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Emese Ugrin – Csaba Varga New theory of state and democracy

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Bevezetés

Emese Ugrin – Csaba Varga

New theory of state and democracy

2008

Published by:

Institute for Strategic Research

www.strategiakutato.hu

Co-publishers:

Translated by:

Anna Born

Cover and typography by: László Siba

© Emese Ugrin, Csaba Varga

ISBN: 978-963-87857-01

Responsible Editor:

Eva, V. Csorba

Printing house: Danube Palece Publisher, 2008

Contents

Preface7

Introduction10

Chapter One: The glocal world and information age13

1.1. The new concept of globalisation: functional and substantial globalisation13

1.2. Localisation and ’life milieu’15

1.3. Glocal age and the new mediation level: the nation16

1.4. The four models of the present glocal age17

1.5. The Information Age that comes to an end18

1.6. The age of new technologies and artificial intelligence19

1.7. Age of new knowledge and critical approaches to democracy20

1.8. Information society as the next stage of glocalization23

1.9. The history of the three basic categories and their submodels25

1.10. A new understanding of knowledge society at the end of the information age28

A restricted concept of knowledge in the information society29

1.11.The expansion of network society and knowledge-based economy31

The era of knowledge-driven economy33

1.12.Capital resources of the information society36

Chapter Two: Developing the relationship between state and citizen39

2.1. Starting point in eight items39

2.2. State and democracy – a solid first approach40

2.3. The theory of the administrative field comprehensively embedded in the individual, political, social and the collective consciousness42

2.4. Citizen – the theory of five prize-winning community citizen44

2.5. The theory of the state: types of state in the new theory of the state45

2.6. Social theory – the theory of new civil society47

2.7. Historical analysis – the basic model of three periods50

The model of the Industrial Age50

The model of the Socialist Age53

The model fo the Information Age54

2.8. Democracy – before the new democracy is established56

2.9. The functional theories of e-public administration57

Chapter Three: State, governing, democracy within the concepts of liberal democracy and in practice63

3.1.The historical formation and definition of the modern state63

Problems with the nation-state and its birth63

The inconsistencies of nation-state65

3.2. Democratic deficit or the post-totalitarian system65

3.3. Minimal democratic procedures have been emptied of their content70

3.4. The repositioning of state after the division of politics from society72

3.5. The possible road of change: the e-state and civilised country74

3.6. Governance and the disfunctional government76

3.7. The institutional and administrative nature of the state76

3.8. The struggle of the service providing state and the weak communication77

Chapter Four: In the current of new paradigms81

4.1. The paradigm that looks back from the future and paradigm change81

4.2. The accepted paradigm of sustainable development82

The anomalies of growth trends in the industrial society82

Globalisation vs. Localisation in the 1990s83

The state has become a bone of contention between functional globalisation and localisation85

4.3. Is a new „ideology” born on how to continue?85

4.4. How does the theory of sustainable development develop?86

Sustainable state as a new state theory87

Chapter Five: New dimensions of general and enigmatic development89

5.1. Space and time dimensions of changes89

5.2. The cognitive nature of information and its consequences90

5.3. Communication globalisation and information society91

5.4. Does knowledge society bring about primordial model change?92

5.5. Redefining knowledge capital and the types of pulling forces of the era94

Personal knowlegde94

Implicit knowledge95

Knowledge as social capital96

Utilized knowledge makes the world off the hinge96

5.6. The laudation of innovation in the new era97

Innovation in the knowledge-based economy97

5.7. Knowledge management in the new economy100

The economic approach – knowledge management100

The social perspective: human resource management101

Chapter Six: The present is already an intelligent development102

6.1. The comprehensive goals and the directions of intelligent development102

6.2. New approach to planning and the general alteration of the whole103

6.3. Tangible limitations of intelligent development104

6.4. Content management: the future branch of the age105

6.5. The infocommunicational public service system and the business type processing model105

Chapter Seven: The new paradigm of governance – the service providing state114

7.1. The service providing state and its various interpretations114

The economic perspective114

New social perspective118

7.2. Differences between virtual space and cyber space119

7.3. Cyber-space is the scene of collective intelligence124

The virtual community124

Chapter Eight: The new state as virtual community126

8.1. The institutionalisation of virtual space in the horisontally organised state126

8.2. The problem of control – order and chaos128

8.3. E-governance and e-public administration without popular fallacies130

8.4. The historic development and global trends in e-governance130

8.5. The hypotheses of various e-governance models131

8.6. E-governance with the continuously developing tools of ICT133

8.7. The four players of e-public administration, or is this the new model?134

8.8. The elementary significance of knowledge centres135

8.9. E-local governance and e-democracy opens a door to the future136

The topical e-local governance programme137

E-democracy – the possibility of participatory democracy137

Chapter Nine: Democracy theories and experiments140

9.1. E-democracy – historical overview – visions and doubts140

9.2. The extraordinary history of electronic democracy as an idea140

The period of "Cybernet"141

The age of tele-democracy142

9.3. Tele-democracy, the age of cyber-democracy143

9.4. Electronic democracy serving universal values145

Chapter Ten: Participatory democracy and/or e-democracy147

10.1. The breakthrough: participatory democracy147

10.2. Understanding participatory democracy – the system of structured dialogue147

10.3. Participatory democracy – road towards the direct149

(e-)democracy ( from welfare society towards well-fare society)149

10.4. The summary of democracy development and the new, for the time being enigmatic model?154

10.5. The local document of participatory democracy – or the "settlement/city charta"156

Chapter Eleven: The Aba model: development of local democracy, creation of a social contract159

11.1. The presentation of civil representatives, analysis of their plans161

11.2. The creation of participatory democracy in Aba and the chances of e-democracy (the history of events)163

The official beginnings of the democracy (Village assembly, September 2004)164

Appeal for a local social contract164

Draft scenario of the local social contract (third version)167

Letter to the citizens of Aba (February, 2005)169

The programme of social contract in Aba170

The (festive) Day of the Social Contract172

The establishment of the forum of civil representatives (April 2005)173

11.3. The future scenario of Aba, until 2007-2010173

The Aba model177

Chapter Twelve: The comprehensive vision of state, democracy and public administration179

12.1. Rethinking the future, vision of the future, strategy of the future180

The reinterpretation of the concepts180

12.2. Clearing the concepts of future planning and future development181

12.3. Long-term future image up until 2020, a comprehensive future image until 2013182

Chapter Thirteen: Paradigm changing new recognitions in the first third of the 21st century183

13.1. The challenging timeliness and the alternative of knowledge society183

13.2. The unexpected post-modernisation models184

13.3. The accepted digital state and public administration vision185

13.4. Network state is the future, but what sort of network state?186

13.5. The cardinal question: participatory democracy and/or e-democracy?188

Exoteric and esoteric democracy theory190

13.6. On a taboo matter: the e-parliament191

13.7. The secret of the conceivable future: consciousness-guided (post)society and (post)democracy194

Chapter Fourteen: The characteristics of conceivable future scenarios198

14.1. The five types of complex future scenarios199

14.2. Universal scenarios200

14.3. Global scenarios200

14.4. National scenarios203

14.5. Local scenarios208

14.6. On the chances that the scenarios are going to be realised (or left unfinished)209

Chapter Fifteen: The combined future of the new state, new e-public administration and participatory democracy212

15.1. What comes after new infocommunication techonologies have been introduced?212

15.2. New public administration and office work: k-public administration213

15.3. Is new knowledge and new consciousness unavoidalbe in public administration?216

15.4. Intelligent civil society – and what comes after it217

15.5. Finally, is the new state and new democracy vision born?218

Chapter Sixteen: Diverging (and decisive?) alternatives of the near future221

16.1. The e-state and e-democracy scenarios221

16.2. The European Union, - the odds of an e-federal state221

16.3. The alternatives of e-governance in Hungary until 2013-2015222

16.4. The scenarios of Hungarian regional, small regional, settlement e-local governance and e-public administration223

16.5. The chances of institutionalisation of e-democracy, e-election and e-referenda at the local level224

16.6. Individual and community e-consciousness, e-realisations as the qualitative requirements of participatory e-democracy scenarios224

Chapter Seventeen: Summary: risk factors and the future chances of creating a new world226

17.1. The veritable long-term chances and hopes227

17.2. Short term prognosis231

Major publications233

Preface

Introduction to foreign readers

This volume leans on the Hungarian and more broadely speaking, on European experiences, although the crisis of the state and democracy model is not exclusively a Hungarian, nor a European phenomenon. We wouldn’t be exaggerating even if we modestly claimed that the political-social crossroads have become global. The sociological backround of the book is based on the social crises of Hungary, Central-Europe and the totality of the European continent. For theory creation, however, this regional observation exceptionally constitutes a point of advantage. For instance, in Hungary or in the Central European states that have implemented political regime change, the uselessness of the Euro-atlantic democracy model is more clearly and sharply visible than in the Western European classical democracies and states.

The authors belong to those exposed intelligentsia who have been instrumental to regime change in 1989/1990. Csaba Varga was one of the opinion leaders and social scientists of the Opposition Round Table while Emese Ugrin art historian became a (Christian Democrat) MP in the Hungarian parliament after the regime change. Already at that time they warned that the post-socialist state neither then, nor subsequently should opt for the 19th century form of capitalism as their universal future perspective.

In 1989 this was scarcely understood and was accepted by even fewer people because during the euphoric times of the regime change everyone seemed to have been satisfied with the slogans that had grown into mythic proportions, namely those of market economy and democracy. Not before long, however, it became obvious that while classical capitalism based on private ownership that replaced state capitalist socialism could function merely as a valid starting point, yet it would never bring real and permanent economic and social solutions (neither) to Central Eastern Europe. And it has also become clear that the empty, formal, false socialist „democracy” won’t be redeemed by civil democracy either that is itself formal and rapidly emptying of content. The two models of the past sharply oppose each other and one could support only one of them, - yet the real solution could only be brought about by a quantum jump-like new model.

We should also note here that the Hungarian social-economic situation and climate is well suited to swiftly and spectacularly reveal the exhaustion and emptiness of the nineteenth-twentieth century market economy and world democracy model at the end of the millenium. Moreover, the Hungarian and other Central European examples of crisis also unveil at a similar speed that the classical European, even Euro-atlantic modernisation can hardly be continued. At the same time it is equally revealed (in a dramatic or perhaps pitiful fashion) that present-day leading civilisation world model has no future image and perspective. It has ended yet is it not ripe enough to be radically replaced?

The first decade after the millenium, slowly coming to an end, has only further strenghtened this experience. Hungary with its struggles and search for the future is becoming once again an example, in a double sense in fact: 1. The new political elite made up by the one-time opposition who fought for regime change and the one-time second-rate leaders of the state party that had accepted regime change are equally captive of the ideology of regime change and thus global perplexity just as the pre-1989 state party elites who directed the Soviet Empire that extended over half of the world and executed „surface” reforms were captive of their own system’s ideology and empirical practice. 2. The crises that cannot be concealed and the weakness of old or new ideological engagement make it possible that in Hungary and Central Europe the birth of radically new state and democracy theories, models, programmes take place, not obstructed at all by the fact that the current political elites are generally speaking not open to new models and solutions.

This is understandable, on the one hand, because serious opinion leader intellectuals cannot be against democracy or constitutional governance since the experience of soft dictatorship called socialism is simply too close and we cannot retreat anywhere in the past. On the other hand, in Hungary neither society nor economy is in the spiritual and mental condition to understand and support a newer second regime change and face the prospective even greater risks. One needs to protect the new, liberal democracy and plan for a new model simultaneously; and likewise, the executive „power” controlled by the parliament should duly be protected while once again it is high time that the centralising, power-centred governance model was replaced with something else.

The global (universal) crisis is clearly visible from Hungary since those interest- and value groups who urge for the concealment of the crossroads are too weak to successfully accomplish and legalise the rescue of the system. It is an inspiring situation and state of consciousness so that new thinking minds and theoretical programmes could come to light.

Emese Ugrin and Csaba Varga take advantage of the new situation and meet the new intellectual challenge. Luckily, neither wanted to be party or government politician and thus both of them have worked primarily in research from the mid-1990s onwards. Csaba Varga together with Emese Ugrin and five other eminent scholars founded the Institute for Strategic Reserch which currently comprises sixteen research groups. Initially, their joint aim was to establish a comprehensive future perspective for Hungary, yet soon after it has become evident that neither Hungary nor the post-socialist region can be understood as isolated entities but only in the framework of broader civilisation-cultural processes. This is why well before the millenium they became preoccupied with the globalisation-localisation theory or the theory of information and/or knowledge society.

This book that was written and published in Hungarian in 2007 and while is is primarily based on the Central Eastern European experience, it conceptualises a universal and new democracy and state theory which goes beyond the borders of Central Europe and even the European continent. While the book bears witness of wide knowledge on state and democracy literature, the authors do not adhere to the traditional way of thinking on demoracy research. The authors are typically the grounded actors of the new knowledge market as they represent researchers with wide intellectual horisons and in possession of transdisciplinary knowledge and who are very knowledgeable on the theories and practices of the digital state, e-public administration and electronic democracy of the information age.

All this while partly explains, partly does not offer reasons for the radical new alternatives of the information age. The cure the authors offer for the state and democracy is universal and based on participation for consciousness-centred societies and political systems; for that matter, it can equally be applied to Hungary, Europe or any other continent. The speciality of the volume is a report on a Hungarian democracy experiment that is centred on participation and aims at developing collective consciousness, - all of which has been started off in Aba. Hopefully our book will inspire debate among the interested professionals of the knowledge world market and perhaps if offers hope for many developed and developing societies. History will not only continue but instead of the illusion of an end a new elementary turn should be expected: the history of a veritable, new world model is about to begin in the coming decades.

Introduction

Present-day democracy is a post-totalitarian system, - is the basic assertion at the turn of the twentieth century. Democracy needs protection in order not to slide back into soft dictatorship, yet it is the concept of democracy that needs re-examination so that we could reach some sort of post-democratic phase. The prefiguration of the turn of the 20th century has lasted a whole century: the post-democratic stage could either be regarded as participatory (as well as electronic) democracy, or as a global, new, ideal democracy based on polis consciousness. The recognised path starts off from democracy and leads to democracy, albeit the distance between the two democracy models is as great as it had previously been between dictatorship and democracy. Furthermore, the new democracy model is not any less blurred than the post totalitarian system's vision of itself.

The Euro-Atlantic state- and democracy model shows spectacular signs of crisis. While the global politico-state arena has vested interests in masking the current crisis, it is through the efforts of local forces that the crisis is essentially managed. This, however, has only a minimal impact on stakeholders at a global and nation-state level. Behind the scenes only very few people deny the necessity of radical reconsideration, whilst in practice there is not even one politico-state group prepared to risk its current positions. The complexity of the situation is adequately demonstrated that while the European Union expressly pushes for the introduction of electronic democracy, the solution to the European Constitution or the reform of the European Commission still awaits a final answer.

A new state and democracy theory is or the more necessary because the democracy of nations/states cannot be interpreted isolatedly. Global democracy that spans over continents is going to come into existence as a coherent system simultaneously in the global and local social space-time, at mid-level as continental and partially nation-state democracy, while at the lower local levels it is going to consist of a regional, micro-democracy. The same also holds true at the state level: the global state is a unified system (or the institutional system which substitutes it), a continental state (union, confederacy, etc.) and a nation-state and a local government.

The multi-layered participatory democracy, the expansion programme of the local and communal democracy is already fifteen years old.[footnoteRef:1] On the whole, we can nevertheless state that a unified system has not yet been set up, despite the fact that every country, continent or international organisation includes in its political mission the aim of "democratising democracy". This, however, presupposes a new model of democracy. The idea of participatory democracy was able to spread so fast first and foremost because globalisation and localisation processes have become ever stronger, they have entered the area of the economy. Due to new information technology systems, the effect of these processess has made its way into the social and cultural spheres, too. Here we are going to introduce the new concept: the idea of knowledge and consciousness-based democracies. [1: One of the first books published in Hungary about this topic is: Pál Bánlaky-Csaba Varga (1978): Azon túl ott a tág világ (The Wide World There Beyond) Magvető, Quickening Time, 1979 ]

In this context, the programme of participatory democracy should be viewed as the strengthening of defence mechanisms of local world(s) that aim at preserving local socio-economic and enviromental interests, as well as local identity. On the other hand, this programme also serves as a means to manage continental competivity of local and national societies. Since different regions of the world are differently affected by the new consequences of glocalisation, the two strategic roles make the differences in its realisation comprehensible.

Another source of diversity is to be found in local democratic traditions, which are greatly influenced by the socio-economic state of a given area and the operability of existing institutional systems, etc.

The theory of e-governance, e-public administration and the new democracy is in itself a new theory. If, for instance, e-public administration is a new type of public administration, then one of the foundations of the new theory is the practice of the new public administration, while another of its foundations is based on the basic principles of the programmes which designed e-public administration. We should not believe that the theoretical conceptions of each and every new European development had been conceived prior to its implementation phase. For that matter, in Hungary the introduction of e-government and e-public administration had been declared prior to the development of a theoretical approach. At present, nevertheless, there is neither an ongoing public debate on the crisis of pleasure society, the emptiness of current political models nor a search for the universal future.

The theory of e-governance is, however, not merely and not exclusively a new public administration theory: on the one hand, the character "e" lifts the public administrative approach into another dimension, hence as of now we speak of an electronic and/or digital public administration. Consequently, the theory has to extend to and include the new (infocommunicative) technology and the world perception that is inspired by new technology. On the other hand, e-public administration is going to fundamentally change, - or to put it more carefully: may probably change, – the state itself, it will redefine what it means to be a citizen as well as assume a new type of relationship between state and citizen (and its communities). The theory of e-public administration (or k-public administration) will therefore need to include theories on the state, citizens, society and democracy. What follows from the above is that sooner or later an integrated theory is going to evolve, which comprehensively examines and interprets basic questions, as well re-examines the development of public administration.

E-governance and e-public administration are in the focus of our attention primarily because so much in Europe as in Hungary this developmental stage for the future seems realistic and feasible. The foreseeable perspectives, however, lead much further: they point toward a participatory state and participatory democracy, both of which are unimaginable without the evolution of the intelligent network society. All in all, the short-term timetable might look the following:

Phases:

Phases of development

Elements

Perspective

First phase

Service state, digital state and e-public administration

Service state, partial digital e-governance which is simultaneously citizen-friendly, with island-like e-state governance and e-local authority; public administration added within the framework of the traditional representative democracy, partly based on a new and formalised social agreement

Established digital state and all inclusive e-scale public administration

Second phase

e-governance and limited e-democracy

Partial European and national democracy reform, national, regional small area and settlement e-democracy, with e-referenda, simultaneously simple or complex or electronically participative democracy

Established e-democracy although representative democracy still in place

Third phase

Intelligent civil society and social particpative democracy

Intelligent (real and virtual) civil societies established at a global, continental and local level are going to step over the framework of traditional democracy, or will enforce the new democracy and social model built on the participation and direct decisions in basic questions.

Intelligent civil society and network democracy

Fourth phase

Participatory democracy and participatory state led by society

A democracy and participatory state built simultaneoulsy on individual decisions and civil associations that are more loosely connected than political parties yet it is also a comprehensive real/ virtual democracy and participatory state where the civilian citizen is aware rather than manipulated and hence becomes a responsible individual

Developed participatory democracy, free society and communal citizen who makes responsible decisions

Table 1. Developmental phases, ideas & hypotheses 2000-2050 (Csaba Varga)

This book is partially a comprehensive attempt to elaborate at length a new and integrated theory, whilst it is also going to raise every important theoretical issue with regards to new state and democracy theories, new society and democracy theories as well as the professional and interdisciplinary theories of e-public administration. The book does not only revolve around theoretical problems and solutions, but it also tries to formulate alternative state and democracy development scenarios for the next thirty to forty years.

Similarly, the book showcases perhaps the most comprehensive Hungarian attempt to local government and democracy, also known as the Aba model. Aba gained regional and national fame and interest when it started its own experiment on the development of participatory democracy in the summer of 2004, which the locals prefer to call democracy experiment or social agreement programme for short. The essence of the Aba model is as follows: it is based not on a single, but multiple representation of citizens combined with structured dialogue and is further developed into shared local governance to finally achieve participatory and electronic democracy. One of the elements of this idea is thus the combined development of e-democracy and e-public administration. The gradual realisation of the Aba model is of particular interest because it is a real practical example rather than merely a theoretical one.

This book was not written as an answer to the current political crisis in Hungary. Yet the increased national democratic deficit and the radical decrease of state capabilities jointly with the crisis currently experienced in the development of Hungarian society may change the view of the involved parties, namely the minds of those who shape public opinion and are the decision-makers in Hungary.

January 1st, 2008

Emese Ugrin –Csaba Varga

Chapter One: The glocal world and information age

As we have already pointed out in the introduction, we need to characterise the information age in order to adequately interpret the concept of e-public administration. This, however, is not possible to understand without a comprehenisve and more paradigmatic interpretation of globalisation processes. This is also necessary because at the end of the twentieth century, the information age stands for universal globalisation.

1.1. The new concept of globalisation: functional and substantial globalisation

Suprisingly, even the Soviet Empire, or the group of COMECON countries can be described as a paramilitary, semi-global, monopolist state system. The globalisation at end of the twentieth century has, however, far exceeded any previous models of globalisation (both those that took place several thousand or several hundred years ago). This new type of globalisation embraces the entire global population and reaches to even the most hidden corners of the third and fourth world. On the other hand, it also creates a new type of universal space-time structure in human civilisation in a way that it simultaneously a functional and substantional world process.

Hence the notion of new globalisation concisely sums up the recognition that the constantly uniting human civilization has reached the stage of functional globalisation. This globalisation, however, does not only create a new world structure, but it also attempts to fill in the "vacuum" it generates with particular content. New globalisation therefore simultaneoulsy entails globalisation and localisation, so it is not surprising that it is increasingly called the glocal world structure.

New globalisation is a dual process: it consists of a functional and substantional series of changes. By functionality we mean that the functional elements and processes of human civilization (economy, society, ecology and their sub-systems, politics, state, military, education, etc) are globalising at a rate and extent never seen before. As a result, global economy, global society, global military order, etc. have come into existence. Substantionality means that the people do no longer simply dream of a unified civilization and culture, but that unification is now taking place at a rate and extent never experienced before. This is why we can speak today of global knowledge and global culture with good reason.

While they differ greatly in their characteristics, the two great processes nonetheless also strengthen each other. New functionalism unifies in such a way that largely identical economic and political structures evolve in different countries and continents while new unification does not merge but rather preseves the culture and way of thinking of the peoples and nationalities. Consequently, new unification also hinders and limits paramilitary or political globalisation in a number of ways. It is therefore no coincidence that there is no exact same state or public administration in the member states of the European Union; after all, each state and its public administration retains its own particuliarities. Yet it is beyond doubt that the state belongs to the functional side of globalisation as it has long lost its substantional characteristics.

It is Endre Kiss, the philosopher, who notes[footnoteRef:2]: "According to a widely shared interpretation, globalisation is the science of such particular comprehensive problems, which affect the ENTIRE humanity in a new qualitative way, and its trends affect us existentially. In this spirit ecological problems become for instance legitimate areas of globalisation, as are other issues such as the state of raw materials, migration, shared healthcare problems of the world, which know no boundaries any more, positive and negative world dynamics of questions regarding the population, the energy situation, the arms trade and drug crisis are all great dilemmas of integration and world economy. Another major interpretation does not tie the issues and the whole phenomenon of globalisation to individual concrete and always singularly appearing "global" questions, (or to a (partial) cluster made up of random questions), but instead it examines the structural and functional correlations of a new world situation in its ENTIRETY." Thus, globalisation theory does not simply aims to define some kind of partial and fragmented state of the world, it puts the functional, and, to add to Endre Kiss' train of thought, the substantial general theory of the post-millennium global-universal world into words. [2: Endre Kiss (2005) Magyarország és a globalizáció (Hungary and Globalisation) Kodolányi, Székesfehérvár); Endre Kiss (2006) A globalizáció jövője és/mint tudástársadalom (The Future of Globalisation and /as Knowledge Society) (www.pointernet.pds.hu/kissendre)]

Since globalisation would hang loose in the universal space were the base not strenghtened and fuctional, thus it needs localisation process to strengthen and evolve on each and every continent. This in itself is already a global process irrespective of the interests of globalisation and it happens even in modernised European countries that local regions aim at increasing their independence to reduce their defencelessness. This is how in the new glocal world order the state (and the nation-state) is situated in the middle, which, on the one hand, offers some protective shields for local regions, while on the other hand simultaneously helps local regions to integrate in the global stage.

The new glocal world can also be described as quantitative and qualitative globalisation. By quantitative globalisation we first and foremost mean that globalisation goes on continually both spatially and functionally and eventually it is going to embrace the entire human civilization. Qualitative globalisation, as its name already suggests, could mean qualitative globalisation (although historically it has not been pre-determined whether this would be the outcome in reality) and this may necessarily entail the substantional unification of the world's countries and peoples (similarly to the above point, it has not yet been decided from a historical point of view whether such an event would also imply a global state or a global army for that matter).

When it became apparent for the very first time in the last decades of the twentieth century that soon the evolution of the information age is going to become an effective world process, many have started to formulate short or long term utopias about how the information age will simultaneously be the cause and the consequence, dynamitic and end product of the present globalisation. This process was essentially set off after the turn of the millennium, when the first the functional then the substantional globalisation acquired enormous power resources with the spread of the info-communication networks and services.

The post-millennium world is thus undoubtedly a glocal world, ever more so in Europe, including the less or moderately developed countries. The present glocal world is wears the robe of the information age, and its public political name is knowledge-based economy and society.

1.2. Localisation and ’life milieu’

At the beginning of the twentieth century, in the semi-global state of the world localities were in dual subjection; on the one hand, they depended on continental superpowers, on the other hand, on the states of the industrial age and their nationalised politics and societies. We may call this stage the age of subjugated European localities. This is a universal phase although local authorities played an increasingly important role in some states. At this point, local economies have become increasingly integrated into the partial global systems of the continents.

At first sight the concept of globalisation is to be understood by focusing, within the global structure, on local levels in the local structure. Nowadays in Europe and in Hungary we call these places the scenes of localisation (starting from larger and ending with smaller elements) as is the region, the county, the small areas, the town and the village. Presently about twenty to thirty settlements make up a small area in Hungary, which is almost always held together by one or more towns; in all, there are almost one hundred and eighty small regions. In Hungary counties are currently reckoned with; besides Budapest, there are nineteen of them altogether. Consequently, by and large ten small areas belong to every one of them; last but not least, the nineteen counties constitute the seven regions of Hungary (except perhaps the region that unites Budapest and Pest county); all in all, every region is consists of three counties.

Just like in Hungary, in every country, local regions (all seven of them) are the basic units and balance of the global world. If there is no localisation there is no globalisation either, or if there is one, then it is of a kind that sooner or later becomes unsustainable. The opposite of this arguments holds true as well: without globalisation local regions would remain isolated and introverted. The relationship between the global and local worlds can vary greatly: the biggest danger of today could be that globalisation prevails over the local levels and thus the subordination of local worlds continue. However, the reverse negative process is not likely to occur, that is, that local worlds prevail over globalisation. It is so much a task as an opportunity to find some kind of a balance between the two levels. The new, interactive internet-based information and communication revolution is one option that provides opportunities.

For the sake of a more in-depth analysis, however, the internal structure and characteristics of local regions are also worth summing up. Within the framework of localisation theory we argue that local worlds are made up of three structural elements: the upper life milieu, the lower life milieu and the internalised life milieu. The notion of life milieu is introduced here in order to adequately account for the analysis of the local worlds; it is significant insofar that it is the local life milieu that the individual as well as the community directly relates to. We find the region and the county at higher levels, which could be described increasingly as regional upper society. Similarly, the concept of lower life milieu can be broken down into two structural elements: the environment and the directly experienced world. The environment (that is, the small area, the centre of the small area, the town or village of residence) is the social milieu in which the individuals live day in and day out. The notion of the direct world refers to – symbolically speaking - the"hot reality" (circle of friends, family, etc.), the everyday experiences of the individual. One of the novelties of the locality theory is that we examine the imprint of the local world and the internal reality of the individual. To put it differently, we focus on the the personal dimensions of the local world.

In the global context, a network of local worlds was born as a continuation and acceleration of localisation. All of these are different realities. In the world structure, they represent an independent and stable pole, which presumably is going to strengthen in the decades to come. In the localization process we can also distinguish between quantitative and qualitative localisation. Past decades have primarily brought about the dominance of the quantitative processes, and it will be the great task of the first half of the twenty-first century realise the qualitative localisation in human civilisation. Today numerous developments point to this direction; the independence and self-assertion of local regions increasingly grows, as they begin to think in terms of new types of "city states" local "states" "regional states” and micro-republics. This holds also true for Hungary, and this is what the more advanced regions and smaller areas strive for, whether they admit it or not.

1.3. Glocal age and the new mediation level: the nation

We can still regard the 1980s and 1990s as a time when globalisation and localisation were on separate although parallel tracks, yet it became clear already before the turn of the millennium that globalisation and localisation also build upon and complement each other. This is why we can state that today there is no globalisation without localisation, and vice versa. If we consider the sphere between globalisation and localisation at the level of nation-states, then this level is so much element, disc, or even as a bridge for mediation that structures the world.

There are several categories generally accepted to describe the dual process of globalisation and localisation: the best terms are perhaps glocalisation or glocal. This contracted category expresses in a precise way that globalisation and localisation are linked together. It is also worth noting, however, that in the information age it is going to become normal practice that globalisation has a direct impact on localisation, and that localisation also "skips" the nation-state mediaton level. Nations do not dissapear, neither do they remain captive of the prevailing nation–state. Instead, more than ever, nations are going to become communities, linked by common culture and high-level consciousness. The content of this consciousness is knowledge. In an ideal scenario, eventually we will be able to speak of knowledge- and cultural nation. This type of nation is first and foremost no longer introvert, no longer on the run, defensive or closed; quite the contrary, it is open, it is strong and rooted in itself, it does not offensive and it is proud to shows itself to the world. It does not aim to divide, it integrates the people both in time and in space. It dates back to thousands of years and looks forward to endless spatial time.

This triple process (global sphere, nation-state level, local sphere) has not yet been developed and accepted. However, we propose a new concept on similar lines: globe-natio-loc (globalisation-nationalisation-localisation). Well, we admit that this word is slightly hard to pronounce and hard to learn by heart. Yet we emphatically emphasise that a new type of globalisation-localisation as well as nationalisation is taking place with a new content. For these reasons a newly created and pertinent concept will be likely introduced in the next few years. Regardless of the name of this concept, we confidently state that Hungary, or in the broader perspective, Central Europe has reached the glocal age, which has also the middle nation level, too.

1.4. The four models of the present glocal age

The new glocal age is not to be placed outside history, on the contrary, it is deeply embedded in history. It has not happened unexpectedly, nor will it end unexpectedly. After the turn of the millenium, the glocal age tries to break away from the captivity of the industrial and, at times, post-industrial age. However, this process takes far more time and effort than the theoreticians of the information age might want to think. The reason for this is that the industrial age, a world model itself, also struggles for subsistence. The present new globalisation, nationalisation and localisation simultaneously embodies the combination and joint existence of the three world models (Industrial Age, Information Age, Knowledge Age). Together they make up the prevailing world model, whilst there are very sharp differences between them.

Industrial Age

monetary industrial society

pleasure society

Information Age Knowledge Age

information innovational knowledge society

society

Consciousness Age

consciousness society

(idea )

Table 2: The universal four age model (Csaba Varga)

The industrial age and especially its end, the monetary industrial age, has created the consumer-centred pleasure society4 model in the Euro-Atlantic zone by partially integrating certain advantages of the information age. The central aim of this era is consumption, thus its benchmark is consumption, too. The individual just as the community or a country measures the state of its development and success by its position in the global market of consumption. Pleasure society is also called risk society[footnoteRef:3]. Pleasure society at present feeds the personal hunger for pleasure, yet due to the nature, standard and manner of the service, the failure of pleasure society is guaranteed. [3: Ulrich Beck (1986) Die Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Frankfurt/Main (Suhrkamp Verlag); (2003); In Hungarian: A kockázattársadalom. Út egy másik modernitásba (Risk society), Századvég Kiadó, Budapest.]

Yesterday’s Europe marked the "invention" of the industrial age: the spread of industrialised mass production, the urbanised city, the representational democracy (mass democracy), science (or rather: normal science), the rational materialist way of thinking and widespread alienation. The information age should be seen as the end of the industrial age: monetary capitalism is replaced by information capitalism, representational democracy and its institutions empty of meaning, politics is generally deconstructed, financial and cultural globalism spread all over the world. Each age concludes with total disillusion and the loss of sense in the future. At the time of political regime change Hungary too, opted not for the future but for the past when it embraced the industrial age, industrial society and its ways of operation.

Representational democracy is the democracy of the industrial age. The post-industrial global age and the present democracy model are not on good terms with each other. Globalisation either neutralises or empties democracy, or, a new type of democracy will be able to sucessfully cope with globalisation and it will put it under its control.

1.5. The Information Age that comes to an end

Having briefly clarified what we mean by globalisation and glocal age, let us turn our attention to the relationship between the information age and the new glocal world. From a historical perspective globalisation cannot be considered a new phenomenon: in the last five to seven thousand years several types of (usually partial and limited) globalisations had taken place. These types of globalisations were first and foremost the result of a more or less imperial, occassionally global imperial aspirations. One of the novelties of the globalisation that has been accelerating since the second part of the twentieth century was that for the first time in the history of humankind globalisation attempted to ”conquer” the entire human civilisation. The quantitive expansion of globalisation, however, can not be imagined without the existence of the Information Age. The technologies and services of the Information Age make it possible for the global economy and attached policies to connect the entire world and attempt to make it a uniform political and economic area. This functional globalisation has not come to an end yet, nonetheless, we can assert with conviction that the Information Age is the newest type of globalisation, or to put it differently, the Information Age is the simultaneous globalisation and localisation.

Lately, we have heard much about new economy, the central element of the glocal age. The concept was imported from the US to Europe; although not fully, yet at intervals it corresponds to knowledge-based economy. It is the essence of economy that has changed: from the economy of industrial age we crossed the threshold to the economy of the information age. To quote Nicholas Negroponte: ”As business activity globalises and the internet spreads around the world, so are we witnessing the evolution of a single, uniform digital workplace. From the point of view of storing and manipulating bites, the significance of geopolitical borders all but have completely disappeared…”[footnoteRef:4]Therefore, we are one step away from the universal digital world, the economically coherent universe of existence. This model, however, only takes mass production into consideration: not only shoes or tertiary degrees are currently mass produced, but information and the mediatized reality is also for the consumption of the masses. [4: Nicholas Negroponte (2002): Digitalis létezés (The Unfinished Revolution) Typotext, Budapest. p.179.]

This glocal age is necessarily moving toward a new social system, too. Earlier on sociology used to report mainly on the structures, classes, strata and subgroups of society as if these elements were to constitute the knowledge of the entire society. These elements, nonetheless, are only the structural features of society, and merely by taking these elements nobody is able to understand in its entirety what society really means. Western European and American authors wrote a number of books on social theory in the last couple of years.[footnoteRef:5] Although at present we might know perhaps more about society as a whole, the scientific explanations and standardisation of different sociological trends still needs to be developed.[footnoteRef:6] There is no complex, unified social theory in Europe, even though we use such notions as communication society, linguistic society, information society, knowledge-based group relations, dynamics, and virtual social phenomenon systems. Regardless of the philosophical viewpoint, the picture of the entire social theory will simply not aggregate.[footnoteRef:7] In the meantime, however, the mindset of industrial society has been emptied of meaning. Whilst information society creates another (virtual) society, we have all but lost our sense of direction; although we might add that luckily, we have also left the illusions of society and community behind. [5: As far as we are concerned, we do not believe that the issue can be solved by the concept of net society as it is used by Manuel Castells frequently: ’These trends are equal to the triumph of the individual, yet it is not clear how much load they put on society. However, we should take into consideration that the individuals supported by the new technical opportunities are really able to reconstruct the social interaction patterns and they create a new form of society, the net society.’ (p.139.)] [6: Imre Kovács ed.. (2006): Társadalmi metszetek (Social sections) Napvilág Kiadó ] [7: There are good foreign and Hungarian examples. Frank L. Szemjon (2005) The Intellectual Basis of Society (Kairosz); In Hungary Elemér Szádeczky-Kardoss could have become a significiant turning point with his book: Elemér Szádeczky-Kardoss (1989) Universal Connection of Phenomena. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest.]

For some it might come as a surprise that some scientists of information society already predict the end of information society. Nicholas Negroponte holds following opinion on the matter: ”We have wasted too many words and too much time by stressing the significance of the transition from the industrial age to the post-industrial or information age. In the meanwhile noone noticed that the age of information has come to a close and we have stepped into the age of post-information”.[footnoteRef:8] We can definitely agree with this statement. Right from the start, before the society of information age could have fully developed, it became apparent that it needs to be reconsidered and stepped over. The surviving industrial age shall be blamed for its failure, too. [8: Nicholas Negroponte: idem p. 129.]

The turn of the millenium unmasked the industrial age for good; its new version is called the Information Age. The boundary, however, is sharp between the two: something different is going to soon commence.

1.6. The age of new technologies and artificial intelligence

Before we can start discussing the new world models and their chances thereof, it is important to note that the industrial age was disrupted most spectacularly by the expansion of new technology. In the last few decades the industrial technology produced numerous technological innovations.

Most of the Hungarian intellectual elite has had an anti-technological bias for a long time; new technological results were keenly interpreted as an inhuman process. In Hungary theory of technology is not even always taught at polytechnic universities, even though we cannot correctly interpret the history of the last twenty years, the regime change and the following 10 to 12 years without an understanding of the numerous changes in economy, society, consciousness and human dimension that were all forced upon us by technological changes. Two global powers such Japan and Germany, regularly issue technological forecasts for the next twenty years.[footnoteRef:9] These elaborate publications of several thousands topics forecast the changes in the fields of science, research and technology for the next two decades. Most of their predictions held so far proved to be correct. [9: Zoltán Pálmai (2002): On Technological Trends. (e-World, 2002/Special Issue); TEP, Technological Forecasting Programme (www.om.hu )]

These forecasts are very serious and well founded. It is therefore clearly predicted that the technology of the next twenty years will have no resemblence of the technology of yesteryears, nor that of today. Already within a decade, the personal computers and digital cameras currently in use are going to become the size of a pen or watch, so the ones that we use now will be out-of-date. More importantly, as a result of human-centred computing the computer is going to become an intelligent assistant.[footnoteRef:10] At this stage we have not even mentioned the expected results of nanotechnology. We may choose to fear the coming super revolutions of technology, yet we can have a different attitude towards technological change[footnoteRef:11]. Being aware of the immenent changes means that we can get prepared for them, and we should try to capitalise on new technologies. We presuppose that in this field enormous breakthroughs are to be expected. [10: Michael L. Dertouzos (2002): Félkész forradalom: útban a megszelidített számítógépek felé (Semi-finished Revolution. En route to Domesticated Computers) Typotext, Budapest, p.48.] [11: It is not suprising that many are already imagining circuits built in the brain or chip installed in the brain, since these technological developments are almost ready. Michael L. Dertouzos (2002) p.49.]

It is in this sense of the word that we claim that artificial intelligence is going to play a key role not only in the the modernisation of the state but also in education and civilisation. We wonder whether even one teacher or instructor has any idea how s/he would put artificial intelligence at work at their facilities and institutions.

All in all, new technology is responsible for providing a helping hand so that information society should not sink into the mud of the industrial society. Yet there is another subtantial matter that the information society shall have to answer: Is knowledge brought by new technologies used in an adequate manner?

1.7. Age of new knowledge and critical approaches to democracy

Contrary to the opinion expressed in other publications, we claim that the most important new feature of (let us momentarily forget about the maturity of) the new age is new knowledge created rather than new technology, or new economy, or a new type of society we are going to live in. This holds true even though at best we are only at the threshold of the age of knowledge. It is a new phenomenon that the total knowledge of mankind doubles every 1.5 to 2.5 years; meanwhile, it is often the case that the knowledge of past decades essentially replaces the knowledge of the last 2000 years.

The grouping and the standardisation of knowledge may be the subject-matter of a whole new investigation.[footnoteRef:12] In the age of knowledge society it seems reasonable to interpret old-new knowledge according to their functional and substantial roles, just as it is interpreted in the case of globalisation, for that matter. The summary of functional roles records the manner knowledge becomes social capital and the speed with which it spreads around in the new glocal world. This is why we distinguish among global, continental (in our case: European), national and local knowledge. There is a relatively large amount of tresspass among knowledge types. This is accounted by the fact that the global world has entered into a multicultural age; yet, all the same, in the long run a significant amount of discrepancy is going to continue to exist between the cultures of human civilisation, whether in the domain of knowledge, religion or value systems. [12: Alfred J. Ayer (1956): The Problem of Knowledge, Penguin Books]

New types of knowledge first and foremost are grouped substantially. We attach more importance to the real values and contents of knowledge than to any social practice; knowledge that is independent from time and space, found in it most pure forms, independent of the understanding and applications of a period. That is why we can distinguish knowledge from reality/non-reality running infinitely in every direction; we thus have knowledge, for instance, about God, materials, space and time, society, mankind or, for that matter, our knowledge of the methodology of thinking. Coming from this perspective it does not matter whether the particular piece of knowledge was created by religion, art or science.

Another way of grouping substantial knowledge is to arrange it according to the content and carrier of knowledge. The dominant aspect of this logic is the collective evaluation of formal and contentual characteristics of knowledge. That type of knowledge belongs to the formatted publicly shared knowledge, which manifest itself in most languages both linguistically and conceptually and which almost always has a uniform meaning. This kind of knowledge is on the other hand widely used in human civilisations, and the wide variety of such knowledge forms the the basic condition of the existance for human culture. This is the commonly shared knowledge of humankind, which of course linguistically translates into a large amount of variations. If this formatted commonly shared knowledge suddenly vanished or ceased to exit, the humanly constructed world and humankind as such would be doomed. The commonly shared knowledge constitutes the elementary, cardinal condition of life on Earth.

It is a recent recognition that no current valid democracy theory exists. There ara numerous different kinds of reasons that account for this recognition:

1. The principle of deformed representative democracy: a valid democracy theory does not exist because we do not live in the classic democracy of Ancient Greeks. Present-day democracy is far from being adequate especially so because its performance is functionally weak;

2. The principle of non-democracy in the robe of democracy: the model that has evolved in the last decades represents such a type of global representative democracy model, which exceeds the mature principles of representative democracy;

3. The principle of facade democracy: for the time being it is comprehensible only for a handful of people that the practice of democracy, which is deeply embedded in the social, intellectual and cultural processes and has been defined for instance by Alexis Tocqueville[footnoteRef:13]is often but a facade democracy; [13: Alexis de Tocqueville (1993) Az amerikai demokrácia (The American Democracy), Európa Könyvkiadó, Budapest.]

4. The paradox principle of democracy: various interest groups hold onto power by subtly shorting out the principles of democracy while exploiting and using the institutional system of democracy to its fullest;

5. The principle of democratic deficit leads to weakening of action: the global, continental and national operability is seriously weakened and its legitimacy thereof drastically questioned due to the new concentration of the dominant interest groups;

6. The principle of exporting ambiguous democracy: the world of developed democracies export an ambiguous, limited type of democracy to the lesser developed or undeveloped world;

7. The principle of democracy protection without reflection: many experts and knowledge groups rightly protect the established principles and practices of democracy while they do not or very reluctantly accept that the Euroatlantic democracy model needs reform;

8. The principle of lack of democracy awareness: in developed countries self-criticism and critical thinking in general is superficially developed and therefore there is no proper oversight of processes which leads to limited or non-existing democracy awareness;

9. The principle of lack of future perspective in democracies: in developed or moderately developed countries there is no future perspective in people towards democracy and therefore people have no idea about what is there to come;

10. The principle of democratic minimum that has not been lost: even so most states attempt or are forced to comply with minimum standards of democracy at all levels, or at least to keep up the appearance of it;

11. Unfinished arguments: We could list numerous other causes to account for the lack of new theories.

The problem can also be approached from the angle what is happening right now in the democracies of the world and in their social realms?

· Reality belongs to a network or system of realities. It is self-evident that paralelly more realities exist than the one the actual political democracy is based upon;

· The central stage of democracy cannot be limited to the (nation-state) political/state level; the requirement today is to build an outstretched, multi-level democracy;

· The role of virtual reality has increased in the real orientations and decisions of democracies. Meanwhile, the issue of democracy in the age of virtual reality has not yet been raised;

· In order to hold onto power for a shorter or longer period of time, the policial elits are willing to apply a range of anti-democratic tools and technics, which are contrary to the ideals of democracy, justice and expedience;

· Democracy once again is not only the public and/or concealed game of the representatives of dominant power groups, but also terrain where civil and social groups and organizations who were left out from the political elit fight for power;

· The principles/practices of democracy should not avoid managing the fight between groups who hold institutionalised power and others who lack such kind of power;

· Democracy does not only consist of rational institutions and set of policies, but a set or a system of comprehensive knowledge, mentality and consciousness, which goes against the uniformity of institutions and pocesses to a large extent;

· Interest-based policy/democracy is corroded and often ignored by the information age and age of knowledge just about to commence and its intrinsical change of paradigm;

· Albeit participatory democracy is a social requirement, even civil society actors are insufficiently prepared for direct, personal participation.

We could go on listing and interpreting the new phenomena for a considerable amount of time. It is hard to deny, however, that even after the turn of the millenium human civilisation and culture has remained a military, political, economic power system operated by centralised states that are controlled by individuals and society to a limited extent. This is the main reason why global risk society exists. We are simultaneously at a verge of a universal-local bancruptcy and the dawn of universal-local new alternatives and hopes that have little in common with old paradigms. The question remains: for how long can this be maintained?

1.8. Information society as the next stage of glocalization

If the information age and within it the model of information, post-information or knowledge-led society is the latest stage of globalisation or rather the latest development of glocalisation, then it is evident that the content and concept of the information age is one of the central categories of the information age. The extended name of the new concept is sustainable, innovative information society.

It has not been decided yet wheter the political, economic, social or cultural concepts of a specific period are in themselves useful while giving a comprehensive interpretation of a certain period. Nevertheless, for the content of information age we find primarily those categories useful that interpret social processes rather than economic and cultural concepts. This is why we distinguish between global, continental (that is: European), national and local knowledge(s). In this sense information society is a general concept, which can be deduced from the category of information age, and which serves as a basis for other categories such as the e-economy, e-state to be later discussed.

The concept of information society can be equally determined on the basis of information technology, economy, politics or power, society, ecology or for instance information theory. If we claimed above that information society is a generative concept, then in this case none of the approaches that offer partial solutions are useful as a starting point. To put it the other way around, we have to come up with an interactive category which summarises and arranges every approach into one system.

The starting point of the first generative approach is that of the information age as world model, which is a concept that stands above information society. In this case it might suffice to state that information society designates the social paradigm change of the information age. Thus it includes the interpretation of global society generated by the new world structure and with the help of which the concept of new global society that stands above local and national societies can be interpreted. If this generative approach is a valid one, then the information society is primarily a global and local, information-based social paradigm change.

The second valid approach could be to characterise information society with concepts that name capital goods. This category presents us with some difficulties because we must give priority to intellectual capital, or to put it differently, knowledge capital and thus the analysis becomes a twofold process. One of the processes details the ways knowledge capital has become a central actor contrary to other, more traditional types of capital such as the economic and/or financial capital; it can be obviously performed only on the condition that we consider that knowledge capital has become equal to the other forms of capital and has an actual exchange value in the financial market-centered new capitalism. The interpretation of the second process focuses on the contents of intellectual capital and the extent it is applicable and the ways it becomes personal and social capital. If we hold this logic true, then information society is nothing but the transformation of knowledge capital into personal and social capital.

The third concept, which we could hold true is based on information theory. It focuses on the first element of the complex concept of information theory and it attempts to clarify the differences between data, information, idea, knowledge and decision. Consequently, it subscribes to the widely shared view that information society is no more or nor less than the production, transmission, marketing and exchange of information. This approach, however, does not distinguish between information, ideas and knowledge therefore it interpretes the age only at the lowest level, that is: the level of information and data. Moreover, it is this approach that attempts to define the information age unequivocally as a new technological age and so the change in the digital, info-communicational network and the system of services and materials is considered the most important feature of this new state of the world. In our opinion, however, although their content is accurate and justifiable, the two interpretational attempts do not cover the full content of information society.

While interpreting information theory and information industry, basic concepts are essential to define. Data: consciousness-linguistic configuration, carrying the meaning of a cognition unit; Information: determines the relation between two data items, thus it is an idea (a message, news, a piece of information about reality); cognition: connected, systematised, construed piece of information; knowledge: interpreted and integrated system of cognition, a comprehensive vision on reality and all its dimensions (which simultaneously make up a new vision of reality); decision: a knowledge system used to alter reality and its application and change it into social and personal capital for the sake of knowledge.

The unavoidable argument against the logical path just descibed is the following: in every age information and knowledge are of a significant value and so it is insufficient to claim that the information age equals the age of information. This is a justifiable counter-argument. It is the characteristic of this age is that information can be converted into analogue and digital signs with the help of new technologies. Sign: information transmitted by human made means. So it is the speciality of information society that both theoretically and practically indefinite amount of information can be produced and transmitted as signs. Here comes the turning point which marks this period: the information age this way and by this means produces information on a never seen before scale and so information trade might become the main sector of economy in the future. By the same token the large amount of information/knowledge available revolutionalises so much society as the individual.

The third approach leads us to the concept that information society is the society of signs transmitted by human made means, and therefore it is potentially merely a cognition society. It is the realisation of information society at a higher level, while knowledge society is already the society of interpreted systems of cognition, which potentially does not transmit information signs, but knowledge signs. Only in this way it has the potential to change the lives of individuals and societies.

The fourth interpretation clearly distinguishes between between information and knowledge society from a historical and contentual point of view.

1.9. The history of the three basic categories and their submodels

With the help of the newly clarified concepts we have come to the point where we can interprete the global-universal models of (recent) past, present and future in a more accurate fashion. If we take into account the aspects of analysis mentioned above, we are able to formulate the definition of an integrated information society, which can stand firm both in the short and long run. The main point thereof is that after the turn of millenium we are increasingly thinking in terms of sustainable and innovative information society in Europe.

The details only show the spectecular difference between societies led by information or knowledge although – pay attention! - this difference does not include the basic changes in the operation of these societies.

The basic, interdiscipliniary concepts may be used as an entry for governmental and social plans and discourses. First of all let us take a closer look at the concept of the information society.

Information society:

Information society is the symbolic name of an era in which the economy, society and the culture is predominantly based on the production, exchange and marketing of information; that, however, in itself is not sufficient for the information society to come into existence. The great novelty of the age of information society is that the information, whether analogue or digital, can be produced and utilesed as signs and so we could with good reason call information society sign society, too. This is why information society simultanuously means large amount of information or digital content, new information communication technology, new information-driven economy and new information-based society. The global and local society and its structure is fundamentally changing due to the joint and wide application of new technology, the spread of new economy and the trade in new types and large amount of information. Information-based economy and the information system organizes social groups into a system all around the world, and by such means different and new junctions are created in the new, dynamic global system. All the same, information-based economy and the information system rejects those social segments, states and regions that are less succesful in producing and trading information. A basic condition of a successful information society and economy is the advanced state of the social receptive agent and the social embededness of a developed information economy and infrastructure. Information society and economy comes into existence only on the condition that the majority of society has access to new information and communication technologies, and possesses the necessary knowledge and skills needed to use these means. Information society as actual state is attractive and has a dynamic impact only if it is on the one hand sustainable and the other hand innovative.

Knowledge society:

Knowledge society produces unequivocally new types of economic, social and knowledge markets all around the world. Moreover, it also creates economic and social structures that are based on networks. Following the information communication revolutions in creating new technologies, human civilisation has become a globally standardised functional system at the beginning of the third millenium, which in itself constitutes a new stage of social development.

In this era the structure and operation of society is determined by the movement and distribution of knowledge as well as its processing and correct application. Knowledge society is stratified based on the ways this knowledge has been acquired; knowledge that is limitless and potentially equally open to everyone creates equal opportunities. On the contrary, differences in opportunities are created along lines of possessing knowledge or lacking knowledge. As a norm knowledge is a new social quality: knowledge society is organized efficiently, filling the individual and community with content and quality. It is a new social system in which innovative learning turns information into knowledge, knowledge into action, or at least it opens up an opportunity to do so. This is why the future prospect of information society is the model of knowledge society, which is a potential new quality: it is not information, but knowledge-based, a network, it is the name of a type of society that tempers the glocal digital gap. Knowledge society brings positive changes not only in the external factors such as economy and society, but also in the consciuousness and awareness of individuals and communities.

Knowledge-based economy:

It is the name of a new economic model, which simultaneously fulfills and changes the industrial – post-industrial and financial economy. In the knowledge-based economy the most important element of economic growth and productivity is knowledge, which is embodied primarily in the intellectual capital of technology and humans alike. The expression ’knowledge-based society’ was born from the acknowledgement and recognition of the effect of knowledge and technology exercised on economic growth. The production processes of knowledge society are based on the utility and distribution of information and knowledge. Knowledge-based economy is invariably a market economy and the most important coordinational factor is the knowledge market. In the knowledge-based economy growth in welfare, efficiency and employment is determined by knowledge intensity and the dynamic development of high technology. The first step in the changes initiated by the post-industrial economic model: modern economy, stepping out of its own medium, makes non-economic subsystems such as education, healthcare, society, etc. part of the economic subsystem. The second step of the change: knowledge producing, stepping out of its own medium, occupies the expanded economy, which is currenlty led by the knowledge market. There is no knowledge-based economy without knowledge-based society. This holds true also vice versa. Moreover, in the information age knowledge production, knowledge-based economy and knowledge society are the driving force behind one another.

The history of the concept

A new opportunity of defining information society comes from no other source than historical modelling or by analysing the development of historical models. Some elements have already been mentioned. If we describe the last two to three thousand years of human development with the help of concepts such as feudalism, industrial age (and its sidetrack: Socialism) and information age, then we can draw a few important conclusions from history. First of all, information age is as big and important period in human history as feudalism was; secondly, the replacement of industrial age by information age is approximately as big a change in terms of world models as, when at the end of the Middle Ages the first formations of industrial age replaced feudalism; the third consideration being that in this case we have to give a broader definition of information age than any of its internal phases, such as information society.

Dominant elements of the Historical-social submodels

1960s-1980s: decades of the information (technological) society

1980s-1990s: decades of the information economy (new economy)

2000 - 2010s: decades of the information society

2010 - 2020s: decades of knowledge led society

Table 3. Historical submodels of the information age (Csaba Varga)

According to this logic, the internal phases and stages of development of the near future are already visible. The information age started out as a technological change in the third quarter of the twentieth century. As far as we are concerned, we prefer to call this era information society, although we must add that it was in the 1960s and 1970s that the dreams, utopia and future prospects of the information age were drafted. It was a time when technological changes were enthusiastically greeted. The next developmental phase commenced sometimes in the 1980s and 1990s: at this stage the information age saw itself primarily as new economy and it was in this way that the money-centred global economy of new capitalism tried to aggregate a much larger than average profit. The development of information age as society became possible only in the mid-1990s and even nowadays it only takes place fragmentarily.

It was only in the second part of the 1990s that the question whether the information age had primarily changed into a knowledge-based age became part of the agenda and its veritable efficiency could be measured by understanding to what extent new knowledge, new science and new ways of thinking aggregated by human civilisation were taken over and used in the information age. (This is when the concept of e-content was introduced in the ideology of information society. This concept is partally narrower and partially broader than knowledge industry, which serves to name and develope content industry). We can talk about continental and state ambitions only after the turn of the millenium, which grasp and interprete information age as a new social model or social change in standards. It will take a considerable amount of time until information societies that follow or exist along each other are going to compile an integrated, information age model, which in turn is probably going to lead to knowledge age.

From the reviewed stages and arguments we can conclude that one can distinguish between at least two large models within the information age: the age of information society and/or knowledge society. The information age and the knowledge age. The two ages cannot be sharply separated from one another; they exist side by side. It is only in the optimal scenario that information society is followed by the model of knowledge society. A new world model is generally born on ruins two-three hundred years old. The knowledge-based world is on the one hand part and parcel of the information age; on the other hand, if history permits it is going to prepare the real model change. The new era can either be called knowledge age, although that still does not mean that history comes to an end because the knowledge-based world model can be possibly followed by a newer universal phase: the era of the consciousness society.

Presently we cannot go into detail about the coherent yet altogether different set of problems of the global and local world, or to use a new concept how and to what extent the integrated and complex crisis situations slow down the unfolding knowledge-based economy and society models. Nowadays the disadvantage of a social (and knowledge) strata or group is multipled because on the other hand the economic-financial, regional-local, social, ecological, cognitive-knowledge or media advantages are also integrated and act together.

We would like to put forward a few more arguments to the sceptics, the disillusioned ones, those who eagerly imagine a negative scenario. The present-day old-age glocal aggreations of negative states may expand at least fivefold the social and moral gaps of the age. A general social conflict can break out between (1) the technologically poor and wealthy, (2) information poor and information rich, (3) knowledge poor and rich, (4) awareness rich and poor and (5) the increasingly different experience of God between the rich and poor. It was Europe that recognised it for the first time the converting power of information in social structure and it hastily has generated a program to combat this continental danger. However, neither the designers nor the analysts of the situation understood it adquately that this is not only a conflict between the technologically reach and poor. The issue is not limited to access to technology, which in some European countries, regions and social groups is less than in other ones. This is why we should not exclusively focus on the the development of the hardware-software capacity or knowledge-centered services.

A recent development: for some reason the development order is not good. So far we could always come up with a reason why the correct order should be to give computers to people first, then connect them to the internet, then offer them new digital services, which altogether somehow, in our minds at least, would automatically enforce the intellectual and mental changes necessary. (It is altogether another question that in Hungary where theoretically speaking this logic has been followed even the ICT-sector did not receive the necessary economic-social and state budget). However, the old logic is all of a sudden no longer valid and a new order is required. One of the dominant causes for this is that, as we have already demonstrated it, the new global world is dually attached: it has a glocal nature. Moreover, it is definitely culture-dependant and when several dominant matters are in conflict, it becomes obvious that cultural dependence is stronger. It is only of local interest that the success of the new development and implementation order interferes with the old-fashioned government structure of member states. Moreover, within governments it is invariably the actions with economic-financial portfolios that are in decision-making positions. Thus we should not pay attention exclusively to the fact that the universal-global directions have a huge impact on the chances of small states, in both a negative and positive sense, but we should also focus on the social-cultural identities, intellectual and mental resources of small states, small regions, small groups that have the potential of becoming pulling factors and indicators.

In the information age the future of Hungary should be interpreted in the global future perspective while at the national and local levels the parallel economy, social, intellectual and mental developments could also bring about success.

1.10. A new understanding of knowledge society at the end of the information age

In our understanding the evolution of information society model and the evolution of knowledge society model are two subsequent development stages of the information age. It is difficult to separate the two models both in theory and in practice. It is worth recalling that many experts, including Daniel Bell[footnoteRef:14], consider knowledge to be the organised set of facts and ideas. According to Bell, knowledge passed over in a systematised form consists of new judgements, moreover, it may be added that these judgements do lead to new actions. [14: Daniel Bell (1986) The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. New York, Basic Books; Daniel Bell (1999) The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, New York, Basic Books.]

As we have already indicated, it is essential to define knowledge among others because the realisation is that information society and knowledge society significantly overlap in practice. In our opinion this may be explained first of all by the internal knowledge carrier features of information and the fact that information is determined by infrastructure. Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between the various phases of development in order not to have a detrimental effect on social values and objectives (social-puch) for the benefit of techno-puch during the realisation of information society.

First and foremost, knowledge society is the social and cultural dimension of information society. This approach therefore does not start out with discriminating between information and knowledge, but from the fact that the knowledge society, contrary to information society, focuses on transforming knowledge into social capital. This is the moment in the evolution of human civilisation when technical/technological possibilities are utilised for reorganising society. To put it differently, the already operating information and knowledge systems are utilised at a social level; they become the public vehicle of knowledge society, through which not only knowledge elements such as information and data lines flow but also knowledge, even substantial knowledge in general. We refer here to knowledge as a continuum of specific organisational features, which is distributed through IT networks, and which becomes a part of social capital (without being identical with it).

A restricted concept of knowledge in the information society

Contrary to the concept of knowledge defined as substantial and social capital, we can also interpret knowledge in the narrow sense of the term. Daniel Bell defines this concept in the information a