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CCPS Monograph: Assessment of and planning for natural hazards

This monograph addresses the assessment of and planning for natural hazards. It is based on lessons learned by various CCPS member companies.

Assessment of and planning for natural hazards

AIChE 2019. All rights reserved. Reproduction for non-commercial, educational purposes is encouraged.

However, reproduction for any commercial purpose without express written consent of AIChE is strictly prohibited.

ii

The Center for Chemical Process Safety was established by the American Institute of Chemical

Engineers in 1985 to focus on the engineering and management practices to prevent and mitigate

major incidents involving the release of hazardous chemicals and hydrocarbons. CCPS is active

worldwide through its comprehensive publishing program, annual technical conference, research,

and instructional material for undergraduate engineering education. For more information about

CCPS, please call (+1) 646-495-1371, e-mail [email protected], or visit www.aiche.org/ccps.

Copyright 2019 American Institute of Chemical Engineers

Cover photo credits:

Upper left: Coffeyville Refinery, Coffeyville, Kansas, 2007

https://agriculture.ks.gov/divisions-programs/dwr/floodplain/resources/historical-flood-

signs/lists/historical-flooding/coffeyville

Right: FEMA Flood Map

https://msc.fema.gov/portal/home

Lower: Lake Charles, Louisiana, 2005

Sanders RE. Expect the unexpected when thinking extreme weather. Process Safety

Progress 2019; e12082. https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12082

This third edition was compiled by Cheryl Grounds, CCPS Staff Consultant with input from

Andrew Goddard, Arkema and Christopher Devlin, Celanese, peer review by Cathy Pincus,

ExxonMobil, Samantha Scruggs, BP, and Tim Murphy, Arkema and oversight by Dr. Anil

Gokhale, Director, CCPS Projects. It is made available for use with no legal obligations or

assumptions (i.e. Use at your own risk). Corrections, updates, additions, and

recommendations should be sent to Dr. Gokhale at [email protected].

It is sincerely hoped that the information presented in this document will lead to an even more

impressive record for the entire industry; however, the American Institute of Chemical

Engineers, its consultants, CCPS Subcommittee members, their employers, and their

employers’ officers and directors disclaim making or giving any warranties, expressed or

implied, including with respect to fitness, intended purpose, use or merchantability and/or

correctness or accuracy of the content of the information presented in this document. As

between (1) American Institute of Chemical Engineers, its consultants, CCPS Subcommittee

members, their employers, and their employers’ officers and directors and (2) the user of this

document, the user accepts any legal liability or responsibility whatsoever for the

consequence of its use or misuse.

https://www.aiche.org/ccps

https://agriculture.ks.gov/divisions-programs/dwr/floodplain/resources/historical-flood-signs/lists/historical-flooding/coffeyville

https://agriculture.ks.gov/divisions-programs/dwr/floodplain/resources/historical-flood-signs/lists/historical-flooding/coffeyville


https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/prs.12082




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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 GENERAL 1

2 INTRODUCTION 1

3 IDENTIFY HAZARDS 1

4 GATHER DATA 2

5 IDENTIFY EQUIPMENT TO BE ADDRESSED IN NATURAL HAZARDS ASSESSMENT 2

6 EVALUATE AGAINST DESIGN CRITERIA 3

7 RECOVERY 8

8 RECOMMISSIONING 10

9 REFERENCES 12

APPENDIX A: EXAMPLE SITE SCREENING FOR NATURAL HAZARDS 15

APPENDIX B: EXAMPLE CONTENTS OF A NATURAL HAZARD EMERGENCY RESONSE PLAN 17

APPENDIX C: EXAMPLE LIST OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIILITIES FOR NATURAL HAZARD

EMERGENCY RESPONSE 26

APPENDIX D: EXAMPLE ACTIVITY LIST FOR BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE NATURAL

HAZARD EVENT 27

APPENDIX E: EXAMPLE LIST OF INTERDEPENDECIES 29

APPENDIX F: EXAMPLE LIST OF SUPPLIES 30

APPENDIX G: EXPLANATION OF TERMS 34

APPENDIX H: ACRONYMS 41




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1 GENERAL

Natural disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Harvey, Superstorm Sandy, and various river flood

events have made it clear to the upstream, refining and chemical industries that planning for such natural

hazards is very important. The likelihood of such natural disasters occurring seems to be increasing. The

U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) references a study by Swiss Re, an

international insurer, covering the years 1970 to 2016, showing that North America has experienced

increasing insured losses from disaster events with the highest losses in 2016. Most of the losses

stemmed from hurricanes, hailstorms, thunderstorms, and severe flood events. (CSB 2018)

The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) member

companies believe that sharing experiences and learnings is fundamental to reducing risk and improving

performance. This monograph addresses the assessment of and planning for natural disasters. It is

based on guidance provided by various government, insurance agencies, and CCPS, as well as lessons

learned by various CCPS member companies. It is also aligned with the CCPS Risk Based Process Safety

approaches of understanding hazards and managing risks. (CCPS 2007)

The reader is reminded that this monograph provides guidance and does not set a standard or

expectation for performance or actions. Ultimately it is the responsibility of each company and its

employees to act on their principles and available information to secure their site and protect their

employees, the community, and the environment from harm. Also, where local regulations provide

compliance requirements, those regulations should take precedent.

This monograph intends to provide basic information, an approach for assessing natural hazards, means

to address the hazards, and emergency planning guidance. It applies to both new and existing facilities.

2 INTRODUCTION

Natural hazards include all types of naturally occurring events that have the potential for negative impact.

These natural phenomena fall into two categories:

Meteorological hazards are those that naturally occur due to the weather cycle or climactic cycles,

and include flooding, temperature extremes, snow/ice storms, wild fire, tornado, tropical cyclones,

hurricanes, storm surge, wind, lightning, hailstorms, drought, etc.

Geological hazards are those occurring due to the movements of the earth and the internal earth

forces, and include seismic events, earthquakes, landslides, tsunami, volcanic eruptions, and dam

rupture.

3 IDENTIFY HAZARDS

The first step in preparing for a natural hazard event is to identify the natural hazards that could occur

at the facility. The list of meteorological and geological hazards above could be considered as a primary

screening list. When deciding if a natural hazard is relevant at a site, codes and standards, regulations,

insurance reports, and site experience may be useful. Although a site, or the analyst compiling the list of

hazards, may not have experienced a specific type of natural disaster, it is important not to discount its

potential. An example site screening for natural hazards document format is provided in Appendix A.




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4 GATHER DATA

Once the potential natural hazards relevant to a facility are identified, the next step is to gather data on

the natural hazards. Data may also be available from third party, expert natural hazard consultants or

from the facility’s insurance carrier. Insurance carriers typically will have developed specific natural event

reports. Other data sources may include the following.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) flood maps - https://msc.fema.gov/portal/home

United States Geological Survey (USGS) seismic maps -

https://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazards/designmaps/usdesign.php

American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) seismic guide - https://hazards.atcouncil.org/#/

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) tornado prediction -

https://www.spc.noaa.gov/new/SVRclimo/climo.php?parm=allTorn

ASCE Tornado Wind Prediction - https://hazards.atcouncil.org/#/

National Hurricane Center (NHC) Storm surge maps - https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/nationalsurge/

ASCE Wind prediction maps - https://hazards.atcouncil.org/#/

ASCE Snow load - https://hazards.atcouncil.org/#/

NOAA Hurricane center - https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/climo/

This data may be used in evaluating facility design in relation to natural hazards, assessing risks, and

emergency planning. It is important that the data gathered from these sources is specific to each site

location. This includes the probability of occurrence and the severity level (e.g. flood zone, water height,

wind speed, seismic zone). For example, the facility may be subject to flooding of 1.52 meters (5 feet) at

a frequency of 1 in 500 years. In addition to data from the above sources, it may be important to

understand the specific site topography, as knowing the high and low spots may inform both increased

risks and potential mitigation measures. A potential best practice used by one CCPS member company

was to develop drone elevation maps of their site prone to river flooding. With this, they understand

exactly what equipment will be impacted at a given river height, a value that is often forecasted days in

advance.

The data gathered should be maintained along with other important raw data describing the conditions

of the site. This site data should be maintained in a format that is accessible to those on site during a

potential emergency and is also backed up and accessible remotely.

5 IDENTIFY EQUIPMENT TO BE ADDRESSED IN NATURAL HAZARDS ASSESSMENT

Facilities include many pieces of equipment and systems which may be critical to supporting operations

some of which may be important to protect from a natural hazard. For example, the emergency power

system may be important for continued operation during a natural disaster, but the maintenance shop

equipment may not be. Any equipment or operation that is required for safe operations or that, if

compromised, could lead to a process safety event, harm to personnel the community, or the

environment should be identified. Further examples of equipment that may be required for safe

operation are: nitrogen generators, firewater pumps, cooling systems, process control and safety

instrumented systems, and wastewater pumps.

Considering natural hazard data as “process safety information” is a good practice.


https://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazards/designmaps/usdesign.php

https://hazards.atcouncil.org/#/

https://www.spc.noaa.gov/new/SVRclimo/climo.php?parm=allTorn


https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/nationalsurge/



https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/climo/




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This identification step should be documented as follows.

For flood hazards, document the equipment/operation potentially impacted and its elevation, and

the predicted 100-year and 500-year levels.

For wind hazards, document the equipment/operation potentially impacted, the required wind

design per local building code, and the existing wind design basis.

For seismic hazards, document the equipment/operation potentially impacted, the required seismic

design per local building code, and the existing seismic design basis.

For other hazards such as temperature extremes, snow/ice storms, wild fire, tornado, tropical

cyclones, hurricanes, storm surge, wind, lightning, hailstorms, drought, landslides, tsunami, volcanic

eruptions, and dam rupture, document the equipment/operation potentially impacted, any design

requirement and the existing design basis.

6 EVALUATE AGAINST DESIGN CRITERIA

Equipment and operations identified in section 5 should be evaluated compared to the natural hazard

likelihood and severity data gathered in section 4. This comparison should be made for each type of

natural hazard. Where the current or planned design falls below the design criteria (refer to section 6.1),

then there is a gap that should be addressed.

The latter two options will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections. The process safety

hierarchy should be kept in mind when deciding how best to close a gap. It is better to first eliminate the

gap, then to engineer a solution, and then to provide emergency response.

A challenge in natural hazards response planning is that a number of important systems and pieces of

equipment may be impacted by the same hazard at the same time, or in rapid succession. This may also

include the layers of protection that have been installed to protect equipment. A common mode failure

may be rising flood waters. For example, as the water level continues to rise, more and more equipment

may be inundated and, eventually, even the equipment on “high ground” may also be flooded.

For meteorological hazards including wind (including hurricane), earthquake, tornado, snow/ice storm,

and lightening, local building codes should be consulted for design criteria. For example, wind or seismic

designs should be evaluated for tall structures such as distillation towers.

For geological natural hazards including wild fires, volcanic eruptions, landslides, droughts, and dam

ruptures, there are likely no relevant design conditions defined. For these natural hazards, addressing

the risk through emergency planning is appropriate.

For natural hazards of flooding and storm surge, there is frequency and severity data available from the

sources listed in section 4 above, but the topic of applicable design criteria is not abundantly clear.

One or more of the following approaches may be taken in addressing a gap.

1. Bring the equipment/operation up to the design criteria

2. Conduct a risk assessment to understand the risk and develop safeguards

3. Address the gap through emergency response plans.




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FEMA defines a 100-year flood and 500-year flood area. (FEMA 2019a) A 100-year rainfall and a 100-

year flood are not necessarily related as the flooding will be influenced by where the rain fell in the

watershed, the soil saturation before the storm, and the storm duration as related to the watershed

stream basins. (USGS 2019)

Hurricanes are categorized using the Saffir–Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale (SSHWS) in categories 1

through 5 based on 1-minute maximum sustained wind speed. The SSHWS does not account for

rain or storm surge – only wind.

The National Hurricane Center defines storm surge levels with the highest level being greater than 9

feet. (NOAA 2019 a)

The information above does not clarify which of these flood zones and storm surge levels one should

use as a design criterion. For example, the emergency power system deemed important in section 5 may

be outside of the 100-year flood zone but within the 500-year flood zone. It is the owner’s decision on

which criterion to apply to new or existing equipment. Some points to keep in mind are the following.

Hurricanes Ike, Katrina, and Hugo all generated storm surges well in excess of 9 ft. (NHC 2019a)

which resulted in floodwater levels exceeding the base flood elevation by several feet. The FEMA

flood maps are updated as new data and funding is available, but this can take decades.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) states it is recommended that (FEMA 2014):

o Critical facilities be protected to the greatest of the following flood elevations:

Base Flood Elevation (BFE) plus 0.61 meters (2 feet),

Locally adopted Design Flood Elevation (DFE), and

500-year flood elevation (flood event having a 0.2% chance of being met or exceeded

annually).

o Emergency power systems within critical facilities and the equipment they supply should be

protected to the greatest of the following flood elevations:

Base Flood Elevation (BFE) plus 0.91 meters (3 feet),

Locally adopted Design Flood Elevation (DFE) plus 0.3 meters (1 foot), and

500-year flood elevation (flood event having a 0.2% chance of being met or exceeded

annually) plus 0.3 meters (1 foot).

6.1 MEET DESIGN CRITERIA

Design criteria addressing natural hazards should be applied to new projects. It can also be used in

designing upgrades for existing equipment. In addition to the criteria noted above in section 6, there is

guidance and criteria provided in a number of sources including the following.

ASCE Flood Resistant Design and Construction, ASCE 24 (ASCE 2014)

ASCE Minimum Design Loads and Associated Criteria for Buildings and Other Structures, ASCE /SEI

7-16 (ASCE 2016)

CCPS Guidelines for Safe Warehousing of Chemicals (CCPS 1998)

CCPS Guidelines for Safe Storage and Handling of Reactive Materials (CCPS 1995)

CCPS GL for Facility Siting and Layout (CCPS 2018)

FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets 1-2 Earthquakes (FM Global 2012)

FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets 1-11 Fire Following Earthquake (FM Global 2010)

FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets 1-29 Roof Deck Securement and Above-Deck Roof

Components (FM Global 2010a)

FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets 1-34 Hail Damage (FM Global 2019)

https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/surge/

https://sp360.asce.org/PersonifyEbusiness/Merchandise/Product-Details/productId/233129242

https://www.asce.org/structural-engineering/asce-7-and-sei-standards/

https://www.asce.org/structural-engineering/asce-7-and-sei-standards/

https://www.aiche.org/ccps/publications/books/guidelines-safe-warehousing-chemicals

https://www.aiche.org/ccps/resources/publications/books/guidelines-safe-storage-and-handling-reactive-materials

https://www.aiche.org/ccps/publications/books/guidelines-facility-siting-and-layout

https://www.fmglobal.com/research-and-resources/fm-global-data-sheets








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FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets 1-40 Flood (FM Global 2019a)

Any gaps identified in section 6 should be evaluated to determine if they can be modified to meet the

design criteria. For example, ask the question, “could critical equipment be elevated to meet the company

defined flood criteria or could a tall structure be reinforced to meet wind load criteria?”

6.2 CONDUCT RISK ASSESSMENT

Guidance on risk assessment methods is provided in a number of CCPS texts including CCPS Guidelines

for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis (CCPS 1999) and CCPS Guidelines for Developing

Quantitative Safety Risk Criteria (CCPS 2009). The guidance in these texts can be used to determine the

risks due to natural hazards. Quantitative methods can also be used and will require the company to

have established risk criteria to determine if actions are required once the risk is determined.

The risk assessment should include three phases. First, determine the damage the natural hazard could

have on the facility. Second, determine the consequences imposed on the personnel, community, and

environment as a result of the natural disaster. Finally, estimate the frequency or likelihood of the

consequences. The risks for natural events may be similar, or completely different, from the risks posed

by the facility during normal operations. It is also more efficient to focus on worst case consequences, as

these will typically cover the lesser consequences as well.

It is important to document all of the natural hazards considered in the assessment and the outcome of

this assessment. The assessment should list the consequences and the existing safeguards and actions

to be taken. An example risk assessment is provided in Table 1. This example is qualitative; however,

data such as the 100-year flood frequency could be used to enable a quantitative assessment. Facilities

should develop their own consequences of concern, risk and abating actions specific for their specific

Example

A company decides that its design criteria for flooding is a 1 in 500-year flood. The equipment

evaluation step reveals that a firewater pump is located lower than the 1 in 500-year flood height.

The first response should be to meet the design criteria and raise the pump above the 1 in 500-

year flood height. The company conducts engineering studies, determines this is feasible, and

proceeds with the project to elevate the fire pump thus meeting the company design criteria.

Example:

Let’s continue the example of the company with a firewater pump below their company design

criteria for flooding. Let’s say that the company conducts engineering studies to evaluate elevating

the fire pump and determines that this is not feasible. They then continue the risk assessment to

determine the consequences if the pump were to become flooded. They determine that the

consequence of the loss of this fire water pump is limited to the loss of fire protection to a remote

structure that does not contain flammables or combustibles but contains packaging materials. The

company determines that the risk is ‘tolerable’ according to the company risk matrix, as there is no

significant onsite or offsite consequence of loss of firewater to this structure. The company decides

not to elevate the pump based on the combination of low consequence and the 1 in 500-year

probability of flooding.





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situation. A company risk matrix can then be used to assign decision level and action criteria. The risk

matrix could indicate that action should be taken, for example, to elevate critical equipment. The risk

matrix could indicate that the risk is tolerable per the company’s criteria, and the appropriate action is

to address it in emergency response plans.

Table 1 Example Natural Hazards Risk Assessment

*H - high; M – medium; L – low; NA – not applicable

Hazard Damage Consequence Existing

Safeguards

Likelihood* Onsite

Risk*

Offsite

Risk*

Heavy

rain

leading

to flood

A few inches of

water in

buildings. Minor.

Building

damage. No

process

equipment

damage.

None H L NA

Damage of

control

instruments,

safety

instrumentation

, and/or

communication

equipment

Loss of process

containment for

hazardous

chemicals.

Loss of

communication

capabilities

Critical

equipment is

elevated

M L NA

Elevation level

of critical

equipment

exceeded.

Major.

Loss of process

containment for

hazardous

chemicals.

Loss of

communication

capabilities.

Waterproof

covering on all

junction boxes,

switchgear,

electrical

cabinets, and

enclosures

L H M

Heavy

snow

High weight load

on structures

and building

roofs

Structural

failure, roof

collapse,

possible

injuries

Clear roof

gutters and

downspouts,

check

drainage

routes

H H L

Hurricane

force

winds

Damage to tanks

and vessels

containing

chemicals

Airborne or

water borne

pollutants

Harm to

people and the

environment

Reduce all

toxic chemical

inventory to

minimal levels

and secure

remaining

supplies

L H M




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The risk assessment should be subject to technical and management approvals and be reviewed at a

frequency similar to those completed for Process Hazard Analyses. A formal action plan for risk

mitigation based on the gap analysis should be tracked to completion.

6.3 NATURAL HAZARD EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN

An FM Global report stated, “loss history has shown that facilities with well-organized flood emergency

response plans have nearly 70-percent less damage, and resume operations sooner than those locations

without a flood emergency response plan, or an inadequate one, in place.” (FM Global 2004) It is clear

that developing, training, and testing an emergency response plan for natural disasters is just as

important as doing the same for other potential site emergencies.

Taking into consideration the assessments performed related to natural hazards, sites should develop a

Natural Hazard Emergency Response Plan (NHERP) to define their steps in response to an event.

In addition to the information in this monograph, there are a number of resources available to assist in

the development of natural hazards emergency response plans including the following.

CCPS Guidelines for Technical Planning for On-Site Emergencies (CCPS 1995)

FEMA Emergency Response Plan (FEMA 2014)

FM Global Creating a Flood Emergency Response Plan (FM Global 2004)

United Kingdom Environment Agency Preparing for Flooding – A guide for sites regulated under

Environmental Permitting Regulations (EPR) and Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH)

Regulations (UK EA 2015)

The following sections comprise an example Natural Hazards Emergency Response Plan. Details on each

section of this example NHERP are included in Appendix B.

1. Emergency Command Center(s)

2. Authority and responsibilities

3. Understand hazards

4. Warning systems

5. Activation prompts

6. Staffing assignments (including ride out crew)

7. Evacuation plans

8. Interdependency

9. Utility supplies

10. Communication systems and protocols

11. Protection of business-critical equipment and data

12. Inventory

13. Access and security

14. Safety

The Natural Hazards Emergency Response Plan (NHERP) should document “who” is to do

“what,” “when,” and “how” for all of the natural hazards relevant to the site. The plan should

be developed well in advance of a potential natural disaster and should include actions to

be taken before, during and after the potential natural disaster

https://www.aiche.org/ccps/publications/books/guidelines-technical-planning-site-emergencies

https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/89518

https://www.fmglobal.com/~/media/Files/FMGlobal/Nat%20Haz%20Toolkit/P0589.pdf

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/preparing-for-flooding-a-guide-for-regulated-sites






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15. Supplies and logistics 16. Equipment checks

17. NHERP maintenance, quality assessment/quality control

Lists of example activities to be taken before, during and after the natural hazard event is provided in

Appendix D. These lists can be used in conjunction with the site’s NHERP, both in the developing of the

plan and in its use.

Although the NHERP in Appendix B includes a section on communication, it is highlighted here as it

applies to all phases of the planning and recovering from a natural hazard event. Plans should be made

and executed for communication with the community, media, and local authorities before, during and

after the event. All communication means (TV, radio, email, text and other social media avenues) should

be considered to reach all potentially impacted people.

7 RECOVERY

After the disaster has passed, it is time to manage the aftermath and resume operations. There will likely

be damaged equipment to repair, contamination to address, hidden or silent failures, new hazards

associated with old equipment, and the typical startup challenges. At this time, it is critical to identify the

concerns and needs driven by the unique situation. The workforce is likely dealing with damage to their

homes and concerns for their families’ welfare. Stress and distraction are of heightened concern in

managing a safe return to operations. Additionally, workers new to the site (e.g., employees from other

worksites, specialty contractors unfamiliar with the site/its processes) may be brought in to complete

repair efforts. Management of any new workforce should be a focus area.

Stabilize and assess. First conduct the activities such as those suggested in the “After the natural hazard

event” section of Appendix D. Assessing the situation is a key step. The site will likely look different, pose

different hazards, and have safeguards disabled. In the effort to bring things back to normal, it is easy to

overlook these points. Time should be taken to consider potential hazards and protect against them to

avoid injury during this assess and stabilize stage.

Secure. As soon as services are available and it is safe to do so, activate as many of the security systems

as possible—including lighting, video monitoring, motion detectors, gate locks, access authorization

Example:

Let’s continue the example of the company with a firewater pump below their company design

criteria for flooding. Recall that the company conducts engineering studies to evaluate elevating

the fire pump and determines that this is not feasible. However, in this alternative case, they

decide that the consequence of a fire will lead to both on-site and off-site impacts. They decide

that they can reduce the quantity of flammables and combustibles inside the structure by

following their hurricane preparedness procedure. This action will help to mitigate the

consequence to a lower level. They also identify that the local fire department can respond in a

few minutes (from high ground) thereby mitigating the consequence with a firewater source

independent of the plant firewater pump. They use the company risk management process,

obtain approval address the potential fire pump flooding through emergency response

planning. In addition to developing and implementing the NHERP, they meet with and make

specific emergency response plans with the local fire department to provide firewater if needed.




9

cards, and guards. Train guards for the type of situations they may encounter at this time such as dealing

with media or questions from neighbors.

Repair. After critical emergency repairs are made, begin to compile and categorize the other damages

that must be repaired before restart. Some damages will be obvious, but some will not. Consider dividing

the repairs into categories such as obvious physical/mechanical damage, potential hidden damages,

contamination, support services impairments, electrical outages, electronic/signal failures, and

computer issues. Assign appropriate teams to investigate the extent of the damages and make repair

decisions. Be sure those making repairs are qualified to do so and don’t forget to do the paperwork which

might include getting a certified inspector to approve the repair. Remember that some repairs may

require Code stamps (American Petroleum Institute (API), European Pressure Equipment Directive (PED),

American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM),

etc.) and/or worker certification of some type. Other repairs may have to conform to national codes

(National Electrical Code or ATEX, for instance) or standards (International Society of Automation (ISA) or

International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) are examples) and others may require conformance to

company standards.

This may be the time to make some upgrades previously planned. This decision should be properly

reviewed using a management of change procedure to validate that it is appropriate to do so at this time

and to obtain necessary permits.

Train. Remember to train (or refresher train) employees who will be recommissioning the facility. This

includes operational, maintenance, safety, engineering and supervision. Training should focus on

recognizing anomalies in the startup sequence and how to correct them. For mechanics, electricians, and

instrument specialists, consider retraining them on recognizing early effects of contamination, electrical

issues, and failed safety systems. Supervisors and engineers should be reminded of and retrained in the

part they are to play in the startup, how they are to interact, and their specific responsibilities and

authorities. Spend some training time on protocols for communicating requests for help, status reports,

and concerns.

Consider training a process safety person (or team) to function as an “unbiased” advisor to give the

startup team advice on potential responses to risks encountered. There will likely be frequent MOC

situations due to abnormal condition, process sequencing driven by equipment availability, and

equipment change due to lack of ability to replace in-kind. Consider setting up an advisory team to make

those reviews work smoothly.

Consider training recommissioning personnel together so that they develop a team concept and are

accustomed to working with each other. If contractors are involved, make them part of the retraining

and recommissioning team. Customize the recommissioning training to the types of circumstances

associated with the type shut down the facility went through and the type of natural disaster it

experienced.

Provide everyone with refresher training on the basic safety procedures that may be used during startup.

Pay particular attention to recognizing and responding to changes required and the facility MOC

procedure. Remind startup personnel to pay particular attention to tripping, falling, cutting, and wildlife

hazards. Remember that insects, fire ants, snakes, spiders, racoons, and even alligators may have been

looking for a safe haven during the storm. Cautiously open equipment, panels, and drainage trenches.




10

Remind everyone to look before they reach. Also consider if personnel should be protected against

hazards in the waste and debris by having tetanus or hepatitis shots.

Consider making a process safety expert(s) part of the recommissioning training and team with the

specific purpose of helping the team identify and properly analyze risks.

Staff. Staffing the facility for emergency repairs, long term repairs, and eventual restart has several

phases each with different needs. Staffing will include company employees and will likely include

contractors as well. Develop a time line or sequence chart of what needs to be done and in what order.

Match required expertise to the different tasks and then develop a staffing chart to match.

Locate employees. The NHERP should include a mechanism for employees to contact the company and

a way for the company to contact and/or in some way get messages to employees and families of the

ride out crew employees. Based on the staffing chart developed above, schedule identified employees

to come back into the plant. This should be voluntary if at all possible. Recognize that some employees

may not be available because of significant damages to their homes and/or family issues associated with

the evacuation requiring their attention.

Lodging and transportation. To enable employees and contractors to return to site, they may need local

housing and services which they may not be able to secure on their own. If you expect them to continue

helping secure, repair, and start up the plant, you may have to provide housing and services for them.

Consider contracting with a local hotel or motel to provide them. If that is not possible or if local services

are damaged beyond use, consider installing temporary housing, laundry, kitchen, etc. onsite. Locate any

temporary occupied buildings in a safe location. API RP 753 Management of Hazards Associated with

Location of Process Plant Portable Buildings and API RP 756 Management of Hazards Associated with

Location of Process Plant Tents provide guidance on locating occupied buildings. Also consider bringing

in additional contractors to operate these temporary facilities and services. Transportation can be an

additional issue. Both personal and facility vehicles may have been damaged in the event or may not be

suitable given high water or debris remaining after the event.

It may be that your employees’ homes were damaged, and their families have no place to stay. Consider

making arrangements for them to be housed in surrounding areas not severely impacted by the disaster.

It is important that you take care of your employees and their families during this time.

Supplies. It is important to have planned in advance on how to purchase things to enable the recovery.

Key staff should have appropriate spending authorization or purchasing cards. Consideration should

also be given to accessing cash if electronic systems are disabled.

8 RECOMMISSIONING

The recommissioning plan for a facility following a natural disaster must be at least as comprehensive as

that for the initial start-up of a new facility. Before starting operations, those responsible for the startup

should be properly trained, it should be verified that the equipment is ready to receive the chemicals and

utilities, and all operational and safety systems should be functional. CCPS Guidelines for Performing

Effective Pre-Startup Safety Reviews (CCPS 2007) and CCPS Risk Based Process Safety (CCPS 2007) section

on operational readiness provide guidance on this topic.

https://www.api.org/oil-and-natural-gas/health-and-safety/refinery-and-plant-safety/process-safety/process-safety-standards/rp-753

https://www.api.org/oil-and-natural-gas/health-and-safety/refinery-and-plant-safety/process-safety/process-safety-standards/rp-753

https://www.api.org/~/media/files/publications/whats%20new/756_e1%20pa.pdf

https://www.api.org/~/media/files/publications/whats%20new/756_e1%20pa.pdf

https://www.aiche.org/ccps/publications/books/guidelines-performing-effective-pre-startup-safety-reviews

https://www.aiche.org/ccps/publications/books/guidelines-performing-effective-pre-startup-safety-reviews

https://www.aiche.org/ccps/resources/publications/books/guidelines-risk-based-process-safety




11

Recommissioning involves preparing equipment and personnel again for all of the tasks associated with

operating the facility. A recommissioning plan should be developed for recovery from the specific natural

hazard impacts such as wind and water damage. Things that may have worked properly before the

disaster may not work after it. Don’t assume that equipment will perform as expected. Confirm it.

Equipment, instrumentation in particular, may have sustained hidden damages, lost calibration, or been

contaminated. For instrumentation, step through the process one stage at a time and check

configurations and responses, ensuring that each item is performing as designed. Check for responses

to out-of-acceptable or operational-range conditions to ensure that the process controls and safety

instrumented systems will bring the process back under control or to a safe configuration. Carefully

check (functional check preferred) each safety device or system:

Basic process controls

Preventative safety systems: active and passive systems

Mitigative safety systems: active and passive systems

Do not forget that your distributive control system(s) (DCS) may be the hub of most of these

instrumented systems, so check functionality all the way from field instruments through the DCS.

For processing equipment, check for damages and contamination and confirm that each is ready to

receive materials. Pay particular attention to storage tanks that may have been emptied or filled with

water during the disaster. Look for displacement and damage to foundations or to tankage due to

floating. Verify the integrity of equipment including secondary containment systems such as dikes. Also

look for piping damage due to tankage displacement, tie-down damage, or impacts from flying debris.

Look for damage to piping connected to tanks that might have floated or been displaced. Conduct leak

testing to ensure tightness of the system. Technologies such as IR cameras for leak detection and drones

for damage assessment may aid in assessing equipment.

After verifying the equipment integrity, start resupplying inventory based on the startup plan. Auxiliary

systems, such as lubrication, compressed air, inerting, and fuel supply systems should be carefully

checked for contamination and product quality. Bearings and seals may have been compromised. Check

them for contamination including grease/packing and local lubrication supply systems. If uncertain

regarding contamination, assume it to have occurred and flush/replace lubrication systems and supplies.

Function test equipment. Look for blockages (for instance in relief valve discharge pipes) and debris that

might impair the functionality of equipment (for instance a piece of debris prohibiting a valve from

stroking). If strong winds or flooding where equipment may have broken loose and impacted other

equipment were involved, look for debris-impact damage such as missing insulation, broken tubing and

wiring, dented piping, and bent structural supports. There may be a greater need than in normal

operations for Civil Engineering expertise to conduct damage assessment and remediation. Pay

particular attention to sensitive or fragile instrumentation systems.

Recommissioning could highlight changes that may be needed to compensate for missing and/or

damaged equipment. It will also allow for identification of repairs made during the natural hazard event.

Use the MOC process and Prestart-up Safety Review process. See Section F for a more complete

description of how to conduct PSSRs after a disaster.




12

Staging the recommissioning of systems is key. There will be an appropriate order, given the damage,

the equipment, and the facility design, to support a safe recommissioning. For example, establish the

ability to assess the process condition through the DCS view. Then operationalize critical safety systems

from individual critical devices to critical systems such as the flare and the firewater system. Next address

utilities such as nitrogen, instrument air and cooling water. After all this is successfully completed, then

the process itself can be started up.

Startup may be contingent on integration from others for electrical power or water supply. Recognize

that the facility may be called on to give a service associated with interdependencies with another

company before you can receive a service from them. When developing recovery and recommissioning

plans, consider the interdependencies identified and address in the interdependency section of the

NHERP. Communicate what services you need and explain how those services will enable your facility to

provide services to others. Follow through on your “promises” by providing services to others as outlined

in the NHERP.

Approach emergency response and governmental agencies for help in recovery. They may be able to

provide expedited routes for repair materials, some security assistance, technical expertise, and

establish communication mechanisms.

Improving the NHERP, recovery and recommissioning will come from documenting and sharing what

went well, what didn’t go so well, what was unanticipated, and what could be improved. This should be

done as soon as possible after the natural disaster so that memories are fresh. If possible, involve site

partners, neighboring facilities, interdependent facilities, and the civic authorities who participated in

managing the disaster and/or response to participate in this process.

9 REFERENCES

ASCE 2014, Flood Resistant Design and Construction, ASCE/SEI 24-14, American Society of Civil Engineers.

ASCE 2016, Minimum Design Loads and Associated Criteria for Buildings and Other Structures, ASCE

/SEI 7-16, American Society of Civil Engineers

CCPS 1995, Guidelines for Safe Storage and Handling of Reactive Materials, Center for Chemical Process

Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, NY.

CCPS 1995, Guidelines for Technical Planning for On-Site Emergencies, Center for Chemical Process Safety

of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, NY.

CCPS 1998, Guidelines for Safe Warehousing of Chemicals, Center for Chemical Process Safety of the

American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, NY.

CCPS 1999, Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis, Center for Chemical Process


CCPS 2007, Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety, Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American

Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, NY.

CCPS 2007, Guidelines for Performing Effective Pre-Startup Safety Reviews, Center for Chemical Process


CCPS 2009, Guidelines for Developing Quantitative Safety Risk Criteria, Center for Chemical Process Safety

of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, NY.

CCPS 2018, Guidelines for Siting and Layout of Facilities, Center for Chemical Process Safety of the

American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, NY.




13

Cowley, Lessons Learned from Natural Disasters, OECD Workshop Natech Risk Management, May 23-25,

2012, Dresden, Germany.

CSB 2005, After Katrina: Precautions Needed During Oil and Chemical Facility Startup, Bulletin No. 2005-01-

S, Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, September.

CSB 2018, Organic Peroxide Decomposition, Release, and Fire at Arkema Crosby Following Hurricane Harvey

Flooding, Report Number 2017-08-I-TX, Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, May.

DHS, Department of Homeland Security, https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/government-emergency-

telecommunications-service-gets

FEMA 2014, Emergency Power Systems or Critical Facilities: A Best Practices Approach to Improving

Reliability, FEA P-1019, Federal Emergency Management Agency, September.

FEMA 2019a, Federal Emergency Management Agency, https://www.fema.gov/flood-zones

FEMA 2019b, Federal Emergency Management Agency, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-

data/14685042016723c52280b1b1d936e8d23e26f12816017/Flood_Hazard_Mapping_Updates_Over

view_Fact_Sheet.pdf

FM Global 2004, Flood Emergency Response Plan, https://www.fmglobal.com/~/media/Files/FMGlobal/Nat

Haz Toolkit/P0589.pdf

FM Global 2012, Property Loss Prevention Data Sheet 1-2 Earthquakes, FM Global, Hartford,

Connecticut.

FM Global 2010, Property Loss Prevention Data Sheet 1-11 Fire Following Earthquake, FM Global,

Hartford, Connecticut.

FM Global 2010a, Property Loss Prevention Data Sheet 1-29 Roof Deck Securement and Above-Deck

Roof Components, FM Global, Hartford, Connecticut.

FM Global 2019, Property Loss Prevention Data Sheet 1-34 Hail Damage, FM Global, Hartford,

Connecticut.

FM Global 2019a, Property Loss Prevention Data Sheet FM 1-40 Flood, FM Global, Hartford,

Connecticut.

MW 2019, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/monograph

NHC 2019a, National Hurricane Center, https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/surge/ (NHC 2019a)

NOAA 2019a, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,

https://noaa.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=d9ed7904dbec441a9c4dd7b2779

35fad&entry=1

NOAA 2019b, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,

https://www.noaa.gov/explainers/severe-storms

NOAA 2019c, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,

https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/hurricane.html

NOAA 2019d, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,

https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshws.php

NOAA 2019e, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,

https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/stormsurge-stormtide.html

NOAA 2019f, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,

https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutgloss.shtml

NOAA 2019g, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,

https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/tsunami.html

NPRA 2006, White Paper: Hurricane Security Operations, National Petrochemical & Refiners Association,

NPRA, May.

NRCS 2019 https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/wi/about/?cid=nrcs142p2_020752

https://noaa.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=d9ed7904dbec441a9c4dd7b277935fad&entry=1

https://noaa.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=d9ed7904dbec441a9c4dd7b277935fad&entry=1




14

OSHA, Hurricane eMatrix—Hazard Exposure and Risk Assessment Matrix for Hurricane Response & Recovery

Work, US. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration,

http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/hurricane/index.html

SPC 2019, https://www.spc.noaa.gov/faq/tornado/ef-scale.html

UKEA 2015, Preparing for Flooding – A guide for sites regulated under EPR and COMAH, United Kingdom

Environment Agency, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/preparing-for-flooding-a-guide-

for-regulated-sites

USGS 2018, U.S. Geological Survey, https://www.usgs.gov/news/post-harvey-report-provides-

inundation-maps-and-flood-details-largest-rainfall-event-recorded

USGS 2019, U.S. Geological Survey,

https://www.usgs.gov/special-topic/water-science-school/science/100-year-flood?qt-

science_center_objects=0#qt-science_center_objects

USGS 2019b, U.S. Geological Survey, https://earthquake.usgs.gov/learn/topics/mercalli.php

USGS 2019c, U.S. Geological Survey, https://earthquake.usgs.gov/learn/glossary/?term=Richter%20scale

Weather 2019, National Weather Service

https://w1.weather.gov/glossary/index.php?word=beaufort+scale

Weather 2019a, National Weather Service https://www.weather.gov/mfl/beaufort




15

APPENDIX A: EXAMPLE SITE SCREENING FOR NATURAL HAZARDS

Site Screening for Natural Hazards

Natural Hazard Applicable

to Site

References/Sources Actions

Yes No

Meteorological

Flood/Storm Surge Complete Flood Hazard

Table

Hurricane/Tropical

Cyclone

Complete Flood Hazard

and Wind Hazard Tables

Extreme Temperature

Snow/Ice Storm Determine snow load

design for building

Hail Storm

Wildfire

Tornado Complete Wind Hazard

Table

Straight-line Winds Complete Wind Hazard

Table

Drought

Geological

Earthquake

Landslide

Tsunami

Volcanic Eruption

Dam Rupture

Review Conducted By:

Date:




16

APPENDIX A: EXAMPLE SITE SCREENING FOR NATURAL HAZARDS, continued

Flood Hazard Table

Critical

Equipment /

Building

Impacted

Estimated

500-year

Flood

Level

(m)(ft)

Estimated

100-year

Flood Level

(m)(ft)

Elevation

(m)(ft)

Elevation Gap:

500yr/100yr

(m)(ft)

Safeguards Action: (one or

more)

Close Gap

Assess Risk

Emergency

Response

Wind Hazard Table

Critical

Equipment

/ Building

Impacted

Wind

design

required

per code

(kph)(mph)

Existing

Wind

design

basis

(kph)(mph)

Wind

Design Gap:

(kph)(mph)

Safeguards Action: (one or more)

Close Gap

Assess Risk

Emergency Response

Earthquake Hazard Table

Critical

Equipment

/ Building

Impacted

Seismic

design

required per

code

Existing

Seismic

design

basis

Seismic

Design

Gap:

Safeguards Action: (one or more)

Close Gap

Assess Risk

Emergency Response

Other Hazard Table

Building

Name

Snow Load

design

required per

code

Storm

Surge

design

basis

Extreme

Temperature

design basis

Other

design

basis:

Action: (one or more)

Close Gap

Assess Risk

Emergency Response




17

APPENDIX B: EXAMPLE CONTENTS OF A NATURAL HAZARD EMERGENCY RESONSE PLAN

This is an example. A facility should use this example in developing a plan specific to their needs.

1. Emergency Command Center(s). The emergency command center coordinates all activities and

serve as communication hubs.

It is advisable to create an offsite Emergency Command Center remote from the disaster’s effects.

Its function is to coordinate all emergency response, recovery and restart type activities, arrange

for assistance and repairs, and respond to needs of the manufacturing facility or employees therein.

It is critical to plan and drill the set-up and operation of this offsite Emergency Command Center in

advance of any natural hazard emergency.

The onsite Emergency Command Center, if it is appropriate to create one, should be staffed by a

small crew with specialized expertise and specific assignments. Their function is to monitor the

effects of the disaster on the facility and resultant effects on the surroundings so that appropriate

and timely actions can be taken to minimize risks, on and offsite impacts, keep the facility in a safe

state, and return the facility to service as soon as is practical and safe to do so. For the onsite staff

to determine the effects of the disaster on the facility they will need to monitor and observe the

facility throughout the disaster. This may entail installing instrumentation specific to the natural

hazard expected (e.g. wind speed and direction, water level). This onsite Emergency Command

Center should be located in a safe location with respect to the potential natural hazards. If there is

not such a location readily available, then consider building such a location in advance of any natural

hazard event. For example, if the hazard is flooding, it should either be located outside of flood

potential areas or it should be elevated sufficiently and adequately provided for the occupants’ safety

if they are inundated (e.g. boats to access the building, food, hygiene provisions). Also, special

provision may be required so that the occupants can see out of the Emergency Command center

since normal doors and windows may be inaccessible or blocked. Because of its purpose, the

command center may be relatively air tight if not properly ventilated. Special safety precautions

should be taken to ensure that the atmosphere is not contaminated by equipment and/or depleted.

Consider installing several battery-operated oxygen sensors with low oxygen alarms and organic

vapor (LEL) analyzers.

2. Authority and responsibilities. The decision should be made, and it should be clearly documented

in the NHERP, as to who has the authority to activate the plan, redirect resources, shut down

operations and make other key decisions. Responsibilities for each of the activities in the NHERP

should be assigned to specific individuals/roles and clearly stated in the NHERP (e.g. testing of

equipment, charging of backup batteries, acquiring supplies). Appendix C provides a simplified

example of a document listing authority and responsibilities for specific natural hazard response

activities and decisions.

3. Understand hazards. The NHERP should include the information compiled as described in sections

3, 4, 5, and 6 above so that it is clear what the hazards are, what the specific impact may be on the

overall site and specific important equipment and operations on the site. Whereas it might not be

appropriate to design equipment to withstand all conceivable situations (e.g. Hurricane Harvey’s 1.52-

meter (60-inch) rainfall totals (USGS), the NHERP should address all conceivable situations. This

should include recognizing that one natural hazard mitigation measure may fail or there may be

common cause failures that may disable a number of systems and mitigation measures

simultaneously.




18

APPENDIX B: EXAMPLE CONTENTS OF A NATURAL HAZARD EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN,

continued

4. Warning systems. Systems to be used to identify impending natural hazards (e.g. weather

predictions, flood warnings) should be identified. The NHERP should include station numbers, radio

frequencies, website addresses and other location information. It should also address the provisions

for if these systems are lost in the course of a natural disaster, which is often the case.

5. Activation prompts. The NHERP may address activities from protecting equipment to evacuating

the site as a natural disaster escalates. It is important to determine the prompts (e.g. rainfall amount,

river levels, flood warnings) which will be used to initiate predefined actions (e.g. shutting down

operations, isolating equipment, or evacuating personnel) and document this in the NHERP. For

example, flood defenses may be put in place at the onset of a flood warning, sensitive equipment

isolated at a given water level, and the site evacuated at a higher water level. It is also important to

recognize the time needed for personnel to perform the activities and take that into account in

determining the prompts. It may be helpful to define prompts based on T-minus times, e.g. for a

storm in the Gulf, 72 hours to landfall, 48 hours to landfall, etc.

6. Staffing assignments. The NHERP should document if there is to be a “ride-out crew” that will remain

on-site during a natural disaster or if the entire facility should be evacuated. There should be a valid

reason, such as significant risk management, for keeping people on-site. If the facility is to be staffed,

by whom should it be staffed and what are the activities they are to perform and when? Identify staff

based on the skills needed. For example, is an operator needed or is a board operator for a specific

unit that is certified with controls required? Request volunteers with the needed skills; don’t assign

an unwilling person. Recognize that this team of volunteers may have a different order of command

and authority than during normal times. Choose volunteers who understand that potential change

and can live with it, working together in isolation for several days. Clearly define staff roles prior to,

during, and after the natural disaster. Analyze each task you expect them to perform and establish

appropriate safety and health procedures they should follow.

If the decision is to staff the facility during the natural disaster, primary staff and alternates should

be named, trained, and educated as to their assignments, performance expectations, and reporting

scheme. Particular attention may be required for the families of those who will staff the facility during

this time. For this staff to perform as needed, it is important that they know that their families are

safe. Plans must be in place to assure that their families are protected and/or evacuated. And that

the company keeps the families up to date on the safety of the ride out crew.

7. Evacuation plans. The NHERP should address removing non-required staff and other personnel

before the disaster with consideration given to allowing time for these staff to make personal

preparations. Emergency evacuation (should the need arise) of those remaining in the facility during

or shortly after the disaster may be dependent on local emergency response providers in which case

the potential for and method of rescue should be discussed with the local, regional, and national

emergency response agencies when developing the NHERP. Consider the need for and availability of

vehicles with high road clearance to transport personnel in and out if the roads start flooding but the

winds aren’t too high.




19


continued

8. Interdependency. Interdependency is the relationship of how your facility depends on and

influences other things around it and how those things depend on and influence your facility.

Interdependencies should be communicated to any and all agencies and/or organizations that might

benefit from that knowledge. A plan for the effective use of interdependencies to facilitate disaster

recovery should be developed, shared with, and agreed upon by all affected parties.

Electrical power is an interdependency example. A manufacturing facility may have a cogeneration

facility onsite capable of supplying the power needed to operate the facility. The local commercial

power generating company serves as the backup. The manufacturing facility is dependent on the

local commercial power generating company for power when its cogeneration system goes down. It

also needs power from them to start up the cogeneration system; and, it needs them to take any

excess power generated. The local commercial power generating company in turn operate a certain

number of generators because they are expecting the manufacturing facility to normally consume a

minimal amount of power or even supply some power back into the grid. They are impacted by what

happens at the manufacturing facility and vice versa. In other words, they are interdependent.

The NHERP should include all interdependencies that a facility has. Particular attention should be

given to those interdependencies that would play a major role during or after an emergency. Make

sure that those who will be making disaster recovery decisions, particularly the regional and national

agencies, know about and understand the interdependencies in your area. See Appendix E for an

example list of interdependencies.

9. Utility services. Identify critical utilities for the safe operation and/or shut down of the facility. This

may include means of operating safety critical equipment and means to safely relocate personnel and

protect sensitive equipment, chemicals or operations. Ensure that electricity (including on-site

transformers and substations), gas, steam, heating, cooling, and water supply systems can withstand

the natural disaster or can be safely isolated or switched off before flooding. As the loss of utilities may

be for an extended period, consider the installation of backup systems for critical equipment.

Electrical power supply is likely to be interrupted. Consider interdependencies as this may apply to

inbound electrical services and outbound services cogeneration excess electricity. Do not assume

that it is lower risk to discontinue all services. Determine what items in the facility must have

electrical power to meet the functions described in your NHERP. If the facility is shut down there will

be a significant reduction in electrical power needs. Delineate what will need emergency power back

up and determine how the onsite emergency electrical supply system should be configured. It may

be appropriate to have a few large generators, or several smaller generators may be the best option.

Either way, consider holding in reserve a few small generators that use little fuel for servicing critical

systems such as your communication systems, ventilations systems, battery chargers, and alarms,

in case a primary generator fails. They may be needed if fuel supplies are almost exhausted and/or

if large generators fail. Be sure that these smaller generators can easily “plug in” to the critical

electrical circuits.




20


continued

10. Communication systems and protocols. Communications before, during, and after an emergency

or disaster are essential. Planning your communication strategy is a key ingredient in ensuring its

reliability and effectiveness. An Emergency Response Coordination Center should be established as

the communication center for managing the natural disaster response. To function effectively, it must

have the ability to gather and disseminate information. This facility or system should be located so

that it is not directly impacted by the disaster itself. It should be able to communicate in all available

modes—land line telephone, Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS), cell

phones, satellite telephones, e-mails, CB radios, etc. Since it will function as the hub of most

communications, it should have an up to date list of contacts, telephone numbers and e-mails.

All communications modes should be tested including these communication protocols in table top

exercises and drills. This also gives the agencies the opportunity to understand the NHERP plan.

Conventional communication equipment (e.g. land lines, cell phones) may not work during a natural

disaster. Have a plan should communications fail. Consider backup systems such as the following.

The United States Government Emergency Telecommunications Service supports federal, state,

local, and tribal government, industry, and non- governmental organization personnel in

performing their National Security and Emergency Preparedness missions. GETS provides

emergency access and priority processing in the local and long-distance segments of the Public

Switched Telephone Network when regular telephone service is congested. (DHS)

A NOAA Weather radio, with a battery backup can provide warning tones and information in

emergency command centers.

Increase the chance of connecting with a cell telephone service by subscribing to several

different providers.

Purchase or rent satellite telephones and a base station. Satellite phones are more complicated

to operate than cell phones so train several people in their use. They also require a relatively

unobstructed path to the satellite. Plan on using them outdoors or connected to a remote

antenna.

Internet communication systems: Computer, cell phones, and smart devices may continue to

work if the wireless service and the site equipment is not compromised. Having an “emergency

use computer” not routed through your company’s firewall and spam filters, which may hinder

or completely block use during an emergency, may be an option.

Citizen Band (CB) Radios: CB’s, or shortwave radio, have long been recognized and used as

emergency use communication devices. Have a CB base station and an appropriate number of

portable units in the emergency command center. CB operators must be licensed and may need

training on the equipment. There may be licensed CB operators already working at the facility

who would volunteer to staff the equipment in an emergency.

Two Way Radios: These will generally allow you to communicate with staff at the plant during the

emergency although they may not reach outside the facility. Make sure that your emergency

command center has the ability to use it (perhaps add a second base station in the command

post) and that extra radios are available. Keep a stock of charged batteries available and put the

battery chargers on your emergency power supply.

https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/government-emergency-telecommunications-service-gets

https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/government-emergency-telecommunications-service-gets




21


continued

Communication protocols are just as important as communication systems.

It is important that regional and national Emergency Service Providers be able to communicate

with the facility Emergency Response Center and the facility being impacted by the natural

disaster (if it is staffed). To facilitate this, establish and agree on communication protocols with

each agency and exchange lists of telephone numbers and people to call. Agree on who calls

whom and when. Call prompts might be agreed upon periodic (every hour, for instance) updates

or when there are significant changes in risks or circumstances.

Your neighbors will be interested in the facility’s status and it may be important to contact them,

for example, to evacuate or to shelter in place. Plan in advance when and how to make these

communications and develop a back-up plan if normal communication systems are disabled.

Employees may be displaced by the disaster. Establish a way for them to contact the Emergency

Response Coordination Center and for the Center to contact them. An option is to establish a

toll-free line to enable personnel to hear messages, leave messages or speak to someone about

their status. Another option is creation of an internet address that can send and receive emails.

Ensure personnel are aware of and know how to use the system.

Communication refresher training and education effort should be prompted in advance of the

natural disaster. Employees and their families should be given up to date information so that

they can take care of themselves and help take care of the facility. It is important that the families

of employees who will remain onsite to help are safe and that the employee knows it.

o Ensure that employees understand that taking care of their families is a first priority

and offer assistance if needed. Tell the employees who will remain onsite the contact

numbers and methods that are expected to be available for contacting their families

and for their families to contact them. Remind each employee of the part they are to

play in securing the plant site for the natural disaster and conduct overview/refresher

training sessions. If special equipment, such as satellite phones, is to be used, conduct

refresher training on where it is, how to access it, and how it is to be used.

o Ensure that families are informed. Send disaster preparedness pamphlets to each

employee’s home informing them on how to properly prepare their home for the

disaster, gather supplies and plan their evacuation mode and route should they choose

to leave the area. Pamphlets are available from the U.S. Department of Homeland

Security, FEMA, and other agencies. These publicly available pamphlets should be

supplemented with site specific information such as local emergency agencies and

contact information. Communicate with families that have special need to ensure their

safety. Include Emergency Response Coordination Center contact information so that

employees offsite can let the company know where they are and find out what you

want them to do. Also include information for families who will have a family member

remaining at the site to contact the company for information about the site and their

family member.




22


continued

11. Protection of business-critical equipment and data. The NHERP should address the protection of

this data. Data protection falls in to two broad categories—onsite or offsite. Onsite data protection

requires the recognition of the difference between volatile data and fixed data. Volatile data

requires continuous power if it is to be retained whereas fixed data does not (e.g. data saved to a

hard drive). In a distributive computer control system (DCS), some of the data may be volatile and

should be protected via emergency power supply—even when the system is not functionally controlling

the facility. Each facility should analyze where their critical data resides, what type of memory contains

it and then establish secure systems to protect that data during all type of service interruptions. Make

copies of and securing Distributive Control Systems (DCS) and other critical computer systems

configuration data just in case memory and all power, including emergency and battery power, fails.

Some data may already reside offsite having been transferred via the internet, the cloud or other

physical or electronic transfer modes. This data may inherently be protected from local natural disasters

simply because of its remoteness and redundancy. Other onsite data can be collected and sent offsite

to secure locations via those same routes or simply by making electronic copies and sending via a variety

of modes. Plan what data needs to be monitored during the natural disaster and how that data is to be

preserved, accessed, or transferred. Develop a protection scheme, and then put that scheme into action

prior to the onset of the natural disaster. Also consider data stored in physical or paper form and its

storage location to prevent potential damage or loss.

Key data that could be needed during or after the emergency includes RMP plan, dispersion models,

electrical drawings, P&IDs, inventory levels, etc. The NHERP should consider providing any hard copies

at the emergency command center so that they can be accessed by the ride out crew. Ideally the data

should be digitalized so that it can be accessed by experts offsite for support or in the event that the site

has to be evacuated.

12. Inventory. A key activity in emergency response is the handling of flammable and toxic inventories.

The decision process should consider the risks associated with leaving the inventories (feed stocks/raw

materials, in-process materials, and finished goods) at normal levels verses decreasing them.

For example, a tank containing a flammable liquid could suffer a loss of containment and pollute

waterways. Removing the inventory from the tank and leaving the empty tank could result in the tank

floating away or suffering wind damage. Inventories can be managed (typically at a height equal to the

dike wall) such that the tank will not float in flood waters. Another option may be to fill the tank with

water (where the chemical is compatible with water) to prevent float off. In this case, preparing the

chemicals in the tank (with latent water) for use after the natural disaster should be considered. An

inventory plan should be made for each vessel of concern. It may be possible to move some inventories

off site. This may require appropriately license drivers and identification of an appropriate temporary

site. These plans should be enacted during the early stages of preparing for the disaster, for example,

before a hurricane makes landfall.

Also consider the inventory stored offsite at tollers warehouses, and terminals and how to protect that

inventory.




23


continued

13. Access and security. It is important to ensure the site (including onsite and offsite employees and

non-employees, facilities, chemicals, equipment, etc.) are properly protected from intruders (e.g.

unwanted visitors, observers, the media) while being accessible to key employees and other specialists

before and after the disaster. Contact local, regional, and national authorities to understand who may

need access to the site during a natural disaster, who will be controlling access to the impacted areas,

what roads will be used for emergency travel, and what credentials will be needed to travel those roads.

Make sure that the right people have the right credentials by having the issuing authorities validate

them. Employees remaining at the site should be aware of who may be coming into the site during or

after the natural disaster as they may be called to provide access.

Area access may be restricted before the disaster hits. Develop a plan for emergency access credentials

for employees who will be coming in to staff the plant during the emergency. Do not count on

employees being able to get in just because the disaster had not yet occurred. Local emergency officials

may have already closed roads to all travelers without appropriate credentials.

Determine if special passes are required for ride-out crews (or first returning recovery crews) to be

allowed past checkpoints or road blocks implemented by local authorities. Ensure this is part of

engagement with community authorities.

Include the use of emergency access and credentials in drills to train your employees to bring them

and to “condition” authorities to expect requests for entry using these documents.

The media has the right to document and report on the news. They do not have the right to come onto

private or company property without permission or to endanger others and/or the safety and security

of your facility or the chemicals onsite. If they request access before this, explain that safety checks are

not yet complete and, therefore, no visitors are allowed in yet. Also tell them that access to the site can

be granted only by senior management located in the offsite command center. If already on the

property, escort them off the property being polite but firm. Again, explain and emphasize that safety

checks are not yet complete and, therefore, no visitors are allowed in yet. As it is likely that these

interactions will be recorded, it is best if staff trained in media relations handle these interactions. It

may be appropriate to train the ride out crew leaders in media relations.

If looters and scavengers enter the site, ask them to leave. Have the Emergency Response Command

Center notify law enforcement. If safe to do so, take their picture for law enforcement follow-up, but

do not try to apprehend them yourself. Personnel safety may be jeopardized by apprehending them

without proper training and experience.

14. Safety. Safety of personnel is vital. Require all onsite personnel to have first aid training. The

importance of safety during the event should be emphasized as seemingly heroic actions can lead to

unnecessary risks and injuries.




24


continued

It may be appropriate to modify or create new safety procedures for during and immediately after the

natural disaster. This is not a lessening of safety, but rather an adaptation to the special circumstances.

Recognize that there will be pressure to quickly approve MOCs necessitated by plant damage, unusual

equipment configuration, and/or the rush to return to normalcy. Changes must be reviewed

thoroughly and with special attention to hidden consequences. PSSRs must be done with critical

diligence since there may be many potential anomalies and hidden hazards. Make arrangements for

potentially not having the usual personnel available for checking and authorizing certain safety

procedures, such as MOCs or lock outs. To manage this risk, ensure that those who will be involved in

authorizing safety permits have the proper training and experience to do so and that they fully

understand their role and responsibilities. Use the management of change procedure to uncover any

unrecognized unwanted consequences of modified safety procedures.

15. Supplies and logistics. Having materials located where they are safe but can be accessed quickly is a

key component of planning that minimizes ongoing damage and facilitates recovery faster after a

disaster. The two broad groups to be considered are 1) disaster and recovery: assistance, materials and

supplies, and 2) manufacturing materials: raw materials and products. Identify what supplies will be

needed, where they will be stored and how they will be accessed. This includes supplies for operations

and personnel on-site. As power and internet may be down, use of credit and debit cards may be

challenging. Remember to have cash available. Make arrangements with the local, regional, and

national agencies that will control access to the disaster area so that your people and materials will be

allowed into the impacted area when needed. An example list of supplies is provided in Appendix E.

Disaster and Recovery: People with specialized skills and expertise may be needed during or

immediately after an emergency to minimize safety hazards and address onsite or offsite damage.

Identify these experts in advance, advise them of the potential need, and include their contact

information in the NHERP for use by the Emergency Response Coordination Center.

Materials and supplies (such as food, water, clothing, shelter, first aid, repair materials, extra

communication equipment, etc.) should be staged and stored in a secure area. Materials for use

during the event should be accessible to those needing it. Materials for use in the recover should

be stored in a location not expected to be impacted by the disaster, but readily available to replenish

exhausted or damaged onsite supplies. Have a delivery system predesigned and ready to respond

as the need arises and flexible enough to gather additional items if not already stocked.

Manufacturing Materials: The section on inventory addressed storage of feed stocks and finished

products onsite or offsite. Using this information, develop a staging plan, if one is needed, for

feed stocks/raw materials and finished goods. Check with suppliers to confirm that they can

delay/hold/store materials at their unimpacted sites. Make informed risk-based decisions

regarding offsite storage/staging of materials. Make arrangements well in advance of any need

(e.g. at the beginning of the hurricane season) with suppliers, customers, and owner/operators of

potential storage locations for use prior, during and after a natural disaster. Consider the ability

to transport product through via roads, docks, and pipelines where damage may have occurred

to the infrastructure.




25


continued

16. Equipment checks. Equipment should be checked to make sure it is in good working order. Checks

may include refreshing battery packs and testing equipment that is not in routine use. Checks could be

scheduled, for example, two weeks before the beginning of the monsoon season in south Asia, one

month before the official start of the hurricane season in the US Gulf coast and Atlantic coast, and two

times a year for earthquake prone regions.

17. NHERP maintenance, quality assessment, and quality control. The NHERP should be kept up to

date, accurate, and appropriate for the types of natural hazards identified. This includes periodic

review, training, drills and after-action critiques plus “Lessons Learned” from others. It is critical that the

drills are conducted on a routine basis on a frequency and schedule appropriate for the facility. When

conducted seriously they act as refresher – both for personnel and equipment. New additions to the

team will witness the full details first hand and past participants will be able to refresh their roles and

also be able to identify areas of improvements. Make your drills as realistic and comprehensive as

possible. Ensure that everyone has the opportunity to ask questions relative to their roles and expected

actions. Of particular importance to validate/test during the drill are communications effectiveness,

whether the participants knew when and what actions to take, were actions taken safety, and was

access and security managed to plan. If it is impossible or impractical to conduct a full involvement drill,

start to finish, consider conducting staged or topic drills. For instance, focus the drill on the period of

time before, during, or after the natural disaster or focus the drill on communications or access and

security. Drills are good training and usually generate improvement suggestions. It is important to

involve resources external to the site in the drills. Update the NHERP as needed. Redistribute the

updated plan and conduct training if needed per updated plan.




26

APPENDIX C: EXAMPLE LIST OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIILITIES FOR NATURAL HAZARD

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

This is an example. Each site should develop their own list specific for their hazards, organization and

needs. For many rainfall and tropical cyclone events, there may be knowledge of the impending event

days in advance. The “when” column below envisions these instances. In some cases, however, the storm

system develops quickly, and it may be necessary to compress this timeline into fewer days, even hours.

Action/Decision Made By Whe

n

Tasks

Activate the Natural

Hazards Emergency

Response Plan

Plant

Manager

First

warning

of event

As described in the plan

Accommodations

for response and

recovery staff

Human

Resources

First

warning

of event

Secure accommodations

Supplies and

logistics

Purchasing First

warning

of

even

t

Formal alert notification to suppliers and

customers to gather/store response and recovery

supplies

Manage facility

chemical storage

inventories

Production

Manager

1 week

before

event

Initiate storage tank de-inventory plan

Close watertight doors and windows

Relocate sensitive chemicals to higher ground or

temporary storage location

Manage facility

tankage inventory

Production

Manager

1 week

before

event

Survey all empty tankage and add tie-down

security if needed

Decide to leave empty or fill with water / other

liquids

Manage

interdependencies

Production

Manager

1 week

before

event

Notify agencies and interdependent

companies

Review interdependencies with each and protocol

for activation

Increase storm

water capacity

Tankage/

Utility Area

Managers

1 week

before

event

Align drainage systems, empty retention ponds.

Verify drainage systems are free of dirt and

vegetation.

Cogeneration shut

down

Plant

Manager

3 days

before

event

Notify commercial utility company

Initiate cogeneration total shutdown

Activate and staff

Emergency

Response

Command Center(s)

Plant

Manager

3 days

before

event

Initiate Natural Hazard Emergency Response Plan

Notify personnel

Shut down process

facility

Plant

Manager

3 days

before

event

Initiate total shutdown

Notify personnel

Defer shipment of raw materials

Electrical power Utilities

Manager

1 day

before

event

Shut down and isolate potentially exposed

electrical equipment




27

APPENDIX D: EXAMPLE ACTIVITY LIST FOR BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE NATURAL HAZARD

EVENT

1. Shortly before the natural hazard event

Prepare the facility and ensure it is as ready as possible for the natural hazard expected. Potential

activities include the following.

Inspect the Emergency Command Center and ensure all equipment is working and that there is

proper ventilation and access/egress.

Check supplies, including food and water for the ride-out crew, and confirm that they are

accessible. Address any shortfalls quickly. See Appendix E for suggested supply lists.

Conduct last minute tests of backup systems.

Secure the facility. Look for anything that will impose a hazard in high winds or rising water.

Review housekeeping. Identify items that might become missiles in high winds and remove,

store them, or tie them down. Look for any chemicals stored in drums or buckets and store

them in a secure location to prevent spillage. Remove unnecessary vehicles from roads, empty

truck beds of loose items, pick up loose tools, materials, signs, etc.

Enact the inventory plans.

Test and confirm adequacy of all modes of communication. Confirm two-way radios, cell

phones and satellite phones work, are charged, and charged backup batteries are available.

Bring storm equipment onsite, including boats or other means to move materials.

Stage flood equipment, such as pumps, hoses, and sandbags.

Fill fuel tanks for backup generators.

Dismiss non-required personnel leaving only those employees designated to remain onsite

during the event. Activate the access and security controls.

Review storm scenarios and actions with members of the ride-out crew.

Reduce the level in waste water treatment equipment in preparation for the heavy rain.

Fill waste disposal containers (e.g. dumpster, skip) with water to prevent them from floating or

remove them to an offsite location.

Dismantle and remove any tents.

Anchor temporary buildings, container boxes (conex), etc.

2. During the natural hazard event

During the natural hazard event, the NHERP should be used to direct activities. Main activities during

this time period include the following.

Ensure personnel safety and monitor personnel location at all times.

Monitor and record the disaster’s effect on the facility. Observe and understand what damage is

being done, the effect on the facility safety and security, and any potential offsite impacts.

Abate damages, spills, releases and unsafe and/or environmentally damaging conditions if able

to do so without endangering personnel

Periodically communicate conditions to the offsite Emergency Response Command Center

along with requests for assistance, if needed, advance notice of repairs and repair personnel

needed after the disaster, and potential offsite damages due to debris and/or loss of

containment of chemicals.

Notify the offsite Emergency Command Center of any damages affecting security systems so

they can make plans for repairs as soon as circumstances allow this to be done safely. If

complete repairs are not possible in the short term, consider temporary repairs and/or

alternate arrangements.




28

APPENDIX D: EXAMPLE ACTIVITY LIST FOR BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE NATURAL HAZARD

EVENT, continued

3. After the natural hazard event

Immediately after the disaster there will be a strong desire to get outside to assess the damages.

Resist that urge until it is assured that the danger has passed, and it is safe to venture outside of the

Emergency Response Command Center. Use the appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE)

(e.g. dielectric boots, rubber gloves) when venturing outside until monitoring proves it is safe.

Communicate personnel status to the offsite Emergency Response Command Center and let them

know that you are going outside. Consider sending a small team out first to validate that the site is

safe. Then follow up with more people in small groups, keeping the groups separate from each other

so that each can function as a rescue team for the other. Always keep at least one person in the

Emergency Response Command Center. All teams should carry portable communication equipment

and stay in touch with the other teams and the Emergency Response Command Center. Survey the

site for the following potential hazards.

Chemical releases. Care should be taken because some caustic chemicals and some acids look

like water. Some float on top of the water and some are heavier than water so the water floats

on them.

Damage to electrical equipment. Beware of electrocution hazards, especially when the power is

on and flood waters are present. If the electrical power is off, electrical hazards may not be

apparent until the power is turned back on. If the power to the site was lost, isolate the main

circuit breakers to enable power to be restored in a controlled manner. Resurvey for electrical

hazards after the power has been restored.

Physical damage. These are often observable, but some can be hidden. Take special care when

walking under equipment or structures as they may be damaged or have debris on them that

could fall off. Be aware of sharp and jagged edges, broken glass, tripping and slipping hazards.

Categorize damages by those that can be addressed with resources currently onsite and those

that will require additional resources. Drones may be helpful in surveying damage and will

require a pilot to be available for their operation. Communicate needs to the offsite Emergency

Command Center so that they can send people and equipment to the site with appropriate

expertise. If possible, take pictures to document the damages as they are before remediation.

Do not make repairs and/or modifications without analyzing the consequences of actions and

inactions using the MOC process.

Wildlife. As they try to escape from the hazard, they may find refuge in the facility. Depending

on where the facility location, this may include insects, fire ants, raccoons, snakes, and

alligators. Specialist assistance may be to rescue some wildlife safely.

Releases to air and water. Monitor the air and water and collect samples for environmental

reference. Report any losses to authorities as required.

Site security issues. Any issues caused by media attempting to gain access. Uninvited visitors

including scavengers, looters, curious citizens, terrorists, opportunists, or people who are lost or

injured.

Fence damage. Since a fence around the facility is a basic form of security, have it repaired as

soon as possible.

Deceased. On a somber note, locate any human and animal bodies and enact plans to remove

them as soon as possible. Be cautious as corpses may be laden with pollutants, insects, disease,

and animals.




29

APPENDIX E: EXAMPLE LIST OF INTERDEPENDECIES

This is an example list of interdependencies. Each facility should develop its own list specific for the

facility.

Interdependency With Whom Contact /

Phone No.

Notes

Electric power Local Commercial Power

Supply

Need electrical power from

local supplier to start

cogeneration unit running. After

startup, facility can supply

electrical power back in to

public grid.

Steam and Fuel Local Gas Company If facility steam boilers and

facility cogeneration plant are

running, facility can supply

steam to ABC who, in turn, can

supplement facility fuel supply

by sending facility the off-gas

from their steam heaters.

Nitrogen Local Inert Gas Supplier Needed for purging prior to

recommissioning of equipment

Communications Local Telecoms Company Facility supplies power to local

telecoms company and they

operate facility

communications systems

and tower for us. Firefighting

emergency

response and

mutual aid

Local Fire Department Local Fire Emergency

Response Company

supplies mobile

firefighting equipment

and personnel. Facility

supplies the fire truck

and personnel.

Waste water

treatment

Next door Operating Plant

and Municipal Sewage

Treatment Plant

Site receives waste water from

Next Door Operating Plant.

Facility in turn, send facility’s

discharge to the Municipal

Sewage Treatment Plant.




30

APPENDIX F: EXAMPLE LIST OF SUPPLIES

This is an example list of supplies for those remaining onsite. It does not include quantities. Each facility

should develop its own list and quantities specific for the expected needs.

Medical and First Aid Supplies

Item Quantity Item Quantity

Prescription medication 2 weeks Antacids

Blood pressure kit Anti-diarrhea medication

Automatic External Defibrillator (AED) Anti-nausea medication

Glucometer for monitoring blood sugar Laxative

CPR breathing barrier Cold medicine

Burn blanket Cough medicine

EpiPen Toothache medication

Snake bite kit Aspirin

Scissors Non-aspirin pain relievers

Tweezers Antibiotics – topical & oral

Knife Antihistamine

Magnifying glass Antiseptic ointment

Small Mirror Insect bite ointment

Small flashlight Hydrogen peroxide

Needle Rubbing alcohol

Thermometer Iodine

Tongue depressors Petroleum jelly

Medical grade non-latex gloves Gauze

Cold pack Cotton pads

Adhesive tape Cotton swabs

Salve for wounds Bandages

Eye wash and eye wash cup Feminine hygiene supplies

Eye drops Contact lens supplies

Eye patches Mouthwash

Nail clippers Insect repellant

Nail file Suntan lotion

Safety pins Disinfectant soap

Hand sanitizer




31

APPENDIX F: EXAMPLE LIST OF SUGGESTED SUPPLIES – continued

Food Supplies

Item Quantity Item Quantity

Salt

Pepper Ice

Cooking oil Bottled sports drinks

Flour Fruit juices

Sugar Soft drinks

Eggs Coffee

Bread Tea

Rice Milk

Seasonings Milk that does not require refrigeration

Peanut butter High-energy bars

Jelly Crackers

Ramen Noodles Cookies

Canned soups Cereal

Canned vegetables Chips

Canned beans Nuts

Canned Chili Cooking utensils

Spaghetti sauce Multivitamins

Spaghetti/pasta Paper plates and plastic utensils

Hot dogs Plastic wrap

Hamburger meat Aluminum foil

Packaged sliced meats Zip lock type bags in varying sizes

Macaroni & Cheese kits Paper towels

Ready-to-eat canned meals,

meats, fruits, and vegetables

Pots and pans

Fresh fruit—Apples, oranges,

grapes, bananas, pears, etc.

Can opener—non-electric

Dried fruit—raisins, plums, prunes,

etc.

Bottled water - 2 gallons / person per

day

Canned fruit and sauces—

applesauce, etc.

Note: Keep in mind any dietary restrictions or food allergies of the onsite staff.




32


Clothing and Personal Effects:

Item Quantity Item Quantity Combs Men’s shirts

Toothbrushes Men’s jeans/slacks

Toothpaste Men’s underwear

Mouthwash Women’s shirts

Deodorant Women’s jeans/slacks

Disposable razors Women’s underwear

Shaving soap or cream Women’s sports bras

Tissues Tee shirts

Shampoo Socks

Soap Raincoats

Sanitizing soap Gloves

Lotion Dielectric gloves

Towels Boots

Washcloths Dielectric boots

Pre-moistened

towelettes

Sleeping bags

Toilet paper Pillow

Reading glasses, varying

strengths

Cots

Blankets

Sheets




33


Tools and Supplies:

Item Quantity Item Quantity Chain saw and fuel Fire extinguishers

Hand saw Flashlights

Mechanics box of tools Battery operated radio

Hammers and nails Battery operated fans

Heavy duty Staplers Batteries in all voltages

Plywood and nails for boarding up Two-way radio batteries

Tarps Cell phone batteries and chargers

Plastic sheets Candles

Rope Lanterns

Duct tape Brooms

Adhesive tape Mops & buckets

Lubricant (e.g. WD-40) Squeegee

Oil absorbents Rags

Tire repair materials Plastic garbage bags

Spare tires Large leaf bags

Electrical contact cleaner spray Burlap Bags

Insect killer—bees, wasps, etc. Thermos bottles

Lighters and matches Cash—coins and currency

Gasoline tanks in vehicles

topped off

Charcoal

Propane stoves Charcoal lighter fluid

Small propane tanks--full Water (for flushing toilet,

washing hands, etc)

Cooler filled with ice until needed




34

APPENDIX G: EXPLANATION OF TERMS

The Beaufort wind scale is a system used to estimate and report wind speeds when no measuring

apparatus is available. It was invented in the early 19th Century by Admiral Sir Francis Beaufort of the

British Navy as a way to interpret winds from conditions at sea. Since that time, the scale has been

modernized for effects on land. (Weather 2019)

Table G.1 Beaufort Wind Scale (adapted from Weather 2019a)

Force Speed Description Specifications for use at sea

kph (mph) knots Specifications for use on land

0 0-1.6

(0-1)

0-1 Calm Sea like a mirror.

Calm; smoke rises vertically.

1 1.6-4.8

(1-3)

1-3 Light Air Ripples with the appearance of scales are formed,

but without foam crests.

Direction of wind shown by smoke drift, but not by

wind vanes.

2 6.4-11.3

(4-7)

4-6 Light

Breeze

Small wavelets, still short, but more pronounced.

Crests have a glassy appearance and do not break.

Wind felt on face; leaves rustle; ordinary vanes

moved by wind.

3 12.9-19.3

(8-12)

7-10 Gentle

Breeze

Large wavelets. Crests begin to break. Foam of

glassy appearance. Perhaps scattered white

horses.

Leaves and small twigs in constant motion; wind

extends light flag.

4 20.9-29.0

(13-18)

11-16 Moderate

Breeze

Small waves, becoming larger; fairly frequent white

horses.

Raises dust and loose paper; small branches are

moved.

5 30.6-38.6

(19-24)

17-21 Fresh

Breeze

Moderate waves, taking a more pronounced long

form; many white horses are formed.

Small trees in leaf begin to sway; crested wavelets

form on inland waters.

6 40.2-49.9

(25-31)

22-27 Strong

Breeze

Large waves begin to form; the white foam crests

are more extensive everywhere.

Large branches in motion; whistling heard in

telegraph wires; umbrellas used with difficulty.

7 51.5-61.2

(32-38)

28-33 Near Gale Sea heaps up and white foam from breaking

waves begins to be blown in streaks along the

direction of the wind.

Whole trees in motion; inconvenience felt when

walking against the wind.

8 62.8-74.0

(39-46)

34-40 Gale Moderately high waves of greater length; edges of

crests begin to break into spindrift. The foam is

blown in well-marked streaks along the direction

of the wind.

Breaks twigs off trees; generally impedes progress.




35

Force Speed Description Specifications for use at sea

kph (mph) knots Specifications for use on land

9 75.6-86.9

(47-54)

41-47 Severe Gale High waves. Dense streaks of foam along the

direction of the wind. Crests of waves begin to

topple, tumble and roll over. Spray may affect

visibility

Slight structural damage occurs (chimney-pots and

slates removed)

10 88.5-101.4

(55-63)

48-55 Storm Very high waves with long overhanging crests. The

resulting foam, in great patches, is blown in dense

white streaks along the direction of the wind. On

the whole the surface of the sea takes on a white

appearance. The tumbling of the sea becomes

heavy and shock-like. Visibility affected.

Seldom experienced inland; trees uprooted;

considerable structural damage occurs.

11 103-115.9

(64-72)

56-63 Violent

Storm

Exceptionally high waves (small and medium-size

ships might be for a time lost to view behind the

waves). The sea is completely covered with long

white patches of foam lying along the direction of

the wind. Everywhere the edges of the wave crests

are blown into froth. Visibility affected.

Very rarely experienced; accompanied by wide-

spread damage.

12 115.9-133.6

(72-83)

64-71 Hurricane The air is filled with foam and spray. Sea

completely white with driving spray; visibility very

seriously affected.

see Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale

The Fujita Tornado Damage Scale categorizes a tornado based on estimated wind speed. It is no longer

used in the U.S. (SPC 2019)

Table G.2 Fujita Tornado Damage Scale (adapted from SPC 2019)

Scale Wind Estimate

kph(mph)

Typical Damage

F0 < 117.5 (73) Light damage. Some damage to chimneys; branches broken off

trees; shallow-rooted trees pushed over; sign boards damaged.

F1 117.5-180.2

(73-112)

Moderate damage. Peels surface off roofs; mobile homes pushed

off foundations or overturned; moving autos blown off roads.

F2 181.9-252.7

(113-157)

Considerable damage. Roofs torn off frame houses; mobile

homes demolished; boxcars overturned; large trees snapped or

uprooted; light-object missiles generated; cars lifted off ground.

F3 254.3-331.5

(158-206)

Severe damage. Roofs and some walls torn off well-constructed

houses; trains overturned; most trees in forest uprooted; heavy

cars lifted off the ground and thrown.




36

Scale Wind Estimate

kph(mph)

Typical Damage

F4 333.1-418.8

(207-260)

Devastating damage. Well-constructed houses leveled; structures

with weak foundations blown away some distance; cars thrown

and large missiles generated.

F5

420.0-511.8

((261-318)

Incredible damage. Strong frame houses leveled off foundations

and swept away; automobile-sized missiles fly through the air in

excess of 100 meters (109 yds); trees debarked; incredible

phenomena will occur.

An update to the original F-scale by a team of meteorologists and wind engineers, implemented in the

U.S. on 1 February 2007. The Enhanced F-scale still is a set of wind estimates (not measurements)

based on damage. Its uses three-second gusts estimated at the point of damage based on a judgment

of 8 levels of damage to the 28 indicators listed below. These estimates vary with height and

exposure. Important: The 3-second gust is not the same wind as in standard surface observations.

Standard measurements are taken by weather stations in open exposures, using a directly measured,

"one-minute mile" speed. (SPC 2019)

Table G.3 Enhanced Fujita Tornado Damage Scale (adapted from SPC 2019)

Fujita Scale Derived EF Scale Operational EF Scale

F

Number

Fastest

1/4-mile

kph (mph)

3 Second

Gust kph

(mph)

EF

Number

3 Second

Gust kph

(mph)

EF

Number

3 Second

Gust kph

(mph)

0 64-115

(40-72)

72-126

(45-78)

0 104-137

(65-85)

0 104-137

(65-85)

1 117-180

(73-112)

127-188

(79-117)

1 138-175

(86-109)

1 138-177

(86-110)

2 181-253

(113-157)

189-259

(118-161)

2 177-220

(110-137)

2 178-217

(111-135)

3 254-333

(158-207)

260-336

(162-209)

3 222-268

(138-167)

3 218-265

(136-165)

4 334-418

(208-260)

338-420

(210-261)

4 270-320

(168-199)

4 267-321

(166-200)

5 420-512

(261-318)

421-510

(262-317)

5 321-377

(200-234)

5 Over 321

(Over 200)

Severe Storms (NOAA 2019b)

Thunderstorms — rain storms with lightning — can be dangerous by themselves and can cause

destructive, deadly flooding. When they contain strong winds, hail and tornadoes they can turn violent.

NOAA classifies a storm as “severe” when it produces wind gusts of at least 93 kph (58 mph) and/or

hail one inch in diameter (about the size of a US coin quarter) or larger and/or a tornado.

Lightning is caused by the attraction between positive and negative charges in the atmosphere,

resulting in the buildup and discharge of electrical energy. This rapid heating and cooling of the air

produces the shock wave that results in thunder.




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Strong winds are often called “straight-line” winds to differentiate the damage they cause from

tornado damage. Most thunderstorm winds that cause damage at the ground are a result of outflow

generated by a thunderstorm downdraft.

Hail is a form of precipitation that occurs when updrafts in thunderstorms carry raindrops upward

into extremely cold areas of the atmosphere where they can freeze into balls of ice. Hailstones can

grow to several inches in diameter and may fall at speeds greater than 100 mph.

A tornado is a narrow, violently rotating column of air that extends from the base of a thunderstorm

to the ground. About 1,200 tornadoes occur in the U.S. annually. The most destructive and deadly

tornadoes come from rotating thunderstorms called supercells and can have winds estimated at more

than 200 mph.

Flooding is an overflowing of water onto land that is normally dry. Floods can happen during heavy

rains, when ocean waves come on shore, when snow melts too fast, or when dams or levees break. It

is a threat all over the United States and occurs nearly every day.

A 100-year storm refers to rainfall events that have a one percent probability of occurring at that location

in that year. Encountering a "100-year storm" on one day does not decrease the chance of a second

100-year storm occurring in that same year or any year to follow. In other words, there is a 1 in 100 or

1% chance that a storm will reach this intensity in any given year. Likewise, a 50-year rainfall event has

a 1 in 50 or 2% chance of occurring in a year. (NRCS 2019)

The term 100-year flood is used in an attempt to simplify the definition of a flood that statistically has

a 1-percent chance of occurring in any given year. The actual number of years between floods of any

given size can vary because the climate naturally varies over time. Large floods or rain events can

occur in successive or nearly successive years. It should be noted that not every 100-year rainfall event

leads to a 100-year flood. (NRCS 2019)

A 100-year storm does not always cause a 100-year flood. This relationship is influenced by the extent

of rainfall in the watershed, the soil saturation before the storm, and the size of the watershed and

stream basin. Consequently a 100-year flood may not, and a smaller storm may, cause a 100-year

flood. (USGS 2019)

FEMA identifies flood hazard areas on the Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM) as a Special Flood Hazard

Area (SFHA). SFHA are defined as the area that will be inundated by the flood event having a 1-percent

chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year. The 1-percent annual chance flood is also

referred to as the base flood or 100-year flood. Moderate flood hazard areas, labeled Zone B or Zone

X (shaded) are the areas between the limits of the base flood and the 0.2-percent-annual-chance (or

500-year) flood. The areas of minimal flood hazard, which are the areas outside the SFHA and higher

than the elevation of the 0.2-percent-annual-chance flood, are labeled Zone C or Zone X (unshaded).

(FEMA 2019a)

Flood hazards are dynamic and can change frequently because of a variety of factors, including

weather patterns, erosion, and new development. FEMA, through the Risk MAP program, works with

communities to collect new or updated flood hazard data and periodically updates flood maps to

reflect these changes. (FEMA 2019b)

http://www.srh.noaa.gov/bmx/?n=supercell




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The Modified Mercalli (MM) Intensity Scale assigns a value to an earthquake intensity that ranges from

imperceptible shaking to catastrophic destruction. It does not have a mathematical basis; instead it is

an arbitrary ranking based on observed effects. The Modified Mercalli Intensity value assigned to a

specific site after an earthquake has a more meaningful measure of severity to the nonscientist than

the magnitude because intensity refers to the effects actually experienced at that place. The lower

numbers of the intensity scale generally deal with the manner in which the earthquake is felt by

people. The higher numbers of the scale are based on observed structural damage. Structural

engineers usually contribute information for assigning intensity values of VIII or above. The following

is an abbreviated description of the levels of Modified Mercalli intensity. (USGS 2019b)

Table G.4 Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale (USGS 2019b)

Intensity Shaking Description/Damage

I Not felt Not felt except by a very few under especially favorable

conditions.

II Weak Felt only by a few persons at rest, especially on upper floors

of buildings.

III Weak Felt quite noticeably by persons indoors, especially on upper

floors of buildings. Many people do not recognize it as an

earthquake. Standing motor cars may rock slightly. Vibrations

similar to the passing of a truck. Duration estimated.

IV Light Felt indoors by many, outdoors by few during the day. At

night, some awakened. Dishes, windows, doors disturbed;

walls make cracking sound. Sensation like heavy truck striking

building. Standing motor cars rocked noticeably.

V Moderate Felt by nearly everyone; many awakened. Some dishes,

windows broken. Unstable objects overturned. Pendulum

clocks may stop.

VI Strong Felt by all, many frightened. Some heavy furniture moved; a

few instances of fallen plaster. Damage slight.

VII Very strong Damage negligible in buildings of good design and

construction; slight to moderate in well-built ordinary

structures; considerable damage in poorly built or badly

designed structures; some chimneys broken.

VIII Severe Damage slight in specially designed structures; considerable

damage in ordinary substantial buildings with partial collapse.

Damage great in poorly built structures. Fall of chimneys,

factory stacks, columns, monuments, walls. Heavy furniture

overturned.

IX Violent Damage considerable in specially designed structures; well-

designed frame structures thrown out of plumb. Damage

great in substantial buildings, with partial collapse. Buildings

shifted off foundations.

X Extreme Some well-built wooden structures destroyed; most masonry

and frame structures destroyed with foundations. Rails bent.




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A monograph is a learned treatise on a small area of learning; a written account of a single thing. (MS

2019)

The Richter magnitude scale is a mathematical device to compare the size of earthquakes. The

magnitude of an earthquake is determined from the logarithm of the amplitude of waves recorded by

seismographs. Adjustments are included for the variation in the distance between the various

seismographs and the epicenter of the earthquakes. On the Richter Scale, magnitude is expressed in

whole numbers and decimal fractions. For example, a magnitude 5.3 might be computed for a

moderate earthquake, and a strong earthquake might be rated as magnitude 6.3. Because of the

logarithmic basis of the scale, each whole number increase in magnitude represents a tenfold increase

in measured amplitude; as an estimate of energy, each whole number step in the magnitude scale

corresponds to the release of about 31 times more energy than the amount associated with the

preceding whole number value. (USGS 2019c)

The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale (SSHWS) is a 1 to 5 rating based on a hurricane's sustained

wind speed. This scale estimates potential property damage. Hurricanes reaching Category 3 and

higher are considered major hurricanes because of their potential for significant loss of life and

damage. Category 1 and 2 storms are still dangerous, however, and require preventative measures.

In the western North Pacific, the term "super typhoon" is used for tropical cyclones with sustained

winds exceeding 241 kph (150 mph). (NOAA 2019d)

Table G.5 Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale (adapted from NOAA 2019d)

Category Sustained Winds Types of Damage Due to Hurricane Winds

1 119-153 kph

64-82 kt

74-95 mph

Very dangerous winds will produce some damage: Well-

constructed frame homes could have damage to roof, shingles,

vinyl siding and gutters. Large branches of trees will snap, and

shallowly rooted trees may be toppled. Extensive damage to

power lines and poles likely will result in power outages that

could last a few to several days.

2 154-177 kph

83-95 kt

96-110 mph

Extremely dangerous winds will cause extensive damage: Well-

constructed frame homes could sustain major roof and siding

damage. Many shallowly rooted trees will be snapped or

uprooted and block numerous roads. Near-total power loss is

expected with outages that could last from several days to

weeks.

3

(major)

178-208 kph

96-112 kt

111-129 mph

Devastating damage will occur: Well-built framed homes may

incur major damage or removal of roof decking and gable ends.

Many trees will be snapped or uprooted, blocking numerous

roads. Electricity and water will be unavailable for several days to

weeks after the storm passes.

4

(major)

209-251 kph 113-

136 kt

130-156 mph

Catastrophic damage will occur: Well-built framed homes can

sustain severe damage with loss of most of the roof structure

and/or some exterior walls. Most trees will be snapped or

uprooted, and power poles downed. Fallen trees and power

poles will isolate residential areas. Power outages will last weeks

to possibly months. Most of the area will be uninhabitable for

weeks or months.




40

5

(major)

252 kph or higher

137 kt or higher

157 mph or higher

Catastrophic damage will occur: A high percentage of framed

homes will be destroyed, with total roof failure and wall collapse.

Fallen trees and power poles will isolate residential areas. Power

outages will last for weeks to possibly months. Most of the area

will be uninhabitable for weeks or months.

A storm surge is the abnormal rise in seawater level during a storm, measured as the height of the water

above the normal predicted astronomical tide. The surge is caused primarily by a storm’s winds

pushing water onshore. The amplitude of the storm surge at any given location depends on the

orientation of the coast line with the storm track; the intensity, size, and speed of the storm; and the

local bathymetry. (NOAA 2019e)

Storm surge maps are available that show potential storm surge levels of less than 0.9 m (3 ft),

greater than 0.9 m (3 ft), greater than 1.8 m (6 ft), greater than 2.7 m (9 ft), and a leveed area. (NOAA

2019 a)

A storm tide is the total observed seawater level during a storm, resulting from the combination of storm

surge and the astronomical tide. Astronomical tides are caused by the gravitational pull of the sun and

the moon and have their greatest effects on seawater level during new and full moons—when the sun,

the moon, and the Earth are in alignment. As a result, the highest storm tides are often observed

during storms that coincide with a new or full moon. (NOAA 2019e)

A subtropical storm is a subtropical cyclone in which the maximum sustained surface wind speed

(using the U.S. 1-minute average) is 63 kph (34 kt or 39 mph) or more. (NOAA 2019f)

A cyclone is an atmospheric closed circulation rotating counter-clockwise in the Northern Hemisphere

and clockwise in the Southern Hemisphere. https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutgloss.shtml

A tropical cyclone is a rotating low-pressure weather system that has organized thunderstorms but no

fronts (a boundary separating two air masses of different densities). Tropical cyclones with maximum

sustained surface winds of less than 62.7 kph (39 mph) are called tropical depressions. Those with

maximum sustained winds of 62.7 kph (39 mph) or higher are called tropical storms. (NOAA 2019d)

A hurricane or typhoon is a tropical storm with maximum sustained winds of 119 kph (74 mph) or

greater. The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale is used to categorize hurricanes. The SSHWS does

not account for rain or storm surge – only wind. (NOAA 2019c) The term hurricane is used for Northern

Hemisphere tropical cyclones east of the International Dateline to the Greenwich Meridian. The term

typhoon is used for Pacific tropical cyclones north of the Equator west of the International Dateline. (NOAA 2019f)

Tsunamis are giant waves caused by earthquakes or volcanic eruptions under the sea. Out in the depths

of the ocean, tsunami waves do not dramatically increase in height. But as the waves travel inland,

they build up to higher and higher heights as the depth of the ocean decreases. The speed of tsunami

waves depends on ocean depth rather than the distance from the source of the wave. Tsunami waves

may travel as fast as jet planes over deep waters, only slowing down when reaching shallow

waters. (NOAA 2019g)

https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/bathymetry.html




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APPENDIX H: ACRONYMS

CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety

AIChE American Institute of Chemical Engineers

CSB U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

USGS United States Geographic Survey

ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

SSHWS Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale

BFE Base Flood Elevation

DFE Design Flood Elevation

EPR UK Environmental Permitting Regulations

COMAH UK Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulation

NHERP Natural Hazard Emergency Response Plan

API American Petroleum Institute

PED European Pressure Equipment Directive

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers

ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials

ATEX French Appareils destinés à être utilisés en ATmosphères EXplosives ISA International Society of Automation

IEC International Electrotechnical Commission

MOC Management of Change

DCS Distributive Control System

PSSR Pre Start-up Safety Review

GETS Government Agency Telecommunications Service

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