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Transcript of NEW ANGLETON DOCUMENT
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T O P
s w E T
Z3 February 1955
MEMO RANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations
SUBJECT:
Exfiltration of CAMUSO/Z a nd CAMB AR0/2
1. Pursua nt to your requ est. an
exam ination was ma de of
this case. The study wa s directed principally to an ana lysis of
the agents' comm unications which we re set forth in two files
furnished by SR: A few select operational m em orandum were
read for backgrou nd purposes. The m ost useful information,
howe ver, was obtained from the responsible case officers. A
num ber of days could be spent on a m ore exhaustive analysis, but
the views expre ssed herein were derived from an eight-hour
review of the case.
Z. Be fore going into deta ils of this case, it is ray w ish to
state here that a study of the aforeme ntioned information offers
no firm evidence w hich justifies a view that
these gents
are under
foreign control. Furthermore, since clear commitments were
ma de to the agents and because they have performed in accordance
with their instructions, it is subm itted tha t we a re ob ligated to do
everything
within our power to exfiltrate them from a position of
jeopardy. At present they are imprope rly docume nted and lack
legal status in the area . They are or will soon be faced w ith the
uncomfortable prospect of apprehension and probab le comprom ise
of their m ission, or, in view of our inab ility to perform, m ay b e
forced to go into the woods with the partisans. There are other
unpleasant consequences w hich may flow from our failure to
evacuate them soon.
3, Since w e do not have counter.intelligence capabilities in
the area nor adequ ate sensitive intelligence de rived from ST D sources,
It is obvious that we ca nnot crosscheck and that any a nalysis based
solely on available documentation is not in ftseilf infallible.
Nevertheless, we are forced to accept their bona fides, and, in this,
DECLASS IF I ED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL I NTELL IGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETRODSEXEMPT ION 382B
NAZI WAR CR IMES DI SCLOSURE AC1
DATE 2 7
T O P
s [ r E T
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TOP SEE1
page two
the exfUtration in one sense represen ts in its most unh appy light
an act of desperation to which we are inflexibly com mitted.
4.
During the course of the study the possibilities of
control kept com ing to the surface. It should be evident that such
doubts are inevitable particularly in a ease
of this typo.
5.
U the subject case is doubled who UY or in pAirt then it
I. evident that the Soviets have ach ieved a high de gree of sophistication
In the developm ent of double agents. It would also mea n that they
have not only apprehe nded and broken successfully the agents in
question but have recreated their persona/Hie-8 the preOise nature
of their m issions their dange r signals and have m anipalsited theist
into cooperative and active elements o f their own. The case officers
state that the m essages both in ton e and attitude reflect consistently
the p ersonalities and p eculiarities of subjects. As to the techn ical
aspects they state that some seven or eight danger signals were
given to each secretly. I f the age nts are so highly m otivated and
courag eous as described then it is difficult to reason wh y they
wo uld have given up a ll their danger signals and not retained at
least one. The Wel absence of dang er signals during the past tw o
and on e.haU yea rs argues persuasively in favor of the view that
the agents are no t under w itting control.
6.
U the agents are under control then Ike artist attribute to
the Soviets the setting up of the factual or notional nets in the area
which have been reported to us and Which have much to do with the
degree of confidence w hich we plate In subjects. In extending the
framew ork of the operation the Soviets have also increased sib-
stantially the security risks inherent in any doubling reface they
enlarge the possible channels through wh ich we could conceivably
cross.check the op erational health of subjects. he existence of
new a nd indepen dent assets in the area is not in itself cenclueive
evidence of the presence or absence of control. It is believed
however that in this case it would not have been necessary for
the Soviets to have taken upon them selves these new burdens in
order to instill confidence in us.
U
the agents were under control
and creatively coope rative there are innum erable double-agent
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T O P
S r P F T
• page three,
t r icks wh ich could have bee n w orked against us without resort ing to
the r isk, of im plementing an operat ional net .
7. On the basis of the docu m entat ion alone, there are certain
negat ive facts which em erge :
(a ) A third man was d ispatched to m ake contact with
one o f the subjects . He has never been heard f rom.
Oho can only assume that he w as e ither kil led on the
t r ip o r ca ptured . U captured , the quest ion o f h i s
confess ion is pert inent. If h is contact w as unde r
control, then he is the victim of an inteaticatisei.
Such success w ould lead ta ja m uch h igher regard for
the double play and temp t any Service to al locate its
super ior ta lent and assets to the case .
(b )
There has been betw een the var ious messages a
cons iderable t ime lag . If subjects are under con trol ,
these delays would permit and favor the working out
of a watert ight playb ack. It would give the local control
suffic ient t ime for c lear ing with M oscow a l l develop.
m eats and m essages in the case and a lso enable them
to concentrate hea vily on the security controls of
subjects and the ir a l leged net . In addit ion, the t ime
lag would m ake it possible for the Sov iets to fol low up
the counter - intel ligence leads der ived from this
operat ion both in the U.S. and in Germ any.
8. The a f f irm at ive v iew expressed in paragraph Z above i s
quali fied as fo l lows: It is recom m ende d that a traf f ic :analysis be m ade
through STD in order to see whether there is ref lected any u nusual
act iv ity coincident with the arr iva l andier comm unicat ions f rom the
agents . I t i s assumed that i f the Soviets are in fact dou bling subjects ,
then all aspects of the case would hav e to be cleared on a continuing
bas is wi th Moscow. Th is i s based on the assump t ion that M oscow wou ld
know that subjects work for Cen tral Intel l igence . Given their experience
in W IN .and in other cases, they could not help but deal with it as a
m atter of the h ighest ope rat ional pr ior ity. (Accbrding to the ca se of f icers ,
the ag ents a re aw are o f our A gency s ident i ty .) U doubled , the nature
T
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T P SE ET
page four.
of the messages wou ld require a considerable velum* of com mu nications
between the lima control and Mo scow. It is of course unknown to w hat
degree the H all or others are in a po sition to con tribute. It is important,
however, that in and bey ond
this
particular case, a check.
Ou t po in t
f or T/A be autom at ica l ly ut i l ised and that the technic ians be pu t on
notice as to
our
requ irement f o r such coverage and su pp or t . In the
event that the Hen shou ld have the per t inent T/A;
their
f
i
roj ings
P 4 4
be such as to m ake i t certa in on e way
or th the; as to the existence
of contrail.
9. To,
the agents have ne t replied to the last conumm i.,
catisms setting ioIth the exfiltration proposal, It is presumed that
the DM will not appreach
th
Swedes pending some reaction from the
:agents,
10. Thou gh gratuitous, it would appear that the current Oleo
may be frustrated through the lack of cooperation by the Swedes, It A.
also questionable whether the State Depa rtment will permit the gothic.
How ever, these observations should not dilute what appears to be a
clear.cut obligation en our part to perform in accordance w ith our
commitments to the
subjects,
II, In the even t that
subjects respond favorably to the proposed
exfiltration plan, then ft le advised that steps be taken im med iately
in the event that they are controlled) to send messages from our end
indicating that the exfiltration is triggered to some
important and highly
sensitive operational matters which w ill take place in the not too distant
future, the nature of which requ ires their presence.. The purpose of
such messages Should be
to create a substantial dilemm a in the minds
o f those Sovie ts U they exis t) who m ay be p lann in g to cap i talize on the
exfiltration regarding it to be the h igh point of the do uble- play
Insofar as subjects are participants, and to argue in suppo rt of the view
that there I. mu ch greater p rof i t to be
gained
i f the
ex/titration is
permitted bi
take p lace. This idea wi l l be exp an ded with
SR.
JAMES
AN GL ET O N
Chief Counter.Intelligence Staff
Distribution:
Copy 1 original): C/OP
Copy Z:
Chief, SR
Copy 3:
r