Naval Operations in the South Channel of Corcyra 435-433 b.c.

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Naval Operations in the South Channel of Corcyra 435-433 B. C.Author(s): N. G. L. HammondSource: The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 65 (1945), pp. 26-37Published by: Society for the Promotion of Hellenic StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/626337Accessed: 07-12-2015 20:00 UTC

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2/16

NAVAL

OPERATIONS

IN

THE SOUTH

CHANNEL

OF CORCYRA

435-433

B.C.

[PLATES

I-III]

SUCH

attention as the battle of

Sybota

has received

has resulted rather

in criticism

of

Thucydides

than

in

clarification

of the

battle;

yet,

as the

greatest

naval battle between

Greek

and Greek before the

Peloponnesian

War,

it

is of some

interest to the naval historian.

My

attempt

to

reconstruct

the battle

is based on the belief

that

Thucydides'

account is

accurate,

though

cursory

in

some

respects,

and contains

enough

topographical

clues for

my purpose.

In

interpreting

these clues I

have drawn

upon

the results

of

travels in

Epirus,

which I

hope

to

publish

elsewhere;

the

relevant data

are adduced

here in brief.

The

paper

falls into

two

parts,

a

topographical

introduction and the

study

of

Thucydides'

narrative.'

I.

TOPOGRAPHY

OF

THE

SOUTH

CHANNEL

The South

Channel

of

Corfu is

contained

between the

almost

parallel

coasts

of

Corfu and

Epirus.

The Corfu

coast

between

Cape

Lefkimo

and

Cape

Bianco

is

low-lying

with

sandy

beach and

shallow water

inshore;

but

south of

St.

Theodoro

Point

sunken

rocks

make

approach

dangerous, especially

off

Cape

Bianco,

where

the Bianco

Shoal

stretches

both

south

and

east

into

the

Channel.

Thus in

modern

times

the

only

area

suitable

for

beaching

is

between

Cape

Lefkimo

and St.

Theodoro

Point.

There is

no evidence

of

any

general

change

since

antiquity

in

the

coastline

or

sea-level;

2

and

as this

coast

is

sheltered

from

.heavy

seas

the

extent

of

the Bianco

Shoal and

the

sunken rocks

is

likely

to

have

been

more

or less

constant.

The

stretch

of

coast between

Cape

Lefkimo and St.

Theodoro Point

is

alluvial and

may

there-

fore have encroached

slightly

on the sea since

antiquity.

The

Cape

Leukimme of

Thucydides

should

be

identified

with

Cape

Lefkimo;

apart

from

the

persistence

of

the

ancient

name,

it

alone

affords

the

beaching

facilities

required

for a

naval

base.3

The

Epirus

coast

between

Hieronisi

and

the

mouth of

the

Paramythia

stream

is

mainly

precipitous

with

deep

water

inshore;

there is no

reason to

suppose

that

there

has been

any

change

since

antiquity.

The

best

anchorage

in

the

Channel

is

Port

Mourzo,

where

Leake

lay

in

a

Russian

brig

of war in

May,

18o6;

sheltered

by

the

Sivota

islands

and with

shallow

water

inshore,

it

is

probably

suitable for

beaching

(the

Mediterranean

ilot is

silent on this

point

and I

have not

visited

the

port).

To

the

south there

are two

bays

with

shelving,

sandy

beaches,

Arilla

Bay

and

that at the

mouth of

the

Paramythia

stream,

and

between

them

a

small

bight,

Stavrolimeno;

the two

bays,

which I

have

visited,

are

suitable

for

beaching.

The

silt

deposited

by the Paramythia stream may have diminished the anchorage at its mouth, but only to a

small

extent

since

ancient

times.

This

group

of

anchorages,

being

exposed

to the

west,

is

secondary

to

Port

Mourzo.

Within

the

Channel

the

Sivota

group

of

islands marks

the

narrowest

part

of the

Channel;

between

the

two main

islands

there

is an

anchorage

which

may

be

entered

only

from

the

north,

a reef

barring

the

southern

entry.

The

islands

are

rocky

and

covered

with

thick

scrub.

With

the

possible

exception

of

the

Sivota

islands,

there

is

water

close

to the

above

anchorages.

The

identification

of

the

ancient

Sybota

islands

with

the Sivota

group

is

certain;

and

'mainland

Sybota'

should

be

identified

with Port

1

am

indebted to

Professor

Adcock

for

his

help

and

criticism.

2

J.

Partsch,

Die

Insel

Korfu,

Petermanns

Mitteilungen

Erganzungsband, xix. (1887), p. 39

and

43, with geo-

logical

map.

3

This

accords with

Strabo

vii.

7, 5, who,

describing

the

coast

from

north

to

south,

mentions

Buthrotum

and then

the

Sybota

islands

Kcrr&

-r6

4ov

&KpOV

ris

KopKVpaias

rilv

AEvKi~IPAt

KEIrEvat;

sailing

south

one

sights

Cape

Lefkimo

and not

Cape

Bianco.

The

latter

should be

identified

with Ptolemy's Cape Amphipagos, cf. Leake, Travels

in

North Greece

(1835)

I

94,

rather

than

Gomme,

Historical

Commentary

on

Thucydides

(i945)

183

n.

I,

who

places

it on the

west

coast of

Corcyra.

26

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3/16

NAVAL

OPERATIONS

IN

THE

SOUTH CHANNEL

OF CORCYRA

27

Mourzo,

being

immediately adjacent

to

the

islands

and also

affording

the best

anchorage

in

the Channel.4

On

the

southern

approaches

to the

Channel the

Paxos

group

has

good

anchorage

at

Port

Gayo.

Three

miles

off

the

port

the

Madonna Shoal

is

dangerous,

being

sometimes

dry

but usually submerged. According to the MediterraneanPilot III 131

'

preference

should

be

given

to the

passage

eastward

of the Madonna Shoal

and in a

sailing

ship

the

mainland

should

be

kept

aboard

particularly

towards

sunset,

as

at

night

the wind is almost certain to

be

off

the

land;

the current

also sets

to the northward

along

this coast.'

The

Epirus

coast

south

of

Paramythia

stream

falls

away

towards

the

east,

running

almost

due east between

Parga

and

Agios

Ioannes,

and

then resumes

its

general

S.S.E.

direction. Between

Paramythia

stream

and

Parga

the

coast

is

precipitous

and

forbidding, rising

like a wall as one sails close

inshore.

In

this

stretch

there

is no salient

promontory;

Cape

Varlam

appears

on the

Admiralty

chart,

for which

Leake

gives

a

variant

name

Formajo,

and

Cape Trophale

is added

by

the

Greek

Staff

map.

Yet

in

itself

this

stretch

of coast

is a salient feature

in

entering

the

South

Channel;

here the

mainland

closes

in to form the

Channel,

and

the

high

point

499

m. between the

two

capes

affords

a landfall

to the

voyager

from the south.

It is also

dangerous

for small

vessels,

being

exposed

to

rough

seas

from

the west

through

the

gap

between

Paxos and Corfu

and

to

the

dangerous

north wind

of

the

Corfu Channel.

The

anchorages

of

Parga,

Agios

Ioannes

and

Splantza

lie off the

main

route to the

Channel

(cf.

Plate

I

and

IIIa).

Of these

Parga

is

the

best,

although open

to the south

except

for

a small beach

in

the north-west

corner;

Splantza,

also

known

as

Phanari,

is difficult

of

egress

against

a west

wind;

Agios

Ioannes,

remote

in

its

angle

of

the

coast,

affords safe

anchorage

in

stormy

weather,

but the

coast

is

rocky

and

steep-

to.

Parga

and

Splantza

are suitable for

beaching

triremes,

but

Agios

loannes is

not;

all

three have facilities

for

watering.5

On

the

Epirus

coast the

only large

site lies

just

south

of

the

Paramythia

stream.

The

acropolis,

which is

half-an-hour's distance

from

the

bay,

is defended

by

a

strong

ring-wall

enclosing

some

130o,ooo

square

metres;

a

single

long

wall extends

down the

slope

towards

the

bay,

and this

slope

is covered with

many

ancient

building

remains;

beside the

bay

there are

remains of

an

ashlar

tower

and a

polygonal

wall,

and the

modern

chapel

of

Agia

Maria rests

on

ancient foundations.

By

analogy

with

other sites

in

Epirus

I

consider

this

site,

named

Vemokastro

on

the

Greek

Staff

map,

to

have

been

a

major

town

in Hellenistic

times;

and

doubtless it controlled the

bays

of

Arilla and

the

Paramythia

stream

(cf.

Plate

IIIb).

On

the cliff

at the southern side

of the

bay

of

Splantza

there

are

the

remains of a small

fort,

some

150

m.

long

by

40

m.

wide,

and

an

-abundance

of coarse

pottery

sherds;

this

fort

evidently

controlled the

port

of

Splantza

in Hellenistic

times,

but

it

numbered

few inhabitants.

The

swamps,

which

cut

off

Splantza

from the

hinterland,

must have contributed

then

as

now

to its

lack of

importance. Agios Ioannes

possesses

neither ancient nor

modern

remains;

at

Parga

some

antiquities

of the Roman

period

have

been

found,

and the remains

of

an

ancient

quay

in the north-west corner of the bay probably belong to that period. While Port Mourzo has

no

ancient

remains,

there is a Hellenistic

acropolis

in

the hills behind

near

Koutsi;

smaller

in

extent than

that

of

Vemokastro,

it

represents

a

small

town,

which

would be

served

on

the

coast

by

Port Mourzo.

The

distribution

of

Hellenistic

sites shows Vemokastro

playing

the

r6le

of the

modern

Parga;

that is to

say,

Vemokastro

was

the

main coastal

town and

port

on

the

routes

between

Preveza and

Corfu,

and also served the

rich

hinterland of the Acheron

valley.

The reason

in

Hellenistic times for

preferring

Vemokastro to

Parga,

which

has

held

undisputed

sway

since

Roman

times,

cannot

be found in the nature of its

territory

or

in

overland

routes;

both

possess

fertile land and

olive

groves,

and there is little to choose between the

routes

from

them

into the

4

Thuc.

I.

50,

3,

og-rt

8

Tr

Xipora tris

OEEWrpcoTri8o

Apv

'pip.os; 52,

I;

and 54, I,

iv

"ro s

'v

-T

1TrEipct)

Vup36ro1s.

Later authors

mention

only

the

islands

Sybota,

under

which the

anchorages

both

west

and

east

of St.

Nicolas

Isle

may

have been

comprised.

When

Leake

lay

at

Port

Mourzo,

it was uninhabited.

Thuc.

III.

76:

Alcidas anchored at mainland Sybota; he was then free

to

choose the

best

anchorage

in the

Channel.

5

Insets of

these harbours

will be

found

in

Admiralty

Chart

206

(1912).



4/16

28

N. G.

L. HAMMOND

hinterland

plains.

The

reason must be

sought

in

considerations

of coastal trade. If such

trade

looks

south

towards

Preveza

(near

the

site

of Roman

Nicopolis)

then

Parga

is the natural

port

for

this

part

of

Epirus;

if

it

looks north

towards

Corcyra,

Vemokastro

and Mourzo are

the

natural

ports,

and

they

have the

great

advantage

over

Parga

that

they

lie north

of the

dangerous

coast

on

either

side of

Cape

Varlam.

In

regard

to

the

main trade route from Greece to

Italy,

Vemokastro

lies on

that

route,

whereas

Parga

lies off

it;

but Hellenistic

Epirus

would be

con-

cerned

more

with local trade

routes than the

main trade route. If Vemokastro had

this

importance

in

Hellenistic

times,

it

may

be

assumed

to

have

been

preferred

to

Parga

in the

fifth

century

B.c.,

when

Corcyra's

supremacy

in

trade

led

her to

dispute

the naval

supremacy

of

the

north-west route.

At

that time

Vemokastro

deserved

the

description

given

in

1819

to

Parga-

'the

Ear

and

Eye

of Corfu'

6;

Plate

IIa

and b

give

the views from Vemokastro and

Plate

IIIa

shows the

coast

from

Splantza

to

Cape Trophale.

In

describing

the

topography

of the

operations

of

435

to

433

B.c.,

Thucydides

could

draw

upon

the evidence

of

eye-witnesses

of the

operations

and

upon

the

general

knowledge

of mariners

who

used

the

north-west route

to the

Adriatic,

Italy

and

Sicily,

the latter

being

summarised

in

the nautical

handbooks

or

Periegeseis

of

the

time;

in either case the

description

was

given

from the

viewpoint

of the

sailor.

In

434

B.C.,

the

Corinthians established

posts

for

naval

and land

forces,

Trri

AK-rTq

Kcid

TrEpirT

XEiJptov Trs eEOwrrpcoTirG0,

n order

to

protect

Leucas

and other

friendly

states

from

raids

by

the

Corcyraean

squadrons;

the

Corcyraeans

encamped

'

opposite'

with

naval

and land

forces

at

Cape

Leukimme

(I.

3o, 3-4).7

The

post

at Actium could

check raids on

Ambracia

Anactorion

and

Leucas

or

further

south;

that

at

Cheimerion

opposite Cape

Leukimme must

have been

intended to

report

Corcyraean

move-

ments

through

the

Channel and

to harass

Corcyraean

raiders either

sailing

thence

or

returning.

The

stretch

of

coast'

opposite

'

Corcyra

is

that

between Hieronisi

and

Cape

Varlam,

for

further

south

one

loses

sight

of

Corcyra;

-rT

XEIpipov

riqS

OEaTrpC0orios

hould

then

be

found

on

this

stretch of

coast,

and

it should be

noted

that

Thucydides' phrase

suggests

an

area

rather

than

a

place

such

as Actium.

In

433

B.C. the

Corinthian fleet

sailing

from Leucas

made

land

on the mainland

'opposite' Corcyra

and

came to anchor at Cheimerion in

Thesprotis

8;

here too

Cheimerion

must

be

placed

north

of

Cape

Varlam

and,

since

the

Corcyraeans

occupy

the

Sybota

islands,

south

of

Port

Mourzo.

At

this

point Thucydides

introduces

a

digression:

E"rl

-T

Axi'rv, Kcii -rr6AIT5

rrEp

iTroO

KEiTral Tro60ahdxAU&q

V

rTi 'EAcxTaTribi

fs

EaTrpcoTi'O

'E)prl"

~iria

6i

~rcap' Mc-riv

'AXEPouciVa

iliv

iES

e6?aacaav*

"

6E

ri

S

?Espcp-oriboS 'AXipcov

roTrcqaps ov EapdAAElMt

E

cravIvTv,

xc'

oJ

KCi T-TiV

TrCAV4dicV

EXE1"

aEE

KCi

dU

ai

T00 raorc~6o,

6picoV

sV

EEoTrpco'risba

KCi

KE-rpivIv,

Cv

EVTb

)

l

QKpc QV(XEi

T6

XEiptIov. oi p~v

i0v

Kopivio TrT

i0TrrEfpoU

EVTaJOaC

6pli30vCTai

TE

KCi

CrTp(T6TrEovTOriaV-VTo.

(I.

46,

4-5).

This

passage

shows that there

was

a

Cape

Cheimerion between the

mouths

of

the rivers

Thyamis

and

Acheron,

and

also a

harbour

of

the same name

which was inhabited.9 The

identification of

Cape

Cheimerion with

Cape

Varlam admits of little doubt; the description of its position between the two river-mouths is

clearly

that of the

mariner,

who

changes

course

at

Cape

Varlam

where the Corfu Channel is

lost

to

sight

and Port

Splantza

comes into

view;

the fact that it

is some

seven miles closer to

the

mouth

of

the

Thyamis

is

immaterial,

as

Thucydides

is

not

giving precise

measurements.

Moreover this

identification

explains

the

landfall

of the Corinthian

fleet

(I. 46, 3),

which

would be

guided

to

the coast

opposite Corcyra

by

the

high point 499

m.

above

Cape

Varlam.

The

port

Cheimerion

should be close

to the

Cape

Cheimerion and

'

opposite

Corcyra,'

that is

6

C.

P.

de

Bosset,

Proceedings

n

Parga

(1819),

46.

S'AvTEcTrpaTO-TE8EjovTSo

'i

Kai

ol

KEpKUpalot

iri

riT

AEuKhI

vaXi

rE

KC

i

TTE3C].

ITTrTEOV

8

OOjUITEpO1

1&k

i

Solt,

&?O&

-r6

Opos-ro

"OT

d&VTKCtE36CIEVO1

XEtpvo srl

86

&VEXcp1pToav Tr'

OiKoU

?K&rTEpOl.

In both

cases

the

meaning

of

dv-rt-

appears

to be

'opposite.' in the geographical sense. In the bay west of

Cape

Lefkimo

there

is

excellent

anchorage,

according

to

the

Mediterranean

Pilot.

8

'E-rEti T8 -poCaEPtaV "-T Kc"r&

apKupotv rvTEripc &T-r

AEUK65O0 ThrOVTE~,6pli3OVTaI

iS

XEt~ptov

T~is

OE(arnpCS8O yi5

(I. 46, 3).

9 Jowett

translates

gaort

bU

t'iv

'Cheimerion

is

a

harbour' and

adds

a

footnote

'or

"

here

there

is a

har-

bour

"

';

I

prefer

the former

translation,

which

is

supported

by the analogous sentence at 50, 3, ga-frt

rd

X0Pora

ris

OeE-rpOTrip0oS

hlv

ipfiPos.

I

assume it

was

inhabited

from

Thucydides'

silence,

since

in

the

case

of

mainland

Sybota

he

states it to

be

uninhabited.



5/16

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH

CHANNEL

OF CORCYRA

29

north

of

Cape

Varlam;

the two

possibilities

are

the

bay

of the

Paramythia

stream

and

Arilla

Bay.

As

the former

lies

closer

to

Cape

Cheimerion

and

served

the

Hellenistic town

at

Vemo-

kastro,

we

may

identify

Port

Cheimerion with the

bay

of

the

Paramythia

stream.

The

digression

of

Thucydides

contains

much information which

is irrelevant to his

purpose,

the locating of Cheimerion, and the style resembles that of Ionian geographers. Pearsonhas

suggested

that

in

this

passage

Thucydides

was

drawing

upon

some

Periegesis perhaps

even

Hecataeus

';

he has

seen

the

same influence

in

Thucydides'

other

descriptions

of

Epirus

and

Acarnania.o1 Some

support

may

be

lent to Pearson's

suggestion

by

comparing

I.

46, 4

with

Strabo

VII.

7,

5,

Esloi

E

vris5E

s

-r

X

poarca, iS

i

v

'HTTEipouKpV aITrXoCa?Il,KTa-rad

To

Ecov

&Kpov

T-rl

KopKupcias

-'v

AEvKippwav

KEip[EVa.

Kcd

&AAat

E'

Ev

Trc T

apaT\rCp vT1r0i5ES

E0iv OlK

lC(1

pvlprl.

EiTEl-rrCM

pac

Ep~MpoV

K

D

FUK0'SAlv

Eis 6v

IPp&?OEl

6

'AXEPcpv

To-rap6dcs,PCEwv

KTi'S

'AXEpouacis

p

S

KCI

EX6Epsvos

XEious

ToT-ra~po's,

OTE

KCi

\JUKdCivEtv

Tbv

K6h'rrOV"

PEi 5i

KcI

0

Ol6c(ptiS

1n'tlCiOV.

UiTrpKEITa

8E

TOUTOU p~Ev

TOJ

K66nrrov

KiXupos, ri

Trp6T-rpov

Equpac,

r6ALs

OEcrTrpcTrov,

ooKa KcrQ

BoupcorT6v

oviKrl.

YIylS iA Tr

KiXopouv

ohiXv0ov

BouX~Tlov

.......

KcQilKE1

OT-rv l

cpcr'

TXp'

"ro

K6TroU.

lET

65 FUVK'vAlIVa ~(PEi EUiC1io &AhoiAlVEaVS.Leake

11

pointed out that Strabo appears

to

echo

Thucydides

in

the reference

to

the

Acheron

river,

Ephyre,

and the

Thyamis

river;

this

echo

is

at first

sight

striking,

because

the relevance

of

including

the

Thyamis

in

each

case

is not

obvious. But

there is a

reason

in

one case.

Thucydides

locates

Cheimerion

between

the

Thyamis

and Acheron

rivers,

two

better-knownlandmarkson

this

coast;

the

mention

of

the

Thyamis

is

essential

to

his

argument.

Strabo adds

nothing

to his

explanation

of the

Glykys

Limen

by

introducing

the

Thyamis;

he

has

already

mentioned

Buthrotum

n

its

proper

place

between

Poseidion

and

Sybota,

and described

Buthrotum as the

seat of a

Roman

colony.

It

therefore

seems

likely

that Strabo found in

the source which he

used for

the

Glykys

Limen

a

reference to

the

Thyamis,

Ephyre

and

Phoinike

near

Buthrotum,

and

includedit here

despite

his

earlier

mention

of

Buthrotum. Was

Strabo

drawing

here on

Thucydides

or

on

a

source

common

to

Thucydides

? It

is

a

priori

mprobable

that

Strabo

would use

Thucydides

when

he

could draw

on

Periegeseis;

and

in

this

case he would find

nothing in Thucydides

about

the

Glykys

Limen.

There

is

thus

good

reason to believe that

Thucydides

and

Strabo

were

drawing

on

the same

Periegesis,

probably

that of

Hecataeus,

which was

more

detailed for

this

part

of

Epirus

than

either of

the

citations made

by

the two

authors.

If

my

deduction

is

correct,

the

Periegesis

ncluded the

Thyamis

mouth,

the

Sybota islands,

some islets

Ev

T~

Tapdtr\cp

(which

Strabo

did not

care to

describe),12

Cape

Cheimerion and

Glykys

Limen

at the

Acheron

mouth.

Cape

Cheimerionwas

thus

a

landmarkbetween

Sybota

and

Glykys

Limen,

and

may

be

identified

without

reference to the naval

operations

of

435-

433

B.c.

as

Cape

Varlam,

at which

point Sybota

is

unsighted

and

Glykys

Limen

comes into

view.l3

The

Periegesis

lso

described

the

hinterland where

lay

the

famous

Acherusian

Lake

and

Ephyre.

It is

probable

that

Strabo

keeps

closer

to

the

Periegesis

n

describing

Ephyre

as

inland of the bay into which the Acheron flows

dGrrpKElTr

c

TOthO'erOU

Iv

aOK6hprOu

KiXvpos,

41

Trp6rTapovEqupa,

rdatS

OsEcatlrporcv)

han

Thucydides,

who

describes t as

inland

of

the

port

Cheimerion

(o'rrn

~

Alilv,

KcI

Tr621

rr5

p

cQ6TOO

KEiT

T

Tr6

08A&cc

~

5

Av

"r

'EAtaldrrn5tT)

?EowrpcorTios

Egiaprl).

Both

descriptions

are

correct

in

the

sense that

the Acheron

valley

plain,

beside

which

Ephyre

probably

lay,

was

served

by

the

ports

on

the

coast,

whether

Cheimerion,

Glykys

Limen

or

in

moderntimes

Parga.

It is

possible

that the

same

Periegesis

s the source of

another

reference to

Cheimerion;

Stephanus

s.v.

Ee~iptov cxKpa

GEorprrpoTicsrcT

evOvTbv

eriEptel'-s.

The

existence

of an

ethnic

10

CQ

xxxiii.

(I939)

52,

and

Early

Ionian

Historians

(1939)

50.

11

NG

iii

7

n.

I.

12

Islets

between

Sybota

and

Cape

Cheimerion

are

Megalo

and Mikro

Mourtemeno,

Peramos and Katsonisi.

13

For

this

stretch

of

coast two

other

names

are handed

down.

Scylax

gives

the

corrupt

EAEA

or

the harbour

at

the

mouth of

the

Acheron.

Today

it is

named

Phanari

after the

name of

the

region

and

Splantza

after

the

village

of

twenty

hovels;

in

antiquity

it

may

equally

have had

two

names,

Glykys

Limen and that of

Scylax,

the

latter

being

associated either with

the

fort

on the south side or with the

swamps

which

cut the harbour

off

from

the

interior.

Ptolemy

III.

14, 5

and

Plutarch

Antony

62

give

Torone

or

Toryne,

which

is

generally

identified with

Parga

and

came

into

use

in

the Roman

period.



6/16

30

N. G. L. HAMMOND

in

reference

to the

Cape

rather than to the harbour or town

(the

latter

probably

dating

from

Hellenistic

times), implies

that there was an area called

Cheimerion,

of which the inhabitants

were

named

Cheimerieis;

there are

analogies

in the Kestrine and Elaiatis areas which Thu-

cydides

mentions,

and we have

already

seen some

reason in Thuc.

I.

30, 3

for

believing

Chei-

merion to be the name of an area. The name would best apply to the coast and hinterland

between

Agios

Ioannes

and

Sybota,

which

juts

out as the eastern bastion

of the Corfu Channel

in

the

eyes

of

a

mariner

from the

south;

and the

meaning

of the name'

stormy'

well

fits

this

dangerous

and

rocky

coast.

The

last mention

of Cheimerion is in Pausanias VIII.

7,

2,

yAIUK0S 05r0p

EK

8c

Xa'carls

8iHov

io-riv

ivTraJc

-rE

dvitvt

v

-r

'ApyoMibt Kci

v

TI"

OEoT-rpcoTri8l

crx

-r

XEIPptov

KcaOOJP[EVov.

Pausanias'

source

is

not

known;

the freshet was

discovered

in

1847

in

the

bay

of

Agios

Ioannes.14

To a modern

geographer

Pausanias'

description

of its

position

'off

Chei-

merion so-called'

has

a

vagueness

which

his

qualification

KaAhooJEVOV

eems

to

confess;

but

it should

be

remembered that

Pausanias could not

describe

a

position

with

the

precision

of

modern

geographers.

Rather,

his

qualification

is added

because

he is

referring

to

a

little-

known canton

in

Thesprotis

in

Epirus.

Prior

to

the

discovery

of the freshet

at

Agios

Ioannes,

Leake had

identified

the

cape

and

harbour

of Cheimerion

with

Cape

Varlam

and Arilla

Bay.

But after

its

discovery

Bursian,

followed

by

Gomme,

used

the

evidence

of

Pausanias

to

identify

the

harbour

of

Cheimerion

with

Agios

Ioannes;

Bursian

and

Gomme were then

compelled

to

align

the

evidence

of

Thucydides

and Strabo

with

this

identification.15

There

are,

however,

cogent

reasons

for

refuting

their

view. The

phrase

of Pausanias is not

capable

of

such

precise

application.

If

it

were,

we should

have to

find

near to

Agios

Ioannes

a

Cape

Cheimerion

which

forms

a

notable

landmark between

Sybota

and the Acheron

mouth. Bursian

suggests

the

spur

on

the

south side

of the

bay;

but this is neither a

cape

nor a

landmark,

and

the

bay

with

its

environs

lies

off the sea-route between

Sybota

and the

Acheron

or

Sybota

and

the

south. It

is therefore

hardly

possible

to

make

the evidence of

Strabo

comply

with

this

identification.

When we come to

Thucydides,

the difficulties are still

greater.

To define the

bay

of

Agios

Ioannes

as between

the mouths

of the

Thyamis

and

Acheron

is

little short of

nonsense. Nor

is

it

suitable

as a

naval and land base

in

434

and

433

B.C.;

the

coast

is

rock-bound,

so

that

beaching

of triremes is

impossible,

and the

immediate hinterland

is

barren.16

And

the

operations

of

435

to

433

B.C.

give

further

reason for

rejecting

Bursian's

and

Gomme's identi-

fication.

II.

THE

NARRATIVE OF

THUCYDIDES

Of the

importance

of

the Battle

of

Sybota Thucydides

leaves

us

in

no

doubt;

his

account

is

detailed

and

graphic.

In

accordance

with

his

statement

of

method

a

few

chapters

earlier

(I.

22),

we

may

assume his sources to have been

the

best

available

eye-witnesses;

he

could

consult the Athenian

participants

after the battle of

Sybota,

and it is

probable

that

either

before

the

Peloponnesian

War

or

during

his

exile he

could

consult

Corinthian

eye-witnesses

for

the battles of Leukimme and

Sybota.

Nor

can

we

exclude the

possibility

of

his

hearing

some account from the

Corcyraeans.

His narrative

was

probably composed

early,

in

my

view before

41I5

B.c. at

the

latest.17

We have

thus

every

reason

to

expect

a clear and

trust-

worthy

account.

The

dispute

over

Epidamnus

involved at first

only

Corcyra

and

Corinth with her

colonies

Ambracia and

Leucas;

the

expedition

sent overland

by

Corinth

occupied Epidamnus,

but

was blockaded

by

the

Corcyraean navy

and

Corcyra's

Illyrian

allies.

Thus,

open

war

became

likely

between

Corcyra

and

Corinth,

a war in

which

not

only Epidamnus

was at stake

but the

14

JGS.

xviii

139

f.

15

Leake, NG. III 6; Bursian,

Geographie

Griech.

(1862)

I

28;

Gomme,

op.

cit.

180.

16

A

caique skipper

with

whom

I

sailed described the

harbour as

adequate

in a

storm

(&v

EX1

&aV'yKrl aao-rdCEl

Alud&vt).Walking

from

Splantza

to

Parga

I

found no

people

near

Agios

Ioannes,

except

one

shepherd

a

mile

inland

where a small

dell afforded

grazing.

17

CQ.

xxxiv.

(i94o)

146

f.



7/16

NAVAL OPERATIONS

IN THE SOUTH CHANNEL

OF CORCYRA

31

naval

supremacy

of the north-west

route to the

Adriatic and

South

Italy;

for Corinth

could

not

relieve

Epidamnus

without

challenging

the

Corcyraean

fleet

of

12o

triremes

(I. 25, 4).

In

preparing

her

forces

Corinth

secured

the aid

of

Megara,

Pale in

Cephalonia, Epidaurus,

Hermione,

Troezen, Elis,

Thebes

and

Phleius,

in

addition

to

the

original

participants,

Am-

bracia and Leucas; Corcyraean envoys, accompanied by envoys from Sparta and Sicyon,

failed

to

persuade

Corinth to use arbitration

rather

than

force.

In

435

B.c.

the allied

fleet

of

seventy-five

sail,

to

which

Corinth

contributed

thirty,

sent

an

envoy

ahead

to declare war

on

Corcyra,

and

assembled

at

Actium;

there

they

were met

by

a

Corcyraean

envoy

with

the

demand not to sail

against

Corcyra,

which

they

refused. The

Corcyraeans

meanwhile

manned

a

fleet of

eighty

sail

(a

squadron

of

forty

being engaged

in

the

blockade

of

Epidamnus),

and

putting

to

sea defeated

the

Corinthian

fleet

decisively.

The

trophy

was set

up

at

Cape

Leu-

kimme;

this

suggests

that the battle was

fought

within

sight

of

Leukimme

and

probably

in

the

South

Channel,

which

Corcyra

could

claim

to be her

home waters. The

Corcyraeans

executed

all

their

prisoners, except

the

Corinthians;

on

the

day

of

the

naval

battle

Epidamnus

fell,

releasing

the

Corcyraean

squadron

of

forty

ships.

Exploiting

its

supremacy

the

Corcyraean

fleet

ravaged

the

territory

of

Leucas

and

Cyllene

in

Elis; Corinth,

unable

to

challenge Corcyra's

fleet,

endeavoured

in

summer

434

B.c.18

to

check the

Corcyraean

raiders

by

establishing posts

of

naval

and

military

forces

on the mainland

coast. The

post

at Actium

safeguarded

the

Ambraciote Gulf and Leucas

town,

and

constituted

a

threat

to

Corcyraean

raiders

sailing

to

the south

of

Leucas.

The

other

post

was

established in

the canton of Cheimerion

in

Thes-

protis,

opposite

Corcyra; Thucydides

does

not

give

the

exact location

of the

post,

but two sites

may

be

suggested-either

the

natural

fortress,

on

which

the Hellenistic site known

as Vemo-

kastro

was later

built,

with

the

adjacent

bay

as

anchorage

for

the naval

force,

or the hill of

Arpitza,

344

m.,

with the

Bay

of

Arilla as

anchorage.19

This

post

in

any

case

overlooked

the

South

Channel

and

could

report by

beacon

signal

the movement of

Corcyraean

ships;

it

could also

harass

any

small

Corcyraean

squadrons

leaving

or

returning

to

the

Channel. The

Corcyraeans

encamped

with

naval and

military

forces at

Cape

Leukimme

opposite

the

Corin-

thian

post;

as the

northern

part

of the

Cape

is

swampy,

I

have

placed

the

camp

as on the

map.

Neither side

attacked the

other

and

in

the

winter both

withdrew

(I. 30)

;

the

tactics of

Corinth

had succeeded.

In

433

B.c.

both

Corcyra

and

Corinth

sent

envoys

to

Athens;

the result was

a

defensive

alliance between Athens

and

Corcyra.

Shortly

afterwards an Athenian

squadron

of

ten

ships

sailed for

Corcyra

with

precise

orders

to

engage

the Corinthians

only

if

they

intended

to land

on

Corcyraean territory

or

possessions.20

Neither the

size nor the

orders

of

the

Athenian

squadron

can

have

pleased Corcyra. For

these orders

meant that

the

Athenians would not

necessarily

contest

the

entry

of

the

Corinthian

fleet

into

Corcyraean

waters,

but was liable to

go

into action

only

when intention

to

land

on

Corcyraean

soil was

proved;

if the

Corcyraeans

waited

upon

the Athenians to

act,

there

was

nothing

to

prevent

a Corinthian fleet from

passing

the narrows of the South Channel and

gaining

the wider waters

opposite

Corcyra

town,

where

their

presence

might

precipitate

a

revolution

or

lead

to

a

naval

engagement

under conditions

favourable to Corinth.

Since

the battle of Leukimme

the

Corinthians had been

building

and

equipping

a

large

fleet,

for

which

they

hired

additional

rowers from

the

Peloponnese

and

elsewhere

(I.

31,

i).

In

late

August

or

early September

433

B.c21

the armada of

I50

ships

set out for

Corcyra;

the

Corinthian

squadrons

totalled

ninety

ships,

and the

remaining squadrons

were

supplied

by

18

The

chronology

of

Gomme,

op.

cit.

197,

is

followed

throughout.

19

Supplies

could be

provided

by

the area

of

Arpitza

(a

village

of

6oo

families)

and

the

hinterland

plain

of

Mar-

gariti;

as

the

post lay

at

the

mouth

of

the South

Channel,communication

by

sea with Actium was not

endangered

by

the

Corcyraeans.

The two

posts

may

have

been linked

for

signalling

by

beacons,

as

in

427

B.c.

when

Alcidas

lay

at mainland

Sybota

and

was

warned

of

an

Athenian fleet

sailing

from

Leucas

(III. 80, 2).

so

I.

45,

,

rri

Kipuvpav

...

.

&

.

is

-Ov

KEVOV

TiT

XcpflV,

cf.

53,

4 may

refer to the

territory

on the mainland which

Corcyra

held

(III.

85,

2);

the

vagueness

of the

phrase,

which

is

probably quoted

from

the

original order, may

be

intended to cover

Epidamnus

also.

21

The

evidence

for

the

month

is in

IG

I

2

295

=

GHI.

55,

cf. Gomme

loc.

cit.



8/16

32

N.

G. L.

HAMMOND

Elis,

Megara,

Leucas,

Ambracia

and

Anactorion;

the allied

squadrons

were

each

under

separate

command.

Sailing

from

Leucas

they

made land

on the mainland

opposite

Corcyra

and came to anchor

at

Cheimerion

in

Thesprotis,

where

they

formed

an

encampment;

they

were

joined

here

by

a

large

force

of

barbarians

who had come

up

to

help

them,

the

mainlanders

of these parts being friendly to Corinth. The Corcyraeanson learning of their approachhad

manned

I

I

o

ships

and

camped

on

one

of

Sybota

islands,

the

Athenian

squadron accompanying

them;

the

Corcyraean

land

force,

accompanied

by

Iooo

Zacynthian

hoplites,

took

up position

on

Cape

Leukimme

(I.

46-47).

The

direct course from Leucas to

Port

Cheimerion,

keeping

east

of

the

Madonna

Shoal,

is

forty-seven

miles

which

is

slightly

more

than

the modern

estimate of

a

trireme's

normal

range

in one

day

on

a calm

sea.22

The

arrival of the barbarian land

force

at the

rendezvous

was

presumably arranged

n

advance

by

Ambracia;

the

rich hinterland

could

provide supplies

for

the

force,

there

were

beaching

and

watering

facilities

for

the

fleet,

and the

position

over-

looked the South Channel and

the coast

of

Corcyra.

The

camp

was

probably

beside the

beach

for the

convenience of the

fleet,

for there

was no

danger

of attack

by

land.

The

Cor-

cyraean

fleet at

the

Sybota

islands

could

lie

in

the

anchorage

between the

two

main

islands

and,

if

necessary,

in

the

anchorage

of

Port

Mourzo;

encamping

on

one of

the

islands the

Corcyraeans

could

ferry

supplies

from

Cape

Leukimme

and

water,

if

there was

none on

the

islands,

from

Cape

Leukimme or from the

uninhabited

Port

Mourzo.

In

this

position

the

Corcyraean

fleet

enjoyed

two

advantages:

the

only

all-weather

anchorage

in

the

South

Channel

and

a

base for

patrolling

the

narrowest

part

of the

Channel,

between

the

Sybota

outer

island

and

the Bianco

Shoal;

in

these,

the

only

narrow

waters between

the Corinthian fleet

and

Corcyra

town,

the

Corcyraean

fleet

could

hope

to

force

an

engagement.

The

Athenian

squadron

accompanied

the

Corcyraeans;

but

its

orders

did

not

authorise action

in

defence

of

Corcyraean

waters.

In

quality,

the

newly

built

Corinthian

triremes

were the best in

the

allied

fleet,

and

in

general

the

ninety

Corinthian

ships

were

probably superior

to

those

of

their

allies.23

The

Corcyraean

fleet of

12o

ships

in

435

B.c.

had

included some

old vessels which

were

streng-

thened for the battle of Leukimme

(I.

29, 3);

on this occasion

Corcyra

posted

at

Sybota

i

Io

ships.

As

the

proportion

of

slave to

free

among

the

prisoners

taken

by

Corinth

was

8oo

to

250

(I.

55,

1),

the

Corcyraean

rowers

were

predominantly,

if

not

entirely,

slaves and

were

likely

to be

inferior

in

skill

to

the

enemy

rowers.

For

naval

manoeuvre

the

Corcyraean

fleet

may

thus be

judged

weaker

than

the

Corinthian

allied

fleet;

but at this

period

battle tactics

were

based on

the use of

marines for

boarding

rather than

on

manoeuvre

for

ramming.

The

Athenian

squadron

was

in

a

class

by

itself both in

seamanship

and

in

battle

tactics;

but it

was

doubtful if it

would

go

into

action.

'When

their

preparations

were

complete,

the

Corinthians with

three

days'

provisions

put

out to

sea

ready

for action

from

Cheimerion

by

night,

and

at

dawn as

they

were

sailing

they

sighted

the

Corcyraean

fleet

not

only

out at

sea but

sailing

towards them.

When

they

per-

ceived each other, they formedorder of battle facing one another. The Athenian ships lay on

the

right

wing

of

the

Corcyraeans,

whose

main

line

was

held

by

three

squadrons.

Of the

Corinthians the

right wing

was held

by

the

ships

of

Megara

and

Ambracia,

and

in

the

centre

lay

the

individual

squadrons

of the

other

allies;

the left

wing

was held

by

the

Corinthians

themselves,

with

their best

sailers

facing

the

Athenians

and the

Corcyraean

right.

When

the

signals

were

raised

on

each

side,

theyjoined

battle and

fought,

both

sides

having

on

their

decks

many

heavy

infantry

and

many

archers

and

javelin

men,

since

at this

time

they

were still

equipped

rather

clumsily

in

the archaic

manner. The

battle was

fought

with

more

obstinacy

than

tactics,

its

general

nature

being

more akin to

battle on

land.

For

whenever

they

charged

22

Gomme,

op.

cit.

20,

following

K6ster;

under

sail

a

trireme

could

cover

up

to

ninety

miles.

Miles are

here

and

below to be understood as sea miles. The direct course

was

probably

that

usually

taken;

in

427

B.c.

Alcidas

followed the

coast from

mainland

Sybota

to the

isthmus

of

Leucas,

in

order to

avoid the

Athenian

fleet

which

would

take the

direct

route

(III.

81,

I).

23

To man

her

fleet

Corinth

also

hired

rowers

who

could

be trained into

good

crews;

for her Sicilian

expedition

Athens

raised

rowers from

her

empire

to

man the

fleet

which is so

highly praised

by Thucydides.



9/16

NAVAL

OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH CHANNEL OF CORCYRA

33

one

another

they

did not

easily

disengage,

owing

to the multitude and crush of

vessels;

also,

their

hopes

of

victory lay

rather in the

heavy infantry

on their

decks,

who stood firm and

fought,

the

ships

being

stationary.

The manoeuvre of

breaking

the line was not

used,

but

they fought

with

more

spirit

and

vigour

than science.

Everywhere

tumult

reigned

and the battle was

confused;

in

the

course

of it the Athenian

ships,

coming

up

wherever the

Corcyraeans

were

being pressed,

caused alarm to the

enemy,

but did not

engage,

the

generals being

deterred

by

their

instructionsfrom Athens. The

right

wing

of the Corinthians

especially

was in

difficulty;

for the

Corcyraeans

with

twenty

ships

routed

them,

and

pursuing

the scattered

ships

to the

mainland

sailed

up

to their

camp,

where,

disembarking, they

fired the deserted tents and

plundered

the

stores. In this

part

then the Corinthians

and their allies were worsted and the

Corcyraeans

were in the

ascendant;

but where the Corinthians themselves

were,

on the

left,

they

were far

superior,

for of their inferiornumbers the

Corcyraeans

had the

twenty

ships

absent

on

pursuit.

The

Athenians,

seeing

the

Corcyraeans

hard

pressed, began

now to

give support

more

unequivocally;

at first

indeed

they

refrained from

ramming

any

opponent,

but

when

the

rout

was

becoming

complete

and the Corinthianswere

pressing

on,

then indeed

everyone

went

into

action without

any

further

distinction,

the

exigencies

of the situation

being

such

that

hostilitiesoccurred between Corinthand Athens.' (I.

48-49).

The fleets

at Cheimerion and

Sybota lay

six and a half miles

part,

and

during daylight

each could

be

kept

under observation

by

the

other

(cf.

Plate

IIb).

The

Corinthians

pre-

sumably

sailed at

night

in order to

escape

observation;

and their

object

may

have been to

exploit

the fact that the

Corcyraean

fleet was nine

miles distant from

the

Corcyraean

and force.

For,

if

the

Corinthian fleet could

gain position

to

the

westward

of

Sybota,

it

would

cut off

the

Corcyraean

fleet

from

the

Corcyraean

land

force;

and,

if

the Corinthian land force

moved

up

to

occupy

the

coast

east

of

Sybota,

the Corinthians could attack the

enemy

fleet under

favourable

conditions.

Either

before

or after

attacking

the

enemy

fleet

the

Corinthians could

sail on

Corcyra

town,

which

they

would

reach

more

rapidly

than the

Corcyraean

land force

marching

overland

from

Cape Leukimme.24

This

possibility may

have caused the Corinthian

fleet to take on board provisions or threedays. If this was the Corinthianplan, the fleet would

sail for the western

part

of the

Channel

in

order to

escape

observation from

Sybota;

their

probable

course

is

indicated

on

the

map.

However,

dawn

found the

Corcyraean

fleet not

only

at

sea but

heading

towards the Corinthian

fleet,

and at no

great

distance

apart

as the fleets

deployed

on

sighting

one another. We

may

suppose

that

the

Corcyraeans

had

either antici-

pated

or been informed

of

the Corinthian

move;

they

would

then sail

for

the narrows

of the

Channel,

which

they

could

best hold.

The

probable

course

and

battle-position

of each

fleet

is

shown on the

map,

action

I.

The-distance

covered

by

the

leading

ships

before

deploying

was

eight

miles

from Cheimerion

and four

miles from

the

Sybota

anchorage.

In

navigating

their

night

course

from

Cheimerion

the

Corinthians

may

be

assumed

to

have

put

their best

sailers

ahead,

and on

deploying

these

formed

the left

wing;

for if the

Corinthianscould

gain

a

victory on this wing, they might yet cut off the Corcyraeans rom their land base at Leukimme.

It was

equally

vital

for the

Corcyraeans

to

safeguard

their

right

wing. They

therefore

placed

there

the

Athenian

squadron

as an

outlier,

highly

manoeuvrable

and

much

feared

by

the

enemy;

moreover the

Ath'enians

were defended

by

their

diplomatic

status,

for

it was

unlikely

that the Corinthians would take

the

initiative

in

attacking

them.

Being

faced

by superior

numbers

the

Corcyraeans

could

either observe the same

interval

between

ships

as the

enemy,

in which

case their

wings

would

be

enveloped,

or extend

their line

by

thinning

out the centre

and

keeping

the

wings strong;

the

course of the

battle

suggests

that

they

adopted

the latter

alternative.25

24

It

may

be assumed that the

Corinthians knew

of

the

land

base at

Leukimme

either from

information or

by

observation from

Cheimerion

(cf.

Plate

IIa

and

b).

25

In the map I have put the Corinthian line at three

miles

in

length.

The

nature

of

the battle

indicates

that

both

sides formed a

single

line for

boarding

tactics

(the

Athenians

alone

acting

as a

mobile

reserve);

for

I50

ships

a

line

of

three miles

allows

forty

yards per ship.

Taking

the

dimensions

of

the

trireme

at

IIo

feet

long

and

fifty

feet

wide from

oar-tip

to

oar-tip,

the

interval

of

clear water

between ship and ship

sailing

ahead would be

twenty-four

yards

and between

ship

and

ship turning

broadside for

boarding

would be

four

yards.

As

boarding

tactics

only

were

employed

in this

battle,

this

seems

to be

a

reasonable

JHS.-VOL.

LXV.

D



10/16

34

N. G.

L.

HAMMOND

The

Corcyraean victory

over

the

enemy

right

wing

occurred

early

in the

battle,

for

Thucydides

comments

on

the

absence

of the

pursuing

squadron

when

the main

Corcyraean

force

was

being

hard

pressed.

As the direct

course

from their

left

wing

to

Cheimerion

was

according

to

my

reconstruction

eight

miles,

we

must

allow

some one

and

a

half

hoursfor

these

ships

to reach

the camp at Cheimerion. The time being shortlyafterdawn, theywereprobably

not visible

to the main Corinthian

fleet when

they

were

halfway

to

Cheimerion,

sailing

into

the

rising

sun with

a

high

and shadowed

coast

as

a

background.

Meanwhile

the

Corinthians

on

the

left

half

of the line

26

were

defeating

their

opponents;

the

outlying

Athenian

squadron

manoeuvred

freely

to

help

the

Corcyraean

right,

and

finally

went into

action

to cover the

rout

of their

allies,

who would

naturally

make

for the land

base at Leukimme.

The extent

of

the

Corcyraean

defeat

appears

later

in the narrative

(I.

54,

2)

;

of the

ninety

ships

remaining

when

the

squadron

was

pursuing

to

Cheimerion,

some

seventy

were

put

out of

action,

so that

of

the

Corcyraean

centre

and

right

wing

only

some

twenty

ships

reached

Leukimme,

escorted

by

the

intact Athenian

squadron

of

ten."2

'

After the rout the Corinthians

did

not

take

in

tow

the

hulls of

the

ships

they

had

sunk,28

but turned to the men

whom as

they

sailed

among

the

wrecks

they

slew rather

than

took

prisoner,

even in

ignorance

killing

their

own

friends,

for

they

had

not

perceived

the

defeat

of

those

on the

right

wing.

As there were

many

vessels

on both

sides

and

they

extended over

a

large

area of

sea,

once

they

were

engaged

with

one

another

it was

difficult

to

distinguish

who

were

vanquishing

or

being

vanquished;

for in

number

of

ships

this

was the

greatest

battle

to

date

between Greek and

Greek. When

the

Corinthians had

pursued

the

Corcyraeans

to

the

land,

they

turned

to

the wrecks

and their

own

dead,

and

recovering

most of

them

conveyed

them

to

Sybota

whither the land force

of

the

barbarians

had

come

up

to

aid

them;

Sybota

is an

uninhabited harbour of

Thesprotis.

Thereafter

they

mustered

anew and

sailed

against

the

Corcyraeans. They,

together

with the

Athenian

squadron,

sailed

out

against

them

with

the

ships

that were

fit

for

action

and

as

many

as

were

left

to

them,

for

they

feared

an

attempt

to

land

on

their

territory.

It

was

already

late

and

the

Paean

had been

sung

for

sailing

in

to close

quarters,

when the Corinthians

suddenly

began

to back water

having

escried

twenty

Athenian

ships sailing

towards

them;

these

ships

had

been

sent

out

subsequently by

the

Athenians

to

reinforce the

squadron

of

ten,

for

they

feared-as did

happen-that

the

Corcyraeans

might

be

defeated and

their ten

ships

prove

too

few to

protect

them.

The

Corinthians

then,

seeing

these

estimate;

even

so two

ships

turning

broadside

simul-

taneously

would

require

skilful

handling,

for it

was

import-

ant

to

save

one's own oars

and timbers and to

damage

the

enemy's.

During

the

Peloponnesian

War

the

tactics

of

breaking

the

line and

ramming required

a

closer

order

in

the line

for

defence;

thus

one

cannot

apply

to

Sybota

deductions

drawn,

for

instance,

from

the

battle

of

Arginusae.

On

the

Corcyraean

side the

Athenian

squadron

might

occupy

more sea

room,

in

order

to

keep

its

freedom of

manoeuvre; even so the Corcyraean ships would be spaced

more

widely

than the

Corinthian,

probably

between

forty-

five

and

fifty yards

per

vessel on

the

average.

Thucydides

I.

50,

2,

7TONN65v

&p

VE6yV

0aCSv

&po-rEpcov

al

rri

7rroXO'

rFs

ea?,Xaas

lS

TEXOUa&Sv,

suggests

that

the

line

was

unusually

long.

Cf.

Rodgers

Greekand

Roman

Naval

Warfare

(I937)

47

and

187

(Arginusae),

and

Koster,

Antike

Seewesen

(1923)

137

f.

26

I.

49,

6

I

,8

oaEroi

aav

ol

Kopivetot,

Tri

TC

EOC.)covvpP,

rrohO

iKCov;

the Corinthians

presumably

held with

their

ninety

ships

the left

centre

as

well

as

the

left

wing.

At

48,

4

the

order

of

battle

is

given

from

right

to

left

by

national

squadrons

and

I

take it

that

the

twenty-one

ships

of

Elis

Leucas

and Anactorion

occupied

the

right

centre

or

part

of

it.

27

Gomme,

op

cit.

194,

and

others

have

doubted the

accuracy

of

the

figure seventy.

Thucydides'

narrative

suggests

that

the

Corcyraean

losses were

very high; he

mentions

the

great

superiority

of

the

Corinthians

(49,

6)

the

Corcyraeans'

effort to

muster

ships

in

offering

battle

in the

evening

(50o, 4),

the

withdrawal

of

the

Corinthians who

feared

the

second

Athenian

squadron

numbered more than

twenty

(51,

I),

and

the considerations

which

dissuaded

the

Corinthians

from

accepting

battle

on the next

day (52,

2).

This establishes

a

presumption

that

Thucydides

did

give

a

high

figure

for the

Corcyraean

losses,

and,

if

we

accept

his

figure

thirty

for the

Corinthian

losses,

seventy

for

the

Corcyraean

losses need

not be

suspected;

as

the

Corinthians

killed survivors

in the

water

(50,

I),

the

1050

prisoners

taken

by

them

(55,

I)

lend some

support

to

the

figure seventy.

If we allow

that the

figure

seventy

was

written

by Thucy-

dides and is not a MS error, is there any probability that he

was correct

?

He

qualifies

the

numbers of

losses with

-rEpi

and

patwora,

but the

general

trustworthiness

of

his

account

suggests

that these

numbers

should

be

respected.

In the

Peloponnesian

War losses

in naval

engagements

were

not so

high

in

proportion

to the

size

of

the

fleet

as

those of

Corcyra

at

Sybota;

but

in the

naval

victory

over

Aegina

c.

458

B.c.

the

Aeginetan

losses were

seventy

ships

(I.

io5,

2)

whereas

their fleet

was

probably

smaller

than that

of

Corcyra

(I. 50,

2. Thuc.

notes

Sybota

was the

greatest

battle

to

date

between

Greek

and

Greek).

It seems

likely

that

the

archaic

tactics

employed

at

Sybota

caused

higher

loss

in

ships

than

the

manoeuvring

and

ramming

of

the

Peloponnesian

War;

all

ships

engaged,

the

fighting

was

bitter,

and

after

charging

one

another

disengagement

was

difficult

(49, 3).

Thus

withdrawal

was less

easy

than

it

later

became.

28 &S

KTaOrabaElav,

Sunk

in

the

sense

of

waterlogged;

when a ship was carried by boarding, it was presumably

holed to

put

it out of

action.

The

towing

in

of

waterlogged

hulls must

have

been

a

slow

process,

which

helps

to

explain

the interval

between

the

dawn

engagement

and

the

action

which

broke

off

in the

evening.



11/16

NAVAL

OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH

CHANNEL OF

CORCYRA

35

ships

first

and

suspecting

them

to be from Athens but in

larger

numbers

than

they

saw,

began

to withdraw.

They

were

not seen

by

the

Corcyraeans,

for in

their

case

they

were

sailing

up

from an

unseen

quarter,

and the

Corcyraeans

were

surprised

at

the

Corinthians

backing

water,

until some saw and cried that there were

ships

there

sailing

up.

Then

they

also

began

to with-

draw; for it was alreadygetting dark, and the Corinthiansturning away brokeoff the action.

So

they

parted

from one

another,

and the battle ended

at

nightfall.

The

Corcyraeans

were

in

camp

at Leukimme

when these

twenty ships

from

Athens,

commanded

by

Glaukon son

of

Leagros

and

Andokides son

of

Leogoras,

bore down

through

the

corpses

and

wreckage

and

sailed

up

to

the

camp

not

long

after

they

were

sighted.

The

Corcyraeans,

for

it was

night,

feared

they

were

enemy

vessels,

and

then knew

them;

and

they

came

to

anchor'

(I.

50-51).

In

killing

the men in the water Corinth

and her allies

were

revenging

the

execution

of

prisoners

by

the

Corcyraeans

n

435

B.c.

Thucydides

accounts

for

the

failure

of

the

Corinthians

to

perceive

their

defeat on

the

right

wing,

but he tells

us

nothing

more

of

the

twenty

victorious

Corcyraean

ships.

As the

Corcyraeans

were

prepared

to

fight

again

in

the

evening,

these

ships

must have

regained

the

base at Leukimme. So

long

as

they

hugged

the

coast,

they

could

move

up

the

Channel

without

being

observedfrom

the scene of the

main

action; it thereforeseems

likely

that,

while the Corinthians

killed

the

survivors,

pursued

the

Corcyraeans

to land

and

were

collecting

their dead and the

wrecks,

the

twenty

ships

passed

north of

Sybota

on

the

east

side of the Channel and then raced across to Leukimme.

For the

pursuit

to

Cheimerion,

the

pillaging

of

the

camp

and the

voyage

to the

latitude

of

the

Sybota

isles,

we

may

allow

some

three

hours

29;

during

that time the Corinthians could

well

have

been

engaged

on

their

opera-

tions

in

the

westward

part

of the Channel.

The barbarian land

force

was

not

at

Cheimerion

an

hour or two after

dawn,

when the

Corcyraeans

pillaged

the

empty

camp;

it

must

have

been

already

on the

way

to

mainland

Sybota

(Port

Mourzo),

and

the

synchronisation

of

its

departure

with

that of the

fleet

must

have been

part

of the

Corinthian

plan

of

action. The

pursuit by

the

Corinthiansof the

Corcyraeans

to

the land

'

was

clearly

to

Corcyraean

territory,

and

in

this

case to

the

coast

near Leukimme

where the

land force

of

the

Corcyraeans

could

cover

them

from

further

attack.

When

assembled

at

mainland

Sybota,

the

Corinthian

fleet

had lost

thirty ships;

of

the

120

left

a

number would be

in

need

of

repair,

which

was

impossible

in

a

deserted

place

(52,

2),

and the losses

in

oars

and

crews

could

probably

not be

replaced

(if

the

Corinthians

had

brought

a

supply

of

oars,

they

would have

been

fired

at

Cheimerion

by

the

Corcyraeans).

It

seems

improbable

that when

they

offered

battle

in

the

evening

they

mustered as

many

as 120

ships.

The

Corcyraeans

probably

had

spare

oars

and

timber at

their

Leukimme

base

and

could also fill

gaps

in

their

crews from the

land

force;

the

forty

ships

which

had survived the battle

were

probably

thus

an

effective

force.

The

phrase

6aorl

aav

?otrrai

(50,

4),

if

not

pleonastic,

must refer to

ships

reserved at

Leukimme

30;

as

the official

strength

of

the

Corcyraean

fleet was

MIo

and

of

these I

10

were

engaged

in

the

morning,

the

reserved

ships

may

have numbered

ten

vessels

too old

and

slow

for

manoeuvre.

Even if

we

put

the

Corcyraean

total

including

the Athenian

squadron

at

sixty

ships

and the

Corinthian

total

at

less than

I20

ships,

the Corinthians

still far

outnumbered

the

Corcyraeans;

therefore

the

Corcyraeans

would not venture farfrom

the cover

of the

land

force. The

probable

position

of

the

fleets

for

action

2

is

shown on the

map.

In

this

position

the

Corinthians

would

see the

second Athenian

squadron

rounding

Cape

Bianco,

before

it was

visible

to

the

Naval Operations in the South Channel of Corcyra 435-433 b.c.

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Transcript of Naval Operations in the South Channel of Corcyra 435-433 b.c.