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Nehru, Patel and ChinaChandrashekhar DasguptaPublished online: 12 Sep 2014.

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Strategic Essay

Nehru, Patel and China

Chandrashekhar Dasgupta

On November 7, 1950, Vallabhbhai Patel wrote his celebrated letter to JawaharlalNehru on India’s China policy. ‘The Chinese Government has tried to delude us

by professions of peaceful intention’, he stated, referring to Beijing’s decision to movetroops into Tibet. A new challenge confronted India as a result of the ‘disappearanceof Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates’. ‘Chineseambitions … not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include theimportant part of Assam. They have their ambitions in Burma also’, he added, noting(incorrectly) that ‘Burma has the added difficulty that it has no McMahon Line roundwhich to build up even the semblance of an agreement’.

The deputy prime minister warned that ‘for the first time, after centuries, India’sdefence has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously’. The danger posed byChina was ‘both communist and imperialist’. The ‘Chinese and their source ofinspiration, [the] Soviet Union, would not miss any opportunity’ of exploitingdiscontent in the Himalayan states or India’s border areas, posing a threat to externalas well as internal security. ‘Hitherto, the Communist Party of India has found somedifficulty in contacting communists abroad, or in getting arms, literature, etc., fromthem.’ With the Chinese now established in Tibet, ‘we may have to deal withcommunist threats to our security along our northern and north-eastern frontiers,where, for supplies of arms and ammunition, they can safely depend on communistarsenals in China’.

Patel called for a comprehensive policy response, including a military and intelli-gence assessment of the Chinese threat; a re-disposition of Indian forces in order toguard important access routes or ‘areas which are likely to be the subject of disputes’;an appraisal of the required force levels to meet the new threat; a long-term con-sideration of India’s defence needs in terms of supplies of arms, ammunition andarmour; political and administrative steps, internal security measures, as well asimprovement of communications to strengthen frontier areas.

Turning to foreign policy, he called for a review of India’s advocacy of the entryof the People’s Republic of China into the United Nations in the context of its actionsin Tibet and its active participation in the Korean War, adding, ‘it is possible that aconsideration of these matters may lead us into [the] wider question of our relation-ship with China, Russia, America, Britain and Burma’.1 Thus, Patel hinted that hisreservations regarding Nehru’s foreign policy were not exclusively confined to Chinabut extended to wider questions of relations with the major power blocs.

Ambassador Chandrashekhar Dasgupta is a former diplomat and currently Distinguished Fellow atThe Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), New Delhi. The views expressed are his own.

Strategic Analysis, 2014Vol. 38, No. 5, 717–724, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2014.941219

© 2014 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

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The differences between Patel and Nehru reflected a deep divide in the Indianforeign policy establishment. Patel was not alone in his dissent on foreign policy. Inthe cabinet, Rajagopalachari and K.M. Munshi shared many of his views. Indeed, itwas Rajagopalachari who first questioned the prime minister’s Tibet policy in thecabinet. On November 2, a week before Patel’s call for a policy review, there was asharp exchange between Rajagopalachari and Nehru on Tibet during a cabinet meet-ing. Patel remained silent, preferring to bide his time and build up his case. ‘WhateverI speak should not go in vain’, he explained to Munshi later in the day.2

Moreover, Patel’s views on Tibet largely coincided with those of conservativesenior officials, in particular Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the secretary-general in Nehru’sMinistry of External Affairs, and B.N. Mullik, the director of the Intelligence Bureau.Patel’s letter of November 7 drew heavily on advice tendered by Bajpai on foreignand defence policy issues, and his specific proposals on security measures incorpo-rated recommendations contained in an Intelligence Bureau report.

On November 3, the day after the exchanges between Nehru and Rajagopalachari,Patel received two important inputs on Tibet—a detailed briefing from Bajpai and apaper from the Intelligence Bureau. Bajpai gave the deputy prime minister an accountof the diplomatic exchanges with China and left a note on the new defence problemposed by China’s military presence in Tibet. He followed up with a hand-written letterthe same evening, spelling out his recommendations. Advocating a strong protestagainst China’s move into Tibet, he suggested: (1) ‘we shall have to withdraw ourmission from Lhasa and the trade posts from Gyantse and Yatung … under protest’.‘The alternative’, he explained, ‘will be war, for which we are not prepared’; (2) ‘makeit clear that the McMahon line is our frontier … it is a strategic necessity’; (3) ‘thenecessary dispositions must be made for defending that line in case of attack’; (4)‘Nepal and Burma are more vulnerable to attack by China than we are … We mustbe prepared to discuss with them problems of common defence against Chineseaggression’; (5) ‘our advocacy of China’s claim to be admitted to the UnitedNations must cease’; and (6) an ‘immediate breach of diplomatic relations will bepremature’ and a final decision would depend on China’s behaviour in relation tothe boundary and towards Nepal and Burma.3

It should be noted that Bajpai advocated a tough diplomatic response even thoughhe fully realised that this could not effectively preserve Tibet’s semi-independentstatus. As a realist, the secretary-general recognised the inevitable but was prepared toaccept it only under protest. Unlike some latter-day critics of Nehru’s policy, he hadno illusions that India was in a position to preserve the status quo in Tibet.

Patel’s reply provides ample evidence of his debt to Bajpai. ‘I have read it [thenote] with great interest and profit to myself and it has resulted in a much betterunderstanding of the points at issue and general though serious nature of the problem’,wrote Patel to Bajpai on November 4. ‘I entirely agree with you that a reconsiderationof our military position and a redisposition of our forces are inescapable … In yourvery illuminating survey of what has passed between us and the Chinese governmentthrough our Ambassador, you have made out an unanswerable case for treating theChinese with the greatest suspicion’.4

The deputy prime minister also received a lengthy paper on Tibet from theIntelligence Bureau. Warning of the heightened danger of Communist infiltrationand subversion, the Intelligence Bureau made a number of important recommenda-tions. These called for extending administrative control in the north-east right up tothe frontier; improving road communications with the frontier areas; strengthening the

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intelligence network in these areas; raising the strength of the Assam Rifles; posting astrong contingent of troops in Sikkim; consolidating ties with Bhutan and Nepal; andso on. These proposals were duly incorporated in Patel’s letter to Nehru, along withsome additional ideas of his own.5

Over the years, critics have castigated Nehru for ignoring Patel’s advice, for analleged lack of realism and failure to take a ‘firm’ stand in support of Tibetanindependence. It has even been asserted that the roots of the 1962 debacle lie inthese policy ‘mistakes’ of 1950. A dispassionate examination of the available evi-dence does not substantiate these charges. The policy errors that led to the debaclewere to occur much later.

It has been widely—but wrongly—assumed that Nehru failed to anticipate China’smilitary move into Tibet and the security challenges it would pose. Before the end of1948 it became clear that the Communists would emerge as the victors in the Chinesecivil war and officials of the Ministry of External Affairs began to warn the govern-ment about its implications for the status of Tibet and the new security threats thatwould result from the entry of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into Tibet. ByJuly 1949, Bajpai was recommending ‘precautionary military measures’ for frontierdefence.6 Nehru dismissed fears of an outright invasion but recognised that Indiafaced a new border security problem. In September 1949—more than a year beforeChina’s entry into Tibet and even before the formal proclamation of the People’sRepublic of China—Nehru advised John Mathai, the finance minister:

Recent developments in China and Tibet indicate that Chinese Communists are likelyto invade Tibet sometime or other. This will not be very soon. But it may well take placewithin a year … The result of all this is that we may well have the Chinese or TibetanCommunists right up to our Assam, Bhutan and Sikkim border … It seems to me essentialfrom every point of view that these areas should have good communications, that is roads …I am putting this to you so that you can consider how far we can go in this direction inthe near future.7

Equally incorrect is the belief that Nehru ignored Patel’s proposals to strengthenIndia’s border security. Patel’s letter and the Intelligence Bureau’s recommendationswere promptly circulated to all concerned departments and action was taken withinthe next seven days. A committee under the deputy defence minister, Major-GeneralHimmatsinghji, was tasked to recommend measures to improve administration,defence, communications and so on, along the whole frontier; an expert committeewas set up to identify locations for new Assam Rifles posts in the north-easternfrontier region; and orders were issued to raise border check post staff and to equipthem with wireless communications.8 By February 1951, administrative control wasextended to Tawang. There was no disagreement between the prime minister and hisdeputy on these issues.

On November 18, Nehru circulated a note for the cabinet on policy regardingChina and Tibet.9 Without specifically referring to Patel’s letter, the prime ministerdealt with some of the questions on which he differed with his deputy. In response toPatel’s contention that ‘India’s defence has to concentrate on two fronts simulta-neously’, Nehru urged a more nuanced approach. In the case of China, all necessarymeasures must be taken to prevent the possibility of ‘gradual infiltration across ourborder and taking possession of disputed territory’ by China. However, the ‘factremains that our major possible enemy is Pakistan. This has compelled us to thinkof our defence mainly in terms of Pakistan’s aggression. If we begin to think and

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prepare for China’s aggression in the same way, we would weaken considerably onthe Pakistan side’. ‘[A] spreading out of our armies in distant frontiers would be badfrom every military or strategic point of view.’ ‘At least for some years’, India couldnot afford to bear the burden of preparing for fully fledged defence simultaneously ontwo fronts. The prime minister thus argued that preparedness to meet the immediateand major threat posed by Pakistan must remain the first priority in India’s defencepolicy. At the same time, all necessary steps must also be taken to prevent Chinesecross-border infiltration or occupation of areas across the McMahon line. Nehru didnot discount the China problem but he called for establishing clear-cut priorities indefence policy at a time when India was in no position to bear the financial burden ofpreparing to meet the threat of a major war on both the western and eastern fronts.

Regarding Tibet, Nehru wrote, ‘We cannot save Tibet as we would have liked todo and our very attempts to save it might well bring greater trouble to it … It may bepossible, however, that we might be might be able to help Tibet to retain a largemeasure of its autonomy … As far as I can see, this can only be done on thediplomatic level and by avoidance of making the present tension between India andChina worse’.10

This summed up the policy that Nehru had consistently followed ever since itbecame clear that the Chinese civil war would end with a Communist victory. As wehave seen, by September 1949, Nehru had anticipated the entry of the PLA into Tibetand had drawn attention to the need to build up road communications in the northernareas. Since 1912, Tibet had enjoyed an exceptional measure of autonomy, vergingon independence, but it was not recognised as a sovereign, independent state by anygovernment. Advocates of Tibetan independence fail to recognise that India pos-sessed neither the legal basis nor the military resources required for effective inter-vention. In the opinion of the commander-in-chief, General Cariappa, the army couldat most spare a battalion for Tibet, in view of commitments on the Pakistan front andinternal security duties. Cariappa also made it clear that this modest force could notgo much further than Yatung; at best, a company could be placed in Gyantse. Heemphasised that the Indian army was neither trained nor equipped to operate at suchheights and would be at a serious disadvantage against Chinese forces.11 As we sawearlier, even Bajpai, the untiring advocate of a hard line on Tibet, fully accepted thereality that India did not possess the means to preserve the status quo in Tibet.

Nehru recognised that any foreign interference in Tibet would only hasten thedespatch of Chinese troops to the territory and further imperil the prospects ofcontinued autonomy. The only hope for Tibet lay in a friendly settlement betweenBeijing and the Lhasa authorities that provided for recognition of Tibet’s autonomy bythe former and Chinese suzerainty by the latter. India could only play a diplomaticrole by facilitating such a settlement. Thus, Nehru encouraged the Tibetan authoritiesto enter into talks with Beijing and, at the same time, sought to persuade Beijing ofthe merits of a peaceful approach. He pointed out to Beijing that military actionagainst the Tibetans would not serve China’s own interests. It would result in asetback to the process of integration and would, furthermore, draw negative interna-tional reactions. Nehru hoped that Beijing would regard this as advice from a sincerefriend and that India had earned the right to be frank through her exertions in theUnited Nations on China’s behalf.12 He did not exaggerate the chances of success; heonly claimed that it was ‘possible’ that an Indian initiative might help preserve a‘large measure of autonomy’.

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Not for the last time, Beijing misinterpreted Indian policy. Despite Nehru’schampionship of Beijing’s admission in the United Nations, China’s new rulers didnot shed their suspicions regarding Indian intentions. India’s protest against theChinese military occupation of Tibet drew a sharp response from Beijing.

As we have seen, Nehru and Patel agreed on the immediate steps needed to buildup India’s border security and defence capabilities, even though they differed in theirassessment of the nature and immediacy of the challenge posed by a Chinese militarypresence in Tibet. The basic differences between the two statesmen concerned twointer-related questions: the diplomatic stance towards Communist China and itsimplications for India’s position in the confrontation between the western andCommunist blocs in the context of the Korean War. These differences reflected awider disagreement on the overall orientation of foreign policy.

Unlike Nehru, Patel saw the Communist powers as a permanently aggressive andmonolithic bloc, with the Soviet Union acting as the ‘source of inspiration’ for China.This perception shaped his views on China even before the PLA’s arrival in Tibet.Patel was opposed to early recognition of the People’s Republic of China. InDecember 1949, he advised the prime minister, ‘We do not stand to gain anythingsubstantial by giving a lead in the matter and that while recognition must come sooneror later, if we are somewhat late in the company of others, it would be worthwhiledelaying a bit’.13 Nehru explained that Commonwealth consultations had been heldon the subject and a decision had been taken in favour of early recognition by membercountries in a sequential manner. Indian officials urged that India should take the lead,lest she be seen as following British dictates.14 Accordingly, India recognised thePeople’s Republic of China on December 30, 1949, followed by Pakistan (January 4)and the UK and Ceylon (January 6). In deference to a Burmese request, it was alsoagreed that Burma (now Myanmar) should be the first country outside the Communistbloc to recognise the new state.

Patel also differed with Nehru on the Korean issue. In June 1950—two monthsbefore China moved into Tibet—war broke out in the Korean peninsula whenCommunist North Korea sent its army across the 38th parallel into South Korea,ruled by the US-supported strongman, Syngman Rhee. In the UN Security Council,India voted in favour of a US-sponsored resolution condemning the invasion andrequiring North Korea to withdraw its troops from the South. India felt that it couldnot remain silent in a case of aggression, even though she did not recognise either ofthe two Korean regimes and was not eager to take sides in an East–West issue.15 TheUnited States next rushed through a resolution in the Security Council recommendingthat UN member states furnish assistance to South Korea to repel the armed attack.India abstained because the delegation was not given sufficient time to obtaininstructions from New Delhi. However, following a cabinet decision on June 29,the Indian representative issued a statement accepting the Security Council recom-mendation, while making it clear that this did not affect India’s overall policy ofstaying aloof from inter-bloc rivalries. This reaffirmation of non-alignment wasintended to distance India from US efforts to link the Korean issue with Formosa(Taiwan) and Indo-China.

Patel was not present in the capital when the cabinet took the decision. Aware ofhis concerns, Nehru wrote to the deputy prime minister the same day, assuring himthat the Indian statement ‘will satisfy the USA and the UK people, and at the sametime maintains the balance and gives us the freedom to act as we chose’.16 Patel was

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not satisfied. He registered a serious reservation concerning the Indian statement ofJune 29. He wrote to Nehru:

I have seen the statement on Korea. While it is satisfactory in its support of the UNO’s[United Nations Organisation] recommendations, I feel that we need not have reiterated ourforeign policy. Such reiteration implies that this step could be construed as a departure fromthat policy and we were being apologetic or on the defensive about it … Once we felt, as wedid in the case of Korea, that an aggression had taken place, I do not think we can set anylimits to our action to resist that aggression. We have to exhaust all the means laid down inthe Charter.17

Knowing that Nehru wanted to play the role of a peace-maker in Korea, Patel tried todissuade him from making the attempt. He argued:

When actual armed aggression takes place, it is doubtful whether negotiations or mediationalone can secure the objective of peace. Negotiations or mediation can avail us only if there isa cessation of hostilities. Otherwise we cannot match words against arms.18

Patel was not alone in the cabinet in calling for a pro-western stance. Munshi, whoshared Patel’s strongly anti-Communist views, wrote to the prime minister: ‘U.S.S.R.never has been a friend and never will be. Why should we lose the goodwill of friendswithout whom we cannot face Russian expansion? If they fall, we go under’.19

Ignoring Patel’s advice, Nehru sought to prepare the ground for a peacefulsettlement in Korea through negotiations between all concerned parties. On July 13,he wrote to Stalin and Dean Acheson, the US secretary of state, urging the former toend the Soviet boycott of the Security Council and the latter to cease opposing theadmission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations. Nehru’s initiativedrew a favourable response from Moscow and a strongly negative reaction fromWashington.

At Rajagopalachari’s request, Henderson, the US ambassador, called on him onJuly 19. Rajagopalachari offered the comment that the main difference between theIndian and US positions appeared to be in relation to the question of China’srepresentation in the United Nations. Henderson replied with some heat that hefound it difficult to understand how anyone could seriously expect the UnitedStates to reverse its position on Chinese representation at a time when Americanlives were being sacrificed to oppose aggression and while the Chinese Communistregime was lauding the aggressor and condemning the US and UN for opposingaggression. Henderson later reported to Washington, ‘Rajagopalachari said he wellunderstood [the] US attitude and appreciated my frankness’.20 A few days later,Henderson followed up with a report that ‘Indian press in general has denouncedwhat it considers as thwarting by [the] US of Nehru’s efforts for peace … There is noindication [that] our reply has irritated such Indian leaders as Patel andRajagopalachari who seem to understand our position’.21

As China prepared to enter the Korean War, Patel once again called for areconsideration of Indian policy, including India’s support for seating the People’sRepublic of China in the United Nations. In his letter of November 7, Patel wrote, ‘Inview of the rebuff which China has given us and the method which it has followed indealing with Tibet, I am doubtful whether we can advocate its claims [to the UN seat]any longer. There would probably be a threat in the UNO virtually to outlaw China, inview of its active participation in the Korean War. We must determine our attitude on

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this question also’. Sardar Patel was thus in favour of taking a common position withthe western powers against China and the Soviet Union on the issues of the KoreanWar and China’s representation in the United Nations.

As we noted earlier, Patel concluded his letter of November 7, 1950 with thecomment that a consideration of the issues raised by him ‘may lead us into [the] widerquestion of our relationship with China, Russia, America, Britain and Burma’. He didnot elaborate this tantalising observation. Did he seek a fundamental review of India’sposition in the Cold War, of her relations with the western powers on the one handand China and the Soviet Union on the other? His earlier positions on recognition ofthe People’s Republic of China and the Korean issue and the strongly anti-Communisttenor of his letter point in the direction of this conclusion. Patel was, of course, thelast person to accept any derogation of India’s strategic independence in foreign andsecurity policy. The policies he advocated were based on the conviction that it was inIndia’s national interest to side with the western powers in confronting the Communistbloc in Asia.

A ‘top secret’ telegram from Ambassador Henderson provides some supportingevidence. On November 10, within three days of the despatch of Patel’s letter toNehru, Henderson advised Washington:

We have reliable and even authoritative information to [the] effect that events in Tibet andunrest in Nepal have resulted in increasing dissatisfaction in top Indian government and partycircles with India’s present foreign policy. Even those members of [the] cabinet who [are]Nehru adherents appear to be convinced that [the] time has come for India to recognize thatinternational communism is [the] country’s chief danger and to make corresponding shifts inpolicy. Patel has been stating privately that within [the] next few days he will insist in [the]cabinet meeting that India not only change policy in [the] direction of closer cooperation withwestern powers, particularly [the] US, but that it make [an] announcement to that effect …Patel and others advocating change in India’s policies are arguing that India must strengthenits military establishment if it is effectively to face its Communist neighbour, and that itcannot properly strengthen its military establishment without aid from [the] US unless itmakes it clear before [the] whole world that it stands with [the] West against [the] aggres-siveness of international Communism. In this connection please see page 7 enclosureEmbdesp 200 July 26 in which [is] outline[d] Patel[’s] statement to me re [the] need forUS military equipment.22

Patel believed that, in a showdown with Nehru, he could count on support not onlyfrom Rajagopalachari and Munshi but also from Baldev Singh, Jagjivan Ram and SriPrakasa, while he expected that Nehru would be backed by Maulana Azad,Gopalaswamy Ayyangar and Rafi Ahmad Kidwai.23 Patel could have challengedNehru not only in the cabinet but also in the Congress Working Committee, wherehe had strong support. The question was raised with him by Purshottam Das Tandon,the chairman of the Working Committee. A principled statesman, Patel rejected thesuggestion, explaining that sensitive policy differences should not be aired in public.24

Nehru, on his part, was totally free from vindictiveness. He realised that much ofPatel’s ammunition had been supplied by Bajpai,25 his own right hand man in theMinistry of External Affairs, but he did not hold it against him. The secretary-general,who was due to retire shortly, received a two-year extension and was subsequentlyraised to a gubernatorial position.

In the event, the showdown in the cabinet between the prime minister and hisdeputy did not occur. Patel’s illness took a sharp turn for the worse in mid-November.He was too ill to attend the meeting on November 21, in which Nehru’s paper came

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up for discussion. Later in the day, Rajagopalachari visited the ailing deputy primeminister to brief him about the proceedings. After Nehru’s opening speech, none ofthe ministers took the floor, except for a brief intervention by Rajagopalacharihimself.26 On December 15, the Iron Man of Indian politics passed from the scene.

Notes1. Patel to Nehru, November 7, 1950, in Durga Das (ed.), Sardar Patel’s Correspondence

[henceforth SPC], Vol. 10, pp. 335–342. The text is also included in G.M. Nandurkar (ed.),Sardar’s Letters—Mostly Unknown, Vol. III, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel Smarak Bhavan,Ahmedabad, 1983, pp. 144–149, but the ascribed date is November 11, 1950.

2. P.N. Chopra (chief ed.), Inside Story of Sardar Patel—The Diary of Maniben Patel [henceforthMPD], diary entry for November 2, 1950, Vision Books, New Delhi, 2001, pp. 452–453.

3. Patel returned the note to Bajpai, as specifically requested by the latter (see Patel to Bajpai,November 4, 1950 [G.M. Nandurkar, no. 1, p. 140]). Hence it is not available in any of thecollections of Patel’s correspondence. Bajpai’s request suggests that the note might have beentemporarily removed from an official file.

4. Patel to Bajpai, November 4, 1950 (G.M. Nandurkar, no. 1, pp. 140–141).5. B.N. Mullik, My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal, Allied Publishers, New Delhi,

1971, pp. 110–115.6. S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol. 2, p. 105; Selected Works of Jawaharlal

Nehru, Second Series [henceforth SWJN], Vol. 12, p. 410.7. Nehru to Mathai, September 10, 1949, SWJN, Vol. 13, p. 260.8. B.N. Mullik, no. 5, p. 122.9. SWJN, Vol. 15, Part 2, pp. 342–347.10. Ibid.11. Ibid., p. 80.12. Nehru to V.K. Krishna Menon, August 18, 1950; Nehru to K.M. Panikkar, August 19, 1950

and October 25, 1950, SWJN, Vol. 15(1), pp. 429, 431 and 443.13. Patel to Nehru, December 6, 1949, SPC (1945–1950), Vol. 8, pp. 87–88.14. Nehru to Patel, December 6, 1949, SWJN, Vol. 14(1), p. 516.15. Nehru’s letter dated July 2, 1950, Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers 1947–64, Vol.

2, Nehru Memorial Fund/Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1987.16. SPC, Vol. 10, p. 355.17. Ibid., pp. 356–357.18. Patel to Nehru, July 3, 1950, SPC, Vol. 10, pp. 356–357.19. Quoted in S. Gopal, no. 6, p. 100.20. Henderson to Secretary of State, July 20, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950,

Vol. VII, University of Wisconsin Digital Collections, Madison, WI, USA, pp. 439–440.21. Henderson to Secretary of State, July 23, 1950, in Foreign Relations of the United States,

1950, no. 16, p. 455.22. Henderson to Secretary of State (Acheson), November 10, 1950, in Foreign Relations of the

United States, no. 16, p. 1474.23. Ibid.24. MPD, entry for November 19, 1950, p. 460.25. I am indebted to Ambassador K.S. Bajpai for this information. Ambassador Bajpai recollects

his father, Sir Girja, telling him that Nehru had walked into his room with a smile on his faceand Patel’s letter in his hand. ‘So you are now marshalling the big guns behind you!’ the primeminister said to the secretary-general.

26. MPD, entry for November 21, 1950, p. 462.

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