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Contents

US Successful On Terror ____________________________________________________________________ 3

US has a successful record of foiling terror plots _______________________________________________________3

A l-Qaeda is Being Destroyed ________________________________________________________________ 4

A l-Qaeda May Be Headed to Defeat _________________________________________________________________4

Death of Bin Laden Will HURT A l-Qaeda _____________________________________________________________4

Groups often pldege allegiance to OBL, not al-Qaeda ___________________________________________________5

Damage Primarily in More Centralized areas __________________________________________________________6

"Finding and killing Osama bin Laden is a huge blow to al-Qaida in Pakistan and A fghanistan, because it showsthey're vulnerable even inside Pakistan," says Kori Schake, a defense analyst at West Point and the Hoover

Institution. "It will have less effect on al-Qaida cells in Yemen and the Horn of A frica, which seem to operateindependently." _________________________________________________________________________________6

A l-Qaeda Isn t Suceeding In Its A ttacks ______________________________________________________________6

A l-Qaeda is Being Weakened ______________________________________________________________________6

A l Qaeda is Weaker _______________________________________________________________________ 7

Recruiting is Down _______________________________________________________________________________7

We are Killing Terrorist Leaders ______________________________________________________________ 8

We Must Kill Leaders to Defeat al Qaeda _____________________________________________________________8

Killing Leaders Has Worked in the past to Weaken Terror Groups _________________________________________8Other Studies of the Success of Killing Leaders A re Flawed Success is Bigger _______________________________8

Killing Leaders Increases Probability of Terrorist Failure by 27% ___________________________________________9

Drone Strikes Good _______________________________________________________________________ 11

Drones Important in Fighting Terror ________________________________________________________________11

Number of Strike Casualties Exaggerated ____________________________________________________________11

Civilian Casualties Minimal Mostly Militants Killed___________________________________________________11

A s number of drone strikes has increased, number of civilian deaths has decreased _________________________12

Lower Threat of Terrorism _________________________________________________________________ 13

Counter Terror Efforts Have Decreased Threat, But it Still Exists__________________________________________13

Assists US Mission in Middle East ___________________________________________________________ 14

Killing Bin Laden Makes Taliban Cooperation Easier ___________________________________________________14

Easier to End War in A fghanistan __________________________________________________________________15

A l-Qaeda Will Not Have Huge Retaliation ____________________________________________________ 16

No New Terrorist A ttacks That Wouldn t Have Happened A nyways _______________________________________16


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Blowback Theory: No Increase in A l Qaeda Membership _______________________________________________16

C ountries Have Still Gone Nuclear ___________________________________________________________ 17

Countries Go Nuclear for Strategic A dvantage ________________________________________________________17

Numerous Failures to Prevent Nations from Pursuing Nukes ____________________________________________18Peaceful Nuke Program = Stepping Stone to Nuclear Power ___________________________________________19

NPT is ineffective ________________________________________________________________________ 20

Too Weak and Inflexible Cannot Easily Be A mended w/ Teeth __________________________________________20

Countries Can Still Get Building Blocks Of Nukes Even Following Treaty ___________________________________20

NPT can be used as a cover _______________________________________________________________________20

Nuclear Smuggling Has Increased __________________________________________________________________21

Easier to Steal if More Countries Have Weapons ______________________________________________________21

Terrorists Can Easily Obtain HEU ___________________________________________________________________21

It is more likely that terrorists could obtain the key ingredient for making a nuclear bomb, plutonium (Pu) or highlyenriched uranium (HEU). While producing a weapon with Pu is a relatively complex task, there is consensus in thescientific community that it would not be difficult for a terrorist group to produce an explosive device similar to theone used on Hiroshima, with as little as 50 pounds of HEU.The International Panel on Fissile Materials estimated inits 2007 report that there are 1,400-2,000 tons of HEU, enough for some 56,000-80,000 nuclear weapons, spreadaround the world. Much of the HEU is in Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union, known to have weaksecurity regulations and widespread corruption. _____________________________________________________21

NPT enforcement is really, really slow ______________________________________________________________21

NPT effectiveness has decreased __________________________________________________________________22

Russia Has Loose Nukes __________________________________________________________________________22

Nuclear Material Could Reach Terrorists through Smuggling ____________________________________________23

Terrorists Target Russian Nuclear Stockpiles _________________________________________________________23

Protection of Russian Nuclear A rsenals A re Flimsy ____________________________________________________23

Number of Nukes Irrelevant ________________________________________________________________ 24

There are still thousands ofactive nuclear weapons in existence _________________________________________24

The Defense Department Misplaces Missile Components_______________________________________________24

Accidental Nuclear War ___________________________________________________________________ 25

Even the best and the brightest can accidentally cause nuclear war! ______________________________________25

Bioweapons are a HUGE Threat ____________________________________________________________ 26

Bioweapons are Readily A vailable _________________________________________________________________26


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US Successful On Terror

US has a successful record of foiling terror plotsMcNeill et al. 11. [Jena Baker McNeill, James Jay Carafano, and Jessica Zuckerman.Analysts, Heritage Foundation.HeritageFoundation. May 20, 2011. Accessed July 17, 2011."39 Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11: Examining Counterterrorism s SuccessStories. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/39-terror-plots-foiled-since-911-examining-counterterrorisms-success-stories]http://www.jewishjournal.com/cover_story/article/a_response_the_case_against_the_islamic_center_20100922/]Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, at least 39 terror plots against the United States have been foiledthanks to domestic and international cooperation, as well as efforts to track down terror leads in localcommunities. Such a successful track record of preventing terror attacks should garner the attention of policymakers around the country as both Congress and the Administration wrestle with the difficult decision of where to best spendprecious security dollars. The death of Osama bin Laden serves as a reminder that the war on terrorism is not over, and as a call to focus onstrategies that have made the nation a harder target for terrorism, while examining which reforms are still necessary.


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A l-Qaeda is Being Destroyed

A l-Qaeda May Be Headed to Defeat Rollins 11. [John Rollins. Specialist in Terrorism and National Security, Congressional Research Service.Congressional ResearchService. May 5, 2011. Accessed July 20, 2011. Osama bin Laden s Death: Implications and Considerations.http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41809.pdf]While some experts argue that OBL s limited ideological appeal and operational role in AQsuggest that the implications of his death will also be

limited, senior U.S. counterterrorism officials view the death of OBL as the possible beginning of the end of AQ.In a press briefing at the White House on May 2, 2011 an unnamed senior administration official offered thefollowing assessment of the significance of OBL s death and the prospect of continued threats to the nation :

Without a doubt, the United States will continue to face terrorist threats. There s also no doubt that the death of Osamabin Laden marks the single greatest victory in the U.S.-led campaign to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AlQaeda. It is a major and essential step in bringing about Al Qaeda s eventual destruction. Although Al

Qaeda may not fragment immediately, the loss of Osama bin Laden puts the group on a path of declinethat will be difficult to reverse.

Obama 11. [Barack Obama, President of the United States. Office of the President. June 28, 2011. Accessed July 17, 2011. NationalStrategy for Counterterrorism.http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf]In the decade since those attacks, we have significantly strengthened our defenses and built a steadfastinternational coalition. In the past two and a half years, we have eliminated more key al-Qa ida leaders in rapidsuccession than at any time since 2001, including Usama bin Laden , the only leader that al-Qa ida has ever known. As aresult, we now have the opportunity to seize a turning point in our effort to disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately defeat al-Qa ida.

As President I have no greater responsibility than protecting the American people. Though there are many potential threats to our national security,it is the terrorist threat from al-Qa ida that has loomed largest since September 11, 2001. And yet today, we can say with growing confidence and

with certainty about the outcome that we have put al-Qa ida on the path to defeat. With an unrelenting focus on the task at hand,and mindful of the challenges still ahead, we will not rest until the job is done.

Death of Bin Laden Will HURT A l-QaedaMendelsohn 11. [Barak Mendelsohn. Assistant Professor, Haverford College, and Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy ResearchInstitute.The New York Times. May 24, 2011. Accessed July 17, 2011 A Devastating Blow.http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/05/02/the-war-on-terror-after-osama-bin-laden/a-devastating-blow-to-al-qaeda]Osama bin Laden s death is a devastating blow to Al Qaeda, but it is not the end of jihadi terrorism. While it isdemoralizing for the whole jihadi camp, it will not eliminate the motivation to attack the U.S. and is likely totrigger revenge attacks. But from a strategic point of view, Bin Laden s death could mark a critical juncture inthe process of demilitarizing the war on terrorism and the beginning of the end for the U.S. presence inAfghanistan Although his operational role has greatly diminished since 9/11, he was still vital for Al Qaeda s existence. He devised the group sstrategy, and was a unique symbol of resistance. Others may prove to be better strategists but no individual, including hislieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, possesses a similar aura of invincibility and appeal among jihadists.Bin Laden s demise also puts the future of the broader Al Qaeda network in doubt. Groups that sworeallegiance to bin Laden himself may not accept the authority of his successor. The leadership of Al Qaeda sbranch in the Arabian Peninsula, which in the past couple of years eclipsed the central organization, may evenpresent a direct challenge to the leadership in South Asia and vie for leadership of the jihadi movement In thelonger run, Bin Laden s death improves the prospects of ending the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan. He was a liability for the Taliban who havemuch greater interest in regaining control over Afghanistan than waging a global jihad. The Taliban will now have an easier time distancing itself


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from Al Qaeda and reasserting its authority over its remnants. With Bin Laden gone, the global war on terrorism can takeanother step away from its earlier focus on the battlefield and toward dealing with terrorism throughintelligence and police work.

Barno 11. [David Barno. US Army Lieutenant General (Ret.) and Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security.The New YorkTimes. May 2, 2011. Accessed July 17, 2011. A New Kind of Defense. http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/05/02/the-war-on-terror-after-osama-bin-laden/a-new-kind-of-defense]The death of Osama bin Laden marks the most significant U.S. victory to date in the war on terrorism. Its fullconsequences may not be known for months or even years, but the violent death of Al Qaeda s leader in Pakistan during a U.S. strike is without

question a "game changer." Bin Laden s importance came not from his daily direction of Al Qaeda cells around theworld, but from the inspiration that his iconic leadership has provided. His image, words and videos have allserved to motivate and energize a growing franchise of like-minded, deadly groups. Bin Laden alive could feedand nurture that demand; Bin Laden dead cannot. His death unravels that critical motivational thread, andone that is unlikely to be replaced. Al Qaeda is a brand built on one man s personality and apocalyptic vision,and has just suffered a blow that, over time, may well prove lethal . For now, it remains a deadly, diffused organization -- butits end may now be more imaginable.

A FP 11. [AFP. AsiaOne News. June 19, 2011. Accessed July 18, 2011. Weak Al-Qaeda Could Splinter: Gates.http://www.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne%2BNews/World/Story/A1Story20110619-284921.html]US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Sunday that Al-Qaeda had been seriously degraded and could split into a set of regional terror groups now

that Osama bin Laden was gone." First of all, they have been significantly weakened. There's just no two ways about it,"Gates told CNN's "State of the Union" program, explaining that bin Laden was not the only Al-Qaeda figure tohave been killed recently. "We have taken a real toll on them over the last, particularly the last two years," hesaid. Al-Qaeda on Thursday named long-time number two Ayman al-Zawahiri as its new leader after bin Ladenwas killed by US commandos in the dead of night in a May 2 raid on his hideout in Pakistan. Zawahiri has been portrayed by USofficials as a pale imitation of bin Laden, someone, they say, who lacks his predecessor's charisma andleadership skills and is also a divisive figure who could fracture Al-Qaeda. "The question is whether Zawahiri,the new leader taking bin Laden's place, can hold these groups together in some kind of a cohesive movement,or whether it begins to splinter, and they become essentially regional terrorist groups that are more focusedon regional targets. And we just don't know that yet," Gates said.

Nichols 11. [Tristan Nichols. Defence Reporter, British Forces News. British Forces News. May 10, 2011. Accessed July 18, 2011.Petraeus: Al Qaeda Weakened by Bin Laden death. http://bfbs.com/news/afghanistan/petraeus-al-qaeda-weakened-bin-laden-

death-47411.html]Gen Petraeus said bin Laden's death may make it easier for the Taleban to renounce al Qaeda, a condition for reconciliation talks set by Nato and

the Afghan government. Bin Laden's demise might weaken al Qaeda from within, Gen Petraeus said, because binLaden's personality and aura were a key for raising money for the world jihad group, and without him, thegroup's worldwide network might fall apart under his successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri. "Ayman al-Zawahiri is noOsama bin Laden," Gen Petraeus said.

Groups often pldege allegiance to OBL, not al-QaedaBBC 2006. [BBC. September 13, 2006. Al Qaeda Issues France Threat . http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5345202.stm]A radical Algerian Islamist group known as the GSPC pledged its allegiance to al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Ladenand vowed to pursue jihad in Algeria, according to a statement posted on the internet on Thursday."We pledge allegiance to sheikhOsama bin Laden ... We will pursue our jihad in Algeria. Our soldiers are at his call so that he may strike who and where he likes," said thestatement signed by Abu Mossaab Abdelwadud, the emir of the group.


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Damage Primarily in More C entralized areasGreenblatt 2011. [Alan Greenblatt. May 3, 2011. GOVERNING Correspondent.NPR. Without Bin Laden, How Dangerous is al

Qaeda? http://www.npr.org/2011/05/03/135953238/without-bin-laden-how-dangerous-is-al-qaida]

"F inding and killing Osama bin Laden is a huge blow to al-Qaida in Pakistan and A fghanistan, because it shows they're vulnerable even inside Pakistan, " says Kori Schake , a defense analyst at West Point and the Hoover Institution. " It will have less effect on al-Qaida cells in Yemen and the Horn of A frica, which seem to operateindependently. "

A l-Qaeda Isn t Suceeding In Its A ttacksJacobsen 10. [Anna Jacobsen. Contributing Editor, The Los Angeles Times. The Los Angeles Times. November 8, 2010. Accessed July18, 2011. Has Al-Qaeda Become the Weak Horse? http://backstory.latimesmagazine.com/2010/11/has-al-qaeda-become-the-weak-horse.html]

Five plots to wreak havoc with explosives in the United States have failed spectacularly or been thwartedintelligently in a little over a year . The Christmas Day underwear bomber s weapon fizzled midair on a Delta flight over Detroit.Then Faisal Shahzad s explosive-packed SUV failed to detonate in Times Square. In February, Afghan immigrant Najibullah Zazi pled guilty to trying tokill New York subway travelers in a 9/11 anniversary attack. Just last month, two bombs headed from Yemen to Chicago in airplanes wired and set

to explode were located before they blew up. All this makes Al Qaeda look not just weak but lame. Is Al Qaeda worried would-beterrorists are shying away? Given the degree to which they have upped their propaganda campaign of late, itappears so . It is not just Gadahn, aka Azzam al-Amriki, who has appeared in high-profile terrorist videos and audio messages in recent days.The American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki on the run from a U.S. presidential kill-or-capture order recentlymade a recruiting video urging that Americans be killed. (The head of England s MI5 called al-Awlaki theWestern world s public enemy number one.) And Al Qaeda s number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri, releasedan audiotapecalling on Muslims to seek revenge for the U.S. court sentencing of Pakistani scientist AafiaSiddiqui.

A l-Qaeda is Being Weakened Jenkins 11. [Brian Michael Jenkins. Senior Advisor to the President, RAND Corp. Testimony before the House. June 2011. AccessedJuly 19, 2011. Al-Qaeda After Bin Laden: Implications For US Strategy.http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2011/RAND_CT365.pdf]We have made considerable progress in the past ten years. Al Qaeda s operational capabilities clearly havebeen degraded. Its leadership has been decimated, its tiny army scattered. It has not been able to launch amajor terrorist operation in the West since 2005 . But we have not dented its determination to continue its campaign.The death of bin Laden does not end al Qaeda s global terrorist campaign. The reported elevation of Ayman al-Zawahiri as al Qaeda s leader suggests that bin

Laden s focus on attacking the United States will continue after his death. Al Qaeda after bin Laden is likely to be even moredecentralized, its threat more diffuse. While he was alive, bin Laden was able to impose aunanimity of focus onhis inherently fractious enterprise. No successor will speak with bin Laden s authority. Al Qaeda could becomea collection of autonomous field commands, presided over by a central command, united only in its beliefs.


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A l Qaeda is Weaker

Recruiting is DownGreenblatt 2011. [Alan Greenblatt. May 3, 2011. GOVERNING Correspondent.NPR. Without Bin Laden, How Dangerous is alQaeda? http://www.npr.org/2011/05/03/135953238/without-bin-laden-how-dangerous-is-al-qaida ]

Al-Qaida may now not only be less organized but less able to recruit new members, suggests Richard Fontaine ,a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.


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We are Killing Terrorist Leaders

We Must Kill Leaders to Defeat al QaedaHoffman 08. [Bruce Hoffman. Professor, Georgetown School of Foreign Service, and Senior Fellow, US Military s CombatingTerrorism Center at West Point. Foreign Affairs Magazine. May/June 2008. Accessed July 20, 2011. Th Myth of GrassrootsTerrorism. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63408/bruce-hoffman/the-myth-of-grass-roots-terrorism?page=show]Defeating al Qaeda will require analysis grounded in sound empirical judgment and not blinded by provocative theories, seductive methodologies,or wishful thinking. Moreover, the United States and its allies must refocus their attention on Afghanistan and Pakistan, where al Qaeda began to

collapse after 9/11 but has now regrouped. And they must recognize that al Qaeda cannot be defeated by military means alone. Success willrequire a dual strategy of systematically destroying and weakening enemy capabilities -- that is, continuing tokill or capture senior al Qaeda leaders -- and breaking the cycle of terrorist recruitment among Sageman'sradicalized "bunches of guys." Only by destroying the organization's leadership and disrupting the continuedresonance of its radical message can the United States and its allies defeat al Qaeda.

Killing Leaders Has Worked in the past to Weaken Terror GroupsJohnston 11. [Patrick Johnston. Research Fellow, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairsat Harvard University.Belfer Center. July 2011. Accessed July 25, 2011. Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation inCounterinsurgency Claims. http://patrickjohnston.info/materials/decapitation.pdf]This consensus is premature. Cumulative knowledge on the e ects of leader removalremains both scant and inconclusive. Contrary to claimsthat removing leaders never works, one can point to numerous examples where the imprisonment or deathof key militants appears to have played an important role in weakening or defeating militant organizations: The1992 capture of Shining Path leader Abimeal Guzman, for example, crippled the group s bid for power in Peru;the 1999 capture of Abdullah Ocalan precipitated the decline of the PKK in Turkey; and the collaboration of

captured Red Brigades leaders with Italian authorities during the late 1970s led the organization to implode.Moreover , contrary to Pape s assertions, scholars conducting large-N studies have recently found evidence thatinterstate wars may be more likely to end when leaders are removed . In a study of national leader assassinations between1952 and 1997,Iqbal and Zorn (2008) nd evidence of a conditional relationship between assassination,leadership succession, and political stability;particularly noteworthy is their ndingthat assassination has had the strongest e ect on political turmoil in countries whoseleadership successionprocesses or procedures are informal or unregulated. Similarly,a study by Jones and Olken concludes that there is weak evidence thatsuccessfulassassination attempts, compared to failed assassination attempts, tend to hastenthe end of intense wars (i.e., wars with greater than1,000 battle deaths). However,Jones and Olken s results suggest that although the e ect is quite large in magnitude,it is only marginally signi cant;they nd that it is insigni cant when case selectionis restricted to the post World War II period and note that the post-war resultsare di cult tointerpret because there were few intense wars after 1946 in theirsample (Jones and Olken, 2009). Likewise, Mannes analysis of terroristleadershipdecapitation suggests some indication that decapitation strikes can be e ective inreducing terrorist group incidents (2008, 43-44).However, these ndings were neitherstatistically signi cant nor consistent across di erent speci cations.Finally, in amicro-level study of Israeli high-value targeting during the Second Intifada, MohammedHafez and Joseph Hat eld conclude that Israel s strategy has met with decidedlymixed

results: Hafez and Hat eld nd no conclusive evidence that high-value targetinghas either increased or decreased Israel s counterterrorisme ectiveness (Hafez andHat eld, 2006, 371). Taken together, these studies provide preliminary evidence that leadershipdecapitation can be e ective. However, there are reasons to believe that leadership decapitation might beeven more e ective than these studies suggest . Three primaryreasons are delineated below.

Other Studies of the Success of Killing Leaders A re F lawed Success is Bigger Johnston 11. [Patrick Johnston. Research Fellow, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairsat Harvard University.Belfer Center. July 2011. Accessed July 25, 2011. Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation inCounterinsurgency Claims. http://patrickjohnston.info/materials/decapitation.pdf]


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However, there are reasons to believe that leadership decapitation might be even more e ective than thesestudies suggest. Three primary reasons are delineated below. First, almost every study of leadershipdecapitation in the security studies literature rests on a no-variance research design.By only examining caseswhere opposing leaders were captured or killed, these studies cannot by de nition make precise, quali ed

inferences about the general e ectiveness of decapitation or the importance of leaders in war. Second,previous research has set the bar unrealistically high for decapitation to be considered a success. Leadershipremovals have generally been coded as failures unless they led to quick victories or the immediate collapse of insurgent or terrorist organizations . While this may be a reasonable way of assessing the proximate impactof leadership removals, itthreatens to lead scholars to neglect leadership decapitation s impact on key factors such as militantorganizations cohesion, capacity, morale, and strategies. Third, previous studies have not addressed importantmethodological issues that stem from the non-random assignment of leadership decapitation in war. Enemyleaders tend to be targeted at key moments of wars, when governments are either more or less likely to win (Fearon and Laitin 2008, 39-42; Jones and Olken 2009). A host of inferential threats, including selection bias and confoundingfactors, arise from this non-randomness. Failing to account for these issues threatens our ability to identifyleadership decapitation s causal e ects.

This article addresses each of these challenges. I employ a data-driven approach tounderstand whether leadership decapitation in uences thedynamics and outcomes ofcounterinsurgency campaigns. This approach is oriented to identifying decapitation scausal impact. To do this, I analyze alarge number of cases in which governmentsattempted, successfully or unsuccessfully, to remove top insurgent leaders. Analyzingthe success orfailure of attempts to decapitate insurgencies is part of a researchstrategy to use instances of failure to control for successes.Successful andfailedattempts are not pre-determined. Attempts fail more often than they succeed, andoften for unforeseen or idiosyncratic reasons. This variationis exploited to constructplausible counterfactual scenarios that enable me to study di erences in the politicaland military outcomes that follow

successful and failed attempts. The results of my analysis demonstrate that removing insurgent leaders has animportant impact on counterinsurgency outcomes. In brief, decapitating insurgencies appears to (1) increasethe chances of speedy war terminations; (2) enhance the probability of campaign outcomes favorable to thecounterinsurgent; (3) reduce the intensity of violent con ict; and (4) reduce insurgent-initiated attacks, such asarmed attacks and kidnappings.

Killing Leaders Increases Probability of Terrorist F ailure by 27%Johnston 11. [Patrick Johnston. Research Fellow, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairsat Harvard University.Belfer Center. July 2011. Accessed July 25, 2011. Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation inCounterinsurgency Claims. http://patrickjohnston.info/materials/decapitation.pdf]The results displayed in Table 3 suggest that campaigns are more likely to end after leadership decapitation.The estimate shown in Column 1 suggests that leadership decapitation increases the probability of wartermination by 27 percentage points ,with a standard error of 0.079, and the result is signi cant at the one percent level.This result isrobust: The estimates displayed in Columns 2, 3, and 4 range from0.249 to 0.290, and all of the speci cations are signi cant at the one percentlevel.Moreover, in each speci cation, the lower bound of the 95 percent con dence intervalof the estimate is above zero. These change little whenattempt type or region xede ects are included. They are also robust to non-parametric modeling; in each of thenon-parametric speci cations, theresults are signi cant at the one percent level.


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Drone Strikes Good

Drones Important in F ighting Terror Katrandijan 11. [Olivia Katrandijan. Staff Writer, ABC News. ABC News. June 4, 2011. Accessed July 20, 2011. Al Qaeda LeaderReported Killed By US Missile Attack in Pakistan.If true, it would be another giant coup for U.S. intelligence. Unlike bin Laden, who was hiding in a compound, U.S. officials say, Kashmiri was actively

involved in plotting and directing attacks. According to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who is in the region, theAmerican drone-fired missile strikes have played a crucial role in the war on terror. "First of all it has to beacknowledged that these drones have played a significant role in taking a lot of Taliban leaders and trainers off the table," Gates told ABC News.

Number of Strike C asualties Exaggerated Williams 11. [Brian Glyn Williams. Associate Professor of History, University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth.Combating TerrorismCenter. March 1, 2011. Accuracy of the U.S. Drone Campaign: The Views of a PakistaniGeneral. http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/accuracy-of-the-u-s-drone-campaign-the-views-of-a-pakistani-general]In all of the above cases, those citing high civi lian casualties have not explained their methodology for accumulating data, and they have only

pointed to confidential Pakistani government statements. Yet a careful analysis of the Pakistani media s own accounts of dronestrikes reveals a striking contradiction. In most specific cases when a drone strike occurs, Pakistani sourcesdescribe the majority of victims as militants, not civilians. A case-by-case analysis of Pakistani and Westernreports of drone strikes by this author and two colleagues at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth foundthat a mere 5% of the victims of drone strikes were described as civilians in press accounts .[9] A study byPeter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann at the New America Foundation similarly found that in 2010approximately 6% of those killed in drone strikes were listed as civilians in media reports .[10] Researchcompleted by The Long War Journal on drone strikes from 2004-2011 indicates thatapproximately 108 civilians

were killed in drone strikes while 1,816 Taliban and al-Qa`ida extremists were killed their study also relied onpress reports.

C ivilian C asualties Minimal Mostly Militants Killed Williams 10. [Brian Glyn Williams. Associate Professor of History, University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth.The JamestownFoundation Terrorism Monitor. November 11, 2010. New Light on the Accuracy of CIA s Predator Drone Campaign inPakistan.http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37165&cHash=225c88ad12]According to our database, as of June 19, 2010, there have been a total of 144 confirmed CIA drone strikes inPakistan, killing a total of 1,372 people. Of those killed, only 68 (or 4.95%) could be clearly identified ascivilians, while 1,098 (or 80%) were reported to be militants or suspected militants (see Figure 4). As theseterms are used somewhat interchangeably by the Pakistani press, we simply classified all of them as

suspected militants. This category of suspected militants includes 50 high value targets that is, al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders, whetherlocal commanders or senior militant chiefs. The status of the remaining 206 (or 15% of) individuals killed in drone strikescould not be ascertained, and consequently they were assigned to the category unknown . The inclusion of thisindeterminate category is admittedly frustrating but unavoidable given the limited and sometimes contradictory reports emanating from the

inaccessible tribal areas. It is important to stress, however, that even if every single unknown is assumed to in factbe a civilian, the vast majority of fatalities would remain suspected militants rather than civilians indeed, bymore than a 4:1 ratio. [3] On the more precise count of civilians (leaving unknowns aside), we found an evenmore imbalanced ratio of approximately 16.5 suspected militant fatalities for each civilian death. [4] Equallystriking, we found a 1.36 to 1 (or close to 1 to 1) ratio of civilians to high value target fatalities (in stark contrast withMir s 49 to 1 report). Finally, in contrast to Mir s report of 123 civilian casualties in January 2010 (with only 3 al-Qaeda targets killed), we found 0


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civilians, 85 suspected militants and 16 unknowns killed in that month.

We also wanted to be careful to address any concerns that Western papers, including those of record like the New York Times and the WashingtonPost, might be underreporting civilian casualties, and that by relying at t imes on their stories we were introducing a downward bias into thatelement of our data. We therefore ran a second analysis, applying the same categories and criteria solely to the Pakistani news sources (specifically,

Dawn, The Daily Times and The News). The results were even more striking. We found reports of 1,061 suspected militants killed,48 civilians, and 251 unknowns, for a ratio of 22.1:1:5.2. Although some ambiguity is suggested by the slightlyhigher number of unknowns, the lower absolute number of civilians in the Pakistani data along with the higherproportion of suspected militants to civilians indicates that, if anything, leading Western news sources areleaning towards over-reporting the number of civilian casualties and underreporting suspected militants killed,at least in relation to representative local news sources. At any rate, we take this result based solely onPakistani data to reinforce our main finding of a surprisingly high reported rate of suspected militant fatalitiesto civilians , particularly in the l ight of a number of widely circulated stories sharply to the contrary.

A s number of drone strikes has increased, number of civilian deaths hasdecreased Williams 10. [Brian Glyn Williams. Associate Professor of History, University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth.The JamestownFoundation Terrorism Monitor. November 11, 2010. New Light on the Accuracy of CIA s Predator Drone Campaign inPakistan.http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37165&cHash=225c88ad12]Our data also revealed that despite a substantial intensification of the Predator strikes starting in 2008 andaccelerating through 2009 into 2010, and the broadening of target categories to include low level PakistaniTaliban, the ratio of suspected militant to civilian fatalities has remained steadily high and has gradually (if unevenly) improved . [6] After incremental increases in attacks from one in 2004 and three in 2005, 2006 and 2007, strikes escalated drasticallyto 33 in 2008, 54 in 2009 and 30 in the first three months of 2010 alone (See Figure 3). Still, far from showing a reduction of accuracy as the campaign has accelerated, our data shows that the ratio of suspected militant to civilian deathshas improved from the approximate 6:1 and 7.8:1 ratios that characterized 2004 and 2006 respectively, to 13:1

in 2005 and 14.067:1 in 2008, peaking in 2007 and 2010 (up to June 19) when no confirmed civilian deathswere reported (see Figure 2). [7]


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Lower Threat of Terrorism

C ounter Terror Efforts Have Decreased Threat, But it Still ExistsClarke 10. [Richard A. Clarke. Former US National Security Advisor.The Washington Post.May 9, 2010. Accessed July 17, 2011. TheTimes Square Bomb Failed. What will we do when the next bomb works? http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/07/AR2010050702257.html]On Christmas Day, a 23-year-old Nigerian engineering student allegedly tried to destroy an airplane flying into Detroit. One week ago, an Americancitizen of Pakistani origin allegedly attempted to detonate a car bomb in New York's Times Square. Neither effort succeeded -- not because U.S.authorities intercepted the attackers, but because the bombmaking skills of the wannabe terrorists were lacking. In both instances, much of the

subsequent debate has centered on how the attacks were able to get as far as they did. The unfortunate fact is that such cases represent akind of terrorism that is virtually impossible to disrupt. These attempts will continue, and from time to timeone of them will succeed, with many dead and injured . The more relevant question, therefore, is: How will we respond whenthat car bomb does go off? Third, it is an objective and undeniable fact that U.S. counterterrorism efforts havereduced the overall threat from what it was a few years ago. So we must not assume that a successful attack

indicates that our antiterrorism efforts have, on balance, failed. We will hold on to what is working and beagile in response to evolving threats.


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A ssists US Mission in Middle East

Killing Bin Laden Makes Taliban C ooperation Easier Nichols 11. [Tristan Nichols. Defence Reporter, British Forces News. British Forces News. May 10, 2011. Accessed July 18, 2011.

Petraeus: Al Qaeda Weakened by Bin Laden death. http://bfbs.com/news/afghanistan/petraeus-al-qaeda-weakened-bin-laden-death-47411.html]The US military commander in Afghanistan says the killing of Osama bin Laden may weaken al Qaeda's influence on the Afghan Taliban.But

General David Petraeus warned that Afghanistan is still a potential refuge for international terror groups, and al Qaeda is just one of those.He also warned that the April 29 US raid that killed the al Qaeda leader in his Pakistani compound did not spell the end of the Nato battle inAfghanistan.The mission began one month after the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington with the aim of wiping out al Qaedaand bin Laden.Nato officials have said they do not intend to speed up their withdrawal just because al Qaeda's leader is gone, but the military feels

it may bring the Taliban closer to negotiations with the Afghan government.Gen Petraeus said the strong link between al Qaeda andthe Taliban was personal, not organisational. "The deal between the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda was betweenMullah Omar and Osama bin Laden, not the organisations," he said as he visited US troops in easternAfghanistan. Gen Petraeus said bin Laden's death may make it easier for the Taleban to renounce al Qaeda, acondition for reconciliation talks set by Nato and the Afghan government.

Fisher 11. [Max Fisher. Associate Editor, The Atlantic. The Atlantic. May 2, 2011. Accessed July 18, 2011. How Bin Laden s DeathCould Help End the Afghan War. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/05/how-bin-ladens-death-could-help-end-the-afghan-war/238191/]Though Obama appears determined to end the Afghan War, as of 24 hours ago he still faced two significant obstacles: a U.S. political and culturaldynamic unready to declare an end to hostilities with the Taliban, and a Taliban that may have been ideologically incapable of breaking with al-

Qaeda's mandate for endless, existential war against the U.S. and accepting peace. Both sides of the conflict understand the generalframework of peace -- government participation for the Taliban, persistent if lower-scale U.S. presence, andbreaking the Taliban from al-Qaeda -- but are restrained by their own domestic politics. Bin Laden's death willloosen those restraints and make both the U.S. and Taliban more able to sell their people on peace. The

Taliban may not be a democratic organization, but, like all insurgencies, it is utterly dependent on the activesupport and participation not just of its fighters but of their communities and the communities of Afghanvillages on and off the front lines. That grassroots support is largely incumbent on expelling foreign militariesand reclaiming Islamist governance in Kabul -- issues that have nothing to do with al-Qaeda's global mission --but the Taliban could not maintain their support if they crossed bin Laden. The al-Qaeda leader has been an inspiring andgalvanizing force for Afghan fighters since in the 1980s Soviet invasion, long before the Taliban even existed, and remains a crucial recruiting tool inthe ongoing war. But bin Laden would never have accepted peace, which means the Taliban was unable to sell many of its rank-and-file on anegotiated settlement.

Bin Laden's death could "free up" the Taliban's options in Afghanistan, says al-Qaeda expert and formerAustralian counterterrorism official Leah Farrall. "Bin Laden's profile has been so much higher than anyone

else's in al-Qaeda, so with him gone, that organization will continue but it's going to have a bit of strategicuncertainty. And that just gives the Taliban some space. It also gives them some deniability as well." With al-Qaeda's most high-profile leader gone, and the Taliban's closest link to the group severed, the Talibanleadership will have a much easier time claiming whatever ideological guidance from al-Qaeda it wants. "Ithink the Taliban's very much got the withdrawal date in its sight, and that's what directs their action.""They're not going to condemn or publicly disassociate themselves from al-Qaeda in a way that challenges al-Qaeda's legitimacy," Farrall says, but"having Bin Laden out of the way does them give them a little bit more room for maneuver." Bin Laden's hard line against the U.S. and against peace

made it difficult for the Taliban to justify. "I do think they were fenced in" by bin Laden, "and the one that's always comeout about bin Laden, particularly with regards to the Taliban, is that no one could control him."


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Rogin 2011. [Joshua Rogin. Staff Writer, Congressional Quarterly. Foreign Policy. May 4, 2011. Clinton: Taliban more likely tonegotiate after bin Laden death.http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/04/clinton_taliban_more_likely_to_negotiate_after_bin_laden_death]"In Afghanistan, we have to continue to take the fight to al Qaeda and its Taliban allies. Perhaps now they will take seriously the work that we aredoing on trying to have some reconciliation process that resolves the insurgency," Clinton said on Wednesday to a conference of editorial writers at

the State Department. "So our message to the Taliban hasn't changed; it just has even greater resonance today. They can't wait us out, they can'tdefeat us; they need to come into the political process and denounce al Qaeda and renounce violence and agree to abide by the laws and

constitution of Afghanistan." Clinton said that bin Laden's death would make al Qaeda and the Taliban more likely tostrike a deal in Afghanistan because they will have no grand leader to rally around. "Well, a lot of people say, well, [binLaden's deputy Ayman] al-Zawahiri will step into it. But that's not so clear. He doesn't have the same sense of loyalty or inspiration or track record,"she said. "I mean, bin Laden was viewed as a military warrior. He had fought in Afghanistan. He wasn't an intellectual. He wasn't just a talker. He hadbeen a fighter, so he carried with him a quite significant mystique." "The Taliban did not give up al Qaeda when President Bush asked them to after

9/11, because ofMullah Omar's personal relationship with bin Laden. That's gone, so I think it opens uppossibilities for dealing with the Taliban that did not exist before."

Easier to End War in A fghanistanReuters 11. [Reuters News.Thomson Reuters Foundation. May 3, 2011. Accessed July 20, 2011. Bin Laden May Hasten AfghanSettlement. http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/analysis-bin-laden-death-may-hasten-afghan-settlement/]Osama bin Laden's death helps clear the way for a political settlement in Afghanistan by making it easier forthe Taliban to sever ties with al Qaeda. But many other obstacles remain in reaching a negotiated end to the Afghan war, includingregional rivalry and competing demands of different groups inside Afghanistan. "Things are falling into their correct place," said onePakistani official, who declined to be named. "Osama bin Laden's killing may lead us towards an end-game."

"...it will be easier for the Taliban to distance itself from al Qaeda after bin Laden's death," Gilles Dorronsorowrote in a post at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace . In a report which has acquired new relevance after binLaden's death, international experts at The Century Foundation said in March one way to make the break would be for

the Taliban to declare an end to the more than 30 years of jihad in Afghanistan which began with the Sovietinvasion in 1979. In a post on The Century Foundation website, foreign policy specialist Jeffrey Laurenti saidthe death of bin Laden, with whom Mullah Omar had shared personal ties, made that easier. "The Talibaninner circle has long debated the wisdom of the movement's alignment with al Qaeda, but the high esteem inwhich the Taliban 'commander of the faithful', Mullah Mohammed Omar, was said to hold bin Laden as a piousMuslim warrior has long been decisive in squelching any talk of a divorce," he said. "We cannot know if MullahOmar's determination not to betray bin Laden will prove as fierce for any successor."


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A l-Qaeda Will Not Have Huge Retaliation

No New Terrorist A ttacks That Wouldn t Have Happened A nywaysJenkins 11. [Brian Michael Jenkins. Senior Advisor to the President, RAND Corp. National Journal.May 12, 2011. Accessed July 19,2011. Al-Qaeda After Bin Laden. http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/05/12/NJ.html]Al Qaeda will seek to carry out some dramatic act of revenge eventually to demonstrate to its foes, and more importantly its followers that binLaden's death does not end the terrorist campaign. But al Qaeda would be doing exactly the same thing had bin Laden not been killed.Meanwhile,

bin Laden's death may inspire spontaneous attacks by self-proclaimed jihadists anywhere in the world, but planned terrorist attacks takelonger to prepare. Al Qaeda operates at capacity, attacking when it can. It has no terrorist reserves waiting tobe ordered into battle. For now, al Qaeda's warnings of revenge will remain the realm of rhetoric. Whatever iteventually succeeds in doing will be labeled as retaliation, but there will be no new terrorist attack thatotherwise would not have occurred.

Blowback Theory: No Increase in A l Qaeda MembershipSanger 10. [David E. Sanger. Chief Washington Correspondent, The New York Times. The New York Times. June 30, 2010. AccessedJuly 26, 2011. New Estimate of Strength of Al Qaeda is Offered. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/01/world/asia/01qaeda.html]Michael E. Leiter, one of the country s top counterterrorism officials, said Wednesday that Americanintelligence officials now estimated that there were somewhat more than 300 Qaeda leaders and fightershiding in Pakistan s tribal areas , a rare public assessment of the strength of the terrorist group that is the central target of PresidentObama s war strategy. Taken together with the recent estimate by the C.I.A. director, Leon E. Panetta, that there areabout 50 to 100 Qaeda operatives now in Afghanistan, American intelligence agencies believe that there aremost likely fewer than 500 members of the group in a region where the United States has poured nearly 100,000 troops.

Silverstein 06. [Ken Silverstein. Washington Editor, Harper s Magazine. Harper s Magazine. July 5, 2006. Accessed July 26, 2011.The Al-Qaeda Clubhouse: Members lacking. http://harpers.org/archive/2006/07/sb-al-qaeda-new-members-badly-needed-

1151963690]Two years ago, I interviewed Jack Cloonan, a 25-year veteran of the FBI who, between 1996 and 2002, served on a joint CIA FBI task force that tracked bin Laden . How many members of Al Qaeda do you think there are? he asked me. Cloonanlaughed when I pegged its membership at several thousand. The real numbers, he said, are miniscule. Documents discovered by the joint task force, Cloonan said, showed that Al Qaeda had 72 members when it was founded in 1989. Twelveyears later, the task force got its hands on an updated membership list after a CIA Predator destroyed abuilding near Kabul during the American invasion of Afghanistan. The membership list was discovered in therubble, along with dozens of casualties, including Mohammed Atef, one of bin Laden's closest aides. It showedthat bin Laden had a grand total of precisely 198 sworn loyalists. (Hirsh's Newsweek article said that the intelligencecommunity generally agrees that the number of true A-list Al Qaeda operatives at the time of 9/11 probably between 500 and 1,000, most of

them in and around Afghanistan.) A lot of people went through Al Qaeda training camps over the years, said Cloonan,but that doesn't mean they have sworn allegiance to bin Laden or taken part in terrorist acts.


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huge dividends, and North Korea, as a nuclear "rogue state," garnered the solicitous attention of many other powers. Washington's bribes of oil andfood deliveries were flanked by its offers of civilian nuclear assistance; never has nuisance value been parlayed so profitably into political and

economic gain. The main focus of all proliferators since China, in short, has been regional. As the Duelfer report,based on the debriefing of captured Iraqi officials following the Iraq war by the Iraq Survey Group, revealed,Saddam had not armed against Israel, let alone against any of the official nuclear powers: "Saddam's rationalefor the possession of [weapons of mass destruction] derived from a need for survival and domination . . .particularly regarding Iran."

Numerous F ailures to Prevent Nations from Pursuing NukesKatz 2007. [Jonathon I. Katz. Professor of Physics at Washington University.Washington University Department of Physics.November 12, 2007. Lessons Learned From Nonproliferation Successes and Failures . http://wuphys.wustl.edu/~katz/ctbt.pdf]There have been a number of nonproliferation successes (Germany, Iraq, Taiwan, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Libya, Syria) and failures(USSR, France, China, India, Pakistan, probably Israel, North Korea [DPRK]), and at least one potentialproliferator (Iran) whose future is uncertain . The successes are heterogeneous: some resulted from direct military or paramilitaryaction, while others followed changes in the political situation that removed the strategic rationale for or the willingness to pay the economic andpolitical price of proliferation. The failures have in common a proliferator that perceived a compelling strategic need for nuclear weapons. Suchcountries resist outside pressures, and may reap the benefits of proliferation even if their weapons are untested.

Younger 2009. [Stephen M. Younger. Staff Writer, WallStreet Journal. Wall Street Journal. January 10, 2009. Taming the NuclearDragon .http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123154631955669739.html]The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970, signed by 190 countries, was intended to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and ul timately

create a bomb-free world. It will come up for review next year and it is in serious danger of unraveling.North Korea has done amasterful job of stalling the reversal of its weapons program, and Iran steadfastly refuses to allow inspectorsinto its nuclear facilities. Pakistan celebrated its 1998 nuclear test as a demonstration of an "Islamic Bomb," afrightening prospect given the current violence in Gaza . Never has nuclear proliferation -- and the treaty that for nearly fourdecades has kept it in check -- been a more serious issue on the world agenda.

The most important element of the NPT is the promise by nations without nuclear weapons not to develop them. In exchange, they receiveassistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology for energy, medicine and industry. The existing nuclear states -- the United States, the Soviet

Union, Great Britain, France and China -- agreed to "general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." OnlyIndia, Israel and Pakistan declined to participate. (North Korea signed, but then withdrew in 2003 andconducted a nuclear test in 2006.) Many countries are now capable of creating their own bombs and somebelieve that they need them to deter attacks from neighbors.

Toon 07. [Owen B. Toon. Professor at the University of Colorado. March 2, 2007. Consequences of Regional-Scale NuclearConflicts .http://bilge.pyrate.mailbolt.com/20070313ConsequencesOfRegionalNuclearConflicts.pdf]

Eight nations are known to have nuclearweapons . In addition, North Korea may havea small, but growing, arsenal.Iran appears tobe seeking nuclear weapons capability , butit probably needs several years to obtainenough fissionablematerial. Of great concern, 32 other nations includingBrazil, Argentina, Japan, South Korea, andTaiwan have sufficientfissionable materials to produce weapons. A de factonuclear arms race has emerged in Asiabetween China,India, and Pakistan, whichcould expand to include North Korea, SouthKorea, Taiwan, and Japan. In the MiddleEast, a nuclear confrontation between Israeland Iran would be fearful . Saudi Arabia andEgypt could also seek nuclearweapons tobalance Iran and Israel . Nuclear arms programs in South America, notably in Braziland Argentina, were ended by severaltreaties in the 1990s. We can hope that theseagreements will hold and will serve as amodel for other regions, despite Brazil s new,large uraniumenrichment facilities.


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Peaceful Nuke Program = Stepping Stone to Nuclear Power A lger 09. [Justin Alger. Researcher and Administrator, Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance. Centre for International GovernanceInnovation. September 2009. Accessed July 26, 2011. From Nuclear Energy to the Bomb: The Proliferation Potential of New NuclearEnergy Programs. http://www2.carleton.ca/cctc/ccms/wp-content/ccms-files/Nuclear_Energy_Futures-6.pdf]

Pakistan was highly dependent on outside knowledgeand assistance while building a nuclear device. india,likewise, received training and technologyfrom the usand Canada, including a research reactor that was usedto produce the material for india s 1974 nuclear test.France supported Israel s nuclear program by providing technology and equipment during the 1950s, leading tothe eventual development of theIsraeli nuclear bomb.Further, North Korea received assistance from the sovietunion, which included a research reactor, and was latersuppliedclandestinely by Pakistan which led to its eventual detonation of a nuclear device in 2006. in addition,south Africa received a research reactor and

the highenriched uranium required to fuel i t from the unitedstates, an act viewed as the genesis of its nuclear program. Every case of successful nuclear weapons development since the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came intoeffect in 1970 occurred under the guise of apeaceful nuclear program with the assistance of nuclearsupplierstates .Most transfers of nuclear technology, however, do notinvolve sensitive fuel cycle technology. importing reactorsand the knowledge to buildand operate them is notsufficient for a state to move into weapons development.The state must acquire an independent enrichment orreprocessingcapability, or obtain weapons grade fissile material from another source. Pakistan, israel and NorthKorea all had the benefit of assistance withsensitive fuelcycle technologies from a nuclear supplier.india, on theother hand, used nuclear technology and expertisegained from American andCanadian assistance prior to1974 to autonomously develop a reprocessing capability.The indian and south African cases demonstrate thatevenwithout direct assistance with enrichment or reprocessingtechnology, a state can use an otherwise peaceful nuclearinfrastructure to simplifyits path towards a nuclear device. The scientific knowledge, expertise and infrastructure required for a peaceful nuclearenergy program can provide an opportunity for a state to develop enrichmentand reprocessing technologies.in the context of latentproliferation, a peaceful nuclear energy program isbest characterized as a steppingstone to acquiring thewherewithal for a nuclear device.


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NPT is ineffective

Too Weak and Inflexible C annot Easily Be A mended w/ TeethSokolski 10. [Henry Sokolski. Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army WarCollege. May 2010. Accessed July 19, 2011. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty s Untapped Potential to Prevent Proliferation.Finally, in the practical world, the NPT hardly admits of modification and is far too easy for violating states towithdraw from. Under Article X, treaty members are free to leave the NPT with no more than 3 months noticemerely by filing a statement of the extraordinary events [relating to the subject matter of the treaty] it regardsas having jeopardized its supreme interests. As North Korea demonstrated with its withdrawal from the NPT,these slight requirements are all too easy to meet. As for amending the treaty, it is nearly impossible . Not onlymust a majority of NPT members ratify any proposed amendments, but every member of the IAEA government board and every NPT nuclearweapons state member must ratify the proposal as well, and this is only to get amendments for consideration by those states that have not yet

ratified the NPT. Ultimately, any state that chooses not to so ratify is free to ignore the amendment, and the treatyis functionally unamendable.

C ountries C an Still Get Building Blocks Of Nukes Even F ollowing Treaty Sokolski 10. [Henry Sokolski. Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army WarCollege. May 2010. Accessed July 19, 2011. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty s Untapped Potential to Prevent Proliferation.For all of these reasons, the NPT is not just seen as being weak against violators and difficult to improve, but it is seen effectively as a legalinstrument that enables nations to acquire nuclear weapons technology. Former President George W. Bushhighlighted this in a February 2004 nuclear nonproliferation speech in which he argued that the NPT hadcreated a loophole in promoting all aspects of civilian nuclear technology including nuclear fuel making. Thisallowed proliferating states to cynically manipulate the treaty to develop and acquire nearly all thetechnology and materials they needed to make nuclear weapons . President Bush attempted to shore up the NPT by calling onthe world s nonweapons states that have not yet developed nuclear fuel making to foreswear such activities and to allow more intrusive civiliannuclear inspections in exchange for their assured access to nuclear fuel from those states now producing enriched uranium. Bush s appeal, however,

was hardly successful: Australia, Canada, South African, Iran, and Argentina, among other states, were unwilling togive up their right to make nuclear fuel . Then, in September 2007, Israel bombed a covert Syrian nuclear reactor that was underconstruction. This act of violence, which followed months of intelligence consultations with the United States, was a clear vote of no confidence inthe IAEA nuclear inspections system.

Litman 06. [Leah Litman. Supreme Court Clerk, Justice Anthony Kennedy. Harvard International Review. May 6, 2006. Accesed July20, 2011. Dirty Bombs and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. http://hir.harvard.edu/development-and-modernization/cleaning-house?page=0,1]Other NPT loopholes allow for supply-side proliferation, namely the sale of radioactive materials to otherstates for defense purposes. This is the justification Russia uses in its current arms sales to Iran, in particular

the recent agreement, totaling US$7 billion in defense transactions toward the establishment of a defensivemissile system . Russian President Vladimir Putin defended the sale in an Iran Times article by stating, Iran has a right to defend itself. Russiahas also sold Iran laser enrichment technology for the alleged purpose of nuclear power experimentation. Thisenrichment technology has the potential to convert non-radioactive elements into radioactive material thatcould be used in dirty bombs.

NPT can be used as a cover Scheinman 2005. [Lawrence Scheinman.Top Arms Control Official in the Clinton administration.Council on Foreign Relations.January 27, 2005. Iran, North Korea, and NPT s Loopholes. http://www.cfr.org/iran/scheinman-iran-north-korea-npts-loopholes/p7661]


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Lawrence Scheinman, a top arms control official in the Clinton administration, says he is concerned that Iran is using the cover of the35-year old Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to develop nuclear weapons . Scheinmansays an NPT review conference in May will likely focus on Iran s program, though participants will also discuss North Korea as well. The Iranian case

is more serious, he says, because it raises a question about whether a country can use a civil cover in order to acquire all thetechnology necessary from outside to put together a comprehensive fuel cycle, claiming that it s for civilpurposes, and then exercise the right of withdrawal under the treaty and say, Sorry, things have changed andwe re going to use this for weapons, thank you.

Nuclear Smuggling Has Increased Jones 2002. [Gary L. Jones. Director of the Natural Sources and Environment Department.Government Accountability Office. July30, 2002. Nuclear Nonproliferation: US Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling . http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02989t.pdf]The threat presented by nuclear smuggling is serious and poses national security concerns. Illicit trafficking in or smuggling of nuclearand other radioactive materials occurs worldwide and has reportedly increased in recent years. According tothe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as of December 31, 2001, there have been 181 confirmed casesof illicit trafficking of nuclear materials since 1993. A significant number of cases reported by IAEA involvedmaterial that could be used to produce a nuclear weapon or a device that uses conventional explosives withradioactive material a dirty bomb to spread contamination over a wide area. Nuclear materials can be smuggled across a country sborder through a variety of means: they can be hidden in a car; train; or ship; carried in personal luggage through an airport; or walked across anunprotected border.

Easier to Steal if More C ountries Have WeaponsA llison 2007. [Graham Allison. Director of Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.Council on ForeignRelations. How Likely is a Nuclear Terrorist Attack On the United States? http://www.cfr.org/weapons-of-mass-destruction/likely-nuclear-terrorist-attack-united-states/p13097]We should ask ourselves every day: Are nuclear materials that could fuel a terrorist s bomb more or less secure than they were a year ago? Thanks

to initiatives like the Nunn-Lugar program, highly enriched uranium and plutonium in Russia are far safer from theft today than they were in theearly 1990s. But the risk that terrorists will buy or steal nuclear material from a rogue state increases as morecountries acquire the ability to produce weapons-usable material. Therefore it is vitally important to roll back North Korea snuclear program and to constrain Iran before it reaches its enrichment finish line. By becoming a nuclear-armed state, each will t rigger a cascade of proliferation in its neighborhood

Terrorists C an Easily Obtain HEU Gard 2008. [Lt. Gen. Robert Gard. Senior Military Fellow. Center For Arms Control and Nonproliferation. May 10,2008. NuclearTerrorism is a Likely Event . http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearterrorism/articles/nuclear_terrorism_likely_event/]

It is more likely that terrorists could obtain the key ingredient for making a nuclear bomb, plutonium (Pu) orhighly enriched uranium (HEU). While producing a weapon with Pu is a relatively complex task , there is consensus in thescientific community that it would not be difficult for a terrorist group to produce an explosive device similarto the one used on Hiroshima, with as little as 50 pounds of HEU.The International Panel on Fissile Materialsestimated in its 2007 report that there are 1,400-2,000 tons of HEU, enough for some 56,000-80,000 nuclearweapons, spread around the world .Much of the HEU is in Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union, knownto have weak security regulations and widespread corruption.

NPT enforcement is really, really slow


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Pollack 10. [Joshua Pollack. Consultant to the United States Government.Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. June 2, 2010. AccessedJuly 20, 2011. What nonproliferation diplomacy can and can t achieve. http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/joshua-pollack/what-nonproliferation-diplomacy-can-and-cant-achieve]It goes without saying that the process takes patience and commitment. But it has taken a special brand of patience to create an effective sanctions

regime in response to Iran's noncompliance with i ts nuclear safeguards. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) openedits investigation of Iran's previously undeclared nuclear activities in late 2002, but not until September2005 PDF did the IAEA Board of Governors formally declare Iran to be in noncompliance with its nuclearsafeguards and place the matter on the docket of the U.N. Security Council. Even then, the better part of another year elapsed before the Security Council adopted itsfirst resolution PDF on Iran's nuclear program,demanding the suspension of all activities related to enrichment or reprocessing. Faced with Iran's refusal toaccept the demand as legitimate, the Security Council adopted three additional resolutions over threeconsecutive years (i.e., 2006 PDF, 2007 PDF, 2008 PDF) imposing limited sanctions. In September 2008, the SecurityCouncil, divided over the merits of additional penalties, adopted a fifth resolution PDF that merely affirmedwhat had come before. Progress has been slow by any standard. After many delays, the Security Council is onlynow approaching a fourth round of sanctions . The draft resolution PDF recently agreed upon by the permanent members of theSecurity Council does not threaten any of the oil and gas or nuclear power deals that Iran has arranged with its trade partners, but authorizes new

interdiction measures and creates new obstacles for imports of conventional arms, missile tests, and the financing of proliferation. Meanwhile,Iran shows no inclination to meet the demands of the Security Council, insisting that it enjoys an unconditionalright to enrichment and reprocessing under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). So why, despite Iran's record of concealment and intransigence, has it been this difficult to reach a consensus on sanctions?

NPT effectiveness has decreased World at Risk 08 [Commission on thePrevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction of Proliferation and Terrorism. 2008. World atRisk: Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism. http://www.preventwmd.org/world_at_risk_nuclear_proliferation_and_terrorism/]Among the other tests facing the IAEA is the inherent difficulty of reliably detecting dangerous illicit nuclearactivities in a timely fashion. Some of these difficulties such as detecting military diversions from nuclear fuel

cycle activities are not likely to be remedied no matter how much the IAEA s resources are increased. In thepast 20 years, while the amount of safeguarded nuclear material usable for weapons (highly enriched uraniumand separated plutonium) has increased by a factor of 6 to 10, the budget for safeguards has not kept pace andthere are actually fewer inspections per safeguarded facility than before . In addition to limited resources, the IAEAlacks clear authority to secure nuclear material and install near-real-time surveillance at the sites it inspects, orto conduct the wide-area surveillance needed to monitor activities under the Additional Protocol.Dysfunctional and nontransparent national accounting practices and national procedures for inventoryingnuclear materials further limit the IAEA s effectiveness, especially when coupled with the agency s increasinginability to meet its timely detection goals.

Russia Has Loose NukesCFR 06.[Center on Foreign Relations. January 2006. Loose Nukes .http://www.cfr.org/weapons-of-terrorism/loose-nukes/p9549]

Mainly in Russia. Before its collapse in 1991, the Soviet Union had more than 27,000 nuclear weapons and enoughweapons-grade plutonium and uranium to triple that number. Since, severe economic distress, rampantcrime, and widespread corruption in Russia and other former Soviet countries have fed concerns in the Westabout loose nukes, underpaid nuclear scientists, and the smuggling of nuclear materials. Security at Russia snuclear storage sites remains worrisome.The former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan where the Soviets based many of their nuclear warheadssafely returned their Soviet nuclear weapons to post-communist Russia in the 1990s, but all three countries still have stockpiles of


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weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. Ukraine and Kazakhstan also have nuclear power plants thebyproducts of which cannot be used to make a nuclear bomb but might tempt terrorists trying to makea dirty bomb a regular explosive laced with lower-grade radioactive material.Some experts also worry about Pakistan, a relatively recent nuclear power with untested security systems, dozens of nuclear weapons, and noshortage of Islamist militants. The United States recently offered to help Pakistan improve its nuclear security measures, an offer which Pakistanhas tacitly accepted since November 2001.

Nuclear Material C ould Reach Terrorists through SmugglingCFR 06.[Center on Foreign Relations. January 2006. Loose Nukes .http://www.cfr.org/weapons-of-terrorism/loose-nukes/p9549]

There have been no confirmed reports of missing or stolen former-Soviet nuclear weapons, but there is ample evidence of asignificant black market in nuclear materials. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reportedmore than a hundred nuclear smuggling incidents since 1993, eighteen of which involved highly enricheduranium, the key ingredient in an atomic bomb and the most dangerous product on the nuclear black market.

Terrorists Target Russian Nuclear StockpilesCFR 06.[Center on Foreign Relations. January 2006. Loose Nukes .http://www.cfr.org/weapons-of-terrorism/loose-nukes/p9549]Yes. Russian authorities say that in the past three years alone they have broken up hundreds of nuclear-materialsmuggling deals . In October 2001, shortly after the World Trade Center attacks, a Russian nuclear official reported having foiled two separateincidents over the previous eight months in which terrorists had staked out a secret weapons storage site. In the 1990s, U.S. authoritiesdiscovered several al-Qaeda plots to obtain nuclear materials, and former CIA Director George Tenet told the Senate Select Committee onIntelligence that Osama bin Laden had sought to acquire or develop a nuclear device.

Protection of Russian Nuclear A rsenals A re F limsy CFR 06.[Center on Foreign Relations. January 2006. Loose Nukes .http://www.cfr.org/weapons-of-terrorism/loose-nukes/p9549]

The United States protects its nuclear weapons with barriers, guards, surveillance cameras, motion sensors, and background checks on personnel.

Several other nuclear powers though not all take similar precautions. Russia s security measures are flimsier. Guards atnuclear weapons facilities have gone unpaid for months at a time, and even basic security arrangements suchas fences, doors, and padlocks remain inadequate in many locations. Futhermore, while U.S. nuclear weapons areengineered with built-in security mechanisms, we know very little about what sort of built-in safeguards there may be on Russia s or Pakistan snuclear arsenals to prevent unauthorized detonations.


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Number of Nukes Irrelevant

There are still thousands ofactive nuclear weapons in existence Starr 11. [Steven Starr, Director of Clinical Laboratory Program, University of Missouri Columbia.Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.February 7, 2011. Consequences of a single failure of nuclear deterrence. http://www.nuclearweapons-warcrimes.org/Consequences_of_a_Single_Failur.pdf]Those who actively support nuclear deterrence are trained to believe that deterrence cannot fail, so long as their doctrines are observed, and theirweapons systems are maintained and continuously modernized. They insist that their nuclear forces will remain forever under their completecontrol, immune from cyberwarfare, sabotage, terrorism, human or technical error. They deny that the short 12-to-30 minute flight times of nuclear

missiles would not leave a President enough time to make rational decisions following a tactical, electronic warning of nuclear attack. The U.S.and Russia continue to keep a total of 2000 strategic nuclear weapons at launch-ready status ready to launchwith only a few minutes warning. Yet both nations are remarkably unable to acknowledge that this high-alertstatus in any way increases the probability that these weapons will someday be used in conflict. How canstrategic nuclear arsenals truly be safe from accidental or unauthorized use, when they can be launched

literally at a moment s notice?A cocked and loaded weapon is infinitely easier to fire than one which is unloaded and stored in a locked

safe. The mere existence of immense nuclear arsenals, in whatever status they are maintained, makes possible their eventual use in a nuclear war.Our best scientists now tell us that such a war would mean the end of human history. We need to ask our leaders: Exactly what political or nationalgoals could possibly justify risking a nuclear war that would likely cause the extinction of the human race?

The Defense Department Misplaces Missile C omponentsStanley 08 . The Stanley Foundation.July 2008. Avoiding an Accidental NuclearWar .http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/resources.cfm?id=498&article=1]

Finally, three disturbing lapses in US nuclear weapons safety and security reduce confidence that the overall US nuclear weapons infrastructureremains well-managed and under strict command and control. Last August, a B-52 bomber was accidentally loaded with six nuclear warheads andflown from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. The bomber was supposed to transport nonnuclear cruisemissiles. Then, in March 2008, Defense Department officials learned and subsequently acknowledged that they had 18 months prior mistakenly

shipped four nuclear missile fuses to Taiwan. Finally, an internal Defense Department review commissioned by SecretaryGates to study security of the US nuclear weapons complex concluded that the US military cannot locatehundreds of sensitive nuclear missile components. "According to previously undisclosed details obtained bythe Financial Times, the investigation also concluded that the Air Force could not account for many sensitivecomponents previously included in its nuclear inventory. One official said the number of missing componentswas more than 1,000." While none of these incidents directly indicates an increased danger of accidental launch, they do indicate an overallerosion of system robustness making accidents more prone to occur. Again, due to the reality that most of the world s nuclear weapons remainunder the control of the US and Russia, the likelihood is that if a serious accidental incident occurred, it would be within this legacy construct.


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A ccidental Nuclear War

Even the best and the brightest can accidentally cause nuclear war! Schram 08. [Martin Schram. Columnist, Scripps Howard News Service.The Washington Times. February 5, 2008. Accessed July 18,2011. India-Pakistan Nuclear Risk? http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/dec/05/india-pakistan-nuclear-risk/?page=all#pagebreak]Once again, world leaders need to recall the frighteningly candid words of a former Pakistan army general who explained to me years agohow in a conventional weapons clash between India and Pakistan, even a well-intentioned, highly trainedgeneral such as he was could inadvertently start a nuclear war. And how the initial nuclear launch would notonly be responded to but would instantly escalate tenfold a catastrophe that would not only obliterate theregion but would have severe global consequences . The warning spoken by retired Brig. Gen. Feroz Khan in my interview withhim in 2002 reads like a warning call today. We spoke at a time when India and Pakistan seemed headed toward yet another ground war over thedisputed bucolic region of Kashmir after Pakistan-based guerrillas of Lashkar-i-Taiba attacked India s Parliament. Now India says last month s

Mumbai murderers were trained inside Pakistan by the same militant group, which is l inked to elements of Pakistan intelligence. Once the

conventional war breaks out, the fog of war sets in, Gen. Khan said then. And during war you havedeceptions. You have misperceptions. You have communications breakdowns. Things get heated up . The retiredgeneral noted that nuclear weapons are normally kept in peacetime, or even during the crisis, under a certain set of conditions where safety is

more important than effectiveness. But he said that as the military situation worsens, these nuclear weapons could bemade available to generals for battle deployment, adding: You are now moving the safety coefficient lesserand lesser in favor of battle effectiveness. And that can cause what Gen. Khan called the danger of inadvertence. Time can be the ultimate enemy in a war between nuclear next-door neighbors, becausemissiles are launched just minutes from their targets. And nuclear decisions sometimes need to be madeinstantly by generals in the field not civilian leaders in the capitals. The former Pakistan general citedthree scenarios in which a general in combat might have to issue an order to retaliate without having enoughtime to know for sure whether the enemy has actually attacked with a weapon carrying a nuclear warhead.

Scenario One: India launches a missile that Pakistan knows is nuclear-capable - but this missile only has a non-nuclear warhead. It hits itsPakistani target. It may or may not be a nuclear explosion, but it could be perceived . as if a nuclear strike has already taken place. A Pakistangeneral might order a nuclear strike he thinks is retaliatory - but he has actually triggered a nuclear first strike.

Scenario Two: In a conventional attack, a weapon hits a nuclear target, causing a radioactive plume. Now, nobody knows whether a nuclearweapon was fired or the nuclear asset was blown up on the ground. The instant field report calls it a nuclear attack. Headquarters orders aretaliatory strike - but it is really the first nuclear strike.

Scenario Three: A conventional attack takes out the command center. Commanders perceived it as a decapitating attack intended to knock outone side s nuclear weapons. And they would then say, Look, before my weapon goes out, I d better use it or lose it. So a nuclear weapon islaunched.

In each case, the nuclear exchanges escalate tenfold .


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Bioweapons are a HUGE Threat

Bioweapons are Readily A vailableCDC 2000. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.April 21, 2000. Biological and Chemical Terrorism:Strategic Plan forPreparednessand Response . http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/rr/rr4904.pdf]Terrorist incidents in the United States and elsewhere involving bacterial pathogens(3 ), nerve gas (1 ), and alethal plant toxin(i.e., ricin) (4 ), have demonstrated that theUnited States is vulnerable to biological andchemical threats as well as explosives.Recipes for preparing homemade agents are readily available (5 ), andreports ofarsenals of military bioweapons (2 ) raise the possibility that terrorists might have accessto highlydangerous agents , which have been engineered for mass dissemination assmall-particle aerosols. Such agents as the variola virus, thecausative agent of smallpox,are highly contagious and often fatal . Responding to large-scale outbreaks caused. Because the initialdetection of a covert biological or chemical attack will probablyoccur at the local level, disease surveillance systems at state and localhealthagencies must be capable of detecting unusual patterns of disease or injury,including those caused by unusual or unknown threat agents.Because the initial response to a covert biological or chemical attack will probablybe made at the local level, epidemiologists at state and localhealth agencies musthave expertise and resources for responding to reports of clusters of rare, unusual,or unexplained illnesses by these agents willrequire the rapid mobilization of public health workers, emergencyresponders, and private health-care providers. Large-scale outbreaks will alsorequirerapid procurement and distribution of large quantities of drugs and vaccines, which mustbe available quickly.

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