National Unions as Organizations

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231

NATIONAL UNIONS AS

ORGANIZATIONS

Jack Fiorito, Paul Jarley and John T. Delaney

ABSTRACT

Although the study of unions and their effects has a long history, only

recently have researchers begun to analyze unions as organizations. In

such studies, the union itself is a focus, rather than its effects or the

behavior of individuals in relation to unions. Some key topics include union

environments, goals, strategies, structures, and outcomes, including inno-

vation and effectiveness. This paper reviews recent research in order to

summarize current knowledge on national unions as organizations, andoffers suggestions for further research. Particular attention is devoted to

national unions, as they occupy a critical place in the network of union

organizations. U.S. unions have faced serious challenges in recent decades,

and their efforts to cope with these and adapt to their changing environ-

ments may have lessons for the study of organizations more generally.

INTRODUCTION

Why study unions as organizations? After all, unions are anachronisms; like

dinosaurs they are facing extinction. American society has passed unions by,

and so should scholars interested in contemporary employment relationships.

Human resource management has prevailed and the study of unions should be

left to historians.

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Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management, Volume 20, pages 231267.Copyright 2001 by Elsevier Science Ltd.All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.ISBN: 0-7623-0840-0


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This is a view commonly expressed in management departments, one we hear

frequently. Unions are in trouble, but they are far from dead and still represent

about 14% of American workers (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2001). Unions

speak directly for over 16 million U.S. workers, and can claim to speak for U.S.

workers with greater legitimacy than can any other group. Paradoxically perhaps,

it is partly the decline in unions that makes them such fertile ground for study.

At the most fundamental level, unions played an important role in setting con-

ditions of employment and championing wider social change for most of the 20th

Century. If they are passing from the scene, it is important to understand why

and what the ramifications are for American workers and society generally. Arethe functions traditionally filled by unions no longer necessary? Are these func-

tions being assumed by other organizations? If not, might new organizations rise

to fill the void left by unions? These are big questions with obvious links to issues

of central importance to the study of organizations generally.

Importantly for immediate purposes, unions offer an opportunity to examine

the relative roles of environment on the one hand, and strategy and structure on

the other, in organizational survival. This speaks directly to the long-standing

debate in social science between advocates of environmental determinism and

those that tout strategic choice. Union influence has diminished over the last two

decades, but it is clear that they are not going down without a fight and have

engaged in much soul-searching and internal reform in an effort to reverse their

fortunes. Can organizations like unions transform themselves in the face of strongenvironmental imperatives? Do they have the capacity to adapt to their environ-

ment or are they destined to fall victim to overwhelming environmental pres-

sure? That unions have governance systems and processes that are distinct from

businesses and many nonprofit organizations only adds to their appeal as a focus

of study. Such unique characteristics may condition the responses of unions to

change and prove to be important contingencies that must be incorporated into

organization theory and theories of organizational change generally.

In this paper, we explore what we know and dont know about unions as

organizations. In critiquing our work, as well as the work of others, we hope to

contribute to theory development about unions, shed light on the issue of union

renewal, and set out an agenda for future research in this area. We also hope

to stimulate more interest in the study of unions by human resource scholars

interested in how human resource systems influence organizational performance.

NATIONAL UNIONS AS ORGANIZATIONS

The study of unions has been around almost since their creation, but the study

of unions as organizations is a much more recent phenomenon. The distinction

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232 JACK FIORITO, PAUL JARLEY AND JOHN T. DELANEY


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is a subtle, but important one. Quantitative studies of unions have generally

been about unions in the aggregate, more precisely about the effect of their

presence or absence on some outcome of interest. It is the outcome of interest

that drives model specification. For example, one of the most popular social

science research topics of all time is undoubtedly the union wage effect.

Typically, such analyses compare union and nonunion workers pay, using a

dummy variable to mark union status or representation, and its coefficient is

interpreted as a union wage effect. In such studies, all unions are presump-

tively alike and each union is a black box. The goal is not to understand

how unions operate, but merely estimate their average effect on some impor-tant outcome.

In contrast, the study of unions as organizations takes the union as the focal

point and seeks to understand how unions function and achieve their objec-

tives. The quantitative literature is much more recent than work on unions

generally, dating from the early 1970s (e.g. Child, Loveridge & Warner, 1973),

although it was influenced by case study and more qualitative efforts dating

from much earlier periods (e.g. Barbash, 1969; Webb & Webb, 1911). It has

also borrowed heavily from the literature on organizations more generally. The

organizational science literature contains many competing paradigms and over-

lapping measures, but we think it fair to say that the application of this literature

to unions has tended to gravitate around two perspectives. First, there are open

rational systems models (Scott, 1987), especially contingency theory, whichrecognize the importance of the environment in shaping organizations and their

performance. Second, there are natural systems approaches, such as the

strategic contingency and institutional literatures, that recognize that organiza-

tional structures and practices are partly the result of political contests within

organizations and cultural pressures to conform to conventional beliefs. Such

insights seem especially salient to unions given their formal democratic nature

(a point we address further below) and heavy legal regulation.

Our synthesis of these two approaches as they apply to unions yields a fairly

succinct framework in which the environment influences but does not wholly

determine both the internal workings and performance outcomes of unions.

Within unions, our model suggests a dominant causal path such that goals lead

to strategies, strategies lead to structures, and both strategy and structure

influence performance (Fiorito, Gramm & Hendricks, 1991; Fiorito, Jarley &Delaney, 1993). These internal union systems (i.e. goals, strategies, and

structures) are key choice variables for unions (i.e. things they control and can

change in an effort to enhance performance). Thus key questions in the

literature on unions as organizations are the degree to which union goals,

strategies, and structures do vary, the role of the environment in explaining

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such variation, and the relative influence of environment, strategy, structure,

and internal union practices on union performance.

The potential for variation in union environments, attributes, and outcomes

is very large. In the U.S. alone, there are over 100 distinct national (in some

instances international) organizations, and tens of thousands of local and

mostly subordinate organizations (Gifford, 2000). Many of these national

unions, and at least some of the larger locals, are full-fledged bureaucracies

with specialized departments staffed by professionals who provide expertise on

particular issues such as health and safety, law, organizing, or negotiation with

employers. Bargaining with employers is typically the raison detrefor theseorganizations.

In addition to these basic elements, there is a national federation of unions

to which most U.S. national unions affiliate (the American Federation of

Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, AFL-CIO) and state, area and

city counterparts to the AFL-CIO (often referred to as central councils). These

central bodies tend to emphasize political issues in their jurisdictions, providing

a common forum for worker interests in corresponding political units (i.e. with

federal, state and city authorities). Internationally, these patterns are repeated

(with important variations) within different nations and there are even transna-

tional bodies that focus on global or transcontinental issues of interest to various

types of unions and workers in different countries.

Clearly, there is an abundance of union organizations in the world. Our mainfocus here is on a particular cross section of these, U.S. national unions. These

are the sovereign bodies of the U.S. labor movement. Accordingly, they deserve

considerable research attention. This is not to say that studies of other cross-

sections (e.g. central councils, local unions, international bodies) are not needed

or would not be informative, of course. But, U.S. national unions occupy a key

position in the complex network of organizations that unions comprise, and

have been the topic of many studies. It is a good time to ask what we know

about them as organizations, and how we might direct future research efforts

to maximize knowledge gains. To provide some order to this discussion, we

use the succinct framework outlined above to review the evidence to date,

moving from environment to goals, strategies, structures, and finally perfor-

mance outcomes.

ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES

Aggregate studies of union growth and decline as well as research on union

organizing and bargaining outcomes suggest that a variety of environmental

influences impact unions, including public opinion, government regulation,

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employer strategies, economic conditions, worker attitudes, and the shifting

nature of employment to name just a few (e.g. Fiorito & Maranto, 1987). But

much of this research has focused on outcomes such as membership growth,

election success, or negotiated settlements, not union structures or internal prac-

tices. In addition, while many of these factors have varied considerably over

long periods of time, the bulk of the research on unions as organizations has

been cross-sectional and there may be little variance in some environment

elements across national unions. Thus, a challenge has been to conceptualize

and measure national union environments, and to link variations in these envi-

ronments to variations in internal union structures and outcomes.

The Law, Public Opinion, and the Economy

Inspiration has come from diverse sources, each with its own problems, and

cumulatively these various efforts to conceptualize and measure national union

environments have produced limited results. One source of inspiration has been

aggregate studies linking broad changes in the economy and society to union

membership growth. Here, the underlying logic is that the factors that have

been identified as important in the aggregate may be present to varying degrees

in national union environments. For example, few would argue that changes in

the legal environment havent played an important role in shaping union struc-

tures and practices. Most obviously, passage of the National Labor RelationsAct in 1935 (commonly referred to as the Wagner Act) created a statutory

process for determining union representation and banned certain employer anti-

union practices. Subsequently, the Labor Management Relations Act in 1947

(commonly referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act or Amendments) outlawed

various union practices including the closed shop. In 1959, the Labor

Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (commonly referred to as the

Landrum-Griffin Act) was passed. It requires unions to formalize and regularize

such internal governance practices as elections of union leaders.

The legal environment as a whole could be described as one that nominally

grants workers rights to form or join unions of their own choosing without

employer interference, and to engage in collective activities in pursuit of their

interests at the workplace and in the political sphere. From the perspective of

unions as organizations, the legal system grants them a right to exist, engage incertain activities on behalf of their members, and carry on their internal affairs

with a limited degree of external regulation. Although many employers respect

these rights, for various reasons including competitive pressures, private sector

employers have been increasingly prone to violate or circumvent these rights in

their efforts to prevent or weaken unionization among their workforces:

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The reality of NLRA enforcement falls far short of its goals. Many workers who try to

form and join trade unions to bargain with their employers are spied on, harassed,

pressured, threatened, suspended, fired, deported, or otherwise victimized in reprisal for their

exercise of the right to freedom of association. Private employers are the main agents of

abuse . . . [L]abor law enforcement efforts often fail to deter unlawful conduct (Compa,

2000, p. 9).

Thus, the overall legal environment for unions can be considered mildly hostile,

with considerable variation particularly as between private sector and public

sector environments. Nominal rights exist, yet in many instances these rights

cannot be effectuated without great cost, if at all. Not surprisingly, unions devoteconsiderable political effort to changing the legal environment, but prospects

for reforms that unions favor are poor. Union efforts to mobilize public support

for favorable legislative change, (e.g. in suggesting that employers are waging

a secret war on workers) have failed to take hold.

In general, federal regulation has served to homogenize contemporary national

union environments and structures, forcing conformity. This is especially true

in the private sector, where only railroad and airline employees operate outside

the NLRA framework. Greater diversity exists between public and private sector

settings and within the public sector itself where state regulations differ on a

number of dimensions. This variation has been exploited to some degree by

researchers as there is evidence of links between sector (i.e. legal framework)

and union characteristics. For example, unions operating under the Railway

Labor Act tend to have more homogenous memberships, consistent with the

craft-based bargaining structure and relatively narrow industry jurisdiction of

that law. A number of private-public sector difference have been detected as

well (Jarley, Fiorito & Delaney, 1998), including greater innovation and more

democratic structures among public sector unions.

Similarly, some argue that public opinion about labor unions (Lipset, 1986)

has played a key role in membership decline. While this hypothesis is contro-

versial it is virtually impossible to test in the national union context because

the general publics views are rarely available in a form that would allow such

data to be linked to particular unions (e.g. by union environment or industry).

Furthermore, it may be reasonable to assume that the public holds opinions

about such unions as the Teamsters, National Education Association, or Major

League Baseball Players, or about the appropriateness of unions for varioustypes of employees (e.g. police officers, firefighters, plumbers). It is doubtful

that much of the public knows that such unions as the Graphic Artists, Office

and Professional Employees, or Train Dispatchers even exist.

A more promising area of inquiry focuses on economic factors. Some of the

earliest studies of union growth and decline over time found a strong link

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between economic variables (e.g. price changes, unemployment) and union

growth. A virtual truism in earlier literature on union growth and decline was

that unions grew in prosperous times and declined in times of economic diffi-

culty. More recent evidence is less clear on this (Stepina & Fiorito, 1986), and

casual observation fails to reveal any obvious link between the long period of

economic expansion in the 1990s and union membership trends.

For our purposes, a key point is that unions face different economic condi-

tions in their respective environments. We would expect these differences would

lead to different union characteristics and outcomes. Once again, however, it

is easier to say union environments differ than it is to measure such differ-ences. A key problem is that while data on economic conditions such as

employment growth, wage changes, and sales are available by industry, mapping

industry data to national unions is complex. Union decline has brought

diversification through jurisdictional expansion and mergers, seriously diluting

traditional jurisdictions based on a single industry or occupation. This lack of

a clear one-to-one correspondence between unions and industries creates the

prospect for considerable measurement error in relying either on matching the

union to the industry characteristics where it has the greatest concentration of

membership (i.e. primary jurisdiction), or by creating synthetic environments

based on some scheme that weights the characteristics of each industry where

the union operates by the proportion of the unions total membership working

in that industry. Perhaps because the problems in this approach are sosignificant, attempts to create such measures of union environments have been

sparse and the results mixed. For example, in studies of organizing effective-

ness, findings from Fiorito, Jarley and Delaney (1995) have linked some

organizing success measures to employment growth in different industries (i.e.

different union environments), but Fiorito, Jarley and Delaney (2001) found no

confirmation of this link.

Employers and Workers

A second source of inspiration has been studies of specific union outcomes,

especially representation elections and bargaining outcomes. The notion of using

worker and employer attitudes and actions to form national union environments

has considerable appeal. Unions confront specific employers in both organizingand bargaining contexts, and workers face the choice of electing and working

through a specific union.

With respect to employers, a key variable has been the degree to which they

actively oppose unions. Employer opposition to unions ranges from generally

mild in the public sector to generally vigorous in the private sector, with

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considerable variation within each. Union wage and benefit effects are substan-

tial, estimated at upwards of 10% (higher for benefits; Freeman & Medoff,

1984). Even if we ignore other union effects (or allow for the possibility that

these effects may be partly offset by positive productivity effects; Freeman &

Medoff, 1984), there are substantial financial implications associated with

unionization. As representatives of owner or shareholder interests, managers

almost instinctively respond unfavorably to organizing efforts and unions.

Beyond the economics, managerial opposition to unions may also stem from

union threats to managerial control.

Not surprisingly, most workers who have experienced organizing campaignsreport that management opposed the union, and most nonunion workers who

say they want union representation cite management opposition as the main

reason they dont have one (Freeman & Rogers, 1999). The vast majority of

managers prefer to deal with workers individually, a majority would oppose

unionization efforts, and a substantial minority, one-third, feel that their promo-

tion chances would be harmed by a successful organizing drive among their

workers (Freeman & Rogers, 1999).

Some unions may face more hostile employers than others, making it more

difficult to achieve organizing and bargaining objectives. Evidence from studies

of unions as organizations is sparse on this matter. A key reason is that it is

difficult to determine in a systematic way the characteristics of employers that

deal with particular unions. NLRB data on employer unfair labor practiceactivity can be sorted by charging union to provide an indicator of employer

opposition for each union Results generally show that more objective union

outcomes, such as NLRB election win rates and membership growth, are

reduced by more intense employer opposition. More subjective outcomes based

on perceptions (e.g. leader perceptions of their unions organizing effective-

ness) do not demonstrate the same linkage, possibly because such assessments

already take into account the employer opposition environment. That is, leaders

may rate their unions organizing success highly even with few victories because

those few victories arose in the face of intense opposition (Fiorito et al., 1995,

2001). It should also be noted that reliance on NLRB data comes at a price,

since many public sector, railroad and airline unions have little or no contact

with the NLRB, and as a result they typically are not included in such analyses.

We are unaware of any theory or empirical results that attempt to link thedegree of employer opposition to the internal structure and operating practices

of unions, but other employer characteristics have been linked to unions in this

fashion. Unions are sometimes called secondary organizations in the sense

that their existence is to some extent defined in terms of another organization.

Again, unions exist largely to bargain with employers. With no employment

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relationship, there is no union, or at least the union would be a very different

sort of organization. Accordingly, one would expect that characteristics of their

referent organizations (i.e. employers) might exert a number of influences.

Centralization of bargaining authority in unions, for example, is likely to reflect

the locus of decision making in bargaining partner organizations (Hendricks,

Gramm & Fiorito, 1993). A recent effort to model information technology (IT)

adoption in unions found some evidence that union IT adoption is driven in

part by IT sophistication among relevant employer organizations (Fiorito, Jarley

& Delaney, 2000a).

By law and tradition, unionization decisions are normally a reflection ofworker preferences. Although the preceding discussion on the legal environ-

ment, public attitudes, and employer attitudes suggests important qualifications

on this view, worker attitudes are nonetheless critical. Numerous studies have

linked worker attitudes and beliefs to voting in representation elections and

similar voting intentions (Barling, Fullagar & Kelloway, 1992; Fiorito & Young,

1998). In such studies, dissatisfaction with jobs and perceptions of union

instrumentality stand out as decisive attitudinal variables, with a somewhat lesser

role for variables representing workers general attitudes toward unions. A

variety of other key union issues such as member commitment and participa-

tion are also linked to attitudes in individual-level studies (Barling et al., 1992).

Data at the macro level consistently show that a sizeable share of nonunion

workers desire union representation. For example, Freeman and Rogers (1999)reported that in 1994, roughly one-third of nonunion workers and nine-tenths

of union members would vote for union representation if given the opportu-

nity. Roughly 20 years of such data indicate fairly stable results over time.

More recent polls suggest that there may be growing attitudinal support for

unions, and perhaps especially among younger workers (AFL-CIO, 1999). This

result on youth may be particularly important as union members are typically

older than nonunion workers. Union density is highest among workers aged

4554 (18.8%), lowest among those 1624 (5%), and generally increases with

age up to age 65 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2001). Unions have had

serious difficulty in relating to young workers, and any change in this pattern

would be a major development.

As for worker attitudes and activities in the study of unions as organizations,

it is also reasonable to speculate that different national unions attempt toorganize and bargain for workers who support unions to varying degrees, with

obvious implications for union performance. Yet here too, as with other

environmental influences, it is difficult to obtain data that correspond closely

to union environments, and prior research has relied on industry-based

tabulations and mappings of unions to industries. There is thus some evidence

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linking worker attitudes to organizing effectiveness differences in unions

(Fiorito et al., 1995, 2001). In effect, some unions may achieve (or leaders may

perceive) greater success as a result of more favorable attitudes among the

workers they are trying to enroll.

In addition, variables measuring the heterogeneity of union memberships have

been found to play a role in studies of union innovation (Delaney, Jarley &

Fiorito, 1996), political activities (Delaney, Fiorito & Masters, 1988; Delaney,

Fiorito & Jarley, 1999), and possibly governance systems (Jarley, Fiorito &

Delaney, 2000). Although membership heterogeneity is clearly not an attitude,

presumably the causal mechanisms involving any heterogeneity effects entailattitudinal differences among the various membership components. Given that

membership heterogeneity is likely to be associated with equality structures

(e.g. having departments for gay and lesbian workers, women, racial minori-

ties), results finding an association between equality structures and adoption of

the organizing model (Heery, Simms, Delbridge, Salmon & Simpson, 2000a)

suggested one additional possible influence. (More is said on the organizing

model later.)

Complexity, Uncertainty, and Munificence

A third source of inspiration has been the organizational science literature and

its more abstract treatment of the environment. Unlike the economic andindustrial relations literatures that have tended to examine single item measures

of concrete aspects of the environment (e.g. employer opposition, employment

growth), the organizational science literature has focused on multi-item

measures of more abstract dimensions of environments. Notions of complexity,

instability, and munificence have been linked to national union characteristics,

but not outcomes. As with other measures created from objective industry level

data, these efforts suffer from the multi-industrial character of most unions, and

thus the difficulty of mapping industries to unions. In addition, while these

constructs seem best captured through multi-item measures, the literature to

date has been guilty of using single item proxies. Thus, for example, Delaney

et al. (1996) used both membership change and changes in bargaining coverage

as proxies for environmental uncertainty with limited success in models of

national union innovation. In perhaps the most extensive application oforganizational science concepts and measures of the environment in the national

union context, Jarley, Fiorito and Delaney (1998) reported links between

environmental complexity and centralized control and administrative rational-

ization within unions, as well as some evidence of a negative association

between structural differentiation and environmental munificence.

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All told, while we know a considerable amount about how various aspects

of the environment influence union outcomes, we still know very little about

how variations in national union environments lead to variations in national

union structures and practices. Data limitations, difficulties in matching the

available data to national unions, and perhaps a lack of sound theory have all

contributed to unimpressive empirical results. This seems especially true of

efforts to link environments to union characteristics, a key element of any effort

to separate out the various effects of environments and organizational attrib-

utes on union performance.

UNION GOALS

As noted elsewhere (Fiorito et al., 1991), union goals can be delineated along

various lines. Goals can be workplace-focused (e.g. wage improvements) or

external (e.g. tax fairness). They can be distinguished in terms of whether they

are defined in terms of members (i.e. narrowly) or in terms of class interests

(broadly). Union goals can be further differentiated as to whether they involve

improvements within the existing social order (instrumentalism) or change in

that order (reformism or radicalism).

Despite their importance, there has been little study of union goals per se at

the organization level. One likely reason for this research neglect is that main-

stream typologies of union goals, while useful in capturing fundamentaldifferences in the labor movements of various countries, are of little value in

distinguishing among American unions. With a few exceptions, U.S. unions

focus on instrumental goals and put primary emphasis on members workplace

interests. Truly radical goals are not a serious issue for the vast majority of

unions and members, and even their interest in meaningful reform is sometimes

questioned.

To capture true variations in union goals, researchers will need to dig

deeper. Collective bargaining agreements differ substantially in content (e.g.

Kochan, 1980). To some extent this reflects differences in bargaining power

and employer preferences, but different union goals are also a factor. Workforces

differ from workplace to workplace and union to union, and so too will

the goals of various worker groups. Preferences will differ for wages versus

benefits, for job control and professional standards, safety, job security, leisuretime, and so forth. Separating these effects is difficult (Fiorito & Hendricks,

1987b). Unions may also differ in the degree to which they emphasize workplace

versus social issues, but these too can be difficult to separate. For example,

recent controversies on international trade policies are a bit removed from the

workplace in the sense that there is little point in bargaining with employers

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on such, yet at the same time many members job interests may be greatly

affected.

A further limiting factor arises because of agency issues. Union goals are a

reflection of both leader and members influences and how these play out (i.e.

agency effects). Given that relations between member and leader goals are a

core issue, data are needed from samples of members in different organizations

as well as from leaders in different organizations in order to provide any system-

atic analysis of the agency issue. We know of no such database, and to construct

such a database would be a daunting task. Yet, this may be a useful way to

isolate goals of members, leaders, and unions from the effects of employerinfluence and bargaining power.

UNION STRATEGIES

Many discussions of union strategy begin with Webb and Webb (1911). The

Webbs identified three distinct methods for advancing worker interests:

bargaining with employers, legal enactment (legislation), and mutual insurance

or self-help (e.g. providing a union-funded pension or direct services to

members). Variations on these three basic strategies have been noted, as have

complementary strategies including resource acquisition, solidarity-building, and

organizing (Fiorito et al., 1991; Fiorito et al., 1993).

A further refinement has been suggested by Boxall and Haynes (1997).Focusing specifically on contemporary neo-liberal environments and empha-

sizing worker-union relations and union-employer relations, Boxall and Haynes

outlined four distinct union strategies. Classic unionism is defined as

emphasizing service to members and organizing along with adversarial employer

relations. Paper tiger unionism emphasizes services but not organizing, and

formalistic adversarial relations with employers. Partnership unionism

emphasizes both servicing and organizing, but in contrast to classic unionism,

adversarialism is de-emphasized in favor of cooperative relations with

employers. Finally, consultancy unionism emphasizes servicing, including

direct services from the union to its members, and routine adversarial relations

with some cooperative practices. Boxall and Haynes noted that these are

idealized types, and that in practice unions may combine elements of these

strategies.Although illustrating their typology with New Zealand unions, their analysis

appears pertinent to distinctions, directions, and controversies evident in union

strategies elsewhere (e.g. Australia, Britain, and the U.S.). As Boxall and Haynes

(1997) noted, their schema does not address union-state relations (e.g. peak-level

tripartism, etc). That limitation aside, it does seem a promising direction for

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further analyses of union strategies. Boxall and Haynes took union strategy

analysis to a greater level of specificity than many previous conceptions, and as

noted, their conception seems to encompass some key issues currently in play.

Heery, Simms, Simpson, Delbridge, and Salmons work (e.g. 2000b) analyzing

British union organizing policies and practices in detail provides guidance as to

how conceptions about organizing strategies might be elaborated.

Does union strategy matter? Given the controversy surrounding this issue in

the literature on business strategy (e.g. Child, 1997), and the relative infancy

of union strategy analysis despite its early roots in the work of the Webbs

(Boxall & Haynes, 1997), the lack of clear answers to this question is notsurprising. Although Heery suggested that the literature now abounds with

typologies of union strategy (1998, pp. 346347), there has been little testing.

Heery further noted that in reality union strategies are often hybrids combining

various types. This no doubt contributes to difficulties in operationalizing

measures for testing purposes. Aside from case studies that employ the

high-resolution microscopic lens of hindsight, there have been few empirical

studies.

One of the first studies examining the impact of union characteristics on

representation elections outcomes used a number of archival measures that

could be linked to strategy (Maranto & Fiorito, 1987). For examples, Maranto

and Fiorito considered dues levels and levels of direct benefits provided to

members (i.e. pricing strategy and product strategy?) along with whetherelections were in the unions primary jurisdictions (i.e. product-placement

strategy?). At least for elections among white-collar workers, they found some

evidence that lower dues levels and greater direct benefit levels were associ-

ated with union victories. The relation between union jurisdiction and the

election units industry was positive for blue-collar units (i.e. unions achieve

greater success in their traditional focus industry). For white-collar workers,

however, an interaction complicated interpretation, but it appears that unions

that were already strong in an industry achieved relatively greater success in

organizing white-collar workers in that industry. A key point here is that there

is some evidence linking union characteristics that have strategic interpreta-

tions with union outcomes.

More recent studies that have attempted to analyze strategy-structure,

strategy-outcome, and strategy-environment links in broad samples of unionshave yielded mixed results for relatively abstract strategy variables.

Conceptualizing strategy in terms of two dimensions, scope of methods and

scope of issues, Jarley et al. (1998) found little variance in the scope of

issues that U.S. unions pursued and no evidence of relations for it with other

union variables. This is consistent with the point about a lack of variation in

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goals noted earlier, but also note the point about the need for greater speci-

ficity in discussion of Boxall and Haynes work (1997) just above. They

did, however, find greater variance in the scope of methods (i.e. strategies)

used, and a positive correlation between this measure and perceived union

effectiveness.

In contrast, Fiorito, Stepina, Jarley, Delaney and Knudstrup (1997) found

perceived union effectiveness positively correlated with the scope of issues

pursued but unrelated to the scope of methods used. The latter study analyzed

individual-level data and controlled for other influences in contrast to the former

study which used bivariate correlation for union-level data, yet the underlyingdata and measures in both studies are essentially the same.

In more recent studies of organizing and union effectiveness with newer

union-level data, Fiorito et al. (2000a, 2001) combined these two strategic

scope measures and found limited evidence of a positive link to effectiveness

measures, but no evidence of a link between strategic scope and information

technology (IT) use.

On the whole then, the evidence suggests that union strategies may matter

for union outcomes. Specifically, there is some hint among the conflicting

evidence that unions that pursue broader strategies (e.g. workplace and non-

workplace) and use a broader range of methods (e.g. bargaining and legislation)

may be more effective than those that focus on narrower goals and use fewer

methods. As much of the cited empirical literature suggests, however, ifconceptualizing union strategy is in its infancy, then measuring union strategy

is still in an embryonic stage. Rather like management strategy . . . strategic

action by trade unions appears to be more complex and less coherent than

available theoretical models suggest (Heery, 1998, p. 350). To take the

biological metaphor one step further back, definitive results on the effects of

union strategy are no more than a gleam in the eye of researchers at this point.

More detailed specification of union strategy may be a promising direction for

future studies.

UNION STRUCTURES

Organizational theorists place considerable emphasis on the importance of

structure (e.g. Perrow, 1986). Union researchers have shared this perspective,and there is a considerable conceptual and empirical literature on the role of

union structure (e.g. Fiorito et al., 1991; Jarley et al., 1997; Strauss, 1993;

Willman, 2001). This literature can be divided into three general topical areas:

external structure, administrative structure, and governance structure (with the

latter two types emphasizing internal structure).

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External Structure

External or horizontal structure (Fiorito et al., 1991) refers to the boundaries

between unions and their environments. This includes boundaries between

national unions and between locals. Issues of jurisdiction and bases for orga-

nization (e.g. occupation or craft, industry, and enterprise) fall under this

heading. Relations between a national union and its locals, however, are more

properly seen as involving a vertical dimension, including both administrative

and governance issues, and are dealt with more fully in following sections.

Research on external structure issues varies by issue. National union mergershave increased considerably since the 1980s and have received considerable

attention (e.g. Chaison, 1996; Clark & Gray, 2000). We know that there are

different types of mergers (e.g. proper mergers where two unions come

together to form a new union versus absorptions where a smaller unions

identity is subsumed within that of its larger partner), and that absorptions are

far more common than true mergers. Key factors favoring and obstructing

mergers have been identified, as has the importance of idiosyncratic influences.

The latter, along with a relatively small number of cases, limit efforts to advance

and test any general theory. Less is known about the consequences of mergers.

There have been few if any credible studies of whether mergers accomplished

their intended purposes or how the members felt about the merger some time

afterwards. One exception is provided by Jarley, Harley, and Hall (in press), whofound little evidence that merger activity among Australian unions had an impact

on their innovative activity. Chaison, Sverke, and Sjoberg (2001) reported that a

union merger had only a modest effect on member participation.

There also has been little research on union jurisdictions per se. Seeber (1984)

noted an expansionary trend in jurisdictions many years ago, and those trends

appear to have persisted. Yet, there is little work in this vein (Sherer & Leblebici,

1993). Jarley et al. (1998) found that unions having a general jurisdiction (i.e.

open or inclusive membership) were more likely to have heterogeneous member-

ships and complex structures. There was no association with union effectiveness.

Heery et al. (2000b) found that open-membership unions were more likely to

adapt the organizing model. These results seem plausible and suggest some

important relations, but there is obviously much we dont know about

jurisdiction or openness and its consequences. Similarly, although many nationalunions have recently pushed for consolidation among their subordinates, there

are few if any systematic studies of this phenomenon. Obviously there are some

interesting questions to be addressed. Are the consolidated unions more effec-

tive or efficient in organizing, bargaining, or in service to their members? How

do the members feel about their new union as compared to their old one?

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Administrative Structures

Theorizing and empirical work on administrative structures in unions have been

heavily influenced by earlier work on business organizations (e.g. Child et al.,

1973; Warner, 1975). The need for unions to operate in a business-like fashion

was noted long ago (Barbash, 1969), and contemporary scholars continue to

stress similar themes. Unions need to become more bureaucratic, in the sense

of operating through expert representatives, in a routine manner, using a web of

procedural and substantive rules if they are to have more than a transient impact

(Heery, 2001, p. 316). This need has been noted in more trade-oriented outletsas well: Trade unions need efficient internal management in order to become

experts in dealing with constant change (McCarten, 2001, p. 22).

Within the context of administrative structures, a key distinction is typically

drawn between centralization and rationalization of decision making (e.g.

Warner, 1975). Centralization refers to the vertical locus of decision making

within the organizational hierarchy, although it has been operationalized both

in terms of organizational subunits (e.g. national headquarters versus locals)

and individuals (e.g. top leaders versus members). It can also be conceptual-

ized in terms whether decisions are concentrated in the hands of a few or

distributed more widely (Jarley et al., 1997; Knoke, 1990).

Rationalization is sometimes referred to as structuring of activities or

structuring. A further distinction within the broad concept of rationalizationcan be made between administrative structuring and administrative rationaliza-

tion (Jarley et al., 1997). More often, rationalization is described as consisting

of several distinct dimensions, including standardization, specialization, formal-

ization, and configuration or hierarchy (e.g. number of levels of hierarchy and/or

span of control). Consistent with the overall thrust of the concept, additional

dimensions may include coordination, communication, and even elements of

strategic planning such as environmental scanning (Fiorito et al., 2000a; Jarley

et al., in press).

Theory and Research on Centralization

Centralization has long been a topic of interest in the study of unions. In part

this is due to its close conceptual proximity to autocracy, oligarchy, democ-

racy, and related governance concepts. The difficulty of distinguishing betweendecentralization and democracy at a conceptual and (even more so) practical

level is often noted (e.g. Delaney et al., 1996; Fiorito & Hendricks, 1987a). It

is certainly possible to divide the two at conceptual levels. For example, central-

ization could be defined in terms of the unions officers and staff only, and in

that sense closely parallel conceptions used in business organizations. Then,

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one could define democracy solely in terms of the relation between members

and officers. A problem with even this seemingly clear distinction lies in the

nature of unions being by the members (Fiorito et al., 1993). That is, those

carrying out the unions work are not limited to formal staff. Union reliance

on lay activists and members to carry out work on behalf of the union blurs

the distinction between staff and membership, and thus contributes to blurring

between centralization-decentralization in the administrative system and

autocracy-democracy in the governance system.

Nonetheless, researchers have posited and tested relations involving

centralization for many years. These have progressed from single items withquestionable face validity (e.g. Roomkin, 1976) to seemingly more sophisti-

cated, almost certainly more reliable, and presumably more valid multi-item

scales based on general conceptions in the organizational literature (e.g. Fiorito

et al., 1995; Jarley et al., 1997).

As a criterion, theorizing about centralization has emphasized the influence

of union environments, goals, and strategies. In essence, the argument is that

unions will structure their decision making to optimize their outcomes within

a given environment (Fiorito et al., 1991). This is of course not to suggest that

union structures at any point in time are optimal. There are founding effects

(Stinchcombe, 1965), and unions change slowly, perhaps more slowly than

business organizations due to their governance systems (Craft, 1991). Still, there

has been some success in relating centralization to both conventional organi-zation science variables representing environmental influences such as stability,

munificence, and complexity, and to variables more unique to industrial

relations literature representing market structure, employer, and union charac-

teristics (e.g. Hendricks et al., 1993; Jarley et al., 1997, 1998). In sum, despite

the complication of administrative-representative systems conflict, conventional

organizational science and industrial relations seem to apply to the analysis of

centralization in national unions.

As a predictor, studies have typically emphasized the adverse potential

impacts of centralization. For example, one could argue that local unions can

contribute much to the design and conduct of organizing campaigns, and hence

centralization would have an adverse effect on organizing outcomes. Similarly,

and consistent with organizational science literature, one might expect

centralization to impede innovation. Expectations for an adverse centralizationimpact have generally been borne out in studies of organizing effectiveness and

perceived union (organizational) effectiveness (Fiorito et al., 1995, 1997, 2001).

The evidence is largely unsupportive on the expected negative relation between

centralization and innovation (Delaney et al., 1996; Fiorito et al., 2000a; Jarley

et al., 1998, in press) and Jarley et al., (1998) suggested that factors relatively

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unique to unions, such as membership heterogeneity, may be more critical for

innovation. Also, Fiorito and Jarley (1992) suggested the possibility that the

development of innovations in unions may be enhanced by decentralization,

while innovations diffusion may be aided by centralization.

Theory and Research on Rationalization

The virtues of rationalization have been noted (e.g. Barbash, 1969) and seem

almost self-evident. Specialization, formalization, and the like are almost

indispensable in large organizations, and studies have consistently linked these

and many other aspects of rationalization with organization size (e.g. Warner,1975). Recent analyses of union revitalization or renewal here and abroad cite

important potential roles for national union bureaucracies and national union

managerial practices, including reference to concepts such as formalization and

specialization (Heery, 2001; Heery et al., 2000a; Voss & Sherman, 2000).

Controversies arise in some important areas, however. Adler and Borus

(1996), for instance, distinguished between enabling and coercive forms of

bureaucracy, and it not difficult to extend this distinction to the concept of

rationalization (along with centralization, one of the two distinct general dimen-

sions of bureaucracy in Warners terms). The same specialization that allows

the large union to apply appropriate expertise to complex technical problems

(e.g. how to design a pension plan) also tends to shut out member influence as

tasks become the province of experts who do not answer directly to themembers. In a study of revitalization among local unions, Voss and Sherman

framed their research question in terms of how social movement organizations

can break out of bureaucratic conservatism (2000, p. 303). Thus conflicts can

arise with democracy although these may be subtler than conflicts between

centralization and democracy. The tension between administrative and repre-

sentative systems (Child et al., 1973) can occur between the representative

system and elements of both centralization and rationalization in the adminis-

trative system. Added to the familiar line-staff tensions noted in organizational

literature (i.e. tension between centralization and rationalization for our

purposes), the situation in unions is potentially quite complex.

In addition, the virtues of rationalized bureaucracy are situational. By most

accounts, bureaucracy is well suited to stable environments with routine tasks.

Globalization of markets, de-regulation, and increased employer oppositioneasily come to mind as important sources of instability in the environments

confronting many unions recently. One can argue that greater flexibility is

needed. The mantra of flexible specialization may have its place in unions.

Studies of rationalization in unions are few. As expected, size correlates

directly with rationalization and some of its elements (Heery et al., 2000a; Jarley

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et al., 1998), but while this relation holds up for administrative structural differ-

entiation in a multivariate model of rationalization, it is not borne out in a

multivariate model of administrative rationalization. In fact, only one of the

environmental variables examined is predictive of both criteria, and it has an

opposite influence on each (Jarley et al., 1997).

Studies of rationalizations effect on union outcomes are mixed but broadly

consistent within outcome areas. Specifically, rationalization has been found to

be a key predictor of innovation (Delaney et al., 1996; Jarley et al., in press)

and of information technology (IT) use (Fiorito et al., 2000a). Consistent with

this finding, Heery et al. (2000b) reported that rationalization (specificallyformalization) is associated with adoption of the organizing model. There is

mixed evidence on rationalizations relation with leaders perceptions of

effectiveness (i.e. from positive to not evident; Fiorito et al., 1997, 2001). There

is almost no systematic evidence of any positive relation between rationaliza-

tion and organizing effectiveness, and in some cases the results for

rationalization appear to be disconfirming (Fiorito et al., 1995, 2001). Consistent

with the lack of findings already noted, Charlwood (2001) found no evidence

of a relation between national union structure (specifically, structure for

organizing) and organizing success in the U.K. Charlwood, however, did find

a positive relation between union structuring at the workplace level and

organizing effectiveness in previously nonunion workplaces. Further, in their

study of union locals, Voss and Sherman (2000) found that the national unionsbureaucracy played a key role in initiating change in those locals that

revitalized. Structuring rewards (e.g. matching funds) to encourage local

organizing is one such initiative they cite, and very clearly fits in with our

conception of rationalization.

All told, the evidence is scant regarding the determinants of rationalization

(beyond the familiar size effect) and less clear when possible subdimensions

of rationalization are considered. It is fairly clear that rationalization contributes

to innovation in unions, consistent with results on organizations elsewhere

(Damanpour, 1991). Studies of effects on outcomes such as organizing

effectiveness and overall union effectiveness suggest little impact in some

instances (e.g. Fiorito et al., 1995) but perhaps a very important impact in others

(e.g. Voss & Sherman, 2000). Also, while rationalizations impact on such

outcomes is less clear, its impact on innovation, which in turn affects otheroutcomes such as organizing, is strong. Distinctions in dimensions of rational-

ization or types of bureaucracy, and situational considerations may warrant more

attention in future research.

For example, research assessing convergent and discriminant validity among

concepts including administrative structuring, administrative rationalization, and

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managerial competence could be useful, along with similar research focused on

the distinction between Adler and Borus (1996) enabling and coercive

forms of bureaucracy. It is important to know whether various aspects of bureau-

cracy affect outcomes differentially, and if effects are situational or not. Such

research may help clarify the meaning of conflicting results for broader concepts

such as rationalization as a predictor of different outcomes (e.g. innovation

versus organizing effectiveness).

Democracy and Governance Structures

As we have noted elsewhere, as have others in various terms, unions are unique

in being organizations for, by, and of the membership (Fiorito et al., 1993). In

addition to administrative systems designed to run the day-to-day business of

the union, unions must maintain representative systems to form goals, specify

the rules that govern the organization, and to choose and monitor leaders who

are accountable to the members to direct organizational efforts in pursuit of

those goals. Representative and administrative systems serve different purposes

and their structures reflect different influences (Jarley et al., 1997).

While governance and administrative structures are distinct, in practice lines

can blur between exercising discretion within ones legitimate scope of authority

and illegitimate assumption of authority. Thus, there is considerable opportu-

nity for tension between the systems designed to carry out the governance andadministrative functions (Child et al., 1973). Debate about the degree and effects

of such tensions has centered around Michels Iron Law of Oligarchy, which

posits that the representative system (and therefore democracy) is inevitably

overwhelmed by the administrative system and a considerable amount of

literature has challenged its veracity (e.g. Knoke, 1990; Voss & Sherman, 2000).

For some, concern about the level of democracy within unions goes beyond

normative issues (i.e. unions should be democratic), and extends to a hypoth-

esized link between democracy and effectiveness. (e.g. Fiorito et al., 1993;

Strauss, 1991). Democracy is seen as a key element of efforts to legitimize

union goals and policies, maintain member satisfaction with the union and

promote the voluntary rank-and-file activity necessary to achieve and sustain

union power (i.e. membership mobilization).

Of course, the particulars of any assessment will depend upon onesdefinition of democracy, and there are many possible definitions (Strauss, 1991).

There are probably even more ways to measure democracy, and unfortunately,

none has emerged as a clearly reliable and valid indicator (Jarley et al., 2000).

Examinations have included officer turnover, closeness of elections, member

participation, frequency of elections and conventions, whether executive board

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members are elected by district or at-large, and perceived influence of members,

among others. In some instances, these indicators have been operationalized in

terms of constitutional provisions, and in others via behavioral or attitudinal

indicators. Not surprisingly, this diverse set of concepts and indicators has led

to conflicting results and interpretations.

Jarley et al. (1997) might be the only study that has examined influences on

a democracy indicator (representative structures) at an organizational level.

They found a modest link with potential bargaining unit capacity (i.e. well-paid

members in larger establishments), and a strong link with centralized decision

making. The latter supports suggestions that representative structures are usedto balance centralization; that is a system of checks and balances (Fiorito &

Hendricks, 1987a).

Relatively few studies have actually tested for democracy effects. Jarley et

al. (1997) found no evidence supporting a hypothesized effect on concentration

of decision making. Delaney et al. (1996) and Jarley et al. (in press) reported

conflicting results on the relationship between democracy and innovation.

Delaney et al. (1999) found no effect on political activity, although Delaney et

al. (1988) did find a negative democracy effect in one of six specifications.

Fiorito et al. (1995) found no evidence for a hypothesized positive effect on

organizing among most indicators of organizing effectiveness, but they did find

mixed evidence of a positive effect on union leaders self-reported organizing

effectiveness. Maranto and Fiorito (1987) found some evidence of a positivedemocracy effect on union success in representation elections. Yet, neither

Fiorito et al. (1997) nor Jarley et al. (1998) found evidence of a link between

democracy indicators and perceived union effectiveness. When one considers

the poor measurement properties of the types of measures often used in union

democracy studies, the diversity of results is predictable, apart from the

diversity of concepts.

This state of affairs led Jarley et al. (2000) to suggest a different approach.

Instead of attempting to define and assess the elusive and value-laden phenom-

enon of democracy, they proposed that scholars take a step back to look at the

bigger issue of governance systems. Governance systems are described as

structures designed to identify, legitimize, and foster member commitment to

organizational goals and leaders (Jarley et al., 2000, p. 228). Considering prior

literature and the national union constitutions that define union governancesystems, Jarley et al. proposed five basic dimensions: codification, division of

authority, federation, member access, and activity. Relations among these

dimensions are considered conceptually, and then empirically based on corre-

lational analysis of content-coded national union constitutions. Finally, Jarley

et al. conducted a cluster analysis based on these governance dimensions,

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examined the resulting groupings, and related characteristics of these groups to

union environments and governance outcomes (i.e. cluster profiling).

The findings were mixed. There was generally found to be support for

expectations about the relations among governance system dimensions, and

environmental characteristics and governance outcomes (e.g. perceived democ-

racy) tended to correlate with governance dimensions. The cluster analysis

results were generally encouraging in that they formed four groups that were

interpretable and generally sensible. The four different governance systems

identified seem to correspond to other known characteristics of the unions and

their environments. An interesting result is that all five unions identified asinvolving serious corrupt or undemocratic practices by a 1980s Presidential

Commission appeared in the same cluster, one in which local product markets,

divided union authority, and codified governance provisions are common. Jarley

et al. (2000) had little success, however, in linking cluster membership

systematically to environmental characteristics or governance outcomes. They

suggested that reasons for poor results regarding environments could be

founding effects (Stinchcombe, 1965); that is, that current governance structures

reflect historical influences and thus cannot be expected to relate closely to

current environment.

Overall, the approach seems promising, and further empirical assessment

is warranted. Notably, this approach casts union governance in terms that

are more readily generalized to a wide range of organizations than is democ-racy. Although trends toward empowering employees in work organizations

may not amount to democratization, all organizations have governance systems.

Issues of how these are to be configured to meet environmental contingencies,

and their impact on governance outcomes, are salient to many organizational

forms.

INNOVATION AND EFFECTIVENESS

Organizational scholars sometimes refer to effectiveness as the ultimate

dependent variable in organizational research (Cameron & Whetten 1983b,

p. 2). This concept is broader than notions of profitability or efficiency and

its measurement is frequently complicated by the presence of multiple organi-

zational interests, each with different objectives and preferences. Unions area case in point. Differences between members and leaders and among the

membership itself over the relative importance of servicing current members

versus organizing new members, or stressing social over workplace goals

makes it difficult to arrive at a valid measure of global effectiveness. Because

many of these conceptual issues have been dealt with elsewhere in general

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terms (e.g. Cameron & Whetten, 1983a), and in the context of unions (Fiorito

et al., 1993; Hammer & Wazeter, 1993), we do not review them here.

Instead, we turn attention to empirical research on national union innovation

and effectiveness. Although innovation is not an end itself, it has been closely

linked to effectiveness outcomes (Bronfenbrenner, 1997; Fiorito et al., 1995,

1997; Jarley et al., 1998; Shostak, 1991), and thus constitutes a reasonable

penultimate variable for analysis in the study of unions as organizations. Indeed,

many impressionistic analyses of U.S. unions emphasize a lack of innovation in

the face of changing environments as a critical failing (e.g. Craft, 1991; Shostak,

1991). Conversely, recent signs of innovation in American unions (e.g. the callfor a transformation from a servicing to organizing orientation) are sometimes

hailed as something to be emulated by unions elsewhere (Carter, 2001).

Research on Union Innovation

Studies of particular innovations date back to at least 1990 (e.g. Fiorito & Jarley,

1992; Jarley & Fiorito, 1990; Jarley & Maranto, 1990; Shostak, 1991). Analyses

of innovation as a general phenomenon are more recent (e.g. Delaney et al.,

1996; Jarley et al., in press). Although the organizational science literature

suggests that innovation is a product of decentralization, neither Delaney et al.

or Jarley et al. found a positive link between decentralization and innovation

within unions. Results with respect to democracy are even murkier, withDelaney et al. reporting some negative effects, and Jarley et al. reporting an

opposite finding. Instead, both studies underscore the importance of resources

(i.e. as measured by membership size), rationalization, and strategic planning

in union innovation. Membership heterogeneity also appears to play a role,

perhaps because more diverse unions have greater opportunities to engage in

mimetic behavior or because a more diverse membership requires unions to

experiment with a wider array of strategies and tactics to meet member needs.

The two studies also attempt to link variations in union innovation to

differences in union environments to very limited effect, leading Delaney et al.

(1996) to speculate that the general crisis in union membership may serve as

a relatively uniform incentive for all unions to innovate.

Applying a variant of the Delaney et al. (1996) model to information

technology (IT) use, Fiorito et al. (2000a) found roughly comparable results(particularly as compared to Delaney et al.s perceived innovation and innov-

ative tactics results). Rationalization (inclusive of an item on environmental

scanning) and size are found to be consistent positive predictors of IT use. In

contrast to the Delaney et al. and Jarley et al. studies, Fiorito et al. found some

evidence that decentralization has a positive impact on IT use. They also extend

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the model to consider union strategy, without apparent effect, and to employer

IT use and prior innovation. They found some evidence that employer IT use

is a positive influence (i.e. mimetic behavior or perhaps a keeping up with the

competition effect), and that previously innovative unions are likely to use IT

most extensively.

Taken together, the evidence suggests that innovation is less a product of

environment than of union characteristics. Concerns about the adequacy of the

environmental measures employed in the literature to date serve to temper this

conclusion, but the evidence suggests that much of what is necessary to invoke

change in unions is within their control. Achieving such change may be a slowprocess, but a well-administered union with adequate resources can place itself

in a position to identify, develop and adopt new methods and services in an

effort to become more effective.

Research on Organizing and Union Effectiveness

There are a good number of penultimate variables that one could examine under

the broader heading of union effectiveness. Fiorito et al. (1993) propose six

penultimate goals: bargaining, politics, self-help, organizing, member solidarity,

and resource acquisition. Yet, only organizing (Charlwood, 2001; Fiorito et al.,

1995, 2001) and overall union performance (Fiorito et al., 1997; Jarley et al.,

1998) have been examined directly in attempts to assess effectiveness on aunion-by-union basis among national unions. (But see Hammer and Wazeter

[1993] for a broad set of measures for union effectiveness among local unions.)

Although focused on NLRB elections, the Maranto and Fiorito (1987) study is

also relevant since winning elections is an element of organizing effectiveness

and that study relates election outcomes to union organizational characteristics.

Union leader perceptions of their own unions effectiveness correlate with a

number of union and environmental characteristics, and results are generally

consistent across differing levels of analysis (e.g. individual or organizational),

statistical methods (bivariate correlations versus multivariate regression), and

time periods (1990 and 1997 data have been examined). These results indicate

that perceived effectiveness is positively linked to size, rationalization,

innovation, scope of issues (or breadth of strategy), membership heterogeneity,

and environmental scanning. Perceived effectiveness is fairly consistently linkednegatively to centralization, and in some instances, to employer opposition

(Fiorito et al., 1997, 2001; Jarley et al., 1998; Maranto & Fiorito, 1987).

Results for organizing effectiveness are broadly similar, although they vary

somewhat with alternative indicators (e.g. NLRB election win rates, membership

growth, and perceived organizing effectiveness). One notable difference arises for

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rationalization measures. Although rationalization sometimes displays a positive

bivariate relation to organizing effectiveness indicators, there is no multivariate

evidence in support of this hypothesized relation. Also, some additional environ-

mental variables that are particularly relevant to organizing (i.e. representing

employment growth and worker attitudes) have produced mixed results.

Most significant in our mind is the innovation to effectiveness link. Results

from both studies of leadership perceptions of effectiveness and from studies

of organizing effectiveness suggest innovation has a strong positive impact on

such outcomes. Combined with our earlier discussion of the determinants of

innovation, our reading of the literature to date suggests unions have directcontrol over several important factors that shape their future. By increasing size

and rationalizing administrative structures, unions can enhance innovation, and

through innovation they influence effectiveness.

Whether such change can result in a resurgence in unionism is an open

question. Although empirical models can identify factors that explain variation

in measures of interest, such variation needs to be placed in the proper context.

In this regard, it should be noted that both the studies that employed objective

and subjective indicators of organizing or global union effectiveness took place

in a period of relative union decline. The analyses identify those unions that

did and felt that they did relatively better than others over the period, but few

if any unions experienced dramatic improvements in their fortunes.

EMERGENT ISSUES

Although there are many particular topics that one could address under the

heading of national unions as organizations, two in particular strike us as

currently at issue and deserving attention. These are union renewal and the

organizing model, and information technology.

Union Renewal and the Organizing Model

Union renewal (or revitalization) generally refers to union efforts to reverse

their decline. Although there is some debate about the meaning of particular

terms such as renewal, there is general consensus that unions in several advanced

industrial nations, including the U.S. and Britain, have declined substantially,and need to restore their vitality through membership growth.

In examining the U.S. case, Hurd (1998) referred to the need for unions to

contest the dinosaur image. That is, unions need to reestablish their relevance

in todays society to turnaround the sort of dinosaur perception alluded to at

the opening of this essay. Hurd provided a cogent historical review of how U.S.

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unions came to their present predicament. He reviewed how the AFL-CIO

leadership of the 1980s and early 1990s belatedly accepted the need for change,

and initially favored structural changes (e.g. creating a new department focused

on organizing, establishing the Organizing Institute to provide a school for

organizers).

Although such changes may have ultimately contributed to a turnaround, by

the mid-1990s, there was a growing sense that the AFL-CIOs reform initia-

tives were offering too little too late, leading to a change in AFL-CIO leadership,

the new Sweeney administration. The key thrust of the new administration has

been an emphasis on organizing. In a broader context, this is part of an emphasison activism and mobilization (Hurd, 1998). But clearly the emphasis is on

organizing. Sweeney set a goal of spending 30% of union budgets on

organizing by 2000. No one knows what the corresponding percent was in 1995

when Sweeney took office. Most observers estimate it was less than 5%, and

a 1997 survey showed that national unions estimated they were spending about

12% of their budgets, on average, on organizing at that time (Fiorito, Jarley &

Delaney, 1998). (It seems quite likely these self-reported figures were a bit

inflated given the social desirability effect in the context of public calls from

Sweeney and others for much higher percentages.)

Along with a philosophical and budgetary commitment to organizing, a key

element of Sweeneys program has been the promotion of the organizing

model (OM), although its development preceded his leadership of theAFL-CIO by several years (Hurd, 1998). Interpretations of this model vary,

and the discussion following simplifies for illustration. The OM is generally

seen to involve an emphasis on worker activism and mobilization in the pursuit

of new members, bargaining and political effectiveness, and social justice. In

many respects, it is a return to the mutual aid logic that governed union

organization and development in the American labor movements formative

years (Bacharach, Bamberger & Sonnenstuhl, 2001). It is often contrasted with

the servicing model (SM). In its simplest form, the SM refers to the idea of

union members paying dues in exchange for services. It stands for a passive

membership who look upon their union membership as a sort of insurance

policy, their union as a sort of vending machine. In the SM, workers ask what

can the union do for us? In the OM, workers ask what can we do through

the union? As Hurd put it: Under the organizing model, the role of the unionwould be to help workers find collective solutions to their work-related

concerns (1998, p. 23).

In principle, the budgetary objective and the OM are complementary. Unions

National Unions as Organizations

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