Network Emergency Coordinator (NEC) Exercise Wolf Report · Figure 1: NEC Industry Exercise Wolf...
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NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 1
Network Emergency Coordinator (NEC)
Exercise Wolf
ReportDate of issue: 8 March 2016
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 2
Executive Summary
To prevent a supply emergency occurring or to minimise the safety risks associated where one develops,
the Network Emergency Co-ordinator (NEC) has established arrangements pursuant to the Gas Safety
(Management) Regulations 1996 for coordinating the actions of duty holders, including transporters,
operating on the affected part of the network. In accordance with the NEC’s safety case obligations these
processes are tested on a periodic basis to ensure that arrangements are robust and duty holders are
cognisant of their responsibilities.
The 2015 NEC emergency exercise, “Exercise Wolf”, was split into four separate exercises to allow more
focus on key areas of the emergency process:
NEC Industry Exercise - Gas Deficit Emergency (GDE) exercise National Grid pre-emergency commercial strategy exercise leading into the NEC Industry Exercise Individual Distribution Network Critical Transportation Constraint (CTC) exercises Individual Distribution Network Firm Load Shedding (FLS) exercises
This report focuses on the main NEC Industry Exercise and includes the high level outputs of the other
exercises.
The NEC Industry exercise gauged the effectiveness of an industry response to a Network Gas Supply
Emergency (NGSE); testing industry communication processes and each party’s internal procedures to
ensure that the emergency arrangements are robust and aligned.
Industry participants taking part in Exercise Wolf included National Grid; Gas Distribution Network
Operators (DNOs); Shippers; Terminals, Interconnectors, Storage Facility Operators, NTS directly
connected loads, the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and the Oil and Gas Authority
(OGA).
Exercise Wolf successfully demonstrated that the industry was able to respond to a Gas Deficit NGSE in
accordance with the emergency arrangements described in the Procedure for Network Gas Supply
Emergency (T/PM/E/1).
The exercises fulfilled all planned major objectives, providing the opportunity for the NEMT to test a
range of updated systems and processes whilst exploring preventative options prior to and during a Gas
Deficit NGSE. Post exercise feedback was generally positive and the suggestions for improvements and
developments have been captured and are being progressed.
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Table of ContentsExecutive Summary .........................................................................................................................................2
1. Introduction.............................................................................................................................................4
2. NEC Industry Exercise..............................................................................................................................5
2.1. Exercise Objectives ............................................................................................................... 5
2.2. Exercise Overview................................................................................................................. 5
2.3. More detailed observations & results from the exercise ........................................................ 8
2.4. Summary of Recommendations........................................................................................... 11
2.5. Looking forward.................................................................................................................. 11
3. Pre-Emergency Commercial Strategy exercise.................................................................................... 12
3.1. Exercise Objectives ............................................................................................................. 12
3.2. Exercise Scenario ................................................................................................................ 12
3.3. Observations & Results ....................................................................................................... 12
3.4. Summary of Recommendations........................................................................................... 13
4. Critical Transportation Constraint (CTC) Exercises with DNs.............................................................. 14
4.1. Exercise Objectives ............................................................................................................. 14
4.2. Exercise Scenario ................................................................................................................ 14
4.3. Observations & Results ....................................................................................................... 15
4.4. Summary of Recommendations........................................................................................... 17
5. Distribution Network Firm Load Shedding Performance Exercise ..................................................... 18
5.1. Exercise Objectives ............................................................................................................. 18
5.2. Exercise Scenario ................................................................................................................ 18
5.3. Observations & Results ....................................................................................................... 18
5.4. Summary of Recommendations........................................................................................... 22
6. Conclusions & Summary of Recommendations .................................................................................. 23
Appendix 1: Exercise Wolf scenario............................................................................................................. 26
Appendix 2: NEC Industry Exercise - further detail & data ......................................................................... 28
A2.1 Documentation........................................................................................................... 28
A2.2 Online survey results .................................................................................................. 28
A2.3 NTS Firm Load shedding results................................................................................... 29
A2.4 Automated mass communication results..................................................................... 31
Appendix 3: Individual Distribution Network Firm Load Shedding Exercise - further detail & data ........ 33
Appendix 4: NEC Exercise Viper (2014) Recommendations & Updates ..................................................... 41
Appendix 5: Glossary & References............................................................................................................. 44
Appendix 6: Feedback on Exercise Wolf Report ......................................................................................... 45
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 4
1. Introduction
To prevent a supply emergency occurring or to minimise the safety risks associated where one develops,
the Network Emergency Co-ordinator (NEC) has established arrangements pursuant to the Gas Safety
(Management) Regulations 1996 for coordinating the actions of duty holders, including transporters,
operating on the affected part of the network. In accordance with the NEC’s safety case obligations, these
processes are tested on a periodic basis to ensure that the arrangements are robust and that duty holders
are cognisant of their responsibilities.
The 2015 NEC emergency exercise, “Exercise Wolf”, was split into four separate exercises to allow more
focus on key areas of the emergency process:
NEC Industry Exercise - Gas Deficit Emergency (GDE) exercise National Grid pre-emergency commercial strategy exercise leading into the NEC Industry Exercise Individual Distribution Network Critical Transportation Constraint (CTC) exercises Individual Distribution Network Firm Load Shedding (FLS) exercises
This report focuses the main NEC Industry Exercise and includes the high level outputs of the other
exercises. Detailed reporting for the CTC exercises will be shared with participants and the HSE only and
Distribution Networks will also report individually on their own firm load shedding observations directly to
the HSE, the combined results of which can be seen in this report.
Industry participants taking part in Exercise Wolf included:
National Grido Network Emergency Management Team (NEMT)o Representation from Gas National Control Centre (GNCC)o Representation from Electricity National Control Centre (ENCC)
Distribution Network Operators (DNs)o National Grid Gas Distribution (NGD)o Northern Gas Networks (NGN)o Scotia Gas Networks (SGN)o Wales & West Utilities (WWU)
Shippers Terminal Operators including LNG Importation Terminal Operators Interconnector Operators Storage Facility Operators Supplementary Transporters NTS Directly Connected Loads Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) Oil & Gas Authority (OGA)
Observers from the Health and Safety Executive were in attendance at National Grid Gas’ offices in
Warwick during the NEC Industry Exercise.
The National Grid pre-emergency commercial strategy exercise, the NEC Industry Exercise and the DN CTC
exercises were organised on behalf of the NEC by the National Grid Emergency Planning Team (EPT).
Three of the four CTC exercises were undertaken before the NEC Industry Exercise. The fourth CTC
exercise was cancelled by National Grid due to unavailability of key players, and will be incorporated into
the 2016 emergency exercise schedule. Each DN managed its own firm load shedding exercise separately
and provided FLS results to support this report.
The status of the recommendations and actions from the previous NEC exercise (Viper) are in Appendix 4.
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2. NEC Industry Exercise
2.1. Exercise Objectives
The principal objective of the NEC Industry Exercise was:
To test the emergency arrangements set out in the Procedure for Network Gas Supply Emergency(T/PM/E/1) and the response of all parties to a developing Network Gas Supply Emergency.
This principal objective was exercised primarily in the main NEC Industry Exercise but also in the CriticalTransportation Constraint and Firm Load Shedding exercises. This principal objective was divided into anumber of primary objectives:
1. Confirm that industry emergency arrangements remain aligned to the Procedure for Network GasSupply Emergency (reference T/PM/E/1)
2. Test of the National Grid and Oil and Gas Authority upstream Oil and Gas Crisis managementprocedure, web portal and emergency response communications
3. Test of the NEMT emergency strategy development, industry communication and emergencyprocesses through emergency stages 1-3
4. Test of the Distribution Networks’ Allocation and Isolation plans
5. Test National Grid’s external emergency communications system
6. Test National Grid’s emergency management instruction pro formas are clear, concise andembedded within the industry’s emergency procedures
7. Test that previous NEC exercise recommendations have been included within the emergencystrategy development and emergency procedures
2.2. Exercise Overview
The NEC Industry Exercise took place on 14th and 15th October during normal working hours. The
information from the pre-emergency commercial strategy exercise enabled the Incident Controller to
immediately brief the Network Emergency Coordinator (NEC) on the current situation and forecast for the
Gas Day, highlighting the need to take decisive action by requesting that the NEC declares a Network Gas
Supply Emergency (NGSE). The richness of the “back story” from Commercial Strategy pre-emergency
exercise provided realism in the build up to an emergency declaration to ensure that the NEC could be
effectively briefed and engaged.
Analysis of the overall system balance and Network Analysis of the potential system pressure losses led
the NEMT to develop a strategy to access emergency actions under Stage 1 and 2 of the emergency
procedures. Once an appropriate strategy to mitigate the significant supply losses was developed in line
with National Grid’s emergency procedures, the Incident Controller sought approval from the NEC
(observed by the HSE) to move immediately to declare a Stage 1 & 2 Gas Deficit Emergency. This strategy
was approved by the NEC and the industry notified of the emergency declaration.
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Table 1: Gas Deficit Emergency Actions tested in Exercise Wolf
Gas Deficit Emergency
EmergencyStage
ActionTested in
Exercise Wolf?Focus area in exercise
Stage 1(Potential)
Gas conforming to Schedule 3 Part IIof GS(M)R
No
Gather supply & demandinformation
Create emergency responsestrategy
Issue emergency instructionsto the industry
NTS Linepack utilisation Yes
Distribution Network Utilisationo Distribution Network Storageo Emergency Interruption
Yes(Data gathering
only)
Public Appeals No
Stage 2
National Grid Gas plc’s participationin the OCM suspended
Yes
Directing Supplies Yes
Firm Load Shedding Yes
Public Appeals No
Stage 3
Public Appeals No Working with DistributionNetworks who providedAllocation & Isolation plans
Actions by NetworkEmergency ManagementTeam & DECC downstreamEmergency Response Team.
Allocation & Isolation Yes
Stage 4 Restoration No
Following emergency declaration, the NEMT exercised a range of emergency communications with all NTS
Entry and Exit points to direct the emergency actions indicated in the table above. These communications
were undertaken by issuing a range of standard forms and an automated mass fax and SMS system
throughout the exercise.
This main industry exercise enabled the testing of the industry emergency arrangements within E1. All of
the below activities were completed within the timeframes allotted for the exercise. No deviations from
the Procedure for Network Gas Supply Emergency were observed during the exercise. All participants
responded appropriately and in a timely manner to the NEC directions issued by the NEMT.
Table 2: Emergency Stages, processes and actions during the NEC Industry Exercise.
NEC Exercise Action
Day 1(14 October 2015)
NEMT mobilisation
Incident Controller briefs NEC and requests NGSE Stage 1 & 2 declaration andstrategy approval
Gas Availability Status Report and Upstream processes
DN demand breakdown requested via NETMAN1 forms
Supply demand balance analysed
Strategy development
Stage 1 and 2 Emergency Actions undertaken
Day 2(15 October 2015)
Maximise Firm Load shedding
Supply demand balance analysed
Incident Controller briefs NEC and requests NGSE Stage 3 declaration
Allocation strategy developed
DNs briefed on allocation strategy and isolation plans requested
DECC Emergency Response Team options
DNs present isolation strategy ready for Stage 3 declaration
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In addition, the exercise provided a unique platform for rich, open discussions and debate between
members of the NEMT, the Incident Controller and the Network Emergency Coordinator. These
discussions are invaluable for developing skills and experience. The exercise also enabled a large number
of people from across the industry to participate in the emergency exercise actions developing awareness
and skills more widely – as summarised below:
Figure 1: NEC Industry Exercise Wolf statistics
NEMT Officer shadowing was used as in previous exercises to support the development of future NEMT
officers. This approach was very well received by all those involved in the shadowing and will be
continued in subsequent exercises as it compliments the classroom based training activities.
The feedback from the exercise has shaped the recommendations within this report, and will be used to
refine and improve National Grid’s emergency procedures, processes, training and exercises. Feedback
and observations were collected through a range of methods including:
“Hot wash” sessions at the end of each day within the incident room Individual and group face to face meetings following the exercise; and Email and web feedback surveys
Below is a summary of the survey feedback:
Over 85% of survey responders answered that the Exercise had been beneficial or very beneficial In specific questions about procedures, communications & resources; the vast majority of
responses were within the good and very good categories, with very few stakeholders providingpoor or neutral responses. These quantative responses will also enable us to benchmark ourperformance in future exercises.
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2.3. More detailed observations & results from the exercise
This section provides a summary of the more specific outcomes and recommendations from the exercise.
Pre-emergency exercise & exercise set upWhilst the pre-emergency commercial strategy exercise had allowed a prompt start to the NEC industryexercise, feedback was received that additional time for briefing at the start of the NEC Industry Exercisewould have aided understanding of the scenario, situational awareness and strategy development.
Ahead of Exercise Wolf, all participants were issued a brief by National Grid providing an overview of the
exercise objectives and the updated forms to be tested during the exercise. This Exercise Brief was issued
via internal contact lists as well as the Joint Office of Gas Transporters industry mailing lists and included a
full suite of updated emergency forms to be tested in Exercise Wolf. One objective was to ensure the
brief was easy to understand and ensured clarity for all industry participants in terms of roles and
responsibilities during the exercise. Positive feedback was received regarding the improved industry
brief.
The real time network analysis of the NTS within the exercise aided creation of the emergency strategy
and added considerable realism and depth to the exercise. This promoted debate and challenge to create
the most effective emergency strategy, aiding the articulation of risk to enable the NEC to declare an
emergency.
Running the NEMT & NEMT roles
The NEMT Technical Secretary role supports the Incident Controller during all NEMT briefing sessions and
strategy development meetings. During Exercise Wolf, the Technical Secretary supported the wider NEMT
by recording and monitoring actions for circulation within the NEMT in between all NEMT meetings. Some
consideration needs to be given as to whether any incremental developments for this role would help
support the technical secretary in their role. In particular, standard templates could support situational
awareness of the NEMT officers & their teams, perhaps using some simple visual management where
appropriate such as on the walls of the incident room. Simplifiying this role may support other NEMT
roles, such as the Crisis Management Team liaison role and aid consistency of information and
communications.
NEMT training & awareness
E3 Emergency forms and NEMT task cards were issued to participants prior to the exercise for
familiarisation and are designed to drive all formal emergency communications from the NEMT to
industry participants. Whilst feedback from exercise participants was generally positive, there could have
been more reference made to task cards during the exercise. A number of NEMT members provided
feedback that additional familiarisation prior to the exercise would have been beneficial. To aid this,
where appropriate, consideration will be given to where more desktop exercises can be used within our
training to further aid development and learning, taking into account feedback from our NEMT members.
The involvement of a wide range of people within the exercise who may be involved should an event
occur aids the quality and richness of debate during the exercise. The active involvement in emergency
exercises and familiarisation sessions from people from across the industry to within various departments
of National Grid such as Legal and Corporate Affairs aids the effectiveness of the exercise and we intend
to continue these activities. Where opportunities allow, sharing experiences with other teams in
emergency management sector may further help us understand whether we are following best practice
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and support our development of training and exercising.
During an emergency exercise, and even more so during a real emergency, the roles of Incident Controller
and the various NEMT Officers require a wide range of competencies, covering technical, personal and
teamwork skills. In addition to the on technical skills and process familiarisation, the exercises give some
further opportunities to experience decision making and situational awareness competencies during
times of stress. We would like to explore further the human behavioural aspects of working in pressured
situations to see if any appropriate tools and techniques may be available to support the NEMT.
NEMT Processes
No deviations from the Procedure for Network Gas Supply Emergency were observed during the exercise.
All participants responded appropriately and in a timely manner to the NEC directions issued by the
NEMT.
The process to get from a strategy to releasing the exercise emergency declaration to industry prompted
some discussions during the exercise. Therefore, there is an opportunity to take another look at this area
to see if any of the steps can be simplified or clarified to expedite decision making and getting
notifications to industry.
During the annual NEC Industry Exercise, the roles of NEC and Incident Controller are undertaken by
different people on each of the two days to enable more people to gain experience of the roles. Feedback
was received that the handover for some roles from one day to the next could be improved to improve
continuity and increase effectiveness.
National Grid and Oil & Gas Authority upstream Oil & Gas Crisis management procedure, web portal
and emergency response communications
Arrangements were developed during 2015 that enabled Terminal Operators including LNG Importation
Terminal Operators to provide their Gas Availability Status (GAS) Report and Situation Reports details via
a new Oil & Gas Authority (OGA) web portal system. The portal is now complete having had two live data
tests: a small scale test with user acceptance testing (UAT) and during Exercise Wolf. The hosting of the
GAS report on the OGA portal worked well. The emergency arrangements in the Upstream Crisis
Management Plan were shown to work well for the management of the information processes in a major
incident and the communications between OGA, National Grid and the upstream industry were effective.
The NEMT Supply Team training will be further updated so that they can gain a better understanding of
how the GAS portal operates.
Industry communications
A key activity in Stage 2 of an NGSE emergency is firm load shedding (FLS). The NEC Industry Exercise
tested the performance of loads directly connected to the NTS when directed to cease taking gas. All NTS
directly connected sites were to be contacted during Exercise Wolf. In total, 54 sites were involved and all
of these sites were contactable and confirmed they would be able to cease gas consumption with a given
lead time.
The task of contacting NTS directly connected sites is managed by the Shipper Team within the NEMT. A
total of 5 people undertook this task and all sites were contacted, issued directions over the phone,
issued a GS(M)R fax notification and all details noted in the curtailment log in a total of 2 hours 8 minutes.
This level of performance is considered satisfactory. Some sites had longer lead times to come off load
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than others and so we will be aiming to improve understanding and understand the potential for
improvements with specific sites. For more information, please see Appendix A2.
A range of different communications are sent during an emergency or emergency exercise by fax and
SMS. 91% of SMS messages were successfully delivered during exercise Wolf; this is slightly lower than
the 95% for last year’s exercise, Exercise Viper. Approximately 75% of all faxes were successfully
delivered, which is similar to the levels seen within exercise Viper. We will continue to test and cleanse all
shipper contact details outside of the NEC Exercise on a regular basis to manage this area. For more
information, please see Appendix A2.
Our communications in an emergency would also include government bodies such as DECC. DECC’s
involvement in Exercise Wolf enabled the team to get an understanding of the potential timing, frequency
and depth of requests for information that may occur during an emergency. This experience will enable us
to work together to improve information sharing templates to aid communications. To aid understanding
of each other’s roles, DECC now has a standing invitation to an industry forum to enable appropriate
engagement between DECC and all the gas transporters to continue.
Distribution Networks Allocation and Isolation Plans
Although Stage 3 was never formally declared within the exercise, each of the DNs provided isolation
plans prior to the declaration of Stage 3, based on the gas allocation that the NEMT provided to the DNs.
Feedback was received from the DNs that this was a worthwhile activity within the NEC Industry exercise.
The allocation and isolation teleconference is between the Demand Officer and the Distribution Networks
(i.e. outside of the NEMT incident room and therefore not captured by the Technical Secretary). The way
in which allocation and isolation data is captured could be reviewed to ensure that the forms are fit for
purpose and capture all necessary information to aid effective strategy development and communication
of agreed allocation and isolation plans.
Forms
Ahead of NEC Industry Exercise Wolf, all participants were issued a brief by National Grid providing an
overview of the exercise objectives and the updated forms to be tested during the exercise. Following
feedback, we will review the NEC declaration forms so that they provide a clearer, stronger articulation of
the emergency to aid prompt appropriate responses to the declaration.
Ofgem’s Gas Security of Supply Significant Code Review was implemented on 1 October 2015. Its
objectives were: to minimise likelihood of a Gas Deficit Emergency (GDE) occurring; to minimise the
duration if a GDE occurs; and to make payments to firm consumers for curtailment. This is achieved
through changes to the Shipper cashout arrangements which apply in an emergency. Cash out charges in
an emergency remain dynamic and now include pricing in of demand reduction actions and isolation of
Non Daily Metered customers. These changes are designed to have an impact on the market, with any
new DN isolation in Stage 3 of an emergency triggering a floor for cash out prices of £14/th for that gas
day. Following feedback received during the exercise, we will develop a pre-prepared message to alert
the market of the implications of any impending emergency Stage 3 declaration.
We will continue to work with all relevant stakeholders through our engagement throughout the year to
aid understanding of the forms and processes and listen to any feedback received.
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 11
2.4. Summary of Recommendations
The following is a summary of the recommendations & actions from the text above:
Consider further standard templates and simple visual management to aid Technical Secretaryrole, situational awareness and strategy articulation.
Investigate use of standard templates and simple visual management to support situationalawareness of the NEMT officers & their teams
Consider where more desktop exercises can be used within our training to further aiddevelopment and learning.
Where opportunities allow, share experiences with other teams in emergency managementsector to share best practice and support our development of training and exercising.
Explore further the human behavioural aspects of working in pressured situations to see if anyappropriate tools and techniques may be available to support the NEMT.
Review the steps from strategy decision making and getting notifications to industry to see if thisprocess can be simplified or clarified.
Look at handover for NEMT roles to improve continuity and increase effectiveness. The NEMT Supply Team training to be further developed on how to use the (Gas Availability
Status) GAS portal and where feasible consider Summer GAS portal exercises with DECC andterminals.
Hold follow up conversations with specific sites to improve understanding and discuss potentialimprovements to NTS Direct Connect Firm Load Shedding performance.
Work with DECC to improve information sharing templates to aid communications. Review how allocation and isolation data is captured to ensure that the forms are fit for purpose
and capture all necessary information to aid effective strategy development and communicationof agreed allocation and isolation plans.
Review the NEC declaration forms so that they provide a clearer, stronger articulation of theemergency to aid prompt appropriate responses to the declaration.
Develop a pre-prepared message to alert the market of the implications of any impendingemergency Stage 3 declaration.
2.5. Looking forward
Each emergency exercise enables focus on a number of aspects of processes, communication and strategy
development. This focus enables a more in depth look at those areas so that we can get quality feedback
and recommendations that can be actioned. There are a few areas that we will consider further how we
ensure they get the focus they need whether through smaller exercises and process run throughs,
stakeholder engagement or inclusion in the main industry exercise in the next few years.
Emergency Stage 4 (restoration) Shipper Nomination accuracy and timeliness Potential for a move from faxes when the right assurances are available and systems and
obligations allow
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 12
3. Pre-Emergency Commercial Strategy exercise3.1. Exercise Objectives
Test the development of the commercial response to a developing incident, using a commercial
strategy timeline to simulate the timely commercial decisions in a realistic environment
Test the Decision Support Tools available to National Grid and update with the new imbalance
position
Provide the incident team with an environment to further develop detailed understanding of the
tools available
Provide the Incident Controller with a commercial response for NEC emergency actions approval
within the NEC Industry Exercise Wolf
Provide industry with backdrop of issues and actions affecting National Grid for the NEC Industry
Exercise Wolf
3.2. Exercise Scenario
This was a National Grid internal exercise undertaken on the morning of 16th September 2015. The
exercise also provided the opportunity to create a detailed “back story”, showing the timeline of physical
events, system status and commercial actions as the scenario developed, showing the system moving
from a typical healthy supply demand balance to a position of such imbalance that the Incident Controller
requested NEC approval for an emergency declaration.
The NEC Exercise utilised a simulated Gas Day based on the highest demand day seen in winter 2014/15.
The historic day utilised was Monday 2nd February 2015, where actual demand reached 357mcm. The
scenario was designed to:
Ensure that NEC Industry Exercise later in the year would test Emergency Stages 1, 2 and 3
To ensure a sufficiently high supply demand imbalance required the loss of all supplies from two
terminals and a storage facility & for the I(UK) Interconnector to be exporting gas
The exercise also provided an opportunity to test the improved “Emergency Data Support Tool” that was
first trialled in Exercise Viper. The tool facilitates improved situational awareness and decision making by
displaying supply, demand and associated forecast NTS linepack information.
The tools and processes utilised in the constraint management strategy are detailed in National Grid’s
System Management Principles Statement available online.
3.3. Observations & Results
The inclusion of a pre-emergency commercial strategy exercise proved very useful; it enabled the creation
of a detailed timeline and supporting information and data to be used as a back-drop and build up to the
commencement of the NEC Industry Exercise, thereby allowing rapid emergency declaration and
maximising time available to industry to undertake their own emergency procedures following NEC
instruction.
The exercise facilitated the understanding of commercial actions available for consideration as an incident
develops. During this exercise, appropriate options were available to select localised and national
constraint actions. Some of the tools are used infrequently for very specific market and operational
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 13
conditions, hence the exercise provided a practical opportunity to develop knowledge and simulate their
use. Many of those participating in the exercise provided positive feedback, stating they found the
experience very useful.
A decision support tool was tested in the exercise. All of the aspects tested worked as expected and it was
fit for purpose. There are some parts of the tool that could not be tested as the tool works with live
market data and bids and offers may not have been posted at the time of the exercise.
The approach of working through a pre-emergency scenario facilitated a timely and information-rich start
to the NEC Industry Exercise, enabling prompt commencement of industry communications and actions
including directing supplies and firm load shedding.
During the exercise real data was used to analyse the available capacity scale back volumes. On the day
analysis showed approximately 9mcm of gas fired power station load could be scaled back with 4 hours
notice. ENCC analysis showed this level and speed of electricity generation reduction may have caused
issues on the electricity network. Though there are restrictions on the information that can be passed
between control rooms, further working together within this framework may contribute to maintaining
security of supply on both the gas and electricity networks within a constraint scenario.
3.4. Summary of Recommendations
The following is a summary of the recommendations & actions from the text above:
Future NEC Exercise design should consider including some pre-emergency commercial strategywhere appropriate for the scenario being exercised.
Seek to maintain ENCC involvement in exercises where appropriate to help enhanceunderstanding of how the control rooms work together and to further build up our commonunderstanding and experience of the interactions between gas & electricity control rooms &incident management teams prior to emergency declaration.
Consider whether any future pre-emergency workshops or exercises would benefit fromappropriate involvement from industry.
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 14
4. Critical Transportation Constraint (CTC) Exercises with DNs
4.1.Exercise Objectives
Focus on Transporter to Transporter strategy development in an emerging Critical Transportation
Constraint
Working together with Distribution Networks to better understand response and timeframes,
promoting open dialogue
Understanding the capability the Distribution Networks have to determine and articulate
downstream constraints and issues
Test network analysis and ability to optimise system capability in constraint scenarios
Develop Incident Controller’s skills, knowledge and experience to manage an escalating incident
Review system optimisation and commercial constraint strategy
Test online network analysis capability of all transporters
Develop the risk articulation in lead up to emergency
DNs to provide minimal critical pressure following any flow swaps and network utilisation prior to
requesting NEC assistance
Distribution Networks to develop risk articulation to enable approval of NEC declaration and
emergency actions
4.2. Exercise Scenario
The Critical Transportation Constraint exercises were designed to create a focus for Transporter to
Transporter strategy development in an emerging Critical Transportation Constraint. The exercises were
focused on promoting open dialogue with the requirement for the Distribution Networks to determine
the constraint impact on their network and articulate the level of emergency actions required to minimise
the network impacts. This included identifying and considering all network utilisation and constraint
options to enable a joint transmission – distribution strategy to be articulated to the NEC. A key focus was
on the DN articulation of risk, for example analysis of pressure and associated volume of load and number
and type of consumers affected, to ensure a robust, justifiable and defendable analysis is submitted. This
underpins the strategy taken to the NEC and subsequent emergency declaration and commencement of
associated emergency actions. The approach allowed for closer inspection of a range of real world
network failure scenarios and the transporters ability to quantify the risk associated with diminished exit
pressures.
Although four CTC exercises were originally scheduled for 2015, only three of the four planned exercises
were undertaken: one was cancelled due to unavailability of key players. The cancellation did not have a
material impact on levels of assurance, as the DN affected (WWU) stated that it believes its activities
within the NEC Industry Exercise provided sufficient opportunities for strategy development and risk
articulation. National Grid will discuss and plan for future exercises such as CTC exercises with the DNs at
the E3 alignment group.
The objective of each DN CTC exercise was for DN operators and their incident teams to articulate the risk
associated with reducing offtake pressures which would ultimately lead to a risk assessment appropriate
to take to the NEC to request the declaration of a Critical Transportation Constraint Emergency. The
journey from normal network operation through to constraint management scenarios and ultimately a
CTC emergency is rarely experienced in normal operation and a CTC emergency has never been declared
by the NEC. Therefore exercising these scenarios is important to build the understanding of how
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 15
transporters can work together efficiently to forecast and avoid system constraints and therefore a
developing CTC.
Each exercise lasted approximately 3 hours and was led by National Grid’s Emergency Planning Team. The
exercise was based on a historic high demand day and then initiated with a NTS failure scenario which
would trigger a reduction in offtake pressures in a specific area of the NTS and an associated Local
Distribution Zone (LDZ).
4.3. Observations & Results
Only the high level findings from the CTC exercises are provided in this report with the outputs specific to
each DN shared directly with DNs and HSE only.
Planning for the CTC exercise
The exercise scenarios were built up from discussion with the DNs on the types and locations of issues
would enable a good strategy discussion and enable some great learning opportunities. To aid the
exercise to meet its aims, clear objectives for the exercise should be agreed between National Grid Gas
Transmission and the Distribution Networks with an increased level of joint planning and dialogue at a
range of levels of seniority where possible. This would help get the appropriate people involved in the
exercise and complement the work of the E3 Alignment Group.
Greater value can be gained from the CTC exercises with improved long term planning. CTC exercise dates
agreed as early as possible with CTC objectives, requirements and resources identified would allow the
DN workshops to be used as a platform to prepare for the CTC and to restate those objectives. Following
the exercise, it is important to have in place a structured review process for feedback, to discuss what
went well and identify areas for improvement. Where appropriate this could include replaying aspects of
the exercise step by step, to see events from another party’s perspective and to understand the reasons
why each party acted as they did.
Sharing data
The CTC exercises highlighted the requirement to ensure communication and information transfer is
clear, concise and understood. LDZ demand breakdown information is provided by DNs to the NEMT via
the NETMAN1 form process which was tested as part of this exercise. This form is also used to inform the
NEMT of the minimum critical offtake pressures required for each LDZ to maintain supply to all users
within an LDZ. The CTC exercises showed that the NETMAN1 pro forma can be improved. Improvements
suggested include increasing the granularity for a CTC at one or more offtake levels, including offtake rate,
profile and DM / NDM load split. The pro forma could also be improved to enable the sharing of best
estimates of likely offtake pressures following the issue, summarising the implications of satisfying current
DN demand and any contingencies they will need assistance in implementing.
Situational awareness & Building a strategy
The CTC exercises focused attention on transporters ability to analyse and understand network risks and
failure points whilst aiding knowledge sharing, continuous improvement and a broader understanding of
constraint management and emergency procedures. All transporters found value in the exercises and
would welcome more in the future.
During each DN CTC Exercise, the NEMT presented scenarios to the DN. The aim of each CTC exercise was
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 16
to reach a point where the DN could clearly articulate the downstream risk in response to forecast NTS
pressure losses. This DN risk assessment is important to support the associated NTS forecast information
which would be used to engage the NEC and seek approval to declare a Critical Transportation Constraint
Emergency.
As expected, the constraint scenarios presented to DNs resulted in a range of responses across DNs.
Though the specifics from the scenarios and network topology drove some differences in the responses, a
range of approaches to risk assessment and analysis and the exercise teams involved also contributed to
the differences.
Each of the CTC exercises have proved valuable in testing the communication, interactions,
understanding, skills, behaviours, procedures, tools and processes that would be central to managing a
CTC. The exercises have also highlighted a number of areas for development. Situational awareness and
common understanding of the options available on both transmission and distribution networks could be
improved. This could lead to more proactive approach, where we would see more evidence of seeking
combined solutions, asking probing questions and showing good leadership.
National Grid NTS worked with the DNs to successfully build and develop strategies for each of the
scenarios, but timeliness of responses and ownership could have been improved to reduce the impact
that delays were having on the ability to undertake timely emergency actions. There was a need to create
a stronger sense of situational realism in the exercise such as through urgency in the dialogue, in
particular stressing the urgency and expectations of response times to questions asked. For those
involved, there were occasions where further knowledge of the network, the role of the NEC and how the
commercial and operational regimes interact would have enabled the exercise to run more smoothly. The
knowledge and skills are often seen in day to day activities and in response to real incidents; this could
have been due to resource or availability constraints on the day.
Network analysis
Network analysis continues to be one of the best tools available to understand network capability and the
associated security of supply risks. The ability to quickly replicate a real gas day and understand the
impacts of forecast NTS pressure losses on LDZ operations provides for swift decision making to mitigate a
constraint or emergency scenario. All transporters should aim to regularly test their ability to articulate
these risks with the support of real time analytical techniques. Network analysis was completed in each of
the exercises and enabled newer analysts to gain experience of an emergency exercise.
Communicating information to enable approval of emergency by NEC
In order for an incident to be an emergency, the NEC needs to approve the declaration to go into an
emergency. The NEC needs to have appropriate information on the situation, risks, impacts and strategy
being taken in order to be confident that declaring an emergency is appropriate. The approach taken by
each Distribution Network was different and highlighted that this process could be improved with more
guidelines on the types of information that the NEC may need.
Developing competence, skills & knowledge
In day to day activities and various real emergency incidents involving National Grid Gas Transmission and
the Distribution Networks, we see high levels of situational awareness, collaboration, technical expertise,
proactivity and decision making. At times during the CTC exercises, these attributes were not consistently
reflected in the performance on the day. It is important that the emergency exercise outputs are a true
reflection of actual operational capabilities; this requires the right people to be involved in the exercises
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 17
and for them to be fully committed. Where resources allow, shadowing can really help build experience
with newer members of staff whilst keeping the exercise on track with more experienced staff.
All subsequent exercises should include the presence of a network manager/control engineer, to ensure
an understanding of the operational impact of an incident on both NTS and DN networks and the
potential interactions, for example in terms of the impact of pressures on offtakes.
It is imperative that the right conversations are being held between National Grid Gas Transmission and
the Distribution Networks, so that all levels of the organisations are aware and understand the
importance of the emergency planning activities.
These activities reinforce the need for increased DN engagement with respect to emergency
preparedness. There needs to be a greater understanding of the role of NEC, particularly around Local
Gas Supply Emergencies and interdependent networks. We would like to work with the transporters to
ensure best practice is socialised, which could be aided by greater visibility of all transporters assurance
activities, and maximise benefits from training and exercising.
4.4. Summary of Recommendations
The following is a summary of the recommendations & actions from the text above:
Discuss potential for greater understanding of all transporters emergency assurance activities toenable best practice to be socialised, and maximum benefit achieved from all training andexercising.
To aid the exercise to meet its aims, clear and agreed objectives for the exercise should be agreed
between National Grid Gas Transmission and the Distribution Networks and where possible this
should be complemented by an increased level of joint planning and dialogue at a range of levels
of seniority. Discuss the CTC exercises at NEC Safety Case Forum to agree an approach & level of
involvement.
Consider improvements for the NETMAN1 pro forma such that it covers the appropriate scope of
information for a CTC.
The approach taken by each Distribution Network in articulating the requirement for a CTC to be
called was different and highlighted that this process could be improved with more guidance on
the types of information that the NEC may need.
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 18
5. Distribution Network Firm Load Shedding Performance Exercise
5.1. Exercise Objectives
Test top 200 emergency contact detail validation per LDZ and conformance to comply to NEC
instruction
Test contact information and understanding of emergency obligations
Test standardised reporting developed for all DNs to drive consistency and deliver assurance to
HSE and NEC of ability to carry out NEC Firm Load Shedding (FLS) instructions
5.2. Exercise Scenario
All Distribution Network Operators have Safety Case obligations to maintain the contact details for the
top 200 sites (in terms of offtake size, largest first) so that they can be contacted in an emergency to
cease gas consumption and reduce LDZ demand. In order to assess the Distribution Network Operators
ability to contact the top 200 sites, each of the four Distribution Network Operators was requested to
undertake an emergency contact validation exercise during September and October 2015 to fully engage
with their top 200 supply point consumers per Local Distribution Zone (LDZ). This exercise validated the
emergency contact numbers whilst ensuring sites understood their legal obligations to comply with
instructions to cease gas consumption during an emergency. In addition the DNs were requested to
engage with the supplementary transporters to test communication and compliance objectives.
Successful emergency management requires prompt contact with large gas consumers and it should be
expected that these consumers have at least a basic understanding of their obligations should a real
emergency occur. Feedback from previous exercises suggested that limited time was provided to DNs
during the NEC exercise to undertake their communications test. Separating out this exercise from the
main NEC exercise allowed DNs more time to undertake this activity, providing for richer conversations
with gas consumers and better information gathering.
Representatives from National Grid Gas Transmission and the DN meet on a quarterly basis at the E3
Alignment Group to ensure emergency procedures are aligned and collaboration at these meetings led to
an agreed set of statistics that would be gathered during these exercises and used going forwards to
benchmark the performance of this activity on an annual basis. National Grid Gas Transmission also
produced a best practice letter that was issued by the DNs to their LDZ’s top 200 sites during September
2015, detailing objectives within an emergency and requesting compliance to instructions to cease taking
gas and to provide emergency contact details prior to the exercise. It is believed that the letter aided the
success of the FLS calls, and should be used in subsequent years.
5.3. Observations & Results
Each of the four Distribution Network Operators was requested to carry out their own firm load shedding
exercises separately to the main NEC Industry Exercise. This activity was separated out from the main
exercise to allow operators more time to make contact with sites and produce a full set of contact
statistics for comparison to recent previous attempts to contact the top 200 sites. The NEC requested
specific demand reduction volumes from each LDZ and the post exercise reporting focussed on the ability
to shed the requested volume rather than the ability to contact the top 200 sites.
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 19
The following analysis focuses on the performance regarding the three key measures of contact success
of:
Number of sites where contact was made and site would stop using gas
Number of sites where contact was made and site would not stop using gas
Number of sites who could not be contacted
Table 3 shows the performance regarding the three key measures for the last five NEC Exercises.
Table 3: Sites contacted during the last five NEC Exercises
No of sitesattempted tobe contacted
No of sites wherecontact was made and
site would stop using gas
No of sites where contactwas made and site would
not stop using gas
No of sites whocould not be
contacted
Wolf 2015 2725 1895 70% 450 17% 380 14%
Viper 2014 2493 1637 66% 282 11% 574 23%
Ulysses 2013 1673 920 55% 250 15% 503 30%
Titan 2012 1229 904 74% 134 11% 191 16%
Saffron 2011 2587 1872 72% 193 7% 522 20%
As can be seen from the above table, from Exercise Viper to Exercise Wolf:
Number of sites attempted to be contacted has increased.
More sites were successfully contacted, though there are still a significant number of sites that
could not be contacted.
There has been a large increase in number of sites that would not stop taking gas when
contacted.
It is positive that the number of sites being successfully contacted is increasing; however, there are still a
substantial number of sites who could not be contacted.
It is concerning that the proportion of sites that would not stop taking gas in line with their obligations has
increased. This increase may reflect the performance of sites that have not been contacted as frequently
in the past given the increase in the number of sites being successfully contacted this year.
In advance of the 2015 DN Firm Load Shedding exercises, the E3 alignment group agreed a common
template for capturing data from the exercise including any reasons given by sites that said they would
not stop taking gas to enable further analysis. The standard template has been used but the data
collected has not unfortunately enabled any meaningful analysis of the reasons why sites would not stop
taking gas.
For further breakdowns of the data, please see Appendix 3; some specific breakdowns of performance by
DN, shipper and in volume terms are shown below.
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 20
Analysis by Distribution Network
Further breakdowns of the data can be found in Appendix 3, and a summary of performance by LDZ can
be seen below:
Figure 2: LDZ firm load shedding contact summary for Exercise Wolf
There was some variation across the DNs in the split between the three performance measures, in
particular;
National Grid Distribution contacted more than 200 sites per LDZ as they chose to continue
contacting sites until the scheduled exercise time was exhausted. Their results show a very low
number of sites who could not be contacted, compared to other DNs, but a much higher number
of sites where contact was made and the sites would not stop using gas, which is an increase from
the previous year.
Northern Gas Networks performance for these measures has improved when compared to the
previous year, in particular there was a substantial increase in the percentage of sites where
contact was made and site would stop using gas.
Scotia Gas Networks has virtually no sites where contact was made and the site would not stop
using gas. This performance may well be related to site engagement activities undertaken
throughout the year by SGN and is similar to the previous year’s performance.
Wales and West Utilities’ performance has improved from last year, with a substantial increase in
the proportion of sites where contact was made and site would stop using gas.
There is significant variation in performance across the DNs. Discussing and comparing current
procedures and practices, such as call scripts could enable best practices to be identified and
implemented across the DNs. Whilst the number of sites where contact was made and where the site
would stop using gas has increased, the number of sites where contact was made and site would not stop
using gas has increased significantly. Unfortunately the data gathered during the NEC Exercise is not
0 50 100 150 200 250
East AngliaEast MidlandsNorth London
North WestWest Midlands
NorthernYorkshire NE
ScotlandSouth East
SouthernSouth West
Wales NorthWales South
NG
DN
GN
SGN
WW
U
No of sites where contact was made and site would stop using gas
No of sites where contact was made and site would not stop using gas
No of sites who could not be contacted
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 21
sufficiently detailed to enable identification of the underlying causes of sites’ responses.
The E3 Alignment Group provides the ideal platform for developing a robust action plan to ensure the
right data is captured from the most appropriate forms of engagement with sites. This plan should
include steps to improve both the accuracy of emergency contact details and the customers’ compliance
to comply with reduction instructions.
Analysis by shipper
Shippers are obligated to ensure that emergency contact details are up to date for the sites in their
portfolio and are provided to the transporter in line with Section Q of UNC. Further, if the Distribution
Network are unable to contact the sites, the shipper is required to co-operate with and enable the
Distribution Network to take the steps required under its emergency procedures. The below chart shows
the firm load shedding performance from when the DNs contacted the sites aggregated by shipper.
Figure 3: LDZ firm load shedding contact summary for Exercise Wolf split by shipper
The figure above shows that there is significant variation in performance across the sites of different
Shippers, with over 40% of the sites of one Shipper were either uncontactable or said that if instructed
they would not stop taking gas during the exercise.
Analysis by System Offtake Quantity
The table below shows the volume of gas associated with the sites that were successfully contacted and
said that they would stop using gas if directed from the load shedding exercises.
Table 4: System Offtake Quantity associated with calls
Total SystemOfftake
Quantity (SOQ)(kWh)
Total SOQwhere contactmade and site
would stopusing gas
Percentagedifference
Total Wolf 2015 582,324,768 486,047,005 83%
Total Viper 2014 624,159,859 527,284,627 84%
Total Ulysses 2013 486,257,706 363,296,073 75%
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 22
Total Titan 2012 597,561,961 509,823,472 88%
Total Saffron 2011 89,353,982 63,982,397 88%
Whilst Table 3 showed that during Exercise Wolf only 70% of all sites were contactable and agreed to
cease gas consumption, Table 4 shows these sites represented 83% of the total offtake volume for all sites
where contact was attempted which provides positive assurance to the NEC that significant volumes of
LDZ demand can be isolated securely.
UNC modification 0428 – Disaggregation of sites, appears to have had little impact of Firm Load Shedding
performance. E3 Alignment Group provides the most appropriate place to discuss any further impacts
from this modification as they arise.
5.4. Summary of Recommendations
The following is a summary of the recommendations & actions from the text above:
Distribution Networks with support from National Grid Gas Transmission’s Emergency PlanningTeam to identify reasons for differences in performance, highlight best practice and develop anaction plan focused on improving DN firm load shedding performance via the E3 AlignmentGroup.
Discuss how best to capture reasons given by sites that said they would not stop taking gas toenable this key area of performance to be reviewed at future E3 Alignment Group meetings.
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 23
6. Conclusions & Summary of Recommendations
Undertaking emergency exercises is central to ensuring that the gas industry remains committed to
continuous improvement of its safety critical emergency processes. The annual NEC Exercise is a
requirement under the NEC Safety Case and GS(M)R and remains a critical annual focal point for all UK gas
industry participants to test their own emergency processes.
This year a number of different exercise elements helped to focus participants on specific areas of the
emergency process and procedures. The main NEC Industry Exercise (Exercise Wolf) was scheduled for
October (to avoid EU gas day change work in September) and the four CTC exercises were scheduled to
take place throughout the year. Only three were completed within 2015, and whilst this has not had a
material impact on levels of assurance, lessons have been learned around the planning, scheduling and
timing of exercises.
The main themes that run through the recommendations for Exercise Wolf are:
Updating and improving standard work templates and practises Industry exercising and engagement Training Continuing to request feedback and actioning this where appropriate
Following feedback from the exercise, there are some specific areas where our standard templates or
processes would benefit from being reviewed to further aid clear communication or prompt decision
making.
To strive for continuous improvement in our assurance from our emergency planning activities will
require us to continue to focus on ensuring our training and exercising activities provide the right people
with the right skills and experience to be able to provide the right answers and equally ask the right
questions. The exercises need to create a realistic emergency environment, to effectively test our abilities
to focus on the key risks and challenges in a timely manner, to articulate and communicate them
succinctly and to be able to develop the appropriate emergency strategies and to understand the scale of
the consequences.
In order to develop the right levels of situational awareness, decision making and strategy development
capabilities requires excellent engagement between all key parties. The main NEC exercise and the
smaller DN exercises (such as the CTCs in 2015) can help develop these areas, and the continuous
improvement of engagement across transporters to better understand each other’s risks and issues will
be a key focus for 2016.
Whilst this year’s success levels for DN emergency contact performance has improved, the increase in the
proportion of sites unwilling to stop taking gas when instructed means there is still further work to
consider how to improve performance. Maintaining correct contact data is an ongoing task for emergency
planning teams, but one that can be supported by all industry participants through regular engagement
and reminding the industry of their legal obligations in this area.
An overview of the 28 key recommendations made throughout this report is provided below:
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 24
Table 7: Exercise Wolf – Summary of Recommendations
No. RecommendationTargetDate
Owner
1Consider further standard templates and simple visual management to aidTechnical Secretary role, situational awareness and strategy articulation.
October2017
NGG NTS
2Investigate use of standard templates and simple visual management to supportsituational awareness of the NEMT officers & their teams
October2017
NGG NTS
3Consider where more desktop exercises can be used within our training to furtheraid development and learning.
Ongoing NGG NTS
4
Where opportunities allow, share experiences with other teams in emergencymanagement sector to share best practice and support our development oftraining and exercising.
OngoingNGG NTS &
others
5
Explore further the human behavioural aspects of working in pressured situationsto see if any appropriate tools and techniques may be available to support theNEMT.
October2017
NGG NTS
6Review the steps from strategy decision making and getting notifications toindustry to see if this process can be simplified or clarified.
By nextNEC
IndustryExercise
NGG NTS
7Look at handover for NEMT roles to improve continuity and increaseeffectiveness.
By nextNEC
IndustryExercise
NGG NTS
8
The NEMT Supply Team training to be further developed on how to use the (GasAvailability Status) GAS portal and where feasible consider Summer GAS portalexercises with DECC and terminals.
By nextNEC
IndustryExercise
& Ongoing
NGG NTS
9 Work with DECC to improve information sharing templates to aid communications
By nextNEC
IndustryExercise
NG NTS
10
Review how allocation and isolation data is captured to ensure that the forms arefit for purpose and capture all necessary information to aid effective strategydevelopment and communication of agreed allocation and isolation plans.
By nextNEC
IndustryExercise
NGG NTS
11
Review the NEC declaration forms so that they provide a clearer, strongerarticulation of the emergency to aid prompt appropriate responses to thedeclaration.
By nextNEC
IndustryExercise
NGG NTS
12Develop a pre-prepared message to alert the market of the implications of anyimpending emergency Stage 3 declaration.
By nextNEC
IndustryExercise
NGG NTS
13
Hold follow up conversations with specific sites to improve understanding anddiscuss potential improvements to NTS Direct Connect Firm Load Sheddingperformance.
By nextNEC
IndustryExercise
NGG NTS
14Future NEC Exercise design should consider including some pre-emergencycommercial strategy where appropriate for the scenario being exercised.
Ongoing NGG NTS
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 25
15
Seek to maintain ENCC involvement in exercises where appropriate to helpenhance understanding of how the control to further build up our commonunderstanding and experience of the interactions between gas & electricitycontrol rooms & incident management teams prior to emergency declaration.
Ongoing NGG NTS
16Consider whether any future pre-emergency workshops or exercises wouldbenefit from appropriate involvement from industry
Ongoing NGG NTS
17
Discuss potential for greater understanding of all transporters emergencyassurance activities to enable best practice to be socialised, and maximum benefitachieved from all training and exercising.
By nextNEC
IndustryExercise
& Ongoing
E3 AlignmentGroup
18Discuss the CTC exercises at NEC Safety Case Forum to agree an approach & levelof involvement.
By nextCTC
Exercise
NEC SafetyCase Forum
19Consider improvements for the NETMAN1 pro forma such that it covers theappropriate scope of information for a CTC.
By nextNEC
IndustryExercise
NGG NTS workwith DNs
(E3 AlignmentGroup)
20
The approach taken by each Distribution Network in articulating the requirementfor a CTC to be called was different and highlighted that this process could beimproved with more guidance on the types of information that the NEC may need.
By nextNEC
IndustryExercise
NGG NTS workwith DNs
(E3 AlignmentGroup)
21
Distribution Networks with support from National Grid Gas Transmission’sEmergency Planning Team to identify reasons for differences in performance,highlight best practice and develop an action plan focused on improving DN firmload shedding performance via the E3 Alignment Group.
OngoingE3 Alignment
Group
22
Discuss how best to capture reasons given by sites that said they would not stoptaking gas to enable this key area of performance to be reviewed at future E3Alignment Group meetings.
By nextDN FLS
Exercise
E3 AlignmentGroup
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 26
Appendix 1: Exercise Wolf scenario
Starting Position
The scenario uses base data from 2nd February 2015 which was the highest NTS demand day from the
last two years (357mcm demand). Picking a specific real day for the base data has enabled the network
analysis across all gas transporters involved in the exercise to align. The scenario then overlays a number
of operational events and issues
• The gas day opening linepack: 352mscm with an end of day linepack target of 354mcm
Events in the run up to Exercise Wolf
• Predicted Closing Linepack (PCLP) was initially 44mscm lower than opening linepack following the
previous day’s supply loss at St Fergus Shell (Offshore issue) and St Fergus was not forecasting to
be able to recover beyond a 15mcm rate following the previous day’s issues.
• The last few days have been cold with current demand at a high of 357mcm. The Met Office has
issued weather warnings for much of the UK with potential severe weather warnings for the
South East, with localised freezing fog expected throughout the morning. The problem is being
worsened by Europe’s cold snap with wind-chill from strengthening cold winds coming in from
Scandinavia.
• Pressures forecasts at start of day are achievable, intermittent compressor problems have been
seen over the past few days.
Time Events & Issues Market response NTS actions & status
06:30 A loss of Norwegian supplies toSt Fergus was notified
There was minimal marketand physical response tothe change in supplies.
Localised commercialconstraint and networkreconfiguration actioncompleted.
07:00 St Fergus terminal experienced afire and complete shut downwith the plant expected to be onoutage for a number of days.
07:45 A loss of Easington suppliesresulted in a further supplyreduction and left balance203mcm below target at 09:00,estimated outage time of anumber of days.
Increase market responseand Medium RangeStorage (MRS) balancingfollowing industrynotifications.
National commercialconstraint and networkreconfiguration actioncompleted.
EU prices started to rise aboveUK prices.
I(UK) reporting reversedflow following colderweather in Europe from9mcm supply to 35mcmdemand
NTS Strategy reviewIncident team mobilisedGDW issuedNotifications sent to industryNTS reconfigurationsNational commercialconstraint actions takenNEC approval sought foremergency declaration
09:00 Start of Exercise Wolf Following market response& actions taken, linepackchange was -90mcm lessthan target for the gas day.
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 27
Focus areas in Exercise Wolf by day
Exercise Wolf Day 1(14th October)
9am: Declare emergency, based on scenario using details from CommercialStrategy exercise (held on 16th Sept) with a focus on emergency stages 1 & 2 andDECC upstream engagement.Stage 1 (potential): NTS Linepack Usage Distribution Network Co-operation & Storage Usage GS(M)R Gas Specification consideration (not tested in this exercise)
Stage 2 National Grid suspends participation in OCM (not CTC) Maximise NTS Supplies NTS Firm Load Shedding (Note: DN Firm load shedding data from DN exercise in September also
included within scenario)
Exercise Wolf Day 2(15th October)
In order to enable the exercise to cover further stages of an emergency within the2 days of the exercise, for the purposes of the exercise it was assumed some timehad elapsed and storage stocks had reduced.Emergency Stage 3: Distribution Network allocation & isolation Public Appeals (not tested in this exercise)
The aims was to move this more to focus on NGGT & DN interactions withapproximately one third of domestic demand isolated and DECC downstreamengagement.
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 28
Appendix 2: NEC Industry Exercise - further detail & data
A2.1 Documentation
Further information on the arrangements available to the NEC during a potential or actual NGSE is
described in the Procedure for Network Gas Supply Emergency (reference T/PM/E/1). An up to date copy
of this procedure can be obtained from the National Grid Emergency Planning Team (contact details for
the Emergency Planning Team are provided in Section 9 of this report) or via the National Grid website
referenced in Section 10.
The E1 procedure is complimented by National Grid’s own internal emergency procedure. This is the
Management Procedure for Gas National Control Centre Response to Gas Supply Emergencies (Ref
T/PM/GNCC/E/3), often referred to as the “E3” Procedure. This procedure details the Network Emergency
Management Team (NEMT) actions in response to a developing emergency including forms and task cards
for driving efficient management of NTS supply and demand and was tested throughout Exercise Wolf.
A2.2 Online survey results
Every year we seek feedback from stakeholders regarding the effectiveness of the NEC Industry Exercise.
This year we sent an on-line survey to all participants to facilitate ease of response. The survey results
provide quantitative and qualitative feedback. Figures 4 and 5 provide a high level summary of the
quantitative results from the survey.
So that we can compare results from year to year, we have taken an average of all of the scores given to
each the questions asked within the survey.
Figure A1 shows stakeholders’ answers to the question: “How beneficial was Exercise Wolf in testing the
Network Gas Supply Emergency procedures?” This provides a useful high level summary of the views of
stakeholders regarding the overall benefit of the NEC Industry Exercise.
Figure A2.1: Online survey response to question: “How beneficial was Exercise Wolf in testing the
Network Gas Supply Emergency procedures?”
The question allowed stakeholders to select one of five answers ranging from “No benefit at all” to
“Extremely beneficial”. Over 85% of responders answered that the Exercise had been beneficial or very
beneficial.
How beneficial was Exercise Wolf in testing the Network
Gas Supply Emergency procedures (as detailed in
T/PM/E/1)?
3.28
1 2 3 4 5
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 29
Figure A2.2 Stakeholders’ answers to the other quantitative questions.
The vast majority of responses were within the good and very good categories, with very few
stakeholders providing poor or neutral responses. Quality stakeholder engagement is critical to provide a
platform for delivering continuous improvement with respect to ensuring emergency arrangements are
robust and duty holders are cognisant of their responsibilities. These results provide a useful reference
point to benchmark subsequent exercises and will enable the Emergency Planning Team to track whether
our NEC Exercise is delivering year on year continuous improvement.
A2.3 NTS Firm Load shedding results
A key activity in Stage 2 of an NGSE emergency is firm load shedding (FLS). The NEC Industry Exercise
tested the performance of loads directly connected to the NTS when directed to cease taking gas. All NTS
directly connected sites were to be contacted during Exercise Wolf. In total, 54 sites were involved and all
of these sites were contactable and confirmed they would be able to cease gas consumption with a given
lead time.
The task of contacting NTS directly connected sites is managed by the Shipper Team within the NEMT. A
total of 5 people undertook this task and all sites were contacted, issued directions over the phone,
issued a GS(M)R fax notification and all details noted in the curtailment log in a total of 2 hours 8 minutes.
This level of performance is considered satisfactory.
Adherence to correct procedures during each stage of
the emergency exercise?3.22
Use of correct notification method according to
procedures?2.86
Clarity of actions issued during the exercise? 3.15
Clarity and conciseness of emergency procedures? 3.11
Level of resource available to implement the required
actions?3.17
Suitability of communication methods? 2.9
1 2 3 4
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 30
Figure A3: NTS Direct Connect firm load shedding call contact times and time to curtailment
The red lines show the time taken between a site being contacted to cease taking gas and the time the
site would actually cease taking gas.
The task strategy adopted was to ensure all sites were contacted and to ascertain whether they would
cease taking gas: a strategy of largest load first or network pressure related was not chosen. Whilst the
overall level of performance is considered satisfactory, Figure A3 shows a significant variation in the time
taken for sites to cease taking gas. The variation can be more clearly seen in Figure A4 below.
Figure A4: NTS Direct Connect firm load shedding: time taken from call to curtailment
10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00
1
6
11
16
21
26
31
36
41
46C
um
ula
tive
site
s
time from contact to curtailment
00:00 01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00
1
6
11
16
21
26
31
36
41
46
Cu
mu
lati
vesi
tes
time to curtailment
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 31
The chart shows that while a small percentage of sites require several hours to cease taking gas, the
average time taken is less than 50 minutes, with over half the sites able to cease taking gas in less than 30
minutes. A more detailed understanding of the underlying reasons for certain sites taking many times
longer than the average would be beneficial, for example is the delay due to safety or process related
factors, and to explore whether there is any opportunity to improve performance by considering partial
load curtailment.
Figure A5: NTS Direct Connect firm load shedding – volume of gas curtailed
Figure A5 shows that over 60 mcm of NTS directly connected load was curtailed.
A2.4 Automated mass communication results
The following table provides an overview of the main mass communications sent to industry using the Fax
and ANS replacement system that was introduced prior to NEC Exercise Viper in 2014.
Table A1: NEMT Communications
Table 2 shows that 91% of SMS messages (shown as ANS (Active Notification System) in the table) were
successfully delivered: this is slightly lower than the 95% for Exercise Viper. This highlights the need to
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
10:00 11:12 12:24 13:36 14:48 16:00 17:12 18:24
Vo
lum
eo
fga
scu
rtai
led
(mcm
)
Time
Communication Time Sent Type Total sent
Emergency declaration 1/2 fax 10:03 FAX 250 73% 27%
Day 1 initial Fax 10:05 FAX 250 73% 27%
Start of exercise ANS 10:09 ANS 121 91% 9%
GS(M)R Shipper notice 10:22 FAX 124 78% 22%
NEC Form with contacts 11:12 FAX 250 72% 28%
Storage flow notification 11:32 FAX 136 76% 24%
Terminal LNG notification 11:43 FAX 154 77% 23%
NEC 1 14:30 FAX 253 73% 27%
NEC End of Day 1 15:48 FAX 253 74% 26%
Start of D2 09:10 FAX 253 76% 24%
Day 2 initial Fax 12:12 FAX 253 77% 23%
NGSE 3 NEC Stage 3 Notification 12:53 FAX 253 77% 23%
NEC Stage 3 Notification 12:56 ANS 121 91% 9%
NEC Declaration End Of Exercise 15:40 FAX 253 77% 23%
NGSE 4 End Of Exercise 15:44 ANS 121 91% 9%
Successful Delivery Unsuccessful Delivery
0% 50% 100% 0% 50% 100%
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 32
continue regular testing and cleansing of all shipper contact details outside of the NEC Exercise. Roughly
75% of all faxes were successfully delivered, which is similar to the levels seen within Viper.
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 33
Appendix 3: Individual Distribution Network Firm Load Shedding Exercise -
further detail & data
Each of the four Distribution Network Operators was requested to carry out their own firm load shedding
exercises separately to the main NEC Industry Exercise. This activity was separated out from the main
exercise to allow operators more time to make contact with sites and produce a full set of contact
statistics for comparison to recent previous attempts to contact the top 200 sites in 2010 (Exercise
Revive), 2011 (Exercise Saffron) and 2014 (Exercise Viper). During Exercise Titan (2012) and Exercise
Ulysses (2013) the NEC requested specific demand reduction volumes from each LDZ and the post
exercise reporting focussed on the ability to shed the requested volume rather than the ability to contact
the top 200 sites.
The following analysis focuses on the performance regarding the three key measures of contact success
of:
Number of sites where contact was made and site would stop using gas
Number of sites where contact was made and site would not stop using gas
Number of sites who could not be contacted
Table A3.1 shows the performance regarding the three key measures for the last five NEC Exercises.
Table A3.1: Sites contacted during the last five NEC Exercises
No of sitesattemptedto becontacted
No of siteswhere contact
was made
No of sites wherecontact was made
and site would stopusing gas
No of sites wherecontact was madeand site would not
stop using gas
No of sites whocould not be
contacted
Wolf 2015 2725 2345 86% 1895 70% 450 17% 380 14%
Viper 2014 2493 1919 77% 1637 66% 282 11% 574 23%
Ulysses 2013 1673 1170 70% 920 55% 250 15% 503 30%
Titan 2012 1229 1038 84% 904 74% 134 11% 191 16%
Saffron 2011 2587 2065 80% 1872 72% 193 7% 522 20%
As can be seen from Table 3, from Exercise Viper to Exercise Wolf:
Number of sites attempted to be contacted increased to 2725 from 2345
Number of sites where contact was made and site would stop using gas increased to 1895 from
1637 (and increased as a percentage of sites where contact was made)
Number of sites where contact was made and site would not stop using gas increased to 450 from
282 (and increased as a percentage of sites where contact was made)
Number of sites who could not be contacted reduced to 380 from 574 (and reduced as a
percentage of number of sites contacted)
The following two figures give a visual representation of the data.
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 34
Figure A3.1: Firm load shedding contact summary (numeric) for last 5 NEC exercises
Figure 9 clearly shows the reduced number of sites contacted during Exercises Titan (2012) and Ulysses
(2013) as the NEC requested specific demand reduction volumes from each LDZ, resulting in less than 200
sites being contacted for each LDZ. Exercise Wolf results show an increase (in numeric terms) in the
number of sites where contact was made and the sites would stop using gas, compared to Exercise Viper,
and reduced numbers of sites who could not be contacted, but an increase in the number of sites where
contact was made and the site would not stop using gas.
Figure A3.2: Firm load shedding contact summary (percentage) for last 5 NEC exercises
Figure A3.2 shows that Exercise Wolf results show an increase in the percentage of sites where contact
was made and the sites would stop using gas, compared to Exercise Viper, and nearly as high as the levels
seen in Saffron and Titan. The percentage of sites that could not be contacted is the lowest seen across
the five exercises, but there is an increase in the percentage of sites where contact was made and the site
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
Saffron 2011
Titan 2012
Ulysses 2013
Viper 2014
Wolf 2015
No of sites where contact was made and site would stop using gas
No of sites where contact was made and site would not stop using gas
No of sites who could not be contacted
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Saffron 2011
Titan 2012
Ulysses 2013
Viper 2014
Wolf 2015
% of sites where contact was made and site would stop using gas
% of sites where contact was made and site would not stop using gas
% of sites who could not be contacted
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 35
would not stop using gas. This is clearly an area that requires further investigation.
The following table breaks the data shown in Table A3.2 by individual LDZ.
Table A3.2: Comparison of LDZ firm load shedding performance
The following two figures give a visual representation of the data shown in Table A3.2 for Exercise Wolf
only.
Figure A3.3: LDZ firm load shedding contact summary (numeric) for Exercise Wolf
There are a number of observations to be drawn from Figure A3.3. National Grid Distribution contacted
more than 200 sites per LDZ: this was intentional as the decision was made to continue contacting sites
until the scheduled exercise time was exhausted. Another observation is the variation across DNs in the
split between the three performance measures. For example National Grid Distribution shows a very low
number of sites who could not be contacted, compared to other DNs, but a much higher number of sites
where contact was made and the sites would not stop using gas. Another observation is that Scotia Gas
Networks has virtually no sites where contact was made and the site would not stop using gas. This
DN LDZ
Saffron Viper Wolf Saffron Viper Wolf Saffron Viper Wolf Saffron Viper Wolf
East Anglia 184 145 241 68% 88% 66% 8% 5% 26% 23% 8% 9%
East Midlands 200 171 213 69% 81% 77% 7% 4% 20% 25% 16% 4%
North London 200 201 221 61% 82% 62% 6% 5% 29% 33% 13% 8%
North West 200 173 217 69% 79% 76% 6% 1% 22% 26% 20% 2%
West Midlands 200 201 231 66% 76% 71% 3% 0% 27% 31% 23% 3%
Northern 198 201 201 54% 46% 65% 23% 27% 14% 25% 27% 20%
Yorkshire NE 200 201 201 60% 39% 64% 1% 31% 13% 40% 30% 23%
Scotland 200 199 200 86% 85% 67% 7% 0% 3% 7% 15% 30%
South East 200 200 200 81% 62% 75% 11% 0% 0% 9% 39% 25%
Southern 200 201 200 73% 74% 83% 10% 0% 1% 17% 26% 17%
South West 200 200 200 88% 56% 64% 6% 21% 19% 6% 24% 18%
Wales North 200 200 200 84% 45% 68% 7% 29% 21% 10% 27% 11%
Wales South 203 200 200 82% 53% 68% 5% 22% 15% 12% 26% 18%
Total 2585 2493 2725 72% 66% 70% 8% 11% 17% 20% 23% 14%
Percentage of sites who could not
be contacted
Percentage of sites where contact
was made and site would not
stop using gas
NGD
NGN
SGN
WWU
No of sites attempted to be
contacted
Percentage of sites where contact
was made and site would stop
using gas
0 50 100 150 200 250
East Anglia
East Midlands
North London
North West
West Midlands
Northern
Yorkshire NE
Scotland
South East
Southern
South West
Wales North
Wales South
NG
DN
GN
SGN
WW
U
No of sites where contact was made and site would stop using gas
No of sites where contact was made and site would not stop using gas
No of sites who could not be contacted
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 36
improved performance may well be related to site engagement activities undertaken throughout the year
by SGN. These observations can also be seen in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: LDZ firm load shedding contact summary (percentage) for Exercise Wolf
Table A3.3 shows DN performance regarding the three key measures for NEC Exercises Saffron, Viper and
Wolf.
Table A3.3: Comparison of DN firm load shedding performance (percentage)
To aid interpretation, the statistics in Table 5 are shown in the four charts in Figure A3.5.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
East Anglia
East Midlands
North London
North West
West Midlands
Northern
Yorkshire NE
Scotland
South East
Southern
South West
Wales North
Wales South
NG
DN
GN
SGN
WW
U
Percentage of sites where contact was made and site would stop using gas
Percentage of sites where contact was made and site would not stop using gas
Percentage of sites who could not be contacted
LDZ
Saffron Viper Wolf Saffron Viper Wolf Saffron Viper Wolf Saffron Viper Wolf
NGD 984 891 1123 67% 81% 70% 6% 3% 25% 28% 16% 5%
NGN 398 402 402 57% 43% 64% 12% 29% 14% 33% 29% 22%
SGN 600 600 600 80% 74% 75% 9% 0% 1% 11% 27% 24%
WWU 603 600 600 85% 51% 67% 6% 24% 18% 9% 26% 15%
Total 2585 2493 2725 72% 66% 70% 8% 11% 17% 20% 23% 14%
Percentage of sites who could not
be contacted
No of sites attempted to be
contacted
Percentage of sites where contact
was made and site would stop
using gas
Percentage of sites where contact
was made and site would not
stop using gas
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 37
Figure A3.5: Comparison of DN firm load shedding performance
Figure A3.5 shows that there is significant variation from year to year and from Distribution Network to
Distribution Network. Each Distribution Network is covered in turn.
National Grid Distribution
The performance regarding the three key measurements for National Grid Distribution were mixed when
compared to those for Exercise Viper. The number of sites where contact was made and site would stop
using gas reduced, and the number of sites where contact was made and site would not stop using gas
increased significantly. With 25% of sites contacted unable to comply to the instruction to cease gas
consumption, recommendations should be made to improve this by reiterating the emergency obligations
to these sites.
On a positive note, the number of sites who could not be contacted reduced.
Northern Gas Networks
The performance regarding the three key measurements for Northern Gas Networks improved when
compared to those for Exercise Viper. The percentage of sites where contact was made and site would
stop using gas increased from 43% to 64%, and there were reductions in the percentage of sites where
contact was made and site would not stop using gas, and the percentage of sites who could not be
contacted.
SGN
The performance regarding the three key measurements for SGN were broadly similar to those seen for
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Saffron (2011) Viper (2014) Wolf (2015)
National Grid Distribution
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Saffron (2011) Viper (2014) Wolf (2015)
Northern Gas Networks
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Saffron (2011) Viper (2014) Wolf (2015)
Scotia Gas Networks
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Saffron (2011) Viper (2014) Wolf (2015)
Wales & West Utilities
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 38
Exercise Viper. The percentage of sites where contact was made and site would stop using gas is the
highest of the four DNs, with the percentage of sites where contact was made and site would not stop
using gas by far the lowest across the four DNs.
Wales and West Utilities
The performance regarding the three key measurements for Wales and West Utilities improved when
compared to those for Exercise Viper. The percentage of sites where contact was made and site would
stop using gas increased from 51% to 67%, and there were reductions in the percentage of sites where
contact was made and site would not stop using gas, and the percentage of sites who could not be
contacted.
Figure A3.6 shows performance regarding the three key measures of contact success for the last twelve
NEC Exercises.
Figure A3.6: LDZ firm load shedding contact summary for the last twelve NEC Exercises
Figure A3.6 shows that Exercise Wolf continues the recent positive trend started with Exercise Viper
following the dip in performance in Exercise Ulysses relative to Exercises Reform/Revive/Saffron/Titan.
Exercise Wolf shows increased percentage of sites where contact was made and site would stop using gas
and reduced percentage of sites who could not be contacted. There is however an increase in the
percentage of sites where contact was made and site would not stop using gas.
Site contact performance provides one measure of firm load shedding success, but it does not account for
the size of sites and therefore the potential volume of load shedding that could be achieved. Table 6
provides the SOQ (System Offtake Quantity) volume statistics associated for all sites where contact was
attempted during Exercise Wolf and the associated aggregate SOQ for sites where firm load shedding
contact was successful.
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Percentage of sites where contact was made and site would stop using gas
Percentage of sites where contact was made and site would not stop using gas
Percentage of sites who could not be contacted
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 39
Table A3.4: System Offtake Quantity
Total SOQ(kWh)
Total SOQwhere contactmade and site
would stopusing gas
Percentagedifference
Total Wolf 2015 582,324,768 486,047,005 83%
Total Viper 2014 624,159,859 527,284,627 84%
Total Ulysses 2013 486,257,706 363,296,073 75%
Total Titan 2012 597,561,961 509,823,472 88%
Total Saffron 2011 89,353,982 63,982,397 88%
Whilst Table A3.1 showed that during Exercise Wolf only 70% of all sites were contactable and able to
cease gas consumption, Table A3.4 shows these sites represented 83% of the total offtake volume for all
sites where contact was attempted which provides positive assurance to the NEC that significant volumes
of LDZ demand can be isolated securely.
Figure A3.7 provides a breakdown for Exercise Wolf by LDZ of the sites where contact was made but the
site would not stop using gas.
Figure A3.7: Exercise Wolf - LDZ split of sites where contact was made but site would not stop using gas
There is significant variation across LDZs in the number of sites where contact was made and the site
would not stop using gas. Figure A3.7 shows the same sites but split by shipper.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
No
.of
site
s
No of sites where contact was made and site would not stop using gas
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 40
Figure A3.7: LDZ firm load shedding contact summary for Exercise Wolf split by shipper
Figure A3.7 shows that whilst there is significant variation across Shippers in the number of sites where
contact was made and the site would not stop using gas, when viewed as a subset of the number of sites
attempted to be contacted for each Shipper, these sites represent a relatively consistent 10% to 20% of
the total.
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 41
Appendix 4: NEC Exercise Viper (2014) Recommendations & Updates
No. ActionTarget
DateOwner Status Comments & Updates
1
Firm Load Shedding statistics developed
via the E3 alignment group should be
gathered annually to enable consistency
when tracking and reporting on the
accuracy of emergency contact details.
By next
NEC
Exercise
E3
Alignm
ent
Group
CompleteFirm Load Shedding statistics were gathered in a
consistent format for NEC Industry Exercise Wolf.
2Desktop NEMT emergency exercises to
be scheduled more frequentlyOngoing EPT Complete Restated in Exercise Wolf Recommendations.
3
NETMAN1 requests should go out same
time as GAS report requests in any
potential GDE scenario.
Ongoing
E3
Alignm
ent
Group
Complete Network Manager Task Card updated.
4Ensure network analysis results utilised
in all future NEC exercises.
By next
NEC
Exercise
EPT Complete
Continue engagement with National Grid Gas
Transmission and Distribution Networks to
ensure that network analysis is central to
exercises (included in Exercise Wolf
Recommendations).
5
Update Technical Secretary task cards to
include internal NEMT situational report
management responsibilities.
April-15 EPT Complete
The Technical Secretary task card includes
guidance maintaining a list of the key actions
agreed within the NEMT meetings, including the
action owner and timescales for delivery. This list
can be distributed to the wider NEMT, making
sure individuals are aware of actions assigned to
each team.
6
Review support team task cards to
include NEMT resource management
and workload distribution
responsibilities.
April-15 EPT Complete
Support Team Task Card updated to continually
assess resourcing of NEMT teams to avoid staff
fatigue and redistribute the team resources as
required.
7
Predetermined messages for Shippers to
be included in the E3 emergency
procedure to request the most accurate
available nomination information to be
entered into Gemini ahead of
restoration.
April-15 EPT Ongoing
Messages to be created - action ongoing.
Messages will be tested in Restoration Workshop
or Emergency Curtailment Quantity End to End
testing (included in Exercise Wolf
Recommendations).
8
Guidelines to be included in the E3
emergency procedure to specify screens
within Gemini system that can be used
to report shipper balance information.
April-15 EPT Ongoing
Screens to be tested in Restoration Workshop or
Emergency Curtailment Quantity End to End
testing
9
Include Shipper Nomination and balance
elements as objectives in any future
restoration exercises.
Restorat
ion
Exercise
EPT Ongoing To be tested in Restoration Workshop
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 42
10
National Grid and DECC to compare
Terminal & Storage contact information
ensure the accuracy of critical
distribution lists
May-15EPT &
DECCComplete
Process forms part of the compliance to NEC
instruction and industry emergency contact
detail validations. EPT have included the DECC
contact emails into their .box contacts
11
National Grid and DECC to look into
possibility of hosting the GAS report on
the DECC online portal.
OngoingEPT &
DECCComplete
The portal is now operational having had two live
data tests: a small scale test with UAT and full
test during Exercise Wolf.
12
DECC to host annual pre-winter
workshops to serve as a refresher for UK
Gas Suppliers with respect to both
upstream and downstream emergency
procedures.
OngoingEPT &
DECCComplete
EPT and DECC to continue to expand engagement
via a range of meetings, workshops and
exercises.
13
Update Shipper Team task card to
provide for a single person to collect
faxes from callers and issue to ensure
callers can issue directions more rapidly.
April-15 EPT Complete
Shipper Team Task Card updated (Time saving
Tips section) with role specific training providing
the most efficient way of managing the call/fax
communications.
14
Continue development of situational
awareness and decision support tools to
aid the NEMT with a view to embedding
these fully prior to the 2015 NEC
Exercise.
Next
NEC
Exercise
EPT CompleteNew Emergency Data Support Tool, live and
replaces previous system.
15Include NEMT Officer shadowing in all
future NEC ExercisesOngoing EPT Complete
NEMT role shadowing to develop competency is
included in the NEC exercise plan.
16
Review all Terminal emergency fax
contact details uploaded to the new
mass fax communication system.
April-15 EPT Complete
Process forms part of the compliance to NEC
instruction and industry emergency contact
detail validations.
17
Improvements to LDZ critical offtake
pressure information request process to
be discussed and developed for
implementation via the E3 Alignment
Group
By next
CTC
Exercise
NGGT
& DNsOngoing
Ongoing discussions and review of post NEC
Exercise Viper CTC performance with each
Distribution Network, and further improvements
identified after Exercise Wolf CTCs (included in
Exercise Wolf Recommendations).
18
Up to date network maps and
schematics to be shared between all
transporters on an annual basis.
April-15
All
Transp
orters
CompleteNetwork maps shared on an ad-hoc basis as and
on request.
19Transporters to continue to undertake
CTC exercises on an annual basis.Ongoing
All
Transp
orters
Complete
CTC exercises scheduled with each Distribution
Network throughout summer 2015, and CTC
exercises included within 2016 Exercise Plan.
20
DNs to always ensure all 200 sites
contacted during firm load shedding
exercises every year
By Next
NEC
Exercise
All DNs Complete
Discussed and agreed within the SO Forum and
E3 Alignment Group. Performance to be
monitored on an annual basis post-NEC Exercise
(included in Exercise Wolf Recommendations).
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 43
21
Distribution network Operators and the
HSE should seek to set a benchmark for
site contact performance and measure
each LDZ against this benchmark in
future years to drive continuous and/or
stable performance.
Ongoing All DNs Closed
Following discussions with HSE, focus is now on
achieving continuous improvement, with DNs
and EPT to agree an action plan via E3 Alignment
Group (included in Exercise Wolf
Recommendations).
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 44
Appendix 5: Glossary & References
CTC Critical Transportation Constraint
DECC Department for Energy and Climate Change
DN Distribution Network
DNCCs Distribution Network Control Centres
DST Decision Support Tool
ENCC Electricity National Control Centre
ERT Emergency Response Team
GDE Gas Deficit Emergency
GNCC Gas National Control Centre
GNCC/E/3 Network Emergency Management Team’s Emergency Procedure
GS(M)R Gas Safety (Management) Regulations 1996
kWh Kilowatthour
LDZ Local Distribution Zone
LGSE Local Gas Supply Emergency
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
MCM Millions of Cubic Metres
MJ/m³ Megajoules per Cubic Metre
NEC Network Emergency Co-ordinator
NEMT Network Emergency Management Team
NGD National Grid Distribution
NGN Northern Gas Networks
NGSE Network Gas Supply Emergency
NTS National Transmission System
OGA Oil and Gas Authority
T/PM/E/1 Procedure for Network Gas Supply Emergency
SGN Scotia Gas Networks
SOQ System Offtake Quantity
UAT User Acceptance Testing
WWU Wales & West Utilities
National Grid’s Emergency Webpages:
http://www2.nationalgrid.com/UK/Industry-information/Gas-transmission-system-operations/Network-
Gas-Supply-Emergency/
National Grid’s System Management Principles Statement:
http://www2.nationalgrid.com/UK/Industry-information/Business-compliance/Procurement-and-System-
Management-Documents/
NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 45
Appendix 6: Feedback on Exercise Wolf Report
This report has been produced on behalf of the Network Emergency Coordinator by the National Grid
Emergency Planning Team. The Emergency Planning Team wishes to thank all the organisations who
participated in Exercise Wolf or who supplied information or recommendations for inclusion in this
report.
The Emergency Planning Team welcomes feedback on the NEC report on Exercise Wolf. Please forward
any comments on the report or suggestions for how future NEC exercises could be improved to the
Emergency Planning Team using the following contact details.
Emergency Planning TeamNetwork Capability and Operations, GasSystem OperatorNational GridNational Grid HouseWarwick Technology ParkWarwickCV34 6DA
Email address: [email protected]