New Commons 1/6: Introduction to Commons Research

Juhana Venäläinen Researcher, PhD Student University of Eastern Finland School of Humanities [email protected]

5516126 New Commons / Juhana Venäläinen / University of Eastern Finland / Spring 2013

¡  Mon 28 January, 12–14 @ M102: Introduction to commons research

¡  Wed 30 January, 14–16 @ M103: The ecological commons (a guest lecture by Tuomo Alhojärvi & Otto Bruun)

¡  Tue 5 February, 14–16 @ M102 (NB! Time & place changed!): Ownership and the urban commons

¡  Wed 6 February, 14–16 @ M103: Authorship and the cultural commons

¡  Mon 11 February, 12–14 @ M102: Peer production and the networking commons

¡  Wed 13 February, 14–16 @ M103: Capitalizing (on) the common ¡  Thu 7 March, 17:00: Deadline for essays

¡  Wed–Thu 13–14 March, 10–14 @ N105: Seminar sessions (discussion on the course essays)

¡  Course requirements: §  Attending the lectures (6 x 2 h) §  Four compulsory readings + short reflective summaries

§  A short essay + feedback for another essay §  Attending the seminar sessions (2 x 4 h)

¡  Readings and slides available from the course website (www.juhanavenalainen.net/teaching/new-‐commons/)

¡  Reflective summaries of the readings §  150–250 words (about ½ page) §  The point of the text as your understood it (or didn’t) §  Optionally: questions, remarks §  Send it to [email protected] before the lecture

¡  Texts §  3: Midnight Notes Collective (1990): The New Enclosures §  4: David Bollier (2004): Why We Must Talk about the Information

Commons §  5: Michel Bauwens (2005): The Political Economy of Peer

Production §  6: Michael Hardt (1999): Affective Labor

¡  Course essay §  Choose one: ▪  A) Case study or a plan for a case study ▪  B) Critical commentary of a chosen text ▪  C) Reflective comparison of two texts

§  Use concepts, ideas, and tools introduced during the course

§  Use texts from the reading lists or elsewhere §  Length: 5–8 pages §  Topic chosen by: end of February §  Deadline for the essay: Thu 7 March 17:00

¡  1. The commons – what and why? ¡  2. A brief history of commons research ¡  3. The tragedy of the commons ¡  4. The institutional framework ¡  5. A quick glance towards the “New Commons”

¡  Q & A

Commons = something that we share

→ what “something”? → who “we”?

→ in which sense “to share”? → why does it matter?

¡  Institutional settings: university §  Legal status: a “public entity” (public-‐law institution) §  Funded mostly by the state (Ministry of Education) §  “Autonomously” governed §  Decision-‐making based on a complex mix of legislation, government control, economic incentives, representative democracy,

collegial (horizontal) agreements, etc.

¡  Physical settings: classroom §  Open access and free entrance §  Has measurable boundaries and capacity §  Premises and movables owned by a private enterprise §  Use of spaces regulated by a complex administrative system

¡  Educational settings: curriculum §  Includes the students of the program / university, excludes others §  Rules: The curriculum grants a certain amount of freedom (individual choice) but excepts a certain amount of compliance to a

predetermined plan §  Incentives and sanctions: The use of resources is measured, controlled and guided by “credits”

¡  Cultural settings: teaching §  The tradition of delivering, sharing and constructing knowledge §  Social norms and codes of conduct §  Formulations of ideas as “intellectual property”?

¡  Communicative settings: speech §  English language as an assumed lingua franca, a common basis of communication

¡  Many kinds and levels of (possible) commons: §  public services commons §  venue and infrastructure commons §  educational commons §  cultural and intellectual commons §  communication commons

¡  What difference does it make to add the word “commons”? §  Emphasis on social interaction, common objectives, rules and norms, practices of sharing, distribution of power relations, institutions of decision-‐making, sources of governance…

§  A general figure: 1) resource + 2) field of action

¡  Commons = §  Resources shared by a group of people §  Traditionally associated with plots of land, but now refers to a plenitude of

phenomena §  Subject to social dilemmas and conflicts §  A third form of “property” outside the market and the state §  The inheritance of humanity in whole (e.g. land, air, water) §  The results of social production (e.g. knowledge, codes, affects)

¡  A commons / the commons §  A commons: a specific resource system (such as a park, playground, or a river)

– plural: commons §  The commons: an analytical concept comparable to “the market” or “the

state” §  The common: a philosophical and political idea: the world as a co-‐habited and

co-‐produced whole

(Hess & Ostrom 2007; Hardt & Negri 2009)

¡  A new “catch-‐all” term? §  intellectual property rights (IPRs) §  computer codes and networking infrastructure §  academic libraries §  invention and creativity §  open-‐source software §  collaborative science §  citizenship and democracy §  collective action §  information economics §  managing scholarly information §  globalization §  westernization of knowledge §  indigenous knowledge and rights §  computer waste

(Ostrom & Hess 2007)

"A commons arises whenever a given community decides that it wishes to manage a resource in a collective manner, with a special regard for equitable access, use and sustainability. It is a social form that has long lived in the shadows of our market culture, but which is now on the rise.” – David Bollier, founder of the webzine On the Commons (onthecommons.org), author of Silent Theft (2002), Viral Spiral (2009) and The Wealth of the Commons (2012)

Joi Ito (Bollier 2011)

The commons

Material commons

Ecological commons

Constructed commons

Immaterial commons

Social commons

Networking commons

(Hardt & Negri 2009)

¡  David Bollier: Commons is a “rather simple and obvious concept” §  A more pervasive and widespread regime than we usually think §  Seems exotic because of the conceived economic conceptions ▪  Private property ▪  Free market ▪  A heroic individual, the rational “self-‐made man” (homo economicus)

separated from social and cultural contexts

§  → understanding the commons requires dismissing many prevailing categories of thought

¡  The collapse of the Soviet Union – an obvious (but misinformed) source for the distrust in collective property regimes §  Communism / Commonism

(Bollier 2007)

¡  The commons is a useful concept, because it helps to… § …identify and analyze problems in collective decision-‐making

§ …sketch a more “holistic” understanding of issues related to the management of collective resources

§ …explain how social and economic value can be created and sustained outside of the market and the state

(Bollier 2007)

¡  A model for balancing economic, social and ethical concerns §  Balancing rights of producers vs. rights of users §  Safeguarding the rights of the commoners in policy-‐making

§  Preserving the vitality of the resource system for future generations

¡  Commons framework can be used for… §  …designing institutions, incentives and legislation §  …proposing effective solutions and alternatives

(Bollier 2007)

¡  Protecting and restoring the ”gifts of nature” for future generations

¡  Underlining the importance of sustainable social organizations along with sustainable resource usage

¡  Framing the nature as non-‐commodificable (not-‐for-‐sale)

¡  The rise of the (new) commons discourse ~ the post-‐industrial turn of capitalism §  “Knowledge economy”, “Information economy”, “Immaterial economy”, “Post-‐Fordism”, “The new economy”, “Cognitive capitalism”

§  General argument: new sources of economic growth are to be found from shared and uncountable assets (→ the commons) rather than from proprietary and delimited (physical) resources

§  Commons provide an effective way to create economic and social wealth

¡  Ever-‐growing commodification of human life §  Continuous expansion of capitalism both extensively and intensively §  More and more resources are produced directly to be sold in the

market ▪  E.g. education, public health services, child and elderly care, experiences,

personalities, culture

¡  Alienability: what resources should be allowed to be privatized? §  Medicine patents? Seedlines? Animal species? The human genome? §  A continuous struggle that involves ▪  Extending capitalism -‐> new enclosures of the common -‐> reclaiming the

commons ▪  Extending common -‐> new “disclosures” of capitalism (“quasi-‐commons”) -‐>

new tactics of commodification

(Bollier 2007; see also Nonini 2007)

¡  Commons as a claim for equal access to and autonomous governance of… §  …means of subsistence §  …means of production

¡  These are not secured in any existing political system §  → Libertarian answer: less regulation of the market, more privatization of

resources §  → Socialist answer: more intervention by the state and supranational

institutions §  → “Commonist” answers: autonomous communities and resource pools

independent from the market and the state, global public domain of immaterial commons, subsidiarity-‐based decision-‐making, site-‐specific solutions

¡  The market and the state – enemies or allies for commons-‐based political initiatives?

¡  Property, contracts, markets ¡  Legal mechanisms ¡  Social norms and rules, social capital ¡  Sustainability, equity ¡  Institutional change ¡  Conflicts and problem-‐solving

¡ → commons research as a multi-‐/inter-‐/trans-‐disciplinary field of inquiry

¡  Some fields of study in commons research – a sample from the reading list of this course:

§  Anthropology (6) §  Activist / Independent Researcher (4) §  Law (4) §  Geography (3) §  Economics (2) §  Environmental Ethics (2) §  Information Science (2) §  Literature (2) §  Media Studies (2) §  Ecology §  Global and Latin American Studies §  Philosophy §  Political Philosophy §  Political Science §  Sociology

¡  Major branches: §  1. Environmental economics / Environmental social sciences §  2. Intellectual property law / Legal philosophy §  3. Critical theory (Philosophy / Sociology / Critical political economy)

Jean-‐François Millet: D

es Glaneuses (1857)

¡  Common → lat. communis → com-‐munus §  1. “shared by all / many” §  2. ”a duty / service performed for the community ▪  shared by the society for the society

¡  Historical pinpoints: §  Platonic communism §  Christian ”Proto-‐Communism” §  Rural Commons §  Info-‐Commons §  Post-‐Marxist Commonism

(see e.g. Hemmungs Wirtén 2008)

“That city is best ordered in which the greatest number use the expression ‘mine’ and ‘not mine’ of the same things in the same way. […] For example, if a finger of one of us is wounded, the entire community of bodily connection stretches the soul for ‘integration’.” – Plato, Republic, Book 5, 1261b

¡  1950s: §  H. Scott Gordon: research on fisheries, §  Concepts of “common property” and “open access”

¡  1960s: § Mancur Olson: The Logic of Collective Action (1965)

§  Garrett Hardin: The Tragedy of the Commons (1968)

(Laukkanen 2011; Ostrom 1990)

¡  Influential works: §  Elinor Ostrom (1990): Governing the Commons §  The Ecologist (1993 special issue): Whose Common Future? Reclaiming

the Commons §  Susan J. Buck (1998): The Global Commons: An Introduction §  Peter Barnes (2000): Who Owns the Sky? Our Common Assets and the

Future of Capitalism

¡  Key ideas: §  Nature as a public resource §  Natural resources as global commons to be managed for the benefit

of all §  E.g. the atmosphere, oceans, fisheries, freshwater supplies,

wilderness, beaches §  Precautionary principle as a guiding rule for preserving the commons

¡  Influential works: §  James Boyle (1997): Shamans, Software and Spleens: Law and

Construction of Information Society §  Lawrence Lessig (2000): Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace §  Jessica Litman (2001): Digital Copyright: Protecting Intellectual

Property on the Internet §  Eva Hemmungs Wirtén (2004): No Trespassing: Authorship,

Intellectual Property Rights, and the Boundaries of Globalization

¡  Key ideas: §  The global “infosphere” as analogous to “the environment” §  Inspired by the thought of the early environments (Rachel

Carson, Aldo Leopold etc.)

¡  Influential works: §  Nick Dyer-‐Witheford (2006): Cyber-‐Marx: Cycles and Circuits in High-‐Technology Capitalism

§  Matteo Pasquinelli (2008): Animal Spirits: A Bestiary of the Commons

§  Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri (2009): Commonwealth

¡  Key ideas: §  Commons (or “the common”) as a new site of political struggle

§  Commons-‐based production as a revolutionary social form

¡  Heinrich-‐Böll-‐Stiftung / Silke Helfrich ¡  P2P Foundation / Michel Bauwens ¡  Creative Commons / Lawrence Lessig ¡  On the Commons / David Bollier ¡  The Commoner / Massimo De Angelis

¡  Commons.fi

¡  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k0ZWFPVBTws

¡  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L7jaSjkd0jM

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

¡  Professor in Human Ecology (UCLA, Santa Barbara)

¡  Main focus: issue of human overpopulation

§  “Tragedy of the Commons” (Science, 1968)

§  9 books, a plenty of articles

§  Summation of the works: Living Within Limits (1993)

¡  Assume a world with two persons breeding cattle in a shared plot of land §  Until the maximum capacity of the land, the breeder A gets extra profit (P) for each added

animal §  The same is true for the breeder B §  Because both of the breeders try to maximize their profit, the land gets overpopulated, and

the cattle do not have enough to eat §  The breeders together will now gain less profit than they would if the land was not

overpopulated

¡  → “Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.” §  Actions that are rational for an individual can be harmful for all of the participants

(→ a “lose–lose” situation) §  These kind of problems cannot be solved by appealing to the goodwill or the conscience of

the participants, because taking alternative action would be risky, suboptimal and thus irrational from the individual standpoint

§  Limitless growth of population in a limited world is one of such problems §  The solution requires an “extended morality” → enforced restrictions on individual freedom

¡  Reflects similar scepticism on human nature as already Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, David Hume etc.

(Hardin 1968)

“Property that is common to the greatest number of owners receives the least attention; men care most for their private possessions, and less for what they own in common […] They think less of it on the ground that someone else is thinking about it […]” – Aristotle, Politics, Book 2, 1261b

“Unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-‐interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests.” – Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1965)

(cited in Ostrom 1990, p. 6)

¡  Hardin’s assumptions §  There is no communication, cooperation, or management system, among the participants, or any external regulation or coercion that limits their activity

§  The decisions of the herders are based only on maximizing their profit through extending their herd

¡  Conceptual confusions §  Tragedy of the commons vs. Tragedy of open access?

(see Kyllönen 2011)

¡  Example: §  The carrying capacity of the meadow is 100 cows §  → In a cooperative situation, both breeders A and B would graze 50 cows each §  The profit of an individual breeder would be maximized at 80 cows §  Both of the breeders have full information on this situation §  Will the breeders stick to the cooperative scheme (by grazing 50 cows each) or try to maximize their

individual profit (by grazing 80 cows each, thus exceeding the capacity of the meadow)?

Scenario Profit for A Profit for B Total profit

Both A and B graze moderately 10 10 20

A overgrazes 11 -‐1 10

B overgrazes -‐1 11 10

Both A and B overgraze 0 0 0

(see Ostrom 1990)

¡  Whatever B decides to do, it’s better for A to “cheat” (and gain 0–11 units of profit) than to seek cooperation (and gain –1–10 units of profit) §  The same is true for A §  This is why both end up cheating, if they act for their rational self-‐

interest §  → The “Prisoner’s Dilemma” (Albert Tucker 1950)

¡  Solutions for the dilemma §  Checking the assumptions (capabilities of cooperation, other sources

of motivation than self-‐interest, etc.) §  A strict coercive political body (Heilbroner: “a military government”) §  Voluntary institutions for the enforcement of

a binding contract between the participants

(see Ostrom 1990)

Formal monitoring • Regular inspections • Randomized surveys

Informal monitoring • Self-‐regulation • Own-‐checks • Social control

Formal arenas • Legislatures • Regulatory agencies • Courts

Informal arenas • Gatherings • Appropriation teams • Private associations

Operational rules-‐in-‐use

(Ostrom 1990, 54–55)

José Zugasti (2003): A la deriva

¡  Political economist, professor (Indiana University & Arizona State University)

¡  Associated with the New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach

¡  Ground-‐breaking research in economic governance & the commons

§  Design principles of common pool resource (CPR) management, 1977 (with V. Ostrom)

§  Governing the Commons, 1990

§  Understanding Institutional Diversity, 2005

¡  Nobel Prize in Economics, 2009

¡  Case studies: fisheries, agriculture, forestry, irrigation systems in Switzerland, Turkey, Japan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, etc. Indiana University

¡  Focuses on §  organizational arrangements §  credible commitments §  modes of governance §  social norms §  social capital §  ideological values §  strategic behavior

¡  Using concepts such as §  incentives §  transaction costs §  asymmetric information §  opportunism §  moral hazard §  bargaining strength §  monitoring costs

¡  Typically thought: “The only way to solve a commons dilemma is X” §  The content of X varies, but the trust to an universal solution prevails

§  E.g. ▪  X = A strong central authority ▪  X= Privatization and free market

¡  Ostrom: Many solutions exist to cope with many different problems (both in theory and in practice)

(Ostrom 1990; Hess & Ostrom 2007)

¡  The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework

§  Seeks to answer fundamental political and social questions… ▪  How do humans come together and create organizations? ▪  How do they make decisions and rules for achieving social goals?

§  …by analyzing rules, norms, strategies and behaviours ▪  Helpful for understanding and explaining individual and group decision

in “public choice” problems ▪  Not a specific “model” or methodology ▪  Can be applied into a variety of different cases

§  Practical goal: to develop tools for designing effective institutions of commons management


A. Underlying factors

•  1. Properties of the resource system

•  2. Properties of the community

•  3. Rules-‐in-‐use

B. Action arenas

•  4. Action situations

•  5. Actors

C. Outcomes

•  6. Objectives

•  8. Evaluation criteria

•  7. Patterns of interaction

(Ostrom & Hess 2007, 46, slightly modified)

¡  The assets, capacities and constraints of a resource system §  Biological §  Physical §  Technological §  Intellectual

¡  The properties of the community §  Users (“appropriators”) §  Producers (“providers”) §  Policymakers (“regulators”)

¡  Rules-‐in-‐use §  Operational §  Policy-‐level §  Constitutional


Rules Constitutional rules

Collective rules

Operational rules

Levels of analysis

Constitutional choice

Collective choice Operational choice

Processes •  Formulation •  Governance •  Adjudication •  Modification

•  Policy-‐making •  Management •  Adjudication

•  Appropriation •  Provision •  Monitoring •  Enforcement

(Ostrom 1990, 53)

¡  The fields and settings where the decisions are made §  Different spatial scales (local, regional, national, global…)

§  Different temporal scales (spontaneous, ad hoc, temporary, permanent)

§  Different levels of rule-‐making

¡  Consists of action situations and actors

¡  A flexible and dynamic tool of analysis ¡  Important in analysing institutional change


¡  Objectives §  What is the purpose (the common good) of the resource?

¡  Evaluation criteria §  How to measure whether the objectives are met or not?

¡  Patterns of interaction §  Affected by underlying factors of the resource system, economic incentives, actions made by other actors

§  Strongly affects the success or failure of the commons in question

§  Can be highly controversial


VIRTUOUS CIRCLE VICIOUS CIRCLE

Strong social capital • Equality • Solidarity • Trust

Beneficial attitudes • Attentiveness • Cooperation • Fair and just contribution

Balanced resource usage • Sustainable use • Win-‐win • The comedy of the commons

Weak social capital • Unjustified hierarchies • Fragmentation (“Tribalism”) • Distrust

Harmful attitudes • Carelessness • Egoism • Free riding

Unbalanced resource usage • Overuse / underuse / misuse • Lose-‐lose • The tragedy of the commons

(partially based on Ostrom & Hess 2007)

¡  In most cases, a good culture of commons is associated with: §  Clearly defined boundaries §  Rules-‐in-‐use matched to local context §  Subsidiarity principle in decision-‐making §  Autonomy of the community to devise its own policies

§  A system for self-‐monitoring members’ behaviour §  A system of sanctions §  Low-‐cost conflict-‐resolution mechanisms §  Nested governance structure

(Hess & Ostrom 2007); Ostrom 1990

amg05k

¡  Charlotte Hess (2008): Mapping the New Commons §  A shift of focus from the traditional commons (land, see, air, forests) to new

commons (intellectual, social, affective, “immaterial)

¡  “New” in which sense? §  New approaches and lines of thought §  New kinds of commons §  New kinds of commons conflicts §  New political projects

¡  Analogies with traditional commons: §  congestion §  free riding §  conflicts §  overuse §  pollution

(Hess 2008; Hess & Ostrom 2007)

New Commons

(NC)

Traditional Commons

Neighborhood Commons

Medical and Health

Commons

Knowledge Commons

Markets as Commons

Global Commons

Cultural Commons

(Hess 2008)

¡  Affluency §  “The Comedy of the Commons” (Rose 1986) / “The Cornucopia of the Commons” (Bricklin 2006) ▪  Information doesn’t wear out or run out in use

§  “The more, the merrier” ▪  The total social value of the immaterial commons increases with more users / producers sharing with each other

§  Provides a strong moral and economic argument for granting open access

¡  Constructed-‐ness §  Constructed (“artificial”, cultural) commons vs. given (natural) commmons

§  NCs have to be continuously produced and reproduced by human effort

¡  Commoning ▪  The work done upon the commons by the commoners ▪  A continuous social, cultural, economic and material process of constructing, developing, sustaining and renewing the common wealth

Non-‐free nature

Scarcity, selfishness Appropriation Material

commodities

Free culture Affluence, cooperation Recycling Relations

1. Modern Economy (Industrial Production)

2. Commons-‐based Economy (“Cultural” Production)

¡  Cultural Commons: §  non-‐private, non-‐public §  shared and reproduced within local and global communities

§  not solely ‘symbolic’/‘immaterial’ but also relating to ‘natural’, ‘biological’ and ‘physical’

§  platforms for new ways of living §  basis for wealth creation & subsistence

amg05k

¡  Bollier, David. 2011. “The Commons, Short and Sweet.” Retrieved (http://bollier.org/commons-‐short-‐and-‐sweet). ¡  Bollier, David. 2007. “The Growth of the Commons Paradigm.” Pp. 27–40 in Understanding Knowledge as a

Commons. From Theory to Practice, edited by Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press. ¡  Bricklin, Dan. 2006. “The Cornucopia of the Commons: How to get volunteer labor.” Retrieved January 28, 2013

(http://bricklin.com/cornucopia.htm). ¡  Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. 2009. Commonwealth. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard

University Press. ¡  Hess, Charlotte. 2008. “Mapping the New Commons.” SSRN eLibrary. Retrieved March 19, 2012 (http://

papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1356835). ¡  Hess, Charlotte, and Elinor Ostrom. 2007. “Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge Commons.” Pp. ix–xiii in

Understanding Knowledge as a Commons. From Theory to Practice, edited by Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press.

¡  Kyllönen, Simo. 2011. “Vailla teknistä ratkaisua: yhteislaidunten tragedia, yhteistoiminnan ongelmat ja ympäristöpoliittinen teoria.” Pp. 73–111 in Kiista yhteismaista: Garrett Hardin ja selviytymisen politiikka. Tampere: niin & näin.

¡  Laukkanen, Marita. 2011. “Yhteislaidunten ongelma ympäristö-‐ ja luonnonvarataloustieteessä.” Pp. 61–72 in Kiista yhteismaista: Garrett Hardin ja selviytymisen politiikka. Tampere: niin & näin.

¡  Nonini, Donald M. 2006. “Introduction: The Global Idea of ‘the Commons’.” Social Analysis 50(3):164–177. ¡  Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge

University Press. ¡  Ostrom, Elinor, and Charlotte Hess. 2007a. “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons.” Pp. 41–81 in

Understanding Knowledge as a Commons. From Theory to Practice, edited by Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press.

¡  Ostrom, Elinor, and Charlotte Hess. 2007b. “Preface.” Pp. ix–xiii in Understanding Knowledge as a Commons. From Theory to Practice, edited by Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press.

¡  Rose, Carol. 1986. “The Comedy of the Commons: Commerce, Custom, and Inherently Public Property.” Faculty Scholarship Series. Retrieved (http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1828).

¡  www.onthecommons.org

¡  www.p2pfoundation.net

¡  www.thecommoner.co.uk

¡  www.commons.fi (mostly in Finnish)

New Commons 1/6: Introduction to Commons Research

Education

Transcript of New Commons 1/6: Introduction to Commons Research