NATIONAL GRID CORPORATION CBAA CASE NO. L-135- 2016 OF …

Republic of the Philippines

CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS 7th Floor, EDPC Bldg., BSP Complex,

Roxas Blvd., Manila

NATIONAL GRID CORPORATION CBAA CASE NO. L-135- 2016

OF THE PHILIPPINES, LBAA Case Nos. 2015-001

Petitioner-Appellant, City of Muntinlupa

-versus-

THE LOCAL BOARD OF

ASSESSMENT APPEALS, CITY OF

MUNTINLUPA

Appellee,

-and-

ANASTACIO L. MINOZA, in his

capacity as ICO, City Treasurer

of Muntinlupa, and HERMINIO

DELA CRUZ, in his official

capacity as the City Assessor of

Muntinlupa,

Respondents-Appellees.

x-----------------------------------------x

R E S O L U T I O N

Submitted for Resolution by this Board is the Petitioner-

Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration praying for

reconsideration of the 27 November 2017 Resolution in the

above-entitled case, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Board, hereby

Resolves to DISMISS the case for failure of Petitioner-

Appellant to perfect an appeal on time.

SO ORDERED.”

Petitioner-Appellant received a copy of the said

Resolution on 12 December 2017. On 05 January 2018, this

Board received through registered mail Petitioner-Appellant’s

Motion for Reconsideration dated December 20, 2017

(“Motion”).

On 20 July 2018, this Board issued a Notice giving

Respondents-Appellees ten (10) days from receipt of the

CBAA CASE NO. L-135-2016

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Petitioner-Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration to file their

Comment/Opposition. On 05 September 2018, Respondents-

Appellees’ Manifestation with Motion to Admit Comment and

Comment/Opposition dated 13 August 2018 (Re: Motion for

Reconsideration) were received by this Board.

On 08 October 2018, this Board received Petitioner-

Appellant’s Opposition (To Respondents-Appellees’

Manifestation with Motion to Admit Comment/Opposition

dated 04 September 2018). Subsequently, on 09 November

2018, copy of Respondents-Appellees’ Reply (Re: Petitioner-

Appellant`s Opposition to Respondents-Appellees’

Manifestation with Motion to Admit Comment/Opposition

dated 04 September 2018) was received by this Board.

Subsequently on 21 November 2018, Petitioner-Appellant’s

Rejoinder (To Respondent-Appellees’ Reply dated 25 October

2018) was received by this Board.

Petitioner-Appellant moves for reconsideration of the

Resolution issued by this Board and to deny Respondents-

Appellees’ Motion to Admit/Comment Opposition to Petitioner-

Appellant`s Motion.

I. Petitioner-Appellant’s Motion For Reconsideration

In the instant motion, Petitioner-Appellant stated the

following arguments:

1. The ruling in NPC vs. Benguet is not applicable in the

instant case based on the following:

a. In NPC v. Benguet, the applicable rules of procedure

in the filing of appeal is the 1996 Rules of Procedure

before the LBAA (1996 Rules) issued by this Board;

while in the present case, the applicable rules of

procedure is the 2013 Consolidated and Revised Rules

of Procedure before the LBAA and the CBAA (2013

Rules) which was also issued by this Board;

b. In NPC v. Benguet, the 1996 Rules does not have a

specific provision for the aggrieved party to file a

motion for reconsideration; while in the instant case,

the 2013 Rules includes a provision on the filing of a

motion for reconsideration;

i. Section 1, Rule VIII of the 1996 Rules simply

provides:

“Section 1. Period of Appeal; Where to Appeal;

How Appeal Taken. – Any party aggrieved by the


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decision, order or resolution of the Local Board

may appeal to the Central Board within the period

and in the manner prescribed under Rule IV of the

Rules of Procedure before the Central Board of

Assessment Appeals.”

ii. Rule IV of the Rules of Procedure before the

Central Board of Assessment Appeals provides:

“Section 2. Who may appeal; when to appeal; -

Any party in a case before the Local Board who

feels aggrieved by the decision, resolution or order

of the said Local Board may, within thirty (30) days

from and after receipt of the said decision,

resolution or order, appeal to the Central Board.”

iii. On the other hand, the 2013 Rules provides:

“(c) The party or parties aggrieved by the decision

or final resolution of a Local Board concerned may,

within thirty (30) days from notice of said decision

or final resolution, appeal to the Central Board of

Assessment Appeals.”(Section 5, Rule III, LBAA

Rules)

“SEC. 6. Motion for Reconsideration – Within the

period for perfecting an appeal from the decision,

resolution or final order of the Local Board of

Assessment Appeals, the aggrieved party may file

a motion for reconsideration, after serving the

adverse party with a copy thereof: Provided, That

only one such motion shall be allowed.” (Rule III,

LBAA Rules)

c. In NPC vs. Benguet, there was no reason for the

Supreme Court to apply the fresh period rule after the

denial of the motion for reconsideration because the

rules of procedure at that time does not provide for

filing such motion, and limits the period for the filing of

appeal within thirty (30) days from and after receipt of

the said decision, resolution or order issued by the

LBAA. After the denial of NPC`s motion for

reconsideration, NPC had only the remaining period

of the thirty (30) days to file its appeal before the

CBAA. Thus, there exists a valid reason for the non-

application of the Neypes ruling (Fresh Period

Doctrine) which the Supreme Court held to be

applicable to judicial proceedings.

d. The situation in the instant case is very much different.

The 2013 Rules not only allows the filing of a motion for

reconsideration, but also allows the filing of the


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appeal before this Board within thirty (30) days from

notice of the decision or final resolution issued by the

LBAA.

e. The inclusion of the words “or final resolution” is crucial

as clearly explained by the Supreme Court in the

Neypes case, to wit:

“Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be

taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment

or final order appealed from. A final judgment or

order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving

nothing more for the court to do with respect to it.

It is an adjudication on the merits which,

considering the evidence presented at the trial,

declares categorically what the rights and

obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order

or judgment that dismisses an action. xxx

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their

notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days,

counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of

notice denying their motion for reconsideration).

This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41,

Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal

shall be taken within 15 days from notice of

judgment or final order appealed from. The use of

the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and

independence of one thing from another. It should,

as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it

ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or in the

above provision supposes that the notice of

appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice

of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the

final order, which we already determined to refer

to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a

new trial or reconsideration.” (Emphasis supplied).

f. The 2013 Rules on appeal should be construed

similarly that is, the appeal may be filed by Petitioner

NGCP within 30 days from receipt of the notice of the

decision or 30 days from receipt of the final order

which is the order denying the omnibus motion for

reconsideration that was received by Petitioner NGCP

on 10 March 2016.

g. On the non-applicability of the Neypes ruling or fresh

period doctrine in the instant case, being an

administrative action, there is a need to distinguish the

cases cited in NPC vs. Benguet with the instant case.


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i. In the case of Julieta Panolino v. Joshepine L.

Tajala, G.R. No. 183616, 29 June 2010 (Panolino v.

Tajala) , the Neypes rule was not applied because

appeal from the decision or order of the DENR

regional office to the DENR Secretary is governed by

Section 1 of the Administrative Order (AO) No. 87,

Series of 1990 which provides:

“SECTION 1. Perfection of Appeals.

(a) Unless otherwise provided by law or

executive order, appeals from the

decisions/orders of the DENR Regional Offices

shall be perfected within fifteen (15) days after

receipt of a copy of the decision/order

complained of by the party adversely

affected, by filing with the Regional Office

which adjudicated the case a notice of

appeal, serving copies thereof upon the

prevailing party and the Office of the

Secretary, and paying the required fees.

(b) If a motion for reconsideration of the

decision/order of the Regional Office is filed

and such motion for reconsideration is denied,

the movant shall have the right to perfect his

appeal during the remainder of the period for

appeal, reckoned from receipt of the

resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed

on reconsideration, the aggrieved party shall

have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the

resolution of reversal within which to perfect his

appeal.

(c) The Regional office shall, upon perfection of

the appeal, transmit the records of the case to

the Office of the Secretary with each page

numbered consecutively and initialed by the

custodian of the records.

Xxx

“SECTION 6. Applicability of the Rules of Court. The

Rules of Court shall apply when not inconsistent with

the provisions hereof. (emphasis and underscoring

supplied)

Thus, the Supreme Court held:

“Petitioner’s present case is administrative in nature

involving an appeal from the decision or order of the

DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary. Such

appeal is indeed governed by Section 1 of


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Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990. As earlier

quoted, Section 1 clearly provides that if the motion

for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall perfect

his appeal “during the remainder of the period of

appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of

denial;” whereas if the decision is reversed, the

adverse party has a fresh 15-day period to perfect his

appeal.”

ii. Likewise, in the case of San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders

and Development Group, Inc. v. Ma. Cristina F.

Bayang1, involving an appeal from the decision of

HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office of the

President, the Supreme Court did not apply the “fresh

period rule” in Neypes because the rules and

regulations governing appeals from decisions of the

HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office of the

President are Section 2, Rule XXI of HLURB Resolution

No. 765, series of 2004, in relation to Par. 2 Section1 of

Administrative Order No.18, series of 1987. Thus, the

Supreme Court also held:

“Section 2, Rule XXI of the HLURB Resolution No.

765, series of 2004, prescribing the rules and

regulations governing appeals from decisions of

the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the

President, pertinently reads:

Section 2. Appeal. - Any party may, upon notice

to the Board and the other party, appeal a

decision rendered by the Board of

Commissioners to the Office of the President

within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, in

accordance with P.D. No. 1344 and A.O. No. 18

Series of 1987.

The pendency of the motion for

reconsideration shall suspend the running of the

period of appeal to the Office of the President.

Corollary thereto, paragraph 2, Section 1 of

Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987,

provides that in case the aggrieved party files a

motion for reconsideration from an adverse

decision of any agency/office, the said party has

the only remaining balance of the prescriptive

period within which to appeal, reckoned from

receipt of notice of the decision denying his/her

motion for reconsideration.

1 G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015.


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Thus, in applying the above-mentioned rules to the

present case, we find that the CA correctly

affirmed the OP in dismissing the petitioners'

appeal for having been filed out of time.”

h. Based on the foregoing, it is aptly observed that, in

not applying the Neypes ruling in the cited cases, the

Supreme Court took into consideration the applicable

provisions of the rules of procedure of the concerned

administrative agencies. It did not rule simply on the

basis that the cases involved are administrative, and

not judicial in nature.

i. Thus, it is safe to conclude that, where the rules of

procedure adopted by a particular body or agency

specifically include a provision depriving the

aggrieved party fresh period of appeal in case of

denial of his/her motion for reconsideration; or there is

no provision specifically allowing or there is no such

provision that tends to allow the application of fresh

period rule; then , the Neypes rule would not apply as

it is applicable only in judicial proceedings and not to

administrative proceedings. These situations are best

illustrated in the cases of Patalino v. Tajala, San Jose

Builders v. Bayang and NPC vs. Benguet.

j. Stated otherwise, the Neypes rule would apply even

in administrative proceedings if the rules adopted by

the concerned agency contain a provision allowing

the application of fresh period rule. Such a situation

applies to the case of Petitioner-Appellant NGCP.

2. According to Petitioner-Appellant the 2013

Consolidated and Revised Rules of Procedures before the LBAA

and the CBAA issued by this Board allows the fresh period rule,

that is NGCP may file its appeal before this Board within a

period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the LBAA final order on

18 August 2016 denying its Motion for Reconsideration. To

support this allegation, Petitioner-Appellant averred that:

a. A reading of all the other relevant provisions of the

2013 Rules, specifically so when it allows the filing of a

Motion for Reconsideration, would readily lead to the

likely conclusion that fresh period is allowed;

b. To reiterate the inclusion of the words “or final

resolution” in Section 5 (c) Rule III of the LBAA Rules is

very important as it led Petitioner-Appellant NGCP to

reasonably believe that it could file its appeal to this

Honorable Board within thirty (30) days from notice of

said decision or final resolution issued by the Appellee-


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LBAA, the final resolution being the denial of its Omnibus

Motion for Reconsideration by the LBAA;

c. Equally significant to mention is the inclusion on Motion

for Reconsideration and the words “or final resolution” in

the 2013 Rules which were absent or not included in the

1996 Rules. The adoption of said provisions in the 2013

Rules clearly indicates inclusion or allowance in the Rules

of the fresh period rule;

d. With the adoption of the Supreme Court of the

Neypes ruling, the same already formed part of the Rules

of Court. As such, said rule has been adopted by the

2013 LBAA and CBAA Rules as provided under Section 3,

Rule 1, to wit:

“SEC. 3. In the absence of any applicable

provision in these Rules, the pertinent provisions

of the Rules of Court of the Philippines may,

whenever practicable and convenient in the

interest of expeditious dispensation of justice, be

applied by analogy or in a suppletory character

and effect.”

e. The application of the Neypes ruling is not inconsistent

with the provisions of the 2013 Rules. In fact, it clarifies

and supplements the 2013 Rules providing clearer

guidance to parties in the expeditious and inexpensive

settlement of their cases.

3. Petitioner-Appellant argued that in filing the Motion for

Reconsideration, Petitioner NGCP was merely following the

provisions of the rules promulgated by this Board and should

not be penalized for doing so, otherwise, it would be unfair and

would constitute denial of due process. Petitioner-Appellant

further stated the following explanations:

a. In filing its Motion for Consideration before the

Appellee- LBAA and the subsequent appeal to this

Honorable Board, Petitioner-Appellant simply complied

with the provisions of Section 5 (c) and Section 6 of Rule

III of the 2013 Consolidated and Revised Rules of

Procedures before the LBAA and the CBAA issued by no

less than this Board;

b. The 2013 Rules, as discussed above, allows an

aggrieved party to file a Motion for Reconsideration

within thirty (30) day period for perfecting an appeal

and to file its subsequent appeal in case of denial of the

motion for reconsideration within the same period


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reckoned from receipt of final resolution denying the

same;

c. Applying paragraph (c) of Section 5, Rule III of the

Rules, the Order of Appellee LBAA dated 22 July 2016

received by Petitioner-Appellant NGCP on 18 August

2016 is considered as the Final Resolution where an

aggrieved party, such as Petitioner-Appellant NGCP,

may appeal to the CBAA within thirty (30) days from

receipt thereof;

d. Therefore, the Memorandum of Appeal filed by

Petitioner-Appellant on 16 September 2016 before this

Honorable Board assailing the Decision dated 21

December 2015 and Order dated 22 July 2016 issued by

Appellee LBAA is within the thirty (30) day period for

perfecting an appeal before this Honorable Board;

e. It must be stressed that Petitioner NGCP should not be

faulted and penalized with dismissal of its appeal for

merely relying on the very Rules of Procedure

promulgated and adopted by this Honorable Board

pursuant to Section 230 of the Local Government Code.

f. The Rules are clear and allow the suppletory and

application of the Rules of Court in the absence of any

applicable provision “whenever practicable and

convenient in the interest of expeditious dispensation of

justice”;

g. Hence, the 2013 Rules of Procedure promulgated and

adopted by this Honorable Board allow the application

of the fresh period rule in the Neypes case unlike in the

cases of Patalino vs. Tajala, San Jose Builders v. Bayang

and NPC vs. Benguet;

h. For this Honorable Board, after issuing and adopting

such Rules of Procedure in 2013, to now deny the

applicability of the fresh period rule without taking into

consideration the factual and legal circumstances

peculiar to the instant case pending before it, would be

unfair and cause injustice on the part of Petitioner-

Appellant who relied on such Rules;

i. Certainly, the dismissal of Petitioner NGCP`s appeal for

relying on and following the Rules of Procedure issued by

this Board would be an injustice which is tantamount to

denial of due process on its part;

j. In the interest of substantial justice and due process,

Petitioner-Appellant NGCP respectfully submits that the

appeal should be given due course by this Honorable

Board based on the provisions of the 2013 Consolidated


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and Revised Rules of Procedures before the LBAA and

CBAA, for the following reasons:

a. The Rules do not include a specific provision

disallowing a fresh period rule;

b. The Rules allow suppletory application (Section

3-Rule1) of the Rules of Curt which include the

Neypes doctrine;

c. The Rules allow liberal construction to promote

their objectives and to assist the parties in

obtaining just, expeditious and inexpensive

determination of every action relative to

assessment of real property and collection real

property taxes. (Section 2, Rule I);

d. The Rules do not adhere technical rules

applicable in judicial proceedings (Section 5(b)

Rule III) ;

k. In the case of Heirs of Victoriana Villagracia v.

Equitable Banking Corporation2 , the Supreme Court

held:

“However, in the instant case, we are of the view

that the ends of justice will be better served if it is

determined on the merits, after full opportunity is

given to all parties for ventilation of their causes

and defenses, rather than on technicality or some

procedural imperfections. It is far better to dispose

of the case on the merits, which is a primordial

end, rather than on a technicality that may result

in injustice. While it is desirable that the Rules of

Court be faithfully observed, courts should not be

too strict with procedural lapses that do not really

impair the proper administration of justice.

The rules are intended to ensure the proper

and orderly conduct of litigation because of

the higher objective they seek, which is the

attainment of justice and the protection of

substantive rights of the parties. In Republic v.

Imperial [362 Phil. 466], the Court, through Mr.

Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., stressed that

the filing of the appellant's brief in appeals is

not a jurisdictional requirement. But an appeal

may be dismissed by the CA on grounds

enumerated under Rule 50 of the Rules of

Court. The Court has the power to relax or

suspend the rules or to except a case from their

operation when compelling reasons so warrant,

or when the purpose of justice requires it.”

2 G.R. No. 136972, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 60.


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4. Petitioner-Appellant stated that the rules of procedure

should be liberally construed to promote substantial justice. To

defend its position Petitioner-Appellant declared the following:

a. Settled is the rule that the right to appeal, being

merely a statutory privilege, should be exercised in the

manner prescribed by law, such as the Consolidated

and Revised Rules of Procedures before the LBAA and

CBAA. As consistently held by the Supreme Court, non-

observance by a party-litigant of the Rules of Court and

failure to offer a valid and acceptable excuse for non-

compliance is fatal to one`s cause. Nonetheless, it is

equally true that, in proceedings before administrative

bodies, the general rule has always been liberality.

b. Strict compliance with the rules of procedure in

administrative cases is not required by law3.

Administrative rules of procedure should be construed

liberally in order to promote their object to assist the

parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive

determination of their respective claims and defenses4.

c. As a matter fact, this Honorable Board in the 2013

Consolidated and Revised Rules of Procedure before the

LBAA and the CBAA, adopts and applies liberal

construction of the rules, to wit:

“SEC. 2. Construction – These Rules shall be liberally

construed to promote their objectives and to assist the

parties in obtaining just, expeditious and inexpensive

determination of every action relative to the

assessment of real property and collection of real

property taxes.” (emphasis ours)

d. In the case of Emelie L. Besaga vs. Spouses Felipe

Acosta and Luzviminda Acosta and Digna Matalag

Coching G. R. No. 194061, 20 April 2015 (Besaga vs.

Acosta), wherein Acosta, instead of filing a Notice of

Appeal to the DENR Regional Executive Director, filed a

Memorandum of Appeal to the DENR Secretary and

paid the appeal fee beyond the 15 day period violating

Section 1 (a) of DENR Department Administrative Order

No. 87 series of 1990, which requires the filing of a Notice

of Appeal and the payment of the appeal fee within the

reglementary period, the Supreme Court categorically

and clearly explained the nature of administrative rules

of procedure as follows:

3 Barcelona vs. Lim, G.R. No. 189171, June 05, 2014. 4 Ibid.


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“It is true that the right to appeal, being merely a

statutory privilege, should be exercised in the

manner prescribed by law. This has been

consistently held in relation to non-observance by

a party-litigant of the Rules of Court and failure to

offer a valid and acceptable excuse for non-

compliance.

Yet, it is equally true that in proceedings before

administrative bodies the general rule has always

been liberality.

Strict compliance with the rules of procedure in

administrative cases is not required by law.28

Administrative rules of procedure should be

construed liberally in order to promote their object

to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and

inexpensive determination of their respective

claims and defenses. xxx

The liberality of procedure in administrative actions,

however, is subject to limitations imposed by the

requirements of due process.

Administrative due process means reasonable

opportunity to be heard. As held in Vivo v. Pagcor:

“The observance of fairness in the conduct of

any investigation is at the very heart of

procedural due process. The essence of due

process is to be heard, and, as applied to

administrative proceedings, this means a fair

and reasonable opportunity to explain one's

side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration

of the action or ruling complained of.

Administrative due process cannot be fully

equated with due process in its strict judicial

sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type

hearing is not always necessary, and technical

rules of procedure are not strictly applied.”

e. Petitioner-Appellant added that further in the case of

Birkenstock Orthopaedie GmbH and Co. KG v. Philippine

Shoe Expo Marketing Corp.5, the Supreme Court held:

“It is well-settled that the rules of procedure are

mere tools aimed at facilitating the attainment of

justice, rather than its frustration. A strict and rigid

application of the rules must always be eschewed

when it would subvert the primary objective of the

rules, that is, to enhance fair trials and expedite

justice. Technicalities should never be used to

5 G.R. No. 194307, November 20, 2013. 710 SCRA 474, 482.


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defeat the substantive rights of the other party.

Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest

opportunity for the proper and just determination

of his cause, free from the constraints of

technicalities, x x x. This is especially true with

quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, such as

the IPO, which are not bound by technical rules of

procedure.”

f. With all due respect, this Honorable Board should have

liberally construed the rules so as not to defeat the

substantive rights of Petitioner-Appellant NGCP

considering that there is already a case decided by the

Supreme Court regarding its exemption from payment of

real property taxes in the case of National Grid

Corporation of the Philippines vs. Ofelia M. Oliva, G.R.

No. 213157 and Ofelia M. Oliva vs. National Grid

Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No. 21358 (sic) (NPC

vs. Oliva case) which already became final and

executory.

g. In Besaga vs. Acosta6, in upholding liberal construction

in administrative cases, the Supreme Court examined

whether the errors breached due process so as to call for

the strict application of the administrative procedures. In

said case, according to Petitioner-Appellant the

Supreme Court found no violation of due process as the

procedural lapses were neither prejudicial nor unfair to

petitioner and the Supreme Court held that:

“First, there is no violation of due process. In fact, to

sustain the position of the petitioner and strictly apply

Section l(a) of DAO No. 87 may violate the respondent

spouses right to due process as this would result to a

denial of their right to appeal.xxx

Between strict construction of administrative rules of

procedure for their own sake and their liberal

application in order to enhance fair trials and

expedite justice, we uphold the latter. After all,

administrative rules of procedure do not operate in a

vacuum. The rules facilitate just, speedy and

inexpensive resolution of disputes before

administrative bodies. The better policy is to apply

these rules in a manner that would give effect rather

than defeat their intended purpose.” (emphasis ours)

h. In the instant case, Petitioner-Appellant NGCP`s

reliance on the Rules issued by this Board in filing its

appeal before this Board did not violate the right of

Respondent-Appellee City Assessor to due process.

Petitioner-Appellant paid the corresponding docket fees

6 Ibid.


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and furnished Respondent-Appellee copies of the

Memorandum of Appeal and all the pleadings and

documents required by this Board to be submitted;

i. In short, Respondent-Appellee was given all the

chances and opportunities to ventilate its position before

this Board and participated in very stage of the

administrative proceeding and her right to be heard was

not compromised. Thus, there being no violation of

Respondent-Appellee`s right to due process, there is

enough room to apply the liberal construction of the

Rules;

j. On the other hand, strict application of the LBAA and

CBAA rules would result to a denial of Petitioner-

Appellant`s right to appeal as guaranteed by the Rules.

k. Petitioner-Appellant NGCP is not unmindful of equally

important decisions7 of the Supreme Court as cited by

this Honorable Board that the failure to perfect an

appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere

technicality but it is jurisdictional. However, we appeal to

this Honorable Board to take into consideration the

peculiar circumstances obtaining in the case at bar as

discussed above, as compared with the cited cases

wherein the laws of procedure relied upon are clear

and not subject of conflicting interpretations;

5. Petitioner-Appellant alleged that assuming this Board

would rule in favor of Petitioner-Appellant NGCP and acquire

jurisdiction over the instant case, Petitioner-Appellant NGCP

respectfully submits that the subject properties should be

declared as exempt from payment of real property tax

pursuant to its franchise, R.A. 9511 and based on the following:

a. Section 9 of R.A. No.9511 clearly provides that NGCP is

exempt from the payment of real property tax on

properties used in connection with its franchise;

b. Said exemption of NGCP from payment of real

property taxes on properties used in connection with its

franchise was upheld by the Supreme Court in the case

of National Grid Corporation of the Philippines vs. Ofelia

M. Oliva, G.R. No. 213157 and Ofelia M. Oliva vs.

National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No.

21358 (sic) The Supreme Court, through Associate Justice

Antonio T. Carpio, categorically held:

“NGCP took control of the subject properties in 2009.

Although laws on real property taxes are prescribed

7 National Power Corporation vs. Spouses Lorenzo L. Laohoo, et.al. G.R. No. 151973, July 23, 2009

and Marcos V. Prieto vs. CA, et.al, G.R. No. 158597, June 18, 2012.


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by the Local Government Code, it is imperative to

examine the applicable tax provisions in NGCP’s

franchise.

Section 9 of RA 9511 provides that NGCP shall pay "a

franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of all

gross receipts derived by the Grantee from its

operation under this franchise." This franchise tax is "in

lieu of income tax and any and all taxes, duties, fees

and charges of any kind, nature or description

levied, established or collected by any authority

whatsoever, local or national, on its franchise, rights,

privileges, receipts, revenues and profits, and on

properties used in connection with its franchise, from

which taxes, duties and charges, the Grantee is

hereby expressly exempted.

It is very clear that NGCP's payment of franchise tax

exempts it from payment of real property taxes on

properties used in connection with its franchise.

However, NGCP's tax exempt status on real property

due to the "in lieu of all taxes" clause is qualified:

NGCP shall be liable to pay the same tax as other

corporations on real estate, buildings and personal

property exclusive of their franchise. The phrase

"exclusive of this franchise" means that real estate,

buildings, and personal property used in the exercise

of the franchise are not subjet to the same tax as

other corporations.

The CBAA should determine whether the subject

properties are properties used in connection with

NGCP's franchise. If the subject properties are used in

connection with NGCP's franchise, then NGCP is

exempt from paying real property taxes on the

subject properties.”

c. The aforesaid decision of the Honorable Supreme

Court has already become final and executory ;

d. Considering that the properties involved are used as

right of way for the Binan-Muntinlupa 230kV Transmission

Line and by their very nature and purpose necessary for

the operation and maintennace of the NGCP`s power

transmission business which is the subject matter of its

franchise, the same should be declared as exempt from

payment of real property tax.

Petitioner-Appellant prayed that the Resolution of this

Board dated 27 November 2017 be reconsidered and set aside

and new one rendered:


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1. Declaring that Petitioner-Appellant NGCP filed its

appeal before this Board within the reglementary

period as provided in the 2013 Consolidated and

Revised Rules of Procedures before the LBAA and

CBAA;

2. Reversing and setting aside the Decision and Order

of Respondent-Appellee LBAA dated 21 December

2015 and 18 August 2016, respectively;

3. Declaring subject properties as Exempt from payment

of RPTs

In the Assessment Roll and in the Tax Declarations;

and

4. Ordering the refund of Php 161,241.17, the amount

paid by NGCP under protest.

II. Respondents-Appellees’ Manifestation with Motion

Respondents-Appellees averred that on 3 August 2018

Respondents-Appellees received the Order dated 20 July 2018,

requiring respondents to file their Comment to Appellant`s

Motion for Reconsideration to the Order dated November 27,

2017. Respondents-Appellees manifested that they complied

with the Order of the Board by submitting their Comment on 13

August 2018. However, Respondents-Appellees inadvertently

addressed the Comment to a case, docketed as CBAA Case

No. L-127 entitled “National Power Corporation vs. Local Board

of Assessment” (sic) which was previously being presided by this

Board and which Respondent City of Muntinlupa was a party.

Respondents-Appellees stated that on 24 August 2018, copies

of the Comment/Opposition were sent back to them. Hence,

Respondents-Appellees are submitting their Comment to the

Motion for Reconsideration containing the same allegations in

the motion previously sent, except for the case title and docket

number. Respondents-Appellees are asking for the kind

indulgence of this Board to admit the same.

III. Respondents-Appellees` Comment/Opposition (Re:

Motion for Reconsideration)

Respondents-Appellees argued that contrary to

Appellant`s contentions, the fresh period rules do not apply to

quasi-judicial agencies. Respondents-Appellees cited the case

of Judith Yu vs. Hon. Sta. Rosa Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979,

February 9, 2011, the Honorable Supreme Court ruled the

applicability of the fresh-period rule and states that:


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“In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil

cases on the counting of the 15-day period within which

to appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of

15 days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration

within which to appeal, thus:

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural

rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend,

repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified

and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of

cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the

Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the

Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and

compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These

extensions may consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the

Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal

their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh

period of 15 days within which to file the notice of

appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt

of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion

for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to

Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial

Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for

review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of

Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial

agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing

appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule

aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to

be counted from receipt of the order denying the

motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether

full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

According to Respondents-Appellees, the Honorable

Supreme Court categorically stated that the fresh-period rule

only applied to the technical rules before the Courts of Justice

applying Rule 40, 42, 43 and 45. Respondents-Appellees argued

that Appellant`s declaration that the fresh-period rules also

applies to quasi-judicial agencies is bereft of merit.

Respondents-Appellees stated that it must be emphasized

that though the Honorable Supreme Court promulgated the

fresh-period rule, the same does not apply to all Court

proceedings before the Courts of Justice as penned in the

case of Nilo Pates vs. Comelec, GR. No. 184915, June 30, 2009,

where the Honorable Supreme Court provided that the fresh-

period rules does not apply to Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, to

wit:


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“Thus, as a matter of law, our ruling of November

11, 2008 to dismiss the petition for late filing cannot but

be correct. This ruling is not without its precedent; we

have previously ordered a similar dismissal in the earlier

case of Domingo v. Commission on Elections. The Court,

too, has countless times in the past stressed that the Rules

of Court must be followed. Thus, we had this to say

in Fortich v. Corona:

Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated

with utmost respect and due regard since they are

designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to

remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution

of rival claims and in the administration of justice. The

requirement is in pursuance to the bill of rights inscribed

in the Constitution which guarantees that "all persons

shall have a right to the speedy disposition of their before

all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies," the

adjudicatory bodies and the parties to a case are thus

enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While it is true that

a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally

true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance

with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and

speedy administration of justice. There have been some

instances wherein this Court allowed a relaxation in the

application of the rules, but this flexibility was "never

intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate

the rules with impunity." A liberal interpretation and

application of the rules of procedure can be resorted to

only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and

circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)

As emphasized above, exceptional circumstances

or compelling reasons may have existed in the past

when we either suspended the operation of the Rules or

exempted a particular case from their application. But,

these instances were the exceptions rather than the

rule, and we invariably took this course of action only

upon a meritorious plea for the liberal construction of the

Rules of Court based on attendant exceptional

circumstances. These uncommon exceptions allowed us

to maintain the stability of our rulings, while allowing for

the unusual cases when the dictates of justice demand

a correspondingly different treatment.

Under this unique nature of the exceptions, a party

asking for the suspension of the Rules of Court comes to

us with the heavy burden of proving that he deserves to

be accorded exceptional treatment. Every plea for a

liberal construction of the Rules must at least be

accompanied by an explanation of why the party-

litigant failed to comply with the rules and by a

justification for the requested liberal construction.


R E S O L U T I O N

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Significantly, the petitioner presented no

exceptional circumstance or any compelling reason to

warrant the non-application of Section 3, Rule 64 to his

petition. He failed to explain why his filing was late. Other

than his appeal to history, uniformity, and convenience,

he did not explain why we should adopt and apply the

fresh period rule to an election case.

To us, the petitioners omissions are fatal, as his

motion does not provide us any reason specific to his

case why we should act as he advocates.”

Respondents-Appellees argued that the foregoing rulings

made by the Honorable Supreme Court to the effect that the

fresh-period rule is an exception rather than a rule and that its

application is not all encompassing that warrant its application

to all technical rules of Courts of Justice and quasi-judicial

agencies. Respondents-Appellees concluded that the Central

Board of Assessment Appeals properly dismissed the Appeal of

Appellant due to failure to timely file its appeal and to

appreciate the fresh period rule.

Respondents-Appellees prayed that the Motion for

Reconsideration filed By Appellant be dismissed for utter lack of

merit.

IV. Petitioner-Appellant`s Opposition (To Respondent-

Appellees` Manifestation with Motion to Admit

Comment/Opposition dated 04 September 2018)

Petitioner-Appellant stated that under Section 13, Rule IV

of the 2013 Consolidated and Revised Rules of Procedure

before the LBAA and CBAA8 (“CBAA and LBAA Rules”), which

was likewise stated in the Notice of Decision dated 01

December 2017 issued by this Honorable Board, an opposition

to the motion for reconsideration may be made within 10 days

from receipt of the motion, to wit:

“SEC. 13. Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration – The

adverse party may, within ten (10) days from receipt of

a copy of the Motion for Reconsideration, file an

Opposition thereto. Failure to do so shall render the

motion deemed submitted for resolution.”

Petitioner-Appellant argued that on 27 December 2017,

NGCP filed its Motion for Reconsideration, and the same was

sent to Respondents-Appellees and their counsel on 27

8 Now 2nd Paragraph of Section 13(sic), Rule IV of the 2016 Consolidated and Revised Rules of

Procedures before the LBAA and CBAA.


R E S O L U T I O N

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December 2018 (sic). Petitioner-Appellant added that based

on the foregoing, Respondent-Appellees’ Manifestation with

Motion to Admit Comment/Opposition to NGCP’s Motion for

Reconsideration should be denied considering that it was filed

beyond the ten (10) day period to file their comment.

Petitioner-Appellant cited the case of Producers Bank of

the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126620, April 17,

2002, 381 SCRA 185, 192., which states:

“The general rule is that a client is bound by the act of

the counsel, including even mistakes in the realm of

procedural technique.”

Petitioner-Appellant stated the following jurisprudence:

“In the case of Muller vs. Muller (G. R. No. 149615, 29

August 2006, the Supreme Court points out that a litigant

who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes

into equity must with clean hands. The same is a

frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the

principle that he who has done inequity shall not have

equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a

court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been

inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or

deceitful as to the controversy in issue9. It is elementary

that he who comes to court must do so with clean

hands10

Petitioner-Appellant averred that in the present case,

Respondents-Appellees claim that NGCP’s Motion for

Reconsideration should be dismissed on ground of technicality

for failure of NGCP to timely file the appeal. Petitioner-

Appellant added that, however, Respondents-Appellees

themselves are seeking from this Honorable Board, in their

motion, to consider admitting their opposition/comment to

NGCP’s Motion for Reconsideration for failure to comply within

the period to file their comment due to mistake.

Petitioner-Appellant argued that it is but inequitable or

unfair to allow the admission of Respondents-Appellees’

opposition/comment (to NGCP’s motion for reconsideration)

questioning the timeliness of NGCP’s appeal when

Respondent-Appellees themselves failed to comply with the

period within which to file a comment under the CBAA and

LBAA Rules. Petitioner-Appellant concluded that the

Respondents-Appellees’ motion should be denied.

9 University of the Philippines vs. Catungal, Jr. 338 Phil 728,743-744 (1997). 10 Dequito vs. Llamas, G.R. No. L-28090, September 4, 1975, 66 SCRA 504, 510; Camporedondo vs.

National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 129049, August 6, 1999, 312 SC RA 47,48.


R E S O L U T I O N

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Petitioner-Appellant NGCP takes exception to the

arguments raised by the Respondent-Appellees as the cases of

Judith Yu vs. Hon. Sta. Rosa Samson-Tatad and Nilo Pates vs.

Comelec which they cited do not squarely apply in the instant

case. According to Petitioner-Appellant, the aforementioned

cases cited by Respondents-Appellees are not applicable for

the following reasons:

i. In the case of Yu vs. Tatad, a criminal case which is

covered by the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court

applied the fresh period rule. Notwithstanding that the

instant case is an administrative case, the fresh period

rule should also be applied as the CBAA and LBAA

Rules allow a 30-day period from notice of decision or

final resolution issued by the Appellee-LBAA to file an

appeal to this Board. Moreover, the CBAA and LBAA

Rules may be summarized as follows:

a. The CBAA and LBAA Rules do not include a

specific provision disallowing the fresh period

rule;

b. The CBAA and LBAA Rules allow suppletory

application (Section 3-Rule 1) of the Rules of

Court which include Neypes doctrine or fresh

period rule;

c. The CBAA and LBAA Rules allow liberal

construction of the LBAA and CBAA Rules (

Section 2, Rule I);

d. The CBAA and LBAA Rules do not adhere to

technical rules applicable in judicial

proceedings (Section 5 (b) Rule III).

ii. In the case of Pates vs. COMELEC, an election case, it

is not applicable to the instant case for the following

reasons:

a. In Pates vs. COMELEC, the petition was dismissed

because Section 3, Rules 64 of the Rules of Court

provides that petitions for certiorari from decisions

or rulings of the COMELEC en banc has a period of

30 days from notice of the said decision or ruling,

with the intervening period used for the filing of any

motion for reconsideration deductible from the

originally-granted 30 days (instead of the fresh

period); while in the instant case, Sec.6, Rule III and

Par. C, Sec. 5 Rule III of the CBAA and LBAA Rules

provide the guidelines on the filing of a motion for

reconsideration and appeal to CBAA.

1. Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court simply

provides:


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“SEC. 3 Time to file petition. — The petition shall

be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the

judgment or final order or resolution sought to

be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial

or reconsideration of said judgment or final

order or resolution, if allowed under the

procedural rules of the Commission concerned,

shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the

motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file

the petition within the remaining period, but

which shall not be less than five (5) days in any

event, reckoned from notice of denial.”

(emphasis ours)

2. On the other hand, the CBAA and LBAA Rules

provide:

“(c) The party or parties aggrieved by the

decision or final resolution of a Local board

concerned may, within thirty (30) days from

notice of said decision or final resolution, appeal

to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.”

(Section 5, Rule III, LBAA Rules)

“Section. 6. Motion for Reconsideration – Within

the period for perfecting an appeal from the

decision, resolution or final order of the Local

Board of Assessment Appeals , the aggrieved

party may file a motion for reconsideration, after

serving the adverse party with a copy thereof:

Provided, That only one such motion shall be

allowed.” (Rule III, LBAA Rules)

b. In Pates vs. COMELEC, it is specifically provided in

Section 3, Rules 64 of the Rules of Court that in case

a motion for reconsideration was filed, the period

used in filing the same should be deducted from

the 30-day period within which to file a petition for

certiorari under Rule 64. Thus, there exists a valid

reason for the non-application of the Neypes ruling

(Fresh Period Doctrine) since the period to file

petition for certiorari was specifically stated under

Section 3, Rules 64 Rules of Court.

c. The situation in the instant case is very much

different. The CBAA and LBAA Rules allow not only

the filing of a motion for reconsideration, but also

allow the filing of the appeal before this Honorable

Board within (30) days from notice of the decision

or final resolution issued by the LBAA. There was no

provision on the deductibility of the period to

appeal once a motion for reconsideration was


R E S O L U T I O N

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filed by the aggrieved party and the Rules

specifically allow the filing of a Motion for

Reconsideration.

Petitioner-Appellant prayed that Respondents-Appellees’

Motion to Admit Comment/Opposition to NGCP`s Motion for

Reconsideration be denied for utter lack of merit and that

Respondents-Appellees’ Opposition/Comment be expunged

from the records of this case. Petitioner-Appellant further

prayed that the Resolution of this Board dated 27 November

2017 be reconsidered and set aside, and a new one rendered:

1. Declaring that Petitioner-Appellant NGCP filed its

appeal within the reglementary period as provided in

the 2013 Consolidated and Revised Rules of

Procedures before the LBAA and CBAA;

2. Reversing and setting aside the Decision and Order

of Respondent-Appellee LBAA dated 21 December

2015 and 18 August 2016;

3. Declaring subject properties as Exempt from payment

of RPTs

In the Assessment Roll and in the Tax Declarations;

and

4. Ordering the refund of Php 161,241.17, the amount

paid by NGCP under protest.

V. Respondents-Appellees’ REPLY (Re: Petitioner’s Opposition

(To Respondent-Appellees’ Manifestation with Motion to Admit

Comment/Opposition dated 04 September 2018)

Respondents-Appellees averred that they timely filed their

Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration based on the

following arguments:

1. The filing of Opposition by Appellees to the

Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration was by way of

compliance to a Notice dated July 20,2018 requiring

Appellees to file its Comment/Opposition to the

Motion for Reconsideration within a period of ten (10)

days from receipt thereof;

2. The Notice was received by Appellee on August 3,

2018 and on August 13, 2018 a Comment/Opposition

was filed within the rgelementary period given by the

Honorable Board.

Respondents-Appellees likewise asserted that Supreme

Court Neypes ruling on fresh period rule does not apply to

administrative cases. Respondents further invoked the case of

San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders and Dev. Corp., Inc., et.al, vs. Maria

Cristina Banya, G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015, where the

Supreme Court ruled that issue on applicability of fresh period


R E S O L U T I O N

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rule in administrative cases. Hence, it is settled that the “fresh

period rule” in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not

to administrative appeals.

Respondent finally invoked the case of Panolino vs. Tajala,

G.R. No. 183616, June 29, 2010, the High court also resolved the

similar issue of whether the “fresh period rule” applies to an

appeal filed from the decision or order of the DENR regional

office to the DENR Secretary, an appeal which is administrative

in nature. The Supreme Court held that the “fresh period rule”

only covers judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil

procedure.

Respondents-Appellees quoted the fresh period rule in

Neypes ruling:

“To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules

and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their

cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh

period of 15 days within which to file the notice of

appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt

of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion

for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule

40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to

the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review

from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals;

Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the

Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by

certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to

regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be

counted from receipt of the order denying the motion

for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or

partial) or any final order or resolution.

Xxx

As reflected in the above-quoted portion of the decision

in Neypes, the "fresh period rule" shall apply to Rule 40

(appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional

Trial Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional Trial

Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court); Rule

42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of

Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies

to the Court of Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by

certiorari to the Supreme Court). Obviously, these Rules

cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure.

Petitioner’s present case is administrative in nature

involving an appeal from the decision or order of the


R E S O L U T I O N

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DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary. Such appeal

is indeed governed by Section 1 of Administrative Order

No. 87, Series of 1990. As earlier quoted, Section 1 clearly

provides that if the motion for reconsideration is denied,

the movant shall perfect his appeal "during the

remainder of the period of appeal, reckoned from

receipt of the resolution of denial;" whereas if the

decision is reversed, the adverse party has a fresh 15-day

period to perfect his appeal. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a

decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP,

is not judicial but administrative in nature; thus, the "fresh

period rule" in Neypes does not apply.”

Respondents-Appellees, relying on the aforecited

Supreme Court rulings prayed that the Motion for

Reconsideration be denied for utter lack of merit.

VI. Petiioner-Appellant’s REJOINDER (To Respondent

Appellees’ Reply dated 25 October 2018)

Petitioner-Appellant, by way of Rejoinder adoped its

arguments in the Opposition that the ruling in the case of NPC

vs. Benguest does not apply in the instant case on the ground

that the 2013 Consolidated and Revised Rules of Procedures

before the LBAA and the CBAA allows the fresh period of 30

days. Petitioner-Appellant added that it is merely following

the rules promulgated by the CBAA and should not be

penalized in doing so as this would constitute denial of due

process; and that the Rules of procedure should be liberally

construed to promote social justice.

Petitioner-Appellant alleged that in a similar CBAA case

entitled NGCP vs. LBAA of Batangas City and Guadalupe

Judy Tumambing docketed as CBAA Case No. L-133-2016,

where the same issue on the timeliness of filing of an appeal

before the CBAA was being raised, this Board already ruled

that the 2013 LBAA and CBAA Rules of Procedures allowed a

fresh period of 30 days to file an appeal from the motion of

reconsideration. This Board resolved the issue in favor of

Petitioner-Appellant and ruled in favor of timeliness of the

appeal. Petitioner-Appellant reiterated the prayer stated in

their Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition on

Respondents-Appellees` Manifestation and Motion.

RULINGS OF THE BOARD

On Respondents-Appellees’ Manifestation with Motion to Admit

Comment/Opposition


R E S O L U T I O N

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A perusal and comparison between Respondents-

Appellees’ Comment/Oppositions both dated 13 August 2018

which were received by this Board on 23 August 2018 and 05

September 2018, respectively show that the arguments stated

therein are exactly the same except the case title and docket

number. Furthermore, the same issues in the instant case were

discussed in the body of the pleading, while the cited case title

involved different issues. Hence, Respondents-Appellees’

inadvertence in addressing their pleading into another case,

was a mere inadvertence. In the interest of substantial justice,

Respondents-Appellee’s Motion to Admit Comment/Opposition

is hereby GRANTED.

On Petitioner-Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration

After thorough evaluation of the arguments of the

parties, this Board finds Petitioner-Appellant’s Motion impressed

with merit as regards the timeliness of its appeal.

When the instant case was filed in 16 September 2016,

the applicable rules of procedure is the 2013 Consolidated and

Revised Rules of Procedure before the Local Boards of

Assessment Appeals and the Central Board of Assessment

Appeals (2013 LBAA and CBAA Rules of Procedure). On the

other hand, the applicable rules of procedure in the “ National

Power Corporation vs. The Provincial Treasurer of Benguet, the

Provincial Assessor of Benguet, the Municipal Treasurer of

Itogon, Benguet and the Municipal Assessor of Itogon, Benguet,

G.R. No. 209303, 14 Novemebr 2016 (NPC vs. Benguet, et.al

case) is the 1996 Rules of Procedure before the Local Board of

Assessment Appeals and the 1996 Rules of Procedure before

the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. A thorough

evaluation of Rules show that there were significant differences

between the two rules which are pertinent to the issue at hand.

The following are the relevant provisions:

1996 LBAA Rules of Procedure:

RULE VIII

APPEALS TO THE CENTRAL BOARD

Section 1. Period of Appeal; Where to Appeal; How

Appeal Taken. – Any party aggrieved by the decision,

order or resolution of the Local Board may appeal to the

Central Board within the period and in the manner

prescribed under Rule IV of the Rules of Procedure before

the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.


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1996 CBAA Rules of Procedure:

RULE IV

APPEAL

“Section 2. Who may appeal; when to appeal; -Any

party in a case before the Local Board who feels

aggrieved by the decision, resolution or order of the said

Local board may, within thirty (30) days from and after

receipt of the said decision, resolution or order, appeal

to the Central Board.”

2013 LBAA and CBAA Rules of Procedure:

RULE III

PROCEDURE BEFORE THE

LOCAL BOARDS OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS

SEC. 5. Action by the Local Boards of Assessment

Appeals –

xxx

(c) The party or parties aggrieved by the decision or final

resolution of a Local Board concerned may, within thirty

(30) days from notice of said decision or final resolution,

appeal to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.

SEC.6. Motion for Reconsideration – Within the period for

perfecting an appeal from the decision, resolution or

final order of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals, the

aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration,

after serving the adverse party with a copy thereof:

Provided, That only one such motion shall be allowed.

In view of the foregoing, this Board hereby sets aside its

resolution as regards the application of the NPC vs. Benguet

et.al case on the ground that the former Rules of Procedure of

the LBAA did not provide a provision for filing of Motion for

Reconsideration, which is now present in the 2013 Rules of

Procedure applicable in the instant case.

As applied in the instant case, Petitioner-Appellant filed its

Appeal on December 27, 2017 within thirty (30) days from

receipt on December 12, 2017 of the Resolution of their Motion

for Reconsideration, which can be considered as the final

resolution. This Board agrees that Petitioner-Appellant is just

following the rules of procedure which was in effect at the time

of filing of the instant case.


R E S O L U T I O N

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WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is

hereby GRANTED, and this Board further resolves:

1. To take cognizance of the instant case for the Appeal

being filed within the reglementary period; and

2. To continue the proceedings of this case and set the

case for preliminary conference.

SO ORDERED.

Manila, Philippines, 10 December 2018.

MANUEL DE JESUS SIAYNGCO

Chairperson

(on leave)

RAMON A. I. BANTA SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO

Member Member

NATIONAL GRID CORPORATION CBAA CASE NO. L-135- 2016 OF …

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