The Love of God in Time And Eternity

Accounting for Particularity in Reformed Soteriology

Nathan Lovell, 2009

Synopsis

In this project we examine how reformed soteriology accounts for particularity, with particular reference to the concept of limited atonement. We begin with Calvin's correct observation that any attempt to account for particularity is a statement about how the eternal act of God in election relates to the temporal outworking of his will in the economy. Therefore it is a statement about Christ, since the incarnate Word is the one who straddles time and eternity for our sake.

However, we will note that Calvin's doctrine of election exposes a point of tension in historical theology that was not easily resolved. Early reformed thinkers followed Calvin in seeing Christ primarily in his mediatorial role, through whom we discover the fact of election. The doctrine of predestination was therefore seen as an a posteriori explanation of sola gratia. The later reformed orthodox theologians rejected this conception due to its possible subordinationist implications and instead conceived of election as the a priori explanation of soteriology and Christ as the electing God.

We argue that the categories exposed by this dogmatic locus of predestination present a fruitful ground for investigating the consequences of the doctrine. Our method will be to examine the a posteriori systems of Calvin, Bullinger, Vermigli and Musculus and contrast them to the a priori systems of Beza, Polanus and Perkins. In doing this we can see more clearly how election relates to Christ, which dramatically shapes how one accounts for particularity. The historical debate climaxes in the highly developed soteriological statements of Amyraut and Owen in the 17th Century, and we shall spend some time examining the implications of these also.

Both the doctrines of predestination and atonement are, in the end, statements about the character of God and his orientation towards humanity. What does the saving activity of God reveal to us? We argue that whatever our statement of particularity, far from being a theological obscurity, will shape our conception of God and the gospel that we offer to others.

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Contents

Synopsis i

Contents ii

Introduction 1

The Love of Which God?Christ and Election 4

Christ as the Author of Election: The Aseity of the Son 5Christ as the Mediator of Election: The Question of Subordination 10

The Love of God in the Eternal Word:Christ and the Decree of Election 16

The Dogmatic Location of Election 16The Love of the Electing God:

The Exposition of the Decree in Early Reformed Theology 21The Glory of the Electing God:

The Exposition of the Decree in Protestant Orthodoxy 26How Should we Conceive of Election? 30Perkins' Diagram of the Causes of Soteriology 31

The Love of God in the Temporal Man:Christ and the Limited Atonement 35

The Love of God for the Elect:Particularity in the A Priori View of Election 37

The Love of God for the World:Particularity in the A Posteriori View of Election 39

“Limited Atonement” and the Soteriology of Amyraut and Owen 44Accounting for Particularity in Reformed Soteriology 49

Conclusions:Our Love for Christ 54

Bibliography of Primary Sources 57

Bibliography of Secondary Sources 59

Other Works Consulted 64

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Introduction

For God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son, so that whosoever should believe in him should not perish, but

have everlasting life.

In many respects, this project might be thought of as an examination of the reformed

exposition of John 3:16. Although "the gospel" can certainly be expressed simply, there

is a depth and complexity in reformed thought that is not immediately intuitive. At the

heart of the complexity is the paradox of sola gratia; that salvation from first to last is

entirely a work of God. The consequence of this is irresistible grace, that God has

chosen whom he will to save, and that those elect will certainly be saved. John 3:16 is

therefore immediately complicated by the numerous questions involved in the doctrine

of predestination. If the sovereign saving will of God is expressed towards the world

then why is not the world saved? If we are to understand the world in a narrower sense

—as whosoever should believe in him; the elect—then are we right to say that God so

loved only the elect also? The way in which we account for particularity is therefore at

the very heart of the reformed gospel, since it affects the way we conceive of the work

of God in giving his Son. It will also shape our conception of the character of God,

since "the Son does only what he sees the Father doing" (John 5:19). Who does the

Father love? For whom does he send his Son?

The method of this project will be to explore the way that reformed soteriology

developed over the two centuries that followed the reformation, and to apply the lessons

that were learned to our own contemporary conceptions of particularity. Although this

method reveals a particular focus on historical theology, the goal of the project is

constructive. The issue of particularity underlies a still current debate in reformed

theology, and the modern positions trace their theological ancestry to the 16th and 17th

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centuries. It is therefore our task to explore the consequences of how one states the

“simple” gospel of John 3:16 from this reformed tradition, and in doing so to avoid

some pitfalls in our own statements.

It is impossible to do justice in a summative way to the collective thought of two

centuries of tradition. Nevertheless we shall need to speak broadly of different

categories within reformed theology. Richard Muller's analysis of the period is helpful,

and we shall roughly follow his schema.1 The early codification of reformed thought

which leads up to the Synod of Dort in 1689/19 focuses on the immediate and

polemical requirements of the burgeoning protestant church. From this period we shall

focus on Calvin, Bullinger, Vermigli and Musculus. Protestantism gains a sure foothold

at different rates in different places, and as it does it is required to develop more

rigorous theological systems for teaching in its institutions. By the peace of Westphalia

in 1648 it had become associated with elaboration and the increasingly tight specificity

of the scholastic method. From this broad period we shall examine Beza, Polanus and

Perkins. Not all of protestantism, however, were equally pleased with the direction in

which protestant thought developed during this period. The result was the internal

soteriological debates of the late 17th century, of which we will pay particular attention

to Amyraut and Owen.2

1 Muller's schema is only roughly chronological. It follows a more theological grouping of similar positions and methods. Nevertheless, he does equate the positions he describes with periods of history. R. Muller, 'Approaches to Post-Reformation Protestantism: Reframing the Historiographical Question.' Pages 3-24 in R. Muller, After Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition. Oxford University: Oxford. 2003.

2 There is a historiographical problem surrounding the development of protestant orthodoxy post Calvin. See R. Muller, "Calvin and the Calvinists": Assessing Continuities and Discontinuities between the Reformation and Orthodoxy, Part 2.' Pages 21-104 in R. Muller, After Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition. Oxford University: Oxford. 2003 for a discussion. I am not intending to address the question of the relationship between Calvin and the Calvinist tradition directly in this project. However, at several points the argument of this project will bear on that question.

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One more preliminary observation is necessary. The issue of particularity is essentially

an attempt to reconcile two perpendicular axis of theology. The vertical axis represents

God as he is in himself—the eternal saving decree of predestination. The horizontal axis

represents God as he has revealed himself to us in the atonement—the temporal

outworking of that decree. Many statements of particularity move directly between the

two and arrive at a doctrine of limited atonement: the will of God was to save only the

elect, and therefore the atonement is limited to the elect. Indeed this is an intuitive

theological move, for predestination and atonement are two sides of the one

soteriological coin; God's saving action in eternity and time. However, the problem with

this method is that we have no epistemological access to the vertical axis. It does not

exist within our temporal universe, except at one point. There is one man who stands at

the apex, not merely mediating between God and man, but between the eternal and the

temporal also. To relate election to atonement, we must first relate election to Christ in

order to see in what way Christ reveals the electing God. Only then can we grasp how

the temporal work of Christ contributes to his eternal work, and how the love of the one

God towards us is revealed in both time and eternity. We will therefore begin in the next

chapter with an exploration of the relationship between Christ and the decree in Calvin's

thought, which will provide a suitable launch-pad to explore the topic in reformed

thought more generally in the rest of the project.

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The Love of Which God? Christ and Election

God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ... chose us in Christ before the foundation of the world... In love he predestined us for adoption through Jesus Christ, according to the purpose of his

will.

The typical reformed exposition of predestination3 begins with the distinction between

the secret and revealed will of God—God's will to save—and proceeds to the

relationship of the decree to providence—God's ability to save. Having established sola

gratia as the primary cause of salvation, reformed thought then moves to the way in

which predestination relates to other soteriological doctrines such as the five points of

'Calvinism.' Stemming from Barth there has been a modern critique of this exposition.4

If soteriology is founded upon the secret decree of God to save the elect, and this decree

is the head of a causal series of events operating through providence, then all of the

economy of salvation is subsumed under something that is by definition unknown to us:

the secret will of God. According to Barth then, God has become something essentially

other than what he is towards us: a Deus nudus absconditus.

What Barth's critique has done, quite apart from the merits of the argument itself, is to

remind us that how one frames the doctrine of predestination is not only a soteriological

question, but theological. The doctrine of predestination reveals something of the God

who predestines and therefore, as Helm notes, there is a "fruitful line of inquiry" that

opens up when it is considered in connection with the doctrine of God.5 It is our task in

this chapter to investigate these connections in the work of John Calvin. We will

3 See for example L. Berkhof, Systematic Theology. Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust. 1958. 100-08. Or L. Boettner, The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination. New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company. 1932. 13-19.

4 Barth, CD II/2. 112.5 P. Helm, 'John Calvin and the Hiddenness of God.' Pages 67-82 in B. McCormack, (ed.) Engaging

The Doctrine of God: Contemporary Protestant Perspectives. Michigan: Baker. 2008. 67.

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accomplish two things by doing this. Firstly, we will lay a necessary trinitarian

foundation for the rest of our discussion and, secondly, we shall also expose the

fundamental theological distinctions that will shape the doctrine of election in reformed

thought in post-reformation dogmatics.

Several of these connections between the doctrines of God and predestination are

apparent in Calvin's comments on Ephesians 1:4-5.6 His exposition of election in Christ

begins in a way typical of nearly all reformed thinkers, with a defense of sola gratia: "if

we are chosen in Chirst, it is not of ourselves."7 However this does not exhaust his

exposition. In his Institutes Calvin develops two other themes in relation to this issue:

Christ is the “Author of election”,8 and Christ is the mediator or “mirror of election”.9

His discussion hinges on two concepts in particular: the aseity of the Son, and his

historically oriented conception of christology.

Christ as the Author of Election: The Aseity of the Son

In Calvin's theology, the aseity of the Son is a consequence of his trinitarian

formulation. As Warfield notes, Calvin's conception of the Trinity is characterised by its

“strongly emphasized distinction between the essence and the Personality” of God.10

Calvin writes, “When we profess to believe in one God, under the name of God is

understood a single, simple, essence, in which we comprehend three persons, or

hypostases.”11 Valentius had argued that the 'Father who is truly and properly the sole

6 Calvin, Commentary, Ephesians 1:4. Cf. His remarks on the same passage in Institutes, III.xxii.2.

7 Calvin, Commentary, Ephesians 1:4. 8 Calvin, Institutes, III.xxi.7.9 Calvin, Institutes, III.xxiv.5.10 B. Warfield, 'Doctrine of the Trinity.' 243. cited by D. Kelly, 'The True and Triune God: Calvin's

Doctrine of the Holy Trinity.' Pages 65-89 in D. Hall, and P. Lillback, (eds.) A Theological Guide To Calvin's Institutes: Essays and Analysis. New Jersey: P&R. 2008. 77.

11 Calvin, Institutes, I.xiii.20.

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God' had 'infused into [the Son and Spirit] his own deity.'12 Calvin responded that God is

a simple unity in essence and therefore the Son is without derivation and essentially

fully God. It would be a “detestable invention that essence [be] proper to the Father

alone, as if he were the deifier of the Son.”13 If the essence of the Son were derived from

the Father, then the Son is not divine in essence at all: “If they grant that the Son is God,

but second to the Father, then in him will be begotten and formed the essence that is in

the Father unbegotten and unformed.”14 Calvin had already rejected this conclusion

firmly in his polemic against the modalist doctrine of Servetus.15 Therefore, for Calvin,

the Son is autotheos—God in essence as he is in himself. To meet any person of the

Trinity is to meet all three since the essence of the godhead is completely present and

represented in each hypostasis. Calvin quotes Gregory of Nazianzus: “I cannot think on

the one without quickly being encircled by the splendor of the three; nor can I discern

the three without being straightaway carried back to the one.”16

Within this unity of being there remains a clear distinction among relations that is

necessary because “the persons carry an order within them.”17 That is to say, the Son is

not the Father, neither is the Father the Holy Spirit. Rather, “the Father is the beginning

and the source... [and] in this way the unity of essence is retained, and a reasoned order

is kept, which takes nothing away from the deity of the Son and the Spirit.”18 There is a

critical distinction here that we shall see re-emerge in Calvin's christology. The Son, in

essence, is underived. He is 'God even as the Father' without principium.19 However,

12 M. Thompson, 'Calvin on the Mediator.' Pages 106-135 in M. Thompson, (ed.) Engaging with Calvin: Aspects of the Reformer's Legacy for Today. Nottingham: IVP. 2009. 111.

13 Calvin, Institutes, I.xiii.24.14 Calvin, Institutes, I.xiii.24.15 Calvin, Institutes, I.xiii.22.16 Calvin quotes Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration, 40.41 in Institutues I.xiii.17.17 Calvin, Institutes, I.xiii.20.18 Calvin, Institutes, I.xiii.20.19 Calvin, Institutes, I.xiii.23.

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with respect to their relations, the Father is principium of the Son. In this way Calvin

defends Nicean christology, maintaining that the the Son is eternally begotten of the

Father.20

Calvin applies this trinitarian formula to election when he considers its relation to

Christ's witness in Institutes III.xxii.7. He argues, citing John 6:37-39, that election is to

be understood primarily as the “Father's gift” of the elect to the Son which is “the

beginning of our reception into the surety and protection of Christ.”21 The internal

relations of the godhead govern this formula. Since the Father is seen as the “beginning

of activity,”22 then “the elect are said to have been the Father's before he gave them his

only-begotten Son.”23 However, this is not to say that Calvin sees election as the work

of the Father alone. Citing John 13:18, Calvin argues that “Christ... claims for himself,

in common with the Father, the right to choose.”24 Since Christ elects in common with

the Father, Calvin concludes that “Christ makes himself the Author of election.”25

Although it finds its source in the Father, election is the work of the “undifferentiated

Trinity” including Father, Son and Holy Spirit.26 Because Christ is autotheos, he is the

electing God, and we meet the electing God in him.

Is Calvin's conception of autotheos sufficient to claim, against Barth, that we have

overcome the Deus nudus absconditus? The answer will depend on the relationship

between the imminant and economic Trinity in Calvin's thought. We have already seen

one strong indication that Calvin's autotheos answers Barth's charge when Calvin

20 D. Thomas, 'The Mediator of the Covenant.' Pages 205-225 in D. Hall, and P. Lillback, A Theological Guide To Calvin's Institutes: Essays and Analysis. New Jersey: P&R. 2008. 211-215.

21 Calvin, Institutes III.xxii.7.22 Calvin, Institutes I.xiii.18.23 Calvin, Institutes III.xxii.7.24 Calvin, Institutes III.xxii.7.25 Calvin, Institutes III.xxii.7.26 Calvin, Institutes I.xiii.20.

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employed John 13:18 to describe Christ as the electing God. The fact that Christ has

chosen his disciples in the economy is evidence that he is “Author of election” and

“clear proof of his Divinity.” Jesus “testifies that they who were elected before the

creation of the world were elected by himself.”27

However, Calvin will not collapse the imminant Trinity into the economic. As Doyle

notes, to do so would be to deny the transcendence of God.28 There is always room in

Calvin's thought for the mystery of God since Calvin is careful to maintain the

distinction between the final truth of the imminant god and the accommodated nature of

revealed truth. However, Calvin does consistently ground his understanding of the

imminant relations of the godhead in their economic revelation, and so therefore the

economy does truthfully point beyond itself. Calvin's comments on Luke 19:41 are

illustrative of this. He first maintains that it is Christ in his humanity who weeps: “He

was God, I acknowledge; but on all occasions when it was necessary that he should

perform the office of teacher, his divinity rested, and was in a manner concealed, that it

might not hinder what belonged to him as Mediator.” However immediately following,

he asserts that even this reveals something true of the Father also: “By this weeping he

proved not only that he loved, like a brother, those for whose sake he became man, but

also that God made to flow into human nature the Spirit of fatherly love.”29

For Calvin then, even through the accommodated nature of revelation, we see

something true of the imminant Trinity in the economic activity of the Son. There is

27 Calvin, Commentary, John 13:18. 28 R. Doyle, 'Strategies and Consequences in Calvin's Teaching on the Trinity.' Pages 82-105 in M.

Thompson, (ed.) Engaging with Calvin: Aspects of the Reformer's Legacy for Today. Nottingham: IVP. 2009. 96-98.Cf. R. Letham, The Holy Trinity: In Scripture, History, Theology, and Worship. New Jersey: P&R. 2004. 363-4.

29 Calvin, Commentary, Luke 19:41.

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therefore sufficient warrant to conclude with Muller, and against Barth, that “Calvin

will not allow reference to a God who decrees salvation eternally apart from a sense of

the trinitarian economy and the effecting of the salvation in the work of the Son of God

incarnate.” Built into Calvin's system is “an interrelation and interpenetration of

predestination and christology.”30 Helm rightly concludes:

Barth's supposition of a “hidden God” in Calvin is greatly exaggerated. God

is not pure will for Calvin; he is a God who is revealed to us in a character

fitted, perfectly fitted, to be for us incarnate in Jesus Christ in his Second

Person... Unless Jesus Christ who is the Subject of election is the Jesus

Christ of the New Testament, he is an a priori theological construct at

variance with the Christ of the Gospels. And we may find ourselves having

less confidence in such a Christ than Barth thinks we ought to have in the

allegedly hidden God of Calvin.31

In Calvin there is no Deus nudus absconditus. What is explicit in the later reformed

dogmatics—that “The Father has chosen us not as Father, because election is not the

personal work of the person of the Father, but as God, since election is the common

work of the whole most Holy Trinity, of whom the Father is the beginning”32—finds

nebulous expression in Calvin in the phrase “Author of election.” Since the Son is

autotheos, we meet and know the electing God in the incarnate Word.

30 R. Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins. Grand Rapids: Baker. 2008. 19.

31 Helm, 'John Calvin and the Hiddenness of God.' 82.32 A. Polanus, A Treatise of Amandus Polanus, Concerning Gods Eternall Predestination. Cited in

Muller, Christ and the Decree. 157.

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Christ as the Mediator of Election: The Question of Subordination

Even granted the aseity of the Son in Calvin's thought, there remains an important

qualification as to how the eternal Word's action of election relates to his mediatorial

role of Christ. That is to ask of Calvin, in what way does this Christ mediate or “mirror”

election to us?33 One aspect of the trinitarian framework that we have already noted in

Calvin was that in relational terms the principium of the Son is the Father. This will

have significant bearing on this question because, according to Calvin, Christ is

mediator in relation to his person and not primarily according to his nature.

Calvin's christology represents a marked development on Chalcedon.34 Whereas

orthodox christology had focused on Christ's role of mediator in relationship to his

human nature, Calvin attaches the role to neither his human nor divine natures, but to

his person as divine Son. The threefold mediatorial office of prophet, priest and king is

therefore developed in Institutes III.xv-xvi not in relation to Christ's humanity

specifically, but in relationship to his entire person. Christ's kingship, for example, is

both his human messianic role35 as well as his divine sovereignty.36 This, together with

his conception of autotheos, leads Calvin to the conclusion that the mediation of Christ

is evidence of God's general disposition for us. Christ is not simply prophet, but prophet

for us,37 not simply king, but king for us,38 and a priest for us also.39 In Christ therefore,

as autotheos, is revealed the God who “is moved by pure and freely given love of us”

even though “we have brought death upon ourselves”.40

33 Calvin, Institutes, III.xxiv.5.34 Muller, Christ and the Decree, 33.

H. Boersma, 'The Chalcedonian Definition: It's Soteriological Implications.' Westminster Theological Journal. 54 (1992): 47-63. 62-63.

35 Calvin, Institutes, II.xv.4.36 Calvin, Institutes, II.xv.5.37 Calvin, Institutes, II.xv.2.38 Calvin, Institutes, II.xv.4.39 Calvin, Institutes, II.xv.6.40 Calvin, Institutes, II.xvi.3.

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Calvin applies this directly to his doctrine of election when he states that “Christ

interposes himself as mediator [of election].”41 Christology is not, for Calvin,

conceived of as the means by which God's eternal plan and purpose are temporally

executed. Rather, since mediation is no longer something solely attached to his

humanity, Christ as the eternal divine Son is able to mediate election also. That is to say

that what we know of God's act of election, we know in him. Therefore also, if we are

to know of our own election, it is to be sought in him. Calvin's explanation of Ephesians

1:4, election in Christ, encompasses this Christological understanding of election.

Christ mediates election to us and in doing so becomes the “mirror” in which we may

contemplate our own election:

Now, what is the purpose of election but that we, adopted as sons by our

Heavenly Father, may obtain salvation and immortality by his favor? No

matter how much you toss it about and mull it over, you will discover that

its final bounds still extend no farther. Accordingly, those whom God has

adopted as his sons are said to have been chosen not in themselves but in his

Christ [Eph 1:4]... [and] if we have been chosen in him, we shall not find

assurance of our election in ourselves; and not even in God the Father, if we

conceive him severed from his Son. Christ, then, is the mirror wherein we

must, and without self-deception may, contemplate our own election.42

However this leaves a point of tension in Calvin's thought that is not easily resolved,

and we shall see that it is a question of no small importance to understanding post-

41 Calvin, Institutes, III.xxii.7.42 Calvin, Institutes, III.xxiv.5.

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reformation developments in soteriology. What is the relationship between Christ and

the ordo salutis? Does the divine Son as “Author of election” stand somehow prior to

the decree, at the head of the ordo, or is the mediator—who is mediator in both his

divinity as well as his humanity—understood as subordinate to the decree in its

execution? As Muller notes there is a need to “ask in the light of the trinitarian ground

of Calvin's doctrine, how Christ is not only 'election itself' but also more than election,

how Christ not only appears within the ordo salutis but also provides the ordo salutis

with its proper foundation.”43

In one sense the strong biblical focus of Calvin's christology forces him to locate the

reason for the incarnation and mediation in redemption. Christ, as mediator, is defined

with reference to the decree. Osiander had argued that the incarnation be understood as

an internal decision of God, and not with reference to the external necessity of

redemption.44 Calvin replied in Institutes II.xii.4 that the sole purpose for Christ's

incarnation is redemption since “all Scripture proclaims that to become our redeemer he

was clothed with flesh.”45 To argue otherwise is “presumptuous”, and “vague

speculation.” In Calvin's soteriology the mediator himself is elect for us.46 Following

Augustine on this point, Calvin reflects in Institutes II.xii.1 on the eternal election of

Christ as the foundation of all soteriology and the highest expression of sola gratia. The

mediation of Christ “has stemmed from a heavenly decree, on which man's salvation

depended. Our most merciful Father decreed what was best for us.”47

In another sense, however, Christ as autotheos stands prior to the ordo salutis as its

43 Muller, Christ and the Decree, 36.44 Thompson, 'Calvin on the Mediator,' 111.45 Calvin, Institutes, II.xii.446 Calvin, Institutes III.xv-xvi.47 Calvin, Institutes II.xii.1.

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Author, and this is the heart of the tension. Christ is not mediator according to his flesh

but according to his person. Yet the 2nd person of the Trinity is mediator in eternity.

Does this represent a subordinationist tendency in Calvin's christology? It might be

argued that in Calvin's thought the person of the Word is defined in eternity by his

relation not only to the Father, but also to the decree to save. Certainly this is not a

conscious theological move on Calvin's part. In Calvin's exegesis of the subordinationist

passages (eg. John 8:42; 12:49; 14:28; 17:21-25; 1 Cor 15:24-28) he maintains a

soteriological and not a relational interpretation. Christ is subordinate in his office as

Christ—the incarnate Word. Warfield and, more recently, Bray have therefore defended

Calvin against the charge of subordinationism maintaining that in Calvin's thought “the

persons of the Trinity are equal to one another in every respect.”48 However, others such

as Helm have criticised this reading: “They are not equal in every respect, since in

virtue of [the order within their relations] each bears a unique relationship to the

others.”49

There have been some recent attempts to resolve this tension. Muller employs the extra

calvinisticum in defense of Calvin where “in the execution of the decree or work of

salvation, the Son of God is wholly given, in subordination to the eternal plan, as

mediator. But the Son as God a se ipso cannot be wholly contained in the flesh or in any

way subsumed under the execution of the decree.”50 But this resolution does not entirely

solve the problem. As we have seen, Christ becomes mediator “before the foundation of

the world” (Eph 1:4), and long before he took on flesh. Mediation for Calvin is only

secondarily related to the incarnation, and primarily related to the eternal person. Paul

48 G. Bray, The Doctrine of God. Leicester : Inter-Varsity Press, 1993. 200.Cf. B. Warfield, Calvin and Calvinism. New York: Oxford University Press. 1931. 230.

49 P. Helm, John Calvin's Ideas. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2004. 45.50 Muller, Christ and the Decree, 38.

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Helm's distinction between the Son of God as eternally logos asarkos and eternally

logos ensarkos is probably more useful.51 By this he tries to capture the two pre-

incarnate eternal states of the Son—the first in which the Son is defined with reference

to the internal relations of the Trinity and the second in which the definition relates to

his eternally assumed role of mediator in relationship to us.52

However helpful these categories may be, they are not Calvin's categories, and they will

not be the categories of thought utilised by either Calvin's contemporaries or his

successors. There remains historically even if not actually a perceived tension in

Calvin's thought. The increasingly precise theological schemata of post-reformation

dogmatics will wrestle with this fundamental issue of how to relate Christ to the ordo

salutis. Many of Calvin's contemporaries will place election, with Calvin, in an a

posteriori position within the context of soteriology, because this is its locus in

Scripture. In this formulation Christ will stand as the elect Son before the Father as

mediator for us. As time progresses and the doctrine is defined and its boundaries and

relations examined, various thinkers will perceive a subordinationist tendency in that

formulation, and begin to more rigorously examine the implications of Christ as

“Author of election.” In this respect they will relocate the doctrine of election and

develop its relations in an a priori position within the context of the doctrine of God. In

the next chapter we shall examine the consequences of these relations. In the final

chapter we shall see the manner in which this formulation will impact on how one

51 Helm, 'John Calvin and the Hiddenness of God.' 68. The distinction is between two eternal states of the divine Word. The Word must exist as logos asarkos logically prior to the decision to create. There was a time, so to speak, when he was not mediator since the decision to redeem is God's free and gracious action, and not compelled in any way. However since the Word is eternally mediator he exists also in eternity as logos ensarkos in which he freely, and in a way suitable to the internal relations of the Trintiy, agrees to become mediator of salvation and, eventually at the right time, the Word incarnate Jesus Christ.

52 I consider Helm's essay a throughtful resolution to the problem. Cf. Helm, 'John Calvin and the Hiddenness of God.'

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accounts for particularity in the reformed doctrine of the atonement, and what one can

therefore learn about the character of God through his act of salvation.

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The Love of God in the Eternal Word: Christ and the Decree of Election

When Rebecca had conceived and bore children by one man, our forefather Isaac, though they were not yet born and had done nothing either good or bad—in order that God's purpose of

election might continue, not because of works but because of his call—she was told, “The older will serve the younger.” As it is

written, “Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated.”

The Dogmatic Location of Election

We have so far argued that Calvin considers the doctrine of predestination in

relationship both to Christ as the “Author of election”, and also to Christ as the man

who became elect of the Father for the sake of humanity. Calvin's location of election at

these two opposite poles has, as we shall argue in this chapter, exposed a point of

tension in historical reformed theology. Considered in the former relations—Christ as

the Author of election—the doctrine of predestination takes on an a priori position

within the structure of theology, and functions to guard divine freedom and sovereignty

in soteriology. Christ as the incarnate 2nd person of the Trinity is the final cause and

executor of predestination for no other reason than it is his gracious will. In this

construction the doctrine finds its locus of exposition within the doctrine of God.

However, considered in its alternate relations, Christ is the elect man, and the “mirror”

by which our own election may be evaluated. Here the doctrine is utilised as an a

posteriori explanation of the sola gratia of soteriology, and the guarantee of the

perseverance of the saints. It is our task in this chapter to explore and evaluate these

connections and their dogmatic consequences.

There has been considerable attention devoted to the question of the dogmatic location

of election in Calvin's theology. In every edition of The Institutes until 1550 the

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dogmatic locus of the doctrine of predestination was found, conjoined with providence,

in an a priori position relative to his soteriology, and within the doctrine of God.53 In his

final arrangement in 1559, however, the doctrine has been separated from this context54

and its exposition set within the context of soteriology.55 This position is an a posteriori

locus, coming after the exposition of the work of Christ as mediator56 and after the

doctrines of grace.57 Barth rightly comments on the dogmatic consequence of this

decision; that predestination is seen in Calvin as the “consummation” of the doctrine of

reconciliation, so that “the Christian life... [is] seen from the standpoint both of its

outlook on eternity and also of its conditioning in time.”58

Much has been claimed of the significance of this doctrinal shift. Calvin himself wrote

in the preface to the 1559 edition of The Institutes that he “was never satisfied until the

work had been arranged in the order now set forth.”59 It is clear from this that he was

concerned to establish the right order of exposition—an ordo recte docendi60—with

regard to the doctrine of election. Earlier commentators on Calvin tended to focus on

the 1559 edition almost to the exclusion of other editions and works, taking Calvin's

statement of satisfaction to mean that this edition was the yardstick by which he wished

his entire system to be evaluated.61 Studies of comparison between Calvin and later

53 F. Battles, Analysis of the Institutes of the Christian Religion of John Calvin. New Jersey: P&R. 1980. 15.

54 It is mentioned in passing as “special providence.” Calvin, Institutes, I.i.5-7.55 Calvin, Institutes, III.xxi-xiv.56 Calvin, Institutes, II.xii-xvii.57 Calvin, Institutes, III.i-xiv.58 Barth, CD II/2. 85.59 J. Calvin, 'John Calvin to the Reader.' Pages 3-5 in Institutes. 3.60 S. Clark, Election and Predestination: The Sovereign Expressions of God. Pages 90-122 in D. Hall

and P. Lillback, A Theological Guide To Calvin's Institutes: Essays and Analysis. New Jersey: P&R. 2008. 91.

61 R. Muller, 'Establishing the Ordo Docendi: The Organisation of Calvin's Institutes, 1536-1559.' Pages 118-139 in The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2000. 118.Muller, 'Calvin and the Calvinists,' 98.

17

scholastic protestantism undertaken by Armstrong,62 Kendall,63 Clifford64 and others

understand Calvin this way, and suggest that Calvin had (correctly) identified the locus

of the doctrine of predestination. They argue that a 'rigid scholastic' influence had

shifted it back into the central dogmatic position found in later works, imposing an

artificial and overly causal structure on Calvin's theology.65

More recent scholarship has suggested a revision to this popular historical conception.

Muller argues that it was Calvin's commitment not only to the contents of Scripture, but

to the systematic methodologies of his day that better accounts for this shift.66 The loci

communes method of exposition was common in the reformation era67 and is

characterised by gathering Scripture from diverse passages in order to arrange them

under thematic headings, to be compared and analysed side by side. The headings

themselves were set in the same relations as they were found in Scripture, and so in this

method the doctrine of election would be expounded within the doctrine of soteriology,

and not within the doctrine of God. Muller argues that Calvin was increasingly

influenced by Melancthon's work, titled Loci Communes, which ordered its theological

topics according to their placement within The Epistle to the Romans. Several scholars

have noted the likelihood of this claim. The influence of Romans on reformed thought

was substantial. More than 70 commentaries on Romans were written during the first

half of the 16th Century, and Calvin praises both Melancthon and Bullinger's own

62 B. Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy: Protestant Scholasticism and Humanism in 17th Century France. University of Wisconsin Press: Madison. 1969. 127-39.

63 R. Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1979. 29-42.64 A. Clifford, Atonement and Justification: English Evangelical Theology, 1640-1790 - An Evaluation.

Oxford: Carendon Press. 1990. A. Clifford, Amyraut Affirmed, or "Owenism, a caricature of Calvinism": A Reply to Ian Hamilton's "Amyraldianism – Is it Modified Calvinism?" Norwich: Charenton Reformed Publishing. 2004.

65 Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy, 263-9. 66 Muller, 'Establishing the Ordo Docendi,' 119-30.67 P. Melanchthon, On Christian Doctrine: Loci Communes. Edited and Translated by Manschreck, C. L.

New York: Oxford University Press. 1965.W. Musculus, Loci Communes. Basel. 1560.

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commentaries for their clarity of exposition in the preface to his own work.68

There does seem to be some correlation between Romans and the ordering of topics in

The Institutes.69 Predestination arises for the first time in Romans 8:28-30 in what is

certainly an a posteriori position after the Work of Christ (Romans 3/5) and the

doctrines of justification (Romans 3), sanctification (Romans 6) and reconciliation

(Romans 5/8). Despite the tendency of modern commentators to separate Romans into

two halves at the end of Chapter 8,70 reformed exposition rightly saw the discussion of

election in chapters 9-11 as hinging upon what came before. If 'nothing can separate us

from the love of God in Christ' (8:39) then this begged the question for Calvin of what

happened to Israel, God's beloved (9:1-5, cf. Ex 19:5). Was there 'no truth in the divine

promise'?71 Chapters 9-11 then serve as Paul's rhetorical answer to this objection: God's

plan did not fail, rather his purpose of election was never for all Israel (9:6-13), and

always included the gentiles (9:24-33). The doctrine of election in Romans therefore

serves not as a causal a priori explanation of salvation, but as an a posteriori assurance

to the believer of the 'power of God for salvation' (1:16). Thus Muller's argument can be

summarised this way: while early editions of The Institutes were structured according to

the Apostle's creed, Calvin became convinced that Scripture itself should govern the

dogmatic location of doctrine, and therefore ordered his Institutes according to the

placement of doctrines in The Epistle to the Romans.72

This argument remains unproven, since Calvin left us no significant annotations on the

structure of the Institutes. However, Muller's thesis accords well with Calvin's

68 Calvin, 'The Epistle Dedicatory' in Calvin, J. Commentaries on the Epistles of Paul to the Romans. 69 Battles, Analysis of the Institutes of the Christian Religion of John Calvin, 16-19.70 See the discussion in D. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996. 31-33.71 Calvin, Commentary, Romans, 9:1-5.72 Muller, 'Establishing the Ordo Docendi', 125-130.

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determination to produce a non-speculative theology; restrained at every point by

exegesis, and refusing to move beyond scriptural limits:73

Human curiosity renders the discussion of predestination... very confusing

and even dangerous... If allowed, it will leave no secret to God that it will

not search out and unravel... Let this, therefore, first of all be before our

eyes: to seek any other knowledge of predestination than what the Word of

God discloses is not less insane than if one should purpose to walk in a

pathless waste.74

Calvin believed that the Bible itself discussed election primarily within an a posteriori

locus and so it is the salvation-historical focus of Calvin's christology that drives this

locus in the final analysis of The Institutes. Christ's mediation of salvation is to be

understood only against the backdrop of the great narrative of Scripture: creation, fall,

redemption and consummation. This is the only Christ that we know, and while we meet

the “Author of election” in him, we still come to God—and to the doctrine of election—

through the elect man Jesus Christ, our “mirror of election.” For this reason Calvin has

chosen the a posteriori exposition of the decree also.

73 Peterson, 'Calvin on Christ's Saving Work,' 247.74 Calvin, Institutes, III.xxi.1-2.

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The Love of the Electing God: The Exposition of the Decree in Early Reformed

Theology75

Other early reformed expositors such as Bullinger, Vermigli and Musculus expound

predestination within the same a posteriori dogmatic locus as Calvin, and tend to agree

both with his historically oriented christology and his hesitation to move beyond the

economy of salvation recorded in Scripture. Bullinger, for example, relates the decree

both to the economic call and to Scripture:

Lo, this is the will or eternal decree of God... that in the Son by faith we

should be saved... Therefore, if thou ask me whether thou art elected to life,

or predestinate to death... I answer simply out of the Scripture... If thou hast

communion or fellowship with Christ, thou art predestinate to life, and thou

aret of the number of the elect and chosen: but if thou be a stranger from

Christ, howsoever otherwise thou seem to flourish in virtues, thou are

predestinate to death, and foreknowledged, as they say, to damnation.76

In these early reformed systems, predestination functions in essentially three ways.

Firstly, predestination is a source of assurance and “comfort [for] the godly worshipers

of God.”77 The doctrine of predestination refracts the otherwise economic soteriology

75 A brief methodological note on supralapsarianism and ifralapsarianism is necessary at this point. The terms are not synonymous with the a priori and a posteriori categories that we will develop here. Although they are the historical choice of the 17th century debate, they are not the most useful terms to clarify the soteriological distinctions within reformed theology. To phrase the debate in terms of the order of decrees is to miss an essential distinction. There were some within the infralapsarian position who expounded the doctrine of predestination in its a priori connections, as well as those who chose the a posteriori locus. Those who developed the doctrine within the a priori locus have much in common with the supralapsarians, the only essential difference being their conception of the role of the fall within soteriology. Therefore in this project we have grouped them with the supralapsarians under the a priori heading. Bavinck's discussion on these categories is helpful in ellucidating the various positions. H. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics Volume 2: God and Creation. Grand Rapids: Baker. 2004. 361-66. Jewett misses this distinction in his otherwise well informed discussion. P. Jewett, Election and Predestination. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 1985. 115-120.

76 Bullinger, Decades, 4.iv 186-7.77 Bullinger, Decades, 4.iv 185.

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through the lens of the sovereignty of God, and in so doing assures us that salvation is

God's work, and does not rest on our frail ability.78 Secondly, and for the same reason,

predestination guards against synergism. As Bullinger writes, “God's predestination is

not stayed or stirred with any worthiness or unworthiness of ours; but of the mere grace

and mercy of God the Father, it respecteth Christ alone."79 The fact of predestination, as

we saw in Calvin, is the fundamental doctrine that underpins the entire reformed sola

gratia.80

Both of these uses can be easily discerned in all reformed exegesis and in that way are

not distinctive of the a posteriori locus. The third, however, is. In early reformed

theology, the fact of predestination reveals the love of God. This point, discernible

clearly in the systems of Calvin, Vermigli and Bullinger arises also from exegesis. The

golden chain of Romans 8:29-30 is framed on the one hand by the providence of God

(8:28), and on the other by the love of God (8:31-39). Early reformed thought therefore

insisted that this connection—beginning with providence and passing through election

—demonstrated God's love.

Nowhere is this use of predestination more striking than in Bullinger's exposition in

Decades.81 Bullinger argues from Ephesians 1:4-6, Romans 9:16 and 2 Timothy 1:9-10

that predestination is an uncontestable fact of Scripture. However this decree to save is

evidence of God's general goodness towards humanity, not his specific goodness to the

elect, in that he remembers our 'lowly estate' and chooses mercy for us (Psalm 103,

Isaiah 49:15-16). Drawing on Matthew 11:28 and Mark 16:15-16, Bullinger asserts that

78 Calvin, Institutes,III.xxiii.4.79 Bullinger, Decades, 4.iv 187-8.80 Calvin, Institutes,III.xxiii.2.81 Bullinger, Decades,4.

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the call to receive that mercy is universal which proves that God must desire the

salvation of all men (2 Timothy 2:4):

"Freely therefore, of his mere mercy, not for our deserts, but for Christ's

sake, and not but in Christ, hath he chosen us, and for Christ's sake doth

embrace us, because he is our Father and a lover of men... Truly, in Christ,

the only-begotten Son of God exhibited unto us, God the Father hath

declared what great store he setteth by us."82

Since election in its a posteriori position does not answer the question who will be

saved, the fact of it reveals God's disposition to act for us in mercy. Therefore for

Bullinger, this general benevolence, following Romans 8:28-32, is manifest in a special

way by the action of predestination itself which is the outworking of providence for the

elect.83 This focus on the economy of salvation, rather than decree, allows Bullinger to

utilise God's saving action in both election and atonement indiscriminately as proof of

the Father's good will and love towards humanity. This is pronounced when he

comments on the universalist passages of Scripture. Drawing on 2 Peter 3:9 he implores

that we must “comfort ourselves with the most sweet promises of God’s hand” which

come to all because “God does not will the death of a sinner.”84

This then is the crucial distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori loci. Early

reformed thought, through its focus on the economy of salvation, agrees that the decree

to elect finds its final cause in the love of God. That is to say, God chooses to save

because he loves. In doing so it draws an exegetical point from Deuteronomy 7:7-8 and

82 Bullinger, Decades,4.iv 188. Emphasis mine.83 Bullinger, Decades,4.iv 187-89.84 Bullinger, Compendium of the Christian Religion, 144-145.

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10:14-15.85 This is not an argument that God loves all men equally; the force of

Romans 9:13 is evident within all reformed exegesis also.86 The argument is simply that

election finds its basis in the love of God. It is this statement, as we shall see, that is

lost in the a priori construction.

Before we can move to consider this a priori construction, there is one more

consequence that must be developed. Although within the a posteriori system there

remains decrees of both election and reprobation, these decrees will not be co-ordinate

in the way that they will become in the a priori system. In early reformed thought man

is considered in the mind of the eternal God as he is in the economy of salvation—

creatus et lapsus. The early reformed systematicians are universally infralapsarian

because of their economic focus. Reprobation is therefore conceived as God's decree in

eternity not to have mercy on some. It is a negative decree, necessitating no positive

action on God's part, only the negative action to withhold mercy from some sinners.87

Vermigli is explicit on this point. Election must be considered in an a posteriori

placement so that it can maintain its correct relation both to the fall and to God's

subsequent saving and loving action. For Vermigli, the reprobate are not appointed to

their end, but simply left to it:

The love, election and predestination of God are ordered among themselves

and follow on one another for a certain reason. First, all men in their

unhappy estate are presented to the knowledge of God, as needy and

miserable, then those whom God of his pure and simple mercy loves and for

85 See for example. Calvin, Institutes, III.xxi.5.86 See D. MacLeod, 'Amyraldus Redivivus: A Review Article.' In Evangelical Quarterly 81.3 (2009).

210-229. 217-220.87 See for Bullinger's exposition: J. Baker, Heinrich Bullinger and the Covenant: The Other Reformed

Tradition. Ohio: Ohio University Press. 1980. 30.

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whom he wills the good are distinguished form those he passes over... by

this discretion they are said to be elect; the elect, truly, are appointed toward

their end.88

This is not to say that reprobation in early reformed theology is not grounded also in the

will of God. Election is a merciful decree that saves some, but passes over others in

judgement. Reprobation in these early systems denies a mercy to some which was freely

given to others—and in that sense is based in the divine decision89—but unlike the a

priori system it is not a decision per se to create a reprobate group of humanity. Of all

of these early systematicians, Musculus moves the furthest in the a priori direction,90 yet

even he will assert in the the non-coordination of the decrees. For Musculus the

reprobate are those that simply do not obtain the grace of election: "We do not call those

reprobate who are reprobate for an inward evil of their nature... but those whom God

rejects or reprobates when he elects those whom he will."91

It is this construction which allows early reformed theology to maintain that God's love

is the causal foundation of election. Therefore, the ordo salutis itself is not simply

grounded in the free decision of God, but in the free decision of God to love. As

Vermigli says, “It was necessary that Christ die according to the purpose of the divine

providence and counsel: for God decreed it should be so. This indeed he did chiefly to

declare his infinite love.”92 We shall understand the reason why this is so more clearly

in contrast with the a priori construction in the following section.

88 Vermigli, Loci Communes, III.i.10, 449.J. Donnelly, Calvinism and Scholasticism in Vermigli's Doctrine of Man and Grace. Leiden: EJB. 1976. 30.

89 Calvin, Institutes, III.xxiii.1.90 Muller, Christ and the Decree, 55.91 Musculus, Loci Communes, 24, 244. 92 Vermigli, Loci Communes, II.xvii.19, 419.

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The Glory of the Electing God: The Exposition of the Decree in Protestant

Orthodoxy

In the later codifications of protestantism, through the 16th and early 17th centuries, there

arose a tendency to return the doctrine of predestination to the a priori position that it

had occupied in Thomist theology.93 Doubtless the application of scholastic

methodology to protestant theology, beginning with Beza and continuing particularly in

the puritan constructions of Perkins and Owen accounts at least in part for the shift.94 As

Armstrong argues, the tight causal structure that the a priori locus applies to soteriology

fits very neatly with the kind of rigid logic that scholasticism utilises.95 However, as

Muller counters, scholasticism is simply one method of doing theology and is

insufficient in and of itself to account for the shift of locus.96

In fact, the seeds of later protestantism were sown, as we have shown in the last chapter,

in Calvin's construct of Christ as the “Author of election.” Calvin's christology left open

the question of a relational subordinationism since Christ in his person is the mediator

of salvation. It was sufficient for Calvin's purposes that predestination establish a

soteriology based in the free decision of God. But, Muller argues, "in the increasingly

sophisticated systems of developing orthodoxy, a stricter, clearer formulation [of

predestination] was needed if the possible subordinationist implications of Calvin's

[christology] and his conception of the election of the mediator were to be overcome.”97

The types of trinitarian and christological formulations found in later orthodox thought

93 T. Aquinas, Summa Theologica. First Part. Q23.94 Cf. M. Shaw, 'William Perkins and the New Pelagians: Another Look at the Cambridge Predestination

Controversy of the 1590's.' Westminster Theological Journal 58 (1996): 267-301. 268-70.95 Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy, 160-69.96 R. Muller, 'Scholasticism and Orthodoxy in the Reformed Tradition: Definition and Method.' Pages

25-46 in R. Muller, After Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition. Oxford University: Oxford. 2003. 45-6.

97 Muller, Christ and the Decree, 149.

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support Muller's basic thesis. Later reformed orthodox thinkers are careful to maintain

the advances they perceive in Calvin's christology. For example, Perkins' christology

closely mirrors Calvin's stress on Christ as God made known in flesh, and in the words

of Muller “bears witness to the Reformed development of a christology that is neither

“from above” nor “from below” but in the historical line of covenant-promise.”98

Polanus developed the clear implication of this. If Christ reveals the electing God then

“the Father indeed elects us, not as Father, since election is not the proper work of the

person of the Father; but as God, for as much as election is the common work of the

whole sacred Trinity, of which the principle is the Father.”99

Once explicitly stated in this way the a priori ordering has an inevitable appeal in that it

allows the resolution of the question of relational subordination. By moving the locus of

predestination back into the a priori position, and back into the doctrine of God,

election can be discussed in the context of the Father and of the Son. In Perkins'

formulation, Christ is subordinate to the execution of the decree, but not to the decree

itself: "[Christ is] called of his Father from all eternitie to performe the office of the

mediatour, that in him all those which should bee saved might be chosen."100 In this

context election functions not as the guardian of sola gratia, although it still carries this

role, but now primarily—as it had once done also in Thomist theology101—to guard the

sovereign freedom of the Father, Son and Spirit: "[Election is] that by which God in

himselfe hath necessarily, and yet freely, from all eternity determined all things."102

Thus the Son can in no way be considered subordinate to the decree. He stands

completely free and sovereign over it. Christ freely becomes subordinate in execution of

98 Muller, Christ and the Decree, 142.99 Polanus, The Substance of the Christian Religion, IV.viii 244.100Perkins, A Golden Chaine, 15.101Aquinas, Summa Theologica. First Part. Q23.102Perkins, A Golden Chaine, 5.

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the decree in his role as human mediator. But as the divine Son he is free to elect or to

reprobate as his sovereign will dictates.103

A further consequence of this a priori dogmatic placement is that it becomes necessary

to co-ordinate the decrees of election and reprobation because they stand at the head of

a causal chain in the ordo salutis. For example, when Beza comments on Romans 8:28-

9:23 his focus is on the role of the will of God as the cause of soteriology. Beza

understands the humanity of Romans 9:21 not as creatus et lapsus, as in the early

reformed systems, but as “uncreated.” In doing this he utilises a distinctly a priori

formulation in which God creates some for election, and some for reprobation

according to his sovereign choice. It would be, argues Beza, a “great injury to God if we

were to conceive of his decree as resting on the result of human activity, or to

hypothesize a second divine decree, a reactive decree, subsequent to the corruption of

the creature.”104 God decrees by his right and according to his will alone. Similarly for

Perkins, “God according to his supreme authoritie doth make vessels of wrath, he doth

not find them made.”105 Both election and reprobation are simply that which “God [has]

willed in his eternall counsell.”106

In the a priori system, the decree of reprobation and the decree of election differ in

manner of execution only. Election is executed by faith in Christ and reprobation by the

wages of sin. In other respects, and importantly with respect to the will of God, the

decrees are co-ordinate. The consequence of this is that election can no longer find its

103J. Moore, English Hypothetical Universalism: John Preston and the Softening of Reformed Theology. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 2007. 37.

104Beza's comments on Romans can be found in Theodori Bezae, Annotationes, in quibus ratione interpretationis vocum reddita. Cambridge, 1642. As far as I am aware this work is not available in English so I gratefuly acknowledge my debt to various secondary sources in this regard. Particularly, S. Bray, Theodore Beza's Doctrine of Predestination. Nieuwkoop: De Graaf. 1975.

105Perkins, A Golden Chaine, 28.106Perkins, A Golden Chaine, 28.

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final cause in the freely given love of God. There are two reasons for this. Firstly,

humanity is uncreated in the mind of God at the point of the decree, and therefore he is

neither loved nor hated. This is a conscious theological move illustrated clearly in

Perkins' soteriology. He reflects that “actuall hatred comes not in till after the creation.

Whom God hath decreed...to hate, them being once created, he hates in Adam with

actual hatred.”107 The second reason is that election can not manifest the love of God

since the fact of election at the same time reveals a co-ordinate reprobation. Instead of

love, the historical focus shifted to the glory of God, since it is possible to conceive of

both election and reprobation within this framework. God's mercy for the elect is co-

ordinate with his justice for the reprobate, the fall is predestined to achieve this end, and

the entire ordo salutis manifests the supreme glory of God. Beza's Tabula

Praedestinationis suitably illustrates this point:

The Lord God, that he might put in execution this eternal counsel, to his

glory, prepared a way according to his infinite wisdom, indifferent both to

those that he would choose, and those also which he would refuse. For when

he determined to shew his infinite mercy in the salvation of the elect, and

also his just judgment in the Condemnation of the Reprobate: it was

necessary that he should shut up both under disobedience & sin, to show his

mercy to... the elect: and contrariwise to have just cause to condemn [the

reprobate].108

In Beza's formulation, God's will is to glorify himself, and election and reprobation

serve only that end. The decision for God to love comes after his decision to elect. The

107Perkins, A Golden Chaine, 287-88.108T. Beza, A Brief e Declaration of the Chiefe Poyntes of Christian Religion, Set Foorth in a Table.

Geneva. 1555. 3. Emphasis mine.

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same can be seen clearly within English puritanism, which is unsurprising due to the

extensive theological connections between Beza and Perkins.109 When Perkins

anticipates the objection that it is “very hard to ascribe unto God who is full of bountie

and mercie, such a decree” he replies that even the “eternall destruction” of “every

creature in heaven and earth [would serve to] set forth the glorie and majestie of

God.”110 Perkin's relative ordering of love and election is clearly illustrated in his

famous diagram in A Golden Chaine (see overleaf.) Perkins places the love of God as a

conditional upon the decree of election, and in logical sequence to the state of unbelief.

In other words, the divine decision to love remains a decision made of creatures in the

state creatus et lapsus. However God's love depends logically on the prior decree to

elect, which has been brought forward to establish the head of the causal chain. This has

exactly reversed the formula of the a posteriori locus. God now loves because he has

chosen, whereas we saw in Calvin, Vermigli and Bullinger that God elects because he

loves.

How Should we Conceive of the Election?

The theological consequences of the discussion of this chapter will be seen more clearly

in the next, and so it has been our task until now to be descriptive without necessarily

offering an evaluation. We should, however, pause at this point to briefly evaluate the

two positions before we proceed.

The question before us is how we should conceive of election and its relationship to the

character of God and to christology. On the one hand, the a posteriori position would

seem to have the better of the scriptural witness. Whenever the Old Testament states a

109Moore, English Hypothetical Universalism, 33-37.110Perkins, A Treatise on Predestination, 611.

30

31

Perkins' diagram of the causes of salvation from A Golden Chain. The Reprobate follow the black line on the right, the elect follow the grey line on the left. Notice particularly the relationship between

election and love on the line of election.

cause for the election of Israel it is always love (Deuteronomy 4:37, 10:15; Psalm 78:67;

Isaiah 41:8). Furthermore, in the two key New Testament reflections on election, love

features prominently as a cause (Romans 9:11-13, Ephesians 1:4-5).111 Also, when

election is spoken of in a particular sense, especially with respect to Christ as the chosen

servant, love is likewise the cause of election (Isaiah 42:1, Matthew 12:18) and there is

a similar link discernible in Paul's letters to the elect (Colossians 3:12, 1 Thessalonians

1:4). It is exegetically justifiable to claim that freely given divine love is the cause of

divine election. Even the golden chain of Romans 8 requires a personal disposition of

God toward man and not just stark divine will alone. It is those that God “foreknew”

that “he predestined” (Romans 8:29).

However, the achievement of the a priori view is a more robustly trinitarian conception

of election, for it shows that it is the work of the three persons of the godhead to elect

and not the work of the Father alone. Therefore the a priori formulation serves to

safeguard the full deity of Christ as “Author of election”. It is not primarily the

imposition of a scholastic system on Scripture that has produced the a priori system.

Rather it is the desire to safeguard this truth. The question that must be asked, however,

is whether this construction can be defended from Biblical testimony. The essential

weakness of the position is that it posits a God, even a Christ, that is fundamentally

different than the salvation historical witness. This is the core of Barth's critique of the

entire protestant tradition; that we have actually arrived at a Deus nudus absconditus.

To illustrate this we will take as an example the co-ordination of the decrees. On a

number of occasions, the gospel writers show us Jesus as the electing God (Matthew

11:27, Luke 10:22, John 15:6), and Calvin's exegesis of these passages posits that this

111P. O'Brien, The Letter to the Ephesians. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 1999. 98-101.

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economic activity reflects the imminant Trinity.112 However what is not evident in the

narratives is any depiction of Jesus as the reprobating God. That Jesus' mercy is

displayed in his choice of followers—among them a tax collector, a traitor and a

prostitute—is unquestionable. Every day he “ate with tax collectors and sinners”

(Matthew 9:10-11). However we never see the co-ordinate decree—that Jesus' justice be

exonerated by his rejection of the reprobate. Rather, he looks on them in love (Mark

10:21) and with pity (Mark 1:41) and, to borrow from Peter, “does not wish that anyone

should perish” but extends the open invitation, “Come to me!” (Matthew 11:28). Jesus

does not even actively reject the one person that Scripture identifies as certainly

reprobate (John 17:12). Rather he calls him “friend” (Matthew 26:40).

Similarly, if we investigate the motivation for God's action in Christ as it is presented in

Scripture then it is one of love and not primarily glory. The disciples are loved and

chosen by Jesus in the same way that the Father loves and chose the Son (John 15:9;

17:23). Even in John's gospel where the theme of glory is so prominent, it remains set in

a fixed relationship with love. Jesus is glorified not because of justice and mercy, but

because of the Father's decision to love him (John 17:24). Love is given as the ultimate

ground of every divine action in the world. God chooses, and gives, and sends his Son

because he loves (John 3:16). God is love (1 John 4:8).

The attraction of the a posteriori view is that it coheres so well with the portrait of Jesus

in the gospels. In contrast, the a priori view insists that the actual reality of election is

something quite other than what we see in Christ. If we are to know anything of the

imminant relations of the Trinity through the economic activity of the Son, then we

112Calvin, Commentary, Matt 11:27, Luke 10:22.Calvin, Commentary, John 15:6.

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must be able to “read up” these relations. We have seen how this operates in Calvin's

exegesis already. The relations of the Godhead—the Father who begets the Son, and the

Spirit who proceeds from both—are accurately mirrored in the economic relations of the

Father sending the Son, and the Father and Son together sending the Spirit.113 If this is

not the case, then the imminant God is indeed a Deus nudus absconditus. If Christ is the

God who creates the mass of humanity, some to election and others to reprobation for

his glory, then this God is hidden from us.

In this respect then, the a posteriori construction is preferable, even if it contains within

it the tendency towards the subordination of the Son. Given how vigorously Calvin

strove to avoid this charge through his conception of autotheos,114 I do not see it as a

necessary implication. I admit, though, that others have and still do. Even if it were true

then we should qualify what would be meant by subordination. The Son would remain,

as in Calvin's christology, homoousios with the Father—in very nature God. The

subordination of the Son would be a relational subordinationism. In his eternal person

the Son is begotten of the Father and then in the economy he is sent by the Father as the

mediator, for us men and for our salvation. This subordination is therefore conjoined

with the divine eternal decision to create and then redeem. The Son, in this co-decision

to create, defines himself as eternally for us, a perpetual mediator in subjection to the

Father (1 Cor 15:28). This relational definition of subordination, at least, can claim for

itself a great deal of scriptural support (eg. John 5:19; 14:28). The Son became who he

is because he is for us.

113Doyle, 'Calvin on the Trinity,' 96-8.114Calvin, Institutes, I.xiii.26.

cf. Kelly, 'The True and Triune God: Calvin's Doctrine of the Holy Trinity.' 84-86.

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The Love of God in the Temporal Man:Christ and the Limited Atonement

In this the love of God was made manifest among us, that God sent his only Son into the world, so that we might live through

him.

Up until this point it has been our task to describe the connections that have historically

been drawn between the doctrines of christology and predestination in reformed

thought. By doing so we have now laid a proper groundwork for our investigation into

the temporal work of God in the atonement. We shall argue in this chapter that one's

conception of the decree of predestination dramatically shapes the way in which one

will describe the atonement, and that a great deal of the variation within reformed

thought about the work of Christ, and in how one accounts for particularity within that

soteriology, can be accounted for using the a priori and a posteriori categories of

exposition that we have so far developed.

There are a number of expositors of reformed theology that have argued that the chosen

locus of election is simply an expression of emphasis, and not in and of itself

substantial. For example, Bavinck comments that the decision of locus “does not

necessarily imply an essential difference in principle.”115 However, we have seen that

the decisions made with regards to the placement of election results in a distinctly

different conception of the ordo salutis, which in turn affects how we should ground the

doctrine of soteriology in the character of God. Since election and atonement are not

two different things, but two descriptions of the same saving purpose of God along two

different axes, how one conceives of the former will significantly influence the latter.

115H. Bavinck, The Doctrine of God. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1951. 358.cf. S. Clark, Election and Predestination: The Sovereign Expressions of God. Pages 90-122 in D. Hall and P. Lillback, A Theological Guide To Calvin's Institutes: Essays and Analysis. New Jersey: P&R. 2008. 91.

35

Reformed theology has always understood this. From its first codifications the

incarnation has been viewed as the temporal nexus between God's eternal plan, and the

execution of that plan in the economy of salvation. As Muller says, “it is the

incarnation, the two-fold nature of Christ, that functions to bind God's sovereignty in

predestination to the temporal execution of the decree.”116 This distinction is not, as

Bray argued, characteristic of Beza and later protestantism.117 Rather it finds a nebulous

expression in Calvin,118 Bullinger,119 Vermigli120 and Musculus.121 And it is ultimately

this distinction between Christ's work in time and eternity which lays behind Calvin's

concept of Christ as the “mirror of election.” It is due to the the sovereignty of the Son,

and not just the Father, that the eternal will of the indivisible God is so precisely and

completely executed in the economy:

I come now to [Christ's] kingship... [of which we must] infer its efficacy and

benefit for us, as well as its whole force and eternity. Now this eternity,

which the angel in The Book of Daniel attributes to the person of Christ

[Dan 2:44], in the Gospel of Luke the angel justly applies to the salvation of

the people [Luke 1:33].122

The implications of this, of how one constructs the doctrine of predestination in relation

to christology, reach much farther than Bavinck's “matter of emphasis”. As we shall see,

116Muller, Christ and the Decree, 19.117Bray, Theodore Beza's Doctrine of Predestination, 90-93.118See for example:

Calvin, Commentar, Ephesians 3:11.Calvin, Commentary, Romans 11:34.Calvin, Commentary, John 10:16.Calvin, Commentary, John 6:40.

119Bullinger, Second Helvetic Confession, x.4.120Vermigli, Loci Communes, II.xvii.2. 121Musculus, Loci Communes, ch17-18.122Calvin, Institutes, II.xv.3. See also Calvin, Institutes, III.xxiv.5.

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they flow out to the very ends of Christian life and practice: in accounting for salvation,

in assurance, and in the presentation and explanation of the gospel itself.

Before we begin it will be necessary to refine our definition of the word atonement.

Reformed dogmatics generally has a wide view of the atonement as the process by

which we have become reconciled to God. That is to say, it includes the entire life and

work of Christ. This is certainly the explicit view of Calvin as he develops his doctrine

of the atonement in Institutes II.xvi. However, on occasion, and particularly in modern

writing on the subject, the phrase has come to refer specifically to the death of Christ,

or properly speaking the oblation. Sometimes “the death of Christ” is used as an

umbrella term, which finds its referent in the entire life of Christ, but sometimes an

equivocation enters theological discourse at this point so that opponents in a debate can

both claim to adhere to a “limited atonement” and mean by it two different things. In

what follows I will employ the broad meaning of the word atonement; that it

encompasses the totality of the reconciling work of Christ, his life, baptism, obedience,

death, resurrection and heavenly intercession. I will not use “death of Christ” as an

umbrella term to cover these same concepts. The death of Christ refers specifically to

his death.

The Love of God for the Elect: Particularity in the A Priori View of Election

We shall begin with the a priori view since it is the more straight-forward of the two,

and has within it the least historical variation. This formulation is found in the reformed

tradition beginning with Beza and continuing mainly through the protestant scholastics.

The distinctive feature of all reformed christology is its covenantal and soteriological

focus—Christ is who he is for us. The a priori conception of predestination adds

37

another focus to this christology: Christ is conceived as the temporal executor of the

divine decree. These two elements are clear, for example, in Polanus' christology.

Polanus describes the atonement as the “means of salvation” in temporal categories, but

then he immediately relates it to election: “Christ [is] given to us by the Father and sent

into the world at the end of time, [died] and suffered for us and in our place” but this

“gift is the effect of our eternal election.” Therefore, for Polanus, the “mediation of

Christ is a meritorious and proximate efficient cause of all subsequent means, which are

the effects of our eternal election.”123

We noted in the last chapter the relationship between election and love in this view—

that God loves those he has first chosen. The same relationship is now evident between

the atonement and election. Christ is sent for the elect, and therefore his work is the

means by which the decree of election is executed. Soteriology proceeds in an a priori

fashion from the “intra-trinitarian determination of the pattern of salvation... to the

execution of the decree [in Christ].”124 In fact, as Bray observes of Beza, “virtually all of

the traditional cardinal Christian doctrines could be viewed from the perspective of the

execution of the divine elective decree.”125

Accounting for particularity within this model is straightforward. Since the decree of

election finds its place at the head of a causal chain from which every other

soteriological consideration stems, the atonement is limited to the elect. Exponents of

this position can still maintain the classical Lombardian distinction: the atonement is

sufficient for all but efficient for the elect alone. This distinction is possible because of

123Polanus, The Substance of the Christian Religion, IV.viii, 244.Cf. Bray, Theodore Beza's Doctrine of Predestination, 98-106.

124Muller, Christ and the Decree, 167.125Bray, Theodore Beza's Doctrine of Predestination, 106.

38

the worth of the sacrifice: “Since Christ suffered as a divine-human person the value of

His suffering was infinite.”126 However this is an academic distinction. It is speaking of

what might have been had the will of God been different. As it is, the work of Christ

simply effects the will of God to save the elect.

There is no point then, indeed it barely makes sense within this view, to equivocate on

the term atonement. The work of Christ in his entirety serves only the end of the decree.

For Perkins “the [atonement] is appointed and limited to the elect alone by [both] the

Father's decree and the Sonnes intercession and oblation... For the Sonne doth not

sacrifice for those, for whom he doth not pray: because to make an intercession and

sacrifice are conjoyned: but hee prayeth only for the elect and for beleevers.”127

The Love of God for the World: Particularity in the A Posteriori View of Election

It must be said at the outset that the a posteriori view allows a great deal of variation

when accounting for particularity in soteriology. This is because the decree of election,

which ultimately still accounts for particularity by the sovereign will of God, is not

considered as the causal head of a chain of temporal events. That is to say that not every

event in the economy of salvation must find its ultimate cause in the execution of the

decree of election. There is room for the sovereign God to work some events of history

for other reasons than to execute the decree. One of these other reasons may be the

universal offer of the gospel.

The value of the a posteriori locus for christology is that not all of the mediatorial work

of Christ must find its referent with respect to the decree of election. In the a posteriori

126Boettner, The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination, 151.127Perkins, A Treatise On Predestination. 609.

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system, it is possible to expound the person and mediatorial work of Christ without any

reference to the decree whatsoever, as Calvin does in Institutes II.xv-xvii, and indeed as

much of the New Testament does. The strength of this formulation is that Christ as

mediator can be said to be acting, at least in some aspects of his work, for humanity in

general rather than for the elect specifically. We have already seen this developed in the

previous chapter. The fact of predestination reveals, for the early reformed thinkers, a

God who desires to save. Anderson puts it simply, “God has a preference for mercy over

judgment.”128 Therefore in the economy also Christ reveals a God who is favourably

disposed towards humanity, not simply the elect.

This is not to deny irresistible grace, nor the sovereignty of God to particularize within

soteriology. Ultimately, reformed dogmatics agrees in all its variations on irresistible

grace. The soteriology of the Synod of Dort suitably illustrates the distinction. The

Synod convened in 1618 against the Arminian soteriology outlined in The

Remonstrance. The Arminian doctrine of of election was based on foreknowledge of

human choice, and with it came a doctrine of universal atonement—that the atonement

made salvation possible for all, but that the human decision to accept Christ was the

ultimate limiting factor in soteriology. Against this, the Synod of Dort affirmed a strong

doctrine of predestination as God's sovereign and free grace.129

Within this framework, Dort's formulation of predestination was a posteriori. Humanity

was considered creatus et lapsus at the point of the decree, and so the chapter on

predestination begins with an exposition of the sin of all men in Adam.130 However, it

128J. Anderson. 'The Grace of God and the Non-Elect in Calviun's Commentaries and Sermons.' (New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, PhD, 1976.) 25.

129The Articles of the Synod of Dort. Translated by T. Scott. Virginia: Sprinkle Publications. 1993. 1.7.130Synod Of Dort, 1.1.

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moves immediately from there not to discuss the decree of God to save, as an a priori

discussion would, but to the universal love of God. Drawing on 1 John 6:9 and John

3:16 it states: “But 'in this is the love of God manifested, that he sent his only begotten

Son into the world, that every one who believeth in him should not perish, but have

everlasting life.'”131 From there it discusses the work of Christ, before finally coming to

predestination. Dort then shares the same dogmatic loci as Calvin. In it, the act of

sending the Son is motivated by God's love towards the world, without limit as to

particularity.

Ultimately, the Synod of Dort does affirm a limited atonement because it accounts for

particularity by the doctrine of election. However, unlike the a priori view, it

understands this decree as election to faith. That is, the atonement is not limited at the

point of Christ's death, but at the point of his intercession as the risen Christ gives faith

to men (Ephesians 4:8):

That some, in time, have faith given them by God and others have it not

given, proceeds from his eternal decree; For “known unto God are all his

works, from the beginning of the world.” Acts xv. 18. Eph i.11. According to

which decree, he graciously softens the hearts of the elect, however hard,

and he bends them to believe: but the non-elect he leaves, in just judgment,

to their own perversity and hardness.132

Dort's offer of the gospel is a genuine offer to both the elect and the reprobate. Since

“the death of the Son of God is... abundantly sufficient to expiate the sins of the whole

131Synod Of Dort, 1.2.132Synod Of Dort, 1.6.

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world”,133 then it follows that “the promise of the gospel... ought to be announced and

proposed, promiscuously and indiscriminately, to all nations and men.”134 The

Lombardian distinction135 takes a very different nuance here than in the a priori

formulation.136 The death of Christ is not academically sufficient—were God to will

something different—but hypothetically sufficient for whoever will believe. Salvation

consists of two related but ultimately independent axes: the first being the free gift of

the Son to expiate sin, and the second being the election to faith of those who will be

saved.137

The exegesis within early reformed systems reveals a similar soteriology. Calvin can, in

his comments on 1 Timothy 2:4, hold both a universal promise of the gospel and a

particular salvation: “God has at heart the salvation of all, because he invites all to the

acknowledgment of his truth... [and] wishes that the gospel should be proclaimed to all

without exception.” But Calvin also sees “the folly of those who represent this passage

to be opposed to predestination.”138 Similarly when he comments on 2 Peter 3:9 the

gospel is genuinely offered to all humanity in an act showing God's disposition of love

towards them. Although God is “ready to receive all to repentance, so that none may

perish”, his “hidden purpose” in election is that not all will receive this promise with

faith. Election in Calvin's soteriology is therefore considered at the point of faith—a

product of union with Christ—and not at the point of the work of Christ:139 “For God [in

133Synod Of Dort, 2.3.134Synod Of Dort, 2.5. 135The Lombardian formulation: that Christ's death is sufficient for all but efficient for the elect alone.136P. Rouwendal, Calvin's Forgotten Classical Position on the Extent of the Atonement: About

Sufficiency, Efficiency, and Anachronism.' Westminster Theological Journal 70 (2008): 317-35. 323.137This is not an election in response to foreknowledge of faith which is the Arminian position. It is a

genuine doctrine of predestination to faith. Cf. L. Berkhof. The History of Christian Doctrines. Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust. 1937. 151-3.

138Calvin, Commentary, 1 Timothy 2:4.139This accounts for Calvin's dogmatic locus of exposition which we discussed in the first chapter. It

shows that the placement of election in Book 3 of The Institutes and not Book 1 is not an arbitrary selection, but a careful dogmatic statement.

42

the act of sending Christ] stretches forth his hand without a difference to all, but lays

hold only of those, to lead them to himself, whom he has chosen before the foundation

of the world.”140

Calvin can therefore be said to hold to a limited atonement. However the reason for the

voluminous modern discussion141 on the topic should now be apparent. Strictly speaking

atonement is not a category in Calvin's thought. Instead he holds throughout Institutes

II.xvi.4-6 that Christ makes satisfaction (satisfactio) and expiation (expiato) for the sin

of the whole world, but reconciliation (reconciliato) and intersession (intercessio), in

short redemption (redemptio), was accomplished only for the elect.142 Atonement is

therefore limited in the sense that only the elect will be saved. However, at the same

time the death of Christ constitutes an unlimited and universal offer. Anderson observes

that this aspect of Calvin's soteriology is more transparent in his exegetical remarks and

commentaries than it is in his Institutes.143 For example, Calvin comments on Job 31

that

the effect of Christ's death comes not to the whole world, nevertheless...

Jesus Christ has suffered his death and passion as well for [the reprobate] as

for us, therefore it behooves us to labor to bring every man to salvation, that

the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ may be available to them.144

The effect of Christ's death, for Calvin, is reserved for those who will be united to Christ

140Calvin, Commentary, 2 Peter 3:9.141See P. Hartog, A Word For the World: Calvin on the Extent of the Atonement. Illinois: Regular Baptist

Press. 2009 for a good summary of the debate.142Muller, Christ and the Decree, 34.143Anderson, 'The Grace of God and the Non-Elect,' 25.144Calvin, Sermons, Job 31.

43

by faith.145 However the act of Christ's death constitutes a genuine, unlimited offer so

that it is for the reprobate as well as for the elect. Christ's mediation is therefore, at least

in this aspect, universal.146 This manner of exposition is common among those that

maintain the a posteriori locus of the decree. Bullinger, for example, also shows the

ability to consistently maintain both an irresistible grace with a non-particular

atonement by considering the decree of election to be temporally executed at the point

where "men are drawn by God."147 Drawing on both 1 Timothy 2:4 and 2 Peter 3:9 he

concludes that we should not "despair... whether I am elected... [and whether] it then

profit me to hear sermons" but rather "let every man be of good hope, that God in time,

will give faith unto him also."148

"Limited Atonement" and the Soteriology of Amyraut and Owen

It will be apparent by this point why the term limited atonement is particularly difficult

to exegete within the context of historical protestantism. For example, Armstrong

argued that Calvin had no conception of a limited atonement,149 Muller argues that he

most certainly did,150 and Peterson believes him to have been ambiguous or

contradictory.151 The resolution depends on what is meant by atonement. If by limited

atonement is meant particular redemption, which is a commonly accepted substitute in

contemporary theology, then there will be no dispute; the entire reformed branch of

theology holds that only the elect will be saved. It is a poor substitute, however, because

it does not distinguish between any of the positions. However, if by atonement is meant

145Calvin, Institutes, III.i.1.146Calvin, Commentar, 1 Timothy 2:5147Bullinger, Compendium of the Christian Religion, 144-145.148Bullinger, Compendium of the Christian Religion, 144-145.

Cf. Decades, 3.vi 169-70 and Isaiah, 266b, Sermon 151, 75.149Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy, 138, 166, 189, 266.150Muller, Christ and the Decree, 33.151R. Peterson, 'Calvin on Christ's Saving Work.' Pages 226-247 in D. Hall and P. Lillback (eds.) A

Theological Guide To Calvin's Institutes: Essays and Analysis. New Jersey: P&R. 2008. 247.

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the oblation, then the discussion is more complex. In my opinion the debate finds its

clearest exponents in the theology of Moses Amyraut on the one side, and later, John

Owen on the other.

Amyraut's own claim was that his system, a hypothetical universalism, was “more like

Calvin than the Calvinists.”152 At the heart of this claim is his use of Calvin's distinction

between the secret and revealed will of God153 by which he illuminates his soteriological

framework. Building on Calvin's insight and the federal theology of his day, Amyraut

proposed a bi-covenantal system. The first covenant contains within it the earthly work

of Christ and establishes the basis in which God might justify sinners. It corresponds to

the revealed will of God, and is predicated on the condition of faith. On the basis of this

covenant, Amyraut can affirm in the straightforward sense that “God does not will that

any should perish.”154 However, the sin of man and the inevitable rejection of God's

Christ necessitates a second, unconditional covenant. This covenant operates sola gratia

and corresponds to the secret will of God, whereby faith is imparted to believers. The

basic soteriological distinctions then are very similar to Calvin's, even though the

covenantal framework is much more fully developed. In Amyraut's own words:

Calvin in his book on predestination gives, as it were, two heads to the

evangelical covenant. To the one relate those promises by which salvation is

promised to all who believe and repent, and which for this reason he called

conditional. To the second head applies those promises which are absolute

and by which God promised that He himself would give the faith which is

152By "Calvinists" Amyraut refers to the reformed orthodox theologians of his day. Bavinck argues that both Amyraldianism and Arminianism were historically the product of a dissatisfaction with the protestant scholastic expression of Calvinism. H. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics Volume 2, 361.

153Calvin, Instututes, I.xviii.3.154See his comments on 1 Timothy 2:6. Translated and cited from Armstrong, Calvinism and the

Amyraut Heresy. 169-177.

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required of men.155

Thus for Amyraut, the term “limited atonement” is actually meaningless. Atonement

finds its locus within the conditional covenant and so it is limited to precisely those who

will fulfill that condition. Since salvation remains sola gratia as a separate act from the

oblation in and of itself, a separate covenant, the phrase limited atonement becomes a

worthless distinction. Again this is seen best in comparison. Reformed orthodoxy of the

17th Century required an exegetical qualification between “all without exception” and

“all without distinction” to make good sense of passages like 1 Timothy 2:4 and even

John 3:16 since a limited atonement precluded a universal aspect. For Amyraut this

distinction is an unnecessary imposition on Scripture. God simply genuinely desires that

all will be saved, and makes provision for it with a universal covenant. Context,

therefore, rather than theological system, will determine the meaning of “all”.156

Amyraut's system neatly holds together what is seen as a paradox by the reformed

orthodox; the atonement is not limited, but only the elect will be saved.

Amyraut's clarity, however, exposes an essential point of similarity between

hypothetical universalism and Arminianism. On close inspection, there is no difference

in their doctrine of the atonement itself. This probably accounts for much of the

reformed reaction against the hypothetical universalist position. After all, was not some

kind of hypothetical universalism one of the core propositions of The Remonstrance:

that Christ's death would save any on the condition of faith? The difference between the

Arminian position and the Amyraldian position was the second, unconditional covenant.

155Amyraut, Eschantillon, 1658, 209-10. Translated and cited from Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy, 198.

156As it had with Calvin. Contrast Calvin's exegesis of 1 Timothy 2:4 (all without distinction) and 2 Peter 3:9 (all without exception). Calvin, Commentary, 1 Timothy 2:4. Calvin, Commentary, 2 Peteter 3:9.

46

Faith, for the Arminian theologians, was the human response to the grace of God in the

universal atonement. For Amyraut, faith was irresistibly accomplished by the Holy

Spirit. Thus the distinction between Amyraldianism and Arminianism lies outside the

established locus of exposition of the atonement. This leaves many reformed orthodox,

and many theologians today also,157 to argue that Amyraut held to an Arminian theology

of the atonement. MacLeod, for example, describes the Amyraldian system as “an

attempt to graft the Arminian doctrine of universal redemption on to the Calvinist

doctrine of unconditional election.”158

Indeed this was John Owen's response.159 Owen could group together the exponents of

hypothetical universalism—particularly Thomas More, Richard Baxter and Moses

Amyraut—with the Arminian theologians and use the same argument against both.160 At

its heart, Owen's objection relies on a particular Aristotelian conception of God as the

“perfect agent,” defined as the being in which there will be no discrepancy between

what he sets out to do, and what is accomplished.161 There is an “infallible connection

between God's purpose and will” so that his will to save matches exactly his purpose in

sending the Son.162 This statement is the Christian doctrine of sovereignty placed into a

scholastic framework: that God will not be thwarted. Since Scripture reveals the end of

the atonement as the salvation of the elect, then Owen can argue that God must also

have intended the atonement save only the elect. If he had intended anything else then

his intention would have failed.163 By this logic, the atonement does not simply enable 157A. McGowan, 'The Atonement as Penal Substitution.' Pages 183-210 in A. McGowan (ed.) Always

Reforming: Explorations in Systematic Theology. Leicester: IVP. 2006. 206-08.Eg. A. Troxel, 'Amyraut "at" the assembly: The Westminster Confession of Faith and the Extent of the Atonement.' Presbyterion 22/1 (1996):43-55. 48.

158MacLeod, 'Amyraldus Redivivus,' 211.159Owen, Death of Death, IV.vi.160J. Packer, 'Introductory Essay.' Pages 1-44 in J. Owen, The Death of Death in the Death of Christ.

Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust. 1995. 24.161Owen, Death of Death, I.i.III.162Owen, Death of Death, IV.i. 199.163Owen, Death of Death, I.ii.

47

the Father to save, it actually accomplishes this end.

Since the end of the atonement proves the intention of God in the atonement then this

also forms the basis of Owen's objection against the bifurcation of the work of Christ

that we saw in both Amyraut and Calvin. Christ's oblation can not be for the world and

at the same time his intercession for the elect.164 It is the one perfect being who willed

both of these activities to bring about salvation for the elect and so therefore this end

proves the same intention of God in both of these acts. Drawing on John 17:9, where

Jesus prays specifically for the elect, Owen claims that the incarnation, the oblation and

the intercession all must accomplish this same goal.165 This objection, for Owen, defeats

hypothetical universalism:

“Those for whom [Christ] died may assuredly conclude that he maketh

intercession for them... which breaks the neck of the general ransom; for

according to that he died for millions that have no interest in his

intercession.”166

For Owen, then, the atonement is limited at the point of the intention of God.

Predestination is the a priori explanation of particularity, based in the eternal covenant

between the Father and the Son.167 Owen is, therefore, driven to the same conclusions as

Beza, Perkins and others within the a priori position. Specifically God does not love the

world in general, but only the elect,168 and Christ is not sent in any way for the world

but only the elect. To carry this argument Owen faces an exegetical challenge with

164Owen's own categories are impetration and application. Owen, Death of Death, II.iv.165Owen, The Death of Death, I.iv. 65.166Owen, The Death of Death, I.iv. 65.167Owen, The Death of Death, I.iii. 56.168Owen, The Death of Death, I.vi. 286. cf. II.ii. 94.

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passages such as 1 Timothy 2:4, 2 Peter 3:9 and particularly John 3:16. His exegesis of

these passages is theologically driven. The Death of Death contains a lengthy sections,

for example, to explain why the Johannine use of “world” can, on occasion, mean

“elect.”169

Accounting for Particularity in Reformed Soteriology

How then should we account for particularity? Both Owen and Amyraut are products of

the 17th Century and so there are facets of their respective systems which most would

not adopt today. Nevertheless they remain the clearest expositors of the two alternatives.

Also, both have modern adherents. Owen's position finds a modern-day defense in

Muller, who argues that “it is superfluous to speak of a hypothetical extent of the

efficacy of Christ's work beyond its actual application.”170 Amyraut finds a supporter in

D.B. Knox who argues that “from the point of view of the preacher, [ie. the a posteriori

position], Christ has died for all of his audience.”171

Certainly there are implications for both positions in the presentation of the gospel,

assurance of faith, and the Christian life which must be taken into account, and we shall

briefly develop these in the conclusion to this thesis. However, to argue from desired

implication to theological framework is backwards. Rather, it should be by now evident

that the heart of the matter of particularity in soteriology is how one accounts for the

temporal execution of the eternal decree. This will be a statement about Christ, since he

alone lives and works both in time and eternity. Within this framework, election and

atonement can both be seen as the one united work of Christ.

169Owen, Death of Death, IV.i.170Muller, Christ and the Decree, 35.

Cf. P. Helm, Calvin: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: T&T Clark. 2008. 136-54.171D. Knox, 'Some Aspects of the Atonement.' Pages 253-266 in Payne, T. (ed.) D. Broughton Knox:

Selected Works. Volume 1 – The Doctrine of God. Sydney: Matthias. 2000. 261.

49

The prior question that must be answered, then, is not to whom do the benefits of

election and the atonement come, but how. Or, in other words, how does Christ come to

live and dwell in us? Calvin will once again provide an important starting point as he

considers the question in the opening of Book III of his Institutes:

We must now examine this question. How do we receive those benefits

which the Father bestowed on his only-begotten Son...? First, we must

understand that as long as Christ remains outside of us, and we are separated

from him, all that he has suffered and done for the salvation of the human

race remains useless and of no value for us. Therefore, to share with us what

he has received from the Father, he had to become ours and to dwell within

us.172

It is common to most reformed thought, though overlooked in some, that union with

Christ forms the basis of the appropriation of the benefits of Christ's atoning work.173 It

is a faith union, bonded by the Holy Spirit. Thus atonement, the execution of the decree

of predestination, becomes a work of the trinitarian God. The Father sends his only-

begotten Son (John 5:30), who achieves a perfect salvation and returns exalted to the

Father's right hand (Acts 2:33). The Father and the Son then together send the Spirit

(John 14:16, 16:7) who through adoption unites us to the Son (Rom 8:15-16). Through

this faith union we appropriate the benefits of the Son (Rom 8:17).174 As Calvin wrote in

the Consensus Tiguranus, “Christ... assumed our flesh to communicate to us by right of

172Calvin, Institutes, III.i.1.173Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics Volume 3, 505-25.

M. Penner, 'Calvin, Barth, and the Subject of Atonemnet.' Pages 118-145 in N. MacDonald and C. Trueman (eds.) Calvin, Barth, and Reformed Theology. United Kingdom: Paternoster. 2008. 119.

174Penner, 'Calvin, Barth, and the Subject of Atonemnet,' 130.

50

adoption that which he possessed by nature, namely, to make us sons of God.”175 It is on

this theological basis that the reformed doctrine of double imputation rests: in our union

with Christ, he becomes for us sin, and we become in him righteousness (2 Cor 5:21).176

Redemption and reconciliation with God therefore is not simply the work of Christ for

us. It is the work of Christ in us and our being in him through faith (John 15:4). Both

atonement and election find their temporal execution when the “one mediator between

God and men, the man Jesus Christ” (1 Timothy 2:5) draws near to us and dwells in us.

It is this act in time, in the existential coming of the Son to us and dwelling within us—

and not in the hapax of the son for us on the cross—that the eternal plan of God is

finally and fully accomplished in each life.

And now we have come to the crux of the matter. There is a biblical distinction to be

made between the work of Christ for us in the atonement, and the work of Christ in us

as his Spirit brings us into union with him; reconciliation, justification, sanctification

and redemption. Yet both are required for salvation. Amyraut was in fact correct in this

regard at least, in his assessment of the soteriology of Calvin, and in his biblical

theology. In Scripture salvation is something that is first accomplished and then applied.

“Unless you are born again,” said Jesus to Nicodemus, “you cannot see the kingdom of

God.” (John 3:3) It is not applied to all indiscriminately, but it is offered to all

indiscriminately. Bavinck reflects that “the application of salvation is no less an

essential constituent of redemption than the acquisition of it.”177 We can see this

principle operating clearly in the language in the book of Hebrews.178 The author of

175Calvin, Consensus Tigurinus. 1549. Articles 2 & 6. 176R. Gaffin Jr. 'Justification and Union with Christ.' Pages 248-269 in D. Hall and P. Lillback, A

Theological Guide To Calvin's Institutes: Essays and Analysis. New Jersey: P&R. 2008. 260-269.177H. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics Volume 3: Sin and Salvation in Christ. Grand Rapids: Baker. 2006.

523-4.178In fact this is true of the New Testament more generally. See L. Morris, The Apostolic Preaching of

the Cross: A Study of the Significance of Some New Testament Terms. Leicester: IVP. 1955.

51

Hebrews will not speak of salvation in direct connection with the cross. The word

groups σωζω and σωτηρια are in fact never connected to Christ's work for us. In

connection with the cross the author prefers λυτρωσις (Heb 9:12, 15), ιλασκομαι (Heb

2:17) and αγιαζω (Heb 10:10, 14). By contrast, salvation is won when it is applied in

the heavenly mediatorial and priestly work of Christ (Heb 2:3, 10; 5:9; 7:25; 9:28).

Possession of the “unshakable kingdom” is apprehended by faith (Heb 12:28; 11:16).

At this point we must pause to answer Owen's objection regarding the intention of God

in the atonement. Historically it has been this objection that has swayed reformed

opinion so decisively away from any form of hypothetical universalism. MacLeod

provides a modern statement of the critique, that a two-stage salvation essentially poses

a split in the intentionality of the persons of the Trinity: “Christ undertook to

accomplish redemption for all, but the Holy Spirit undertook to apply it only to the

elect.”179 Barth's objection is similar, that “the Holy Spirit does not make effective a

work of Jesus Christ which was ineffective without it' because God's 'eternal will has

been fully and completely realized in Jesus Christ.”180 The objection, however, fails to

grasp the trinitarian weight that the doctrine of union with Christ gives to the

atonement. The Father, Son and Spirit are not divided because the work of the Spirit in

the application of redemption is not something done outside of Christ. The Father and

Son mutually send the Spirit which unites us to Christ because he is the Spirit of Christ

(Rom 8:9).181 In this way the Son, as our heavenly mediator, “continues his prophetic,

priestly and ruling activity”182 and accomplishes salvation “to the utmost” (Heb 7:24-

179MacLeod, 'Amyraldus Redivivus,' 212.180Cf. B. McCormack, 'The Actuality of God: Karl Barth in Conversation with Open Theism.' Pages

185-244 in B. McCormack, (ed.) Engagine the Doctrine of God. Grand Rapids: Baker. 2008. 229.181In this statement we see the absolute importance of affirming the filioque clause. Unless the Spirit is

the Spirit of Christ then he cannot make Christ present to us. Everything that Christ has done, then, stands outside of us and is useless to us.

182Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics Volume 3,524.

52

25). The intention of the triune God in his work for us was to offer a genuine gospel to

all men—“good news for all the people, a saviour!” (Luke 2:10-11). The intention of

the triune God as he unites us to himself through the Son is to accomplish that salvation

sola gratia in those he chooses.

In the final analysis, the question of limited atonement is to understand the debate in the

wrong categories. The great value and strength of the a posteriori locus of election is

the economic focus that it brings to the whole question. Such an economic focus is also

the consistent answer of Scripture. When Jesus was asked “Will those who are saved be

few?” his answer was simply “Strive to enter.” (Luke 13:23-24). To phrase the question

in terms of the will or intention of God is, in the first place, to accept the a priori

formulation, and therefore, to concede the debate before it has begun. The a posteriori

answer to the question “For whom did Christ die?” is simply that God so loved the

world that he gave his only son. And of the question “Who will be saved?” it answers

without denying sola gratia, whoever should believe in him. Particularity in soteriology

should be accounted for by the human response of faith. This may sound Arminian to

some reformed ears, but it is not, because faith is the gift of the ascended Lord Jesus

Christ through the work of the Holy Spirit to the elect. Through the temporal

outworking of the economy of salvation, the Father accomplishes his divine purpose to

save fallen humanity through the work of his Son, by his Spirit.

53

Conclusions:Our Love for Christ

We love because he first loved us.

We have argued in this project that particularity within soteriology must be understood

primarily within the context of christology, and only secondarily as a function of

predestination. What is ultimately at stake is our conception of the character of God,

and how that character is revealed to us in his Son. We have seen that the a priori

placement of predestination resulted in the primacy of election over love. In this system

God is a God of the pure will, who decrees two groups of people, one to perdition and

the other to salvation for no other reason than his own freedom and glory.

But is this a God, humanly speaking, in whom fallen creatures can find refuge?183 As the

Psalmist says, it is as God shows his wondrous love that we will hide in the shadow of

his wings. (Psalm 17:7-8). To approach God it is necessary to believe first that he is

good to us (Hebrews 11:6), for otherwise God is a consuming fire (Hebrews 12:29). The

mountain is glorious, to be sure, but it is also fearful (Hebrews 12:21). There are several

consequences, then, if our theological system permits only the statement that God is

good to the elect.

Firstly, a great deal of introspection will be required to determine the status of one's

election. The eternal decree of God is unknowable directly, and so must be deduced

from its temporal effects. The practical syllogism of later reformed orthodoxy attempts

to do precisely this, to determine the status of election through the visible signs of the

Holy Spirit in sanctification. As has been often noted,184 the pastoral consequences of

183Cf. S. Jeffery, M. Ovey and A. Sach. Pierced for Our Transgressions: Rediscovering the Glory of Penal Substitution. England: IVP. 2007. 319-31.

184Eg. D. Carson, 'Reflections on Christian Assurance.' Westminster Theological Journal 54 (1992): 1-

54

Christian introspection as the basis of assurance are devastating. In the extreme cases,

reformed soteriology has found a surprising affinity to high-medieval Catholicism in

this regard. Although it always maintained salvation by grace through faith, once

assurance came from introspection, soteriology became in practice not very different

from the via antiqua.

Secondly, the basis on which the gospel is proclaimed to “all the world” (Mark 16:15) is

tenuous if God loves only the elect. What would be the good news to proclaim? That

“among you are some that God loves?” The Christian evangelist must be able to

genuinely say “Let the one who is thirsty come and take the water of life without

price!” (Revelation 22:17) The fundamental separation between redemption and

application that we have developed in the previous chapter is in fact important to the

gospel in this regard. When asked, “How do I know that God wants to save me?” the

evangelist replies without hesitation, “Because Christ died to save you.” When asked,

“how do I know if I am saved?” the evangelist can in turn say, “Because you believe

that Christ died to save you.” In this formula the practical syllogism is avoided, and the

basis of assurance becomes the fact of faith. It is the genuine offer of Christ to the world

without particularity that is important, for in this offer we understand truly that God

loves us and works for us (1 John 4:10). And so in Christ is revealed to us a God in

whom it is worth taking refuge, in whom it is safe to take refuge. As we understand

God's love for us, only then will we begin to love him in return.

The distinction then between the a priori and a posteriori exposition of the decrees is

neither academic, nor unimportant. It reaches to the very core of the Christian gospel.

29. 4-5.A. Null, Lectures on Repentence in Tudor Anglicanim delivered at Moore Theological College, Annual Lectures, 2009.

55

Neither is it an oddity of historical theology. The debate over how we should understand

limited atonement is still very current in the worldwide reformed church. However we

frame the question, and whatever our solution, we must not abandon the love of God for

us, for people, for the world. We may, in the final analysis, catch a glimpse of the

extraordinary grace of God in the doctrine of predestination. And we certainly must

cling to this sola gratia with all our might lest we be cast back helplessly upon our own

resources. Nevertheless, there is only one mediator between God and man, and in him is

revealed the loving heart of the Father, who looks upon our helpless estate and

genuinely desires that none should perish.

56

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