Nations and Nationalism (Wiley) Volume 6 Issue 3 2000 [Doi 10.1111%2Fj.1354-5078.2000.00319.x] John...

8/22/2019 Nations and Nationalism (Wiley) Volume 6 Issue 3 2000 [Doi 10.1111%2Fj.1354-5078.2000.00319.x] John G. Cock

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Nations a nd N ationalism 6 (3), 2000, 319-345. 0 SEN 2000

Ethnic nationalism and subalternpolitical process: exploring

autonomous democratic action inKashmir*

JOHN G.COCKELLConflict Analysis and Development Unit (C A D U ), Department ofInternational Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science,Houghton St., London WC 2A 2AE , U K

ABSTRACT. This article argues that the emergence and development of subalternpolitical process is a significant conflict dynam ic fou nd in the escalation of ethnicnationalist movements. These ethnie-defined modes of political participation are inturn an expression of the autonomous nature of ethnic nationalism, but occurunderneath and often antecedent to the organised violence and militancy whichdistracts most analyses of these conflicts. The article discusses this p rocess of insurgentpolitical mobilisation as a response to the structural paralysis of the post-colonialstate, using the ethnic nationalist conflict in Indian Ja m m u and Kashm ir as the centralcase study. In its discussion of this case, the article seeks to argue tha t the presence ofsuch subaltern political process provides additional empirical evidence of th eautonomous nature of ethnic nationalism, and its capacity to carve out alternativeoptions for democratic action and popu lar participation.

IntroductionEthnic nationalist movements that contest the sovereign authority of themodern state often lead to protracted internal conflicts and the apparentbreakdown of non-violent modes of political participation. Where the statesuspends access by nationalist minorities to the political process, militantsoften emerge to demand autonomy or secession by violent means. In this* Many thanks are due to Bashir Manzar, Fayaz Ahmad Kaloo, Amitabh Mattoo, and RiyazPunjabi for facilitating field research in K ashmir. I also wish to thank David Carment, DavidLong, Simon Dalby, and Fred Halliday for their helpful comments on previous drafts, and tothe Social Sciences and H umanities Research Council of Ca na da for supporting this research.I am particularly grateful to Yezid Sayigh and the journals referees for their many helpfulsuggestions to improve the coherence of the arguments presented here. I alone, of course, amresponsible for the content of those arguments.


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320 John G. Cockellprocess of conflict escalation, de mo cratic norms an d practice (where initiallypresent) ap pea r to be am on g the first victims. Th e government, in turn , willoften characterise the m ilitancy as terrorism an d inherently antithetical tostate security and democratic values. But to what extent does this commonaccount of ethnic conflict capture the nuances of ethnic nationalistmob ilisation? Are there non-violent processes of nationalist politics th at ar eoften obscured by the advent of state repression and ethnic militancy? If so,what role do such nationalist political processes play in the definition anddevelopment of nationalist movements in their confrontation with the state?One approach to such questions would be to posit that there may be asubaltern aspect to the phenomenon of ethnic nationalism, in which non-violent nationalist mobilisation is pursued through a variety of politicalprocesses and formations over a sustained period of time, often antecedentto militancy by several years and even decades. Even following the rise ofmilitant groups, such political processes may continue to play a central rolein nationalist mobilisation.Tracing the character and dynamics of such non-violent mobilisation, itwill be argued here, is of central importance to a balanced analysis of theoutbreak of ethnic conflict. Not only can evidence of subaltern modes ofpolitical process indicate the au tonom y of ethnic political development, suchprocesses may also represent non-state alternatives for popular, democraticparticipation within a nationalist movement. In circumstances wherepopular participation and representation in local decision-making is over-shadowed by state and militant violence, such alternative forms of politicalparticipation may be the last remains of an indigenous societal dynamic ofnon-violent conflict management. They may be the only remaining expres-sion of a historical tradition of ethnic political culture and norms, and thusthe only forms of political expression that would enjoy popular legitimacyin a period of upheaval and insecurity. Post-colonial Kashmiri nationalismwould appear to bear these arguments out, and will be explored here as anempirical illustration of this analytical approach. The Indian state ofJammu and Kashmir has been gripped by protracted internal conflict since1989, as various Kashm iri nationalist an d m ilitant o rganisa tions have wagedan anti-state movement for azadi [freedom] and secession from India. Over30,000 lives have been lost since Indian security forces were deployed inforce in 1990, and the conflict has since decayed into extremist terror andstate repression.The nature of azadi, as the collective consciousness of Kashmirinationalism, will be our empirical point of reference for thinking throughthe political content of the nationalist movement. The article will explorethe political meaning of azadi in four broad sections. The first will discussthe theoretical relationship between subalterneity and ethnic nationalism.The second will relate this theoretical relationship to the Kashmir conflictand outline a subaltern analytical agenda on azadi. The third will examinethe first half of this agenda: autonomous insurgent consciousness in


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Subaltern political process 32 1

Kashmir. Finally, the fourth will examine the other half of the agenda:autonomous democratic action in Kashmir.

Subaltern perspectives on ethnic nationalismWhile subalterneity has a variety of dimensions in state-society relations, wewish to look specifically at its relevance to an analysis of ethnic nationalistdynamics. The term subaltern is being used here in the Gramscian (1971:52) manner developed by the Subaltern Studies tradition of Indianhistoriography, denoting those subordinate social groups below the politicalelite which assert an autonomous insurgent consciousness.2 It will benecessary at the outset to sketch the two theoretical components of thesubaltern approach being taken here. The first will address the genealogicalaspect of ethnicity in nationalist mobilisation, and the second will posit theparticular salience of such nationalist mobilisation for post-colonial ethnicpolitics. Together, these two elements - the genealogical and the post-colonial - orm the basis of a subaltern analytical approach to the dynamicsof ethnic nationalist mobilisation, and will structure our examination of thespecifics of the Kashmir case. They also correspond to the two primaryconcerns of subaltern studies analysis in its focus on subordinate socialgroups: subjectivity and agency (Guha 1983b; Prakash 1994).Subjectivity: genealogical ethnicity and nationalist mobilisationA subaltern approach to ethnic nationalism looks first for the enduringelements of sociocultural discontinuity between the state and the ethnicminority - for the historical divergence between state-national and ethno-national identities. The purpose here is to recognise the autonomoussubjectivity of ethnic assertions of extant collective identity, as distinct fromstatist discourses of national identity. State discourses of national identitydeny the recognition of nationalist movements as subjects of history inpursuit of their own political projects (Guha 1983a: 3). Recent debate onthe nature of ethnic identity has moved incrementally towards the recogni-tion that while the boundaries and cultural resources of ethnicity changedynamically over time, there remains at the core of the ethnic group abroadly recognised corpus of shared sociocultural values and identityreferents. The enduring salience of this ethnic solidarity, despite the statistorientation of the broader sociopolitical environment in which the groupexists, invests ethnic communities with an autonomous apprehension ofaffective, collective personality (Smith 1991, 1993; Esman 1994; Connor1994). For ethnic minorities, in particular, the historical experience ofdiscrimination and exclusion serves to heighten the shared perception of acore commonality and shared values which may serve as the foundation forcollective action to resist such threats. While other forms of group


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322 John G. Cockellaffiliation, such as citizenship, class, occupation and religion, may also callupon individual loyalties, the affective ties of ethnic kinship remain as apersistent, paramount determinant of group solidarity, particularly in post-colonial Asia and Africa.For the subaltern approach, recognition of the sociological imperative ofethnic solidarity in turn implies the historical subjectivity of the ethniccommunity. This is central to an accurate account of the power of ethnicnationalist mobilisation, and the role played by ethnic solidarity in thisprocess (Smith 1993: 28). While political elites can and do manipulatesymbols and myths of an ethnic past, and deploy calculated strategies toappeal to mass sentiment, the resonance of these appeals relies upon theethnic recognition of sociocultural particularism and historical discontinuityWith the state. It is this collective consciousness and not the specificstrategies and actions of elites which sustains ethnic nationalism, even incircumstances of violent conflict with the state.3 This is, to use AnthonySmiths characterisation, to posit the importance of the ethnic-genealogicalcharacter of sub-state nationalist mobilisation, particularly for cases of post-colonial ethnic nationalism (Smith 1991: 123). The analytical emphasis hereis on the ethnies demotic perception of its autonomous existence as a self-defined and self-determining social, political, cultural and economic unit. Inthis sense, while the protection and maintenance of ethnic autonomy is aprimary ideological aim of nationalism, nationalist mobilisation is itselfdefined and shaped dynamically by the nature of that ethnic autonomy andits historical confrontation with the state. The genealogical approach toethnic nationalism is thus entirely consistent with the traditional subalterntheorys non-elitist analytical m e t h ~ d . ~Agency: the post-colonial politics of ethnic na tionalismThe second element of the subaltern approach to ethnic nationalism is theconsideration of autonomous political agency, independent from statestructuring of legitimate politics. The tension between state-territorialnationalism and ethnic nationalist politics poses severe problems for post-colonial states, which are often based on juridical, ex-colonial boundaries(Mayall 1990; Jackson 1990). The post-colonial political process is definedand imposed by the state through structures and institutions largelyinherited from the colonial rulers, with a pronounced accent on centralisa-tion and hegemonic control (Alavi 1972; Kothari 1988, 1990; Norbu 1991;de Silva and May 1991). Subaltern ethnic minorities are excluded from thiscentralised definition of national identity, and often have circumscribedavenues for political mobilisation since the state recognises as legitimateonly those groups or communities that engage with official politicalprocesses of the sovereign state (i.e. parliament, elections, and otherconstitutional institutions). The post-colonial disjuncture between the state-territorial and ethnic-genealogical definitions of the nation means that


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Subaltern political process 323ethnic political mobilisation is particularly likely to be confronted withstatist strategies of hegemony and delegitimation. The identity basis ofintractable ethnic conflict thus arises most often where a post-colonial stateregime attempts to impose a monological definition of national identity, andlinks this with the political closure and coercive control structures ofnational security. This is done in the name of the sovereign authority of thestate, this authority often being implemented in practice by the ethnic groupdominating the decision-making elite. As a result, most ethnic nationalistmovements are located in the post-colonial regions of the world, and candraw on historical traditions of autonomy or quasi-independence to justifycontemporary demands for greater political autonomy or secession (Gurrand Harff 1994: 18).The post-colonial states attempt to delegitimate the political agency ofthe nationalist minority is perceived as an existential threat to its ethniccollective identity (Norbu 1991: 194; Crighton and MacIver 1991). Whenthese minorities perceive their collective identity to be under threat, theyarticulate escalating demands for minority rights, regional autonomy andeventually secession. In response, the state often rejects these movements iisillegal and illegitimate - as threats to its self-defined national security -and refuses to accord claims of self-determination any kind of politicalrecognition. This confrontation is driven by the fact that the post-colonialstate is structurally positioned to adopt an institution-specific understandingof the legitimacy of ethnic opposition, whereas ethnic political culture isbased on deeper vulue-specific issues of genealogical identity and groupsecurity. These shared values are what underpin the ethnies demoticaffirmation of self-legitimating political agency. As the ethnie observes thispolitical expression of identity being blocked by statist control of existinginstitutions, it may in turn deny the legitimacy of those controllinginstitutions (Smyth 1994: 3 17). The outcome of this institutional-valuationalopposition is no mutually acceptable processual framework for even apreliminary consideration of dialogue, given that it is the very existence andpractice of these institutions which is in dispute. In short, the state and theethnie are often speaking with incompatible political vocabularies, oneinstitutional and the other valuational, and the resulting absence of a viabledialogue of mutual recognition results in the structural paralysis of thestate. This paralysis creates a vacuum in which coercion and oppressionappear to be the only options open to the state ruling elite.

The post-colonial states responses of delegitimation and political closurein such situations often serve only to accelerate ethnic nationalist mobilisa-tion, indicating the autonomy of nationalist political agency. Horowitz(1994: 49) notes that state institutional structures imposed on the premisesthat ethnic solidarity performs no legitimate political functions, and thatsuch powerful affiliations can simply be written out of the political process,are almost certaain to prove dysfunctional and ultimately anti-democratic.This is bemuse the autonomous nature of nationalist politjcal action


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324 John G . Cockellprovides an alternative locus for group security in a divided society, as wellas a source of trust and protection against existential threats to basic needs.The subaltern perspective would suggest that the popular resonance of thisprocess derives from the ethnies au ton om ou s affirmation of both itsgenealogical subjectivity and its political agency. However, as ethnicnationalist political formations strive to establish alternative (i.e., non-state)processes and structures for popular participation and representation, thescope for violent militancy increases. As efforts to create a new state orau ton om ou s unit meet with post-colonial state coercion, the popu larwillingness to su ppo rt m ilitancy grows. Unfortunately, the advent ofviolence as the mode of political mobilisation irrevocably alters thedevelopment of nationalist ideology; those militant groups with access togreater firepower will have the means to enforce the dominance of theirparticular political agendas within the nationalist movement. Violence, inshort, soon obscures the old currency of political power through popularrepresentation and legitimacy, and corrupts the valuational autonomy ofpolitical agency. Ironically, the post-colonial problematic in situations ofethnic nationalism is such that violent insurgency is an almost inevitableoutcome, and yet this militant turn in political agency just as inevitablyundermines the original valuational goals of popular participation andgro up security.Ethnic nationalism in Kashmir: towards a subaltern analysisThe dynamic interaction in the Kashmir case of autonomous ethnicity withthe institutional v s . valuational opposition inherent in post-colonial politicswill be the focus fo r the balanc e of this article. Our purpose here will be toexplain the autonomous insurgent consciousness of azadi as the basis forthe subaltern politics of Kashmiri nationalism. The analysis will explorefour specific elements of the subaltern research m ethod outlined by Gram sci(1971: 52): the autonomous origins and ideology of the subaltern group; thepolitical relationship between the group and the dominant formations ofthe state; the political formations which the subaltern group produces inorder to press its claims; and the dynamic evolution of these subalternformations. Using the subaltern method to analyse Kashmiri nationalistmobilisation, we will thus examine its autonomous political process, andthe escalation dynamic produced in its confrontation with Indias strategiesof processual closure and coercion. In applying this approach to theKashmir case, we will also be confronting two common misconceptionsconcerning the current militant insurgency against the Indian state: (a) thatits motivating force is religious (i.e., Islamic) nationalism; and (b) that i tbegan as a result of flawed state elections held in 1987. These misconcep-tions have rested, respectively, on the failure to analyse accurately theof ethnicity in Kashmiri nationalism, and on the Uncontested presumption


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Subaltern political process 325

that Indian institutions effectively define the parameters of legitimatepolitical participation.

Recent studies of the Kashmir conflict, particularly those written byliberal Indian scholars critical of Indias broader political development, haveoften interpreted the conflict as an outcome of Indian mismanagement ofpolitical institutions governing the quasi-federal relationship between NewDelhi and Ka~hmir.~uch interpretations have significantly advanced theanalysis of political marginalisation as an aspect of the ethnic perception ofalienation, albeit from an Indian point of reference. Balraj Puri relates therise of militant insurgency to the policies of successive Indian governmentsto deny Kashmiris the basic elements of democratic participation within thepolitical structures of the Indian state. He argues that the basic premises ofthis policy are that the Kashmiris are unfit for democracy, or do notdeserve it and that democracy and national interest are incompatible (Puri1993: 52). Sumanta Banerjee suggests that the Indian constitution allowspopular participation in the political system within a framework of rules,structures and processes that invests such participation with a certainlegitimacy. But, in Kashmir, the people have been forced to take to arms,due to the Indian states refusal to accommodate their demands throughdemocratic avenues . .. throttling the normal democratic process therethrough a series of rigged elections (Banerjee 1996: 92, 88). Finally, SumitGangulys (1996, 1997) recent study of the Kashmir conflict has alsopursued this well-worn path of inquiry. Here the alienation of the Kashmiripolity (particularly educated youth) from the Indian political system isdriven by the discrepancy between democratic freedom throughout the restof India and rigged elections in Kashmir.

Such analyses are not incorrect in their understanding of the uzudimovement as a form of political mobilisation, but in their conclusion thatthis mobilisation comes as a response to the decline of existing institutionalchannels. Thus, for example, Gangulys (1996: 78) perspective admitsfailings on the part of the Indian government, without questioning Indiasfundamental statist dominance of Kashmiri political life. He thus, like manyanalysts of Kashmir who employ precast statist parameters of inquiry,argues that the insurgency began as an abrupt rise of violent ethno-religiousfervour in 1989. This effectively denies the Kashmiri community anyautonomous political agency outside of that defined by these institutions,failed or otherwise; it can only respond to the terms set by the state. Asubaltern analysis suggests, instead, that the advent of armed insurgencywas neither abrupt, nor related to religion, nor as directionless andpurposeless as fervour implies. In fact, what appears to be decline fromthis institutionalist perspective may instead be the structural paralysiscaused by the incompatibility of state-institutional vs. ethnic-valuationalpolitical processes. If one examines the development of extra-systemic formsof political mobilisation in Kashmir after 1947, it becomes apparent thatKashmiri political development has proceeded along alternative and often


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326 John G. Cockellunderground avenues of mobilisation (Cockell 1995). This then calls for theanalytical recognition of the Kashmiri articulation of demotic, popularforms of political mobilisation, underneath the militant violence with whichmost accounts have been distracted.

Azadi as autonomous insurgent consciousnessA subaltern approach to the nature of post-colonial ethnic nationalismposits then that such movements are neither solely mobilised by instrumen-talist political elites, nor primarily defined by the institutional hegemony ofthe state. Instead they are autonomous, insurgent spaces derived from theantecedent historical and valuational consciousness of ethnicity. The ethnieis, in short, the self-conscious and subjective author of its own insurgency.Let us apply below, then, the dual aspects (ethnic subjectivity and politicalagency) of our approach to the case of azadi nationalism in Kashmir. Wewill look first at the genealogical subjectivity of kashmiriyat ethnicity, as theauto no m ou s origins and ideology of the K ashmiri community. Next we willoutline a decentred analysis of post-colonial political development inKashmir, focusing on the relationship between the Kashmiri communityand the dominant formations and institutions of the Indian state. Incombination, both factors should point to the historical emergence of theautonomous insurgent consciousness of azadi as the primary basis forKashmiri nationalist mobilisation. This relationship between insurgentconsciousness and mobilisation is analytically important. From it we willalso argue, with reference to Kashm ir, tha t the aut on om ou s political spacecreated by ethnic nationalist movements can act as a locus for thearticulation of non-state modes of democratic action. This relationship isalso, however, no t w ithout its difficulties an d discontinuities.Kashmiriyat: the genealogy of sub altern ethnicityOur subaltern analysis begins with an examination of the nationalistexpression of Kashmiri ethnic identity, particularly as a focus of groupsecurity, as distinct from (a nd in op position to) the national identityhecuritydiscourses of the Indian state. The insurgent ethnic consciousness thatunderpins the solidarity of the current azadi movement is defined byperhaps two primary factors. One is a strong sociocultural identity, and theother the shared historical memories of four centuries of imperial domina-tion, from Mughal (1586-1757) and Afghan (1757-1819) t o Sikh (1819-46)an d D og ra (1846- 1947). In the post-colonial context of subaltern alienation,the insurgent aspiration to self-rule in Kashmir has thus evolved into a corevalue of Kashmiri ethnicity, a conjunction embodied in the concept ofkashmiriyat (Cockell 1993). T he essence of kashmiriyat ethnicity is thenetwork of sociocultural, historical and linguistic ties that bond all


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Kashmiris, regardless of religion, into an interdependent social collective.While Kashmiri Muslims and Kashmiri Hindus (Pandits) differ in religion,they share a great many cultural practices which infuse the practice of eachreligion with elements of the other as well as with uniquely Kashmiridevotional and philosophical norms (Punjabi 1990, 1992). Chief amongthese is the strong emphasis on what may be termed ethnic humanism: thecommon understanding that the unique Kashmiri history and culture unitesall Kashmiris regardless of religion. Inter-communal harmony has thus beena strong social norm in Kashmiri society. A large measure of this humanistaspect to kashmiriyat is derived from the history of religious syncretism inKashmir, particularly between Hindu Shaivite Vedanta and Sufi Islam,which both drew upon Kashmiri cultural practices. By the 1300s thesetraditions had produced the rishi culture which lies at the heart ofkashmiriyat. Rishis, the religious ascetics in Kashmir who for centuriespreached mutual tolerance and non-orthodox devotion, have acted ascommon points of cultural reference for the development of ethnic collectiveconsciousness in the geographically isolated Kashmir valley (Khan 1994;Bamzai 1994; Sufi 1974).

The strong sense of ethnic particularism informs the Kashmiris desire fora legitimate political status that would reflect their lived sociocultural andhistorical autonomy. This understanding of kakhmiriyat has particularresonance with those groups who, in the current conflict, advocate theindependence of the state, and these groups in turn enjoy the vast majorityof popular support. As a senior figure within the pro-independence Jammuand Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) stated in 1994:The azadi movement is a reaction to a history of centuries of subjugation and deceit.Our kashmiriyat culture is unique, our customs and way of life are unique - we feelKashmir is our own country. Now , the Indian authorities are a threat to this culture.We want to build our own country, in our own way, according to our own culture.6Such affirmations of the Kashmiri sense of autonomous sociopoliticaldevelopment, decentred from the institutions and processes of the state,suggest that Kashmiris view their polity as a subjective, sovereign actor in avery practical and political manner. It further suggests that the azadimovement is rooted in the genealogical identity politics of kashmiriyat, andthat the nationalist mobilisation is informed by the collective perception ofthis extant corpus of core ethnic values.

Kashmiris thus perceive the pursuit of self-determination and autono-mous sociopolitical development in its widest sense to be a fundamentalexpression of their ethnicity. Kashmiri political scientists have indeedargued that it has been the erosion of Kashmiri autonomy, in political,economic and sociocultural terms, which has led to the alienation of theKashmiri people from Indian rule and the rise of militant nationalism. Wani(1993), for example, argues that nationalism in Kashmir did not come aboutsuddenlv in the late 1980s, but had a period of some two decades of slow


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328 John G. Cockell

growth. Political closure, corruption, underdevelopment of the Kashmirvalley and (latterly) systematic human rights violations by Indian securityforces have contributed over time to the widespread perception withinKashmir of a collective identity under siege. Beyond this, Kashmiris feelthat Indias repudiation of the autonomous ethnic basis of their politicalmobilisation led inevitably to popular alienation and the rise of militantopposition (Wani and Naqash 1993). Certainly, by 1947 and Kashmirsaccession to India, kashmiriyat had evolved into a powerful basis for thenationalist politics of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullahs National Conferenceparty. In post-colonial Kashmir-India relations, the call for azadi hasemerged as the nationalist politics of kashmiriyat. This is to argue then thatthe political agency of the azadi movement is rooted in the genealogicalnature of Kashmiri ethnicity.Post-colonial political mobilisation and institutional legitimacyOur focus now turns to the decentred analysis of post-colonial politicaldevelopment in Kashmir, and the contested relationship between theKashmiri community and the dominant formations and institutions of theIndian state. The analysis will look in particular at the emergence anddevelopment of anti-systemic political action in Kashmir from 1953 to 1989.While most studies of the Kashmir conflict devote considerable time torestating the usual course of events following the controversial 1947accession of Jammu and Kashmir to newly independent India, our aim hereis different. It is our contention that the initial political foundation for thecurrent insurgency can be traced to subaltern political mobilisationfollowing Sheikh Mohammed Abdullahs (then prime minister of Jammuand Kashmir) removal and arrest in 1953, and particularly after theGandhi-Abdullah accord of 1975. This is an account of political participa-tion (and agency) outside of the standard statist narratives that trace thepost-1947 succession of pro-India regimes installed by New Delhi inKashmir. Throughout the discussion of this decentred political action, theaim will be to illuminate the development of organised anti-Indian politicalopposition - opposition which has been based on a valuational rejection ofthe structural legitimacy of Indian sovereignty over Kashmir and a relentlessassertion of the right to self-determination.

The relationship between the Kashmiri polity and the Indian state, bothbefore the independence and partition of British India in 1947 and after, hasbeen characterised by the absence of a legitimate and self-sustaining processof political interaction. Post-colonial institutional frameworks superimposedupon an autonomous process of political development within Kashmirisociety were ineffective in absorbing the Kashmiri demand for self-determination, which had developed during the anti-Dogra regime protestsof 1931-2.* As early as November 1932 these popular agitations forimproved welfare of the Muslim majority had led to the formation of the


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Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, under the leadership of SheikhAbdullah. As the Kashmiri ethnie has become increasingly nationalist, thisstate-ethnie relationship has gone through several stages of escalation, fromdysfunctional transitional arrangements at the time of independence toprotracted insurgency four decades later. This means that rather thanlooking upon the Kashmir insurgency as having abruptly broken out withthe emergence of armed conflict in 1989, the advent of organised militancyin the late 1980s should be seen as the beginning of a new phase in a processof polarisation and mobilisation dating back as far as the early 1930s.

With the August 1953 arrest of Sheikh Abdullah (ordered by New Delhiin the face of Abdullahs vocal calls for India to honour Nehrus promise ofa plebiscite to confirm Kashmirs accession), the National Conference wassplit and control of the Jammu and Kashmir government handed over toBakshi Ghulam Mohammed, a pro-India colleague of Abdullahs backed byNew Delhi. The arrest sparked massive public protests against Indian ruleand the presence of Indian troops in Kashmir, and calls were raised for aUN-supervised plebiscite. In response to this manifest closure of politicalprocess, Abdullahs deputy Mirza Mohammed Afzal Beg established thePlebiscite Front in August 1955 in order to rally popular support for self-determination in an organised manner. The Bakshi regime responded to thispopular mobilisation with harsh repression and the arrests of Frontactivists. Wani (1993: 65) observes that the post-1955 era of Plebiscite Frontpolitics signalled a phase of withdrawal from the Indian system and theemergence of a formidable challenge to the accession of the state of Jammuand Kashmir [to] the Indian Union. Punjabi (1992: 144) further argues thatthe generation of youth which came into political consciousness in thedecades following the organised call for a plebiscite took this demand to bealmost a cardinal component of kushmiriyat: The term plebiscite had beenorchestrated in their ears from birth to adulthood so forcefully that it hadbecome part of their psyche. The rise of the Plebiscite Front evinced, then,the capacity of the nationalist movement in Kashmir to create subalternavenues for political mobilisation as early as 1955, avenues which wouldconstitute significant democratic alternatives to the institutions imposed bythe state.

After Nehrus death in May 1964, the Indian government took a series ofsteps to extend greater centralised control over the political institutions ofJammu and Kashmir state. In particular, constitutional provisions relatingto the dissolving of state government and legislative powers were imposed.This fundamentally undermined the de @re recognition of autonomy forJammu and Kdshmir found in Article 370 of the Indian constitution(Abdullah 1965; Brass 1994). Such dominance also was effected at thepolitical level, when the Indian government dissolved the National Con-ference and replaced it with a local arm of the ruling Congress party. Puri(1993: 3 1) notes that Kashmiris reacted with unprecedented anger againstwhat they perceived to be an assault on their identity and autonomy. Mass


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330 John G. Cockellpublic protests were suppressed with violent force, and Plebiscite Frontactivists were arrested en masse. In 1971 the Plebiscite Front was banned bythe Union Home Ministry under the Unlawful Activities Act, and was alsoprevented from taking part in the state elections of 1967 and 1972, in whichgovernments loyal to New Delhi were installed through rigged polling.In response to the centres decimation of local parties and closure oflegitimate avenues for democratic political participation, a number of youthprotest groups formed to call for the exercise of self-determination as theprimary objective of political struggle in Kashmir (Sidiq 1994).9 In 1963-4the Jammu and Kashmir Youth League provided the first forum of politicalactivism for a new generation of pro-freedom youth, rejecting the apparentpersonality cult of Abdullahs Plebiscite Front. In response to the activismof the Youth League, Beg encouraged the establishment of Plebiscite Front-allied youth groups such as various Young Mens League factions and theStudents Unity Meet. Shabir Ahmad Shah, currently one of the mostpopular azadi leaders in the valley, joined the Young Mens Leagueactivities as a teenager in 1968, and was jailed soon thereafter for severalmonths.Disenchantment with the existing political structure, and resentmentagainst its Indian provenance, set in over the next few years among theKashmiri polity at large. The 1975 Kashmir Accord between Indira Gandhiand Sheikh Abdullah marked the end of the popular legitimacy of themoderate National Conference (and the Sheikh himself) as the representa-tive voice of Kashmiri ethnic nationalism and political culture. Under theprovisions of the accord, Abdullah was released from house arrest andappointed as chief minister of the state, and the Plebiscite Front wasdissolved. In return, he agreed that Kashmir would be integrated within thecentral constitutional structures of the Indian state, and would lose itsremaining vestiges of autonomy in practice, if not de jure . The accord wasfollowed with state elections in mid-1977, which exacerbated the growingresentment against the National Conference within the Kashmir valley(Bazaz 1978). These years marked a key turning point in Kashmiri politicalmobilisation. With the demise of the Plebiscite Front and the discrediting ofAbdullah, the political process shifted to the new youth protest groups andthe emergence of political militancy in which sporadic acts of politicalviolence were no longer unthinkable.From this point on, anti-systemic political mobilisation began to expressitself in broader formations, some of which were forced underground by theprevailing climate of total authority exerted by Abdullahs NationalConference government. The opposition of Kashmirs Islamist Jamaat-i-Islami to the 1975 Accord was quickly targeted by the Abdullah govern-ment, which shut down the Jamaat-run schools and trusts and banned itsofficial newspaper, Azaan. Abdul Gani Lone later formed the Jammu andKashmir Peoples Conference in 1978 to oppose the Indian bias ofAbdullahs revived National Conference, and to demand greater autonomy


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for Kashmir within India. While both the Jamaat and the PeoplesConference still attempted to engage with the flawed institutional process ofJammu and Kashmir state politics, other underground groups began tomobilise against the sovereignty of the Indian state. The Jammu andKashmir Peoples League, formed in October 1974, became a key alternativepolitical forum for opponents of Kashmirs accession to India and theabsence of democratic governance, as too did the Mahaz-i-Azadi (FreedomFront) after 1977. Against the closure represented by the 1975 Accord, anumber of Mahaz-i-Azadi leaders such as Bashir Ahmad Bhat and h a mInquilabi rejected any form of participation in the state parliament andbegan to speak of the need for armed struggle, which had significantresonance among youth at that time.1 One such youth group at that time,the Islamic Student Organisation, would later emerge in 1985 as a leader ofthe Islamic Students League (ISL). The ISL was the forerunner of theJammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), and several ISL activists,such as Yasin Malik and Naeem Khan, would become significant political/militant leaders after 1990.

The dominance of Indian institutional control over Kashmiri elite politicscontinued into the 1980s. In 1984 the new National Conference governmentof Farooq Abdullah was swiftly destabilised and removed by the covertintervention of the governor of Kashmir (Abdullah 1985; Brass 1994: 221).When state elections were held again in 1987, the National Conference wasforced by the Congress (I) government in New Delhi to run on a coalitionplatform with the state Congress (I). Farooqs acceptance of this subordina-tion of the Kashmiri polity to the hegemonic penetration of Indian nationalpolitics provoked intense resentment at the popular level (Puri 1993: 52).Many of the anti-Abdullah political groups formed in the mid-1970s cametogether under a coalition called the Muslim United Front (MUF) to fightthe elections on a common platform. The MUF was the 1980s expression ofthe subaltern (and now more radicalised) political process which thePlebiscite Front had previously represented. But escalation of the ethnicconflict at the political level was now happening more rapidly than duringthe Plebiscite Front era, and the outright rigging of the 1987 electionsdecisively undermined the existing institutional structure, dominated as itwas by hegemonic control from New Delhi. This triggered the defection ofnationalist Kashmiri youth towards armed militancy. Many cadres of theIslamic Students League (ISL) had been polling agents and campaignworkers for the MUF coalition. A substantial number of these ISL activistsand defeated MUF electoral candidates soon crossed over to the portionof Kashmir controlled by Pakistan to be trained as JKLF militants.However, several militant leaders have since stated that militancy wasalready in motion well before the 1987 elections, with JKLF and othercadres being trained across the ceasefire line in Pakistan-controlled Kashmirfrom 1985 to 1989.12

As one militant leader has remarked: For those people who were never


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332 John G. Cockellwith In dia, the 1987 elections were not of their concern. It w as the fence-si t ters and those who st i l l had some hope who were disi l l~sioned.~~isremark points to an important aspect of subaltern political process that thisdecentred analysis highlights: that political mobilisation in a position ofsubordination to dominant discourses of control is inevitably discontinuousand internally conflicted. While some formations continue to engage withelements of statist process and institutions, others break away to assert newforms of opposition. By 1988-9 with the decline of the M U F as a politicalformation and electoral politics as a process, a new phase of mobilisationbegan with the advent of organised acts of anti-government violence. Theearly years of the current azadi movement, 1989-91, were characterised bymassive demonstrations of popular alienation, in the form of protestmarches, strikes, riots and other forms of opposition to rule by the Indianstate. On this fertile ground of deep alienation, a plethora of militant group semerged as the violent crest of this popular wave of anti-India sentiment.Armed militancy in the Kashmir valley was perhaps inaugurated by thearrival of a valley-based cell of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front(JKLF). The nucleus of this JKLF cell was the so-called HAJY group,which returned from Pakistani training in 1989 to make public statementsabout the JKLF manifesto and the need for armed resistance to Indianrule.I4 Since that time, the JKLF has consistently advocated a popularideology of independence, secularism and self-determination for the entirepopulation of Jam m u and Kashm ir.I5 In addition to its ideology, the rapidspread of the J K L F in 1990-1 may be attributed to the grassro ots social/religious activist network of its forerunner, the ISL.I6What does this decentred analysis of post-colonial political mobilisationin Kashmir reveal? Recalling our subaltern research agenda, we areconcerned here with examining the political relationship between thesubaltern group and the dominant institutions of the state, and the politicalformations that the subaltern group produces in order to press its claims.Many accounts of the Kashmir conflict assert a common wisdom that therigged 1987 electoral process effectively drove Kashm iri political resistanceto evolve an alternative, movement-based political process in the MUF.These accoun ts do not, however, trace the historical composition of theM U F to the antecedent expressions of auto no m ou s political m obilisationnoted above. A decentred perspective indicates that there is a clear historicalpattern of ethnic-valuational political form ations outside of the institutionalchannels imposed by India on the Kashmiri polity, from the PlebiscitcF ro nt a fter 1955 t o the various 1970s protest group s which later formed theM U F . This w ould suggest tha t the 1987 electoral results could not have hadthe effect of initiating anti-systemic political action, but only pushing extantmodes of mobilisation into a new phase of militancy. The emergence of theJKLF in Kashmir may also then be traced to the political developments ofthe 1970s, if not earlier, and was consistent with the various efforts by non-state nationalist formations to pursue subaltern political mobilisation. We


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may thus surmise that the autonomous insurgent consciousness of azadi has(in combination with kashrniriyat) been defined directly by the historicalexperience of a post-colonial process that subordinates Kashmiri modes ofnationalist political agency as pre-political and illegitimate.

But as we have also noted above, tracing the political relationshipbetween Kashmir and the Indian state also reveals discontinuities in thespecific political formations which the Kashmiri polity has produced inorder to advance the azadi agenda. Why is subaltern political mobilisationdiscontinuous? In the post-colonial political condition, the power of thedominant discourses of statist politics and of legitimate political processmakes it almost impossible for subaltern formations to conceive and assertcompletely autonomous forms of political action. In other words, much ofthe content of subaltern mobilisation is derivative of statist politics andcannot be interpreted outside of its binary relationship with the dominantformations and institutions of the state (Chatterjee 1986, 1993; Prakash1994). This is seen most clearly in the fall of the Plebiscite Front andAbdullahs accord with India, but also later in the ambivalent position ofparties such as the Jamaat and the Peoples Conference, and in thewillingness of the MUF to engage in the electoral political process of thestate. So we must conclude not only that the post-colonial politics ofKashmiri nationalism evinces a subaltern insurgent consciousness, but alsothat this consciousness (and its political agency) are not entirely autono-mous but only intermittently so. As a result, there is significant flux in thedynamics of nationalist mobilisation, with political formations first gainingpopular legitimacy and then losing it to new formations as they becomecompromised by their engagement with the state and its dominantdiscourses. In Kashmir, this process has been directly responsible for theemergence of violent militancy in the azadi movement. The discontinuitiesof subaltern political agency fostered an incremental disillusionment withnon-violent modes of protest, as each new phase of mobilisation was metwith denial by the state. As Prakash (1994) observes, the moment ofrebellion [in subaltern agency] always contain[s] within it the moment offailure.

A r d i as autonomous democratic actionThe insurgent consciousness of the subaltern group is thus not onlyopposed to post-colonial statist power but also intrinsically constituted byit. Autonomy in an absolute sense is impossible, and subaltern politicalagency is constituted as defiance only episodically and in a conflictedmanner. But the other element of insurgent consciousness which wediscussed above, the subjectivity of genealogical ethnicity, has an inherentlydemotic, popular character. This means that the group aspiration forpolitical self-determination, a valuational space rooted in ethnic political


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334 Joh n G . Cockellculture, will continually foster the articulation of new non-state modes ofdemocratic political action even as existing modes and political formationsbecome unrepresentative and unpopular due to their subaltern condition.The rootedness of nationalist political agency in autonomous ethnicity,then, invests nationalist movements with the capacity to dynamically renewand reposition the democratic content of their autonomous politicalprocess. Discontinuity, in short, implies processual dynamism, evensubsequent to the related emergence of armed militancy. In the Kashmircase, this means looking at the dynamic democratic politics of thenationalist movement and relating its specific manifestations to theau ton om ou s insurgent consciousness of azadi. We will do this by lookingat two broad manifestations of democratic action in the nationalistmovement: the coalition politics of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference(APHC); and the opposition politics of movement-based formationsoutside of the Hurriyat process.Political process and the All Parties Hurriyat Conference ( A P H C )While armed militancy emerged in 1989-90 to seize much of the mom entumof the azadi movement, this escalation did not prevent the continueddevelopment of non-violent modes of political mobilisation and participa-tion, as suggested at the outset of this article. One aspect of this in the early1990s was that most militant groups affiliated themselves with an existinginsurgent political organisation. Most of these groups were former consti-tuent members of the MUF, and had thus retained a certain measure ofpolitical credibility as representatives of popular opinion in the azadimovement. This fact demonstrates that in the early (pre-1995) years of thearmed insurgency, militant and political groups were linked in an uneasyand shifting symbiosis. The second major development in this intra-insurgency political process was the re-formation in January 1993 of abroad-based, multiparty coalition to guide the politics of the movement: theAll Parties Hurriyat (Freedom) Conference (APH C).The beginnings of the all-party consensus were outlined by five seniorpolitical leaders while being held together as a group in jail in 1992: ShabirAhmad Shah of the Peoples League, Syed Ali Shah Geelani of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Abdul Gani Lone of the Peoples Conference, Maulvi MohammedAbbas Ansari of the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, and Abdul Gani of the MuslimCon ference. Together these leaders agreed th at ideological differences wouldbe set aside in favour of asserting a united demand for the right to self-determination, avoiding any dispute over the merits of independence asopposed to accession to Pakistan.I7 The common points of agreement forthe APHC are then the unified demand that India recognise the Kashmirisright to self-determination, an d tha t it must be the Ka shm iri peoplethemselves who decide on the s tatus of K ashm ir, whether it be independenceor accession to Pakistan.I8 The total number of political, religious and civil


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Subaltern political process 335society organisations that make up the APHC General Council currentlystands at around thirty, and represents a broad cross-section of groups andinterests within Kashmiri society, including organised labour and socialwelfare. Political leadership of the APHC is by an Executive Council madeup of seven political parties, nominated by the General Council, most ofwhich have played some important role in the azadi movement: AwamiAction Committee, Jamaat-i-Islami, Peoples Conference, Jammu andKashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), Peoples League, Muslim Conferenceand Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen.

The advent of the APHC process has demonstrated the dynamic capacityof Kashmiri insurgent politics to evolve new forms of political mobilisationfollowing the MUF moment of failure. As well, the rejection of any furtherparticipation in statist political processes has been accompanied by a moreexplicit concern with popular representation. As Peoples Conference leaderAbdul Gani Lone has stated, there is no need at this time to press any one[ideological] option . . . If we press one option now, we are sabotaging thernovement.l9 Similarly a senior JKLF leader observed that the APHCparties cannot go against the wishes of the masses, and that they wereobliged to represent the will of the people given that the azadi movementwas a mass movement whose success depended on political leadershipreflecting the wishes of the people.*O The creation of the APHC, as a newforum for political mobilisation and non-state democratic representation,thus repositioned the autonomous political agency of the azadi movement inan explicitly pluralist and populist formation. Its initial resonance with theKashmiri people was a direct result of both its appeal to Kashmiri politicalvalues and its emancipatory call for self-determination.

The inherent discontinuities of subaltern political agency have arisenhere, however, and the APHC has since failed to realise the democratic andemancipatory potential that its emergence implied. This moment of failurefor the APHC has two facets. The first entails the gradual emergence ofPakistani statist discourses of monological Islamist national identity. Whilethe genealogy of kashrniriyat has historically been expressed in secular andnationalist mobilisation of the Kashmiri polity, the APHC process is in factprogressing in the reverse direction, becoming less representative and morenarrowly Muslim in character. One of the primary reasons for this reversalhas been the shift in armed militancy from a multiplicity of groups to thepost- 1995 outright dominance of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and otherPakistan-backed radical Islamist groups. Because of the meshing of politicaland militant organisations early on in the azadi movement, certain marginalpolitical groups were able to enhance their political profile in Kashmirthrough the actions of their militant affiliates. This has been particularlytrue for the Islamist political groups, with the pro-Pakistan Jamaat-i-Islamiin particular taking on a dominance far out of proportion to its actualpopular base in Kashmiri society. What is important to note here is that asmilitancy has gained ground with each moment of discontinuity in


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336 John G, CockellKashmirs subaltern political development, its unprecedented Pakistan-backed dominance of the current insurgency now threatens to underminethe very genealogical values which animate the autonomous insurgentconsciousness of azadi.Linked to this has been the second facet of discontinuity in the APHCprocess: the adoption of political closure in the face of calls for democraticaccountability. Several of the members of the Executive Council arerelatively small political organisations with very limited constituencies ofactual support in the valley. As the coalition institutionalised itself into astanding conference, it failed to reform its generally undemocratic internalstructure. The initial draft constitution for the APHC was to base itsformation upon decentralised participation from proposed local and districtAPHC councils. However, the seven azadi leaders balked at the possibilityof formalised democratic participation, and opted for a revised structure inwhich they maintain their sole and indefinite control over the ExecutiveCouncil.21 This relatively closed structu re has c ontribu ted to the growingpopular perception that the APHC leadership is out of touch with both theviews of the General Council members and the mood of the averageKashm iri, and has also prevented any serious questioning of the dom inanceexerted within the Executive Council by the Jamaat-i-Islami. With thedramatic increase in counterinsurgency violence since 1995-6, and theabsence of any progress on forcing the Indian government into uncondi-tional, tripartite negotiations, the lustre of the APHC has now faded formany Kashmiris. The cumulative effect of these factors has been a popularloss of confidence in the APHC as a genuinely representative voice of theazadi movement. When state elections were held in 1996, for the first timesince the start of the conflict, a certain proportion of the low voter turnoutwas ascribed to the popular desire for at least some form of return todemocratic institutions. The return of a National Conference government inthe state has not, however, made any measurable gains in persuading thcKashm iri people to dr o p their nationalist movement against Indiansovereignty.Interpreting the wider democratic potential of azadi political formationsis prob lematic a t ano ther level as well. As m any of the current statements ofthe JKLF reveal, those pro-independence political-militant azadi organisa-tions which represent the decentred political agency of the movement haveover time come to insist on complete secession and the creation of a newstate. The dominant discourse of post-colonial state sovereignty is sopervasive tha t it colonises the political imagina tion of subaltern politicalmobilisation, leading the ethnic nationalist movement to conflate self-determination with a similarly monological insistence on its own state(Sheth 1989: 382-4). This decline of the ethnic nationalist project intomonistic statism is evinced by a number of different political and militantleaders within the azadi movement. One of the manifestations of this is thecommon demand that a free Kashmir must include all of the territory of the


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former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Yet this relatively recentagglomeration of various ethnic groups under Dogra imperial rule duringthe nineteenth century makes this political unit as internally divided as theexisting post-colonial states of South Asia. Little Kashmiri attention hasbeen paid to this internal question. Many political leaders either assert thatDogras, Ladakhis, Gujjars and other smaller ethnies are all also Kashmiri,or (ironically) insist that these minorities-twice-over have no right to self-determination because this could result in the territorial division of the stateof Jammu and Kashmir. On balance, the movements leading APHC leadershave done very little in practical terms to reach out to these minorityregions of Ladakh and Jammu, or to migrant Hindu Pandits in Jammu.

Shabir Ahmad Shah and movement-based oppositionAlthough the advent of the APHC may be interpreted as the repositioningof subaltern political process in the azadi movement, the widespreadperception now is that the coalition had no effective unity, little politicalactivity, and will not prove effective in achieving self-determination for theKashmiri people. In July 1996, the popular Peoples League leader ShabirAhmad Shah was suspended from the APHC Executive Committee. Thisevent made manifest another dynamic shift within the subaltern politicalprocess of the azadi movement, one which reflected the growing populardisenchantment with the discontinuous politics of the APHC: the 1990sadvent of movement-based alternative voices questioning its leadershipand credibility. For many younger nationalist leaders who emerged in the1970s and 1980s, insurgent mobilisation has been movement-based ratherthan party-based. These new leaders had no record of association with thestate government and Indian political process, but were products of themovement. Sometimes also referred to as the historical forces of theazadi movement, almost all of these leaders trace their political activismback to the organisations formed in the mid-1970s to oppose the KashmirAccord of 1975. In this sense, a very substantial component of the azadileadership began its mobilisation some fifteen years before the firstmilitant organisations began the overt armed struggle. Moreover, theseleaders are particularly inclined to frame their efforts at politicalmobilisation in terms that are populist, non-militant and pro-kashmiriyatvalues. They largely resist existing structures such as the APHC, and callfor a recommitment of the movement to its ethnic-valuational anddemotic roots. They are troubled by the dominance of pro-PakistanIslamist militancy, and tend to favour dialogue and pragmatism in theKashmiri pursuit of self-determination.

What is of analytical interest here is the role played by these leaders intheir increasingly demonstrative political opposition to the APHC govern-ment, this further complicating the conflicted subaltern agency of the azadimovement. While some of these individuals formed or later joined the


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338 John G. CockellJKLF, a number of them have pursued independent political paths andformed und ergro und organisations.22 The m ost politically significant figurein this category of nationalist leadership, and some would say in the entireazadi movement, is Shabir Ahmad Shah. More so than any other singlepolitical figure in the movement, Shabir Shah continues to command avalley-wide base of popular support and respect. For his leadership of thePeoples League since 1974, and his unwavering advocacy of Kashmirsright to self-determination, Shah spent almost all of the period from 1968 to1994 in Ind ian prisons. Released in late 1994, Sh ah reasserted his long-standing position that the Kashmir conflict was defined not by Pakistan-backed Islamist militancy but by the popular aspiration to achieve self-determination. In a 1995 interview he stated:I have a firm belief that the Kashmir problem should be solved at the table in ademocratic and political way, [but] peace can only be achieved if the aspirations ofthe people of K ashmir are respected here [thus] I am pro-people in my outlook.23In a move which demonstrated his initial misgivings concerning the politicaldynamics of the APHC collective, Shah proposed an eight-point plan to theHurriya t leadership in D ecember 1994, which had a s its primary po int therecommendation tha t the AP H C become a united party instead of acoalition, with one ideology: self-determination. As he also stated in 1995:The Hurriyat Conference has not yet satisfied the people, but I am hopeful and 1 a mdetermined to reform it from within. If this [proves to be] a hopeless task, then I willgo to th e people, expose all, and tell them why it failed.24By M ay 1998 Shah had indeed broken with the A PH C an d formed a newparty, the Democratic Freedom Party.The absence of a broader social and economic programme in theHurriyat process also continues to concern the leader of the ISL, ShakeelAhmad Bakshi. In a 1995 interview, Bakshi criticised the Hurriyat leadersfor their failure to reach out more to the grassroots of Kashmiri society,and argued that the APHC had to develop a more effective means ofpopu lar contact a nd participation a t the local level, as the M U F had triedto do in its day.2 5 The prom inent M ahaz-i-Azadi leader, Azam Inquilabi,has also charged that the APHC has failed to deliver azadi to Kashmiris,and that its leadership must seek the counsel and consent of the historicalforces which have been working in this movement for the past thirtyyears.26 The history of dynamic escalation was noted also by anothermovement-based figure, Ghulam Qadir Wani, in his call for a new allianceof opposition formations to lead the movement away from the control ofthe A PH C: People like h a m [Inquilabi] were already in trenches fightingguerrilla battles when Abdul Gani Lone was a minister in a Congressgovernment.27 There is thus an emerging polarisation between the APHCprocess and the oppositionist figures such as Shah, Inquilabi, Baba andwani who reject that process in favour of a return t o t h e demotic character


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of Kashmiri nationalist values and insurgent consciousness. The emergenceof these critical voices stands then as the most recent expression of thedecentred agency of the insurgent consciousness of azadi. Inquilabi haswarned, however, that if the war drags on for another decade, thesemoderates will become irrelevant, just as the democratic approach hasbecome irrelevant in the decade gone by.28 Inquilabis warning evokes thesubaltern potential for discontinuity and failure, with its contemporaryconflict-related outcome of radicalised militancy. The capacity of thesemovement-based formations to reposition democratic action within thecontext of nationalist insurgent politics, and thereby respond to, interactwith, and represent popular participation in the political process, is thusnow attenuated directly by the escalation of extremist militancy.

ConclusionThis article has tried to outline the more recent developments within theazudi movement in Kashmir which indicate that the movements subalternpolitical process retains the capacity to evolve autonomous modes ofdemocratic participation and representation. This can not be an unqualifiedconclusion, as noted above, but it suggests that ethnic insurgent mobilisa-tion requires a reproblematisation of the location of democratic politicalprocess which departs from statist presumptions of sovereign legitimacy.What is perhaps limiting many contemporary analyses of the conflict inKashmir, then, is the uncontested assumption that legitimate politicalprocesses and democratic participation are phenomena defined by theinstitutions of the post-colonial state. This leads analysis in the direction ofthe purported errors of omission and commission of the state, but withoutan understanding of the autonomous basis of ethnic political mobilisation.Among other things, this would suggest that the roots of violent insurgencyare more complex and historical than simplistic accounts of institutionaldecay and modernisation attempt to assert.

In exploring the emergence of autonomous modes of political process inthe azudi movement in Kashmir, we have sought to argue that the characterof Kashmiri ethnic nationalism is that of subaltern insurgent consciousness.The movements insurgent ethnic-valuational confrontation with the institu-tional structure of the state is evidence not of pre-political or anti-democratic action but rather of an effort to create decentred forms ofautonomous political participation, and a popular repudiation of statistdiscourses claiming a monopoly on legitimate democratic process. Theemergence of these alternative forms of political Participation (and theirdemocratic potential) may be seen in the nationalist politics of the AllJammu and Kashmir National Conference between the late 1930s and 1953,the post-1955 Plebiscite Front, the 1987 Muslim United Front and thecurrent All Parties Hurriyat Conference and its dissenting opposition. The


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340 John G. Cockelldynamic development of these forms of subaltern resistance also suggests,then, that such movements are informed by the collective ethnic awarenessof subjective community a nd au ton om ou s political agency. T he K ashmircase also shows, however, that the post-colonial political conditiondominates the content of ethnic nationalist movements, inclining themtowards a conflicted and discontinuous search for autonomous or indepen-dent political structures to replace those of the post-colonial state. In thisnationalist search, the repeated failures of non-violent political formationsleads to the eventual rise of militant groups which may or (increasingly inKashmir) may not derive their own political agency from the genealogicalsubjectivity of the ethnic community. Militancy, in other words, is analmost inevitable product of the subaltern political process in ethnicnationalism, but one that does not necessarily share its valuationalobjectives and may well undermine them over time.In conclusion, we would argue that the subaltern autonomy of ethnicnationalist mobilisation can result in three often overlooked factors inethnic conflict: (a) the structural incompatibility of post-colonial state-institutional and ethnic-valuational assertions of political legitimacy andnational identity; (b) the consequent emergence of subaltern forms ofautonomous political process and democratic action; and (c) the inherentdiscontinuities in the dynamic evolution of nationalist politics, due to itsvery subaltern character, which contribute to the emergence of violentmilitancy. This approach offers the beginnings, perhaps, of an alternativeframework of analysis for ethnic nationalism that is based on the criticaldecentring of the sovereignty thematic. Such a n ap pro ac h should co ntributeto a n unde rstanding of why ethnic m inorities a re willing to endure years ofprotracted insurgency against the statist denial of political recognition andlegitimacy, and why such insurgent nationalism is neither pre-political noranti-democratic. It may indeed, to quote a phrase of azadi graffiti inSrinagar, offer a window on providing an answer to why the Kashmiriswant freedom an d ar e willing to sacrifice everything for it.

Notes1 One of the only comparable treatments of this issue is found in the work of Zunes (1994a,1994b). Zunes draws on the cases of the Polisario Front of Western Sahara, the EPLF ofEritrea and the ANC of South Africa to argue that: it is significant that although Western-style

representative democracy in dependent neocolonial Africa has at best a mixed record,democracy based on principles of equality, growing out of indigenous culture and renewed bypopular movements, can be quite successful . . . these internal developments may be a harbingerfor needed and positive changes in African political development (1994b: 335-43).2 On this aspect of Subaltern Studies theory see Guha (1982, 1983a, 1992), Spivak (1985) andDas (1989) for detail. Further analysis may be found in Prakash (1994, 1995), Gandhi (1998:172-3), and Loomba (1998: 198-201).

3 O ur subaltern focus here then is on the political implications of nationalist ethnicity at thesub-elite level. It should be noted however, that this factor produces mass mobilisation more


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Subaltern Dolitical Drocess 341often when combined with the shared experience of deprivation and delegitimation at the handsof the state (Ahmed 1992;Gu rr and Harff 1994).4 The term genealogy is used here in bo th its post-structuralist meaning (subjugated anddiscontinuous forms of popular historical knowledge) and its sociological meaning (presumedcommon ancestry and shared historical memories as key elements of ethnic identity), the latterbeing analytically subsumed as an aspect of the former. See Foucault (1980 82-3) and Smith(1991: 12).5 One of the first such analyses was Puri (1981, 1983). Cf. Akbar (1991) nd Fernandes(1992).Fernandes (now the Indian defence minister) attributes the r ise of militancy in 1988-9to corruption in the state government of Jammu and Kashmir, economic maldevelopment ofthe state, and the Indian governments rigging of the 1987 state elections.6 Interviews with G hulam Abbas Beigh, then acting secretary-general of the JK LF , Srinagar,April 1994.7 My understanding of post-colonial political mobilisation in this regard owes much to theideas of non-party political formations and the decline of the moderate state in the work ofRajni Kothari (1988, 1990, 1991).As he argues: Ethnicity can provide, together with socialmovements and citizens actions, a different ground for security and democracy (1990: 221).See also discussions of democratic legitimacy in the various contributions to Rudebeck (l992),particularly Mukherji (1992) nd Ahmed (1992).8 Under Dogra (184-1947) ule, the multiethnic princely state of Jammu and Kashmir wasformed through conquest and domination, within the approximate political borders of thepresent territory claimed by both India and Pakistan. The discrimination and feudal oppressionmeted out to the Kashmiri Muslim majority by the Maharajas regime led to agitation againstDogra rule in 1930-1,which set off a m ore widespread movement among the Kashmiri Muslim

community for political and socioeconomic emancipation. This period is believed by somehistorians to be the dawn of political mobilisation in Kashmir, and the beginnings of themovement for self-determination which continues to this day. See Zutshi (1986) nd Copland(1981).9 Gangulys (1996: 82) analysis, in contrast, suggests that in the mid-1960s he KashmiriMus lims lacked awareness of their political plight and the requisite organisational impetus, andtherefore did not vigorously challenge the ex isting order.10 Interviews with Firdous Ahmad Baba (aka Babar Badr), chief commander of MuslimJanbaaz Force, and chairman of the Forum for a Permanent Resolution of Jammu andKashmir, Srinagar, July 1995.Pampori (1992: 02) also notes that Sheikh himself had spokenin 1964-5 of the potential need for an armed uprising against India: Kashmiris would try their

utmost to secure a peaceful solution of the problem, but if peaceful methods fail, we shall haveto launch a struggle.1 1 It was stated at the time that the M U F coalition had in fact gained at least 30 per cent ofthe votes cast, and would have won at least fifteen seats in the assembly, rather than the four itwas accorded. See Zaidi (1990).12 Hashim Qureshi (the former Kashmir Liberation Front leader of 1971) and AmanullahKh an ( JK L F chairm an; in exile in Pakistan-occupied K ashmir) have stated that the Pakistanimilitary was actively facilitating such training camps in the mid-1980s. See the discussion inNoorani (1991:3). It must be noted, however, that the advent of violent protest in Kashmirwas not a situation created substantially by Pakistani infiltrators.13 Interviews with Baba (see note 10). He argues that those militants who began their trainingas early as 1986were youths who by 1980 had a burning desire for armed struggle.14 HAJY stands for the first initials of the four youths who made up this militant vanguard:Hamid Sheikh, Ashfaq Wani, Javed Mir and Yasin Malik. Of these four initial JKLF leaders,only Sheikh had not previously been a cad re of the Islamic Students League (ISL).15 One of the only Kashmiri militant groups to have a unified political and military structure,the JKLF Supreme Revolutionary Command Council states as part of its official objectives:[JKLF] believes in preserving Kashmir nationalism, culture, and all those factors whichconstitute bonds of commonality between the people . . irrespective of its political objective for


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342 John G. Cockellcomplete and total independence of Kashmir state, the final choice rests only with the people ofKashmir state . ..(Malik 1994: 90-6).16 Interview with Shakeel Ahmad Bakshi, leader of the Islamic Students League (an d currentlysecretary-general of the Jammu and Kashm ir Liberation Fro nt), Srinagar, July 1994.17 Interviews with Abdul Gani Lone, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Maulvi Mohammed AbbasAnsari, and Abdul Gani, Srinagar, January-February 1993.18 Interviews with Lone and Geelani, Srinagar, July 1995; and Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, leaderof the Awami Action Committee (and then president of the APHC), Srinagar, April 1994.These points are also stated in the APHC Constitution. See All Parties Hurriyat (Freedom)Conference ( I 994: 6).19 Interview with Lone (n . 18), July 1995. Lone rejected the suggestions that the Jamaat-i-Islami dominates the APHC and gives it a p ro-Pakistan slant: The Jamaat is not do minatingthe Hurriyat process . . . the Hurriyat Conference functions in a democratic manner, each partyhaving one vote.20 Interviews with Beigh (n. 6).21 Interview with Mufti B ahauddin Faro oqi, fo rmer chief justice of the Jam mu a nd K ashmirHigh Court, Srinagar, June 1994.22 Those products of the movement who joined with the JKLF would include the originalHAJY group, the Mahaz-i-Azadis Bashir Ahmad Bhat, and more recently, the leader of theIslamic Students League, Shakeel Bakshi. See Sidiq (1995).23 Interview with Shabir Ahmad Shah, leader of the Jammu and Kashmir Peoples League,Srinag ar, July 1995. Asked for his unde rstandin g of the purpose of self-determination, Shahreplied that self-determination . . . is to keep intact and preserve your own identity. It meanshow you want to live, according to your own identity.24 Ibid. Shah received little in the way of constructive responses to his suggestions from theAPHC leadership. See also Shah appeals for dissolution of all political parties, GreuterKashmir (Srinagar), 20 December 1994.25 Interview with Bakshi (n. 22).26 Rem arks by Azam Inquilabi in a speech at Ja m a M asjid, Srinagar, 21 July 1995. His phrasehistorical forces refers to uzudi movement-based leaders, such as himself.27 Top militant seeks new Kashm ir initiative, The Hindu (Madras), 30 January 1997.28 Interview with Azam Inquilabi, leader of the Mahaz-i-Azadi, Srinagar, July 1995. See alsoMushtaq (1995). He elaborated then that the trend in militancy is towards increased Islamistradicalism of the type espoused by the Harkat-ul-Ansar, and that this poses a medium-termthreat to the pluralist, kushmiriyut identity of the Kashm iri ethnie. By 1997-8 his fears hadbeen borne out, with these Islamist militants (a great many of whom are now non-Kashmirimercenaries from Talibans Afghanistan and further afield) dominating the armed confrontationwith India a nd resorting increasingly to terrorist attack s on Hindu villagers in the Jamm u an dDo da districts.

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Development Strategies.Akbar, M. J. 1991. Kashmir: Behind the Vule. New Delhi: Viking.Alavi, Ham za. 1972. The state in postcolonial societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh, N e w LeftReview 7 4 59-82.


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