New Code of Judicial Conduct_Canon 1 Sec 5
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Transcript of New Code of Judicial Conduct_Canon 1 Sec 5
8/12/2019 New Code of Judicial Conduct_Canon 1 Sec 5
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New Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 1 Sec. 5
SEC. 5.
Judges shall not only be free from
inappropriate connections with, and influenceby, the executive and legislative branches of
government, but must also appear to be free
therefrom to a reasonable observer.
8/12/2019 New Code of Judicial Conduct_Canon 1 Sec 5
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New Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 1 Sec. 5
• new section adopted in the Code of Judicial Conduct.
• While this section seems to share similarities with some
provisions of the Canon on Propriety, it deals specificallywith the avoidance of inappropriate connections.
– as well as any situation that would give rise to the
impression of the existence of such inappropriate
connections – with the executive and legislative branches of
the government.
8/12/2019 New Code of Judicial Conduct_Canon 1 Sec 5
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New Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 1 Sec. 5
• Judges are expected to exercise judicial power.
CONSTITUTIONS, Art. VIII, Sec. 1, 2
• The rule set forth in Section 5 has both legal and practical value.
Legally, it affirms the independence of the judiciary from the two otherbranches of government, as required by the Constitution. Thus, as co-equalbodies, neither the executive nor the legislative branch can dictate or exertinfluence upon the judiciary.
Practically, considering that the appointments, promotions and movements
of judges are subject to executive approval, and that the organization, budgetand resources of the judiciary are matters that require legislative grace, theprovisions of Section 5 require judges to uphold their solemn duty to render
justice freely without any obligation to reciprocate whatever beneficencethat might have been bestowed on them by the other two branches.
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New Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 1 Sec. 5
Comparative
Rule 2.4: External Influences on Judicial Conduct
A. A judge shall not be swayed by public clamor or fear of criticism.
B. A judge shall not permit family, social, political, financial, or otherinterests or relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment.
C. A judge shall not convey or permit others to convey theimpression that any person or organization is in a position to influencethe judge.
American Bar AssociationModel Code of Judicial Conduct: Canon 2
8/12/2019 New Code of Judicial Conduct_Canon 1 Sec 5
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New Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 1 Sec. 5
Jurisprudence
Alfonso vs. Alonzo-Legasto
A.M. MT J-94-995, September 5, 2002, 388 SCRA 351
Facts:
A judge did not act independently of the Local GovernmentUnit (LGU) when she downsized her staff at the MTC and
asked the city to re employ the laid- off workers withoutdiminution of compensation or dis advantage with regardto location of work assignment.
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New Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 1 Sec. 5
Alfonso vs. Alonzo-Legasto
A.M. MT J-94-995, September 5, 2002, 388 SCRA 351
Held:
• The SC rules that the respondent Judge has actedimproperly in not informing the High Court through theoffice of Court Administrator of the need to streamline
her court and of its personnel needs, instead asking LGUto employ those who were displaced due to herdownsizing.
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New Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 1 Sec. 5
Alfonso vs. Alonzo-Legasto
A.M. MT J-94-995, September 5, 2002, 388 SCRA 351
Held:
• The high court cited Bagatsing vs. Herrera, explaining the judicial independence is the reason for leaving exclusivelyto the Court the authority to deal with internal personnel
issues, even if the court employees in question is fundedby the local government.
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New Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 1 Sec. 5
Alfonso vs. Alonzo-Legasto
A.M. MT J-94-995, September 5, 2002, 388 SCRA 351
Held:
• Because a reasonable person could conclude that theLGU maintained some influence over the MTC judge,under the New Code of Judicial Conduct , respondent
judge’s actions created an improper connection with anexecutive/ administrative body - the LGU
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New Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 1 Sec. 5
Alfonso vs. Alonzo-Legasto
A.M. MT J-94-995, September 5, 2002, 388 SCRA 351
Held:
• ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge Rose Marie Alonzo-Legasto, in her capacity as then Executive Judge of theMetropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City, is FINED
P10,000.00 to be paid within twenty (20) days fromnotice of this Decision for abuse of authority
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New Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 1 Sec. 5
Appearance of impropriety.
A.M. No. 93-10-1296-RTC, August 12, 1998, 294 SCRA 119.
RE: SUSPENSION OF CLERK OF COURT ROGELIO R. JOBOCO, RTC, BRANCH 16 NAVAL, BILIRAN
Facts:
The case of Suspension of Clerk of Court Jacobo illustrates this point. The judge in that case wason congenial terms with the governor from whom he borrowed vehicles on several occasions totravel to his judicial station.
Held :
The Supreme Court held that this congeniality was not necessarily detrimental to judicialindependence, provided that there was no showing that such relations were for corrupt ends.
However, had this case been tried under the New Code of Judicial Conduct, the judge’s actswould likely have created an “appearance” of an improper connection. To the common person,the accommodation may seem a reason for the judge to ingratiate himself towards hisbenefactors, which may ultimately be perceived as affecting the judge’s ability to ruleindependently. Therefore, whether or not the congenial relationship was indeed used for corruptends, it would be advisable for judges to avoid becoming dependent on other parties, especiallyfor basic needs like transportation to the judge’s workstation.