Neocons and neolibs?Their edifice has crumbled.

Chet RichardsJ. Addams & Partners,

Inc.December 2006

Are we facing a new form of warfare?

We don’t know – still being worked out. To be useful, it has to be something other than state military vs. state military or insurgency vs. a state. Possibilities include state vs. state (nonmilitary) and state vs. nonstate (other than classical insurgency).

Major Issues:

– Is it war? Is there anything wrong with calling it “war”?

– Regardless, how do we end these conflicts on favorable terms? Neocons and neolibs prescribe more military force. Is there an alternative?

Is it war?

Depends on what you mean.

For a long time, people didn’t want to call it “war,” using terms like “low-intensity conflict” and even “military operations other than war” (MOOTW).

Others, while granting that it might be war, don’t see anything different.

Now, however, a growing group of observers use labels like “fourth generation warfare” and “nontrinitarian warfare.” Nothing wrong with this, so long as we are specific in what we mean.

Is it important what we call it? Possibly, because how you view a situation may affect how you deal with it.

What would be wrong with calling it “war” if it really isn’t?

You might do counterproductive things. Like

thinking the military is the solution and then

outspending the rest of the world, combined

– in order to fight a rag-tag insurgency, militias, and criminal gangs.

Wall St. J., 20 Oct 2006

[Note: the Journal does not mention that defense spending even in inflation-adjusted dollars is now higher than it was during the Vietnam War. The percentage is lower because the economy has grown so much.]

Let’s go and fight us some insurgents

Solutions to insurgencies are largely political, which is why insurgencies get going in the first place.

In other words, an insurgency often arises as the solution to a larger problem.

– So why is our military budget equal to the rest of the world’s combined?

– Once things get so bad that a state has to ask for outside (read: gringo, infidel, kaffir, etc.) help, is there any chance?

– And as a revolutionary state ourselves, shouldn’t we be supporting the insurgency most of the time?

Let’s go and fight us some insurgents

Solutions to insurgencies are largely political, which is why insurgencies get going in the first place.

In other words, an insurgency often arises as the solution to a larger problem.

– So why is our military budget equal to the rest of the world’s combined?

– Once things get so bad that a state has to ask for outside (read: gringo, infidel, kaffir, etc.) help, is there any chance?

– And as a revolutionary state ourselves, shouldn’t we be supporting the insurgency most of the time?

Action

Undermine guerrilla cause and destroy their cohesion by demonstrating integrity and competence of government to represent and serve needs of people—rather than exploit and impoverish them for the benefit of a greedy elite.*

Take political initiative to root out and visibly punish corruption. Select new leaders with recognized competence as well as popular appeal. Ensure that they deliver justice, eliminate grievances and connect government with grass roots.*

Infiltrate guerrilla movement as well as employ population for intelligence about guerrilla plans, operations, and organization.

yadda, yadda, …

___________

* If you cannot realize such a political program, you might consider changing sides!

Perhaps we can glean something from counter-guerrilla warfare

John R. Boyd, Patterns of Conflict, Chart 108

“Becau

se it’

s a lo

t more

fun to

be on

the w

inning

side!”

~ John

Boyd

Think the first two bullets are easy?(a sample from the new C/I manual)

1-118. … Commanders and staffs must continually diagnose what they understand legitimacy to mean to the HN population. The population’s expectations will influence all ensuing operations.

1-120. Military action can address the symptoms of a loss of legitimacy. In some cases, it can eliminate substantial numbers of insurgents. However, success in the form of a durable peace requires restoring legitimacy, which, in turn, requires the use of all instruments of national power. A COIN effort cannot achieve lasting success without the HN government achieving legitimacy. (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, pp. 1-21, 22).

Conclusion: Counterinsurgency is a losing – lost – game.

1-118. … Commanders and staffs must continually diagnose what they understand legitimacy to mean to the HN population. The population’s expectations will influence all ensuing operations.

1-120. Military action can address the symptoms of a loss of legitimacy. In some cases, it can eliminate substantial numbers of insurgents. However, success in the form of a durable peace requires restoring legitimacy, which, in turn, requires the use of all instruments of national power. A COIN effort cannot achieve lasting success without the HN government achieving legitimacy. (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, pp. 1-21, 22).

• How does a foreign army of occupation restore “legitimacy” to a government?

What do soldiers know about restoring legitimacy?

What does anybody?

• How will locals feel about being the recipients of “all instruments” of US national power?

• Wouldn’t it be better to be on the winning side, occasionally?

If you cannot realize such a political program, you might consider changing sides!

Neocons & neolibs: Use military force to make a better world.

Reality, though, intrudes:

• Enemy military forces are the least of our problems.

• Occupations are unpredictable in result, but always expensive:

–nationalism, tribalism, sectarianism, etc.

–resistance via guerrilla warfare is inevitable.

• We never fund reconstruction adequately.

• And then there’s corruption.If you invade and destroy an existing state, nobody may be able to build it back. Bill Lind.

However, nonmilitary offensives are possible

Developed world must combine:

– patience,

– judicious use of military force, primarily for containment and the occasional insurgency,

– police and intelligence initiatives,

with strong preemptive incentives:

– financial

– commercial

– political

– diplomatic

– personal

where we really are a superpower, for a while at least

What’s going to happen to armies?

Distinctions between war and crime will break down (204) as will the difference between armed forces and civilians (194)

Battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings and massacres

Intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the civilian population, and extreme dispersion have become the norm (208) The problem of subversion is likely to be serious (211)

Much of the task of defending society against nontrinitarian warfare/4GW will fall to private security companies, with a corresponding decrease in the utility, size, and technological complexity (cost) of military forces

Armies will shrink in size and wither away, to be replaced by police-like security forces on the one hand and armed gangs on the other (not that the difference is always clear, even today) (225)

Van Creveld, Transformation of War

What’s going to happen to armies?

Distinctions between war and crime will break down (204) as will the difference between armed forces and civilians (194)

Battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings and massacres

Intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the civilian population, and extreme dispersion have become the norm (208) The problem of subversion is likely to be serious (211)

Much of the task of defending society against non-trinitarian warfare/4GW will fall to private security companies, with a corresponding decrease in the utility, size, and technological complexity (cost) of military forces

Armies will shrink in size and wither away, to be replaced by police-like security forces on the one hand and armed gangs on the other (not that the difference is always clear, even today) (225)

Van Creveld, Transformation of War

Why privatize?

Our (largely) public system isn’t working.

– $500+ BN/yr = rest of world, combined

– can’t suppress a pick-up insurgency/civil war in Iraq

– More of same will only produce more of same, but at higher cost.

Our opponents are already privatized.

– non-state

– cellular, networked, distributed, global

– low cost of entry (and exit)

Rate of evolutionary change is a function of the amount of variation present in the population (Fisher’s Law).

Why privatize?

Bankrupt organizations can go out of business.

Markets unleash competition.

– variety, rapidity, initiative, creativity

Privatization has a long military history.

– privateers & mercenaries

– British East India Company(1600-1858)

– PMCs today

Nothing less will force the amountof change that we need.

As Van Creveld suggests, it’s goingto happen anyway.

Robert Clive, early proponent of privatization

Obvious solution

Because military force has limited (not to say no) utility,

and we already have vastly more than we need,

and we cannot afford what we have,

and we are thereby shortchanging other elements of our national well-being,

and transformation of large, non-competitive bureaucracies is impossible,

therefore: We must eliminate what we don’t need, and we should privatize most of the rest.

Sign-off sermonette

It is far from clear whether “good intentions plus stupidity” or “evil intentions plus intelligence” have wrought more harm in the world.

Dörner, The Logic of Failure, 8

A great nation is like a great man: When he makes a mistake, he realizes it. Having realized it, he admits it. Having admitted it, he corrects it … He thinks of his enemy as the shadow that he himself casts.

Tao Te Ching (Mitchell trans., 61)

Questions?

Comments?

Accolades?

T

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