals mentioned in the notes. This list and a list of abbreviations precede thenotes and should be consulted whenever unfamiliar names or abbreviations turn up.

As best as possible, the flavor and style of the original have been preserved in the English translation, but in a few cases I haveexpanded Russian and Hungarian abbreviations and acronyms to avoid confusion. For example, there is no equivalent in English forthe Russian abbreviation “m.b.,” short for mozhet byt’, meaning “perhaps” or “maybe.” Hence, in this particular instance the Englishword has been written out in full. In most cases, the translation seeks to replicate abbreviations and acronyms, but they have been usedonly when it does not cause confusion.

The English translation is not identical to the published Hungarian and Russian compilations of the Malin notes. Both of theseearlier publications contain several errors, including a few that substantially alter the meaning of the original. The fact that mistakescropped up is mainly a reflection of how difficult it is to work with the handwritten originals, which, aside from problems of legibility,are occasionally out of sequence in the archival folders. In some cases the mispagination is easy to correct, but in a few instances thereordering of pages necessitates very close textual analysis. I have corrected all these mistakes in the English translation, and haveincluded details about the corrections in the annotations. --Mark Kramer

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APRF = Arkhiv Prezidenta RossiiskoiFederatsii (Archive of the President of theRussian Federation), MoscowAVH = Allam-Vedelmi Hatosag (State Se-curity Authority; name of Hungarian secretpolice agency after 1949)AVO = Allam-Vedelmi Osztaly (State Secu-rity Department; name of Hungarian secretpolice agency until 1949)AVPRF = Arkhiv vneshnei politiki RossiiskoiFederatsii (Archive of Foreign Policy, Rus-sian Federation), MoscowCC = Central CommitteeCde. = ComradeCPC = Communist Party of ChinaCPSU = Communist Party of the SovietUnionGS/OS = General Staff/Operational Direc-torateHCP = Hungarian Communist PartyHL/HM = Hadtortenelmi Leveltar,Honvedelmi Miniszterium (Hungarian Mili-

THE “MALIN NOTES” ON THE CRISESIN HUNGARY AND POLAND, 1956

Translated and Annotated by Mark Kramer

tary History Archive), BudapestHWP = Hungarian Workers’ PartyHSWP = Hungarian Socialist Workers’ PartyKGB = Committee for State SecurityKSC = Komunisticka strana Ceskos-lovenska (Czechoslovak Communist Party)MVD = Ministry of Internal AffairsPKK = Political Consultative Committee ofthe Warsaw PactPZPR = Polska Zjednoczona PartiaRobotnicza (Polish United Workers’ Party)SUA = Statni ustredni archiv (Central StateArchive), PragueTsAMO = Tsentral’nyi arkhiv Ministerstvaoborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii (CentralArchive of the Ministry of Defense, Rus-sian Federation)TsKhSD = Tsentr Khraneniya SovremennoiDokumentatsii (Center for the Storage ofContemporary Documentation), MoscowUV = Central Committee (of the KSC)VHA = Vojensky historicky archiv (Military-Historical Archive), Prague

INDIVIDUALS MENTIONEDIN THE MALIN NOTES

Three points are worth mentioningabout this list:

First, unless otherwise indicated, thepositions listed for each person are thoseheld during the 1956 crises.

Second, the entries for some Hungar-ian Communist party officials include asmany as three titles for the party. The Com-munist party in Hungary was called theHungarian Communist Party (MagyarKommunista Part) until June 1948, when itcompelled the Hungarian Social DemocraticParty (Magyar Szocial-Demokrata Part) tomerge with it. The combined party was re-named the Hungarian Workers’ Party(Magyar Dolgozok Partja). The Hungar-ian Workers’ Party was dissolved at the endof October 1956, and a new Hungarian So-cialist Workers’ Party (Magyar SzocialistaMunkaspart) was formed on 1 November1956. The acronyms HCP, HWP, and


HSWP will be used in the listings to refer tothe successive incarnations of the Hungar-ian Communist party.

Third, two Hungarian officials whoplayed contrasting roles in 1956 were bothnamed Istvan Kovacs. The identificationsand the translator’s annotations should pre-vent any confusion about which was which.

CPSU CC PRESIDIUM

FULL MEMBERS: NikolaiBULGANIN (prime minister), KlimentVOROSHILOV (chairman of the Pre-sidium of the Supreme Soviet), Lazar’KAGANOVICH (first deputy prime min-ister), Aleksei KIRICHENKO (First Sec-retary of the Ukrainian Communist Party),Georgii MALENKOV (deputy prime min-ister), Anastas MIKOYAN , VyacheslavMOLOTOV (foreign minister until June1956), Mikhail PERVUKHIN , MaksimSABUROV (first deputy prime minister),Mikhail SUSLOV (CPSU CC Secretary),and Nikita KHRUSHCHEV (CPSU CCFirst Secretary).

CANDIDA TE MEMBERS: LeonidBREZHNEV (CPSU CC Secretary),Georgii ZHUKOV (defense minister),Nurotdin MUKHITDINOV , EkaterinaFURTSEVA (CPSU CC Secretary), NikolaiSHVERNIK (chairman of CPSU PartyControl Committee), and Dmitrii SHEP-ILOV (foreign minister after June 1956).

CPSU CC SECRETARIES NOT ONTHE CPSU CC PRESIDIUM

Averki ARISTOV , Nikolai BEL-YAEV , and Pyotr POSPELOV.

OTHERS MENTIONEDIN THE NOTES

ANDICS, Erzsebet: chief historian forthe HWP until the autumn of 1956; fled tothe Soviet Union with her husband, AndorBerei (see below), in late October 1956

ANDROPOV, Yurii: Soviet ambassa-dor in Hungary

APRO, Antal: member of the HCP/HWP Politburo from 1946 to 1951 and 1953to 1956; Hungarian deputy prime ministerfrom November 1953 to 3 November 1956;member of the HWP Presidium from 28October 1956; minister of industry after 4

November 1956; member of the HSWP Pro-visional Executive Committee; senior Hun-garian state official until 1984

BATA , Istvan: Hungarian minister ofnational defense until 24 October 1956; fledto the Soviet Union on 28 October 1956

BEREI , Andor: head of the Hungar-ian state planning bureau from 1954 to 1956;fled to the Soviet Union with his wife,Erszebet Andics (see above), in late Octo-ber 1956

BOLDOCZKI , Janos: Hungarian am-bassador in Moscow

CHERNUKHA , Vladimir: deputyhead of the General Department of theCPSU Central Committee

CYRANKIEWICZ , Jozef: Polishprime minister

DOBI , Istvan: president of Hungary(a largely figurehead post)

DOGEI , Imre: appointed minister ofagriculture in the Provisional Workers’ andPeasants’s Government formed on 4 No-vember 1956

DONATH , Ferenc: well-knowneconomist; leading supporter of Imre Nagy;appointed a Secretary of the HWP on 23-24October 1956; appointed a member of theHSWP Executive Committee on 1 Novem-ber 1956; took refuge in the Yugoslav em-bassy on 4 November 1956; arrested bySoviet troops on 22 November 1956 andtransferred to Romania; sentenced to 12years imprisonment in June 1958; amnestiedin 1960

DUDAS, Jozsef: engineer; one of themost radical leaders of the Budapest rebelforces after 23 October 1956; took part inthe armed resistance against the Soviet in-vasion; arrested by Soviet troops on 21 No-vember 1956; executed in January 1957

DULLES , John Foster: U.S. Secre-tary of State

EGRI , Gyula: HWP Secretary from1955 to 1956; fled to the Soviet Union atthe beginning of November 1956; returnedto Hungary in April 1957

EISENHOWER , Dwight: U.S. Presi-dent

ELYUTIN , Vyacheslav: Soviet min-ister of higher education

EPISHEV, Aleksei: Soviet ambassa-dor in Romania

FARKAS , Mihaly: Hungarian minis-ter of national defense from 1948 to 1953;notorious organizer of mass repression inHungary during the Rakosi era; expelled

from the HWP in mid-July 1956; arrestedon 12 October 1956; sentenced to 16 yearsimprisonment in February 1957; amnestiedin 1961

FIRYUBIN , Nikolai: Soviet ambas-sador in Yugoslavia

GERO, Erno: First Secretary of theHWP from 18 July 1956 to 25 October 1956;fled to the Soviet Union on 28 October 1956

GHEORGHIU-DEJ , Gheorghe: FirstSecretary of the Romanian Workers’ Party

GOMULKA , Wladyslaw: First Sec-retary of the Polish United Workers’ Party(PZPR) from 20 October 1956 to Decem-ber 1970

GROMYKO , Andrei: Soviet firstdeputy foreign minister

GRYAZNOV , Feodosii: counselor atthe Soviet embassy in Yugoslavia

HEGEDUS, Andras: Hungarianprime minister from April 1955 to 24 Octo-ber 1956; first deputy prime minister from24 to 27 October 1956; fled to Soviet Unionon 28 October 1956

HIDAS , Istvan: member of the HWPPolitburo from June 1953 to 26 October1956; deputy prime minister from 1954 to26 October 1956

HORTHY , Admiral Nicolas de: finalcommander-in-chief of the Austro-Hungar-ian Navy; authoritarian leader (with the titleof Regent) in Hungary during the interwarperiod and most of World War II (1920-1944)

HORVATH , Imre: Hungarian foreignminister from 30 July 1956 to 2 November1956; foreign minister in Provisional Work-ers’ and Peasants’ Government formed byJanos Kadar on 4 November 1956

KADAR , Janos: victim of Stalin-erapurges; member of HWP Politburo after 18July 1956; elected HWP First Secretary on25 October 1956; chairman of HWP Pre-sidium from 28 October 1956 until the for-mation of the HSWP on 1 November; mem-ber of the HSWP Executive Committee from1 November; state minister in Imre Nagy’sgovernment from 1 to 4 November 1956;formed a “Provisional Workers’ and Peas-ants’ Government” on 4 November 1956;top leader in Hungary until 1988

KARDELJ , Edvard: vice-president ofYugoslavia; top aide to Tito

KIRALY , General Bela: released fromprison in September 1956; appointed headof the police and armed forces of the Revo-lutionary Committee for Public Order on 30


October 1956; appointed to the Revolution-ary Defense Committee on 31 October 1956;appointed commander of the National Guardon 3 November 1956; one of the leaders ofthe armed resistance to the Soviet invasion

KISS, Karoly: member of the HWPPresidium from 28 October 1956; memberof the HSWP Provisional Executive Com-mittee after 4 November 1956; member ofthe HSWP Politburo from 1957 to 1962

KONEV , Marshal Ivan: commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint ArmedForces; appointed on 1 November as over-all commander of Soviet troops that invadedHungary on 4 November

KOSSA, Istvan: finance minister inthe Provisional Workers’ and Peasants’ Gov-ernment formed by Janos Kadar on 4 No-vember 1956

KOVACS, Bela: Secretary General ofthe Independent Smallholders Party untilFebruary 1947; imprisoned in the SovietUnion from February 1947 until the autumnof 1955; member of Imre Nagy’s cabinetfrom 27 October 1956 (and a state ministerfrom 3 to 4 November 1956)

KOVACS , General Istvan: seniorHungarian army official; appointed chief ofthe Hungarian General Staff; arrested by So-viet KGB troops on 3 November; sentencedto six years imprisonment in 1958;amnestied in 1960

KOVACS , Istvan: senior official inHCP/HWP from 1945 on; member of theHWP Politburo from March 1955; HWPSecretary from November 1955; first sec-retary of the Budapest party committee fromJuly 1954 to 29 October 1956; fled to theSoviet Union on 31 October 1956

LIU Shaoqi: Secretary of the ChineseCommunist Party Central Committee;deputy chairman of the Chinese Commu-nist Party

LOSONCZY , Geza: victim of Stalin-era purges; rehabilitated in 1954; candidatemember of the HWP Politburo from 23 Oc-tober 1956; state minister in Imre Nagy’scabinet from 30 October 1956; member ofthe HSWP Executive Committee from 1 to4 November 1956; took refuge in Yugoslavembassy on 4 November; arrested on 22November and transferred to Romania; im-prisoned in Hungary in April 1957; died inprison in December 1957 under mysteriouscircumstances

MALETER , Pal: colonel in the Hun-garian People’s Army who took the side of

the insurgents after the 1956 revolution be-gan; appointed to Revolutionary DefenseCommittee and a first deputy minister of na-tional defense on 31 October 1956; ap-pointed national defense minister on 3 No-vember 1956 and promoted to the rank ofmajor-general; arrested on the evening of 3November by Soviet KGB troops; executedby hanging along with Imre Nagy in June1958

MALIN , Vladimir: head of the Gen-eral Department of the CPSU Central Com-mittee

MALININ , General Mikhail: firstdeputy chief of the Soviet General Staff;commanded Soviet forces during the initialintervention in Hungary on 23 October

MALNASAN , Aurel: Romaniandeputy foreign minister

MAO Zedong: Chairman of the Chi-nese Communist Party

MAROSAN , Gyorgy: victim ofStalin-era purges; rehabilitated in 1956;member of the HWP Politburo from July toOctober 1956; state minister in the Provi-sional Workers’ and Peasants’ Governmentformed by Janos Kadar on 4 November 1956

MICUNOVIC , Veljko: Yugoslav am-bassador in Moscow

MILOVANOV , Milenko: employeeat the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest; killedby stray Soviet tankfire on 5 November 1956

MINDSZENTY , Cardinal Jozsef: Pri-mate of the Hungarian Catholic Church; im-prisoned from 1948 to July 1955; underhouse arrest from July 1955 until 30 Octo-ber 1956, when he was freed by Hungariansoldiers; took refuge in the U.S. embassyon 4 November 1956 and remained thereuntil 1971, when he was allowed to leavefor Austria

MUNNICH , Ferenc: Hungarian am-bassador in the Soviet Union from Septem-ber 1954 to July 1956; Hungarian ambassa-dor in Yugoslavia from July 1956 to 25 Oc-tober 1956; member of the HWP Presidiumfrom 28 to 31 October 1956; minister of in-ternal affairs from 27 October 1956; deputyhead of the Provisional Workers’ and Peas-ants’ Government formed by Janos Kadaron 4 November 1956

NAGY , Ferenc: leader of the Indepen-dent Smallholders Party from 1945 to mid-1947 and Hungarian prime minister fromFebruary 1946 to June 1947; emigrated tothe United States after the Communistsforced him to resign from his posts

NAGY , Imre: Hungarian prime min-ister from July 1953 to March 1955 and from24 October 1956 to 4 November 1956;sought refuge in Yugoslav embassy on 4 No-vember 1956; arrested by Soviet troops on22 November 1956 and transferred to Ro-mania; executed by hanging in June 1958

NOVOTNY , Antonin: First Secretaryof Czechoslovak Communist Party

OCHAB , Edward: First Secretary ofthe PZPR from March 1956 to 20 October1956

PIROS, Lajos: Hungarian minister ofinternal affairs from 1954 to 27 October1956; fled to the Soviet Union on 28 Octo-ber 1956

PONOMARENKO , Panteleimon:Soviet ambassador in Poland

PONOMAREV , Boris: head of theCPSU CC Department for Ties with For-eign Communist Parties

POPOVIC, Koca: Yugoslav foreignminister

RAJK , Laszlo: top Hungarian Com-munist official; sentenced to death ontrumped-up charges in October 1949; post-humously rehabilitated in March 1956; re-buried in October 1956

RAKOSI , Matyas: HWP First Secre-tary from June 1948 to July 1956; servedsimultaneously as Hungarian prime minis-ter from 1952 to June 1953; fled to the So-viet Union on 26 July 1956, where he spentthe rest of his life

RANKOVIC , Aleksander: Yugoslavminister of internal affairs; party secretaryresponsible for cadres; second most power-ful figure in Yugoslavia and widely regardedat the time as the heir apparent to Tito

ROKOSSOWSKI, Marshal Konstan-tin: Soviet officer serving as Polish nationaldefense minister, December 1949 to No-vember 1956; removed from PZPR Polit-buro on 20 October 1956; recalled to theSoviet Union in mid-November 1956

RONAI , Sandor: former SocialDemocrat; member of HWP Politburo untilJune 1953; appointed minister of commercein Provisional Workers’ and Peasants’ Gov-ernment formed by Janos Kadar on 4 No-vember 1956; chairman of the HungarianState Assembly (parliament) from 1952 to1962

SEROV, Ivan: chairman of the KGBSOBOLEV, Arkadii: Soviet perma-

nent representative at the United NationsSZANTO, Zoltan: member of the


THE MALIN NOTES

DOCUMENT No. 1

Working Notes from the Session of theCPSU CC Presidium on 9 and 12 July1956(Re: Point IV of Protocol No. 28)1

Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov,Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov,Pervukhin, Khrushchev, Shepilov, Belyaev,Pospelov, Brezhnev, Zhukov

Ciph. Teleg. No. . . . from Budapest2

(Khrushchev, Voroshilov, Zhukov,Ponomarev)3

We should call Cde. Mikoyan so that he’llgo take a vacation on Lake Balaton.4

An article should be prepared in our pressabout internationalist solidarity to rebuff theenemy.The subversive activities of the imperial-ists—in Poznan and Hungary. They wantto weaken internationalist ties; and in thename of independence of paths, they wantto foment disunity and destroy [the social-ist countries] one by one.To Cdes. Pospelov, Shepilov, and Pono-marev.5

Perhaps the Italian cdes. could publishsomething in the press.Perhaps Cde. Togliatti will write an article.6

On the Rajk affair7—there must be an eas-ing of the situationRakosi8

(Malenkov, Khrushchev, Voroshilov).9

Cde. Mikoyan should confer with Kovacs,and he should speak firmly.10

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll.2-2ob, compiled by V. N. Malin.]

DOCUMENT No. 2

Working Notes from the Session of theCPSU CC Presidium on 20 October 1956

Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Kaganovich,Malenkov, Mikoyan, Molotov, Pervukhin,Saburov, Suslov, Khrushchev, Brezhnev,Zhukov, Shepilov, Furtseva, Pospelov,Serov.

I. Briefing fr om the CPSU Delegationabout the Trip to Warsaw.11

(Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Molotov,Kaganovich, Konev, Zhukov)

1. There’s only one way out—put an endto what is in Poland.

If Rokossowski is kept, we won’t haveto press things for a while.12

Maneuvers.Prepare a document.Form a committee.13

2. The ambassador, Cde. Ponomarenko,was grossly mistaken in his assessment ofOchab and Gomulka.14

3. We should invite to Moscow represen-tatives from the Communist parties ofCzechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, theGDR, and Bulgaria.15 Perhaps we shouldsend CC officials to China for informationalpurposes.16

4. Send information. Take notice of in-formation. Think through the questions thathave been raised.

II. On Hungar y.

We need to think it over, perhaps send Cde.Mikoyan.17

Cdes. Mikoyan and Zhukov must considerrecalling soldiers to their units.18

Cde. Mikoyan is to draft information forthe fraternal parties.19

Pull out the KGB advisers

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll.49-50, compiled by V. N. Malin]

DOCUMENT No. 3


On the Situation in Poland20

(Molotov, Serov, Zhukov, Mikoyan,Pervukhin, Saburov, Kaganovich,Voroshilov, Suslov, Furtseva, Malenkov)

Cde. Khrushchev:Taking account of the circumstances, weshould refrain from military intervention.We need to display patience. (Everyoneagrees with this.)

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, un-numbered page. Compiled by V. N. Malin.]

DOCUMENT No. 4


Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Kaganovich,Mikoyan, Molotov, Pervukhin, Saburov,Khrushchev, Suslov, Brezhnev, Zhukov,

HWP Politburo from 24 October 1956 (andof the HWP Presidium from 28 October);member of the HSWP Executive Commit-tee from 1 to 4 November 1956; took ref-uge along with Imre Nagy in the Yugoslavembassy on 4 November 1956; arrested bySoviet troops when he left the embassy on18 November 1956; transferred to Roma-nia along with Imre Nagy and other formerofficials five days later; permitted to returnto Hungary in 1958

TILDY , Zoltan: one of the leaders ofthe Independent Smallholders Party untilAugust 1948; under house arrest from Au-gust 1948 to April 1956; a state minister inImre Nagy’s government from 27 October1956 to 4 November 1956; arrested in May1957 and sentenced to six years in prison inJune 1958; amnestied in 1960

TITO , Josip Broz: General Secretaryof the Yugoslav League of Communists;president of Yugoslavia

TOGLIATTI , Palmiro: General Sec-retary of the Italian Communist Party

ULBRICHT , Walter: General Secre-tary of the (East) German Socialist UnityParty (SED)

VAS, Zoltan: top-ranking official inthe HCP and HWP from 1945 on; served aschairman of the Government Commissionon Consumer Supplies during the 1956 revo-lution; took refuge in the Yugoslav embassyon 4 November 1956; arrested when he leftthe embassy on 18 November 1956; trans-ferred along with Nagy and other formerofficials to Romania five days later; allowedto return to Hungary at the end of 1958

VEG, Bela: HWP Secretary from1953 to October 1956

ZORIN , Valerian: Soviet deputy for-eign minister



DOCUMENT No. 5


Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov,Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov, Saburov,Brezhnev, Khrushchev, Zhukov, Shvernik,Furtseva, Pospelov, Yudin.From the CPC CC—Cdes. Liu Shaoqi,25

Exchange of Opinions about the Situationin Poland and Hungary

The point about Rokossowski is the centralquestion.26

(Cde. Liu Shaoqi).Gomulka is taking this to extremes.

Continuation of the session of 26/X at 8:00p.m.27

Review of the information from Cdes.Mikoyan and Suslov.28

Cdes. Shepilov, Brezhnev, and Furtseva areto study it.

Hungarian party workers (126 cdes.) arestudying at the Higher Party School.29

We should provide information to them.Instruct them, carry out work. We mustn’tturn them against the Directory and CC, butshould say there are vacillations within theCC.30

Convene a meeting with them with partici-pation of the Hungarian ambassador andmilitary officers (in the school), and thensend them back there (to Hungary).Hold a meeting with the students and in-form them (at the colleges) perhaps with theambassador present.31

Perform the work.

Three copiesfor Cdes. Brezhnev,Shepilov,Furtseva.32

On the Situation in Hungary33

Cde. Bulganin—Cde. Mikoyan is maintain-ing an improper and ill-defined position, andis not helping the Hungarian leaders put anend to their flip-flops.A firm line must be maintained.34

Cde. Molotov—endorses Cde. Bulganin’sview.We must set certain limits and instruct Cde.

Mikoyan how to act.

Cde. Kaganovich—the real correlation offorces is such that it does not support theconclusions of Cde. Mikoyan.We must adopt a firm position.A Military-Revol. Com’tee must be setup.35

Cde. Malenkov—we sent in troops, and theadversary began to recover.We should tell Cde. Mikoyan that he mustfirmly press Nagy to restore order.

Cde. Zhukov—Cde. Mikoyan is actingimproperly, he’s pushing us toward capitu-lation.We must insist on a firm position.

Cde. Shepilov—the step was extreme, butcorrect.Real power is with the troops.To make further concessions would be re-garded as weakness.

Cde. Furtseva—Cde. Mikoyan, apparently,is mistaken about Nagy. They released1,000 who had been arrested.36

Cde. Khrushchev—Mikoyan is acting ashe said he would.Cde. Mikoyan supported a position of non-intervention, but our troops are there.

A new stage—we don’t agree with the gov-ernment.

We should send reinforcements—Molotov,Zhukov, Malenkov.

Contact should be established with bothHegedus and the others.37

We must write an appeal to our troops.

Prepare a flight.Reinforce the troops.Cdes. Molotov, Zhukov, and Malenkov areto fly off.38

Later we can say definitively.

Regarding Cde. Mikoyan’s trip to Austria—it should be deferred.39

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll.53-53ob, 62-62ob, compiled by V. N. Malin.]

DOCUMENT No. 6

Working Notes from the Session of theCPSU CC Presidium on 28 October195640

Furtseva, Shepilov

On the Situation in Budapest and Over-all in Hungary21

(Cdes. Zhukov, Bulganin, Khrushchev)

Information of Cde. Zhukov.A demonstration by 100 thous. in BudapestThe radio station is on fire.22

In Debrecen the obkom [provincial partycommittee—trans.] and MVD [Ministry ofInternal Affairs—trans.] buildings were oc-cupied.

Cde. Khrushchev speaks in favor of send-ing troops to Budapest.23

Cde. Bulganin believes Cde. Khrushchev’sproposal to send troops is justified.

Cde. Mikoyan: Without Nagy they can’tget control of the movement, and it’s alsocheaper for us. Expresses doubt about thesending of troops. What are we losing? TheHungarians themselves will restore order ontheir own. We should try political measures,and only then send troops.

Cde. Molotov—With Nagy left on his own,Hungary is coming apart. Favors the send-ing of troops.

Cde. Kaganovich—The government is be-ing overthrown. There’s no comparisonwith Poland. Favors the sending of troops.

Cde. Pervukhin—Troops must be sent.

Cde. Zhukov—There is indeed a differencewith Poland. Troops must be sent. One ofthe members of the CC Presidium shouldtravel there. Martial law should be declaredin the country, and a curfew introduced.

Cde. Suslov—The situation in Poland isdifferent. Troops must be sent.

Cde. Saburov—Troops must be sent touphold order.

Cde. Shepilov—Favors the sending oftroops

Cde. Kirichenko—Favors the sending oftroops. Cdes. Malinin and Serov should bedispatched to Budapest.

Cde. Khrushchev—We should recruitNagy for political action. But until then weshouldn’t make a chairman of the govern-ment.Cdes. Mikoyan and Suslov are to fly toBudapest.24


Those Taking Part: Voroshilov, Bulganin,Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov, Saburov,Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Zhukov, Shvernik,Shepilov, Furtseva, Pospelov, Zorin

On the Situation in Hungary(Khrushchev)

Cde. Khrushchev—the matter is becom-ing more complicated.They’re planning a demonstration.41

Kadar is leaning toward holding negotia-tions with the centers of resistance.

We must set Sobolev right at the UN.42

The workers are supporting the uprising(therefore they want to reclassify it as some-thing other than a “counterrevolutionaryuprising”).

Cde. Zhukov provides information.They would refrain from stamping out oneof the centers of resistance.43

An order was given not to permit a demon-stration.

They’re dismantling the railroad tracks in anumber of localities.In Debrecen power has passed to ourtroops.44

Cde. Khrushchev provides information.The situation is complicated.Cde. Suslov is to fly back to Moscow.A Directory has not been declared.They propose that Hegedus be removedfrom the Directory (4 in favor, and 6against).45

The plenum is going on now.46

Cde. Voroshilov—they are poorly in-formed.Cdes. Mikoyan and Suslov are behavingcalmly, but are poorly informed.We’re in a bad situation. We must deviseour own line and get a group of Hungariansto embrace it.Cde. Mikoyan is not able to carry out thiswork.What we intended to do (to send a group ofcomrades) must now be done.We should not withdraw troops—we mustact decisively.Nagy is a liquidator.

Cde. Molotov—things are going badly.The situation has deteriorated, and it isgradually moving toward capitulation.Nagy is actually speaking against us.Our cdes. are behaving diffidently.It is agreed up to what limit we will permitconcessions.

This pertains now to the composition of thegovernment and to the Directory.They are excluding Hegedus, and this meansthey’re no longer showing regard for us.The bare minimum is the question of friend-ship with the USSR and the assistance ofour troops.Cde. Mikoyan is reassuring them.If they don’t agree, we must consider whatwill happen with the troops.

Cde. Kaganovich—a counterrevolution isunder way.Indecisiveness of the Hungarian Commu-nists.Kadar should make certain concessions tothe workers and peasants and thereby neu-tralize the movement.Decisive action is needed against the cen-ters of resistance; we cannot retreat.

Cde. Bulganin—the HWP is actingambivalently.Kadar kept lurching. The main thing is todemand greater decisiveness from Kadar.

We must act as follows—summon Mikoyanto the phone and say: The HWP Politburomust act decisively; otherwise, we will takeaction without you. Perhaps will have toappoint the gov’t directly.47

Cde. Malenkov—we shouldn’t lay blamefor the situation on our comrades. They’refirmly carrying out a line aimed at suppress-ing the uprising. Nagy from the governmentso he can put forth a program [sic—trans.].

Cde. Zhukov—regarding Cde. Mikoyan’srole, it’s unfair to condemn him right now.The situation has unfolded quite differentlycompared to when we decided to send introops.We must display political flexibility.We must organize the CC for more flexibleactions.We must organize armed workers’ brigades.Our troops must be kept in full readiness.The main center of resistance must be sup-pressed.48

Cde. Saburov—agrees with Cde. Zhukov.They must take up their positions at largeenterprises.A program is needed.

Cde. Khrushchev—we will have a lot toanswer for.We must reckon with the facts.Will we have a gov’t that is with us, or willthere be a gov’t that is not with us and willrequest the withdrawal of troops?What then?

Nagy said that if you act he will relinquishhis powers.Then the coalition will collapse.49

There is no firm leadership there, neither inthe party nor in the government.

The uprising has spread into the provinces.The [Hungarian] troops might go over to theside of the insurgents.50

We can’t persist on account of Hegedus.Two options.The gov’t takes action, and we help.This might soon be completed, or Nagy willturn against us.He will demand a ceasefire and the with-drawal of troops, followed by capitulation.

What might the alternatives be?

1) The formation of a Committee, whichtakes power into its hands (this is the worstalternative), when we . . .51

2) This gov’t is retained, and officials fromthe gov’t are sent into the provinces.A platform is needed.Perhaps our Appeal to the population andto workers, peasants, and the intelligentsiashould be prepared, or else we’re just shoot-ing.3) Would it not be appropriate if the Chi-nese, Bulgarians, Poles, Czechs, andYugoslavs appealed to the Hungarians?4) Decisively suppress the armed forces ofthe insurgents.

Cdes. Brezhnev, Pospelov, Shepilov, andFurtseva are to prepare documents.

It is agreed: the fraternal parties should ap-peal to the Hungarians.

Do we support the present government oncethe declaration is issued?52

Yes, support it. There is no alternative.

Cde. Bulganin: . . .53

Cde. Voroshilov: We acted correctly whenwe sent in troops. We should be in no hurryto pull them out.American secret services are more activethere than Cdes. Suslov and Mikoyan are.A group of comrades should go there. Ar-range to form a gov’t and then withdraw thetroops. We sent you there for nothing.54

(Cdes. Khrushchev and Kaganovich object.)

Cde. Bulganin: We acted properly whenwe sent in troops, but I can’t agree with theassessment offered by Cde. Voroshilov. Weshould endorse the actions taken by Cdes.Mikoyan and Suslov.


We must draw the right conclusion: InBudapest there are forces that want to getrid of Nagy’s and Kadar’s government. Weshould adopt a position of support for thecurrent government.Otherwise we’ll have to undertake an occu-pation.This will drag us into a dubious venture.

Cde. Kaganovich: Regarding the sendingof troops, we acted properly in sendingthem.There is no reason to attack Mikoyan andSuslov.They acted properly. It’s unfair to lay theblame on them.If we don’t offer support, there’ll be an oc-cupation of the country.That will take us far afield.We should do what is needed to support thegov’t.Changes shouldn’t be made in the declara-tion regarding the withdrawal of troops.55

So that they speak about friendship.The question is how to strengthen the party.We don’t need to send additional peoplethere.

Malenkov:56 The actions that were takenwere correct.There is no point at all in condemning Cdes.Mikoyan and Suslov.We should support the new gov’t.We should keep troops there with the ap-proval of the gov’t.

Cde. Malenkov: So many people were in-volved there that there’ll have to be a guar-antee of an amnesty.

Cde. Molotov: We acted properly when wesent in troops. The initial messages fromCdes. Mikoyan and Suslov were reassuringabout their view of the government.The influence of the party on the masses isweak.With regard to the new government, weshould support it.But regarding friendship with the USSR,they’re talking about the withdrawal oftroops. We must act cautiously.

Cde. Zhukov: We must support the newgov’t.The question of a troop withdrawal fromHungary—this question must be consideredby the entire socialist camp.The authority of the HWP CC must beraised.We should appeal to the fraternal parties sothat they, in turn, will issue appeals to theHungarians.

In Budapest, we should pull troops off thestreets in certain regions.Perhaps we should release a statement fromthe military command.With regard to the assessment of Cdes.Mikoyan and Suslov, it’s inappropriate tosay the things that Cde. Voroshilov did.

Cde. Saburov: We must support this gov’t.The authority of the gov’t must be increasedin the eyes of the people.We shouldn’t protest their assessments ofevents, and we shouldn’t protest about thewithdrawal of troops, albeit not an immedi-ate withdrawal.

Cde. Khrushchev: Agrees with the cdes.We must support this gov’t.We must devise our tactics.We must speak with Kadar and Nagy: Wesupport you; the declaration—you evidentlyare not able to do more.57

We will declare a ceasefire.We are ready to withdraw troops fromBudapest.We must make this conditional on aceasefire by the centers of resistance.

Cde. Molotov: Second, we must look afterthe Hungarian Communists.58

Cde. Bulganin—the regime of people’sdemocracy in the country has collapsed.The HWP leadership no longer exists.Power has been gained by . . .59

Cde. Kaganovich—we’re not talking hereabout concessions, but about a war for thepeople.The declaration must be adopted.60

A troop withdrawal from Budapest.

Cde. Voroshilov: If only a group could beformed there, we could leave our troops inplace.There’s no one to rely on.Otherwise there’s war.

Cde. Khrushchev—I support the declara-tion.Politically this is beneficial for us.61

The English and French are in a real messin Egypt. We shouldn’t get caught in thesame company.62

But we must not foster illusions.We are saving face.

Fundamentally, the declaration must beadopted.But adopt it with corrections.63

Life in the city must be put right.

An appeal from the fraternal parties.64

A ciphered cable to Yugoslavia.65

Cde. Pospelov is to be included in prepara-tions of the report for 6.XI.56

If there is to be a leaflet from the militarycommand, let . . .66

HegedusGeroPiros

them to Bulgaria.67

On the Situation in Hungary68

(Cde. Suslov)

Cde. Suslov: The situation is complicated.On 23 Oct. our troops entered.69

On 25 Oct. only one pocket of resistancewas left; we found out about it on 26 Oct. Itwas in the “Corvin” cinema, a group headedby a colonel from the Horthyite army.70

Single gunshots are heard (often).They’re beating officers.3,000 wounded, 350 dead (Hungarians).Our losses are 600 dead.The popular view of our troops now is bad(and has gotten worse). The reason is thedispersal of the demonstration on 24 Oct.56.71 Shooting began. 70 ordinary citi-zens were killed. Many flags were hung upon the sidewalk.

Workers are leaving their enterprises.

Councils are being formed (spontaneously)at enterprises (around various cities).72

There is an anti-Soviet trend in the demon-strations.

How can we regain control of the situation?The establishment of a relatively stronggov’t.

Our line is not to protest the inclusion ofseveral democrats in the gov’t.Yesterday a government was formed.

On the morning of 28 Oct., at 5:00, Kadararrived and pointed out that the trade unionshad demanded a reassessment of the insur-gents, reclassifying the events as a national-democratic uprising.73

They want to classify it according to theexample of the Poznan events.Kadar reported that he had succeeded inagreeing with the trade unions to eliminatethe formula of a national-democratic move-ment and about the organs of state security.

In his address, Nagy inserted a point aboutthe withdrawal of Soviet troops.


They’re also insisting on a ceasefire.

Our line now: this time the gov’t is recom-mending a ceasefire, and the military com-mand is devising an order for the withdrawalof troops from Budapest.74

Nagy and Szanto raised the question of re-moving Hegedus from the Directory.75

There’s no need to hold elections.

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll.54-63, compiled by V. N. Malin.]

DOCUMENT No. 7


(Re: Point 1 of Protocol No. 49)77

Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov,Molotov, Kaganovich, Saburov, Brezhnev,Zhukov, Shepilov, Shvernik, Furtseva,Pospelov

On the Situation in Hungary

Information from Cdes. Mikoyan and Serovis read aloud.78

Cde. Zhukov provides information aboutthe concentration of mil.-transport aircraftin the Vienna region.79

Nagy is playing a double game (in Malinin’sopinion).Cde. Konev is to be sent to Budapest.80

On Discussions with the Chinese com-rades.81

(Khrushchev)

We should adopt a declaration today on thewithdrawal of troops from the countries ofpeople’s democracy (and consider thesematters at a session of the Warsaw Pact),taking account of the views of the countriesin which our troops are based.

The entire CPC CC Politburo supports thisposition.

One document for the Hungarians, and an-other for the participants of the Warsaw Pact.

On Rokossowski—I said to Gomulka thatthis matter is for you (the Poles) to decide.82

Cde. Bulganin—The Chinese cdes. have anincorrect impression of our relations withthe countries of people’s democracy.

On our appeal to the Hungarians—weshould prepare it.A declaration should be prepared.

Cde. Molotov—Today an appeal must bewritten to the Hungarian people so that theypromptly enter into negotiations about thewithdrawal of troops.There is the Warsaw Pact.This must be considered with other coun-tries.On the view of the Chinese comrades—theysuggest that relations with the countries ofthe socialist camp be built on the principlesof Pancha Shila.83

Relations along interstate lines are on onebasis and interparty relations on another.

Cde. Voroshilov: We must look ahead.Declarations must be composed so that wearen’t placed into an onerous position. Wemust criticize ourselves—but justly.

Cde. Kaganovich—Pancha Shila, but Idon’t think they should propose that webuild our relations on the principles ofPancha Shila.Two documents—an appeal to the Hungar-ians and a Declaration.In this document we don’t need to provideself-criticism.There’s a difference between party and staterelations.

Cde. Shepilov—The course of events re-veals the crisis in our relations with thecountries of people’s democracy.Anti-Soviet sentiments are widespread.The underlying reasons must be revealed.The foundations remain unshakable.Eliminate the elements of diktat, not givingplay in this situation to a number of mea-sures to be considered in our relations.The declaration is the first step.There is no need for an appeal to the Hun-garians.On the armed forces: We support the prin-ciples of non-interference.With the agreement of the government ofHungary, we are ready to withdraw troops.We’ll have to keep up a struggle with na-tional-Communism for a long time.

Cde. Zhukov—Agrees with what Cde.Shepilov has said.The main thing is to decide in Hungary.Anti-Soviet sentiments are widespread.We should withdraw troops from Budapest,and if necessary withdraw from Hungary asa whole.This is a lesson for us in the military-politi-cal sphere.

Cde. Zhukov—With regard to troops in theGDR and in Poland, the question is moreserious.It must be considered at the ConsultativeCouncil.84

The Consultative Council is to be convened.

To persist further—it is unclear what willcome of this.A quick decision, the main thing is to de-clare it today.

Cde. Furtseva—We should adopt a generaldeclaration, not an appeal to the Hungarians.Not a cumbersome declaration.

The second thing is important for the inter-nal situation.

We must search for other modes of relationswith the countries of people’s democracy.

About meetings with leaders of the people’sdemocracies (concerning relations).

We should convene a CC plenum (for in-formational purposes).85

Cde. Saburov: Agrees about the need for aDeclaration and withdrawal of troops.At the XX Congress we did the correct thing,but then did not keep control of the un-leashed initiative of the masses.It’s impossible to lead against the will ofthe people.We failed to stand for genuine Leninist prin-ciples of leadership.We might end up lagging behind events.Agrees with Cde. Furtseva. The ministersare asking; so are members of the CC.86

With regard to Romania—they owe us 5billion rubles for property created by thepeople.87

We must reexamine our relations.Relations must be built on an equal basis.

Cde. Khrushchev: We are unanimous.As a first step we will issue a Declaration.

Cde. Khrushchev—informs the othersabout his conversation with Cde. Mikoyan.

Kadar is behaving well.5 of the 6 are firmly hanging in there.88

A struggle is going on inside the [HWP—trans.] Presidium about the withdrawal oftroops.

The minister of defense will issue a direc-tive about the suppression of insurgents inthe cinema, using the armed forces.


(Malinin, apparently, became nervous andleft the session.)

Officers from the state security (Hungarian)are with our troops.89

Consideration of the Draft Declaration(Shepilov, Molotov, Bulganin)

Cde. Bulganin—we should say in whatconnection the question of a Declarationarose.Page 2, Par. 2, don’t soften the self-criticism.Mistakes were committed.Much use should be made of “Leninist prin-ciples.”

Cde. Khrushchev—expresses agreement.We should say we are guided by Leninistprinciples.Page 2, Par. 5—we should say we are mak-ing a statement, not an explanation.Page 3—we should speak about economicequity, make it the main thing.We should say that no troops are stationedin the majority of countries.We should say that on the territory of thePolish, Hungarian, and Romanian states thestationing of troops is done with the con-sent of their governments and in the inter-ests of these gov’ts and peoples.90

We should express our view of the govern-ment of Hungary.Measures to support them.About support for the party and HWP CCand for the gov’t. We should refer specifi-cally to Nagy and Kadar.

Cde. Kaganovich, Cde. Molotov, Cde.Zhukov: We should mention the Potsdamagreement and the treaties with every coun-try.91

Cde. Zhukov—We should express sympa-thy with the people. We should call for anend to the bloodshed.

Page 2, Par. 2: We should say the XX Con-gress condemned the disregard for principlesof equality.

Cde. Zhukov—we should speak about eco-nomics.Restructuring was thwarted after the XXCongress.(Cde. Khrushchev)We are turning to the member-states of theWarsaw Pact to consider the question of ouradvisers.92 We are ready to withdraw them.

Further editing.93

Transmitted via high frequency to Cdes.Mikoyan and Suslov.

Information fr om Cde. Yudin on Nego-tiations with the Chinese Comrades.

What’s the situation: Will Hungary leaveour camp? Who is Nagy? Can he betrusted? About the advisers.

Those taking part: Bulganin, Voroshilov,Kaganovich, Molotov, Saburov,Khrushchev, Zhukov, Brezhnev, Shepilov,Shvernik, Furtseva, Pospelov, Yudin. Chi-nese comrades.

On the Situation in Hungary(Cde. Khrushchev,Cde. Liu Shaoqi)

Cde. Liu Shaoqi indicates on behalf of theCPC CC that troops must remain in Hun-gary and in Budapest.94

Cde. Khrushchev—there are two paths.A military path—one of occupation.A peaceful path—the withdrawal of troops,negotiations.

Cde. Molotov—the political situation hastaken clearer shape. An anti-revol. gov’t hasbeen formed, a transitional gov’t.95 Weshould issue the Declaration and explain ourposition. We should clarify our relationshipwith the new gov’t. We are entering intonegotiations about the withdrawal of troops.

Nagy—the prime minister.Kadar—a state minister.Tildy Zoltan— “Kovacs Bela—Losonczy—a Communist and a supporterof Nagy96


DOCUMENT No. 8


(Re: Point VI of Protocol No. 49)98

Information about Discussions withGomulkaRegarding the Situation in Poland andHungary99

(Khrushchev)

A meeting with Cde. Gomulka (in the Brestregion) was proposed.

On Hungary

Cde. Khrushchev sets forth the variousconsiderations.We should reexamine our assessment andshould not withdraw our troops from Hun-gary and Budapest.100 We should take theinitative in restoring order in Hungary. Ifwe depart from Hungary, it will give a greatboost to the Americans, English, andFrench—the imperialists.They will perceive it as weakness on ourpart and will go onto the offensive.We would then be exposing the weaknessof our positions.Our party will not accept it if we do this.To Egypt they will then add Hungary.101

We have no other choice.If this point of view is supported and en-dorsed, let’s consider what we should do.

Agreed: Cdes. Zhukov, Bulganin, Molo-tov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Saburov102

We should say we tried to meet them half-way, but there is not now any government.What line are we now adopting?

We should create a Provisional Revol. Gov’t(headed by Kadar).103

Best of all—a deputy.Munnich—as premier and min. of defenseand internal affairs.104

This government—we should invite themto negotiations about the withdrawal oftroops and resolve the matter.If Nagy agrees, bring him in as dep. pre-mier.105

Munnich is appealing to us with a requestfor assistance. We are lending assistanceand restoring order.We should negotiate with Tito.We should inform the Chinese comrades, theCzechs, the Romanians, and the Bulgar-ians.106

There will be no large-scale war.

Cde. Saburov—after yesterday’s sessionthis discussion is all pointless.It will vindicate NATO.

Cde. Molotov—yesterday was only a com-promise decision.

Cdes. Zhukov, Voroshilov, Bulganin: Weshould reject the view that we are reexam-ining our position.

Cde. Furtseva—What further should bedone?We showed patience, but now things havegone too far. We must act to ensure that


victory goes to our side.

Cde. Pospelov—we should use the argu-ment that we will not let socialism in Hun-gary be strangled.

Cde. Shvernik—Cde. Khrushchev’s pro-posal is correct.

Cde. Molotov—we should not defer thecreation of organs in localities. We shouldact simultaneously in the center and in thelocalities.

Cde. Zhukov is instructed to work out a planand report on it.107

Shepilov, Brezhnev, Furtseva, and Pospelovare to handle the propaganda side.108

An appeal to the people from the militarycommand or the government.An appeal to the people from the Prov.Revol. Gov’t.An order from Cde. Konev.109

We should send a group to the region of Cde.Konev’s headquarters.110

Cde. Rakosi—favors Munnich (as pre-mier)111

Cde. Hegedus— “Cde. Gero— “

Apro112

KadarKiss Karoly113

BoldoczkiHorvath

On Negotiations with Tito(Cdes. Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin)

Draft a telegram to Tito about the meet-ing.114

To Brest: Khrushchev, Molotov, Malen-kov.115

To Yugoslavia: Khrushchev, Malenkov.

To discuss with you the situation that hasemerged in Hungary. What is your view ofit? If you agree, our delegation will visitincognito from1. XI in the evening to2. XI in the morning your time.

Confirm the telegram to the Soviet ambas-sador in Belgrade.


DOCUMENT No. 9

Notes of a Telephone Message from F. N.Gryaznov, a Counselor at the USSR Em-bassy in Yugoslavia, on 31 October 1956

The message was transmitted throughKardelj.

Cde. Tito is at Brioni. Kardelj reportedthat Tito is prepared to meet with Cdes.Khrushchev and Malenkov on 1 November.However, because the doctors have forbid-den him to leave his current premises in viewof his illness, Tito requests that our delega-tion, if possible, come to Brioni.

As Kardelj further said, it would be de-sirable if the aircraft carrying the delega-tion arrived at the airport in Pula at roughly5:00 p.m. Belgrade time so they can leavefrom the airport for Brioni with the approachof darkness.

Instructions about the flight path andthe landing in Pula will be given in duecourse.

Kardelj requested that we let him knowthe time of departure for the aircraft and thetime of arrival in Pula.


DOCUMENT No. 10

Notes of a Telephone Message116

There was a certain common under-standing. The position is what we expected.This is an internal affair. There should notbe interference.

Reaction is rearing its head.8-10% at elections.Arm the workers, let them keep the

weapons.

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, L.66, compiled by V. N. Malin.]

DOCUMENT NO. 11

Working Notes from the Session of theCPSU CC Presidium on 1 November 1956(Re: Point I of Protocol No. 50)117

Those Taking Part: Voroshilov, Bulganin,Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, Suslov,Brezhnev, Zhukov, Shvernik, Furtseva,Pospelov, Konev, Serov118

On the Situation in Hungary.(Cdes. Mikoyan)

The demand for the withdrawal of troopsbecame universal.Anti-Soviet sentiments have intensified.(Cde. Mikoyan )In current circumstances it is better now tosupport the existing gov’t.Right now, the use of force will not helpanything.We should enter into negotiations. For 10-15 days.If the regime slips away, we’ll need to de-cide what to do. We simply cannot allowHungary to be removed from our camp.

We shouldn’t quarrel right now with thearmy.If the situation stabilizes, we should decideat that point whether we’ll withdraw thetroops.We should wait another 10-15 days and sup-port this government.If the situation stabilizes, everything willchange for the better.

Cde. Suslov: The unstable polit. situation.The danger of a bourgeois restoration hasreached its peak.

The situation will be clarified in the nextfew days.

Events are developing wildly, but withoutthe control of the party.A schism in the HWP—the intra-partystruggle has spilled out onto the streets.I don’t believe that Nagy organized the up-rising, but his name is being used.

If we back this gov’t—there is no guaran-tee.

Only by means of an occupation can wehave a government that supports us.

Cde. Serov—the demonstrations were me-ticulously prepared. Nagy was connectedwith the rebels.

We must take decisive measures.We must occupy the country.

Cde. Bulganin—provides informationabout the decision taken on 31-X-56 andabout the discussions with the Chinese com-rades.119

Cde. Bulganin: The international situationhas changed.120

If we don’t take measures—we will loseHungary.

Cde. Konev—Budapest is in the hands ofthe rebels.


Anarchy is spreading; reaction is triumph-ing.The decision: occupation.

Cde. Kaganovich: The discussion wascomplicated.121

The Chinese said we should not withdrawtroops.Objectively—a sharp reactionary move-ment.The party doesn’t exist.We can’t wait long.The reactionary forces are attacking, and weare attacking.122

Cde. Furtseva—reactions to the Declara-tion.Are worried that we’re giving away Hun-gary.123

Cde. Zhukov—there is no basis for recon-sidering the decision of 31-X-56.I don’t agree with Cde. Mikoyan that wemust support the current gov’t.Our actions must be decisive.Remove all the unsavory elements.Disarm the counterrevolution.

Delay the parliamentary delegation toFrance.To the ambassador in Budapest—send thefamilies.124

Reconsider sending a parliamentary delega-tion to Thailand.

Cde. Bulganin—everything is being donein the spirit of the decision of 31 X.

Cde. Zhukov: Everything will be restoredto order.We are acting on the basis of the Declara-tion—the redeployments will bring order.

Cde. Suslov—now the situation has becomeclearer.Separate out the honest ones.125

Zhukov, Suslov, Konev, Serov, Brezhnev(the plan of measures).126

Those Taking Part: Voroshilov, Bulganin,Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, Suslov,Brezhnev, Zhukov,Shepilov, Shvernik,Furtseva, Pospelov, Konev, Serov

On the Situation in Hungary(Mikoyan)

About our embassy in Hungary.(Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Zhukov,Shepilov)

So far, to keep the embassy.127

On the main question.

Cde. Shepilov: There were two paths: toreckon with the mass nature of the move-ment and not to intervene; or second, themilitary path; it turned out there was a thirdpath: both that we intervened and that reac-tion triumphed.

The current situation: a counterrev. putschhas been carried out, and the state order haschanged; the main trend is anti-Soviet; thechief orientation of forces is being orches-trated from outside.If we don’t embark on a decisive path, thingsin Czechoslovakia will collapse.128

We must establish order by the use of force.

Cde. Mikoyan: If Hungary becomes a basefor imperialism, that’s a different matter.What we’re talking about here is the cur-rent situation.We should not tolerate a pedantic approach.There are still 3 days to think it over; there’llbe advice from the comrades.The tactic: to maintain contacts withthem.129

Cdes. Suslov, Brezhnev, + Hungarian com-rades—to prepare measures (on which cadres to relyand what we will do).


DOCUMENT No. 12

Working Notes from the Session of theCPSU CC Presidium on 2 November1956, with Participation by J. Kadar, F.Munnich, and I. Bata130

Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov,Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Molotov, Saburov,Suslov, Brezhnev. Cdes. Munnich, Kadar,and Bata

Exchange of Opinions about the Situationin Hungary

An assessment.131

The intelligentsia is taking the lead;the oppositionists are supporters of Nagy;the armed groups are headed byparty figures, includingDudas, an engineer.132

When the uprising ended, they spoke withthe rebels;these were workers, the leaders of the group;they arrived at the coalition government;they didn’t want this;

they’re seeking the ouster of the Rakosiclique.

They fought for the withdrawal of troopsand for the order of people’s democracy.133

Mass demonstrations are taking place on theperiphery;these didn’t include any goal—to destroythe order of people’s democracy; many de-mands about democratization, and socialdemands.

I personally took part in one meeting (of theconference), and no one wanted counter-revolution.

But when we spoke with the leaders of thearmed groups, inside these groups—armedgroups of a counterrevolutionary naturehave emerged.

I have to say that everyone demanded thewithdrawal of Soviet troops.We didn’t clarify how the counterrevolution-aries managed to disseminate this counter-revolutionary propaganda.

The strike is a demand for the withdrawalof troops: we’ll starve in the process, butthe troops must be withdrawn.

Yesterday there was a conference.

They were speaking about the Declarationof the Soviet government and the Declara-tion of neutrality.134

Stated that we will go back to work.But Soviet troops were being redeployed,and the news quickly spread.

The government will not be considered tohave any authority because of the coalitionnature of the government.All forces are seeking the restoration of theirparties. Each group wants to take powerinto its own hands. This undermines theauthority of the government even further.The Soc.-Democrats are especially distinc-tive in this regard.

In the inner cabinet the Soc.-Dems. weregiven one spot. But they haven’t named acandidate; they don’t want to act in solidar-ity with Nagy.135

Nagy’s policy has counterrev. aspects to it.The soldiers freed Cardinal Mindszenty.136

The Austrians support a fascist organization(in West Germany—a Hungarian organiza-tion) 35 thous. people (Horthyites).


The weak link is the HWP; it has ceased toexist: some have been killed (workers),some were saved.

The leaders of 1/3 of the obkoms are takingpart in revolutionary committees (for the re-gion and province).Local bodies have been destroyed.

On 1 Nov. at noon—the point of view in thegovernment is that it’s necessary to holddiscussions with the Soviet gov’t and to havethe troops withdrawn by a certain time.But this isn’t accurate.137

The coalition parties don’t want counterrev.Tildy and other cdes. are afraid of FerencNagy.138

Those in the emigre community: they’reafraid of them.Tildy is afraid of Kovacs, but he’s better thanTildy and is a smart man.

Kovacs gave a speech in Pecs:139 we arecreating a Smallholders party, but we can’tstruggle on the basis of the old program.He is against the return of the landownersand capitalists.

But they aren’t putting forth demands thatare popular in the nation.

Hour by hour the situation is moving right-ward.

2 questions:1) the gov’t’s decision about neutrality,2) the party.

How did the decision about neutralityemerge?

The strong impression is that there’s an or-ganized departure of troops.The Declaration—a good impression and areassuring gesture.But the masses are very stirred-up and arereacting harshly.There were movements of Sov. troops,which alarmed the gov’t and masses.140

The gov’t is doing one thing, and the troopsanother.

They reported that Soviet troops had crossedthe border in transport vehicles. Hungarianformations are entrenched.What should be done—to shoot or not toshoot?They summoned Andropov. Andropov saidthat these are railroad workers.Hungarians at the border sent back tele-grams saying that these definitely are notrailroad workers.Then they reported that Soviet tanks are

moving into Szolnok.This was at noon. The government has beenthrown into a nervous state.They summoned Andropov. He responded:the withdrawal of wounded soldiers.

Nagy was convinced that a strike againstBudapest is being prepared. Tildy requestedthat Hungarian tanks approach the parlia-ment.

In the army—a Rev. Council,Maleter, Kovacs,141 and Kiraly are not sub-ordinate to the gov’t.They don’t want bad ministers.

The whole gov’t was inclined to the viewthat if the troops move toward Budapest, thecity must be defended.In this atmosphere the idea of neutralityarose.The initiator of it was Zoltan Tildy.Everyone supported it.I was a supporter of the view that no sortsof steps should be taken without having spo-ken with Andropov.

The whole cabinet, other than Kadar, de-clared that the Sov. gov’t is deceiving theHungarian gov’t.They deferred it for two hours.The Sov. gov’t’s explanation didn’t satisfythem. They told Andropov that they’ll betaking this step.142

When Andropov left, they took their stepabout neutrality and decided to issue an ap-peal to the UN.If these are just maneuvers, they’ll withdrawthe question from the UN.When Andropov left, Kadar voted for neu-trality, too.The renaming of the party: the HungarianSocialist Workers’ Party (a name used backin 1925).The HWP has been compromised in theview of the overwhelming masses.The peak of the HWP’s authority was in1948 (the alliance with the Soc.-Dems.).The Rajk affair shattered its authority.

About the future.

Yesterday I voted for these two decisions ofthe government.

If they will withdraw Soviet troops in thenear future (within two-threemonths)—the decision on the withdrawal oftroops is the important thing—our party andother parties would be able to fight againstthe counterrev.But I’m not sure this will be successful.There’s no unity within the coalition.

My point of view is: if the Soc.-Dems. andthe Smallholders party are going to operateon the basis of their old progams, they willbe deceitful.

The people believe in nationalism and re-gard it as their affair.143

If the Communists declare that they supportnationalism, the authority of the other par-ties will stop increasing.

The looming danger—the counterrevolutionwouldn’t embolden these coalition parties.

My view is that there’s another path.The armed forces could be deployed to sup-port Hungary.But then there will be skirmishes.The use of military force will be destruc-tive and lead to bloodshed.What will happen then? The morale of theCommunists will be reduced to zero.The socialist countries will suffer losses.Is there a guarantee that such circumstanceswill not arise in other countries?

The counterrev. forces are not meager.But this is a matter of struggle.If order is restored by force, the authorityof the socialist countries will be eroded.

Munnich:A gloomy situation.Why did this situation arise?The isolation of the leaders from the masses.Certainty that the regime exists and is pre-served only through the support of theUSSR.144

This is the source of anti-Soviet sentiments(facts: soccer, radio broadcasts).145

In Hungary: total chaos.What would be the result if the troops arewithdrawn—this would respond to the sen-timent of the masses.

Counterrev. elements are receiving rein-forcement, and their actions are not beingstopped.We have no more forces left.

On the military nature of the events.Anti-Soviet sentiments are being spread bycounterrev. elements.

Cde. Kadar—a concrete request:preserve the party cadres.

Cde. Bata:The question is pointedly raised about thewithdrawal of Soviet troops.Everything all of them are doing will leadto a confrontation of Soviet and Hungariantroops.


I was a witness when a Hungarian unitopened fire on Soviet troops.The Soviets didn’t respond. Further suchrestraint couldn’t be expected from even themost disciplined army.Whether deliberately or not, the gov’t is lay-ing the groundwork for a confrontation ofSoviet and Hungarian troops.Order must be restored through a militarydictatorship.Change the policy of the government.


DOCUMENT No. 13

Working Notes from the Session of theCPSU CC Presidium on 2 November 1956(Re: point IV of Protocol No. 50)146

On the Plan for Measures ConcerningHungary147

(Zhukov, Serov, Konev, Molotov, Mikoyan,Kaganovich, Bulganin, Voroshilov)

1) to speak about the threat of fascismposed by the Horthyites;148

the threat to our homeland,they want to use it as a base againstour country;the workers and peasants supportus.Adopt it with amendments.

2) send Cdes. Mikoyan and Brezhnev149

(decide on 3 XI 56).

Approve the plan.150

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L.30, compiled by V. N. Malin.]

DOCUMENT No. 14

Notes of a Secure Phone Call from theUSSR Ambassador in Romania, A. A.Epishev151

3/XI/56

Bucharest, Cde. Epishev152

A message.

Late in the evening of 2 Nov. after adiscussion with the Soviet ambassador, ImreNagy summoned the Romanian ambassadorand told him that he, Imre Nagy, has re-ceived verified information that Soviettroops are entering the country.

In this connection, he asks the ambas-

sador to transmit to Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej hisrequest for advice on what to do.

This request to the ambassador hasbeen transmitted to Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej.

Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej responded to theambassador—in a message to be conveyedto Imre Nagy—that he received his appealand stated, by way of reassurance, that forthe life of the Hungarian working class andof the Hungarian Republic it is never toolate, and I am sending Cde. Malnasan toyou.153

The response has not yet been sent toBudapest.

3/XI/56

An LI-2 aircraft (a single one) will flyout of Bucharest at 10:20 Bucharest timefor a trip into Budapest city airport. Onboard the aircraft is Malnasan.154


DOCUMENT No. 15

Working Notes from the Session of theCPSU CC Presidium on 3 November1956, with Participation by J. Kadar, F.Munnich, and I. Horvath

Those Taking Part: Voroshilov, Bulganin,Kaganovich, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Molotov,Kirichenko, Saburov, Suslov, Brezhnev,Pospelov155

On the Preparation of Documents for Usein Hungary(Khrushchev, Mikoyan)

The documents are poorly prepared.Cdes. Suslov, Mikoyan, and Shepilov areto prepare the documents.156

On the Composition of the HungarianGov’t(Mikoyan)157

Cde. Mikoyan: At the head of the gov’t isKadar.

Kadar—it is worth speaking about mis-takes, but for a long while there was no time.About one matter—why in the summer theychose Gero as secretary.The Soviet comrades always helped, butthere was one mistake: only 3-4Hungarian cdes. enjoyed the full trust of theSoviet cdes.: Rakosi, Gero, Farkas.

But among others there are many orderlypeople.3-4 individuals monopolized relations be-tween Hungary and the USSR.This is the source of many mistakes.

Rakosi would say “this is the view of theSoviet cdes.,” and that would put an end tothe debate.

On the exclusion of Nagy from the party:Rakosi said that the Soviet cdes. share hisview.

Cde. Kadar—the decisions of the XX Con-gress were heartily welcomed.158

To criticize Rakosi means speaking outagainst the Soviet cdes.

The congratulatory telegram in Rakosi’sname (caused confusion).159

For 12 years: the Soviet comrades werecalm with Rakosi at the head and then Gero(they didn’t raise objections to them).

What now?On Nagy’s behavior.They’re killing Communists.The counterrev. are killing them, and pre-mier Nagy provides a cover.

The government lacks the forces to put anend to it.

What must be done?Surrendering a socialist country tocounterrev. is impossible.I agree with you.The correct course of action is to form a rev.government.

I’d like to dwell on one point:the whole nation is taking part in the move-ment.The nation does not want to liquidate thepeop.-dem. order.

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hun-gary has great significance.We are being strengthened in our militaryrelationship, and are becoming weaker inthe political.National sentiments are offended (form,title).

Cde. Kadar:This government must not be puppetlike,there must be a base for its activities andsupport among workers.There must be an answer to the question ofwhat sort of relationship we must have with


the USSR.

Cde. Munnich:Believes that Cde. Kadar’s assessment andconclusions are correct.

Cde. Kadar—the center of counterrev. isin the city of Gyor.160

If we declare Nagy’s gov’t counterrev., allparties will fall under this rubric.The government does not want to struggleagainst the counterrev.

The position:on the basis of defending the peop.-dem.order, socialist gains, and friendship withthe USSR and with other socialist countriesand cooperation with all peaceloving coun-tries.

At the head of the gov’t is Kadar.

To send: Malenkov, Mikoyan, Brezhnev.161

To fly off: (at 2:00-3:00) at 7:00 to 8:00 inthe morning.

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L.31-33ob, compiled by V. N. Malin.]

DOCUMENT No. 16

Imre Horvath’s Notes of Khrushchev’sSpeech at the 3 November Session162

Khrush., Bulg., Vorosh., Malen., Molot.,Kagan., Mikoyan, Brezhnev

Khrush.: Organized counterrev.Events are without letup.From the north.Mistakes of Rakosi, Gero, + others

Miskolc!163

We are doing a lot, but not everything!This is no justification for the fact thatthere are no Hungarian leaders!Rakosi was paralyzed, but we didn’t activelyspeak out. We were too late in requestingthat he be replaced.It’s my fault and Mikoyan’s that we pro-posed Gero rather than Kadar.164 We gavein to Gero. Rak. and Gero are honorable andcommitted Communists. But they did manystupid things.Rak. is hardline, and Gero hapless.They criticized I. Nagy and regarded himas an opportunist, but he is also a traitor.The exclusion of I. Nagy from the party wasa mistake and a reflection of Rak.’s stupid-ity. We would have arrested I. Nagy. Wewere for admitting him back into the party.Some of the rebels are not enemies! Theywere antagonized by the mistakes of theleadership. We welcome your (Kad.’s)

choice. We cannot regard I. Nagy as a Com-munist. Dulles needs someone just like I.Nagy. We uphold the Declaration. But withI. Nagy that’s impossible!Eng. + Fr. Egypt.165 We consulted withother parties. Malen., Khr. Poland.We can’t be observers on the sidelines.Yug., Rankovic, Kardelj, Micunovic, theambassador in Mosc. + Malenk., Khrush.Alarm!Revol. government. The traitors want to useKadar as a screen. If I. Nagy is not forcedinto retirement, he’ll be working for the en-emy.

—Munnich — Apro | Hidas deputy, —Ronai | Berei internal affairs, Kiss | Andics defense —Marosan—Kadar as chairman Kovacs—Kossa at finance Egri

Veg They want to isolate Kadar

—DogeiMiskolc |—> BudapestSzolnok |

[Source: Magyar Orszagos Leveltar, XIX J-1-K Horvath Imre kulugyminiszter iratai,55, doboz.]

DOCUMENT No. 17

Working Notes from the Session of theCPSU CC Presidium on 4 November 1956(Re: Protocol No. 51)

Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov,Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov,Pervukhin, Saburov, Suslov, Khrushchev,Zhukov, Shepilov, Furtseva, Pospelov.

On the Operations and Situation in Hun-gary166

Cde. Kaganovich’s ciphered cable fromCde. Malininat Cde. Khrushchev(4 XI).167

1) Bring back Cdes. Mikoyan and Brezhnev.2) Provide assistance to Hungary.168

3) More actively take part in the assistanceto Egypt.169

Think through a number of measures (per-haps a demonstration at the English em-bassy).More widely in the newspapers.

Cde. Molotov—think about Hungary.Exert influence on Kadar so that Hungarydoes not go the route of Yugoslavia. Theymade changes in the Declaration—they nowcondemn the Rakosi-Gero clique—and this

might be dangerous.170

We must convince them that they shouldrefrain from this referenceto the Rakosi-Gero clique.

Kadar is calling (1 XI) for a condemnationof Stalinism.171

The title of Hungarian Workers’ Partyshould be retained.We should come to agreement with themand prevent them from shifting to Yugoslavpositions.

Cde. Molotov—reinforce the military vic-tory through political means.

Cde. Khrushchev—I don’t understandCde. Molotov. He comes up with the mostpernicious ideas.

Cde. Molotov—you should keep quiet andstop being so overbearing.

Cde. Bulganin—we should condemn theincorrect line of Rakosi-Gero.

Cde. Khrushchev:The declaration is good—we must act honorably.

Cde. Shepilov—during the editing theyadded the phrase “the clique of Rakosi andGero.”We are giving them legal opportunities todenigrate the entire 12-year period of theHWP’s work.

Cde. Shepilov—is it really necessary to dis-parage cadres?Tomorrow it will be the “clique ofUlbricht.”172

Cde. Saburov—if they themselves don’tcomprehend their mistakes, we will deal atlength with the matter.

Reward the military personnel.Take care of the families of those who per-ished.173

V. On Purging the Higher EducationalInstitutions of Unsavory Elements(Cdes. Zhukov, Khrushchev, Furtseva,Pervukhin, Voroshilov)

Furtseva, Pospelov, Shepilov, and Elyutinare to come up with recommendations forpurging the higher educational institutionsof unsavory elements.174

IV. On the Response to Cde. Kardelj andthe Telegram About Imr e Nagy


Affirm the text of the response.175

On Instructions to the Soviet Ambassa-dor in Hungary

On the Raising of the Question at the Gen.Assembly’s Session on Hungary

Cde. Kadar is to say that he will withdrawthe question from the UN.176


DOCUMENT No. 18

Working Notes from the Session of theCPSU CC Presidium on 5 November 1956(Re: Point VIII of Protocol No. 52)

On the Party in Hungary177

(Khrushchev, Zhukov, Molotov)

Today this question need not be considered.The old name (HWP) will not be suitable.The name must be in accord with Marxist-Len. content.

Cde. Zhukov—consult with secretaries ofthe provincial party committees.

Cde. Molotov—it would be important topreserve the old name of the HWP.

Cde. Voroshilov—through the CC weshould hold a conference of the party aktivand consult about the name of the party.

Cde. Malenkov—we don’t need to considerit right now.

Cde. Kaganovich—consider it organiza-tionally, in essence.

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll.40-40ob. Compiled by V. N. Malin.]

DOCUMENT No. 19

Working Notes from the Session of theCPSU CC Presidium on 6 November 1956(Re: Protocol No. 53)

Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Malenkov,Mikoyan, Molotov, Kaganovich, Pervukhin,Saburov, Suslov, Khrushchev, Brezhnev,Zhukov, Shepilov, Shvernik, Furtseva,Aristov, Belyaev, Pospelov178

I. On the Appeal of the Provisional CCof the Hungarian Socialist (Workers’)Party179

(The text is read aloud by Cde. Malenkov.)

Cde. Mikoyan—overall it should beadopted.

Cde. Molotov—in whose name is the docu-ment being issued (from the CC)? The com-position of the CC is still unknown. It isunclear what entity is supporting democra-tization if there is still a CC of the HWP. Inactuality, the dissolution of the party is be-ing proposed.A new party will be created on an unknownbasis. Where will it lead?

In April 1956 there was an appeal from theCPSU CC. We sent greetings to the HWPCC (we acknowledged their services).180

They’re talking about acknowledgment ofMarxism-Leninism, but in reality everythingcan be acknowledged.

So far we have concurred in not resolvingthe question of the renaming of the party.We should not use the expression “theRakosi clique.”181

Cde. Suslov—the draft of the appeal is cor-rect—no one is talking about the dissolu-tion of the HWP. The party’s basic prin-ciples are being preserved.We must support it. On the “clique”—theissue is not the name, but the mistakes thatwere made. The Hungarian comrades againwill have suspicions; let’s dispel them.

Cde. Kaganovich: This is a step forward.Having discreet influence on Kadar. Over-all it should be adopted.We should try to suggest not changing thename of the party. We should suggest theyspeak about friendship with the USSR. Weshould suggest they decline mentioning boththe name and the Rakosi clique.

Cde. Bulganin—The Declaration is fine.Cde. Mikoyan’s changes are correct.As forthe statements by Cdes. Molotov andKaganovich: no one is talking about thedissolution of the HWP. That’s a mislead-ing argument.There is no principled basis for Cde.Molotov to couch the matter that way.

On friendship with the USSR, we shouldn’tmention it. Leave it as they propose (spo-ken about friendship).

Cde. Pervukhin—a proper document.The HWP CC collapsed. It’s not true that ifwe call something a “clique,” we’re con-demning the whole party.

Cde. Malenkov—without harsh criticism ofRakosi we won’t be able to strengthen the[Hungarian] leadership.They’re setting forth their own program. ACC plenum should not be convened (sinceNagy is also a member of the CC).182

Cde. Zhukov—we must decisively supportCde. Kadar. Otherwise they won’t under-stand us. Rakosi conducted an inapprop.policy, which must be condemned.

Cde. Saburov—I support Cde. Mikoyan.

Cde. Molotov—we must not forget that achange of names is a change of character.What’s going on is the creation of a newYugoslavia. We are responsible for Hungary(without Stalin).I vehemently object.

Cde. Furtseva—raises the question: wherewere the leaders?The people fully support them.

Cde. Brezhnev: The Declaration is appro-priate. It’s pointless to theorize about it.

Cde. Saburov: Cdes. Molotov andKaganovich are simplistically and dogmati-cally approaching the question.The party will be better.

Cde. Mikoyan—Cde. Molotov is com-pletely ignoring the concrete situation—Cde. Molotov is dragging us backward.Speak about Nagy.

Cde. Voroshilov—Cde. Molotov’s state-ments are fundamentally correct.But in this case it’s impossible to adopt.

Cde. Aristov—we must endorse and sup-port Cde. Kadar. The statements by Cdes.Molotov and Kaganovich—they clung to thecult of Stalin, and they’re still clinging to it.

Cde. Shvernik—Cde. Molotov is incorrect.How can we not say something if Rakosicaused a great deal of harm?

Cde. Shepilov—the document is appropri-ate. Say—a condemnation of Nagy. On the“clique”: we will leave a stain on the so-cialist past.

Cde. Khrushchev—a good draft.We should make changes. Indicate whichgroup is presenting it. If the CC is convened,it should be said then that we have faith inKadar.183 For Cde. Molotov this is logical(Cde. Molotov doesn’t come out and say it,but he’s thinking of bringing back both


Hegedus and Rakosi).

Rakosi caused enormous damage, and forthis he must be held accountable.He must be excluded from the party.184

Cde. Khrushchev:Cde. Kaganovich, when will you mend yourways and stop all your toadying? Holdingto some sort of hardened position. WhatCde. Molotov and Kaganovich are propos-ing is the line of screeching and face-slap-ping. Speak about Nagy. About Losonczyand Donath.

Cdes. Mikoyan, Suslov, and Brezhnev areto transmit our changes and requests in atactful manner.

II. Ciph. Tel. No. . . . from . . . .(Zhukov, Shepilov)185

Affirm as an unfortunate event.186


DOCUMENT No. 20

Working Notes from the Session of theCPSU CC Presidium on 27 November1956(Re: Protocol No. 60)187

I. Fr om Bucharest.(Khr., Vorosh., Kagan., Mik., Mol., Perv.,Bulg., Sab., Zhuk., Grom.)

It’s not advisable.188

We should inform Dej that this is not to ouradvantage, and is not to the advantage ofHungary.

Cde. Bulg. is to negotiate with Cde. Dej.189

Zhukov—we should state our view of theposition of the Yugoslavs.

Khr. —we don’t need to enter into corre-spondence with Tito about Imre Nagy; that’sa matter for Hungary to handle. It was amistake for our officer to go into the bus.190

II. 191

Instructions to:The Foreign MinistryKGB, and

On the discrediting of Imre.192

Konev

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L.52, compiled by V. N. Chernukha.]

TRANSLATOR’S NOTES

1 Protocol No. 28 was the formal protocol draftedfor this session, which is now stored in TsentrKhraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii(TsKhSD), Moscow, Fond (F.) 3, Opis’ (Op.) 14,Delo (D.) 41, Listy (Ll.) 1-2. The session washeld on both 9 and 12 July 1956, but the itemcovered here (Point IV) was discussed solely onthe 12th.2 This refers to a ciphered telegram from theSoviet ambassador in Hungary, Yu. V. Andropov,on 9 July 1956. The lengthy telegram, stored inArkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF),F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 151-162, recounts a dis-cussion that Andropov had with the Hungarianleader, Erno Gero, three days earlier. Gero hadspoken about the disarray within the Hungarianleadership and the growing ferment in Hungar-ian society.3 Here and elsewhere in Malin’s notes, the list-ing of surnames in parentheses after the title of asession means that these individuals spoke, in thesequence indicated, about the given topic. Theformal protocol for this session, as cited in Note1 supra, reveals that Molotov, Kaganovich, andBulganin also spoke about the subject.4 Mikoyan arrived in Budapest the following day(13 July) and was there until 21 July. The mostimportant of the ciphered telegrams, secure phonemessages, and reports that he and Andropov sentback from Budapest during this time were declas-sified in 1992 and published in “Vengriya, aprel’-oktyabr ’ 1956 goda: Informatsiya Yu. V.Andropova, A. I. Mikoyana i M. A. Suslova izBudapeshta,” Istoricheskii arkhiv, No. 4 (1993),pp. 110-128. Lake Balaton, the largest lake inCentral Europe, is a popular Hungarian vacationsite that was also favored by party and govern-ment leaders.5 This means that preparation of a lead editorialfor Pravda was entrusted to Pospelov, Shepilov,and Ponomarev. (The formal protocol for thesession, as cited in Note 1 supra, explicitly stated:“Instruct Cdes. Pospelov, Shepilov, andPonomarev to prepare, on the basis of the ex-change of opinions at the CPSU CC Presidiumsession, an article for publication in the pressabout the internationalist solidarity of workers inthe countries of people’s democracy and aboutthe intrigues of imperialists who are carrying outtheir subversive work to weaken ties among thecountries of the socialist camp.”) The article, pub-lished on 16 July, denounced the “intrigues ofimperialist agents” who were seeking to exploitthe ferment in Eastern Europe after the 20th CPSUCongress. It claimed that members of the PetofiCircle in Hungary had “fallen under the influenceof imperialist circles” and were “disseminatingtheir anti-party views under the guise of a dis-cussion club.”6 Togliatti was indeed contacted by the Hungar-ian newspaper Szabad Nep, at Moscow’s behest,on 12 July 1956 about the possibility of givingan interview to explain the “significance of pro-letarian internationalism” and how to “strengthenthe positions of the popular-democratic order inHungary.” Before the interview could be con-ducted, however, Mikoyan informed the CPSU

Presidium, shortly after his arrival in Budapeston 13 July, that the situation in Hungary wouldnever improve so long as Rakosi remained theleader of the Hungarian Workers’ Party (HWP).Acting on behalf of the Soviet Presidium,Mikoyan engineered the dismissal of Rakosi fromthe HWP leadership and all other posts, a stepthat Rakosi’s colleagues welcomed, but had notdared to pursue on their own in the absence of adirect Soviet initiative. The new information fromMikoyan caused the CPSU leadership to send anew cable to Togliatti on 13 July (“Shifr-telegramma,” 13 July 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op.14, D. 43/2, L. 2) urging him to be aware, in anyinterviews he might give about Hungary, thatRakosi would not be in power much longer.Moscow’s willingness to rely on Togliatti is some-what surprising because a recent interview withTogliatti, published in the Italian Communist dailyL’Unita on 17 June 1956, had provoked dismayin certain quarters of the HWP leadership. TheSoviet ambassador in Budapest, Yurii Andropov,had noted these misgivings in an important cablehe sent to the CPSU Presidium on 9 July. See“Shifrtelegramma,” from Yu. V. Andropov, 9 July1956 (Strictly Secret—Special Dossier), in APRF,F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 151-162. Andropov hadrecommended that newspapers in East Germanyand Czechoslovakia be asked to publish articlesin support of Rakosi, but he made no such rec-ommendation about L’Unita.7 Laszlo Rajk was one of the leaders of the HWPuntil 1949, when he fell victim to the Stalinistpurges. In October 1949 he was sentenced todeath on trumped-up charges, a case that Rakosihelped mastermind. Following Stalin’s death,rehabilitations of the “unjustly repressed” beganin all the East-bloc countries, albeit at varyingrates. This process moved rather slowly in Hun-gary and did not initially extend to Rajk and hisassociates, but calls for the rehabilitation of Rajksteadily increased. After Rakosi staged a come-back in March-April 1955, he tried, for obviousreasons, to deflect the growing pressure for Rajk’srehabilitation. In early 1956, however, the pro-cess of rehabilitation in Hungary gained greatermomentum because of the limited “thaw” inspiredby the 20th Soviet Party Congress. On 28 March1956, Rakosi finally gave in and announced theformal rehabilitation of Rajk, though his an-nouncement (published in Szabad Nep on 29March) contained no admission of personal re-sponsibility for the case. On 18 May, Rakosi didacknowledge a degree of personal culpability forthe repressions of 1949-1952 (though not for theRajk case), but this was not enough to curb po-litical unrest in Hungary. Rakosi was dismissedfrom his posts as HWP First Secretary and anHWP Politburo member by the HWP CentralLeadership (i.e., Central Committee) on 18 July1956. (At Mikoyan’s behest, the dismissal hadbeen arranged by the HWP Politburo on 13 Julyand was then formally endorsed by a plenum ofthe HWP Central Leadership five days later.)Subsequently, Rakosi was stripped of all his otherposts. On 26 July 1956, Rakosi fled to the SovietUnion, where he spent the remaining 25 years ofhis life in exile. Back in Hungary, Rajk and threeother high-level victims of the purge trials in 1949(Gyorgy Palffy, Tibor Szonyi, and Andras Szalai)were reinterred in formal ceremonies on 6 Octo-


ber 1956, an event that contributed to the grow-ing social unrest in Hungary.8 This passage in Malin’s notes is ambiguous be-cause Rakosi’s surname, like other foreign sur-names that end in vowels other than “a,” doesnot decline in Russian. Most likely, Khrushchevwas saying that “we must alleviate Rakosi’s situ-ation.” It is possible, however, that Khrushchevwas saying that “Rakosi must alleviate the situa-tion,” which would imply the need for Rakosi tostep down. Unfortunately, there is no way to de-termine which of these two, very different inter-pretations is correct. The Hungarian edition ofthe Malin notes fails to take account of this am-biguity. See Vyacheslav Sereda and Janos M.Rainer, eds., Dontes a Kremlben, 1956: A szovjetpartelnokseg vitai Magyarorszagrol (Budapest:1956-os Intezet, 1996), p. 19. Sereda and Raineropt for the former interpretation (“we must alle-viate Rakosi’s situation”) without even consider-ing the latter.9 Here and elsewhere in Malin’s notes, the inclu-sion of surnames in parentheses after a statementor proposal means that these individuals sup-ported the statement or proposal.10 The formal protocol for this session (see cita-tion in Note 1 supra) contained the followingpoint on this matter: “Instruct Cde. Mikoyan totravel to Hungary for discussions with the lead-ership of the Hungarian Workers’ Party.” The ref-erence here is to Istvan Kovacs, a top HungarianCommunist official who fled to Moscow at theend of October 1956, not to Bela Kovacs, theformer Secretary General of the IndependentSmallholders’ Party. Soviet leaders knew thatIstvan Kovacs had long been dissatisfied withRakosi’s performance. See “Telefonogramma vTsK KPSS,” from M. A. Suslov to the CPSU Pre-sidium and Secretariat, 13 June 1956 (Top Se-cret), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 6, D. 483, Ll. 146-149.11 On 19 October 1956, the day before this Pre-sidium meeting, Khrushchev led a top-level So-viet delegation on an unannounced visit to War-saw. The Soviet delegates held tense negotiationswith the Polish leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, inan effort to prevent the removal of MarshalKonstantin Rokossowski and other officials fromthe Politburo of the Polish United Workers’ Party(PZPR). The Soviet delegates were unsuccess-ful in their task, despite exerting strong militaryand political pressure on Gomulka. For a fulleraccount of the meeting, see the notes by one ofthe participants, Anastas Mikoyan, in “Zapis’besedy N. S. Khrushcheva v Varshave,” October1956, No. 233 (Strictly Secret—Special Dossier),in APRF, Osobaya papka, F. 3, Op. 65, D. 2, Ll.1-14.12 Marshal Konstantin Rokossowski, a Polish-born officer who had lived most of his life in theSoviet Union and was a marshal in the Sovietarmy, was installed as defense minister and com-mander-in-chief in Poland in December 1949. Healso was a full member of the PZPR Politburo.He was one of hundreds of high-ranking Sovietofficers who were brought into the Polish armyin the late 1940s and early 1950s. Not surpris-ingly, their presence caused widespread resent-ment. For a detailed account of this phenomenon,see Edward Jan Nalepa, Oficerowie Radziecky wWojsku Polskim w latach 1943-1968: Studiumhistoryczno-wojskowe (Warsaw: Wojskowy

Instytut Historyczny, 1992). Here and elsewherein Malin’s notes, Rokossowski’s surname is mis-spelled as “Rokkosowski.” The spelling has beencorrected in the translation.13 It is not entirely clear from these brief pointswhat the Soviet Presidium was intending to do.Most evidence suggests, however, that theyplanned to hold new military exercises in Polandand to form a “provisional revolutionary commit-tee” of pro-Soviet Polish officials, who wouldthen be installed in place of Gomulka. This isroughly what occurred with Hungary in early No-vember, when a “revolutionary workers’ and peas-ants’ government” was formed in Moscow, withJanos Kadar and Ferenc Munnich at its head.Kadar’s government was installed when Soviettroops moved in on 4 November.14 Khrushchev declined to mention that he him-self—and the rest of the Soviet leadership— had“grossly” misjudged the situation in Poland overthe previous few months. This was evident, forexample, when Ochab stopped in Moscow in Sep-tember 1956 on his way back from Beijing. See“Priem Posla Pol’skoi Narodnoi Respubliki vSSSR tov. V. Levikovskogo, 10 sentyabrya 1956g.,” 11 September 1956 (Secret), memorandumfrom N. Patolichev, Soviet deputy foreign minis-ter, in Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki RossiiskoiFederatsii (AVPRF), F. Referentura po Pol’she,Op. 38, Por. 9, Papka, 126, D. 031, L. 1.15 This session of the CPSU CC Presidium washeld on 24 October. See the assessment of themeeting and translation of handwritten Czechnotes by Mark Kramer, “Hungary and Poland,1956: Khrushchev’s CPSU CC Presidium Meet-ing on East European Crises, 24 October 1956,”Cold War International History Project Bulletin,Issue No. 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 50-56.16 As it turned out, Khrushchev phoned Mao, andthe Chinese leader decided to send a high-leveldelegation to Moscow for consultations. Thedelegation, led by Liu Shaoqi, arrived on 23 Oc-tober and stayed until the 31st.17 Not until three days later would the uprisingin Hungary begin, but Andropov’s telegrams fromBudapest on 12 and 14 October had kept theCPSU leadership apprised of the rapidly mount-ing crisis within the HWP and Hungarian soci-ety. The two telegrams were declassified in 1992and published in “Vengriya, aprel’-oktyabr’ 1956g.,” pp. 110-128.18 The reference here is to the large number ofSoviet officers who were busy at the time help-ing out with the harvest. Although the uprisingin Hungary had not yet begun, Soviet troops inthat country had been preparing since mid-Julyto undertake large-scale operations aimed at “up-holding and restoring public order.” A full “Planof Operations for the Special Corps to RestorePublic Order on the Territory of Hungary,” whichreceived the codename “Volna” (Wave), was ap-proved on 20 July 1956 by General PyotrLashchenko. See “Plan deistvii Osobogo korpusapo vosstanovleniyu obshchestvennogo poryadkana territorii Vengrii,” in Tsentral’nyi arkhivMinisterstva oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii(TsAMO), F. 32, Op. 701291, D. 15, Ll. 130-131.See also the account by Lieut.-General E. I.Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta”(Part 1), Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No 10(October 1993), pp. 24-25. The proposal to re-

call Soviet troops from their agricultural work waspart of the “Volna” plan, which placed Sovietforces on increased alert in mid-October andbrought them to full combat alert by 20-21 Octo-ber at the behest of the Soviet General Staff. Thefull plan was due to be put into effect when asignal known as “Kompas” was received.19 No such informational report had actually beenprepared by 21 October, when a meeting of East-bloc leaders was hastily arranged. But by the timethe meeting was held on 24 October, the start ofthe uprising in Hungary on 23 October forcedKhrushchev to cover the events in Hungary insome detail. See Kramer, “Hungary and Poland,1956,” pp. 1, 50-56.20 Unfortunately, only a small fragment of thissession has been found. It is possible that miss-ing pages will turn up in other parts of the Malincollection, but for now the brief (but important)section below is all that is available.21 The formal protocol for this session (ProtocolNo. 48) did not list the Hungarian question amongthe twelve other matters considered here. Themost likely reason is that Mikoyan was opposedto the use of Soviet troops in Hungary, preferringinstead to rely on political mediation (see below).The Presidium therefore had to adopt its decisionwithout unanimity, an unprecedented step for suchan important matter. As a result, no decree onthis issue was included as an extract in the for-mal protocol.22 In fact, the radio station was not on fire, butheavy smoke from several nearby cars that hadbeen set alight had created the impression thatthe building, too, was burning. Zhukov’s refer-ence to the storming of the radio building indi-cates that this CPSU Presidium meeting musthave taken place shortly after 10 p.m. Moscowtime. The storming of the building was sparkedmainly by the broadcast of a hardline speech byErno Gero at precisely 10 p.m. Moscow time (8p.m. Budapest time). It is clear that the CPSUPresidium meeting was over by around 11 p.m.(Moscow time), when orders were transmitted byZhukov for the mobilization of five Soviet divi-sions. See “TsK KPSS,” memorandum fromZhukov and Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, chiefof the Soviet General Staff, to the CPSU Pre-sidium, 24 October 1956 (Strictly Secret—Spe-cial Dossier), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll.85-87. Hence, the meeting must have been heldbetween 10 p.m. and 11 p.m. It is remarkablethat, for a session convened at such short notice,so many Presidium members were able to attend.Although a meeting had already been scheduledto discuss other matters, it was abruptly movedup to take account of the situation in Hungary.23 Khrushchev is referring here to the requestsfor military intervention he had received fromErno Gero. The request came initially via YuriiAndropov (who transmitted Gero’s appeal toMoscow and followed up with an emergencyphone call) and then was repeated during a phonecall that Khrushchev placed to Gero. A writtenappeal from then-prime minister Andras Hegedus,supposedly delivered on the night of 23-24 Octo-ber 1956, was transmitted by Andropov in a ci-phered telegram on 28 October. See“Shifrtelegramma” (Strictly Secret—Urgent), 28October 1956, in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D.5, L. 12.


24 Mikoyan, Suslov, Malinin, and Serov arrivedsomewhat late in Budapest because inclementweather forced Mikoyan’s and Suslov’s plane tobe diverted to an airport 90 kilometers north ofthe capital. A Soviet armored personnel carrier,accompanied by tanks, brought the four intoBudapest, where they promptly began sendingreports back to Moscow. See “Shifrtelegramma”from Mikoyan and Suslov to the CPSU Pre-sidium, 24 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), inAVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D. 5, Ll. 1-7. A ret-rospective account of Mikoyan’s and Suslov’s ar-rival in Budapest, by Vladimir Kryuchkov, whowas a senior aide to Andropov in 1956 and wholater followed in Andropov’s footsteps at theKGB, claims that Mikoyan’s and Suslov’s planewas diverted northward because it came underfire and was struck by a machine gun. Kryuchkovalso asserts that Mikoyan and the others had towalk for more than two hours to reach the em-bassy. See Vladimir Kryuchkov, Lichnoe delo, 2vols. (Moscow: Olimp, 1996), vol. 1, p. 58. Thereis no evidence whatsoever to back upKryuchkov’s assertions. On the contrary,Mikoyan’s and Suslov’s contemporaneous reportseems far more reliable than Kryuchkov’s ten-dentious memoir.25 The notes provide no further names of mem-bers of the Chinese delegation, who were in Mos-cow for consultations between 23 and 31 Octo-ber. The delegation, headed by Liu Shaoqi, in-cluded the CPC General Secretary, DengXiaoping, as well as three lower-ranking officials:Wang Jiaxing, Hu Qiaomu, and Shi Zhe. Sovietleaders conferred with them several times aboutthe events in Poland and Hungary.26 By this point, Rokossowski already had beenremoved from the PZPR CC Politburo. The onlyremaining question was whether he would be keptas Polish national defense minister.27 For the continuation of the session, see theportion below and the explanation in Note 33 in-fra.28 On 26 October, Mikoyan and Suslov sent fouremergency messages via secure telephone to theCPSU Presidium. See the longest and most im-portant of these messages, “Telefonogramma,” 26October 1956 (Top Secret—Deliver Immedi-ately), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 123-129.29 The reference here is slightly awry. The num-ber given in parentheses (126) refers to the totalnumber of Hungarians studying in Moscow, in-cluding party workers, military officers, state se-curity officials, and others. See “Zapis’ besedy sposlom Vengerskoi Narodnoi Respubliki tov.Yanoshem Boldotskim, 26 oktyabrya 1956 g.,”Cable No. 597/AR (Secret) from A. A. Gromyko,Soviet deputy foreign minister, to the CPSU Pre-sidium, 26 October 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64,D. 484, Ll. 116-117. Malin’s notes imply thatthe figure includes only HWP officials studyingat the Higher Party School.30 A “Directory,” which served as the highestHWP organ, had been created by this point underSoviet auspices, but its existence had not yet beenofficially announced. The existence of the Di-rectory was acknowledged for the first time on28 October (three days after it had been set up),when it was renamed the HWP Presidium andwas formally granted supreme power by the HWP

Central Committee.31 The reference here is to young people fromHungary studying in the Soviet Union, who wouldnot have been included in the 126 mentionedabove.32 This annotation was in the bottom left-handmargin of Malin’s notes. It refers to copies of themessages from Mikoyan and Suslov.33 According to Khrushchev’s remarks above, thesession on 26 October was to be reconvened at 8p.m. to consider the latest information fromMikoyan and Suslov. The double-sided page ofhandwritten notes pertaining to the continuationof the session, which is provided here, was out ofsequence in File 1005. In the earlier publishedversions of Malin’s notes (the Hungarian transla-tion and the original Russian), this fragment isincorrectly placed at the end of the 28 Octobersession. Close analysis of the text reveals thatthe fragment must have come before, not after,the portions on the 28th. The fact that the 26October session was due to be reconvened sug-gests that this is precisely what the fragment cov-ers, rather than being part of a separate meetingon the 27th. (There is no evidence that the Pre-sidium met on the 27th to discuss the situation inHungary.)34 Bulganin is complaining about the long tele-grams and secure phone messages that Mikoyanand Suslova had been sending to Moscow on 25and 26 October. See Note 28 supra. See also“Shifrtelegramma,” 25 October 1956 (StrictlySecret—Special Attention), in AVPRF, F. 059a,Op. 4, P. 6, D. 5, Ll. 8-11.35 On 30 October a Revolutionary Military Coun-cil was set up within the Hungarian army, but itwas not the type of body that Kaganovich had inmind. He was referring to an armed organizationthat would suppress the uprising, whereas theRevolutionary Military Council did just the op-posite, expressing strong support for the resistanceand demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troopsfrom Hungary.36 Actually, of those who had been detained sincethe start of the uprising, more than 8,000 had beenreleased by this time.37 Khrushchev evidently means that they shouldconfer with the recently ousted prime ministerAndras Hegedus and other Hungarian officialswho had been removed from high-level party andstate positions after 23 October.38 This trip never occurred, presumably becauseof time constraints as events in Hungary gath-ered pace.39 Mikoyan had planned to travel to Austria atthe very end of October 1956, but his trip endedup being postponed until April 1957.40 Some of the pages from this session were outof sequence in the original file. The order hasbeen corrected in the translation.41 Hundreds of demonstrations and meetings hadbeen taking place in Hungary since 23 October,even after a curfew was imposed. Evidently,Khrushchev is referring here to a warning he re-ceived on 27 October in an emergency messagefrom Mikoyan and Suslov (APRF, F. 3, Op. 64,D. 484, Ll. 131-134). The message noted thatposters had gone up in Budapest declaring ImreNagy a traitor and demanding that Bela Kovacs,the former General Secretary of the IndependentSmallholders Party, be instated as the new prime

minister. The posters called for a demonstrationin support of Kovacs, who was in Pecs at the timerecovering from nine years of imprisonment inthe Soviet Union (between 1947 and 1955). WhenKovacs was contacted by the Hungarian presi-dent, Istvan Dobi, on 27 October over the phone,he tentatively agreed to serve as agriculture min-ister in Nagy’s reorganized government. ButKovacs did not actually participate in any gov-ernment deliberations until he returned toBudapest on 1 November, by which time the situ-ation had changed a great deal. [Ed. note: AnEnglish translation of the Mikoyan-Suslov reportof 27 October 1956 cited above appears inCWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 29-30, froma copy of the document in TsKhSD, F. 89, Per.45, Dok. 9. However, it contains a mistransla-tion of the passage referring to the posters whichhad gone up in Budapest declaring Nagy a traitorand supporting Bela Kovacs. The mistranslatedportion notes that placards had appeared inBudapest at night, “in which Nagy was declaredthe chairman and Bela Kovacs was recommendedas premier,” and that a demonstration was planned“in their honor.” It should have read that Nagywas called “a traitor” and that the demonstrationwas called on “his” (Bela Kovacs’) behalf. TheBulletin regrets the error.]42 An emergency session of the UN SecurityCouncil was convened on 28 October in the mid-afternoon (New York time) to discuss the situa-tion in Hungary. The Soviet Foreign Ministryoriginally had instructed Arkadii Sobolev, theSoviet representative at the Security Council, todepict the events in Hungary as being inspiredsolely by fascist, anti-democratic elements. See“Shifrtelegramma,” 27 October 1956 (StrictlySecret—Special Dossier), in AVPRF, F. 0536, Op.1, P. 5, D. 65, Ll. 24-28. Khrushchev’s statementhere suggests that the Presidium must issue newinstructions to Sobolev, ordering him to take ac-count of the latest developments in Hungary.43 Zhukov is referring here to the strongest cen-ter of resistance in the densely populated regionaround the Corvin film theater in downtownBudapest. Counterinsurgency operations againstthis area were supposed to commence on themorning of 28 October, but Nagy cancelled thoseplans because of the risk of heavy civilian casu-alties.44 For an illuminating account of events inDebrecen, where anti-Gero demonstrations pre-ceded those in Budapest on 23 October, see TiborA. Filep, A debreceni forradalom, 1956 oktober:Tizenket nap kronikaja (Debrecen:Mozgaskorlatozottak Egyesulete, 1990).45 Here and elsewhere in Malin’s notes,Hegedus’s surname is mistakenly rendered asHedegus. The spelling has been corrected in thetranslation.46 Mikoyan and Suslov were taking part in thisHWP Central Committee plenum, which ad-journed around 5:30 p.m. Budapest time. TheHWP Central Committee endorsed the programof Nagy’s new government and conferred su-preme power on a new HWP Presidium consist-ing of Janos Kadar (as chair), Antal Apro, FerencMunnich, Imre Nagy, Zoltan Szanto, and KarolyKiss. See the CC resolution in Szabad Nep(Budapest), 29 October 1956, p. 1.47 This sentence fragment is highly ambiguous


in Russian. The final word in the fragment, trans-lated here as “directly,” is samim, which literallymeans “by itself” or “by himself.” The anteced-ent might be either the HWP Politburo orMikoyan, or perhaps something or someone else.The ambiguity cannot be fully conveyed in En-glish (which has separate words for “itself” and“himself”), but the translation tries to do so asbest as possible.48 Here again, Zhukov is referring to the centerof resistance around the Corvin cinema.49 Khrushchev is referring here to the coalitiongovernment that was formed (or actually reorga-nized) on 27 October. This government included,on an informal basis, representatives of partiesfrom the pre-Communist era: Bela Kovacs, theformer General Secretary of the SmallholdersParty; Zoltan Tildy, the former leader of theSmallholders Party; and Ferenc Erdei, the formerleader of the National Peasant Party. Not until30 October, however, did Nagy announce the for-mal restoration of a multi-party state, with fullparticipation by the Smallholders, the NationalPeasant Party (renamed the Petofi Party on 1November), and the Social Democratic Party aswell as the Communists. (Other non-Commu-nist parties soon sprang up as well, including theHungarian Independence Party, the People’sDemocratic Party, the Catholic People’s Party, andthe Catholic National Association.)50 Scattered defections of Hungarian troops tothe insurgents had begun on the first day of theuprising, but Khrushchev was concerned that thewhole army would switch sides. In later years,official Soviet accounts of the 1956 uprising ac-knowledged that “during the most trying days,”a substantial number of “soldiers and officersfrom the Hungarian People’s Army” had joinedthe insurgents in fighting “against Soviet soldierswho had been called in to help.” See P. A. Zhilin,ed., Stroitel’stvo armii evropeiskikh stransotsialisticheskogo sodruzhestva, 1949-1980(Moscow: Nauka, 1984), p. 93. Formerly secretdocuments in the main Russian military archive(TsAMO, F. 32, Op. 701291, D. 17, Ll. 33-48)include the Soviet defense ministry’s completelist of Hungarian army units that took the side ofthe insurgents. Many other valuable documentsabout the role of the Hungarian army are nowavailable in the 1956 Collection (1956-osGyujtemeny) of the Hungarian Military HistoryArchive, Hadtortenelmi Leveltar, HonvedelmiMiniszterium (HL/HM). For a useful volumedrawing on these documents, see Miklos Horvath,1956 katonai kronologiaja (Budapest: MagyarHonvedseg Oktatasi es Kulturalis AnyagellatoKozpont, 1993). For an equally valuable surveyof the Hungarian army’s role in 1956 based onarchival sources, see Imre Okvath, “Magyartisztikar a hideghaboru idoszakaban, 1945-1956,”Uj Honvedsegi szemle (Budapest), No. 1 (1994),pp. 14-27. See also Bela Kiraly, “Hungary’sArmy: Its Part in the Revolt,” East Europe, Vol.7, No. 6 (June 1958), pp. 3-16.51 This sentence is incomplete in the original.52 This refers to the new Hungarian government’sdeclaration on 28 October, which Nagy wouldread over the radio at 5:20 p.m. that same after-noon. Among other things, the declaration calledfor the dissolution of the state security organs,amnesties for those involved in the uprising, the

restoration of the Kossuth emblem as the nationalemblem, and the immediate withdrawal of So-viet troops from Budapest as well as subsequentnegotiations on a full withdrawal from Hungary.The statement also rejected previous character-izations of the uprising as a “counterrevolution,”saying that the events were representative of a“broad national-democratic movement” that wasseeking to achieve “national independence andsovereignty” for Hungary. Unfortunately, thedraft of this declaration that the CPSU CC Pre-sidium was presumably considering at this meet-ing has not yet been located by scholars.53 Nothing follows Bulganin’s name in the origi-nal.54 Most likely, the “you” (Vas) in this sentenceshould have been “them” (ikh), referring toMikoyan and Suslov, the former of whom wasstill in Hungary. If so, Voroshilov was sayingthat their mission in Hungary had been worth-less. It is also remotely possible that Voroshilovwas claiming that Mikoyan himself had said thesesorts of things about the Soviet troops who weresent to Budapest on the night of 23-24 October.Whatever the case may be, it is clear thatVoroshilov was expressing strong disapproval ofMikoyan’s performance in Budapest.55 Kaganovich and other speakers are referringto possible changes in the Hungariangovernment’s draft statement, which was broad-cast in final form at 5:20 p.m. on 28 October (seeNote 52 supra).56 Malenkov’s surname appears here without thestandard title “Cde.” The full designation “Cde.Malenkov” appears a few lines further down in acontinuation of Malenkov’s remarks.57 This clearly refers to the Hungarian statementof 28 October (see Note 52 supra), not to theSoviet declaration of 30 October. At this point,Khrushchev and the others had seen the Hungar-ian statement only in draft form.58 Most likely, Molotov is referring here toRakosi, who was already in Moscow, and otherhard-line HWP officials who were about to bespirited to the Soviet Union. See below.59 This sentence is incomplete in the original.60 Kaganovich is referring to the draft Hungar-ian statement of 28 October, not to the declara-tion adopted by the Soviet authorities on 30 Oc-tober (which was considered at the Presidiummeeting that day; see Document No. 7 infra).61 Khrushchev is probably referring here to thebenefits they hoped to gain for Soviet-Hungarianrelations, and in international opinion generally,by announcing a ceasefire and the withdrawal ofSoviet troops from Budapest.62 Khrushchev is referring to the political, notmilitary, problems that the French and British gov-ernments had been encountering. At this point,military action in Suez was imminent, but hadnot yet begun. On 26 July 1956 the new Egyp-tian leader, Gamel Abdel Nasser, had national-ized the Suez Canal Company. He stuck by thatdecision despite coming under vigorous diplo-matic pressure from Great Britain, France, andthe United States. On 27 and 28 October, Israelmobilized its army for an operation that wasbroadly coordinated with France and Great Brit-ain. On 29 October, Israeli troops moved rapidlyinto Egyptian territory. The French and Britishjoined the Israeli incursions on 31 October by

launching air raids against Egyptian cities andimposing a naval blockade.63 Here again, Khrushchev is referring to pro-posed corrections in the draft Hungarian state-ment. It is doubtful there was enough time formost such changes to be included.64 In line with this decision, the CPSU Presidiumsent a message to Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz ex-pressing support for Nagy’s new government andfor the statement Nagy issued on 28 October. ThePolish authorities followed up with an appeal tothe HWP and the Hungarian people, published inthe PZPR daily Trybuna Ludu on 29 October,which expressed “shock,” “pain,” and “deep dis-quiet” at “the tragic news coming from [Hun-gary]” and called for “an end to the bloodshed,destruction, and fratricidal struggle.”65 As a result of this decision, the CPSU Pre-sidium dispatched a cable to Tito that was verysimilar to the cable sent to the Polish leadership.On 29 October the Yugoslav authorities publisheda message to the HWP, in the main Belgrade dailyPolitika, urging “an end to the fratricidal struggle”and warning that “further bloodshed would onlyharm the interests of the Hungarian workingpeople and socialism, and would only promotethe aims of reactionaries and bureaucratic defor-mation.”66 This sentence is incomplete in the original.67 This is what appears in the original. Perhapsinitially there was some consideration given tobringing these three officials to Bulgaria. Asthings actually worked out, however, the threemen and their families, as well as the former de-fense minister Istvan Bata and his family, werespirited to Moscow in a Soviet military aircrafton the evening of 28 October. Hegedus and Pirosremained in Moscow until September 1958, andGero stayed there until 1960. Only Rakosi wasnever able to return to Hungary. For an intrigu-ing article about Rakosi’s many years of exile inthe USSR, drawing on recently declassifiedsources, see V.L. Musatov, “Istoriya odnoissylki:‘Zhitie’ Matiasa Rakoshi v SSSR (1956-1971 gg.),” Kentavr (Moscow), No. 6 (Novem-ber-December 1993), pp. 72-81.68 Judging from some of the statements below(e.g., “yesterday a government was formed”) andfrom Suslov’s presence (after he had flown backfrom Hungary), this portion of the meeting musthave taken place either late in the evening on 28October or early in the morning on 29 October.In either case, the CPSU Presidium memberswould already have heard about the statement thatNagy broadcast over the radio on 28 October.69 The chronology is slightly awry here. Thedecision to send in Soviet troops was adopted onthe evening of 23 October (see above), but thetroops did not actually arrive until the early morn-ing hours of 24 October.70 The area around the Corvin cinema, on thecorner of Jozsef Boulevard in downtown Pest(Budapest’s 8th District), was the site of intensefighting that led to many casualties, both Sovietand Hungarian. For a useful account, see BillLomax, Hungary 1956 (London: Allison andBusby, 1976), pp. 118-119, 126-127. On 26 Oc-tober the fighters in the Corvin district electedGergely Pongracz as their leader. Suslov presum-ably is referring to Pal Maleter when he mentions“a colonel from the Horthyite army.” Early on


the morning of 24 October, Maleter had been or-dered by the then-defense minister Istvan Bata tomove with five tanks against the insurgents inBudapest’s 8th and 9th Districts, providing relieffor the Kilian Barracks in the 9th District. WhenMaleter and his tank unit arrived on the scene,they decided to support the rebels’ cause instead.Maleter then assumed command of insurgentforces in the Kilian barracks.71 The original reads the 24th, but this incidentactually occurred on the 25th. A peaceful dem-onstration of some 25,000 people was held on 25October outside the Parliament Building (whereNagy’s office was located, though Nagy was notinside). The precise sequence of events cannotbe conclusively determined, but most evidencesuggests that Hungarian state security (AVH)forces suddenly opened fire on the unarmedcrowd, with additional shots being fired by So-viet tanks deployed around the building. Roughly200 people were killed and many more were in-jured. As news of the incident spread aroundBudapest, the reported scale of the bloodshedquickly became exaggerated and most of theblame for the deaths was attributed—erroneously,it seems—to the Soviet tanks. No Soviet or Hun-garian officials were held accountable for thedeaths, but Suslov’s statement indicates thatCPSU leaders were aware that their own troopswere believed to be culpable.72 The last few parenthetical words of this sen-tence are ambiguous in Russian. A word has beenomitted here for the sake of clarity in English,with no effect at all on the substance of the phrase.Suslov is referring to the formation of workers’councils, which had begun taking shape sponta-neously on 26 October in Csepel and other in-dustrial areas. The government formally con-doned the establishment of workers’ councils ininstructions released on the evening of 26 Octo-ber, which were then published in major Budapestnewspapers the following day.73 As noted above, this is precisely what the Hun-garian government’s statement on 28 October did.It described the recent events as a “national-demo-cratic uprising” and condemned those who haddepicted the situation as a “counterrevolution.”74 Nagy issued an order for a “general and im-mediate ceasefire” before his radio address on 28October. Hungarian army units were ordered to“fire only if attacked.”75 Hegedus was excluded from the six-memberHWP Presidium that was formed on 28 October,and he was then spirited to Moscow aboard aSoviet military aircraft on the evening of 28 Oc-tober.76 As with the previous session, the pages in theoriginal file were slightly out of sequence. Theorder has been corrected in the translation.77 Protocol No. 49 encompasses both this ses-sion and the session on the following day (seeDocument No. 8) under the rubric “On the Situa-tion in Hungary” (O polozhenii v Vengrii). Point1 (from 30 October) covers the Soviet declara-tion on ties with socialist countries, whereas Point6 (from 31 October) covers the decision to in-vade. The relevant extracts from Protocol No.49 are now stored in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484,Ll. 25-30 and APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, L. 41,respectively.78 Presumably, the reference here is to three docu-

ments: one that arrived on the morning of 30October, and two that arrived late at night on 29October. The item that arrived on the morning of30 October was a secure, high-frequency tele-phone message from Mikoyan and Suslov, whichgave a bleak portrayal of the latest events. See“TsK KPSS,” 30 October 1956 (Strictly Secret),in TsKhSD, F.89, Op.45, D.12, Ll.1-3. Of thetwo documents that arrived late at night on the29th, one was a ciphered telegram from Mikoyanand Suslov reporting that they had attended a ses-sion of the HWP Presidium earlier that evening.They also commented on the takeover of theSzabad Nep building by a group of unarmed stu-dents and writers. Mikoyan and Suslov assertedthat the Hungarian “comrades have failed to winover the masses,” and that “the anti-Communistelements are behaving impudently.” In addition,they expressed concern about what would hap-pen to former agents of the Hungarian State Se-curity (AVH) forces in the wake of Nagy’s deci-sion to disband the AVH. See “Shifrtelegramma:TsK KPSS,” 29 October 1956 (Strictly Secret-Urgent), from A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov, inAVPRF, F.059a, Op.4, P.6, D.5, Ll.13-14. Theother document that arrived late on the 29th wasa situation report from Ivan Serov, dated 29 Oc-tober, which Mikoyan and Suslov ordered to betransmitted to Moscow via secure telephone.Serov’s report gave an updated overview of theinsurgency and expressed deep concern about thelikely repercussions from the dissolution of theAVH. See “Telefonogramma,” 29 October 1956,from A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov, relaying I.Serov’s memorandum, in APRF, F.3, Op.64,D.484, Ll.158-161.79 British military transport aircraft were flyinginto the Vienna airport with supplies of humani-tarian aid, which were then being conveyed toBudapest. It is unclear whether Zhukov knewwhy these planes were concentrated there. It ispossible that he believed the aircraft were ferry-ing in military supplies or were preparing for amilitary operation.80 As commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact,Marshal Ivan Konev assumed direct commandof Soviet military operations in Hungary in No-vember 1956. In a telephone message on themorning of 30 October (see Note 78 supra),Mikoyan and Suslov had urged that Konev bedispatched to Hungary “immediately” as a pre-cautionary step. One of Konev’s top aides dur-ing the invasion was General Mikhail Malinin, afirst deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff, whocommanded Soviet troops during the initial in-tervention on 23 October. As indicated in theprevious line, Soviet leaders frequently consultedMalinin in the leadup to the invasion.81 The “Chinese comrades” with whomKhrushchev had discussions were the membersof the delegation headed by Liu Shaoqi (see Note25 supra). Liu Shaoqi was in direct touch withMao Zedong several times during the delegation’sstay in Moscow, and thus he was able to keepKhrushchev apprised of the Chinese leader’sviews of the situation in Poland and Hungary.82 Rokossowski had been removed from the Pol-ish Politburo on 19 October. On 13 Novemberhe was replaced as Polish national defense min-ister by a Polish officer, Marshal MarianSpychalski. Rokossowski was then recalled to

the Soviet Union, where he was appointed adeputy defense minister. Evidently, Khrushchevhad spoken with Gomulka by phone that morn-ing.83 The five principles of Pancha Shila—(1) mu-tual respect for sovereignty and territorial integ-rity, (2) non-aggression, (3) non-interference ininternal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit,and (5) peaceful coexistence—were endorsed ina joint statement by Chinese prime minister ZhouEnlai and Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehruin New Delhi on 28 June 1954. The principleswere intended to “guide relations between the twocountries” as well as “relations with other coun-tries in Asia and in other parts of the world.” Forthe full text of the statement, see G. V. Ambekarand V. D. Divekar, eds., Documents on China’sRelations with South and South-East Asia (1949-1962) (New York: Allied Publishers, 1964), pp.7-8.84 Zhukov is referring here to the Political Con-sultative Committee (PKK) of the recently-cre-ated Warsaw Treaty Organization. The PKK con-vened only seven times between 1955 and 1966,despite its statutory requirement to meet at leasttwice a year.85 During major international crises in the post-Stalin period, the Soviet Presidium/Politburo oc-casionally would convene a Central Committeeplenum to give the CC members a sense of in-volvement in decision-making and to ensure thatthe leadership’s policies would be firmly obeyedat lower levels.86 Saburov is referring here to Furtseva’s sug-gestion that a CPSU CC plenum be convened forinformational purposes.87 This presumably refers to Soviet propertytransferred to Romania during World War II,rather than to Romania’s war reparations, whichby 1956 were no longer of great magnitude.88 Khrushchev is referring here to the six-mem-ber HWP Presidium. The only holdout was Nagy.89 The State Security Department (Allam-VedelmiOsztaly, or AVO), which was reorganized in 1949and renamed the State Security Authority (Allam-Vedelmi Hatosag, or AVH), was reincorporatedinto the Hungarian Internal Affairs Ministry inthe autumn of 1953. Formally, the agency wasgiven back its old name of AVO, but it was stillalmost always known as the AVH. One of theearliest and most vigorous demands of the pro-testers in October 1956 was for the dissolution ofthe AVH. On 28 October, Nagy promised to ful-fill this demand, and the Hungarian governmentapproved the dissolution of the state security or-gans the following day. Because the AVH hadbeen instrumental in carrying out repression andterror in the late 1940s and 1950s, some state se-curity agents became the targets of lynchings andother violent reprisals during the 1956 uprising.Hungarian state security officers would havejoined up with Soviet troops mainly to seek pro-tection, not to assist in counterinsurgency opera-tions. On this matter, see the documents trans-mitted by Suslov and Mikoyan on 29 October,cited in Note 78 supra.90 It is interesting that, when referring to Soviettroops deployed in Eastern Europe, Khrushchevdoes not mention the Soviet troops in East Ger-many, implying that they were not necessarilythere “with the consent of the [East German] gov-


ernment and in the interests of the [East German]government and people.”91 The final Declaration noted that “Soviet unitsare in the Hungarian and Romanian republics inaccordance with the Warsaw Treaty and govern-mental agreements. Soviet military units are inthe Polish republic on the basis of the Potsdamfour-power agreement and the Warsaw Treaty.”The Declaration then claimed that “Soviet mili-tary units are not in the other people’s democra-cies,” omitting any mention of the hundreds ofthousands of Soviet troops in East Germany.92 Khrushchev presumably is referring here toboth the military advisers and the state security(KGB) advisers.93 When this editing was completed, the Pre-sidium formally adopted Resolution No. P49/1(“Vypiska iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniyaPrezidiuma TsK ot 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.: Opolozhenii v Vengrii,” 30 October 1956, in APRF,F.3, Op. 64, D.484, Ll. 25-30) stating that it would“approve the text, with changes made at the CPSUCC Presidium session, of a Declaration by theGovernment of the USSR on the foundations ofdevelopment and the further strengthening offriendship and cooperation between the SovietUnion and the other socialist countries.” The reso-lution ordered that the “text of the Declaration bebroadcast on radio on 30 October and publishedin the press on 31 October 1956.” For the pub-lished text, see “Deklaratsiya o printsipakhrazvitiya i dal’neishem ukreplenii druzhby isotrudnichestva mezhdu SSSR i drugimisotsialisticheskimi stranami,” Pravda (Moscow),31 October 1956, p. 1.94 It is unclear precisely when the Chinesechanged their position from non-interventionistto pro-intervention. The statement recorded here,if correctly transcribed, would suggest that thechange occurred before the final Soviet decisionon 31 October, but almost all other evidence(including subsequent Presidium meetings re-corded by Malin) suggests that it came after, notbefore, the Soviet decision. In any case, if thechange did occur before, it did not have any dis-cernible effect on the Soviet decision at this meet-ing to eschew intervention.95 Molotov is referring here to major develop-ments in Hungary. On 30 October, at 2:30 p.m.Budapest time, Nagy announced the formal res-toration of a multi-party state and the establish-ment of an “inner cabinet” of the national gov-ernment. The new cabinet consisted of Nagy,Zoltan Tildy, Bela Kovacs, Ferenc Erdei, JanosKadar, Geza Losonczy, and Anna Kethly (fromthe Social Democratic Party). That same day, a“revolutionary national defense council” of theHungarian armed forces was set up, which sup-ported the demands of “the revolutionary coun-cils of the working youth and intellectuals,” andcalled for the “immediate withdrawal of Soviettroops from Budapest and their withdrawal fromthe entire territory of Hungary within the short-est possible time.” The new Council also prom-ised to disarm all agents from Hungary’s dis-banded state security forces (AVH), who had beennotorious agents of repression during the Stalinera. A Revolutionary Armed Forces Committeealso was formed on 31 October, and it was em-powered by the government to create a new army.96 These are five of the seven members of Nagy’s

new “inner cabinet.” Anna Kethly’s name is notlisted here because she had not yet been ap-pointed. (Nagy mentioned in his speech on 30October that “a person to be nominated by theSocial Democratic Party” would be in the innercabinet, and Kethly later turned out to be thatperson.) It is unclear why Malin did not listFerenc Erdei’s name here.97 The pages for this session were in reverse or-der in the archival file. They have been put intocorrect order in the translation.98 In the formal protocol of this session (cited inNote 77 supra), Point VI was given the title of“On the Situation in Hungary” (O polozhenii vVengrii), the same as the previous segment.Malin’s working notes do not provide a list ofparticipants, but the following list is given in theformal protocol: Khrushchev, Zhukov, Bulganin,Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and Saburov.It is also clear from Malin’s notes that Furtseva,Pospelov, and Shvernik took part at certain points.99 These “discussions with Gomulka” were con-ducted by Khrushchev over the telephone. Thetwo leaders agreed that Khrushchev, Malenkov,and Molotov would meet the next day (1 Novem-ber) in Brest with Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz.The formal protocol of the session (cited in Note77 supra) notes that “in accordance with the ex-change of opinions at the CPSU Presidium ses-sion, Cdes. Khrushchev, Molotov, and Malenkovare empowered to hold negotiations with repre-sentatives of the PZPR CC.”100 In a speech at a mass rally in front of theParliament Building on 31 October, Nagy de-clared that his government had already “openednegotiations for the withdrawal of Soviet troopsfrom the country and for the renunciation of ourobligations under the Warsaw Treaty.” Clearly,he was referring to the negotiations he had beenholding that morning with Mikoyan and Suslov,who had generally seemed receptive to Nagy’sdemands. These negotiations are briefly re-counted in Tibor Meray, Thirteen Days ThatShook the Kremlin: Imre Nagy and the Hungar-ian Revolution, trans. by Howard L. Katzander(London: Thames and Hudson, 1959), pp. 163-165. See also the first-hand comments by GyorgyG. Heltai, the Hungarian deputy foreign ministerunder Nagy’s government, “International As-pects,” in Bela K. Kiraly and Paul Jonas, TheHungarian Revolution of 1956 in Retrospect, EastEuropean Monograph No. XL (Boulder, Col.:East European Quarterly, 1978), esp. pp. 52-53.It is conceivable that Nagy’s expressed desire torenounce Hungarian membership in the WarsawPact, which was promptly transmitted to Mos-cow by telephone, was one of the factors that ledto Khrushchev’s change of heart at this session.Although Nagy had spoken in earlier years (es-pecially after he was ousted by Rakosi in 1955)about the desirability of neutrality for Hungary,his decision to raise the matter with Mikoyan andSuslov at this critical moment must have comeas a jolt to Soviet leaders.101 Early on the morning of 31 October, theFrench and British launched bombing raidsagainst Egyptian cities and imposed a naval block-ade against Egypt, thus aiding Israeli’s groundincursions. By the time the Presidium met on the31st, reports of the French and British operationswere pouring in, conveying a greater impression

of “success” than later events warranted.102 The inclusion of Saburov’s name in this listis odd, as will become clear in his remarks be-low. Initially, he was disinclined to reverse thePresidium’s non-interventionist stance of the pre-vious day.103 It is unclear at what point Soviet officialsapproached Kadar about becoming the head of aprovisional government. Kadar’s statements atthe CPSU Presidium meeting on 2 November (seeDocument No. 12 infra) suggest that he was notyet aware he had been chosen to perform thisfunction.104 On the evening of 1 November, the day afterthis Presidium meeting, Kadar and Munnich weresecretly flown to Moscow aboard a Soviet mili-tary aircraft. They were brought back to Hun-gary when Soviet troops launched Operation“Whirlwind” three days later.105 It is extraordinary that even as Khrushchevwas calling for a full-scale invasion, he was stillapparently willing to consider including Nagy inthe soon-to-be-formed Revolutionary Workers’and Peasants’ Government.106 It is interesting that Soviet leaders were con-cerned most of all about informing the Poles. Asindicated above, a meeting with the Polish lead-ership had already been set up for the followingday in Brest. Informing the leaders of these othercountries was important, but not as high a prior-ity. Soviet Presidium members informed the vis-iting Chinese delegation about the decision on 31October, just before the Chinese officials flewback to Beijing. After the meetings in Brest on 1November, Khrushchev and Malenkov continuedon to Bucharest, where they met with Romanian,Bulgarian, and Czechoslovak leaders. The twoSoviet officials then traveled to Brioni to conferwith Tito on 2-3 November. Khrushchev andMalenkov returned to Moscow on the morningof the 3rd.107 The formal protocol for this session (cited inNote 77 supra) states that “taking account of theexchange of opinions at the CPSU CC Presidiumsession, Cde. Zhukov is instructed to devise anappropriate plan of measures connected with theevents in Hungary, and to report on them to theCPSU CC.”108 The formal protocol from this session (citedin Note 77 supra) notes that “Cdes. Shepilov,Brezhnev, Furtseva, and Pospelov are instructed,on the basis of the exchange of opinions at theCPSU Presidium session, to prepare all neces-sary documents and submit them for the consid-eration of the CPSU CC.” Among the key docu-ments they prepared over the next few days were:an “Appeal of the Hungarian RevolutionaryWorkers’ and Peasants’ Government to the Hun-garian People,” which Kadar announced when hewas installed in power on 4 November; an “Ap-peal by the Command of Soviet Troops in Hun-gary to the Hungarian People and the Officersand Men of the Hungarian Army,” which wasbroadcast in translation over Hungarian radio anddistributed via leaflets at the outset of the inva-sion; and Order No. 1 issued by Marshal Konev(the supreme commander of the invasion) to allSoviet officers just before the start of Operation“Whirlwind.” The English-language texts of thefirst two items and other “propaganda documents”prepared in Moscow can be found in Paul E.


Zinner, ed., National Communism and PopularRevolt in Eastern Europe: A Selection of Docu-ments on Events in Poland and Hungary, Febru-ary-November 1956 (New York: Columbia Uni-versity Press, 1956), pp. 473-481.109 For the final text of this order, see “PrikazGlavnokomanduyushchego Ob”edinennymivooruzhennymi silami No. 1, 4 noyabrya 1956goda,” reproduced in Lieut.-General E. I.Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta”(Part 3), Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Moscow),No. 12 (December 1993), p. 86.110 It is unclear what “group,” if any, was actu-ally sent. Presumably, the reference here is to agroup of Presidium members.111 The three former Hungarian officials listedhere—Rakosi, Hegedus, and Gero—had fled tothe Soviet Union within the past few days. Nodoubt, Khrushchev had solicited their views be-forehand about the proper course to pursue inHungary. It is also possible that the three wereasked to take part in this phase of the CPSU Pre-sidium meeting, and that they offered their viewsdirectly.112 The five Hungarian officials listed here wereamong those who were slated to take part in aforthcoming “provisional revolutionary govern-ment.” The first three were still in Budapest(though Kadar was spirited out the next evening),Boldoczki was in Moscow (in his ambassadorialpost), and Horvath, the foreign minister in Nagy’sgovernment, was on his way to a UN General As-sembly session, but was delayed in Prague.113 Kiss’s name is incorrectly rendered in Malin’snotes as Kisskar.114 The formal protocol for this session (cited inNote 77 supra) “affirms the text of the telegramto the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade for Cde.Tito.” A copy of the telegram is attached to theprotocol, which further notes that “if the answer[from the Yugoslav side] is positive, Cdes.Khrushchev and Malenkov are authorized to holdnegotiations with Cde. Tito.” For the Yugoslavresponse to the Soviet telegram, see DocumentNo. 9 infra.115 See Document No. 10 infra.116 This telephone message is unattributed andundated. Presumably, the message came fromMolotov just before he returned to Moscow fromBrest on 1 November. It had been arranged be-forehand that while Khrushchev and Malenkovwould continue on to meet with other East Euro-pean leaders, Molotov would return to Moscowand brief the CPSU Presidium on Gomulka’s po-sition.117 Protocol No. 50 (in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D.484, L. 58) contains directives from the sessionson both 1 and 2 November (see Note 146 infra).118 On the evening of 31 October-1 November,Mikoyan and Suslov returned to Moscow, pre-sumably accompanied by Serov. This was thefirst Presidium meeting in which Mikoyan hadtaken part since 23 October. In Khrushchev’sabsence, Bulganin presided over this session.119 Other than Mikoyan and Suslov, who werestill in Budapest, all the Presidium members tookpart in the 31 October decision and the subse-quent discussions with the Chinese delegation.Hence, Bulganin provided this information for thebenefit of Mikoyan and Suslov.120 It is not entirely clear what Bulganin is refer-

ring to here, but he probably had in mind one ormore of several developments: Hungary’s with-drawal from the Warsaw Pact and demand for theremoval of all Soviet troops from Hungary; thecommencement of French and British militaryoperations against Egypt (see Note 101 supra);China’s sudden decision to support rather thanoppose Soviet military intervention in Hungary;new intelligence about the West’s position vis-a-vis Hungary; and the warnings coming in fromneighboring East European countries, particularlyCzechoslovakia (see below) and Romania.121 Kaganovich uses a word here, obsuzhdenie,that is normally translated as “discussion,” but itcould also mean “deliberations” in this context.Presumably, he is referring to the meeting thatSoviet leaders had on 31 October with the Chi-nese delegation after the CPSU Presidium ap-proved a full-scale invasion of Hungary.122 This is how the sentence reads in the text.Presumably, Malin meant to say that “we are notattacking.”123 It is unclear precisely who was “worried thatwe’re giving away Hungary.” Furtseva may havebeen referring to one of several groups: ortho-dox Hungarian Communists who had sought ref-uge in Moscow; neighboring East European (es-pecially Czechoslovak and Romanian) leaders;Chinese officials; members of the CPSU CentralCommittee and the heads of union-republic Com-munist parties and of regional and local CPSUorganizations; and employees of the Soviet em-bassy in Budpaest. By this point in the crisis, allof these groups had expressed concerns very simi-lar to the ones that Furtseva mentions.124 Presumably this refers to the decision at theend of October to evacuate the families of Sovietembassy employees to the USSR. For a briefaccount of the evacuation, see the highly tenden-tious but occasionally useful memoir by VladimirKryuchkov, Lichnoe delo, vol. 1, p. 57.125 Presumably, Suslov is referring to the planto bring Janos Kadar and Ferenc Munnich toMoscow.126 The formal protocol for the session, “Vypiskaiz protokola No. 50 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsKot 2 noyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,”in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, L. 58, states that“taking account of the exchange of views at theCC Presidium, Cdes. Zhukov, Suslov, Konev,Serov, and Brezhnev are to work out the neces-sary measures in connection with the events inHungary and report their proposals to the CPSUCC.”127 A passage from Kryuchkov’s memoir(Lichnoe delo, vol. 1, pp. 57-58) sheds light onwhat may have been discussed here: “At the endof October and beginning of November . . . thesituation around Soviet buildings [in Budapest]deteriorated significantly; the embassy was un-der siege, and any attempt to exit the buildingwas fraught with danger. The diplomats long agohad essentially shifted over to a barracks-type op-eration, spending the night in their offices andonly rarely—once our troops had returned [toBudapest]—taking a half-hour ride home one byone in armored personnel carriers to see theirfamilies, who were holed up in living quartersseveral blocks from the embassy. . . . Ordinarily,knowledge of Hungarian allowed me to engagein conversations with Hungarians and to receive

fresh infomation directly from the center of events. . . but [by late October] attempts to strike up aconversation often caused me to have to flee, sincethey could tell by my accent that I was a Russian.The fulfillment of official instructions, whichentailed visits to appropriate buildings and agen-cies, also was a difficult matter, both in some-how getting there and in then returning to the em-bassy while holding on to the needed documents.This did not pass off without a number of seriousincidents.”128 It is unclear precisely what Shelepin is refer-ring to here, but this seems to be an indication ofMoscow’s growing concerns about a spillover intothe rest of Eastern Europe. Urgent warnings tothis effect had been pouring in from the Czecho-slovak authorities since late October. See, forexample, “Stenograficky zapis ze zasedani UVKSC,” 5-6 December 1956 (Top Secret), in SUA,Arch. UV KSC, F. 07, Sv. 14, Archivna jednotka(A.j.) 14; “Zabezpeceni klidu na uzemi CSR astatnich hranic s Mad’arskem,” Report from Col.-General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Czecho-slovak General Staff, and Lieut.-General JaroslavDockal, chief of operations, 29 October 1956 (TopSecret), in Vojensky historicky archiv (VHA)Praha, Fond Ministra narodni obrany (MNO)CSR, 1956, Operacni sprava Generalniho stabucs. armady (GS/OS), 2/8-39b; and “Souhrnhlaseni operacniho dustojnika Generalniho stabucs. armady,” Notes from Col.-General VaclavKratochvil, chief of the Czechoslovak GeneralStaff, to the KSC Central Committee (Top Se-cret), 27 October 1956, in VHA, F. MNO, 1956,GS/OS, 2/8-49b.129 Mikoyan’s references here to “comrades” and“them” are to Nagy’s government. His mentionof “three days” in the line above indicates thatthe timetable for the invasion (code-named“Whirlwind”) had already been set. Mikoyan washoping that some last-ditch attempt could still bemade to head off the military operation.130 No formal protocol for this session has beenfound (unlike the other session on 2 Novemberrecorded in Document No. 13 infra).131 These initial comments are not attributed toanyone in Malin’s notes, but it is clear that thespeaker was Kadar. The notes of Kadar’s remarkscontain a few third-person references to himself,but this is because Malin sometimes jotted downthe speaker’s name rather than using the pronoun“I.”132 Jozsef Dudas, a former Budapest city offi-cial who had been imprisoned during most of theCommunist period, was one of the most radicalleaders of the October-November uprising. Hewas in charge of the rebel forces headquarteredin the Szabad Nep building. Dudas and other rebelleaders insisted that Nagy must meet the protest-ers’ demands. Dudas was detained by Hungar-ian police on 1 November. After Soviet troopsintervened on 4 November, he took a leading partin the military resistance. He was arrested bySoviet troops on 21 November and was executedtwo months later. His name is incorrectly ren-dered as “Dusak” in Malin’s notes; the spellingis corrected in the translation.133 Kadar is referring here to negotiations thathe, Munnich, and others had held in the parlia-ment with one of the insurgent groups headed byIstvan Angyal. Angyal was not as radical as most


of the other rebel leaders, but he was insistent onthe need for far-reaching changes. Angyal wasexecuted in November 1958. See Laszlo Eorsi,ed., “Angyal Istvan sajat kezu vallomasai, 1956december,” Multunk (Budapest), Vol. 40, No. 4(1995), pp. 133-182.134 The references here are to the Soviet decla-ration of 30 October and to the declaration of neu-trality adopted by the Hungarian government onthe evening of 1 November. Nagy announcedthe declaration in a nationwide radio address.135 On 3 November, Anna Kethly was named asthe Social Democratic representative in the gov-ernment. See Note 96 supra.136 On 31 October the Hungarian governmentannounced that, on the previous evening, Cardi-nal Jozsef Mindszenty had been freed from housearrest in Felsopeteny. He had been detained therefor some 15 months after his release from prison.As the Primate of the Hungarian Catholic Church,Mindszenty had been sentenced to life imprison-ment during an anti-religious campaign in Feb-ruary 1949. Mindszenty’s statements in the au-tumn of 1956 were restrained, but clearly sup-portive of the revolution. When Soviet troopsintervened on 4 November, he sought refuge inthe U.S. legation in Budapest. Subsequently,Kadar’s government prohibited Mindszenty fromperforming clerical duties of any sort from thelegation.137 It is unclear precisely what Kadar was say-ing here. (Malin inadvertently may have omittedsome comments just before this line.) At thenoontime meeting, the Hungarian governmentreached no final decision on whether to demandthe immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops andwhether to issue the declaration of neutrality.Those decisions were not approved until theevening session, as Kadar explains below.138 Ferenc Nagy, one of the former leaders ofthe Independent Smallholders’ Party who hadbeen living in exile in the United States, came toVienna in late October to display solidarity withthe insurgents. On 31 October, however, theAustrian authorities forced him to leave the coun-try on the grounds that his presence might bedeemed incompatible with Austria’s neutral sta-tus.139 Bela Kovacs had been recuperating in Pecsfrom his nine years of imprisonment. Thegovernment’s evening session on 1 Novemberwas the first activity in which he took part inBudapest.140 On the alarm generated by the Soviet troopmovements, see Andropov’s ciphered telegramsfrom 30 October, 1 November, and 2 Novemberin AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D. 5, Ll. 15-16,17-19, and 20-22, respectively.141 The name “Kovacs” here refers to GeneralIstvan Kovacs, not Bela Kovacs. General Kovacshad become chief of the Hungarian General Staffon 31 October and was also a member of theRevolutionary Defense Committee. He was ar-rested on 3 November along with the other mem-bers of the Hungarian delegation that were nego-tiating the withdrawal of Soviet troops. He wasnot released from prison until 1960.142 Andropov’s own account of his attendanceat the inner cabinet’s evening session, which tal-lies very well with Kadar ’s version, is in“Shifrtelegramma,” 1 November 1956 (Strictly

Secret), in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D. 6, Ll.17-19.143 The word used here for “nationalism” isnatsionalizatsiya, which normally means “nation-alization” (i.e., the assertion of state control overproperty), but Kadar seems to have in mind thenotion of reasserting Hungarian national controlover Hungary’s internal affairs, rather than leav-ing important matters under Soviet control.144 This again is a telling indication that EastEuropean and Soviet leaders were fully aware ofthe popular resentment caused by Soviet prepon-derance in Eastern Europe.145 Presumably, Munnich is referring to nation-alistic slogans that had been shouted during So-viet-Hungarian soccer matches and to the influ-ence of Radio Free Europe and other Westernbroadcasts. The Hungarian scholar Janos M.Rainer adds the following explanation for the ref-erence to “soccer”: “It was widely believed atthe time that the celebrated Hungarian [soccer]team of the period, the ̀ Golden Team’, which wonagainst nearly every country it played, was notallowed to beat the Soviet Union for political rea-sons. (Their matches usually ended in a draw.)In actual fact, the first Hungarian win against theSoviet team took place some weeks before therevolution.” See Janos M. Rainer, “The Road toBudapest, 1956: New Documentation of theKremlin’s Decision To Intervene,” pt. 2, in TheHungarian Quarterly Vol. 37, No. 143 (Autumn1996), p. 31 n. 28; readers interested in follow-ing the exploits of a fictionalized Hungarian bas-ketball team of this era are advised to read TiborFischer’s novel, Under the Frog (Penguin: Lon-don, 1993).146 The protocol in question is “Vypiska izprotokola No. 50 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ot2 noyabrya 1956 g.: O meropriyatiyakh v svyazis sobytiyami v Vengrii,” in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64,D. 484, L. 58. It reads simply: “To approve theplan for measures concerning the events in Hun-gary.”)147 On 1 November, in accordance with Proto-col No. P50/I (“Vypiska iz protokola No. 50zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ot 1 noyabrya 1956g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” in APRF, F. 3, Op.64, D. 484, L. 47), five Soviet officials (Zhukov,Suslov, Konev, Serov, and Brezhnev) had beeninstructed to “work out the necessary measuresconcerning the events in Hungary and presentthem to the CPSU CC.” This session allowedthem to complete the task.148 All four phrases in this point were incorpo-rated (with modifications) into Order No. 1 is-sued by Marshal Konev in the name of the War-saw Pact Joint Command (see Note 109 supra).149 Those sent to Hungary (at varying intervals)included Suslov, Averki Aristov, Serov, andZhukov.150 The text of the plan has not yet been releasedfrom the former Soviet archives, but the direc-tive here presumably refers to the military (asopposed to political and propaganda) steps neededto fulfill the decision of 31 October. On the sameday of this meeting, Marshal Konev arrived athis command post in Szolnok and ordered thereinforced Special Corps in Hungary to be readyfor full-scale combat operations by the followingday.151 No source is specified for the information in

this telegram from Soviet ambassador AlekseiEpishev, but the content leaves little doubt thatthe Romanian embassy in Budapest was relyingat the time on the Soviet embassies in Budapestand Bucharest to relay information.152 Aleksei Alekseevich Epishev had been a com-missar in the Soviet army during World War II.After the war he served in a number of regionalparty posts, and from 1955 until 1962 he was theSoviet ambassador to Romania and then Yugo-slavia. In 1962 he was given the military rank ofarmy-general and appointed the head of the So-viet Army’s Main Political Directorate, a post heretained until his death in 1985.153 The surname of Aurel Malnasan (who wasthen a deputy foreign minister in Romania) is cor-rectly spelled in the original Malin notes, but forsome reason the published versions of the notes(in both Hungarian and Russian) mistakenly ren-der Malnasan’s surname as Malnasanu. The edi-tors of the published versions erroneously claimthat Malin’s notes misspelled the name.154 On 2 November in Bucharest, Khrushchevand Malenkov briefed the Romanian leader,Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, and his Czechoslovakand Bulgarian counterparts about the forthcom-ing invasion. On the eve of the invasion,Malnasan held lengthy talks with Nagy.Gheorghiu-Dej’s motivation in sending Malnasanto Budapest must have been to keep Nagy occu-pied and to prevent him from taking any steps tocounter the imminent military operation. For briefreports by Malnasan on the talks, see the newlydeclassified cables from the Romanian ForeignMinistry archive in Corneliu Mihai Lungu andMihai Retegan, cds., 1956 Explozia: Perceptiiromane, iugoslave si sovietice asupraevenimentelor din Polonia si Unguria (Bucharest:Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 1996), pp. 181-182.155 For some reason, Malin did not listKhrushchev’s name among the participants. Alsonot listed here are Janos Kadar, Ferenc Munnich,and Imre Horvath, who took part in the segmenton the formation of a new Hungarian government.This portion of the meeting began at 8:45 p.m.,with Khrushchev and Malenkov in attendanceafter their return from Brioni.156 The reference here is to documents issuedby the Kadar government after it was installed inpower.157A Hungarian scholar, Janos Rainer, recentlyfound a document in the Hungarian NationalArchive that sheds important light on this part ofthe CPSU Presidium’s deliberations. Notes takenby Imre Horvath, one of the Hungarian officialswho were present, reveal that Khrushchev offeredan opening statement here, which for some rea-son was not transcribed by Malin. The notesHorvath took of Khrushchev’s speech are trans-lated below (see Document No. 16) as a supple-ment to the Malin notes, but they may be worthreading at this point before finishing Malin’s ren-dition of the meeting. Although Horvath’s noteswere written hurriedly in mixed Hungarian andRussian, they provide a good flavor of whatKhrushchev said.��

158A secret report from the Soviet ambassadorin Hungary, Yurii Andropov, in May 1956 wasmuch less positive, alleging that “the work of the


Hungarian press in illuminating the results of theXX CPSU Congress has been totally inadequate.”See “I. O. Zaveduyushchego EvropeiskimOtdelom MID SSSR tov. Levychkinu K. D.,”Cable No. 141 (Secret) from Yu. Andropov, 2 May1956, in AVPRF, F. Referentura o Vengrii, Op.36, Por. 15, Papka 48, D. 178, Ll. 22-33.159This refers to a telegram published in majorSoviet and Hungarian newspapers on 6 April1956, shortly after the 20th Party Congress. Thetelegram, sent by Khrushchev (as party leader)and Bulganin (as prime minister) to their Hun-garian counterparts, Rakosi and Hegedus, markedthe 11th anniversary of the liberation of Hungaryfrom Nazi occupation.160The local authorities in Gyor, including thesecurity forces, had been supportive of the revo-lution from the outset. See Gyor-Sopron megyeiekemlekeznek az 1956-os forradalomra (Budapest:Zrinyi, 1991).161Judging from Malenkov’s presence at Pre-sidium sessions on 4 and 5 November, onlyMikoyan and Brezhnev actually traveled toBudapest.162See Note 157 supra. This document, locatedby Janos Rainer, was published in Hungary in1996. See Vyacheslav Sereda and Janos M.Rainer, eds., Dontes a Kremlben, 1956: A SzovjetPartelnokseg Vitai Magyarorszagrol (Budapest:1956-os Intezet, 1996), pp. 92-93. The documentis in Hungarian interspersed with a few Russianphrases and names. Horvath’s notes show thatthe deliberations about this matter began at 8:45p.m. (see Note 155 supra).163These three lines appeared in the far left col-umn of Horvath’s notes.164This statement is a candid acknowledgmentof the extent to which the Soviet Union still con-trolled leadership politics and successions in East-ern Europe after Stalin’s death. Khrushchev’s ref-erence to Mikoyan concerns the steps thatMikoyan took when he was in Budapest from 13to 21 July 1956 (see Document No. 1 supra).During a preliminary meeting with Rakosi, ErnoGero, Andras Hegedus, and Bela Veg, Mikoyantook the initiative in bringing about Rakosi’s dis-missal. (The other Hungarian officials had longwanted to proceed with this step, but were un-willing to act until the Soviet authorities them-selves told Rakosi he would have to go.) Mikoyanthen participated in a crucial meeting of the HWPPolitburo on 13 July, which voted to removeRakosi from his posts as HWP First Secretary anda member of the HWP Politburo. At Mikoyan’sbehest, the HWP Politburo also chose Gero asthe new party leader. See “Zapis’ besedy A. I.Mikoyana s Matyashem Rakoshi, AndrashemHegedushem, Erne Gere i Beloi Begom, 13 iyulya1956 g.,” 17 July 1956 (Secret), compiled by Yu.V. Andropov; “Zapis’ vystuplenii na zasedaniyaPolitbyuro TsR VPT, 13 iyulya 1956 g.,” 13 July1956 (Secret), compiled by Yu. V. Andropov; and“Zapis’ besedy A. I. Mikoyana s YanoshemKadarom, 14 iyulya 1956 g.,” 17 July 1956 (TopSecret), compiled by Yu. V. Andropov, all inAPRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 186-190, 191-205, and 206-215, respectively. In ciphered tele-grams on 16 and 18 July, Mikoyan explained indetail why he ended up supporting Gero to be-come the new HWP First Secretary. See “TsKKPSS,” 16 July 1956 (Strictly Secret — Urgent),

Osobaya Papka; and “TsK KPSS,” 18 July 1956(Strictly Secret — Urgent), Osobaya papka, bothin APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 183-185 and225-236, respectively.165The nature of this statement is unclear (to saythe least), but the mention of these countries at atime of escalating hostilities is another interest-ing indication of the role of the Suez Crisis inSoviet thinking about events in Hungary.166This topic was not included in the formal pro-tocol for the session (“Protokol No. 51 zasedaniyaPrezidiuma TsK KPSS,” in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64,D. 484, Ll. 60-61).167Most likely, there is a mistake or omission inMalin’s text. These phrases, as given in the origi-nal, do not make sense.168The reference here is to financial, not mili-tary, assistance. A Soviet economic aid packagefor Hungary was approved on 5 November andannounced the following day.169These points about the Suez Crisis are intrigu-ing in light of what happened the following day(5 November). During the first several days ofthe Suez Crisis, Moscow’s response was limitedto verbal protestations through the media and atthe UN. On 5 November, the day before aceasefire was arranged, Soviet prime ministerNikolai Bulganin sent letters to the U.S., French,British, and Israeli governments. His letter toPresident Eisenhower warned that “if this war isnot halted, it will be fraught with danger and mightescalate into a third world war.” Bulganin pro-posed that the United States and Soviet Unionmove jointly to “crush the aggressors,” an actionhe justified on the grounds that the two super-powers had “all modern types of arms, includingnuclear and thermonuclear weapons, and bear par-ticular responsibility for stopping the war.” Notsurprisingly, Eisenhower immediately rejectedBulganin’s proposal. Bulganin’s letters to France,Great Britain, and Israel were far more minatory,including thinly-veiled threats to use missiles ifnecessary to prevent Egypt’s destruction. Theletters to France and Britain contained identicalpassages: “In what position would [Britain andFrance] have found themselves if they had beenattacked by more powerful states possessing alltypes of modern weapons of destruction? Thesemore powerful states, instead of sending naval orair forces to the shores of [Britain or France],could use other means, such as missile technol-ogy.” Bulganin’s letter to Israel declared that “Is-rael is playing with the fate of peace and the fateof its own people in a criminal and irresponsiblemanner.” This policy, Bulganin warned, “is rais-ing doubts about the very existence of Israel as astate. We expect that the Government of Israelwill come to its senses before it is too late andwill halt its military operations against Egypt.”For the texts of the letters and other Soviet state-ments during the crisis, see D. T. Shepilov, ed.,Suetskii krizis (Moscow: Politizdat, 1956). Al-though the letters represented a much more force-ful and conspicuous Soviet stance against the al-lied incursions, they came so belatedly that theyhad only a minor impact at best on efforts toachieve a ceasefire.170This passage refers to the appeal to the na-tion that Kadar’s government issued when it wasinstalled in power on 4 November.171Molotov is referring to Kadar’s radio address

on 1 November, which was published inNepszabad the following day.172This in fact is precisely what Ulbricht him-self feared; see the detailed account by the chiefof the East German State Security forces in 1956,Ernst Wollweber, in Wilfriede Otto, ed., “ErnstWollweber: Aus Erinnerungen — Ein PortraitWalter Ulbrichts,” Beitrage zur Geschichte derArbeiterbewegung, No. 3 (1990), esp. pp. 361-378. For more on the impact of the 1956 criseson the East German communist leadership, seethe papers presented by Hope M. Harrison andChristian F. Ostermann at the “Conference onHungary and the World, 1956: The New Archi-val Evidence,” which took place in Budapest on25-29 September 1996 and was organized by theInstitute for the History of the 1956 HungarianRevolution, the National Security Archive, andthe Cold War International History Project. Cop-ies of the papers, both of which draw extensivelyon the archives of the former Socialist Unity Partyof Germany (SED), are available from the con-ference organizers.173Saburov is referring to the families of Soviettroops who were killed, not to the much largernumber of Hungarians who died in the fighting.174This illustrates how concerned CPSU lead-ers were that the crisis was spilling over into theSoviet Union. Both before and after 4 Novem-ber, unrest and protests occurred at a number ofhigher educational institutions in the USSR, in-cluding Moscow State University (MGU). AtMGU, “protests against Soviet military interven-tion” were accompanied by “anti-Soviet slogansand posters.” Both students and faculty took partin the actions. The KGB quickly moved in andrestored order, but the crackdown was not as vig-orous and sweeping as some CPSU officialswanted. See the first-hand account by the long-time deputy director of the KGB, Filipp Bobkov,KGB i vlast’ (Moscow: Veteran MP, 1995), pp.144-145. Bobkov claims that Pyotr Pospelov andsome other senior party officials, as well as anumber of high-ranking personnel in the KGB,wanted to launch “mass repressions” to deter anyfurther unrest, but their proposals were never for-mally adopted. Subsequently, a commissionheaded by Brezhnev issued secret orders andguidelines to all party organizations to tightenpolitical controls.175On 4 November, the Soviet ambassador in Yu-goslavia, Nikolai Firyubin, sent a telegram toMoscow with information provided by Kardelj(at Tito’s behest) about the refuge granted to ImreNagy and his aides in the Yugoslav embassy. Theresponse, as approved by the CPSU Presidium,called on the Yugoslav authorities to turn overthe Hungarian officials to Soviet troops. See“Vypiska iz protokola No. P51/IV zasedaniyaPrezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 4 noyabrya 1956 g.,” 4November 1956 (Strictly Secret), in APRF, F. 3,Op. 64, D. 485, Ll. 103-104.176Nagy had appealed to UN Secretary-GeneralDag Hammerskjold on 1 November asking forsupport of Hungary’s sovereignty and indepen-dence. The UN Security Council began consid-ering the matter on 3 November. On 4 Novem-ber, the UN Security Council took up the ques-tion of Soviet military intervention in Hungary,and the UN General Assembly voted to condemnthe Soviet invasion. On 5 November, the CPSU


newspaper Pravda featured a letter purportedlysent by Kadar and Imre Horvath to DagHammarskjold. The letter claimed that Nagy’ssubmission of the Hungarian question to the UNhad been illegal, and requested that all consider-ation of the issue cease.177This brief session produced few results. Theformal protocol for the session (in TsKhSD, F. 3,Op. 14, D. 73, L. 4) simply reads: “Defer con-sideration of the matter.”178Voroshilov’s name is not listed among the par-ticipants, but the notes below indicate that he ac-tively took part.179Other documents recently declassified by theRussian government shed light on what occurredat this meeting. On 5 November an official fromthe CPSU CC international department, VladimirBaikov, who had been sent to Budapest the pre-vious day to maintain liaison with Kadar, sent asecure, high-frequency message back to Moscowalong with the draft text of a statement preparedby Kadar. Baikov’s message reads as follows:“At the request of Cde. Kadar, I am conveyingthe translation from Hungarian of an Appeal bythe Provisional Central Committee of the Hun-garian Socialist Workers’ Party ‘To HungarianCommunists! To Loyal Members of the Hungar-ian Workers’ Party!’ Cde. Kadar requested that Itransmit the views and observations of the So-viet comrades regarding the text of the Appealby 10:00 a.m. on 6 November.” (See “Po VCh,”APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L. 132.) The draftwent to Mikoyan, who prepared a number ofchanges and suggestions before the Presidiummeeting began. The most significant change wasthe addition of a reference to the “treacherous”activities of a “group of Imre Nagy, Losonczy,and Donath” after the condemnation of the“Rakosi clique.” (See the marked-up draft inAPRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L. 136.) Kadar in-corporated this change, though he dropped themention of Ferenc Donath, referring simply tothe “Nagy-Losonczy group,” which he claimedhad committed “treason” and inspired the “coun-terrevolution.” Other proposed changes also wereincluded. The final text was released as a leafletin Hungary on 6 November. It was published inthe Szolnok newspaper Szabad Nep on 7 Novem-ber and in Russian translation in the CPSU dailyPravda that same day. On 8 November it waspublished in Nepszabadsag. This was the firstmajor programmatic statement by Kadar’s gov-ernment.180This is the same telegram that Kadar men-tioned earlier. See Note 159 supra.181The draft statement pledged that the HSWPwould “make a decisive break with the harmfulpolicy and criminal methods of the Rakosi clique,which shook the faith of the broad popular massesin our party.” This was preserved in the final textalong with other condemnations of “past mis-takes.”182Malenkov obviously is referring to a CC ple-num of the HWP, not of the CPSU.183Again, the reference is to a CC plenum of theHWP, not of the CPSU.184From exile in Moscow, Rakosi had made over-tures about his possible readmission into the Hun-garian Communist party.185The topic discussed here was a telegram re-ceived on 5 November 1956 from the Soviet am-

bassador in Yugoslavia, Nikolai Firyubin, trans-mitting a formal protest by the Yugoslav govern-ment about the death of Milenko Milovanov, aYugoslav embassy employee in Budapest whowas struck by shots fired from a Soviet tank. TheYugoslav foreign minister, Koca Popovic, accusedthe Soviet tank of having deliberately opened fireon the embassy even though the compound wasclearly marked and “the Soviet government hadbeen informed by the Yugoslav side of who, otherthan Yugoslav diplomatic personnel, is in theYugoslav embassy compound in Budapest.” See“Shifrtelegramma,” 5 November 1956 (StrictlySecret), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, Ll. 143-144. To reinforce Popovic’s complaint, a similarprotest was delivered by the Yugoslav ambassa-dor in Budapest, Dalibor Soldatic, to the Sovietambassador in Budapest, Yurii Andropov.Soldatic requested that the Soviet military unitalongside the Yugoslav embassy be pulled back.Andropov relayed this message by telephone tothe Soviet deputy foreign minister Valerian Zorin,warning that “the demand for the withdrawal ofthe Soviet military unit from the building of themission is of a suspicious nature.” See“Telefonogramma,” 5 November 1956, in APRF,F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L. 130. These messageswere discussed at the Presidium meeting not onlyby Zhukov and Shepilov (as indicated by Malin),but also by Khrushchev, who presented the draftof a cable intended for the Yugoslav government.Subsequently, the cable was transmitted viaFiryubin to Popovic.186The formal protocol for this session (“Vypiskaiz Protokola No. 53 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsKKPSS ot 6 noyabrya 1956 g.,” in APRF, F. 3, Op.64, D. 485, L. 141) indicates that the Presidium“affirmed the draft response to the Yugoslavs inconnection with the unfortunate case of an em-ployee at the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest.”The telegram, signed by foreign minister DmitriiShepilov, was sent to the Yugoslav foreign min-ister, Koca Popovic, via the Yugoslav ambassa-dor in Budapest, Veljko Micunovic. It stated thatthe Soviet military commander in Hungary hadbeen ordered to make a careful study of how theincident happened. The telegram also conveyedthe Soviet government’s “deep condolences” re-garding the death of Milenko Milovanov, andpromised assistance in transporting Milanov’sbody to Yugoslavia. The telegram said that theSoviet military government would take “all nec-essary measures” to safeguard the Yugoslav em-bassy in Budapest, and in a follow-on conversa-tion with Micunovic, Shepilov indicated that theSoviet military command would comply with theYugoslav request to “pull back the military unitnext to the [Yugoslav] embassy compound.” See“O besede s poslom Yugoslavii v SSSRMichunovichem,” No. 486 (Secret), from D. T.Shepilov to the CPSU Presidium, 7 November1956, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 29, Ll. 1-3.The investigation into the incident was completedby mid-day on 7 November. It concluded thatthe Soviet tank had come under fire from a housealongside the Yugoslav embassy. When the tankresponded by firing back, one of the shots hadstrayed into the embassy, killing Milovanov. Itis unclear whether this version of events is moreaccurate than the original Yugoslav account, butwhatever the case may have been, steps were

taken to prevent further “unfortunate incidents.”187These notes were compiled by Malin’s deputy,Vladimir Naumovich Chernukha, not by Malinhimself. Hence, they are somewhat sketchier thanother notes from this period. No list of partici-pants in the session is given, but the formal pro-tocol for the session (“Vypiska iz Protokola No.60 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 27noyabrya 1956 g.,” in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 488,L. 181) indicates that, in addition to those listedhere, the participants included Brezhnev,Shvernik, Furtseva, Belyaev, and Pospelov. Theprotocol does not mention Andrei Gromyko.188The Presidium is discussing a telegram thatwas sent on 26 November by V. F. Nikolaev, anofficial at the Soviet embassy in Bucharest. Thetelegram indicated that the Romanian leader,Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej intended to seek top-level negotiations with Yugoslavia as soon aspossible to alleviate the dispute that Yugoslaviawas having with the Soviet Union and Hungaryabout the fate of Imre Nagy. During negotiationswith the Yugoslavs, Kadar’s government hadgiven assurances of safety for Nagy and his aidesif they left the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest.When Nagy’s group went outside on 22 Novem-ber, they were immediately arrested by Sovietmilitary personnel. Soon thereafter, they weretransported as prisoners to Romania. A senioraide to Gheorghiu-Dej, Emil Bodnaras, toldNikolaev that the Romanians “hadn’t expectedthat the Yugoslavs would raise a fuss about thetransfer of Imre Nagy and his group to Romania.However, as you know, they presented a note ofprotest to the Soviet and Hungarian governments.It’s possible that this question might be raised atthe UN, etc. We believe that we must be readyfor different speeches and discussions regardingImre Nagy. But first of all we believe it is neces-sary to discuss this matter with the Yugoslavs.”See “Shifrtelegramma,” 26 November 1956(Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5,Ll. 13-14.189The formal protocol for this session (“Vypiskaiz Protokola No. 60 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsKKPSS,” 27 November 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op.64, D. 488, L. 177) stated that “on the basis ofthe exchange of opinions at the session of theCPSU CC Presidium, Cde. Bulganin is instructedto hold negotiations with Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej.”Later that day, Bulganin had a telephone conver-sation with Gheorghiu-Dej, which he promptlyrecounted in writing for the other members of theCPSU Presidium: “I told Cde. Gheorghiu-Dejthat, in our opinion, a meeting at the highest levelwith the Yugoslav leadership about Imre Nagyand his group will not produce a good solution,since the Yugoslavs have a set position on thismatter, and such a meeting might complicate thesituation. The Yugoslavs might demand a meet-ing with Imre Nagy and the others, which wouldhardly be worthwhile. . . . Cde. Gheorghiu-Dejasked that I let the CPSU CC Presidium knowthat they are working via plenipotentiaries withImre Nagy and his group. They have set out topersuade Imre Nagy and his group to issue a state-ment in which they would acknowledge theircriminal actions and indicate that the only cor-rect course at present is to support and consoli-date the Revolutionary Workers’ and Peasants’Government of Kadar, and to strengthen the re-


gime of people’s democracy. In this way, saidGheorghiu-Dej, we want to test Imre Nagy.” See“Informatsiya,” 27 November 1956 (Top Secret),in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, Ll. 16-17.190This refers to the manner in which Imre Nagyand his aides were arrested. A bus had beenbrought alongside the Yugoslav embassy, suppos-edly to transport the officials and their familiesto their apartments. It turned out that the bus wasmerely part of an elaborate plot devised by IvanSerov and other senior KGB officials to lure Nagyfrom the embassy. A Soviet military officer wassitting in the bus, and others quickly approached.Two Yugoslav diplomats who were accompany-ing the Hungarians were forced out of the bus,and the remaining passengers were placed underarrest, contrary to the assurances that Kadar’sgovernment had given to the Yugoslavs. Thisepisode is recounted in detail in the note of pro-test that Yugoslav foreign minister Koca Popovicsent to the Soviet and Hungarian embassies on24 November 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D.5, Ll. 19-26. See also “Telefonogramma,” Se-cure High-Frequency Transmission, fromMalenkov, Suslov, and Aristov, 23 November1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 488, Ll. 95-96.191No title for this section is given, but the for-mal protocol for the session (No. 60, as cited inNote 187 supra) indicates that Point II dealt with“Questions of Hungary.” According to the Pro-tocol, “the USSR Foreign Ministry, the KGB, andthe USSR Ministry of Defense [were] instructedto prepare materials about Imre Nagy and hisgroup in accordance with the exchange of opin-ions at the CPSU CC Presidium’s session.”192Nagy’s surname is omitted in this line ofMalin’s notes.

Mark Kramer, a scholar based at the DavisCenter for Russian Studies at Harvard Uni-versity, is a frequent contributor to theCWIHP Bulletin.

RESEARCH NOTES:

THE RUSSIAN NUCLEARDECLASSIFICATION PROJECT:

SETTING UP THE A-BOMBEFFORT, 1946

by G. A. Goncharov, N. I. Komov,A. S. Stepanov

On 16 July 1945, the USA con-ducted the world’s first test of an atomicbomb, and on 6 and 9 August 1945, itused the new weapon on Hiroshima andNagasaki. The world faced the fact ofthe USA’s monopolistic possession ofthe new, unprecedently powerful de-vice. The atomic bombardments of theJapanese cities, some believed, alsoconstituted a demonstration byAmerica’s leaders of their readiness toemploy these weapons later on as well.

The events of 1945 forced the So-viet leadership to undertake emergencymeasures to speed up the creation of theUSSR’s own nuclear weapons. It wasclear that solving the problem of mak-ing the atomic bomb as soon as pos-sible would require mobilization of allthe country’s resources, which had beenentirely directed to securing the victoryover fascist Germany and its allies.

Focusing all the country’s forces onthe solution of this complex problemcalled above all for the establishmentof a new state management body en-dowed with appropriate power. Such abody, which was entrusted with practi-cally unlimited authority, was the Spe-cial Committee, headed by L. P. Beria(a member of State Defense Commit-tee and Vice Chairman of the USSRCouncil of People’s Commissars) andwas founded by the USSR State De-fense Committee’s Resolution No.GOKO-9887 of 20 August 1945. TheCommittee was founded under the StateDefense Committee, but after the StateDefense Committee was abolished inSeptember 1945, the Special Commit-tee functioned as a body of USSR Coun-cil of People’s Commissars (and afterMarch 1946 as a body of the USSRCouncil of Ministers).

In reality, the Special Committeewas an independent state control body

directly subordinate to Soviet leader J.V.Stalin. It functioned for almost eightyears until it was abolished in accor-dance with a CC CPSU PresidiumResolution of 26 June 1953—the sametumultuous meeting at which Beria wasarrested. Thus, the Special Committee’sactivities covered a most important, for-mative period of the Soviet atomicproject, that is, the establishment andgrowth of the USSR atomic-energy in-dustry, the development and testing ofthe first Soviet atomic bomb (in 1949)and early improved atomic bomb de-signs, and the development and virtualcompletion of the first Soviet hydrogenbomb (RDS-6), which was first testedin August 1953.

Considering and resolving all themost basic issues which arose in thecourse of the early Soviet atomicproject, the Special Committee wasempowered to supervise

all work on the use of atomic energy ofuranium:- the development of scientificresearch in this sphere;- the broad useof geological surveys and the establish-ment of a resource base for the USSRto obtain uranium...;- the organizationof industry to process uranium and toproduce special equipment and materi-als connected with the use of atomic en-ergy; and the construction of atomicenergy facilities, and the developmentand production of an atomic bomb.1

The Special Committee’s decisionseither were of unilaterally decisive char-acter or were made to support draft reso-lutions and directions of the USSR Gov-ernment previously submitted to Stalinfor approval. Throughout the lifetimeof the Special Committee, more than140 sittings were held. The approxi-mate volume of the SpecialCommittee’s protocols is 1000 type-written pages. The complete work of theSpecial Committee fills about 1700dossiers containing more than 300,000typewritten pages. These materials arecurrently stored in the Archive of thePresident, Russian Federation (APRF).

These materials, documentingevents from 1943 to 1953, constitute aninvaluable treasure of early Sovietatomic project history.

New Evidence on the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises

Documents

Transcript of New Evidence on the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises