U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

ENERGY

Infrastructure Security

& Energy Restoration

Prepare. Respond. Adapt.

NASEO Central Regional Meeting

DOE SLTT Energy Assurance Activities

Matthew D. Duncan – Program Manager

June 5, 2017

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Agenda

• Program Overview

• FY 17 Energy Assurance Activities

• CLEAR PATH V Overview

• LIBERTY ECLIPSE Key Findings

• FY 18 Energy Assurance Planning

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DOE SLTT Energy Assurance Program

Build Relationships

Encourage Comprehensive

Planning

Increase Expertise

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Energy Assurance Activities in FY 17 – DOE HQ

• SLTT Energy Assurance 2016 Year in Review

https://energy.gov/oe/articles/state-local-tribal-and-territorial-energy-assurance-2016-year-review

• Energy Assurance Joint Policy Committee• Comprised of Energy Officials,

Emergency Managers, & Regulators – April 5, 2017

• Next Generation of EAGLE-I • Full access for states

• https://eagle-i.doe.gov/login

• Energy Waiver Library on Energy.gov• https://energy.gov/oe/energy-waiver-

libraryHurricane Season 2017

• UPDATE EEAC INFO• http://naseo.org/eeac

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CLEAR PATH V

Objectives1. Establish and reinforce relationships across the

energy and communications sectors to facilitate future preparedness and emergency response operations.

2. Define interdependencies between the energy and communications sectors, emphasizing areas of mutual reliance, resource needs, and mechanisms for effective sharing of information during a multi-state regional incident causing energy and communication system interruptions.

3. Examine the interactions between state and federal government organizations during an energy emergency to provide resources and assistance to impacted jurisdictions.

160 participants from federal, state, and energy/comms sectors

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CLEAR PATH V

Key Takeaways (unofficial)

1. Better coordination between electricity and communications sector for response needed

2. Improve access and credentialing for utility crews remains an issue at local level

3. UAS/Drones are a game-changer for damage assessments – need better clarity on FAA rules

4. Better understanding of restoration prioritization

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Energy Assurance Activities in FY 17 – N-Groups

• Energy Assurance Plan Updates w/ NASEO

• 12 states in process of updating plans

• NASEO updating guidelines/provide technical assistance

• Cybersecurity Training w/ NARUC

• Cybersecurity Primer for Regulators 3.0 – Jan 2017

• Cybersecurity Primer regional training – Summer ‘17

• Resilience Assessment/ Exec Orders w/ NGA

• Develop state resilience assessment tool for states

• Develop executive order roadmap

• Emergency Management Energy Education w/ NEMA

• Hosted cyber incident coordination panel in March ’17

• Developing energy focused TTX package for states

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Energy Assurance Activities in FY 17 – N-Groups

• Protect Critical Infrastructure Information and Tribal Engagement w/ NCSL

• Develop best practices for critical infrastructure information protections in legislation

• Reengage tribal state energy assurance work

• Enhance mutual assistance with municipally-owned utilities w/ APPA

• Improve outage mapping and information sharing

• Support updates and exercising of mutual assistance plans and agreements

• Reinvigorate local energy assurance activities

• Reestablish local energy assurance contacts

• Identify gaps in local energy assurance capabilities

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LIBERTY ECLIPSE Key Findings and Recommendations

LIBERTY ECLIPSE Exercise –

Newport, RI, December 8-9,

2016 – Co-hosted w/ NASEO

• Cyber-incident in the

electricity sub-sector

affecting other sectors

• Interdependencies in

energy sector

• 3 FEMA Regions, 13 States,

industry, 96 participants

• AAR released April 18https://energy.gov/oe/articles/liberty-eclipse-exercise-summary-report

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LIBERTY ECLIPSE Key Findings and Recommendations

1) The cyber incident coordination frameworks at both the state and federal levels need to be further defined and synchronized with industry.

2) The public will face a great deal of uncertainty following a significant cyber incident that causes physical damage (such as a long-term power outage or petroleum disruption), creating a considerable challenge for public information and expectation management, particularly around restoration times.

3) The evolving nature of cybersecurity threats makes it difficult for PUCs to accurately quantify the cost of cybersecurity investments for rate recovery.

Key Findings – Cyber Incident Coordination

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LIBERTY ECLIPSE Key Findings and Recommendations

4) While the consequence management activities for the physical impacts caused by a cyber incident are largely the same as they would be for any other hazard—including the potential use of the Stafford Act—the unique conditions of a cyber incident pose additional challenges that necessitate new capabilities and the use of new authorities.

5) Information sharing and the ability to communicate remain prime concerns in an energy emergency—regardless of the cause.

6) There is a need to improve state petroleum response plans to make them more operational and detailed and provide for greater consistency across multi-state regions.

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LIBERTY ECLIPSE Key Findings and Recommendations

7) Emergency response stakeholders need to have a good understanding of the energy sector supply chains and interdependencies to plan for, and respond to, energy emergencies.

8) There are substantial resources available to support efforts that would enhance cybersecurity. These resources, and their applicability, are not always well known at the state and local levels by some of the organizations within the energy supply chain.

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LIBERTY ECLIPSE Key Findings and Recommendations

Key Findings – Exercise Design

9) The quality of the exercise, the ability to identify planning gaps,

and action items are affected by the composition of the

individuals and organizations that participate in the exercise.

10) Participants felt that the exercise should have been a more

focused set of events targeting a smaller geographic region to

allow for more in-depth discussions.

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LIBERTY ECLIPSE Key Findings and Recommendations

1) DOE should support SLTT governments and industry partners to

improve communication and information sharing consistent with

forthcoming cyber-incident coordination mechanisms, and strengthen

procedures to facilitate energy restoration. Particular attention needs to

be paid to public communication and expectation-setting during

significant cyber incidents.

2) The federal government needs to better define its roles and

responsibilities for a significant cyber incident and communicate those

roles clearly.

3) DOE should continue its work with SLTT partners, other federal

agencies, and the private sector to ensure that appropriate resources

and capabilities are available to reduce the risks to the energy sector

from a cybersecurity threat. DOE, DHS, and industry should also work

together to ensure that measures are in place for the recovery of critical

information technology systems to ensure a more rapid system

restoration and to minimize impacts.

Recommendations

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LIBERTY ECLIPSE Key Findings and Recommendations

4) DOE should facilitate further dialogue between governments at all

levels and industry on developing fuel-shortage response plans, and to

evaluate these plans in future regional exercises that focused on the oil

and natural gas subsector.

5) DOE should maintain and expand its energy assurance program to

encourage and support planning and preparedness, through regular

education, training, and exercises for SLTT partners, with the goal of

promoting a better understanding of energy sector supply-chain

interdependencies. These efforts should culminate in updated energy

assurance plans at all levels.

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Energy Assurance Activities for FY18

• Three Themes

• Cybersecurity Preparedness

• Information Sharing and Situational Awareness

• Regional Interdependencies

• EAGLE-I Upgrades to include ISERnet content

• Possible work on Local Energy Assurance

• Cross DOE/Lab Cooperation on analytical

products focused on resilience and security

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DOE ESF#12 Regional Coordinators

Bill Edwards

Bob McLeod (Alt)

Sam Brinker

Pete Miller (Alt)

Rob Gross

Donald Ferguson (Alt)

Vic Pearson

Russ Pascua (Alt) U.S. NORTHCOM

Jamie Clark

Donald Ferguson

Rob Gross (Alt)

Greg Campbell

Walter Yamben (Alt)

Chris Lawrence

Matt Rosenbaum (Alt)

Bob Reed

James Briones (Alt)

Keith Dodrill

Clark Robinson (Asst)

Updated April, 2017

Colorado Springs

DC

Jay Hanna

Joseph Dygert (Alt)

NRCC

Jamie Clark

John Ostrich (Alt)

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Matt Duncan

Program Manager

State, Local, Tribal, & Territorial (SLTT)

Energy Assurance

U.S. Department of Energy

Cell: 202.202.6072

Email: matthew.d.duncan@hq.doe.gov

Rob Gross

ESF#12 Regional Coordinator

Region VI IV

Cell: 304-216-0902

U.S. Department of Energy

Robert.Gross@NETL.DOE.GOV

Infrastructure Security & Energy Restoration (ISER) Division, DOE --

https://energy.gov/oe/mission/infrastructure-security-and-energy-

restoration-iser

EAGLE-I GIS System -- https://eagle-i.doe.gov/Default.aspx

ISERnet – secure, restricted password-protected site

https://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/isernet/

Don Ferguson

ESF#12 Regional Coordinator

Region VII IV

Cell: 304-216-2426

U.S. Department of Energy

Donald.Ferguson@NETL.DOE.GOV

Vic Pearson

ESF#12 Regional Coordinator

Region VIII IV

Cell: 208-720-7008

U.S. Department of Energy

Pearsovc@id.doe.gov