Nazi Germany and the Spanish Civil WarContinuity in Hitler’s Foreign Policy

Tom GoldsteinProfessor Herf

HIST441May 15, 2001

The Spanish Civil War (1936-9) was a very important event during the

tense1930s in Europe. Although it did not make World War II inevitable, it increased the

likelihood of a general war a great deal. The war had a tremendous impact on Spain

itself, leaving much of the state’s economic and social infrastructure in ruins and leaving

thousands dead. But the war also saw involvement from other European states as both

sides of the conflict – the Right-wing Nationalists and the Left-wing Republicans (a.k.a.

Loyalists) – requested and received foreign aid not only in terms of financial assets, but

also in terms of war material and troops. Adolf Hitler’s Germany was one of the foreign

countries most involved in the conflict, contributing economic loans as well as several

thousand troops to the Nationalist cause. Hitler’s involvement in the Spanish war was

consistent with a larger Nazi foreign policy aimed at diverting British and French

attention from Central and Eastern Europe so that he would be unhindered in his plans for

eastern expansion.

However, the ramifications of the Spanish war for the rest of Europe were great in

other ways. The Spanish Civil War was a major contributor to the hardening of the

division between the democracies (Britain and France) and the dictatorships (Italy and

Germany). Germany also gained the valuable raw materials from Spain that it needed

for eastern expansion and the accompanying possibility of war. The Spanish Civil War

also undermined British and French credibility to Hitler, emboldening him to make more

dramatic eastern expansion moves. Furthermore, the war helped drive the USSR away

from Britain and France and was one of the reasons why Stalin reluctantly concluded that

an accommodation with Hitler was necessary. In all these ways then, the Spanish Civil

War was a major step toward World War II. In order to understand more thoroughly how

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the war did this, I will first will explore the background of the Spanish Civil War as well

as present a general survey of the progression of the war, highlighting the role that

foreign nations - and particularly Germany – played. Then I will consider the larger

background of Europe in the 1930s in relation to Hitler’s broad foreign policy goals.

Finally, with the context thus set, I will discuss the implications of the Spanish Civil War

as a component of Hitler’s broad foreign policy goals and its ramifications for the peace

of Europe.

The Spanish Civil War

Understanding the Spanish Civil War in regard to its place in a larger European

context requires first understanding the war itself. The war, after all, was caused mainly

by internal forces, not external ones, although external forces certainly played a part.

Spain since the nineteenth century had been struggling with its fall as a great power and

the ensuing social tension that this fall had caused. In the early twentieth century it was

economically backward and in many ways highly traditional.1 Spain remained neutral in

World War I, causing many both inside the former world power and abroad to see the

state as internationally insignificant. Furthermore, the war exacerbated social and

political division within the country, and despite modernizing efforts during the reign of

Dictator Miguel Primo de Rivera (1923-30), in the words of historian Tom Buchanan,

“Spain was an anachronism.”2

In 1931 King Alfonso XIII, along with the entire Spanish monarchy was

overthrown and a Republic was installed. Yet political tensions reemerged as liberal

1 Monteath, “Hitler and the Spanish Civil War, p.430.2 Buchanan, Tom. Britain and the Spanish Civil War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.14.

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politicians desiring to modernize Spain encountered stiff resistance from traditional

elements in society such as the military, the Catholic Church, and large landowners. By

1936 the electorate was virtually split down the middle, and the leftist Popular Front

coalition (including Socialists, Communists, liberal Republicans) barely defeated rightist

parties in the elections that year. After their narrow electoral victory, the Popular Front

attempted to instigate more social reforms. Disappointed with rightists’ failure to gain

power through political means, the army, under Generals Sanjurjo, Mola, and Franco, led

a rebellion of “Nationalists” in July against the Republic.3 In short, the Republic failed,

and as a result, both sides requested help from abroad.

The three generals, though, were actually not all in Spain at the start of the

rebellion. Sanjurjo was in Portugal, and was killed in a plane crash en route back to

Spain before any major military action could occur. Mola, meanwhile, had raised 6,000

troops in Pamplona in eastern Spain, but still needed Franco’s Army of Africa, which was

stationed in Spanish Morocco just across the Straits of Gibraltar. The Army of Africa

was Spain’s most effective fighting force, but because the Spanish Navy had remained

loyal to the Republic, Franco, with only a small number of transport aircraft, could not

get his troops to mainland Spain.4 Franco first turned to Italy for help, requesting its

assistance in transporting troops. Italy declined for the moment, leaving Franco to try to

obtain German help.

Franco knew that getting Germany to provide transport aircraft would not be easy.

In order to improve his chances of obtaining German aid, Franco contacted Johannes

Bernhardt – a German businessman living in Spanish Morocco at the time and a member

3 Ibid., pp.15-17.4 Gerald Howson. Arms for Spain: The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), pp.9-16.

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of the Auslandsorganization (AO – the Foreign Organization of the Nazi Party). Franco

convinced Bernhardt to try to persuade the German government to send the Nationalists

ten transport aircraft and then sent Bernhardt to Bayreuth, where Hitler was attending the

annual Wagner festival. Using his AO contacts, Bernhardt was able to win an audience

with Hitler, where he pleaded Franco’s case to the Fuehrer and gave him a letter written

by Franco himself (in Spanish, no less – Hitler had to have it translated). After spending

some time deliberating and going over the latest reports on the Spanish situation, Hitler

concluded that because of the danger that would ensue if a Communist government

prevailed in Spain, Germany should aid the Nationalists, and promptly sent Franco twice

the requested number of transport aircraft.5

Germany soon became much more involved in the Spanish conflict. It proceeded

to set up HISMA (Compañía Hispama-Marroqui de Transportes) soon after the July 1936

decision to send aid to Franco. HISMA was a company based in Spanish Morocco, set

up as a cover for Germany to give arms to Spain in exchange for Spanish goods and raw

materials. Although such economic support proved important, Germany made a more

lasting impression when it committed 3,786 men, 37 officers, and 92 planes to what

became known as the “Condor Legion.” The Condor Legion was sent to fight in Spain

in November 1936 and did not return to Germany until after the fall of Madrid, leading to

the end of the Spanish Civil War in March 1939.6 The Condor Legion had a decisive

impact on the outcome of the war, providing air support with which the Republican

forces could not compete.

5 Monteath, “Hitler and the Spanish Civil War,” pp.431-436.6 Robert H. Whealey, Hitler and Spain: The Nazi Role in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1989), p.8.

5

Furthermore, Germany backed Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War,

hoping to drive a wedge between the democracies and Italy, and thus prevent a recreation

of the Stresa Front, which Britain, France, and Italy had formed in 1935 to oppose

German rearmament.7 By aiding and encouraging Italian support for the Nationalists,

Hitler hoped that the tension already existing between Fascist Italy and the democracies

would be exacerbated because Britain and France were against a Nationalist takeover of

Spain and foreign intervention altogether in the conflict. Italian support for the

Nationalists thus defied British and French aims. Mussolini, for his part, desired not only

to expand his influence in the Mediterranean but also, like Hitler, to stave off

Communism in Spain. Soon after conflict broke out in Spain, Italy was sending Franco

troops in addition to material, and Italian submarines began attacking neutral shipping in

the Mediterranean.8

Germany also used the Spanish war as a chance to improve its image with the

democracies. Because the Spanish Communist Party was a prominent part of the

Republican coalition, and because the Soviet Union became the only nation to give

outright support to the Republicans, the Germans used their Propaganda Ministry at full

force to pose as the ‘defenders of Western civilization’ against the Communists.9

Furthermore, Soviet policies in Spain toward its own Republican allies became

increasingly radical, leading to major fracturing within the Republican forces as the

Communists attempted to wrest complete control of the situation in Barcelona from their

7 J. Noakes, and G. Pridham, eds. Nazism, 1919-19-1945: Volume 3: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination: A Documentary Reader (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 1994), p.664.8 Whealey. Hitler and Spain, pp.9-14.9 Robert H. Whealey, “Nazi Propagandist Joseph Goebbels Looks at the Spanish Civil War.” The Historian, Volume 61, No. 2 (1999), p.348.

6

allies, in 1938, with the Nationalists closing in on the city.10 The resulting civil war

within the civil war was marked by great atrocities committed by the Communists, and

the Germans were very quick to bring attention to those acts. Thus Nazi Minister of

Propaganda Joseph Goebbels painted the Communists as ‘barbaric’ while painting the

Germans as ‘honorable.’ As Guernica in 1937 was to prove, this latter point, of course,

was not the case. Yet Goebbels still attempted to, and no doubt did, convince many

Germans and some non-Germans that the Nazi government was indeed the ‘defender of

civilization.’

Indeed, many in Britain and France became even more suspicious about the

Communists because of the Spanish Civil War. Even Winston Churchill, by no means a

supporter of Fascism, seemed to place greater blame on Communists for starting the war,

as he stated in a July 19, 1937 House of Commons speech:

It is well known that ordinary guarantees for safety and order had largely lapsed in Spain, that it was not safe for people to go out at night over large areas, that murders and outrages were rife, and that constitutional parliamentary government was being used as a mere mask, a screen, to cover the swift, stealthy and deadly advance of the extreme Communist or anarchist factions, who saw, according to the regular programme of Communist revolutions, the means by which they could obtain power. It was when confronted with a situation like that that this violent explosion took place in Spain.11

Even if Hitler could not convince the democracies that Germany was free of barbarism,

they could at least drive a wedge between the democracies and the Soviets, preventing

the recreation of the alliance that hampered German war plans in World War I by forcing

a two front war. Morever, by alienating the two sides, Hitler could more freely pursue an

eastern expansion policy – the democracies, he surmised, would now care little if

Germany wrested hegemony over Eastern European from the ‘barbaric’ Communists.

10 Gerald Howson. Arms for Spain: The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), pp.242-245.11 Robert Rhodes James, ed. Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 1897-1963: Volume VI, 1935-1942 (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974), p.5874

7

Both Germany and Italy maintained an official position of “non-intervention,”

however. Indeed, most of Europe desired to stay out of the conflict altogether. Wary of

being dragged into another protracted war like World War I, Britain and France, despite

sympathizing with the Republicans, took the lead in establishing a Non-Intervention

Agreement that was eventually signed by 17 countries including Germany and Italy. To

the democracies, “War was seen as a mindless and unnecessary stampede to destruction,”

according to historian Willard Frank.12 Britain and France hoped to discourage German

and Italian participation in the conflict through non-intervention, which entailed

prohibiting arms sales to either Republicans or Nationalists, although one could still trade

non-militarily with either. Britain and France favored such a policy despite the fact that it

soon became obvious that Germany and Italy were practicing anything but non-

intervention in Spain. Still, neither Britain nor France called the dictatorships’ bluff, with

ominous consequences for the future. Thousands of people from all over Europe

(including Germany) did volunteer in the so-called “International Brigades” which fought

for the Republicans during the war. These people often claimed to have a sense of duty

to fight a war against injustice, and many in fact were Communists.13 Although their

impact was decisive in defeating the Italians at Guadalajara in 1937 and in preventing

Republican collapse for several years, their presence was no match for the combined

German and Italian military and economic aid to the Republicans.14

Indeed, as witnessed by Britain and France’s contribution of its citizens to

International Brigades despite official non-intervention policies, the democracies were

deeply divided over the Spanish war. The Great Depression had already stretched social 12 Willard C. Frank, “The Spanish Civil War and the Coming of the Second World War.” The International History Reviews Volume 9, No. 3 (August 1987): 373.13 Buchanan, pp.122-123.14 Whealey, Hitler and Spain, p.57.

8

cohesion thin, and the added weight of the decision over the Spanish Civil War began to

take its toll. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, for example, forced Foreign

Secretary Anthony Eden to resign as a result of disagreements over Spain. Eden favored

being tough on the dictatorships while Chamberlain favored staying uninvolved and

‘ignorant’ of Fascist intervention in the hopes of not antagonizing them into provoking a

general war. The democracies appeared weakened, especially in France, and Hitler took

note of this.15

Britain and France did attempt to curb Fascist intervention on behalf of the

Nationalists in one way, though. Alarmed at Italy’s wanton submarine warfare on neutral

shipping destined for Spain, Britain and France coordinated Naval policies in the

Mediterranean in order to hunt down “pirate” submarines in the Nyon agreement of

September 1937. Even though it was common knowledge that the submarines were

Italian, the democracies still refused to openly accuse the Italians of intervention. Britain

in particular still hoped for rapprochement with the Italians, hoping to recreate the Stresa

Front against Germany. As a result of the British and French crackdown, Italian ‘piracy’

stopped, but attacks on neutral shipping were picked up again this time by German

aircraft, against which the British and French were largely powerless.16

Furthermore, Germany made use of two incidents to “justify” their intervention

should anyone challenge them. On May 29, 1937, the battleship Deutschland was

mistakenly attacked by a Soviet bomber who thought it was a Nationalist cruiser. Hitler

cried for vengeance and ordered the shelling of the port town of Almería, killing 24

civilians. As a result of the Deutschland incident, Germany and Italy walked out of the

15 Frank, pp.374, 386-387.16 Ibid., p.393.

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Non-Intervention conference, despite the fact that the British cruiser Hunter had been hit

by a German mine earlier in May and no major repercussions occurred. The second

incident occurred on June 15, 1937 when the German cruiser Leipzig claimed a

submarine fired upon it, although no real evidence existed to back up its claim.

Nonetheless, Hitler demanded international naval action be taken against the Republic.17

Yet these incidents were far from the most notorious things the Germans did in Spain.

Perhaps the most infamous incident concerning German involvement in the

Spanish Civil War was the use of explosives and firebombs on the Basque city of

Guernica on April 26, 1937. As part of a massive Nationalist campaign to split the

Republican controlled area of Spain in half, the Condor Legion in spring 1937 launched

an attack on the Basque province of northeastern Spain. Aiming to prevent Republican

troops from retreating through Guernica to their strongpoint at Bilbao, the Condor Legion

attacked and destroyed 70% of Guernica. The attacks came in the middle of the day

when many people were at the city’s market, and hundreds of civilians were killed as a

result.18

There has always been a debate as to whether the civilians were attacked on

purpose or whether, like the Germans claimed at the time, bad weather and wind had

caused their bombs to miss their primary target – a bridge outside the city. Historian

Peter Monteath explains:

Had the stone bridge been the sole target, then incendiary bombs would not have been used, nor would the machine gunning have take place . . . And had the bridge, which survived the attack unscathed, been the only target, then [the German commanding officers] would hardly have described the raid as a complete success.19

17 Ibid., pp.380-381.18 Peter Monteath, “Guernica Reconsidered: Fifty Years of Evidence.” War & Society Volume 5, No.1 (May 1987): 93-100.19 Monteath, “Guernica Reconsidered,” p.95.

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This incident lives in infamy, and although not terribly symbolic of German foreign

policy up until this point, it began to foreshadow the civilian terror bombing that became

a staple of World War II. The Guernica incident was also indicative of a radicalization in

German policy in Spain that saw a parallel in Hitler’s decision that year to prepare for the

annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia, as revealed in the

Hossbach memorandum.20

The Nationalist campaign of 1937 was successful. By Spring of 1938, the

Nationalists had split Republican Spain in half, reaching the Mediterranean on April 15.

Yet victory was elusive for the exhausted Nationalists due to a temporary regrouping of

Republican forces in the summer of 1938. With German and Italian support in hand,

Franco slowly began driving the remaining Republican armies into France in what

quickly became a bloody war of attrition. On March 5, 1939 the Republican government

fled Madrid, and after an intense battle for the city, Spain’s capital fell on March 28,

effectively ending the Spanish Civil War.21 In order to understand what place the war

had in Hitler’s overall foreign policy goals, I will now explore what those goals were.

Hitler’s Foreign Policy

The basic goal of Hitler’s foreign policy as outlined in Mein Kampf and

subsequently carried out in the 1930’s was German expansion to the east and the

(re)incorporation into the German Reich of all ethnic Germans, particularly those

Germans in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. On the very first page of Mein Kampf

Hitler declares, “German-Austria must return to the great German mother country . . .

20 Whealey, “Nazi Propagandist Joseph Goebbels Looks at the Spanish Civil War,” p.353.21 Gerhard L. Weinberg. The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Starting World War II, 1937-1939 (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp.159-161.

11

One blood demands one Reich.”22 Regarding the need for expansion in the east, Hitler

writes, “Only an adequately large space on this earth assures a nation of freedom of

existence [his emphasis] . . . If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in

mind only Russia and her vassal border states.”23 Driving this goal was Hitler’s belief in

the supremacy of the German or Aryan race. He writes, “He [the Aryan] is the

Prometheus of mankind from whose bright forehead the divine spark of genius has

sprung at all times.”24 Hitler also held the conviction that Germany would need to

expand to be able to accommodate a growing German population.25

The east was a logical choice for Hitler given the other driving force of his

ideology – racism predicated on hatred of Jews, Slavs, and Communists. To Hitler, the

supremacy of the Aryan race required the elimination of all competing races, and the race

that was the most threatening to the Aryans was the Jewish race, which Hitler compared

to “parasites.” 26 To him they were the lowest race imaginable. According to Hitler, the

Jews were bent on world domination and their heartland was Communist Russia –

indeed, he often referred to Communism as “Jewish Bolshevism.” He therefore warns,

“Do not forget that the international Jew who completely dominates Russia today regards

Germany, not as an ally, but as a state destined to the same fate.”27 Thus, expanding

eastward not only allowed Germany to accommodate its population, it also allowed the

German race to eliminate its largest threat.

To accomplish eastern expansion, Hitler’s foreign policy in the 1930s was geared

first toward annexing Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia and Poland. Achieving this

22 Adolf Hitler. Mein Kampf (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), p.3.23 Ibid., pp.643,654.24 Ibid., pp.290.25 Ibid., p.643.26 Ibid., p.305.27 Ibid., p.661.

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would be no easy task at a time when Britain and France were wary of a German military

revival following the horrors of World War I. Therefore, at first Hitler proceeded

cautiously, testing the waters slowly. He then became increasingly defiant and strong

willed after gaining more confidence that the democracies would not interfere with his

policies. One of the first major foreign policy moves Hitler made was announcing

German rearmament in 1935. This caused concern among Britain, France, and Italy, who

subsequently formed the Stresa Front against Germany. Although the Stresa Front

amounted to hollow threats, Germany was wary of its isolation; the next time, Hitler

would act more cautiously.28 In 1936, Germany remilitarized the Rhineland, violating the

Locarno Treaty of 1925. Yet Hitler this time had chosen to wait until Britain and France

were distracted – a theme that would be repeated – with Italy’s war of conquest in

Ethiopia. Britain and France were indeed caught off guard, and internal division and fear

of war caused them to refrain from action against Germany.29 Then later that year in

July, Franco asked Hitler to send him transport aircraft so that he might be able to move

his troops from Spanish Morocco to Spain. Hitler saw an opportunity to divert the

democracies’ attention from Germany for the time being and he also saw the threat of

having a pro-Communist government in Spain in the event that Franco could not send his

troops to combat the Republican forces. This latter development would make the

Fuehrer’s expansionist goals difficult to achieve. He also saw an opportunity to gain raw

materials from Spain that Germany would need if it were to launch a war. Hitler

therefore sent his first shipments of aid to Franco that same month.30

28 Noakes and Pridham, p.664.29 Ibid., p.669.30 Peter Monteath, “Hitler and the Spanish Civil War. A Case Study of Nazi Foreign Policy.” Australian Journal of Politics and History, Volume 32, No. 3 (1986): 439-440.

13

Germany’s involvement in Spain lasted until the end of the war in 1939. During

that time, Hitler began accelerating events in Europe. In March 1938 he annexed Austria

outright, and in October of the same year at the Munich Conference he forced the

democracies to allow him to annex of the Sudetenland. In March 1939, Hitler invaded

and annexed the remainder of Czechoslovakia despite agreeing at Munich not to do so.

At this point the last significant population of ethnic Germans not living in Germany was

in Western Poland. It was thus Poland to which Hitler turned his attention. In response,

Britain and France pledged to guarantee Polish independence, now realizing the

shortcomings wrought by their appeasement policy in terms of European security.31

Furthermore, it was Poland that Hitler, acting on his foreign policy goal of eastern

expansion, invaded on September 1, 1939, starting World War II. Nazi foreign policy in

the 1930s is marked by continuity despite its diversity – all was done as part of a plan to

gradually move Germany into a position where it might expand eastward. With its intent

to prevent a hostile Communist government in Western Europe, to distract the

democracies from Central Europe, and to obtain raw materials from Spain, Nazi

Germany’s participation in the Spanish Civil War fits into this pattern.

Not all historians agree with this assertion, however. The “Functionalist” school

of Nazi historians contends that Hitler had no coherent foreign policy throughout this

period. They emphasize what they see as a decentralized foreign policy decision-making

process that involved multiple Nazi organizations competing to get their agenda across.

Hitler, they say, did not act alone in determining foreign policy. As historian Wolfgang

Schieder concludes in regard to Spain, “The German decision to actively support the

rebels in Spain offers a positively ideal example of how the polycratic power-structures

31 Noakes, p.738.

14

of the so-called Fuehrer-state also influenced foreign policy,” as he cites the role played

by the AO, the Foreign Ministry, and Deputy Fuehrer Hermann Goerring, who also

headed the Ministry of the Interior.32 Furthermore, even if he did make the decisions by

himself, there is no relationship between Hitler’s actions in Spain and his overall foreign

policy goals – he merely reacted to opportunistic situations quickly and crudely. Again,

Schieder notes, “Hence Hitler’s foreign policy cannot be understood exclusively as the

realization of long-term programs, nor can it be explained as the product of a goal-less

nihilism.”33 The Functionalists thus regard German involvement in the Spanish Civil

War as having little to do with any coherent goal in terms of an expansionist policy.

Yet evidence suggests that, at least relating to German intervention in Spain, these

claims are wrong. To take the first point – that of polycratic decision-making – the

Foreign Ministry played no role in Hitler’s decision to intervene in Spain, and was in fact

surprised by his decision. Goerring was not even present at the meeting where the

decision to intervene in Spain was made. And although the AO did play an important

role in bringing about German intervention, it was not a decision-making role.

Furthermore, Hitler’s actions did have coherency in terms of a larger foreign policy – his

decision to involve Germany in the Spanish Civil War does fit in as part of a larger Nazi

policy of Eastern European expansion. With a pro-Soviet bloc in Western Europe, Hitler

could not have as free a hand in the east. Moreover, Hitler took a good deal of time when

considering what to do with Spain – he reviewed the latest reports from the Iberian

Peninsula very carefully before agreeing to intervene.34 Thus when the Spanish Civil

War erupted, Hitler already had an idea of what to do.

32 Monteath, “Hitler and the Spanish Civil War,” p.439.33 Ibid., p.439.34 Ibid., pp.439-440.

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Impact of the War on European Peace

The Spanish Civil War had important consequences for all of Europe. The

conflict further contributed to the polarization of Europe. Italy drew closer to Germany

as a result of the conflict, and Britain and France drew closer together as well. Italy

suffered several military setbacks in a war to which they were committed but increasingly

wished they could withdraw. This commitment, along with those setbacks, made Italy

even more dependent on its one ally, Germany.35 Britain and France drew together as a

result of their common desire to maintain non-intervention and also through their joint

naval program to stop Mediterranean ‘piracy.’ As historian Willard Frank concludes,

“After rather chilly relations during the Ethiopian crisis, the Spanish war brought out the

similarities between Great Britain and France.”36 All hopes for resurrecting the Stresa

Front were dashed by Italy’s insistence on intervening in the conflict and Britain and

France’s determination to stay out. Italy, by committing a large number of troops, played

right into Hitler’s hands as Mussolini isolated the British and French, leaving Germany as

his only real ally.

Another important consequence of the Spanish Civil War was to drive the Soviet

Union further from the democracies. The Soviet Union was the only country to support

the Republicans outright against the Nationalists, and the lack of support from Britain and

France helped convince an already paranoid Stalin that the democracies were merely

trying to turn Hitler eastward. Indeed, he had called on them several times to invoke the

League of Nations principle of collective security, with no reply. The Soviets were also

35 Frank, p.379.36 Ibid., p.406.

16

left out of the Nyons Conference on policing the Mediterranean, to their annoyance.37

Furthermore, anti-Communism rhetoric was used throughout the war by many parties,

further alienating the Soviets and helping Stalin decide that he needed to reach an

agreement with Hitler – better to trade Eastern Europe for peace with Hitler than to face

him in war alone.

As a result of the Spanish war, Germany also obtained valuable raw materials

from Spain. Germany had been deeply concerned about its lack of raw materials, and by

striking a trade agreement with Franco by which Germany received raw materials for

German military equipment and personnel, it was able to obtain a crucial safeguard in

case Hitler’s plan of eastern expansion led to war. These agreements were discussed at

the beginning of German involvement in 1936, and then codified in three July 1937

treaties.38 Of particular interest to Germany was Spain’s pyrite mines because that

mineral was used to furnish iron and copper, and was also used in many chemical

industrial procedures that Germany considered critical.39

The Spanish Civil War caused Britain and France’s credibility to decrease in

Hitler’s eyes. The democracies looked weaker than ever because despite common

knowledge of German and Italian involvement in Spain, neither Britain nor France had

challenged the dictatorships’ pledge to remain non-committed.40 Hitler was beginning to

see that he might have his way with the democracies. Therefore, an emboldened Hitler

began accelerating the pace of his expansionist policies. This development helped lead to

the Austrian and Sudeten annexations of 1938, the outright annexation of Czechoslovakia

37 Ibid., p.397-398.38 Whealey, “Nazi Propagandist Joseph Goebbels Looks at the Spanish Civil War,” p.352.39 Whealey, Hitler and Spain, p.75.40 Frank, p.391.

17

in March 1939, and the invasion of Poland in September 1939, which set off World War

II.41

Conclusion

The Spanish Civil War was important not only to Spain but also to the whole of

Europe. Germany’s involvement in that war was crucial to helping Franco’s Nationalists

claim control of Spain. Despite some historians’ views as to a functional foreign policy,

the evidence suggests that involvement in Spain was perfectly consistent with Hitler’s

foreign policy goal of distracting Britain and France and driving a rift between them,

Italy, and the Soviet Union, all while Hitler was making plans for eastern expansion. The

result of Germany’s involvement in the Spanish Civil War was just that – Britain and

France, although drawing closer together themselves, moved further away from Italy and

alienated the Soviet Union. Both Italy and to a lesser extent the USSR were subsequently

drawn toward Germany. Furthermore, the Spanish Civil War and Britain and France’s

Non-Intervention policy led Hitler to begin to believe that he could manipulate the weak

democracies to achieve his foreign policy ends. This led to an acceleration of his plans

for Eastern expansion, which in turn helped accelerate Europe’s movement toward World

War II.

41 Ibid., p.408.

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19

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