In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific questions, did not in any way curb the publics right to information or diminish the importance of public accountability and transparency.This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. They could continue the investigation and even call petitioner Neri to testify again. He himself has repeatedly expressed his willingness to do so. Our Decision merely excludes from the scope of respondents investigation the three (3) questions that elicit answers covered by executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot be compelled to appear before respondents to answer the said questionsInChavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,40it was stated that there are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged. Nonetheless, it enumerated the recognized restrictions to such rights, among them: (1) national security matters, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information. National security matters include state secrets regarding military and diplomatic matters, as well as information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements.It was further held that even where there is no need to protect such state secrets, they must be "examined in strict confidence and given scrupulous protection."

Respondent Committees ardently argue that the Courts declaration that presidential communications are presumptively privileged reverses the "presumption" laid down inSenate v. Ermita11that "inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.Respondent Committees observation that this Courts Decision reversed the "presumption that inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure" arises from a piecemeal interpretation of the said Decision. The Court has repeatedly held that in order to arrive at the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its entirety.19Obviously, the last sentence of the above-quoted paragraph in Senate v. Ermita refers to the "exemption" being claimed by the executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, solely by virtue of their positions in the Executive Branch. This means thatwhen an executive official,who is one of those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464,claims to be exempt from disclosure, there can beno presumption of authorization to invoke executive privilege given by the Presidentto said executive official, such that the presumption in this situation inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.First, respondent Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan does not relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power," because the Constitution does not vest it in the President alone, but also in the Monetary Board which is required to give its prior concurrence and to report to Congress.The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less executive.The power to enter into an executive agreement is in essence an executive power. Now, the fact that the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the poweSecond, respondent Committees also seek reconsideration of the application of the "doctrine of operational proximity" for the reason that "it maybe misconstrued to expand the scope of the presidential communications privilege to communications between those who are operationally proximate to the President but who may have "no direct communications with her."In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a large swath of the executive branch" (a fear apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because the official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term "advisor" of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of her official family.Third, respondent Committees claim that the Court erred in upholding the Presidents invocation, through the Executive Secretary, of executive privilege because (a) between respondent Committees specific and demonstrated need and the Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality, there is a need to strike the balance in favor of the former; and (b) in the balancing of interest, the Court disregarded the provisions of the 1987 Philippine Constitution on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of informationIt must be stressed that the Presidents claim of executive privilege is not merely founded on her generalized interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita specifiedpresidential communications privilegein relation todiplomatic and economic relations with another sovereign nationas the bases for the claim.Even inSenate v. Ermita, it was held that Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect for a coordinate and co-equal department.