NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California · 2011. 5. 13. · NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL...
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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOLMonterey, California
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THESIS
A STUDY OF REASONS FOR NOT REENLISTING:
FIRST-TERM MARINES IN CRITICAL OCCUPATIONS
by
Timothy J. Beaty
December 1989
I Thesis Advisor: Mark J. Eitelberg
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
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11. TITLE (include Security Classification)A Study of Reasons for Not Reenlisting: First-Penn iMarines in criticai Occupa,,tionsUNCIASSIFIET)
* 12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) BE~ATY, Timothy Joel
1 3a. TYPE OF REPORT 13.TIME COVERED 14. DATE OF P.EPORT (yeet non, dy 15. PAGE COUNTMaster's Thesis From 10 December 1989 ___154
* 16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATIONI. The views expressed in this thesis are those ofthe author and do not reflect the official pulicy or posil~ion ot the Department ot' ef~iise or thri U.S.
Government. ___________ ___________________
17 COSATI CODES 18. SUBJECT TERMS (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by bloc-k number)FIELD GROLUP SUBGROUP __ Reenlistment, Separation, Personnel Retention, Critical Occupations,
___________ 'irst-Term Marines, Enlisted Separation Questionnaire, Exit SurveysReenlistment Incentives, Select'vc Reenlistment Bonus TJ~) )~
119. ABS\ CT (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
This thesis dpterm~ines the primary reasons why first-term enlistees assigned to criticaloccupations decidk. against reenlisting in the Marine Corps. The reasons given for notreenlisting are determined by analyzing responses to the&Marine Corps Enlisted SeprationQuestionnaire over the period of fiscal Per1985 through fiscal 1989 (third quarter.
questionnaire responses are analyzed 'using cross-tabulations P nd frequency distribu tionsaccordin~g to demographiic characteristics (marital status, gfnder, race, a~nd pa-- rade) andoccupational skill requirements. The results suggest that, or most Marines, Mec of promotionopportunity is thie main reason for not reerlisting. Other reasons yary b~y demographic and
occupa ntiqnl killogroups. Fa - ly sepa ration influences t4he decisiouOils 0 ome WWII(s wiiMarines in more technical specialties are more concerned with compensation. Reenlistmentincentives are evaluatedl using the res~ults of this study. Recommendations are offered toimp.-ove current incentives and the criteria for reenlistment. 720. 13151 RIBUTIONIAVAiLABILITY OF ABSTRACT 21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
0 LNCLASSIIIEO/UNIMITED 1 SAME AS CEPORT OTIC USE MS Unclassified22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 22b. TELEPHONE (Include Are3 code) _ 22c. OFFICE SYMBOL.Mark J. Eitelberg, Thesis Advisor _______ (408) 646-3160 54EIIDD FORM 1473.84 MAR 83 APR edition may ho used uintil exhau~o~ed SECURITY CLASSIFICATrION QF THIS PAGE
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
A Study of Reasons for Not Reenlisting:First-Term Marines in Critical Occupations
by
Timothy Joel Beaty
Captain, United States Marine CorpsB.A., Miami University, 1980
Submitted in partial fulfillment of therequirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOLDecember 1989
Author: 2I thy J. Beary
Approved by: iO- Lmark Eitelberg,h4jesis Advisor
.. a j L4e_5!teph,_i L. Meihar. S---ndR~aaer
David R. Whipple rman,Department of Administrativ Sciences
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ABSTRACT
This thesis determines the primary reasons why first-term
enlistees arsigned to critical occupations decide against
reenlisting in the Marine Corps. The reasons given for not
reenlisting are determined by analyzing responses to the
Marine Corps Enlisted Separation Questionnaire over the period
of fiscal 1985 through fiscal 1989 (third quarter) .
Questionnaire responses are analyzed using cross-tabulations
and frequency distributions according to demographic
characteristics (marital status, gender, race, and pay grade)
and occupational skill requirements. The results suggest
that, for most Marines, lack of promotion opportunity is the
main reason for not reenlisting. Other reasons vary by
demographic and occupational skill groups. Family separation
influences the decisions of women and E-5s, while Marines in
more technical specialties are more concerned with
compensation. Reenlif-tment incentives are evaluated using the
results of this study. Recommendations are offered to improve
current incentives and the criteria for reenlistment AAoession ForN•IIS AGRA&IDTIC TABUnan-louxced [1
Justif ikt Ior]-
D13t.rlhutj ____
"Availabllity Codegs/kill. 1,v" fij ad/or
S ,D.tist
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE ...... 1
A. GENERAL ................ .................. 1
B. SCOPE OF THESIS ............. .............. 3
C_ METHODOLOGY ................. ........... ... 4
D. LITERATURE REVIEW ............ ............. 5
1. Overview ............. ................ 5
2. Retention and Turnover Behavior . . .. 5
3. Reenlistment Incentiv:..s ......... .. 17
4. Retention and Quality ....... ........ 23
5. Conclusion ......... .............. 28
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY ... ........ 28
II. BACKGROUND ................. .................. 30
A. OVERVIEW ............. ................. 30
B. REENLISTMENT ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA . ... 32
C. FIRST-TERM REENLISTMENT INCENTIVES ... .... 37
D. FORCE BALANCE AND OCCUPATION CRITICALITY 44
E. CONCLUSION ........... ................ 48
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY ....... ............. 50
A. OVERVIEW ............. ................ 50
B. IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL SPECIALTIES 50
C. USMC ENLISTED SEPARATION QUESTIONNAIRE 56
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS ...... ................ 69
A. OVERVIEW ............. ................. 69
B. DATA ANALYSIS BASED ON DEMOGRAPHICVARIABLES ............ ................ 69
1. Marital Status ....... ............ 69
2. Gender ........... ................ 72
Ai 3. Race ............. ................ 76
4. Pay Grade ............... ............. 7
5. Concluding Remarks on DemographicVariables ....... .............. 83
C. DATA ANALYSIS BASED ON DOD OCCUPATIONALAREA ............... ............... .. 84
1. All First-Term Marines in CriticalMOSs ............. ................. 84
2. Infantry and Gun Crew ........ .... 88
3. Electronic Equipment Repairers . . . . 89
4. Communications and IntelligenceSpecialists .......... ............. 92
5. Technical and Allied Specialists . . 94
6. Functional Support and Administration 96
7. Electrical/Mechanical EquipmentRepairers (Aircraft) ....... ......... 9?
8. Electrical/Mechanical EquipmentRepairers (Non-lircraft) .. ....... 99
9. Craftsmen .......... .............. 101
10. Service and Supply Handlers .. ..... 103
11. Conclusions of Results Based on DoDOccupational Areas ..... .......... 105
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D. CURRENT REENLISTMENT INCENTIVES 107
V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS . 112
A. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS ........... 112
1. Identification of Critical Skills . . 112
2. USMC Enlisted SeparationQuestionnaires ....... ............ 112
B. CONCLUSIONS ........... ............... 118
1. Results of Analysis .... ......... 118
2. Enlisted Separation Questionnaire . 120
3. Current Reenlistment Incentives . . . 124
C. RECOMMENDATIONS .......... ............. 126
1. Current Reenlistment Criteria . . . . 126
2. Reenlistment Incentives .. ....... 129
APPENDIX A - LIST OF CRITICAL MILITARY OCCUPATIONALSPECIALTIES, BY DOD OCCUPATIONAL AREA ... ........ 132
APPENDIX B - USMC ENLISTED SEPAPATION QUESTIONNAIRE . 137
LIST OF REFERENCES ............. ................. 139
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ........ .............. 143
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LIST OF TABLES
TABLE 1. DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE POPULATION BY DODOCCUPATIONAL AREA, GENERAL TECHNICALSCORE, AND PAY GRADE ..... ........... 59
TABLE 2. DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE POPULATION BY DODOCCUPATIONAL AREA, MARITAL STATUS, GENDER,AND RACE ............. ................. 60
TABLE 3. MEAN VALUES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF
USMC ENLISTED SEPARATION QUESTIONNAIRERESPONSES ........ ............. .... 64
TABLE 4. PERCENT OF FIRST-TERM MARINES (IN CRITICALMOSs) GIVING REASON FOR NOT REENLISTING,BY MARITAL STATUS ........ ............ 70
TABLE 5. PERCENT OF FIRST-TERM MARINES (IN CRITICALMOSs) GIVING REASON FOR NOT REENLISTINGeBY GENDER ........... ................ 73
TABLE 6. PERCENT OF FIRST-TERM MARINES (IN CRITICALMOSs) GIVING REASON FOR NOT REENLISTING,BY RACE ............. ................. 77
TABLE 7. PERCENT OF FIRST-TERM MARINES (IN CRITICALr, MOSs) GIVING REASON FOR NOT REENLISTING,
BY PAY GRADE ......... ............... 80
TABLE 8. PERCENT OF FIRST-TERM MARINES GIVINGREASONS FOR NOT REENLISTING, FROM HIGHESTTO LOWEST IMPORTANCE, ALL CRITICAL MOSs • 85
TABLE 9. PERCENT OF FIRST-TERM MARINES (IN CRITICALMOSs) GIVING REASON FOR NOT REENLISTING,BY DOD OCCUPATIONAL AREA ... ......... 87
TABLE 10. SUI4MARY OF MOST IMPORTANT PJEASONS FOR FIRST-TERJM MARINES IN CRITICAL MOSs NOTRLENLISTING, BY DOD OCCUPATIONAL AREA 117
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. No. of MOSs Awarded an SRB by FiscalYear ............. .................. 53
Figure 2. Average SRB Multiple by Fiscal Year . . . 54
Figure 3. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting,by Marital Status .... ........... .. 72
Figure 4. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting,by Gender .......... ................ 75
Figure 5. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting,by Race .......... ................. 79
Figure 6. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting,by Pay Grade ......... .............. 82
Figure 7. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting,First-Term Marines (Critical MOSs) . . . 86
Figure 8. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting,First-Term Marines, DoD OccupationalArea 0 .................... 90
Figure 9. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting,First--Term Marines, DoD OccupationalArea 1 ........... ................. 91
Figure 10, Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting,First-Term Marines, DoD OccupationalArea 2 ......... ............... .... 93
Figure 11. Top Three Reasons tor Not Reeniisting,First-Term Marines, DoD OccupationalArea 4 ........... ................. 96
Figure 12. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting,First-Term Marines, DoD OccupationalArea 5 ........... ................. 98
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Figure 13. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting,First-Term Marines, DoD OccupationalArea 6.a ........... ................ 100
Figure 14. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting,First-Term Marines, DoD OccupationalArea 6.b ........... ................ 102
Figure 15. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting,
First-Term Marines, DoD OccupationalArea 7 ........ ............... .... 104
Figure 16. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting,First-Term Marines, DoD OccupationalArea 8 ........... ................. 106
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I. INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE
A. GENERAL
In a prepared statement submitted to the Senate Armed
Services Committee on 24 March 1988, the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, Grant S. Green,
clearly outlined the importance of retaining military
personnel. He stated that:
The penalties associated with insufficient retentionare severe. Most notable is reduced mission capability,but there are longer term effects that are no lessserious. Lower retention leads to less selectivity inchoosing the future leaders of the officer and enlistedforce and fewer experienced people in the middle grades.Because lower retention drives higher accessions, it meansgreater training costs and higher trainee-to-supervisorratios. It means placing substantially greater demandson the remaining Service members. Most serious of all,it means that all of these conditions will continue forma. y years, because significant losses of trained andexperienced officers and enlisted members cannot berecouped in the short term. [Ref 1: p. 113]
Mr. Green later pointed out that there is a need to be
concerned about the future, especially considering that in
fiscal 1987 the Marine Corps achieved only 93 percent of its
first-term reenlistment goal.
Balanced against the need to retain enlisted personnel is
the issue of their "quality". All Military Services emphasize
the recruitment of high-quality individuals. For initial
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enlistment, measures of quality are usually based on aptitude
test scores and educational attainment (high school
graduation). The Marine Corps has been particularly
successful in bringing highly qualified members into its
ranks, as recently noted by LtGen J. I. Hudson, Deputy Chief
of Staff for Manpower at Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC).
He stated that the Marine Corps has increased the percentage
of high school graduates recruited from 77.8 in fiscal 1980
to 98.1 in fiscal 1987, while the percentage of new recruits
with above-average scores (50th percentile or higher) on the
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) has increased from 59.0
in fiscal 1980 to 67.6 in fiscal 1987. [Ref. 2 :p. 211]
The Services emphasize the recruitment of high quality
enlistees because they learn relatively quickly and experience
generally fewer disciplinary problems. In addition, high
quality recruits are more likely than their counterparts to
complete the first term of enlistment. However, the Services
have also found that high quality personnel are less likely
to reenlist at the completion of the first term.
The Marine Corms (like the other Services) offers various
reenlistment incentives. However, while the quality of the
first-term population has dramatically improved over the past
ten years, the reenlistment incentives being offered over the
same period have remained relatively unchanged. This
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situation may help to explain the recent difficulties
experienced by the Marine Corps in meeting first-term
reenlistment goals.
B. SCOPE OF THESIS
This thesis focuses on military occupational specialties
(MOSsl in the Marine Corps that have been critically short
since fiscal 1985. It also seeks to determine the role of
available reenlistment incentives in influencing the
reenlistment behavior of first-term personr il assigned to
critically short specialties. To fully develop the connection
between the critical specialties and available reenlistment
incentives, background information is examined on the criteria
for first-term reenlistment. The reenlistment criteria are
evaluated as to whether they guarantee the continued servicc
of highly qualified Marines beyond the first term. The study
further examines the current reenlistment incentives offered
to first-term Marines, and compares these incentives to those
offered by the Army. The final elements of background
information discuss general Marine Corps policy for providing
balance to the enlisted force a~id the criteria for designating
an MOS as "critical".
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C. METHODOLOGY
The bulk of background information for this thesis was
provided by the Enlisted Plans Section of the Manpower Policy
and Plans Division at HQMC. Additional information was
obtained from various Marine Corps directives. The first area
of analysis determ-nes which Marine Corps' MOSs are considered
critical. To determine these specialties, first-term
Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) multiples are analyzed from
fiscal 1985 to the present. (SRB multiples are explained in
Chapter II under current reenlistment incentives.) In this
study, it is assumed that the presence of a multiple indicates
a potential future shortage in the respective occupational
specialty. In addition, it is assumed that the higher the
multiple, the more critical the specialty is to the Marine
Corps.
In the second area of analysis, data compiled by the
Manpower Analysis section at HQMC using Enlisted Separation
Questionnaires are examined. Questionnaire data on first-
term Marines in critical occupations are analyzed using cross-
taiulation and frequency distributions, Thee techniques are
used to characterize differences among the respondents based
on the background factors of marital status, gender, race and
pay grade. Furthermore, the data are divided by Department
of Defense (DoD) occupational area and analyzed using
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frequency distributions to detect trends according c'io
occupational skill similarity. Finally, a relationship is
established between the factors influencing the separation of
Marines from critical specialties with available reenListment
incentives.
D. LITERATURE REVIEW
1. Overview
The literature review begins with an examination of
the factors affecting personnel to remain in or separate from
an organization, both from civilian and military perspectives.
Next, studies that focus on the purpose and effectiveness of
reenlist'ment incentives are discussed. Finally, the
literature review addresses the importance of quality in
retaining enlisted personnel.
2. Retention and Turnover Behavior
a. Civilian Studies
The parallel between c.i.vilian employment and
military service centers around the individual's voluntary
choice to leava or remain in an organizatioa. Stolzenberg
and Winkler [Ref. 2] analyzed the causes and consequences of
voluntary separation by developing an analytical framework
based on previous civilian research. The basis of their stidy
comes from research conducted by J. W. Thibaut and H. H. Kelly
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in 1959 in The Social Psychology of Groups. Thibaut and
Kelley propose "...that people evaluate their experience in
groups according to the costs and benefits involved in
maintaining membership in the group" [Ref. 2:p. 4]. Their
proposition is formed around the concept9 of comparison level
(within the organization) and comparison level for
alternatives (outside the organization) . The comparison level
requires and individual to evaluate his or her satisfaction
in a group relative to the other group members. The
comparison level for alternatives requires a group member to
evaluate his or her satisfaction in a group relative to
membership in another group. As the authors state:
The key point about the comparison level is that itdetermines whether workers are happy with their jobs, butit does not determine whether they leave them. The keyfeature of the comparison level for alternatives is thatit determines whether workers leave their jobs, but notwhether they are happy with them. Accordingly, workerssometimes leave jobs they like, or stay in jobs they donot like. [Ref. 2:p. 5]
In addition to Thibaut and Kelley, Stolzenberg
and Winkler borrow from the work of Herbert Simon to add two
more aspects to their framework of voluntary separation
First, Simon treats low satisfaction as a precipitator to
search for a more satisfying job, thus establishing job search
as a behavioral link between job satisfaction and the decision
to quit. Second, Simon allows the result that a search for
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an alternate job may be unsuccessful, which causes the
formerly unsatisfying job to become more satisfying.
Within the above framework, Stolzenberg and
Winkler employ the following six characteristics as factors
that contribute to job comparison and the eventual decision
to voluntarily stay or separate:
1. expected earnings
2. job security
J. advancement opportunities
4. dispute resolving mechanisms
5. fringe benefits
6. amenities, conveniences, psychological rewards andworking conditions
Stolzenberg and Winkler conclude their review of
civilian separation literature by emphasizing that job
comparison and the search for alternatives must account for
H the above range of characteristics. By not doing so, one mayincorrectly attribute the decision to separate to a narrow
range of factors, and possibly achieve misleading results.
,:n addition to the work of Stolzenberg and
Winkler, Farkus [Ref. 3] applies civilian-oriented concepts
to determine how unmet expectations, changes in satisfaction,
and changes in organizational conLnitment relate to changes in
the intention to reenlist. Farkus relies heavily on research
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conducted by L. W. Porter and R. M. Steers in 1973, published
under the title Organizational , Work, and Personal Factors
in Employee Turnover and Absenteeism. Porter and Steers found
a consistent relationship between job satisfaction and
employee turnover, and they explained this relationship in
terms of "met expectations". Simply, they found that if an
employee's expectations are met, he or she will experience job
satisfaction and tend to remain in the organization. The
opposite is true if expectations are unmet..
In addition to the application of met
expectations, Farkus uses the notion of organizational
commitment as a predictor of employee turnover. His use of
organizational commitment includes the acceptance of values
and goals of the organization, a willingness to exert high
effort on behalf of the organization, and a desire to remain
in the organization.
With the above concepts in mind, Farkus
administered questionnaires to a cohort of Navy enlisted
personnel over different points in their first term. His
analysis found that changes in job satisfaction and
organizational commitment resulted from a steady decline over
time in met expectations. His analysis also suggested that
changes in organizational commitment were a stronger
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determinant of changes in the reenlJ ;tment intention than were
changes in job satisfaction.
Another area of civilian research is Herzberg's
two-factor theory, which focuses on the aspects of job
satisfaction [Ref. 4]. Herzberg found that certain factors
were associated with high satisfaction and others with
dissatisfaction. He referred to job content factors as
"satisfiers", which included such things as achievement,
recognition, advancement, and responsibility. He called the
job context factors "dissatisfiers", and these included
company policy, supervision, salary, and working conditions.
Herzberg proposed that jobs containing content
factors (satisfiers) will lead to job satisfaction; but their
absence will lead to neutrality or indifference. Conversely,
he suggested that a job containing many context factors will
lead to indifference; but their absence will lead to
dissatisfaction. Herzberg concluded that jobs should be
designed to include both context factors (to avoid
dissatisfaction) and content factors (to ensure satisfaction) .
While the intention to reenlist is not exactly
comparable to the intention to remain in a civilian
organization, the studies discussed above are relevant to the
reenlistment decision. It is apparent from these works that
a wide range of factors influence one's decision to remain or
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separate, as do the strength of organizational commitment and
changes in job satisfaction and met expectations.
b. Military Studies
Doering and Grissmer [Ref. 5] give a general
review of the methodologies employed by researchers who have
studied reenlistment behavior through 1984. With regard to
IJ retention, they note that several studies have concluded that
retention rates are sensitive to both the present and expected
future value of compensation. They write:
The focus on pay research is partly understandable.The cost of military compensation is quite visible;therefore measirements as to its effectiveness areconstantly in demand. Pay is also easily observed andfrequently adjusted to meet short term manpower goals.Data to track these pay changes and associated retentiondecisions are very good and easily accessible. No specialdata collection is required. It, thus, presents anexcellent opportunity for measurement of effects. [Ref.5:p. 16]
Doering and Grissmer expand their review of
retention research by acknowledging that the effects of
compensation must be combined with other explanations of
retention. Using both administrative personnel data and
survey results, various studies have found a wide range of
variables that influence retention decisions among mi...itary
personnel. Additionally, most studies are longitudinal in
approach, linking an indiividual's reenlistment intention with
eventual reenlistment behavior. Doering and Grissmwr suggest
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that statements of enlistment and reenlistment intentions
provide good predictions of both actions, and can lead to
policy-relevant analysis.
Mobley, Hand and Griffith [Ref. 6] reviewed 76
military studies that dealt with enlistment, reenlistment,
and/or the withdrawal process. The studies employed diverse
methodologies and data. Mobley et al. were able to classify
the studies according to the dominant independent variable
(e.g., economic, organization climate and practices, etc.)
and the resulting decision (e.g., reenlistment, separation).
The authors evaluated 11 categories of independent variables,
including: economic/incentives, organization practices,
organization climate, job content, satisfaction, intentions,
expectations, demographic/biographic, psychological, aptitude,
and performance [Ref. 6-p. 119].
A common theme discovered by Mobley et al. is that
the economic/incentive category accounted for the most
-ariapce among the independent variables. However, the
authors conclude that the reenlistment process is multivariate
in natu, a.....d rese-a...
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used a difference in means test to compare those intending to
reenlist to those not intending to reenlist. Each Marine
rated several categories of intrinsic and extrinsic job
factors. The intrinsic factors include the work itself,
achievement, recognition, responsibility, and growth. The
extrinsic factors included working conditions, supervisors,
peers, policies, family and social life, and pay. CarlisleI.found those intending to reenlist had positive perceptions of
the intrinsic factors, and no extrinsic factor affected their
intention to reenlist. Alternatively, those deciding not to
reenlist were primarily concerned with their dissatisfaction
with extrinsic factoro.
Chow and Polich [Ref. 7] used a 1976 DoD survey
of 4,000 Army, Navy and Air Force personnel to determine the
factors influencing first-term reenlistment. Their study
focused on individuals in pay grades E-4 or higher who had
one year or less remaining on active duty.
Chow and Polich constructed a multivariate logit
model to predict reenlistment probability using such
explanatory variables as regular military compensation,
reenlistmen't bonuses, allowances, aspects of the military
environment, and demographic variables (such as education,
race, sex, AFQT category and occupational specialty). Some
of their findings include the following:
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1. The survey respondents con3istently overvalued theircompensation.
2. Those who perceived larger values of compensation weremore likely to reenlist.
3. There were higher reenlistment rates among females, non-whites, those receiving higher bonus multiples, andthose with dependents living in government quarters.
4. There were lower reenlistment rates for personnel withhigh school diplomas, with some college, and for thosewho underestimated the value of their compensation.
The study by Chow and Polich emphasized that
reenlistment intention accurately predict reenlistment
behavior. By comparing a respondent's survey intention with
his or her personnel record one year later, the authors found
that for those who said there was a greater than 90 percent
chance of reenlisting, 89 percent actually did.
Finn [Ref. 8] used data from the 1985 DoD survey
of officer and enlisted personnel to predict the reenlistment
intentions of Marines in their first or second term. Finn
used a multivariate logit model with the following explanatory
variables: pay satisfaction, job satisfaction, predictive
ability to find civilian employment, attitude toward the
military in meeting one's expectations, and satisfaction with
family environment.
Finn found that job satisfaction was the most
significant variable affecting reenlistment behavior. He also
found that several factors were directlyr related to the
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likelihood of reenlistment. These included higher pay, higher
promotion, minority status, and being married. In addition,
he found that a person's gender could not be used to predict
reenlistment intention.
Fletcher and Giesler [Ref. 9] used data from the
Navy Occupational Task Analysis Program (NOTAP) survey to
relate the respondent's attitudes toward Navy working and
living conditions to reenlistment decisions. The authors
further identified the effects of these attitudes in providing
guidelines for allocation of quality of life program funds.
The respondents' occupations covered a range of technical and
non-technical jobs. The authors used factor analysis to
reduce the survey data from 67 NOTAP job satisfaction items
to the three factors of pay, quality of job, and quality of
military life. The quality of job factor included autonomy,
physical work environment, skill utilization, team effort and
relationships with peers, supervisors, and subordinates. The
quality of milii.ary life factor included deployment time,
housing, duty station, medical services, and ship
habitability.
Fletcher and Giesler used the three factors along
with demographic variables in a trinomial logit model to
estimate the probability of separating, Oxtending, or
reenlisting. Their results show that pay is consistently
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important in retaining first-term personnel, and the quality
of job factor affected the decisions for both first-termers
and careerists. The authors also found that the quality of
military life factor was identifiable with quality of life
programs, and related most directly with the retention of
career personnel.
Cavin [Ref. 10] used data from the 1985 DoD survey
of officer and enlisted personnel to determine the number of
dimensions of Marine satisfaction with military life. By
using factor analysis, the author was able to form three
factors from 18 survey questions that gauged the satisfaction
of respondents with different asiects of military life (e.g.,
personal freedom, assignment stability, pay and allowances,
medical and dental care, etc.). Cavin identified the three
factors as personal fulfillment in the military, military
family stability, and military compensation and benefits.
Cavin noted two important implications from his
study. First, because satisfaction can be related to three
factors, he suggested that different elements of human
behavior explain different aspects of individual dedication
to the service. Therefore, different models of behavior may
be appropriate. Second, the presence of three factors has
policy implications in terms of how best to allocate resources
to retain dedicated personnel. In addition, as Cavin writes,
15
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the results "suggest that economic factors are only part of
the retention story and that military personnel policies
bearing on family stability may be important as well" [Ref.
10:p. 8].
The study by Vernez and Zellman (Ref. 11] provides
a review of the factors influencing reenlistment and
separation decisions for military members with families. The
authors point out that the proportion of married military
members increases with years of service. The authors present
statistics showing that just five percent of enlisted Marines
are married at the time of entry. By comparison, 34 percent
are married between their third and fourth years of service.
Therefore, the authors write, family considerations might
become increasingly important as personnel reach the first-
term reenlistment decision. In addition, the authors state
that it is not enough to know whether military members and
their families are satisfied with military life. One must
also consider how their level of satisfaction compares to the
perceived levol of satisfaction available to them in the
civilian sector.
Vernez and Zellman point out that service members
with spouses or with children are more likely to leave during
their first-term. Additionally, the authors highlight that
frequent relocation, lack of choice in duty station, and
16
-
frequent separations impact negatively on one's choice to
remain in the military.
This thesis relies heavily upon past research to
determine the factors influencing reenlistment or separation.
The studies presented in this portion of the literature review
provide a broad view of those factors. A continuing theme
throughout is that the choice to stay in or separate is a
combination of many factors, including compensation, job
satisfaction, and location stability. The final decision
obviously rests with the individual service member, based upon
the level of satisfaction, fulfillment of goals, and perceived
availability of options. The next section of the literature
review covers the role of reenlistment incentives in
influencing a service member's decision to remain in the
military. It also discusses research dealing with the
effectiveness of retention incentives.
3. Reenlistment Incentives
Weybrew (Ref. 12] discusses the effectiveness of
several Navy incentive programs in 1966. Although the
programs are outdated, the background information he develops
is still relevant. Weybrew writes that the objective of
military incentive programs "is to maintain or improve the
manpower 'posture' both quantitatively and qualitatively"
[Ref. 12:p. 2]. In relation to this study, the objective of
17
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reenlistment incentives is to get the right number of quality
personnel to reenlist in the right skill groups as a way of
balancing the force.
A primary theoretical issue discussed by Weybrew is
the concept of incentives as they relate to personal
motivation. The effectiveness of a given incentive depends
upon the perception or meaning the incentive has to the person
making the decision. He states that "the effectiveness of an
incentive program will be affected by the degree to which each
member of the population toward which the system is directed
perceives the incentives as meaningful, tangible and relevant"
[Ref. 1 2 :p. 3].
Weybrew also relates the concept of incentive
effectiveness to the fulfillment of a hierarchy of primary
and secondary needs. He assumes that monetary incentives are
directed toward primary needs (food, clothes, housing), and
these needs must be met first before secondary needs
(security, self-esteem, status affiliation and need
achievement) can be met. Therefore, an incentive (e.g.,
educational opportunity) aimed at achieving a secondary need
will be ineffective unless the individual is relatively sure
that primary needs will also be met.
Weybrew ends his discussion of motivational theory by
emphasizing "that a recruit, a reenlistee or a career officer
18
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is a person with needs, motives, and perceptions and not
simply a retention statistic" [Ref. 12:p. 7]. Therefore,
incentives most be adaptable enough to meet the needs of the
broadest range of personnel. Weybrew suggests that incentive
programs with the most potential for maximizing first-term
reenlistments should address the areas of advancement and
educational opportunities, pay and allowances, and
satisfaction with duty.
Studies focusing on the effectiveness of reenlistment
incentives have invariably looked at the impact of the
Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program. Hosek, Fernandez,
and Grissmer [Ref. 13] offer a general outline of the utility
of the SRB Program. Five of their major points are listed
below: [Ref. 13:pp. 28-29]
1. Bonuses are probably more cost effective than across-the-board pay increases because they can be targetedto•t rd particular skills.
2. Bonuses offer greater flexibility because they can beadjusted among skill groups, and can help controltransitory shortages.
3. Bonuses counter long term imbalances because of theircontinued payment to many skill groups over time.
4. Bonuses counter the effect of declining military pay andcivilian unemployment on retention in critical skills.
5. Bonuses lengthen the average term of commitment sincethey are paid to personnel who reenlist for more thanthree years. This, in turn, improves the military'sreturn in its training investment and reduces accessionrequirements.
19
7 -. . . . ____ ___,_•__ ___ Jj'_j_.... ..
-
Hosek and Peterson [ref. 14] follow-up on the above
points by analyzing continuation rate data from fiscal 1976
through fiscal 1981. Their purpose in studying this period
is to determine the impact of two methods of bonus payment,
installment and lump sum. They found that lump sum bonuses
are more cost-effective, at least at the first-term retention
point. This is true bocause a smaller lump sum payment has
the same impact on retention as a larger bonus paid out over
the term of reenlistment. The authors concludtt by suggesting
a continuation and possible expansion of the SRB program.
They base this recommendation on the ability of bonuses "to
respond quickly to changes both in labor supply, such as those
created by economic and demographic cycles, and in labor
demand, such as those created by changes in weapons systems
or force deployment" (Ref. 14:p. 3].
Another study centering on the impact of SRBs on
retention is that of Cymrot [Ref. 15]. Cymrot looks
specifically at the Marine Corps, and begins by grouping over
350 Marine occupational specialties into 22 skill families,
assuming individuals in similar occupations have similar
responses to bonuses. He further divides the skill families
'-1 into three experience zones based on years of service.
Cymrot uses the Annualized Cost of Living (ACOL)
approach to establish a relationship between bonuses and
-
reenlistments. Cymrot states that the ACOL approach assumes
Marines make reenlistment decisions based on the comparison
between military and civilian monetary arid psychic rewards.
The ACOL approach also allows Cymrot to introduce other
factors (i.e., civilian unemployment rate, net pay and
military rank) that have an indirect effect on the
relationship between bonuses and reenlistments.
The results of Cymrot's study show there is a strong
statistical association between bonuses and reenlistments in
nearly all cormbinations of skill tamilies and experience
zones. With his results, Cymrot is able to calculate
reenlistment rates under different bonus multiple levels and
economic conditions. He finds that increases in the
unemployment rate increased expected reenlistinents, and that
higher-ranked personnel are more likely to reenlist than
lower-ranked personnel. Additionally, Cymrot's study
indicates that suspensions of the SRB program due to fund
depletion resulted in decreased reen.istments.
Aside from studies dealing with bonuses, no research
was found that quantitatively addresses the impact of other
incentives on retention. However, the study by Doering and
Grissmer (discussed above) highlights the need to determine
the effectiveness of additional. reenlistment incentives. They
note that enlistment experiments have been conducted to
21
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measure the effects of educational benefits and terms of
service. The authors propose that several different
incentives could be tested with relatively small. sample sizes
(500 to 1,000 individuals) and yield statistically significant
results. They recommend the testing of incentives that
include pay, guaranteed location, tour length, and job
retraining. Additionally, the authors recommend testing
specific incentives at different reenlistment points.
The final study mentioning the use of reenlistment
incentives is by Jacobson and Thomason (Ref. 16]. The purpose
of their study is to determine the impact of permanent change
of station (PCS) orders on the earnings of a military wife and
the resulting effect on a husband's retention. The authors'
research of first-term Navy personnel estimates that overall
retention is reduced by nine percent because of relocation
lessening the earnings of wives. Based on these results, the
authors recommend as a reenlistment incentive the guarantee
to service members that no relocation will occur. They
indicate the incentive would be valuable to approximately 18
percent of the potential first-term reenlistees, but that
savings would occur from reduced accession, training, and PCS
moves.
Reenlistment incentives may be effective in retaining
the proper number of personnel with the right skills, but
22
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simple numbers should not be the only concern. The military
also wants the best quality personnel- to stay. The next
section of the literature review discusses the issue of
quality, and its importance in a technically-oriented, highly
specialized military.
4. Retention and Quality
The issue of quality was addressed above as it
pertains to standards of enlistment (measured by AFQT category
and high school graduation) Marcus [Ref. 17] uses AFQT
categories as standards of quality while addressing the effect
of SRB levels, unemployment, and pay on the quality of the
career force. He proposes that responsiveness to pay is
different for individuals with differing characteristics, and
that changes in pay or the national economy may have a
significant impact on the quality of personnel retained.
The research by Marcus shows that there are
substantial differences in the impact of pay and unemployment
across mental groups. He suggests that change3 in pay and
unemployment have the most impact on the best people who are
more raluable to civilian employers. Therefore, the higher
quality people are less likely to reenlist at the end of their
first-term when faced with widening gaps between military and
civilian pay or reduced unemployment levels.
23
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An additional. funding by Marcus that is relevant to
this study concerns the importance of advancement to the
reenlistment decision. He points out that promotion is a
targeted policy since those promoted are the best perfoimers
and therefore more valuable. Marcus proposes that increasing
the advancement rate in undermanned skill groups would have
a substantial impact on retention and is targeted on the best
people.
Ward and Tan [Ref. 18] differ from previous research
in their measure of quality. Although AFQT score and high
school graduation indicate the quality of personnel at the
time of enlistment, the authors question whether these factors
are meaningful predictors of job performance. Ward and Tan
introduce into their analysis the factors of promotion speed
and rank attained (along with AFQT scores and education level)
to get a broader picture of quality at the fLrst-term
reenlistment point.
Their research shows that the military retains much
better personnel in the career force than it loses. In
comparing t3 e performance of those who reenlisted w-`l those
who did not, the authors note those who reenlisted had the
highest performance and higher absolute military ability.
Ward and Tan also state that AFQT category and education level
24
I
-
matter very little in predicting the "1juccess"' (as measured
by rank and speed of promotion) of the first-term enlistee.
Ward and Tan apply their findings to reenlistment
policy. According to the authors, guidelines on eligibility
to reenlist should. not be heavily weighted toward AFQT
category or education achievement, and should allow waivers
of standards that vary by military occupation. Additionally,
they propose that rank attained at the end of the first term,
and perhaps the speed of promotion should be included in
reenlistment. policy guidelines.
Binkin [Ref. 19] addresses the relationship between
military technology and manpower requirements. Binkin
balances two concepts against each other. First, with regard
to technology, technical jobs have grown to represent a larger
share of all jobs in the military, while the technical
complexity of specific jobs has also expanded. Second, with
regard to manpower, the shrinking youth population combined
with anticipated economic recovery may make it increasingly
more difficult for the military to enlist and retain the
proper amount of ual ified personnel.
Binkin addresses quality from the normal standards of
AFQT category and education level. He notes that because of
their declining bilities, a smaller proportion of the youth
population will be qualified for service if advances in
25
p --.-------- 'i'- - - -
-
technology bring a heavier concentration of technical jobs to
the military.
Binkin discusses whether advances in technology
increase or decrease the need for higher quality personnel.
He approaches this subject from the perspective of system
complexity, reliability, and maintainability. By presenting
recent examples of the introduction of technically-advanced
equipment, Binkin concludes that high technology increases
the need for smarter, more technically proficient personnel.
Binkin balances the issues of technology and manpower
by offering several policy options. With regard to equipment
technology he proposes that the military services procure less
complex, more reliable, and more easily maintained equipment.
At the same time, he discusses the possibilities of expanding
the roles of women and civilians. He also discusses the
retention of highly skilled personnel by diverting resources
used to retain semi- or unskilled personnel. Binkin suggests
using these resources for incentives to retain highly skilled
individuals. As a further hedge against technology andmanpower , , dvises the mlitry to alter trainina
concepts by focusing more on on-the-job training and applying
new technologies to the training base-
his Eitelberg [Ref. 20] echoes some of the above thoughts
in his study of aptitude trends in the military's C3I
26
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(command, control, communication, intelligence) specialties,
including electronics and computers. He points out tha': these
specialties have grown in technological complexity, and have
also grown as a portion of the overall force.
Eitelberg examines the aptitude test scores (as
measured by the AFQT) of three cohorts or enlisted personnel
assigned to C31 jobs. The cohorts include persons enlisting
in the military in 1972, 1977, and 1.982. The results reveal
a consistently downward trend over time in the aptitude test
scores of those who remain in the military. From these
trends, he concludes that the military is losing many of its
smartest people from some of the most technical jobs.
Eitelberg states that although the mean percentile scores have
fallen, they are still well above the national average. Yet,
a substantial loss of talent is evident, and it could be
countered through more effective reenlistment programs.
In addition to the downward trends in aptitude,
Eitelberg identifies future considerations concerning manpower
and technology. Specifically, he states that:
The competitlon for bright p.op. le • • n technologicalfields is intensifying as the available supply ofemployees continues to shrink. Moreover, as the militaryexperiences technological growth, its demand for highly-qualified members will likely expand. The net result(assuming relatively stable force size) is thatproportionately fewer people from an already--decliningpopulation will be qualified for a growing number ofmilitary jobs. This suggests that any deterioration in
27
SI I I i I t • ,....
-
the quality of military manpower will be proportionatelygreater in places where quality is needed most. [Ref.20:p. 25]
5. Conclusion
The literature review has built a foundation of topics
relevant to the study of reenlistment incentives. It began
by addressing the wide range of factors that influence
military and civilian personnel to leave or remain in an
organization. This was followed by a discussion of the role
of incentives, and a brief summa'ry of several incentive-
specific studies. Finally, the literature review looked at
the relationship between retention and quality within an
increasingly technical and specialized military.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II provides background information in three
general ireas. First, the criteria for reenlistment are
examined to determine their ability to ensure the retention
of qtality Marines. Second, the reenlistment incentives
currently offered by the Marine Corps are presented. Lastly,
the concepts of enlisted force balance and occupational skill
criticality are addressed.
In Chapter III, critical MOSs are identified by examining
the assignment of SRB multiples from fiscal 1.985 to the
present. Additionally, a methodology is presented for the
28
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examination of data obtained through the USMC Enlisted
Separation Questionnaire.
In Chapter IV, data from the separation questionnaires
are analyzed using cross-tabulation and frequency
distributions. The data are examined according to demographic
characteristics and DoD occupational areas to determine the
primary reasons for first-term Marines (in critical MOSs) not
reenlisting.
The results of the analyses conducted in this study are
summarized in Chapter V. Additionally, conclusions are
presented that focus on the enlisted separation questionnaire
and current reenlistment incentives. Finally, recommendations
are made that address reenlistment criteria and incentives.
29
': i ... ... • .... . .. .... i i : i i . . . . . ... i i i - .... i '• i . ...Ai . ... i "i wi.
-
II. BACKGROUND
A. OVERVIEW
In the Marine Corps, the process of retaining highly
qualified enlisted personnel falls under the guidance of the
career planning program. Marine Corps Order P1040.31E [Ref.
21], the Career Planning and Development Guide, states that
the "retention of quality Marines will ensure the maintenance
of a career force which is composed of Marines who axe capable
of making significant contributions to the overall
effectiveness of the Marine Corps." [Ref. 21:p. 1-3] This
study draws on two phrases of this quote to present retention
background information.
The "retention of quality Marines" invokes the notion that
the Marine Corps is selective in keeping the best personnel.
The issue of quality, although never defined in the reference,
is addressed in this chapter by referring to the criteria for
reenlistment eligibility. These criteria should ensure that
only quality Marines (those who meet the criteria) will be
permitted to reenlist.
The same phrase, "retention of qual ity Marines, " could be
viewed from the perspective that there are quality Marines
approaching the end of their enlistment and facing a
30
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reenlistment decision. By being "quality" Marines, they meet
the criteria, yet they are not all inclined towards
reenlistment. Some are undecided, while the others feel
strongly for or against reenlisting. This study views
reenlistment incentives as mechanisms for influencing those
who are undecided. It also views incentives as added benefits
to those who would reenlist even without the presence of the
incentives. For those who are strongly inclined to separate,
reenlistment incentives are viewed as being non-pertinent to
their decision process. In this chapter, the study presents
the first-term reenlistment incentives offered by the Marine
Corps. These incentives are also compared to those offered
by the U.S. Army, as outlined in Army Regulation 601-280.
[Ref. 22]
Another portion of the above quote (from the Career
Planning and Development Guide) concerns "the maintenance of
a career force". This study assumes that the phrase refers
to the enlisted ranks, beyond the first-term, as being
balanced by rank, experience, and skill. However, quality
first-termt Marines are those the Marine Corps wants to
trans:er into the career force. Therefore, maintaining
balance in Elie career force begins with retaining those in
their first-term who possess the skills deemed critical by
enlisted manpot-er plannoro. ThG concepts of enlisted force
31
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balance and occupational skill criticality are the fiiial
background issues discussed in this chapter.
B. REENLISTMENT ELIGIBILITY CRITER.IA
As previously noted, the criteria for reenlistment should
provide a guarantee for maintaining a high quality enlisted
force beyond the first-term. The majority of criteria apply
to all enlisted Marines, whether first-term or beyond.
Additional criteria apply only to first-term reenlistment.
Moreover, all unmet criteria may be waived at different levels
in the chain of coiumand. This study examines the reenlistment
criteria by categorizing them into one of three groups.
The first reenlistment criteria group involves individual
character and other personal traits. This group includes the
following five prerequisites: [Ref. 21:pp. 3-5 to 3-6]
i. Possess high standards of leadership, professionalcompetence, and personal behavior required to maintainthe prestige and quality standards of the Marine Corps.
2. Possess the moral character and personal integrityexpected of all Marines.
3. Not be a conscientious objector.
4. Not be a sole surviving son or daughter.
5. Be recommended by the commanding officer.
The first two of these criteria appear so grandiose in
wording that they refer more to the collective character of
the Marine Corps than they do to the individual Marine. As
32
I
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such, these criteria have little impact in determining whether
a Marine is qualified to reenlist. The third prerequisite has
less impact since a conscientious objector is not likely to
voluntarily join an organization renowned for its warfighting
capacity and probable early commitment in any size scale of
conflict. Likewise, restricting enlistment or reenlistment
from a sole-surviving son or daughter can be easily waived,
and seems more appropriate under draft conditions during a
large-scale conflict than under volunteer conditions of a
peacetime force. The final character criterion is the most
basic in that it introduces the element of judgment by the
chain of command. However, a commander must base his judgment
concerning the worthiness of a prospective reenlistee on some
tangible evidence. This evidence can be found in the second
and third categories of reenlistment criteria.
The second category of reenlistment criteria can be
described as performance-related. Included in this category
are the following six prerequisites:
1. Pass the physical fitness test and meet militaryappearance and height/weiqht standards.
2. Have a minimum conduct and proficiency average of4.0/4.0 (explained below).
3. Have successfully completed a twelfth grade educationor its equivalent.
33
I_ __ __I _ I __I __I __I __I I __II i __I __I __I I__ _I _ _I i _ i___II I I I
-
4. Have a general technical (GT) aptitude area score of 80for a high school graduate or 95 for a non-high schoolgraduate.
5. Pass a physical examination to be fully qualified forall duties at sea and in the field.
6. Meet the necessary time-in-service requirements. Mostoften, this means that a Marine has less than one yearremaining on his or her current reenlistment contract.
Three of the above prerequisites may be waived at the
Commanding General's level for first-term Marines. These
include education level., general aptitude, and performance
rating. These three prerequisites are the most directly
related tc standards of quality discussed in Chapter I As
previously noted, in recent years virtually all Marine
recruits have been high school graduates. Furthermore, the
few new recruits who do not possess a high school diploma at
enlistment are strongly encouraged to obtain an equivalency
diploma during their fJrst term. The criterion for
educational level is therefore meaningless by today's
standards. Concerning aptitude, the requir ment for a GT
score of 80 for high school graduates is not particularly
restrictive. In fact, studies have suggested that this score
can be achieved by at least 72 percent of the general
population.' Additionally, a Marine who scored poorly on the
'Eitelberg, M. J., Manpower for Military Occupations, p. 235,
April 1988.
34
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entrance examination may retake any portion to improve his or
her scores to qualify for reenlistment or other selective
training programs. The final performance-related criterion
that can be waived by a commanding general pertains to
proficiency and conduct ratings. Without going into the
specific rating guidelines, a mark below the 4.0 level for
either area normally identifies a Marine needing too much job
supervision ýproficjý'ncy) or having disciplinary problems
(conduct). Considering that over a typical four-year
enlistment, a Marine will receive many marks from different
supervisors, average marks of below 4.0/4.0 signal a marginal-
to-poor performer. In all, the performance-related criteria
are not particularly restrictive, and are less so when
allowing the three that are most related to standards of
quality to be waived.
The final category of cAnlistment criteria is punitive-
related, and includes the following six prerequisites:
1. Not have a record of military involvement in thewrongful use, possession, distribution, or introductionfor the purpose of distribution on a militaryinstallation of any narcotic substance or dangerous drug(including marijuana).
2. Have no conviction by a court-martial.
3. Have no known convictions by civil authorities, oraction taken which is tantamount to a finding of guiltyof an offense for which the maximum penalty under theUniform Code of Military Justice is confinement for sixmonths or more and/or a fine of $500 or more.
35I '_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
-
4. Have no more than two nonjudicial punishments.
5. Not have completed formal alcohol treatment during thepast year. (Marines may be extended for up to one year.This restriction does not apply to Marines who volunteerfor treatment and have had no performance or conductproblems.)
6. Have completed an unscheduled urinalysis within 90 daysprior to reenlistment.
As previously observed, the Services have learned that
higher-quality enlistees generally experience fewer
disciplinary problems. Additionally, the urinalysis testing
program, currently used by all Services, has resulted in a
steady decline through the 1980s in the number of drug-
related incidents. As such, these criteria set forth
minimally-accepted standards of conduct. A Marine who
breaches one of these criteria will receive reduced marks for
conduct and possibly even proficiency. Moreover, as with most
reenlistment criteria, a cotmmanding general may waive the
prerequisites for first-term Marines that deal with illegal
drugs, civilian convictions, court-martials, and nonjudicial
punishments.
The majority of all enlistment criteria, Particular].y
those related to performance and punitive standards, establish
minimally accepted standards. As stich, the criteria seem to
allow the reenlistment of Marines who can meet only the
minimum standards. Additionally, by permitting miny of the
36
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criteria to be waived, the Marine Corps provides reenlistment
opportunities to Marines who do not meet all minimum
standards. The overriding presence of the waiver process
appears to give the Marine Corps the flexibility to -eenlist
marginal. personnel, likely during difficult periods of
recruiting or retention. As noted by Doering and Grissmer,
the flexibility in the reenlistment criteria may allow the
retention of marginal personnel if the alternatives are vacant
billets and unmet retention goals. [Ref. 5:p. 2]
C. FIRST-TERM REENLISTMENT INCENTIVES
Chapter Four of the Marine Corps Career Planning and
Development Guide outlines the incentives available to first-
term Marines who are eligible to reenlist. The chapter begins
by statiniD that "incentives are offered to afford qualified
Marines who are sincerely oriented towards a Marine Corps
career an opportunity to influence their future". [Ref. 2 1:p.
4-3] With regard to first-term Marines, those decided to
reenlist after having served approximately four years have
likely not made the reenlistment decision with a long-term,
I." 20-yaar career in mind. More likely, they have considered the
ability of the Marine Corps to meet their expectations, their
opportunity to pursue perceived alternatives, and their
overall satisfaction with a wide range of tactors.
37
I-._- - - - - - -
-
This study consequently considers the first-term
reenlistment decision to be of shorter term, lasting for the
length of the reenlistment contract. Also, the quote in the
above paragraph focuses on the ability of incentives to allow
reenlisting Marines to ihape and influence their future. This
concept relates more to the Marine who is certain of
reenlisting. However, for those who are undecided, the
incentives should influence their reenlistment decisions in
-that incentives must be meaningful and pertinent to the
individual contem[lating reenlistment. It is unlikely that
the incentive with the most quantifiable impact on
reenlistment, the Selective Reenlistment Bonus, or SRB, could
be categorized as allowing a Marine to shape his or her Marine
Corps career. Receiviitg an SRB may influence one's lifestyle,
and it may shape one's career only to the extent that by
receiving a bonus, a Marine will stay in.
The SRB has been the most widely studied incentive, and
guidance for its use is the most detailed of all the
incentives. The guidance begins in Title 37 of the United
States Code, parag-aph U 308. Re. 2 3 :pp. 214-2161 m ,ajor
points to be drawn from Title 37 are as follows;:
1. It requires an individual t,) be qualified in a militaryskill designated as critical.
38
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2. It establishes the method of bonus formulation; (SRBmultiple) I (one month's basic pay) * (number of yearsreenlisted). (The SRB multiple is explained below.)
3. It sets the maximum multiple of six, the maximum numberof years of reenlistment as six, and the maximum bonusat $30,000.
4. It states that, of the total new bonuses paid during afiscal year, not more than ten percent may exceed$20,000.
5. It requires an individual to reenlist for more thanthree years.
6. It allows the payment of bonuses either in a lump sumor installments.
The SRB multiple is a number between. zero and six. Its
value is assigned to every enlisted military occupation by
manpower planners for each of the Services. A higher multiple
indicates a more critical occupation and thus a higher bonus.
In addition to varying by occupation, multiples also vary by
three experience zones: Zone A for first-term reenlistees,
Zone B for second-term reenlistees, and Zone C for careerists
with no more than 14 years of service. Finally, multiples are
changed frequently by manpower planners to manage the size and
experience levels of their respective Services. As noted by
Cymrot, the Marine Corpnm changed the SpB multiples 21 times
between October 1979 and December 1.985 [Ref. 15:pp. 4-5].
The above guidelines are further refined in Department of
Defense (DoD) Insi ruction 1304.22, dated 7 August 1985 [Ref.
39
I I - I . I I I
-
24]. The major refinements from this instruction include the
following four points:
1. It established three zones of SRB eligibility dependingon total years of service. Zone A generally pertains tofirst-termers, Zone B to intermediates or second-termers, and Zone C to careerists.
2. It stipulates the criteria for designating anoccupational specialty as critical. (These criteria areoutlined below along with the concept of force balance.)
3. It further defines criteria for individual membereligibility, such as being in pay grade E-3 or above.
4. it states that the purpose of the SRB is to induceindividuals serving in a critical skill to reenlist andserve in the skill for the full period for which thebonus is paid.
The maintenance of the SRB program is further refined at
the level of the Secretary of the Navy and Commandant of the
Marine Corps. The Marine Corps incorporates three additional
points to the program. First, the Marine Corps requires an
individual to reenlist for a minimum of fou. years, not three.
Next, the method of payment is required to be 50 percent of
the total bonus at the time of reenlistment, with the
remaining portion paid in equal amounts on the reenlistment
CLA .Lrari ar dat-es. B - -.. A blar-
multiple at five, not six.
As can be seen above, although Title 37 of the U.S. Code
establishes basic guidelines, the SRB program faces many
refinements before arriving at the individual service level.
40
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Additionally, each Service may administer the program
differently from the others. For example, the Army has
recently added two refinements. [Ref. 25) First, the Army
allows multiples to increase by half values between one half
and six (0.5, 1, 1.5, etc.). This may provide the Army with
more accuracy in targeting the necessary number of
reenlistments in each critical specialty, given a change in
the SIPB multiple. Second, the Army now links the SRB multiple
to not only occupational specialty and zone, but also to
grade. For example, an E-5 may receive a larger multiple than
an E-4 even though they are both first-termers with the same
occupational specialty. This may help to retain personnel of
higher quality if quality is gauged by rank attained and speed
of promotion, as suggested by Ward and Tan [Ref. 18]. In
1985, the Marine Corps similarly tied an SRB multiple of one
to occupational specialty and rank. In that year, first-torm
Marines in several combat arms specialties (rifleman,
machinegunner, mortarman, assaultman, and field artillery
A cannoneer) qualified for a bonus only if they were in paygrades E-4 or E-5.
In addition to the SRB, the Marine Corps offers
reenlistees a choic-e of assignment preference to a duty
station, a type of duty, or a location where a requirement
and billet vacancy exist for the' Lr grade and occupational
41
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specialty. With regard to a particular duty station, Marines
may request three preferences for assignment. The preferences
may be in the continental United States (CONUS) or overseas
(normally Okinawa, Japan), or the Marine may request to remain
at his or her present location for up to 12 months. In
general, the individual's assignment preferences must match
the Marine Corps' requirements for grade and skill vacancies.
The request for a specific type of duty involves trainiig
for an assignment to a duty that is outside of a Marine's
primary occupational specialty. Examplus of these duty
assignments are Marine security guard (barracks), recruiting,
and drill instructor duties. These assignments require the
Marine to meet strict screening criteria. Additionally,
"reenlistment is not the only occasion when these special
duties may be requested. If a Marine meets the screening
criteria, he or she may request special duty at any time. It
is beyond the scope of this study to address the likelihood
of a Marine requesting and eventually being assigned to
special duty. However, special duty billets are extremely
competitive, not only for initial assignment to training, but
also to complete training.
The Army offers reenlistment incentive3 for choice of duty
station or type of duty based upon the same general theme as
the Marine Corpn--t.hat is, 4 lie indliv.idual's qualifications and
42
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the needs of the Army. Some of the Army's options are
basically identical to those of the Marine Corps, such as
remaining at one's present location for up to 12 months, or
reqTesting an assignment either in CONUS or overseas. Type
of duty incentives are also similar to the Marine Corps in
that they are extremely competitive. These include assignment
to the Berlin Brigade or to the Army's ceremonial "Old Guard"
(the Third Infantry in Washington, D. C.). Other options
offered by the Army appear broader in scope. For example, a
reenlisting soldier may request assignment to a particular
unit down to the regimental level. Also, some of the
incentives involving type of duty seem to expand the soldier's
opportunities within his or her primary occupational
specialty. These include the possibility of airborne or
ranger training, with the subsequent assignment to a unit
requiring those skills.
The Marine Corps offers career progression training as
the third type of reenlistment inceintive. This type of
training is normally within a Marine's primary occupational
specialty, and it exposes the Marine to advanced level courses
based on the needs of the Marine Corps and the availability
of formal school quotas. Reenlistment is not the sole
occasion for assignment to career progression training.
However, this type of training is set aside for Marines who
43
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have a solid record of performance and will remain on active
duty for a specific amount of time(at least 12 months,
normally) following completion of the training. The Army
offers similar advanced training to reenlistees.
Additionally, the Army offers foreign language training &t
the Defense Language Institute. As with airborne and ranger
training, language training expands the soldier's
opportunities within his or her primary specialty.
The final type of reenlistment incentive offered by the
Marine Corps is lateral movement to another occupational
specialty. Lateral movement may occur if an individual is in
a specialty that is overstrength and qualifies for training
in an understrength specialty. As wcith other reenlistment
incentives, lateral movement does not have to occur at the
point of reenlistment. Moreover, lateral movement is a method
used more by manpower planners to balance the force than it
is as a reenlistment incentive [Ref. 26]. The issue of a
balanced force and the designating of an occupation as
"critical" are addressed below.
D. FORCE BALANCE AND OCCUPATION CRITICALITY
The issue of balancing the Marine Corps' enlisted force
involves several factors. Amonq these factors are overall
end-strength, occupational specialties, years of service,
44
,J- I II
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rank, attrition, recruitment, and retention. Because this
study focuses on reenlistment incentives and their impact on
first-term retention, this section initially addresses the
process of setting reenlistmeft goals. It then examines how
these goals are adjusted when balanced against end-strength
and occupational specialty requirements. The information for
this section was provided by the Enlisted Plans Section of the
Manpower Policy and Plans Division at HQMC.
The setting of reenlistment goals begins with an estimate
of what the career planning force can expect to achieve. The
estimate comes from the Enlisted Force Management System,
"which applies forecasted losses to the current personnel
inventory. The system then compares the forecasted inventory
by occupational specialty and zone (based upon years of
service) to the overall target inventory for the enlisted
force. The system calculates retention rates for each
specialty and zone based on recent historical behavior from
the past year. It then applies the rates against the
population of Marines who will reach the end of their service
contracts in the targeted fiscal year. This produces an
estimate of how reenlistments can contribute towards balancing
the enlisted force. After review by the enlisted assignment
monitors and the Enlisted Retention Section, the estimate
becomes the reenlistment plan for a given fiscal year.
45
1I
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The execution of the reenlistment plan is monitored by
the Enlisted Retention Section. This section determines on
a monthly basis whether the reenlistment goals are achievable.
If not, the entire enlisted manpower plan must be changed to
reflect more realistic goals. Every change to the manpower
plan requires the approval of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs at HQMC. For example, two
changes to the plan in fiscal 1989 reduced the overall
reenlistment goal by over 1,400 reenlistments.
Changes to the reenlistment goals may occur when goals
are not being met for specific occupational specialties. This
can affect the skill balance within the force. However,
achieving an end-strength figure is more critical than
balancing the force by skills. Thus, not achieving a
retention goal in one specialty may result in retaining more
personnel than required in other specialties. Exceeding a
specialty's retention goal is limited by the policy that
prohibits first-term reenlistment into an overmanned
specialty.
Similarly, as with occupational specialties, personnel
experience (years of service) also contributi~s towards
balancing the force. If balance and end-strength cannot both
be met, balance will be sacrificed to achieve end-strength.
Therefore, the inability to meet first-term reenlistment goals
46
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can lead to an increase in intermediate and career goals. For
example, during fiscal 1988 and fiscal 1989, shortfalls in
first-term reenjintments were counteracted by over-execution
of intermediate and career goals.
The achievement of a balanced enlisted force by skill and
experience is secondary in importance to meeting end-strength
requirements. However, other factors besides reenlistment
plans affect the attainment of an end-strength. For instance,
recruitment plans and separation policies can contribute to
short-term achievement of an end-strength. To address the
long-term effectiveness of a force, one must consider balance
by skill and experience. The dependence of the Services on
the SRB to encourage retention of personnel. having critical
skills confirms the need for this type of balance.
As mentioned earlier, the SRB is offered to individuals
in specialties that meet specific criteria for being
designated as "critical". DoD Instruction 1340.22 [Ref. 24]
outlines the requirements for designating these occupational
specialties. The criteria include the following:
1. Serious undermanning in a number of adjacent year
groups.
2. Chronic and persistent shortages in total career manningin past years or projected for future years.
3. High replacement cost, including training costs.
47
l[l_______________ll _ i__ l l |l
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4. Skill is relatively arduous or otherwise unattractivecompared to other military skills or civilianoccupations.
5. Skill is essential to the accomplishment of the Servicemissions.
The selection of "critical" occupations requires a
balanced evaluation of the above criteria. Although the DoD
Instruction outlines the criteria, each Service must apply
the guidelines to their respective force to deterjine the
critical specialties. The Marine Corps, for example,
considers a skill critical when it is manned by less than 95
percent of the billet requirement. Additionally, each service
must equally consider the amount of money allocated for
IIexpenditures on SIRBs. Based on the above DoD guidelines, mostspecialties would likely be considered "critical".
E. CONCLUSION
This chapter began by presenting the first-term
reenlis:1ment criteria currently used by the Marine Corps.
These criteria are fairly unrestrictive in allowing the
possible reenlistment of marginal personnel. Current
reenlistment incentives were covered next. in addition to
the SRB, the incentives offered by the Mat. ne Corps are choice
of duty and duty station, career proqression training, and
lateral movement into an understrength MOS. The SRB is
strictly rontrolled at many different administrative levels
48
_ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
-
within the Department of Defense. The other incentives are
specific to the Marine Corps, and available at other times
besides the point of reenlistment. The final areas covered
in this chapter were enlisted force balance and skill
criticality. Total force end-strength overrides force balance
based on skills and experience, while skill criticality
appears equally controlled by allocated SRB funds, and by DoD
and Service guidelines.
,4IL
49
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I.I
III. DATA ANQD METHODOLOGY
A. OVERVIEW
Thi- chapter consists of two sections. In the first
"section, critical military occupational specialties (MOSs) in
the Marine Corps are identified. These MOSs were selected by
examining the SRB multiples assigned by HQMC from fiscal 1985
to the present. The second section focuses on data obtained
through the USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire.
B. IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL SPECIALTIES
The focus of this study is on Marine occupational
specialties that have been critically short from fiscal 1985
to the present. The initial step is to obtain data and
develop a methodology for identifying the critical skills.
Identification of critical skills was originally requested
from the Enlisted Plans Section of the Manpower Policy and
Plans Division at HQMC. Specifically, the author requested
that critical specialties be identified according to annual
retention goals for each specialty, with the corresponding
success rate in meeting each goal. As it turned out, this
information was not retained by IiQMC during the time period
studied here, and was therefore unavailable. As an
50
J ......... _ _ _ _
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alternative, it was recommended that this study examine the
assignment of SRB multiples from fiscal 1985 to present. As
noted in the previous chapter, an MOS must first be designated
as critical before it can be assigned an SRB multiple.
Therefore, it is assumed that an examination of SRB multiples
can reveal which MOSs are considered critical. As a result,
seven messages were examined that assigned SRB multiples to
Marine Corps MOSs. The seven messages with their
corresponding message designation and fi.scal year appear
below.
1. ALMAR 268/84 for fiscal 1985 [Ref. 27]
2. ALMAR 260/85 for fiscal 1986 [Ref. 28]
3. ALMAR 264/86 for fiscal 1987 [Ref. 29]
4. ALMAR 329/87 for fiscal 1988 [Ref. 30]
5. ALM&R 266/88 for fiscal 1989 [Ref. 31]
6. ALMAR 101/89 to update fiscal 1989 [Ref. 32]
7. ALMAR 165/89 for fiscal 1990 [Ref. 33]
The messages identify the occupational specialties by
their four digit codes, with corresponding multiples for each
of the three zones 'A, B, or C). This study deals only with
the zone A multiples for first-term Marines. Additionally,
this study examines only those speci:•Ities that existed from
1985 to the present. For instance, several specialties that
rated multiples on the fir st thr-ee messages were deleted and
51
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reassigned between 1985 and 1987 due to enlisted skillsreorganization. As & result, 23 specialties were eliminated
from further study. Also excluded from further study are
specialties designated for Marines not yet occupationally
qualified (that is, trainees) and 1-hose designated for Marines
of pay grade E-6 and above. In all, 291 enlisted occupational
specialties existed over the entire period and rated at least
one SFB multiple.
Two interesting trends appear in the assignment of SRB
multiples. First, the number of specialties rating an SRB
has declined by more than half from fiscal 1985 to present;
235 in fiscal 1985, down to 116 for fiscal 1990 (see Figure
1) . Second, the average multiple has been increasing, from
3.27 in fiscal 1985 to 4.10 for fiscal 1990 (sce Figure 2).
From these trends it appears that the Marine Corps has become
more selective in using the SRB as a reenlistment incentive.
This selectivity may be partly due to generally less money
being appropriated to the Marine Corps for new SRB payments
during the same period. According to the Enlisted Plans
Section, the Marine Corp,. recei,.a.r $S1.8 million in fiscal
19 15, and has been appropriated $38.3 million for fiscal 1990.
52
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A
250- 235 24•____224
201200-
162 170
S150 138
C;1 0 0 -
50-
/ .... F i F F "1985 19 .36 1987 1989 19 9 -1 1989--2 1990
Fiscal Year
Note: The above values were obtained by summing the nunberof MOSs awarded an SRB for each fiscal year. 1989-1 indicates the initial SRB program for fiscal 1989(ALMAR 260/88). 1989-2 reflects an update of thefiscal 1989 SRB program (ALMAR 101/89)
Source: ALMAR 268/84, ALMAR. 260/85, ALMAR 264/86, AL•MR329/87, ALMAR 260/88, AIMAR 101/89, and ALMAR 165/(89.
Figure 1. No. of MOSs Awarded an SRB by Fiscal Y•:iar
I 5
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4.1
0- r19 . 198 1987 1988 189-1 1, 2 9T
Fiscal Year
Note: The average multiple was found by summing allmultiples and dividing by the number of eligible MOSsfor each fiscal year. 1989-1 indicates the initialSRB program for fiscal 1989 (ALMAR 260/88). 1989-2reflects an update of the fiscal 1989 SRB program(ALMAR 101/89).
Source: AIMAR 268/84, ALMAR 260/85, ALMAR 264/86, ALMAR329/87, ALMAR 260/88, ALMAR 101/89, and ALMAR 165/89.
Figure 2. Average SRB Multiple by Fiscal Year
As mentioned earlier, the assignment. of an SRB denotes a
specialty as critical. However, this study sought to
distinguish those specialties that have received the highest
multip