Negative Blocks

8/9/2019 Negative Blocks

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Tournament of ChampBettendorf HW

NEGATIVE BLOCKS

A/T: TEACHER UNIONS ARE GOOD..................................................................................

A/T: TEACHER UNIONS BENEFIT EDUCATION...................................................................

A/T: MORE MONEY MEANS MORE MOTIVATION...............................................................

A/T: PEER REVIEW WORKS.............................................................................................

A/T: TEACHERS DONT GET PAID ENOUGH......................................................................

A/T: PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS WORK TO SERVE............................................................

A/T: UNIONS PROTECT RIGHTS.......................................................................................

A/T: UNIONS MAKE WORKPLACE SAFER..........................................................................

A/T: UNIONS FIGHT DISCRIMINATION.............................................................................

A/T: PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS HELP THE POOR................................................................

A/T: PUBLIC/PRIVATE SECTORS HAVE SAME UNIONS.......................................................

A/T: PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS ARE EFFICIENT..................................................................

A/T: UNIONS MAKE GOVERNMENT EFFICIENT..................................................................

A/T: PUBLIC SECTOR BENEFITS ARE JUSTIFIED................................................................

A/T: PRIVATE SECTOR SUCKS (DISCRIM/CORRUPT)..........................................................

A/T: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING GOOD.............................................................................

A/T: FREEMAN AND MEDOFF STUDY...............................................................................

A/T: PUBLIC WORKERS GET PAID THE SAME....................................................................

IND


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NEGATIVE BLOCKS

A/T: TEACHER UNIONS ARE GOOD

(__) Teacher unions obstruct and hold hostage our political process. Pantuosco and Ullrich write in the Journal ofEducation Finance1:

However, the wage premium that attracts and maintains high-quality teachers, also allures opponents who question the union's benefit to the production process. For example, a battle has surfacedNew York where lawmakers and the teachers union (NYSUT) find themselves in opposition. The Governorproposed a cap on the growth of school taxes limiting funds earmarked for education. The union respondedGovernors request by withholding their endorsement of 38 senators who supported the Governors idea, and stating thunion members, who are also New York taxpayers, do not desire tax relief at the expense of school spending.

(__) Teacher unions use coercive tactics to deprive entire communities of resources. Pantuosco and Ullrich write inthe Journal of Education Finance2:

While the unions' objective is to produce a crop of students who are better suited to successfully lead our country in a diverse and interdependent world, there is another, less attractive, face of unionsthat of a mono

In this scenario, the teachers unions' behave as rent seekers who use their bargaining power to obtain higher salarieand benefits. If the compensation demands are met, states must reduce non-salary school expenses, cut othe

areas of spending, or raise taxes. The crowding out of spending or subsequent tax increase either levels or reduces currenrates of growth and GSP per employee. Herein lies the theoretical unattractive face of the union, as residents and businesses suffer from higher tax raor reduced services, and students suffer from strapped resources.

1Louis J. Pantuosco and Laura D. Ullrich. "The Impact of Teachers Unions on State-Level Productivity." Journal of Education Finance 35.3 (2010): 276-294. Project MUSE. 21 Feb. 2010 .

2 Ibid


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NEGATIVE BLOCKS

A/T: TEACHER UNIONS BENEFIT EDUCATION

(__) No way to determine how much a teacher has benefited a student.

(__) Costs have actually increased without a subsequent increase in student scores. Pantuosco and Ullrich write in t

Journal of Education Finance:

Estimating the value added of unions to the education process is not a precise science. Typically, inputs are measured by the state and local governments' finances allocatedtoward teachers' salaries or spending per pupil. While, output is measured by the standardized test results ofthe students educated by unionized teachers.7 Over the past three decades, public education per pupil costs hincreased. These costs include salaries, benefits, infrastructure, and supplies. During the same period,standardized test scores have not improved.

(__) A 1% increase in teacher union membership will lead to a decrease in gross state product of over 100 milliondollars. Pantuosco and Ullrich write in the Journal of Education Finance:

The results indicate that the number of union members in a state,all else constant

, is associated with a decrease instate productivity in the following year. Specifically, in 1994, a one percentage point increase in the percentage of teachers belonging to a union in a bargaining swould be expected to lead to a $0.04 decrease in per employee state productivity in the following year. Given mean employment in 1994 of 2,964,863, the model indicates that an increase in unmembership of only 1% would be associated with a mean decrease in GSP of $118,594,520. The coefficient in 2000 is smand is not statistically significant.


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NEGATIVE BLOCKS

A/T: MORE MONEY MEANS MORE MOTIVATION

(__) Milwaukee is a case study that disproves the assumption that more money leads to motivated teachers. Pantuoand Ullrich write in the Journal of Education Finance:

The positive aspects of teachers unions are challenged by some researchers. They argue that the wage premium simply inspires ineffective teachers tocontinue working.12 While some researchers find that smaller class sizes can improve student outcomes13 others contend that education quality is not related to class size.14 Wright andGundersen (2004) agree that money is not the sole solution to educational woes. They discuss the case ofMilwaukee's public school system in which the Milwaukee unions' requests were consistently granted for 20 years.Over the 20 year period, wages were improved, the student-teacher ratio fell, and dollars poured into theschool system. However, even with these improvements, the results were dismal. Milwaukee students' test scores rankedamong the lowest in the state, and morale was dreadful. They posit that this finding indicates that money alone cannsolve the problems of our public school system.15 Rather, for the additional money to result in improved achievement and productivity, the money has to be appropriathe proper programs.16 But, teachers unions are not the only organized labor group that has been challenged to justify their productive value.

(__) A 1% increase in teacher union membership will lead to a decrease in gross state product of over 100 milliondollars. Pantuosco and Ullrich write in the Journal of Education Finance:

The results indicate that the number of union members in a state, all else constant, is associated with a decrease instate productivity in the following year. Specifically, in 1994, a one percentage point increase in the percentage of teachers belonging to a union in a bargaining swould be expected to lead to a $0.04 decrease in per employee state productivity in the following year. Given mean employment in 1994 of 2,964,863, the model indicates that an increase in unmembership of only 1% would be associated with a mean decrease in GSP of $118,594,520. The coefficient in 2000 is smand is not statistically significant.


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NEGATIVE BLOCKS

A/T: PEER REVIEW WORKS

(__) All of these impacts are just speculative since principals are clearly not using peer review as the main method dismissing a teacher. Insofar as unions were the ones to enact these tenure procedures that make it nigh impossible fire a teacher, they are the ones at fault for creating this convoluted process.

(__)


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NEGATIVE BLOCKS

A/T: TEACHERS DONT GET PAID ENOUGH

(__) Means unions havent been doing their jobs, thus no positive impact.

(__) The job of a teacher is something you need to build up, to become experienced before you can receive a decen

compensation.

(__) Pensions and healthcare benefits balance out these issues.


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NEGATIVE BLOCKS

A/T: PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS WORK TO SERVE

(__) We cant make huge generalizations like this. It is reasonable to assume some people become teachers to receitenure benefits and job security. There isnt any way to accurately gauge this factor, so you shouldnt consider thisargument due to its lack of reliability.

(__) A recent Brookings survey shows that theres little commitment to public service in the public sector. DonaldDevine writes in the Journal of Labor Research3:

Consider first the civil service. The best way to evaluate the modem relevance of the civil service ideal is to assess the strength of its norms with the federal work force today. Looking closely at a recentBrookings Institution Center for Public Service study demonstrates that the "public service" incentive to work well -- the ideal ofpublic service for the public good -- has little support in today's federal government. Of the 1,051 federal employees interviewed,percent replied that getting a paycheck was more important than doing something worthwhile for the countrand 65 percent said job security was more important than helping the public or for maintaining pride in theiorganizations (Light, 200 l). Two-thirds said their own agency did a "not too good" or a "not good at all" job indisciplining employee performance. Only 30 percent thought their organizations did a very or somewhat good job with poor performers. Only half argued that their agencies were vgood at helping the people they serve.

3Devine, Donald J. "The Future of Labor Relations in the Federal Public Sector." Journal of Labor Research XXV.1 (2004). Springer. Web. 13 Apr. 2010.


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NEGATIVE BLOCKS

A/T: UNIONS PROTECT RIGHTS

(__) Comparable worth legislation passed by public sector unions is watered down and doesnt help women. MorleGunderson writes in the Journal of Labor Research4:

Public sector unions are also a main force behind the passage of comparable worth legislation in both the United States (Evans and Nelson, 1989; Wesman, 1988) and Canada (Gunderson, 1995; Hart, 2002). Such

initiatives have been applied mainly in the public sector and invariably through union complaints or initiatives which are viewed by unions as ways of injecting additional funds into the "pot" over and above those acthrough collective bargaining. For that reason, public sector unions have tried to keep comparable worth settlements separate from bargaining settlements, so that comparable worth settlements are not subject to the g

and-take of the bargaining process where, for example, higher settlements in female-dominated jobs would have to come from lower settlements in male-dominated jobs. Public sector unionshave also tried to have comparable worth settlements not advertised as such so that employees may think thare settlements won by the union. In Iowa in the 1980s, public sector unions effectively lobbied for alteratioin comparable worth awards that were initially announced but that would have led to pay cuts to male unionmembers. The lobbying led to an infusion of additional public funds as well as a reallocation of the awards towards male union members (Orazem and Mattila, 1990). Unions have alsobeen able to obtain exemptions for seniority in comparable worth legislation (Weiner and Gunderson, 1990:112), effectivelyallowing male-female wage differences if they are the result of seniority. In Ontario, they have even obtained an exemption for "bargainingstrength." That is, after comparable worth has been achieved, pay differences between male and female jobs are allowed if they result from differences in bargaining strength (Gunderson, 2002).

(__) Public sector unions have a very different dynamic from 40 years ago. They are no longer the crusaders for rig

in the workplace, but now fat cats coercing politicians and communities into giving them more benefits. Unions donrepresent your average grade school teacher or road worker, but a political machine in motion.

(__) Public sector unions are not affected by transparency and oversight legislation like the LMRDA, and thus aremore prone to being affected by undemocratic and corrupt practices. The Journal of Labor Research5writes:

State employees clearly have fewer legal protections from undemocratic and corrupt practices in their unionthan their counterparts in the private sector and federal sector. Given that about half of all states permit collective bargaining and unionization (excludingeducational institutions), state and or federal legislators should consider adopting better and stronger statutory protections. By expanding LMRDA provisions to cover all public sector employees, there's no doubt thamore uniform and consistent approach to union membership protections would evolve. Even with some of its weaker provisions, the LMRDA can enhance union democracy and encourage more open disclosure of th

union activities that may affect its rank and file. The results of our study are indeed disquieting. As such, we recommend the expansion of the LMRDA provisions to aemployees as a minimum, and perhaps even to all other public sector unionists where state statutory union membership protections fall short.

4Gunderson, Morley. "Two Faces of Union Voice in the Public Sector." Journal of Labor Research. XXVI.3. (2005) Springer. April 29, 2010.

5Fine, Cory R. "Public Sector Union Democracy: A Comparative Analysis." Journal of Labor Research XXII.2 (2001): 491-04. Springer. Web. 13 Apr. 2010.


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A/T: UNIONS MAKE WORKPLACE SAFER


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A/T: UNIONS FIGHT DISCRIMINATION

(__) Police unions have been encouraging extensive fitness testing, which has been shown to be a huge disadvantagfor potential female officers. Sass and Troyer write in the Journal of Labor Research6:

The relationship between departmental composition and the incidence of fitness exams can also be informative. If male officers oppose hiring women and fitnessexams serve to exclude females, there should be a positive correlation between the percentage of males on tforce and the use of fitness exams for new recruits. Similarly, there should be a negative correlation between the percentage of male officers and the use of periodic exams for non-recruits. Probit estimates of the probabilities that a department requires fitness exams for recruits and for experienced officers are presented in Table 4. Consistent with the idea of exams as a tool for coworker discrimination, the incidence of fitness tests for new recruits increases with the proportion of current officers that are male, and the u se of recurring fitness exams for non-recruits is inversely related to the

percentage of male officers (columns 1 and 3). Interestingly, the impact of union status follows a similar pattern: Unionized departments are more likely to employfitness exams for new recruits and less likely to require exams for experienced officers. This is consistent wthe notion that police unions represent the interests of their predominately male membership and runs countto our previous findings that (in some cases) union status is associated with a greater percentage of female recruits

(__) There is no evidence to show there is greater discrimination in the private sector workplace. Fernandez andSmith write in the Review of Public Personnel Administration:

Unions also have contended that there are social costs that are often ignored by governments when they choose to contract for services. For example, the public sector has been crucial in providing adequate employm

opportunity for minorities, in part, because of union activism (AFSCME, 2004; Kearney, 2003). Unions and antiprivatization factions asserted that contracting out will negatively affect minorities. There is lack of evidence suggesting that minorities are harmed disproportionately by privatization, however (NCEP, 1988; Savas, 2The claim that privatization opens the door to corruption, bribes, and kickbacks continues to be made, too,although experts disagree about the incidence of such practices (e.g., AFSCME, 2004; Donahue, 1989; Rehfuss, 1989; Savas, 2000; Wesemann, 1981).

6Sass, Tim R., and Jennifer L. Troyer. "Affirmative Action, Political Representation, Unions, and Female Police Employment." Journal of Labor Research XX.4 (1999). Springer. Web. 13 Apr. 2010.


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A/T: PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS HELP THE POOR


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A/T: PUBLIC/PRIVATE SECTORS HAVE SAME UNIONS

(__) The actions taken in the name of the public sector are clear, and should be isolated as the effects of public sectunions. The arguments in this debate should stay true to the resolution, so they should focus solely on the impacts opublic sector unions.

(__) There are jobs that are clearly mostly public sector, like the NEA, and other unions that are not public sector, lmanufacturing unions.


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NEGATIVE BLOCKS

A/T: PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS ARE EFFICIENT

(__) Public sector unions and their bureaucracies are always less efficient than private sector work. Donald Devinewrites in the Journal of Labor Research7:

Actually, Ludwig von Mises had seen the fundamental problem much earlier. His magisterial Bureaucracy (1944) demonstrated that public bureaucracies had no bottom line measure their success. Top management had no way to track what was happening under them. If government could keepmission simple, with a sound appraisal system, it could do reasonably well as long as the passion of a charismatic leader allowed it to act. Over time, especially in a democracy, this will prove difficult to sustain.

People will demand competing goals, and legislators will be reluctant to disagree with them and support theexecutive leadership. The private sector had a marvelous profit-and-loss system that keeps top managementcontact with the smallest unit to evaluate whether it is returning an adequate investment and that is why theymust inherently be more efficient institutions than public ones (Mises, 1944).

(__) Privatization does not necessarily mean lower wages or less work. Goerke writes in the Journal of Economics8

Privatization does not necessarily lower wages, it does not have to cost jobs and involve harder work, and itneed not raise labor productivity if efficiency-wage effects are important. The theoretical analysis might therefore shed light on the

empirical observation [shows] that wages or employment do not fall or might even increase after privatizatiand that labor productivity can be more or less unaffected by a change in ownership. Whether the fears of opponents and theexpectations of proponents of privatization are thus warranted, therefore depends, first, on the mechanism of wage determination and, second, on the precise impact of privatization on the behavior of firms, and on thinteraction of these two effects.

7Devine, Donald J. "The Future of Labor Relations in the Federal Public Sector." Journal of Labor Research XXV.1 (2004). Springer. Web. 13 Apr. 2010.

8Goerke, Laszlo. "Privatization and Efficiency Wages." Journal of Economics 67.3 (1998): 243-64. Springer-Verlag. Web. 15 Apr. 2010.


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NEGATIVE BLOCKS

A/T: UNIONS MAKE GOVERNMENT EFFICIENT

_______. Public Sector Unions Reduce Government Efficiency.Edwards in 2010,Chris Edwards [Director of Tax Policy Studies at the Cato Institute]. Public Sector Unions and the Rising Costs of

EmployeeCompensation. Cato Journal. 30(1). Winter 2010.http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj30n1/cj30n15.pdf.Accessed March 12, 2010.

The upshot of all this is thatpolicymakers will need to make large budget reforms in the years ahead. They will to need to deliver public services more efficiently [and] to privatize services when feasible, to cut staffing levels, and terminate low value programs. Policymakers often hesitate in making such reforms, but the high level of unionization in many state workforces will make reformeven harder to achieve. During labor negotiations, for example, public officials often succumb to pressure to makeshortterm concessions that end up damaging public finances in the long run.

Unions reduce the ability of government managers to cut costs and increase efficiency in many ways. They protectpoorly performing workers, they push for minimum staffing levels, they resist the introduction of new technologies

that threaten their jobs, and they create a ruleladen and bureaucratic workplace. In New York State, for example, Virtually any idea for saving monthrough outsourcing and consolidation of services must first be negotiated and agreed to by the union representing the employees who currently provide the service (ONeal and McMahon 2007: 17). A recent Cato paper describesof the structural problems with unions in the public sector (Bellante, Denholm, and Osorio 2009; see also Denholm 1994).


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A/T: PUBLIC SECTOR BENEFITS ARE JUSTIFIED


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A/T: PRIVATE SECTOR SUCKS (DISCRIM/CORRUPT)

(__) There is no evidence to show privatization harms minorities or leads to corruption. Fernandez and Smith writethe Review of Public Personnel Administration9:

Unions also have contended that there are social costs that are often ignored by governments when they choose to contract for services. For example, the public sector has been crucial in providing adequate employm

opportunity for minorities, in part, because of union activism (AFSCME, 2004; Kearney, 2003). Unions and antiprivatization factions asserted that contracting out will negatively affect minorities. There is lack of evidence suggesting that minorities are harmed disproportionately by privatization, however (NCEP, 1988; Savas, 2The claim that privatization opens the door to corruption, bribes, and kickbacks continues to be made, too,although experts disagree about the incidence of such practices (e.g., AFSCME, 2004; Donahue, 1989; Rehfuss, 1989; Savas, 2000; Wesemann, 1981).

9Fernandez, Sergio, and Craig R. Smith. "Looking for Evidence of Public Employee Opposition to Privatization: An Empirical Study With Implications for Practice." Review of Public Personnel Administration 26.4 (2006): 356-

SAGE. Web. 7 Apr. 2010.


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NEGATIVE BLOCKS

A/T: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING GOOD

(__) On balance, there isnt a positive effect coming from collective bargaining. Bruce Kaufman writes in the Journof Labor Research10:

Second, it is evident that the union wage gain with bargaining is smaller than predicted by the simple monopoly model. In Panel A, the wage gain is Wz-W0; in Panel B it is WI-Wo. Bargaining thus serves to modera

size of the union monopoly wage gain, keeping the misallocation of resources and rent transfer smaller than otherwise predicted. Moreover, when the right to strike is limited or banned, as in many public sector situa

the union wage gain is smaller yet. Bargaining's positive contribution to efficiency is counterbalanced, however, by anadditional form of resource cost and inefficiency. The restraint bargaining provides on union rent-seeking isnot a free good. To "produce" collective bargaining requires scarce time and factor inputs of union, firm, angovernment negotiators and mediators. More importantly, when coercive weapons are used, such as strikes, boycottsand slowdowns, production is lost and resources remain idle. Although strikes in recent years have occurred in only a small proportion of union negotiatiand, in general, resulted in very modest social cost, in the 1940s-1960s when union density and power was much higher so too were the incidence and cost of strikes (Gunderson and Melino, 1987; Kaufman, 1992).

Finally, an intangible but real cost of collective bargaining is that it heightens or gives outlet to an adversarial,sometimes bitter "we against them" relationship between the workers and the firm.

(__) Collective bargaining leads to a per capita increase of state debt by 250 percent. Marlow and Orzechowski wriin the journal, Public Choice11:

Public sector employees are commonly believed to favor an expanding role for the public sector (Tullock, 1974; and Buchanan and Tullock, 1977). This view predicts that public sector unionism exerts a positive inf

on demand for public programs through their voting and lobbying efforts. As casual support of this hypothesis, a strong positive correlation has been shown betweper capita state debt and the scope of collective bargaining statutes (Indiana Chamber of Commerce, 1992). In states with nocollective bargaining statutes, average per capita state debt was $916; but, in states where all public sectoremployees are covered by such statutes, average per capita state debt was 250 percent higher, or $2,264 perresident.

(__) Collective bargaining is not a right. Richard Kearny writes in the Review of Public Personnel Administration 12

Unions exercise their greatest impact through collective bargaining over the terms and conditions of employment, including wages, benefits, and warrangements and procedures. What we do know is that in the absence of a facilitative legal environment mandating or permittingbargaining, collective bargaining rights are difficult to win and exercise. All state and local employees havefirst amendment right to organize and join a union or employee association, but they do not have acommensurate right to be recognized by management for purposes of collective bargaining. Bargaining does occur in somescattered state agencies, local governments, and school districts without formal legal sanction (Dilts, Boyda, & Sherr, 1993; Rhodes & Brown, 1992), but the vast majority of bargaining relationships are carried out icontext of a facilitative legal environment.

10Kaufman, Bruce E. "What Unions Do: Insights from Economic Theory." Journal of Labor Research XXV.3 (2004): 351-82. Springer. Web. 7 Apr. 2010.

11Marlow, Michael L., and William Orzechowski. "Public Sector Unions and Public Spending." Public Choice 1.16 (1996): 1-16. Springer. Web. 7 Apr. 2010.

12Kearney, Richard C. "Public Sector Labor Management Relations: Change or Status Quo?" Review of Public Personnel Administration 30.1 (2010): 89-111. SAGE. Web. 7 Apr. 2010.


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NEGATIVE BLOCKS

A/T: FREEMAN AND MEDOFF STUDY

(__) Freeman and Medoff were insufficient in their analysis of union effects, so we should regard their studies asobsolete and incomplete. Bruce Kaufman writes in the Journal of Labor Research 13:

When one looks at the theoretical literature on unions, other union "faces" also emerge that seem important but under-emphasized by F&M. One such distinction, for example, is the "short run" and "long run" faces o

unions. Much of the theory and analysis in What Do Unions Do? is static, cross sectional, and short run. On one hand emphasis is to a degree unavoidable, given modeling complexities and data avail- ability. But economic theory also suggests that a preponderate focus on the short run is likely to impart a positive bias to the economscorecard on unionism. One reason is that more of the efficiency benefits from unions are realized in the short run (from the voice and monopsony-reducing effects); a second is that more of the efficiency costs from

monopoly face of unions appear in the long run (due to factor misallocation and lower productivity growth). As a concrete example, F&M use the median- voter model ofunions to derive a positive union effect on the short-run provision of collective goods in the workplace but fto consider the negative long-run implication of this model for employment, capital investment, and cost-puinflation. Another example is the primary (but not exclusive) focus on the determinants of the cross-sectional differences in the level of productivity across firms, rather than on the dynamic path of productigrowth between union and nonunion firms. Also largely neglected by F&M are the macroeconomic costs of unions, such as atendency for cost-creep inflation and higher unemployment in order to restrain union bargaining demands.

13Kaufman, Bruce E. "What Unions Do: Insights from Economic Theory." Journal of Labor Research XXV.3 (2004): 351-82. Springer. Web. 7 Apr. 2010.


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NEGATIVE BLOCKS

A/T: PUBLIC WORKERS GET PAID THE SAME

Ramoni-Perazzi, Josefa, and Don Bellante. "Do Truly Comparable Public and Private Sector Workers Show AnyCompensation Differential?" Journal of Labor Research XXVII.1 (2007). Springer. Web. 13 Apr. 2010.

Decades of studies on public sector wages were focused incorrectly

For years, the idea that earnings of public sector workers were significantly above those received by their privatecounterparts generated a debate about the size of government, the efficiency of the public wage-setting systits contribution to fiscal stress, and the proper use of tax funds. In general, studies were based on the efficiency andequity principles: Workers with similar productivity-related characteristics should be paid the same regardleof the sector of employment.

Public sector workers actually do receive a wage premium

Our results indicate that public sector workers are paid a wage premium that ranges from 3.5 percent to 11.1

percent, compared to similar workers in the private sector.This range becomes substantially smaller once the effect of unionization is excluded from the

varying from1.6 percent to 6 percent. These wage differ- entials can be explained by differences in the returns to human capital and other productivity-related variables, rather than by the differences in the distributhese variables in each sector. In all the cases, the premium increases with the level of education, reaching its peak for workers with some college, and declining somewhat for workers with a college degree or moreindicating a higher compression of the distri- bution of wages in the public sector compared to the private sector, as other studies have suggested. Differences in nonwage benefits amplify the wage inequality.

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