NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1967

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AERONAUTICAL Ali!) SPACE SCIENCF8' UNITED STATES SENA.TEEIGHTY-NINTH CONGRESSSECOND SESSIONON

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,~TlVlll,-; t.echnological capability that the Soviet Union has demonstrated in its space program. The splpction of such a mission objective by the Soviet Union would reflect the values that they stress among the many that flow from an effective program of tPchnological development. If, in their judgment, an early circumlunar flight would sen'e their interests then it is quite likely that they would program such a mission.IMPORTANCE OF ApOLLO MANAGEMENT

Question 19. Mr. Webb, on page 12, and again on page 14, the second last paragraph, you speak of your system of management. Do you regard the development of the capability to manage a program as large as Apollo a significant fallout of the space program? Would you discuss the importance of learning to manage large programs such as the Apollo to our national strength and leadership? Answer. To reply to your questions on the importance of what we have learned and what we have achieved in the space program with respect to the management of large programs, it is desirable to begin by placing our management problems and efforts in historical perspective with those that preceded and conditioned them. In 1939, the last year before our buildup for World War II, our gross national product was $80 billion and the defense budget about $1 billion. During World War II we as a nation developed a very real competence in producing ships, aircraft, all kinds of specialized equipment, new items like radar, and, of course, atomic weapons. At the end of the war, we gave consideration to the organization of our efforts in atomic energy, in science and technology, and also had the problem of organizing certain other large efforts such as the Marshall plan and the military assistance program. And then we had to organize to fight in Korea. Later, after we knew the Russians had learned to make atomic weapons and ballistic missiles, WP bpgan a major effort to prod\\('e missil(>s of our own and to bring into play the strengths of our universities and industries through the largescale combination of science, technology, engineering, and management. This effort was accelerated with the Russian sputnik success, but with an important new departure--the various activities related to aeronautics and space research and development which were not required for military operations or research and development to meet military needs wen' brought together in a new organization, NASA. The assimilation into ~ASA of t.hese activities, each wit.h its own ongoing programs and diverse methods of management, had hardly ~pn completed when the Russian success with Gagarin brought the :\lay 1961 decision to embark on a 10-year program to devplop prepminpncp in space basPfi on an even more vigorous application of the method that had proved succpssful before; namply, a large-scale effort involving scipnce, tpchnology, enginpering, and management. The decision was made to utilize American industry to the fullest extent possible and to encourage the accomplishment of the scit'utific research on t.hp campuBf's of universities in close associat.ion with gractl.late education. A real effort. was made to meet the requirempnt in the 195R Space Act. to expand the Nation's capability for scientific and engineering work relatpd to aeronautics and space. In the NASA effort, Dr. Dryden, Dr. Seamans, and I, each from a different background, brought a combined experience which I believe succeeded in developing an effective management system and placed it in a position to insure the derivation of the greatest value from the other three elements-science, technology, and engineering. Under this system, about 90 percent of NASA's dollars are spent "ith industry, a small percentage with universities, and less than 5 percent for direct personal services in its own centers. The relationships between NASA and its contractors, between NASA's prime contractors and their subcontractors !llld suppliers, and between the individual decisionmakers in this complex have been based on three main factors: (1) we have required that the responsible program manger in NASA be qualified technically to make the tradeoff judgments necpssary and also, in addition to his technical responsibilities, to be responsible for both cost and schpdules; (2) we have attempted to insure that the program managers and decisionmakers in NASA are supported by highly qualified technical organizations fully&.responsive to them, at the NASA centers; and (3) we have stressed the

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NASA AUTHORIZATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1967

necessity for rapid and effective decisionmaking based on both individual competence and the development of judgment at each level of management in the system. An illustration of how these factors have been integrated in the actual management of the program is our requirement that on each contract of major consequence members of a source evaluation board must report their evaluation of the various contractor proposals to the senior officers of the agency in person and must be prepared to support in person their judgment as to the effectiveness of the methods undpr which the evaluation was conducted, the actual conduct of the process of evaluation, the results which came out of the process, and the qualifications of the contractor proposers to do the work within the cost and technical requirements. The senior officers of NASA, in the past Dr. Dryden, Dr. Seamans, and myself, then made a thorough examination of all these factors through questioning of the members of the board, evaluated all special factors to be taken into account in the negotiation or administration of the contract; and decided the award. This has meant that each person dealing with a contractor's proposal knew that the decision would go to the highest levels of the agency, that his own judgment as to the methods used and the results achieved would be brought into question, and that he would be required to support his actions and the results of his work. He also knew that he could, in turn, evaluate the judgment of the three senior officers of the agency because all facets of their decision could be scrutinized by all those below them who had participated in the source evaluation process. The fact that we have learned-with techniques like this and many othershow to manage effectively a program for which over $20 billion have bpen appropriated and effectively obligated within 5 years, with every unit working in the program becoming stronger as a result of its participation, and with our ability to manage the effort continually improving is, I believe, an extremely important value which the country has received as a result of the N ABA space program. More and more large systems, such as the Government and commercial communication satellite systems, the operational weather satllite system, and the commercial supersonic air transport system, and others, are becoming feasible because of our national efforts in science and technology. Management must keep pace and constantly evolve to makp such RYRtl'mR possiblp and make them effective. The management experience and methods developed in NASA have real significance in this regardPOLICY FOR INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION

Question 20. Mr. Webb, what is the policy framework in the executive branch of the Government for U.S. activities in international space cooperation? Answer. The policy framework which governs the executive branch in pursuing international cooperation in space is that provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, which makes clear that Congress intended that U.S. space activities be carried out in cooperation with other nations. In following this injunction, we have sought to maximize international participation in, and contributions to, all aspects of our program-so long as meaningful, substantive activities could be dcfined, consistent with our own national objectives, valuable to the cooperating countries as well as ourselves, and with a truly cooperative rather than foreign aid character.RELATION OF SPACE PROGRAM COST TO COST OF OTHER PROGRAMS

Question 2l. "lhat answer would you suggest to those who are disenchanted with the space program and who charge that the United States is wasting billions of dollars on their manned lunar programs and other space programs, and that we would be better off to spend that money on some of the pressing problems we have here on the ground? Answer. A strong national effort to explore and use space is essential to our security and to our position of world leadership. The technological balance of power and the capacity of the United States for effective leadership among the nations of the world depend in large measure on continued progress in our space program. If we did not have a strong, ongoing space program, the Soviet lTnion would be the only major space power in the world today and would have the uncontested opportunity to use space for whatever purposes it wished-and perhaps even to deny other nations the ri!!:ht to explore amI nse space. Moreover, an active Soviet space program, and relative inactivity on our part, would bolster the Soviet argument that only communism can mobilize the scientifie and technological resources necessary to meet the great challenges of the 20th century.


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Our national space program bas been carefully planned to protect us against technological surprise in space and to demonstrate to all the determination and capacity of the United States to lead in all vital fields of modern science and technology. Our space program is meeting well these high priority needs today. Nothing else that we might do could replace the space program in developing the new technology, equipment, personnel, and operating experience needed to keep the Soviet Union from effectively using successes in space to help spread communism throughout the world. We are also getting many other valuable returns from our investment in the national space program, including new scientific knowledge; practical benefits such as those produced for all mankind from our weather and communications satellites; unique experience in the organization and management of large-scale research and development programs which is being drawn upon to help solve many problems facing modern society; and a general quickening of the Nation's pulse as we respond to one of the greatest challenges ever laid before any generation. In this connection, it has been pointed out that if the stimulus of the space program and the new knowledge and the new technology it produces lead to no more than a I-percent increase in the gross national product per year it will be paying for itself in full. The space program would be a sound investment in progress even if there was no significant international competition. But the strong bid made by the Soviet Union for space leadership ever since the late 1950's does have an important influence on the urgency and the scope of our effort. So long as the Soviet Union continues on its present course in space, a major American investment in space exploration and use is not only prudent and productive, but absolutely essential to our security, peace, and freedom, and therefore deserving of the highest priority in the national interest. When asked whether we can afford to continue making a major national effort in space, the only answer we can make, after careful consideration of all the possible consequences, is that we cannot afford the much higher cost of lagging behind the leading Communist power in this vital new field of human endeavor. The tremendous advances we have made in our current program, and the great capability we are building for future progress, may lead some people to forget what it was like to be behind, as we were at the beginning of the space age; but no one in a position of responsibility in the Nation today can fail to weigh the dangers and the lost opportunities and the extra costs that would result from falling behind again.

Mr. WEBB. Mr. Chairman, before Dr. Seamans proceeds, I think I should tell the committee, with the greatest degree of concern and sadness, that we have just had a crash in St. Louis and two astronauts were killed. l We have decided to withhold their names until their next of kin have been notified, but this will have some effect on our program and is one of the kind of things for which we have to maintain a capability for flexibility. The CHAIRMAN. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.) The CHAIRMAN. Will you proceed, Mr. Seamans, to read your statement?STATEllENT OF ROBERT C. SEDANS, JR., DEPUTY ADIIINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADJIINlSTRATION

Dr. SEAMANS. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, in my testimony today I would like to discuss NASA's fiscal year 1967 budget request in terms of the decisions which led to its formulation, the implications of those decisions in the process of drawing up the program plans for fiscal year 1968, and the directions toward which we are looking in the future as they are affected by these decisions.I

Elliott M. See, Jr., snd CharleS A. BBlISett IL

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NASA AUTHORIZATIOX FOR FISCAL YEAR 1967

I would also like to submit for the record folll' prepared statements on se\'eralareas in which your committee has shown interest, without reading them at this time. (See p. 84.) Dr. Mueller, Dr. Newell, Dr. Adams, and Mr. Buckley, the Associate Administrators who carry a major burden of responsibility in the planning, management, and execution of the :NASA program, will discuss in detail the specifics of the authorization request now before you; each is an effective and proven mannger of resources and an effective proponent for a key element of our national aerollautics and space progrnm. The il,1lthorization request before you totals $5,012 million, $163 millioll less than was appropriated to NASA last year. Of the total, by far the largest element is for research and development; we are requesting $4,246,600,000, It sum $265 million lower than our current fisc ILl year 1966 operating plall, to continue our current programs in mhnned flight, space sciences, satellite applications, aeronautics, advanced research and technology, tracking and dltta acquisition, and technology utilization. We are requesting $101,500,000 for construction of facilities, the necessary investment in laborn,tories, research facilities, and launch complexes to cnrry out the total NASA mission. For administrative operations, we are requesting $663,900,000 which is an increase of $52 million over the fiscal year 1966 operating plan; we must cover here the costs of additional personnel at ERC, KSC, and GSFC, as well as the effect of the pay raises and our increased needs for service contractor support.FISCAL YEAR 1967 REQUEST REPRESENTS STRINGENT BUDGET

This aut.hori,mtion request represent.s a very stringent budget, renlisticltlly gem'ed to the total situation thn.t the N n.tion faces in fulfilling its commitments in Vietnn.m and in moving n.heltd at the same time with essential domestic progmms. It is particularly stringent in the light of the vast and complex undertaking entailed by our objective of national preeminence in all fields of aeronn.utics and spn.ce. There hn.ve been many difficult decisions to make in shaping the NASA program for fiscal yen.r 1967 within the constraints of the totn.l budget. As Mr. Webb indicn.ted, we have given up, for this year, the opportunity to start major new projects we felt should be recommended. We hn.ve sought, but have been unable to follow, the best n.dvice of the scientific community as to the directions in which we should focus our capabilities. Promising areas of research n.nd development will not be supported fully nnder level-oI-effort constmints. Bluntly put, we have deferred unt.il fiscal year 1968 the final major decisions as to the ultimate direction of NASA's progmm. The fiscal year 1967 budget maintains the momentum needed to reach those decisions.BUDGET REFLECTS PRIORITIES OF NASAPROGRA~I

We n.re presenting the budget that reflects 0111' best balanced provision for four essential priorities, priorities which must rn,nk together as the core of the NASA progrn.m: The need to press forward the development of the Nation's capn.bility for mn.jor Manned Spaee Flight opera.tions, to be demonstmted by a I1lI1I1ned lunar landing within this decade.

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XA8A AUTHORIZATIOX FOR FISCAL YEAR 1967

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The need to continue those important projects in space sciences and "pace applications that ar!3 al~eady underway and that have already made such valuable contnbutIOns to our fundamental understanding of the universe and to the use of space systems for human benefit. The need to maintain the flow of advanced research and technology effort that is at the heart of the Nation's ability to undertake future projects in aeronautics and space explorations. The need to take certain steps now to avoid an otherwise certain gap in our future space capabilities and achievements. I will now discuss each one of these four elements. Within the constraints of a $5,012 million budget plan, we have proyided for these priority needs-but have provided for none of them at the level of support we would deem most desirable.MA~NED

SPACE

FLIGHT

SCHEDULES

We are this year beginning the first real flight activity in Apollo, starting with suborbital and Earth-orbital tests with the Saturn I-B. The first suborbital mission, Apollo-Saturn 201, was successfully conducted last Saturday, February 26, as was discussed here this morning. By next year, we expect to have tests of the Saturn V launch vehicle, the operational booster for the manned lunar landing. In all, the Apollo program includes development, procurement, and launching of 12 Saturn I-B and 15 Saturn V vehicles with their associated manned spacecraft. Chairman ANDERSON. Off the record. (Di",cussion off the record.) Dr. SEAMANS. The fiscal year 1967 funds we plan to allocate to this effort ",ill, we believe, be sufficient to maintain the schedules needed to carry out a manned lunar landing and return before the end of the decade-if we encounter no unforeseen problems. This is the problem :\fr. Webb. spoke of. As you know, there have been unanticipated difficulties in the past but our very able manned space flight team has been able to solve them or work around them up to now without a major impact upon the program schedules. We are committed to the concept of all-up systems testing which, if successful, provides more data per flight mission and therefore reduces the total number of missions required to qualify and prove the reliability and effectiveness of the entire system. However, a failure of a major component would require a profound reassessment of onr working schedules and of onr ability to meet the announced deadline for the manned lunar landing. We have no margins of t.ime or of resources to counter the effects of setbacks or failures. We are working toward a success schedule, and we feel that. our confidence is well placed: the Saturn I flew 10 flights without a failure; we have successfully completed the Apollo abort. tests; we have launched Apollo-Saturn 201; we have fired all the stages of the operational Apollo vehicles; our management team and management approach have demonstrated their effectiveness. But it is unlikely that we conld stand another S-II stage failure during tests, for example, and reach our current targets. There is no leeway left, and, as \ye enter into this next phase of heavy flight activity, we will require full support, perseverance, and dedication to achieve our goals.

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SOME PROJECTS TERMINATED

This past summer, the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences undertook a detailed study of the directions to which NASA should look in the future, both near and long term, in the realization of its potential for the scientific exploration of space. In several critical areas, the fiscal year 1967 budget cannot meet the high expectations and rapid rates of progress recommended by the Board. Specifically, the Board recommends development of the Advanced Orbiting Solar Observatory for continuous observations of the Sun during the period of the solar maximum. Faced with budget constraints, we had to make the difficult decision to terminate the AOSO project and not continue the spacecraft design effort into the next phase of flight hardware development. The Board recommended, over the long term, a major increase in emphasis in our programs of planetary exploration. The key to this recommendation was the assumption that we would be undertaking missions to Mars in the early 1970's, using the Voyager spacecraft system for planetary orbiters, probes, and landers. The Board felt that an automated biological laboratory landed on Mars should have the highest NASA scientific priority. In the 1967 budget, we are stretching out the Voyager program and allocating funds only for the continuation of the system design. If we are able to initiate a major effort on the Voyager program in fiscal year 1968, there is the possibility that we could meet the 1973 Mars opportunity with a landing capsule; however, the magnitude of the task encompassed by an automated biological laboratory appears to defer that mission to the period after 1975. In general, the Board recommended a significant increase in our level of activities in the space sciences: in general, we have had to cut back and reduce our level of activity in fiscal year 1967 considerably below that currently underway in fiscal year 1966. However, we are able to continue with the important projects that we have underway, such as our astronomical, geophysical, and solar observatories, the Explorer satellites, the biosatellite, and the lunar Orbiter and Surveyor projects.ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

The third area I wish to emphasize is advanced research and technology. The advanced research and technology effort of NASA, that includes our support of aeronautics, is fundamental to the future of the national program. We have been able to maintain a broad but restrained level of effort in most of the areas of concern. We have, however, had to reorient several promising projects away from hardware or end-item goals toward lower key technological investigations. For example, we have terminated the M-1 engine development; we are, however, maintaining an energetic program in investigation of high-energy, liquid-fueled engines. The work on the SNAP-8 system is now projected at a slower pace. 'We are maintaining a low level of effort in the large solid motor area. By contrast, we are able to show a total increase in the level of resources applied to aeronautics over last year; although the R. & D. increment shows a decline, we nre recommending a major facility project at the Lewis Research Center


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that will give us a full-scale capability for research on supersonic jet engines. Viewed overall, our advanced research and technology program is receiving minimal funding; further cutbacks or further reductions in the level of resources applicable to this investment in our future would require a great readjustment of our total program planning assumptions. Unless the critical elements and techniques of the future are under development today, the engineering tools for decisions on the feasibility of future projects are missing. The F-l engine, for example, was initiated in 1958 as an advanced technology project; in 1961 the F-l engine development was proven to be a critical factor in the planning of a Saturn V launch vehicle capable of sending men to the Moon.MAINTAINING OPTIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES

The fourth point I wish to mention relates to our maintaining options for hardware that we are presently developing and to our need to avoid creating, through lack of adequate application of leadtime resources, a major hiatus in program activity. In the program of planetary exploration, for example, we have instituted a Mariner mission aimed toward Venus in 1967 and a heavier, more sophisticated Mariner mission for Mars in 1969. If in next year's budget we are able to support a Voyager 1973 Mars mission, these two intermediate missions will have provided continuity and important new scientific data in the program area stressed most forcibly by the Space Science Board. In the area of chemical propulsion, we now plan one additional firing of a half-length 260-inch solid-rocket motor at increased thrust levels-this assumes the utilization of an already fired case. We hope we can thereby preserve the option of undertaking full-length motor development if warranted by the results of the phase I program.APOLLO APPLICATIONS

Perhaps the most critical gap that we face is in the area of manned space flight. The Apollo applications effort, recommended for funding at a minimum level in fiscal year 1967, represents another major decision to defer until fiscal year 1968 important considerations affecting the future of the program. As you know, Apollo is much more than a manned lunar landing effort; it encompasses an important program of scientific and technological experiments and tests and, most important, is providing a wholly new capability for a wide spectrum of space flight operations. It is the exercise of these capabilities of the Apollo-Saturn systems for new missions of scientific and technological illlportance that we are calling Apollo Applications. In the last half of fiscal year 1966 and during fiscal year 1967 we will define those new and useful missions that will be able to take advantage of unique opportunities provided by the capabilities of the developed and available Apollo flight hardware. The Apollo Applications effort represents that next family of major manned flight missions which we expect to be recommending for approval and authorization in the coming years starting in fiscal year 1968. We believe that the Apollo Applications work is of critical

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KASA AUTHORIZA'froX FOR FISCAL YEAR 1967

importance since it is necessary to any further definition of a new major goal comparable to that of Apollo itself. In the application of Apollo systems to new missions in addition to initial manned lunar landing, we believe we will develop the hard facts, identify the major problems, and be able to outline a course of action Rssociated with the next major steps of space exploration. There are three basic elements to the Apollo Applications effort that we foresee: We believe we can improve the basic Apollo space vehicle capabilities with minor modificntions to extend the manned time in orbit from 2 weeks to 45 days and longer-I believe up to 3 months. We can pro(~ure additional Sp!lCecraft and launch yehicles for new, or followoll, missions beyond the time frame of the current Apollo schedule; that is, adding to the 12 Saturn I-B's nnd the 15 Saturn V's that are already under procurement. The CHAlInIA~. Off the record lust a moment. (Discussion off the record.) Dr. SEA!\IA~S. Third, if the progrnm can be carried out Along the lines of our most optimistic s('hed\llin~, m' will find that, \\-ithin the approved and programed Apollo schedule, there are up to nine vehicles that can be used for alternate missions in the period 1968 to 1970. I would like to stress two points: First, while there is a possibility that some hnrdware from the appro\-ed Apollo program mny be made Ilvailnhle for alternate missions-and it is therefore prudent to phm for its most effective use-at, the same time, we must remember that \\-e nre todn.V only at the heginllin~ of u major lIe"- pro~rnm ,,"hi('h will require the best nse of our resources, and the highest lltltIlugement and technological skill,." and which mny yet pro\"e to require the full complement of vehicles now programed. ~ecolld, although we are planning to keep options open for a smooth transition from Apollo to Apollo Applications, we kno,,- that we will not be able to exercise all of these options at once nor at their fullest rate because of resource limitations in fiscal years 1966 and 1967. The task before us, then. is one of definition, particularly the identification of the scientific and technological experiments and operational missions that require the presence of man in space; it is this planning that will be at the heart of the decisions taken for the fiscal year 1968 program. To recapitulate, then, the priorities of manned space flight, space sciences and applications, advanced research and technology, and program continuity are very tightly balanced within the framework of a $5,012 million budget. Any setback, any lack of support will assure that at least one of these priorities cannot be met.FUTURE LIES IN FIRCAL YEAR 1968 DECISIONS

The future of the NASA program lies in the decisions for fiscal year 1968. At that time, we must ('onsider the full-scale initiation or Project Voyager, the unmanned planetary spacecraft system whose first mission would be the 1973 Mars opportnnity. At that tim~, we must consider full-scale initiation of Apollo Applications miSSIOns, based upon the selective definition efforts now underway. At that time, we must consider increases in the levels of effort of selected program areas where important work has been deferred.


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We cannot look today toward the initiation of a permanent manned space station, or a lunar base, or projects for manned planetary exploration; our operational, scientific, and technological experience will have to mature further before we could make such a reeommendation. However, it is becoming clear that in fiscal year 1968 the Nation must begin to choose among the major options that the NASA program has prm'ided. I believe, as the chairman indicated in his January 27 letter to Mr. Webb, that in the year ahead, we must identify the major meaningful objectives that will serve as the national focus for the years to come. I will not speculate today on what those objectives might be; but I feel I can say with some assurance that if such goals are not chosen, then this major and totally new element of national power for creative use, this intricate and successful structure of flight systems, production capability, test and launch facilities, and dedicated men will haye to be disassembled, ,,'asting the opportunities for its application to the wider objectives of space exploration. Fiscal year 1967 we see as a period during which we can plan, define, and select; fiscal year 1968 must be the year of choice. The CHAIR~rAN. There has been a change in schedule & bit and they have a quorum on the Senate floor and we have ~u to meet. Off the record. .. (Discussion off the record.)M-l EXGINE

The CHAIR:'Lo\.N. In your statement you say that we are maintaining an energetic program in the investigation of high-energy liquidfueled engines. On December 3, 1965, Mr. Webb wrote the comInittee of the decision to terminate the M-1 engine development and proceed with the pursuit of this new program and he said that NASA would reprogram some of the M-1 funds made available to NASA last year. The Congress, in authorizing the .M-1 funds last year, specifically stated that if such funds were not used, they were not to be reprogramed. I, as chairman, asked that you not proceed with that program until you discussed it with the committee. I would like to put into the record the correspondence on that. (The documents referred to follow:)NATIONAL AERONAUTICS MiD SPACE ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR, Washington, D.C., December 3,1965.

Hon. CLINTON P. ANDERSON, Chairman, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Science8, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: We have recently requested and received apportionment of $2 million of fiscal year 1966 funds held in reserve by the Bureau of the Budget for application to the phasing out of the M-1 engine project along the lines that we described to the Congress in our testimony during the last session. It is my desire to acquiant you ",ith our reasons for this decision and to outline our proposals for further work in the advanced liquid propulsion area. The ~I-l engine project was initiated in Hl62 to develop a large hydrogenoxygen upper stage engine that could be used in post-Saturn launch vehicies. No specific requirements for such launch vehicles have been adopted. J 01 the absence of such requirements a thorough review has been made of the basic technological contrilmtions that could be expected from continued effort va the l\I-1 project as compared "ith research on other liquid propulsion concepts. The concepts incorporated in the 1>1-1 engine are now several years old and still more advanced concepts, promising perfor;nance ad\'antages over the M-1 engine approach, have recently become apparent. These newer concepts can be explored

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in smaller scale and, hence, at lower funding rates than would be necessary for efficient continuation of the M-l work. We have, therefore, concluded that the M-l engine development should be terminated after uncooled thrust-chamber tests, now underway, are completed. This phaseout will be consistent with the plan presented to the committees during the last session of the Congress. Because of problems and delays in the fabrication of injectors, the M-l thrustchamber testing schedule is presently several months behind that contemplated at the time we concluded that the project could be phased out within fiscal year 1965 fund availabilities. In order to insure that significant technological results will be in hand prior to termination of the project, we have recommended, and the Bureau of the Budget has concurred, that $2 million of the fiscal year 1966 funds being held in reserve be provided for completion of this test program. We will now notify the contractor, the Aerojet-General Corp., that upon the expenditure of the available funds the M-l project will be terminated. We have further proposed that early work be initiated to explore and develop eertain of the newer, advanced concepts that appear to hold great promise for high-energy, liquid engines. The two concepts being considered are (1) the toroidal combustion chamber with regeneratively cooled nozzle, and (2) the twostage high-pressure combustion chamber using advanced cooling and a conventional bell nozzle. These engine types offer advantages over current engines of conventional design in that when used in conjunction with the plug nozzle exit configuration they will provide improved altitude compensation; more compact structural arrangement, and lower overall engine system weights. Both engines would use oxygen-hydrogen propellants. It is proposed that the concepts bc explored at the 200,000 to 300,000 pound thrust scale in order to utilize presently available equipment and test facilities. In addition to research and development of components, it is proposed that investigation be accelerated in the areas of cooling, materials and fabrication methods, propellant injection and combustion characteristics at high pressures, and nozzle flows in order to supplement the advanced engine work. NASA has recommended that this advanced, high performance engine technology effort be initiated with $3.5 million of the fiscal year 1966 funds presently being held in reserve. If approved and supported by additional funds in the fiscal year 1967 budget for continuation of the effort, we will initiate this activity through contracts that will be open for competition within the industry. I would emphasize that the plans outlined above, except for the $2 million testing extension of the M-l contract prior to termination, will require additional funding in fiscal year 1967 and subsequent years to accomplish their objectives. Their execution along the proposed lines is contingent upon inclusion of sufficient funds in the fiscal year 1967 budget to warrant their initiation. As for the SN AP-8 and 260-inch solid rocket motor effort, both of which are in the same category as the M-l, we are still reviewing the possible avenues of activity open to us and have not yet come to a final determination. Trusting that this will meet the needs of your committee and with much respect, believe me, Sincerely yours, JAMES E. WEBB, Administrator. DECEMBER 17, 1965. Mr. JAMES E. WEBB,

Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, D.C.DEAR JIM: I appreciate your letter of December 3 outlining the termination plan for the M-l engine project and your thinking on the initiation of a new effort on high-performance engine technology. I noted with considerable interest the extensive technical review which NASA has made of its high performance engine technology program which apparently underlies your present determination. In reviewing your letter two questions occllr to me: First, what is the relationship of your proposed program to the DOD program outlined to the committee by Dr. John S. Foster, Director, Defense Research and Engineering, in his letter of October S, 196.5? Dr. Foster's letter appears on page 361 in the committee hearings on national space goals for the post-Apollo period. The coordination of N ASA- DOD spnce efforts is, as you know, of great intr>rcHt to the committee. Secondly, YOIl will recall that the fiscal yts, but until one defines the next major goal, it is more difficult to gIve definitive answers or definitive cnteria in some depth for the precise way of meeting that goal. It is an involved process. One needs first to establish the broad goals and within that broad goal, determine the most effective way of achieving that, and so on. So it cannot be a simple, one time only decision. Any of these programs represent a continuing set of decisions in more and more detail as one comes to the actual point of confrontation. Mr. GEHRIG. As you study these various program alternatives, such as long duration Earth orbital flights, further lunar exploration, planetary exploration-along with these studies, you do make cost estimates, do you not? Dr. MUELLER. Yes, we do. ASTRONAUT FLIGHT CREW TRAINING

Mr. GEHRIG. Dr. Mueller, I would like to read a question for the record. I do not expect you to answer this-I do not want you to answer the question now, but if you would answer it for the record. In the statement you submitted for the record, you discussed astronaut flight crew training and you do not mention proficiency flying in jet aircraft. In view of the risks involved and the three tragic deaths already suffered, is the continuation of these flights really necessary? Have you made any studies to determine whether or not there is any transfer of training, and maybe even a negative feedback here, between the ability to fly a jet airplane and the ability to fly a spacecraft?

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Is it necessary to teach the astronaut scientists how to fly jet aircraft? The CHAIRMAN. Did you want to make some reply? Dr. MUELLER. I could answer quite specifically those three questions. The CHAIRMAN. I did not know you were prepared to answer those questions. The question in everybody's mind apparently is why do you make an astronaut fly a jet airplane? Is there some relationship between the jet airylane and the controls of a spaceship? Dr. MUELLER. On the basis of the actual flIght experience of the pilots themselves, they feel there is a very high correlation between the experience of flying high performance jet aircraft and that of flying spacecraft. They feel that this is an essential part of their training in order to maintain proficiency so that they can, in fact, carry out the space missions. With respect to the scientist astronaut, not all scientist astronauts will be trained as test pilots, but those that are being selected for the lunar mission do need to be trained as pilots because as you recall, we have two men who leave the command module and go to the lunar surface. We would like to have either one capable of flying that spacecraft in order to return it to the command module in orbit, so they both have to be trained pilots. In addition to that, we would like the capability of the man left behind in the command module to actually fly over the Lunar Excursion Module in the event some possibility prevents those in the excursion module from returning to the command module. In the case of Earth orbital operations, our planning does include the inclusion of crew members, scientists in particular, who are not trained pilots. The CHAIRMAN. I can see when you come down to the final three men, you want all of them to know how to fly the spaceship. But why do these men have to be able to fly a jet airplane? Dr. MU]JLLER. The jet airplane appears to be the nearest thing that we have here on Earth to simulate some aspects of the actual flight regime in space. N ow, clearly, one needs in addition to that to develop the simulators which lrovide a slightly different kind of set of motions that are develope in the spacecraft itself. But the coordination and the general attention to instruments that we need in the spacecraft are duplicated reasonably well in high-performance aircraft of today. They have about the same instrument panels, they have about the same set of controls. And also one of the advantages is the ability to react, to be under pressure and learn and to accommodate to the pressures that are involved in actual space flight as well as in jet flight. The CHAIRMAN. I think that answers the question unless you care to amplify it. There are those people who have been told, possibly incorrectly, that it is easier to teach people who do not fly airplanes to fly a helicopter. Maybe there is some similarity in this sort of fli~ht. I think it is necessary to know why, when you go to put SCIentists in these ships, they have to be able to fly a jet airplane. I am very happy at your decision to take scientists along, because when you start exploring the Moon, I want a good scientist along to find out what is involved in the exploration. But if you have any further answers to that, I would be glad to have them.


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(The information referred to follows:)(1) Question. Is flying necessary? Answer. Spacecraft operations run the complete gamut of flight conditions from hypersonic lifting reentry to hovering flight just prior to a lunar touchdown. During oribital flight as well as during reentry, our astronauts must exercise piloting skills to cope with rapidly varying vehicle orientations and changing energy states very similar to those encountered in flying high-performance aircraft. Docking operations and the final stages of lunar landing demand a high degree of skill in precision control of spacecraft very similar to that required in formation flying and helicopter landing. Because the range of piloting skills is so broad, a variety of trainers and training methods must be integrated into an overall training program that will equip the astronauts to handle all normal and emergency piloting tasks from liftoff to touchdown. Procedural training and familiarization of crews with the operation of spacecraft systems and the mission profile can best be given in simulators. However, with simulators, there is a complete absence of the dynamic response of a machine to the pilot's control inputs, which subject the pilot to accelerations and spatial orientations induced by his actions. Experience gained in training test pilots using simulators and aircraft has clearly shown that skills developed in the absence of the dynamic environment cannot be translated on a I-to-I basis into an actual flight condition. In general, a pilot is capable of handling much more difficult control problems on a simulator than he can in an actual aircraft or spacecraft. A good example of this is the use of variable stability aircraft in combination with simulators for demonstrating stability and control characteristics of marginally stable vehicles. Pilots quickly learn that attainment of a proficiency level which enables them to fly an unstable vehicle on the simulator by no means insures that they will be able to fly the same vehicle in an airborne simulation. The feedback of vehicle responses to control inputs is such that the pilot cannot respond to cues in the dynamic environment as he does in the static environment. The capability of astronauts or test pilots to function in a dynamic environment can be substantially improved and maintained at a high level through practice. Flying high-performance aircraft is one effective means of providing the necessary practice. We have always found it necessary to use dynamic trainers in training for aircraft flight or space flight. For example, even though we have instrument trainers that can almost duplicate actual flight conditions from the standpoint of visual cues, pilot instrument training still demands the use of airborne trainers. We have not yet made an X-I5 flight that was not preceded by practice in the F-I04, even though the X-I5 pilots had repeatedly flown the flight profile on an X-I5 simulator that almost duplicated the X-I5 characteristics. The use of aircraft in astronaut training is only the continuation of a tried and proven flight readiness technique. If we did not have aircraft, it would be necessary for us to develop a dynamic trainer of some sort to fill the void. (2) Question. Is proficiency flying necessary? Answer. The question has been asked, Why must experienced pilots who have accumulated many hours of flying time in high-performance aircraft continue to fly as a part of their space flight readiness training? Astronauts must maintain proficiency in all of their space flight training for the same reasons airline pilots undergo a continuous program of proficiency training and flight checks and that all active military pilots maintain at least minimum proficiency levels. There is no field of endeavor that requires peculiar skills that does not also demand that these skills be maintained through consistent use. This is particularly true of piloting skills. (3) Question. Is it necessary for scientist/astronauts to fly? Answer. The requirements placed on the crews for each manned space flight are different. In general, a complex combination of technical and manual skills are needed. There will be some flights for which all of the crew members will need to be pilot rated. An example is a manned lunar landing. There will be some earth orbital flights for which one or more of the crew members need not necessarily be pilot rated. Where appropriate, nonrated scientist/astronauts can be used. (4) Question. Is there a direct relation between jet aircraft and spacecraft? Answer. Space flight is simply an extension of aircraft flight to include the region of space where aerodynamic loads have, for all practical purposes, vanished. With

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some modification, the basic techniques used in flying aircraft apply to spacecraft piloting. Instrument displays are monitored and control applications are made in response to instrument readings and external cues in much the same manner whether the vehicle being flown is an aircraft or spacecraft. (5) Question. Is there any negative training effect associated with flying? Answer. There is no negative training which accrues from aircraft flying. From a design standpoint, there is a natural tendency for pilot astronauts to apply lessons learned in the design and modification of aircraft cockpits to the layout of spacecraft cockpits. Occasionally this appears to limit design flexibility; however, in the long run, design inputs based on aircraft piloting experience have proved to be sound and effective. (6) Question. Do astronauts fly only to receive flight pay? Answer. No. To maintain their piloting skills at a proper level, all the astronauts attempt to fly 25 hours per month. N one of this flying is accomplished specifically for the purpose of meeting the minimum requirements for flight pay purposes.

E. E.

CHRISTENSEN.

The CHAIRMAN, Senator Cannon? APOLLO APPLICATIONS Senator CANNON. I have just a couple more questions. Dr. Mueller, the Communications Satellite Corp. has recently announced its plan to install a multipurpose satellite station for TV, radiocommunication, et cetera. In view of this, what do you contemplate or envision for your Apollo Applications in this area that you discuss in your statement? Dr. MUELLER. Well, I think that the Communications Satellite Corp. plans in this area are still in the formative stage. Basically, the communications satellite is a point-to-point trunkline carrier providing for much the same kind of service to the internal networks of a nation, internal telephone network, and that in turn carries out television and telegraph communications throughout a nation that a cable connection does. So in a sense, it is competitive with the underseas cables. The applications I was talking about would contemplate the possibility, rather than necessarily a commercial possibility, of direct broadcast from orbit to home receivers, for example, so that you would then eliminate the ground transmitters that are located across the nation. Now, there are disadvantages to this as well as advantages. I am not p'ressing this as a thing to do. I only was there discussing the possIbilities of what could be done. Senator CANNON. NASA has transferred funds to the Navy and to the Department of Agriculture to study potential Apollo Applications in oceanography, for ease and crop surveys and related activities. Since these agencies have the function responsibility for these areas, how much funding and personnel effort are they putting into potential space applications to their work? Dr. MUELLER. May I supply that for the record? I do not have that. Senator CANNON. Yes. (The information referred to follows:)You are aware of the fact that we are heavily engaged in the definition phase of the natural resources program (space applications). Work has been divided into the fields of agriculture/forestry resources, geology/hydrology (mineral and water resources), geography, (cultural resources), and oceanography (marine resources). Cooperative agreements were signed in 1965 with the Department of Agriculture (Agricultural Research Service), the Department of the Interior (U.S. Geological Survey), and the Department of Defense (Navy Oceanographic Office). These agencies were chosen because they have been very active in these disciplines and have made available their scientists and facilities. Our understanding of the


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extent of their current contribution to the natural resources program is summarized below from detailed plans which these groups are now preparing. Additional and more authoritative information on these matters should be obtained directly from the agencies involved. When complete, their plans can be furnished if desired. The funds provided by the agencies are for work which is of use both to NASA and the agencies. In some cases the fiscal support is direct, as for the salaries of certain scientists engaged in the natural resources program. In other cases the support is indirect, as for facility outfitting and maintenance. The governmental personnel support falls into three classes: full-time technical management for the NASA project (paid by NASA); principal scientific investigators for specific NASA experiments (paid by NASA and the agencies); and part-time advisers to the agencies (paid by NASA and the agencies). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) funded $30,000 in fiscal year 1966 to Purdue University specifically for multispectral sensing of various crops. In the "general" category, USDA has averaged $1 million per year for aerial photography, not including the substantial costs of interpretation and analysis. These latter techniques are particularly pertinent for space applications. Other funds were employed to develop the three agriculture/forestry test sites which will be useful for "ground-truth" calibration of the remote sensors. At present, there is the equivalent of 1 USDA man engaged in full-time technical management with approximately 10 USDA principal investigators. It is planned to augment the technical staff as qualified scientists become available. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) in fiscal year 1966 has budgeted approximately $4.1 million for studies of geology, hydrology, and geography, as well as for magnetic, infrared, and ultraviolet experiments plus multisensor investigations at test sites which have specific application to the natural resources program. In fiscal year 1965, $730,000 was spent by the USGS on the sensor experimental activity. It is estimated that $10 million has been invested by the USGS in developing data for the test site phase of the work which is useful to both NASA and the USGS for natural resources studies. Seven USGS people are engaged in full-time technical management, 58 USGS specialists in various types of experiments including test site work, plus 24 part-time civil service advisers. Examples of the indirect fiscal support of value to both NASA and the Navy, which was furnished by the Navy, include use of the Argus Island Tower and instrumentation ($2 million installation), use of the drifting ice station near Point Barrow (operational costs run to $1 million per year), $1 million for modifying and equipping a special aircraft with remote sensors, and $75,000 per year for research on laser sensors. The Argus Island and Point Barrow areas are being used as oceanographic test sites. Other Navy capabilities, facilities, and resources expected to be utilized include icebreakers, helicopters, ships, forecasting services, ice observers, etc. Substantial indirect su~port will benefit the NASA program through Navy-sponsored research at the University of Michigan, Scripps, and Woods Hole, all of which have aircraft engaged in remote sensing. Personnel support consists of 8 full-time for technical management, 9 so far for principal scientific investigators, and 15 part-time for advisers. It is to be emphasized that the intangible support is equally important. As stated by the USGS: "These funds, however, do not include the wealth of scientific information and experience that are available to support your natural resources program. This experience and information, garnered in a century of scientific investigations, is our major contribution."

Mr. GEHRIG. Mr. Chairman, Senator Mondale left a few questions that he would like answered for the record, and Senator Byrd left a few. And I have one question that I would like to put into the record. (Questions submitted by Senator Mondale to Dr. Mueller and answers supplied for the record are as follows:)MANNED ORBITING LABORATORIES

Question 1. Dr. Mueller, in their recent report the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Science, urged development of a series of manned orbiting research laboratories to conduct medical, psychological, and behavioral research required for prolonged space flight up to 1,000 days, and that space laboratories

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which can accommodate six to eight persons with room for experimentation are needed. How much advanced planning has NASA done for such manned space stations and when, in your judgment, would it be practical to first put in orbit such a station-from a technical point of view? Answer. The Manned Orbital Research Laboratory (MORL) concept can effectively accommodate up to nine crew members in a pressurized volume of approximately 8,500 cubic feet. This allows research in human physiology and behavior for long space flights up to 1,000 days. In addition, we have configured this station concept so that it can also support a broad experiment program, including beneficial Earth applications as well as astronomy, physics and basic biology investigations. To date we have examined the MORL concept feasibility, and system utilization and have completed the preliminary system definition; this has included delineation of how the experiment equipment can be arranged in the laboratory for specific experiments. We are now ready to proceed with final system definition and preliminary design. From the technical point of view the six- to nine-man orbital research laboratory would be practical in the 1971-73 time period. Moreover, it should be noted that the AAP offers an early capability to initiate the space station program by allowing us to test critical subsystems, such as stabilization for the MORL in space to verify some of our experimental techniques in orbit and to gain operational experience in a variety of orbits including those at synchronous altitudes.NASA-DOD ORBITING LABORATORIES

Question. 2. Dr. Mueller, DOD has a Manned Orbiting Laboratory program which will have an orbital lifetime of 30 days. NASA Earth-orbiting Apollo missions will have a maximum life of 45 days-later maybe 90 days. Since the two programs have orbital lifetimes nearly the same why is NASA not looking to systems that have a much longer orbital lifetime? Answer. The NASA Earth orbital Apollo missions provide a logical complementary capability to the DOD MOL program. Apollo hardware in Earth orbit can effectively be used to conduct research aimed at peaceful, beneficial application such as extended, accurate weather forecasting, a worldwide communications network and a world resources management system. The orbital stay time with Apollo systems can be extended to 135 and 180 days with rendezvous giving us the opportunity to develop a high confidence approach through orbital testing to the development of a space station. Our operational capability and experience will be advanced significantly by flying in various orbits including synchronous altitudes and conducting in-orbit maneuvers and extravehicular activities with a detached LEM. From studies completed we have concluded that the AAP can perform many critical, pivotal experiments which will enhance effective utilization of a follow-on larger station that provides a more complete space laboratory in which to conduct broadly beneficial experimcnts. Studies have indicated that an ultimately 50,000 hour/year orbital experiment work load is reasonable to expect, but that we should achieve this level through experience gained at a lower rate. Since AAP can operate cost-effectively in the 5,000 to 15,000 man-hours/year rate, we can exploit the inherent capabilities of the Apollo system without the cost of a completely new development program, Moreover, this approach allows pilot-model space station operation which can provide confident assurance that the new larger space station design will meet all the experiment program requirements. NASA has, over the last 3 years examined in depth the concept of a space station with orbital life in excess of 1 year. These studies have resulted in the definition of a manned orbital research laboratory which would support a crew of six to nine men in orbit for in excess of 1 year. From a technical point of view the six- to nine-man orbital research laboratory would be practical in the 1971-73 time period.FUNDING OF APOLLO APPLICATIONS

Question 3. Dr. Mueller, of the NASA appropriations for fiscal years 1964, 1965, and 1966, how much can be identifi('d with what is now termed "Apollo Applications" but was previollsly called by such terms as "Apollo extensions"? How much is unspent? Answer. As indicated in the fiscal year 1966 budget, $14 million of our fiscal year 1965 Apollo supporting development funds were programed for advanced


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development effort in Apollo extension systems. These funds were used for subsystems level predevelopment evaluation and testing of the Apollo spacecraft and were all obligated. Forty-eight million dollars was provided in our fiscal year 1966 budget to enable program definition, a long leadtime deVelopment of extended duration spacecraft subsystems, and long leadtime experiments development. These funds were not released until a determination was made on the administration's budget request on Apollo Applications for fiscal year 1967. This decision was made in late December 1965. As of March 1966, all but approximately $10 million has been released to NASA centers. All funds are planned for obli,?ation this year. Apollo Applications (previously "Apollo Extensions Systems ') first began with fiscal year 1965 budget. Question 4. How much of the NASA fiscal year 1967 request can be identified as Apollo Applications? Answer. The MSF fiscal year 1967 budget request includes $41.9 million for Apollo Applications. This will be devoted entirely to long-Ieadtime items that are required for flight hardware beyond that included in the present Apollo program. Relatable to Apollo Applications is approximately $25 million in the Office of Space Science and Applications budget for experiments definitions, many of which are anticipated to be candidates for Apollo Applications flights.ADVANCED MISSION PLANNING AND ITS RELATION TO AAP

Question 5. How does your advanced mission planning differ from the planning you do in the Apollo Applications Program? Answer. The Office of Manned Space Flight utilities the Phased Project Planning concept which NASA has adopted for future program planning. Phased Project Planning involves four time phased steps as follows: Phase A-Advanced Studies. Phase B-Program Definition. Phase C- Design. Phase D-Development and Operations. Phase A.-Advanced Studies is the first step in the process. During this phase feasibility studies are conducted covering various approaches to accomplish the future program mission objectives. Engineering assessments are made, research and technology requirements are identified and gross schedules and cost factors are determined. Favorable and unfavorable factors are analyzed and recommendations are made to proceed to the next Phase as a function of the analysis and decisionmaking process activity contained in Phase A. Phase B.-Program Definition is concerned with the assessment of total mission requirements for the program under study. An overall system analysis is made and selected concepts are refined. Preliminary design specifications are prepared, manufacturing and checkout assessments are made along with research, technology and advanced development requirements. Cost estimates and schedules are further defined and management and procurement approaches are evaluated. An analytical report is prepared and recommendations are made concerning the next phase. In the next Phase (Design of Final Program Definition) the finalized program concept is determined and a total systems analyis in conjunction with final design specification is prepared. Supporting development activities are initiated and plans for facilities, test operations, and other resource requirements are prepared. A final Program Development Plan is issued and preparations for contractor selection are initiated. The last phase--Phase D-is called development and operations. In this phase manufacturing and testing of system and subsystem occur, the flight vehicles are assembled, checked out, and flight tested and finally mission operations flights are initiated. In Manned Space Flight, all Phase A Advanced Studies activities are under the jurisdiction and cognizance of our Advanced Manned Missions organization. Feasibility studies are conducted in such areas as advanced Earth-orbital missions, entended lunar exploration, planetary flyby and landing Inissions and supporting flight vehicles. Some examples would include: a resupplyable space station; extended lunar exploration based on a direct-flight cargo delivery vehicle; Mars or Venus flyby mission based on Apollo-type technology and methods of increasing the payload capacities of the Saturn launch vehicles.

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Apollo Applications is an example of an Advanced Manned Missions study effort which has completed the Phase A step. Apollo Applications is now in Phase B, or Program Definition. A separate program type organization has been authorized and Apollo Applications is no longer under the jurisdiction and cognizance of Advanced Manned Missions. The phase B Apollo Applications program definition studies are directed toward specific missions which could be performed with Apollo and modified-Apollo hardware in Earth orbit, in lunar orbit, and on the lunar surface. These missions include flights of up to 45 days in Earth orbit, up to 28 days in lunar orbit (plus transit time) and lunar surface missions of up to 14 days (plus transit time). These flights utilize Apollo Saturn IB and Saturn V launch vehicles and are based upon uprated Apollo Command and Propulsion modules and the Lunar Module Laboratory. Advanced mission planning differs from Apollo Applications planning in two ways; the time period for which the planning is aimed, and the degree of planning detail required. Advanced mission planning projects into the more distant future to determine the available alternative mission goals which will maintain this Nation's exploration. For example, missions are being planned using Apollo Applications as a logical step toward the evolutionary development leading to a multipurpose orbital space station which can support a wide variety of missions including planetary, lunar, and Earth-orbital types. Apollo Applications mission planning is aimed at the near future directed to specific flight missions and advanced mission planning is aimed at the more distant future and performs less detailed mission planning. This mission planning is aimed at defining detailed mission objectives and payloads for those missions that may become available from the Apollo program beginning in calendar year 1968. These missions are to use to the fullest the capabilities of the Saturn-Apollo systems so as to provide a basis for the next major U.S. step in manned space flight by accomplishing: Extended lunar exploration, including I-month orbital surveys and 2-week lunar surface operations, and Manned operations in any Earth orbit of 90-days duration, using rendezvous-resupply and orbital-assembly techniques.ADVANCED MISSIONS CONSIDERED

Question 6. What arc some of the advanced space missions being considered? Answer. Dr. Mueller. As distinguished from the Apollo Applications Missions which we are considering, the Office of Manned Space Flight is studying advanced manned missions in the following general categories: (1) Earth-orbital systems which include the Manned Orbiting Research Laboratory (MORL), the large rotating orbiting laboratory and ferry and logistic systems based on the Gemini or Apollo command modules or increased sizes Apollo spacecraft, larger ballistic systems, and lifting-body systems; (2) lunar systems which include exploration missions, those related to transportation systems, and those for supporting operations; (3) planetary systems including capture and flyby missions to Mars and Venus, as well as operations and support on the surface of the planets; and (4) manned space flight vehicle studies which encompass new vehicles from the upratingjimprovement of the present Saturn systems to different vehicle concepts for very large payloads, passenger transport, and space ferries. Question 7. How much of the NASA fiscal year 1967 budget request can be identified as being for advanced mission studies? Answer. There is $8 million in the NASA fiscal year 1967 budget for advanced manned missions studies. The MSF item, "advanced manned missions" is the only such category in the fiscal year 1967 budget.

(Questions submitted by Senator Byrd to Dr. Mueller and answers supplied for the record are as follows:)NEED FOR ADDITIONAL GEMINI FLIGHTS

Question 1. Dr. Mueller, why do we need the additional five Gemini flights? Answer. The five remaining Gemini flights are required for several reasons. A very significant reason is the training we will gain for our astronauts. These missions will provide valuable flight experience that will be beneficial to our Apollo program. Additionally, we will investigate and develop various methods of rendezvous and docking as well as extensive extravehicular activity, that will


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expand our knowledge of how effectively a man may function and work outside the spacecraft. Our experiments program and development of procedures and techniques for controlled reentry will also be continued on these flights.GT-8 FLIGHT

Question 2. The extravehicular activity on GT-8 will have Astronaut Scott outside the spacecraft for over 2 hours. I understand he will spend the night portion of the 1~ revolutions in the adapter section of the spacecraft.' Why is this? Answer. The extravehicular activity planned for Gemini VIII is our second step in the investigation and development of extravehicular activity operations. The time the astronaut will spend in the adapter, which is approximately 36 minutes, will be utilized to don and check out the back pack that will be evaluated during the next daylight period of extravehicular activity and will also provide a short rest period for the astronaut.. Question 3. Dr. Mueller, have the problems of the Agena target vehicle been solved so that one will be ready for the upcoming GT-8 rendezvous? If it becomes necessary to use the ATDA (Augmented Target Docking Adaptor), will it be able to fill the same training experience that the Agena would? Answer. Modifications have been made to the Agena target vehicle to correct the problem we encountered with the vehicle last October and these modifications are presently being tested at the Arnold Engineering Development Center, Tullahoma, Tenn. Test results have been encouraging and barring any unforeseen incidents, we feel confident the Agena target vehicle will be flight ready for our Gemini VIII mission. On Gemini VIII, if it becomes necessary to use the Augmented Target Docking Adapter, it will provide the same training experience that the Agena would.REIMBURSEMENT FOR NASA PEOPLE ASSIGNED TO MOL

Question 4. Dr. Mueller, you mention the assignment of a number of highly skilled civilian employees from the Gemini program to the MOL Systems Program Office. Will NASA be reimbursed for these services? Answer. NASA will be reimbursed for the services of personnel that may be detailed to the MOL Systems Program Office in accordance with a written agreement between NASA and the Air Force dated September 1964.LEAD TIME ON SATURN

Question 5. Dr. Mueller, how long does it take to produce a Saturn V launch vehicle? Does that time include transportation, testing, and assembly at Cape Kennedy? Answer. Saturn V launch vehicle is produced tn 36 months from the initiation of long lead procurement through assembly at Cape Kennedy.COST OF SATURN V

Question 6. Dr. Mueller, what is the estimated cost of an operational Saturn V launch vehicle? Answer. The estimated cost of an operational Saturn V launch vehicle is based on continued production after the first 15 required for the Apollo program at a rate of 6 per year. At that time, the average unit cost of a Saturn V, delivered to KSC, would be approximately $100 million.

(Question submitted by the committee to Dr. Mueller and the answer supplied for the record is as follows:)AAP RECOMMENDATION TO BUDGET BUREAU

Question 1. Did NASA's original $264 million recommendation for an Apo11o applications program to the Bureau of the Budget include recommendations for specific Apollo applications flight program. If so, would you please state those for the record. Answer. NASA's original $264 million recommendation to the Bureau of the Budget included a specific flight program. Our recommended flight program for a funding level of $42 million is essentially the same but would require a longer time period to achieve the objectives.I MiSSion aborted before thIS activity could be IICCOmp1lshed.

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The flight program recommended was: (1) To develop the capability to utilize unmodified Apollo space vehicles for alternate missions in the event the manned lunar landing should not require them; and (2) to continue a flight program which utilized the current production capability of six Saturn IB's, six Saturn V's eight Command and Service Modules, and eight Lunar Modules. The flights planned as alternate missions would be conducted during 1968 and 1969, and would have a nominal 14-day mission duration. Typical missions and experiments planned for the flights included: (a) Low-altitude Earth orbital missions in both low-inclination and polar orbits for: Development of rendevous maneuver and extravehicular operations techniques such as orbital rescue, propellant transfer in space, etc; Surveys of the Earth's surface leading to improved knowledge and fut.ure management of Earth resources (water, crops, forests, oceans, etc.) ; Tests of materials and components under natural and artificial stresses in the space environment. (b) Synchronous Earth orbit missions for conducting such experiments as: Solar astronomy, possibly using Orbiting Solar Observatory-derived equipment employing recovery of data on film or glass plates. Radio astronomy, using large "V" antennas deployed by a remote maneuvering unit and left to operate unmanned for long-term observations of low frequency signals from galactic sources. Data would be transmitted to ground stations via radio link. Observations of the atmosphere over one-third of the Earth's surface for synoptic weather forecasting. (c) Low altitude, circular lunar orbital missions of up to 8 days duration for acquiring scientific lunar survey data in the form of: Recovered film photography of both mapping quality and high resolution stereo of near and far-side lunar features. Multispectral imagery from infrared, ultraviolet and radar sensors. Surface contact measurements using orbit-to-surface probes derived from Surveyor and Ranger technology. Experiments planned for flights after the 14-day alternate Apollo missions would employ Apollo spacecraft, modified only to the extent necessary to provide 45-day mission capabilities in Earth orbit, 28-day mission capabilities in lunar orbit and 14-day mission capabilities on the lunar surface. Typical missions and experiments planned for these flights included: (a) Extended duration missions in Earth orbit for experiments such as: Biomedical and behavioral response of man to the space environment for periods up to 45 days for a single-launch mission and up to 90 days through use of rendezvous and resupply techniques, possibly including provisions for artificial gravity in the space vehicle. Bioscience experiments with living cells and animals under natural and artificial stresses to record data return specimens leading to knowledge in such areas as healing processes under weightless conditions, response of living organisms in space to drugs, etc. Manned orbital astronomy possibly using an adaptation of an Orbiting Astronomical Observatory type telescope or larger, which could be left to operate in orbit and revisited during a subsequent mission for adjustments and maintenance. Communications and navigation applications, employing direct FM or TV transmissions from synchronous orbit with large solar arrays for power and periodic revisits by crews for maintenance and adjustment. (b) Long duration missions in lunar polar orbits for surveys of the entire lunar surface during a complete lunaration (28 days) employing advanced sensors based on experience with those described in (c) above. (c) Lunar surface exploration missions of up to 2 weeks' duration to obtain detailed geological, geochemical and geophysical measurements and samples of the lunar surface over an area up to 10 miles in radius through use of small one-man mobile vehicles, and to depths of several hundred feet below the surface using drills and seismic techniques. Optical and radio astronomy experiments are being planned for the lunar surfacc to usc the Moon as a stable base for long-duration observations of planetary, solar and stellar phenomena. The data obtained from extended lunar surface missions would be correlated with data obtained from orbital sensors to provide a basis for analysis of the potential scientific and economic benefits of more extended lunar operations.


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(Question submitted by Senator Jordan to Dr. Mueller and the answer supplied for the record is as follows:)ASSIGNMJDNT 01' AU JDXPERIMENT INTEGRATION TO ItBC

Question 1. Dr. Mueller, in assigning responsibilities (fig. 16 and p. 166) for Saturn Apollo Applications, what specific assignments for experiment integration are assigned to the Kennedy Space Center. What is the relationship of these experiment integration tasks to the launch function at Kennedy Space Center that caused. you to &BBign this function to KSC? Answer. The experiment (or payload) integration task assigned to Kennedy Space Center is the installation portion only of the overall payload integration function. The major ~art of payload integration involves the engineering, development and test (E.D. & T.) activities which precede the assembly of flight hardware. These E.D. & T. activities will be carried out by Manned Spacecraft Center for the Command and Service Module and Marshall Space Fli~ht Center for the Lunar Module and launch vehicles. The E.D. & T. activities will produce the plans the specifications for conduct of the installation of experiment flight hardware. As indicated on the Apollo Applications-Mission Concepts Chart (fig. 97, p. 238), the alternate missions will be conducted with basic lunar mission space vehicles which may become available. The decision to make these vehicles available will be based on a number of factors which cannot be determined until we are well into the Apollo flight program. With the launch vehicles and spacecraft modules at various stages in the flow to Kennedy Space Center for checkout and launch operations, it appears advisable not to disrupt this flow by diverting elements to other locations. KSC possesses the technical expertise and facilities necessary to do the installation task, and installing the experiment payloads at KSC would maintain the continuity of hardware flow; therefore, the assignment of payload installation responsibility to KSC. For the follow-on missions, the spacecraft configurations and experiments will be planned as primary mission assignments and not as alternates on spacecraft that may become available. Because the experiment payloads may grow more complicated during the follow-on missions it appears advisable to accom3)lish as much of the payload integration process as possible ])rior to delivery to KSC. However, BOme experiments will require installation at KSC; therefore the assignment of responsibility for limited installation of experiments for follow-on missions. As indicated above, the Kennedy Space Center is assigned only the installation portion of payload integration. This task is closely related (and in many cases identical) to the launch functions. It includes preassembly checkout, systems installation, total system functional verification, mission simulations, and module assembly and servicing. The experiments will vary in configuration but their complexity and checkout requirements will be identical in scope to those of the basic space vehicle systems.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Mueller. You are always a refreshing influence on the committee. We are glad to have you here. We are recessed unti110 tomorrow. (Whereupon, at 12 :05 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene March 2, 1966, at 10 a.m.) (The complete prepared statement of Dr. Mueller follows:)PBELIKINARY STATEMENT OF GEORGE E. MUELLJDB, AS80CIATJD AnIlINISTlU.TOR FOR MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADIIINISTRATION INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the statement is to present an annual report of accomplishments in the past year and plans for the fiscal year beginning in July 1966. The statement will review Manned Space Flight management, report on the status and planned activities of the Gemini and Apollo programs and Advanced Manned Mission studies, and will outline the schedule for accomplishing specific objectives.59-941 066 11

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NASA AUTHORIZATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1967MANAGEMENT

Manned Space Flight organizational and personnel changes are reviewed, including the activities of Mission Operations and Saturn/Apollo Applications. Procurement management and emphasis upon incentive contracting are discussed. Relationships with industry, science, and other Government areas are noted.GEMINI

Gemini's contribution to all objectives of Manned Space Flight with the program's one unmanned and five manned flights of 1965 is summarized. Accomplishments reviewed include the completion of flight qualification, extravehicular activity, three long duration flights of 4, 8, and 14 days, and history's first successful space rendezvous, involving close formation flight of two Gemini spacecraft and four astronauts. Production and delivery of flight hardware to support increased operational activity during 1965 is noted, and the production status of all remaining flight hardware reported. Four Gemini missions are planned for 1966. Major objectives will be further development of various phases of rendezvous and docking, extravehicular activity, and extensive experiments continuing the successful experiments program of 1965.APOLLO

The substantial progress of Apollo during the past year is cited. The first phase of the Saturn I program was eminently successful in providing the base on which the large launch vehicle technology is built. The foundation for Apollo flights has been laid and preparation for the first Apollo/Saturn flight are completed. Movement of flight hardware for manufacturing, test, and flight operations is being accomplished. An operational capability has been built for basic mission control and recovery. Conversion of Saturn I launch facilities nears completion while construction of the Saturn V launch complex progresses toward the start of checkout operations on that facility. The timetable for upcoming unmanned and manned Apollo Saturn flights is reviewed. The resources capability that exists or is being developed in support of the present lunar landing program is summarized in terms of management, personnel, and facilities. The capabilitipB 01 NASA and contractor facilities for development, manufacturing, test, and the capability of NASA launch and space flight operations facilities are described. Apollo Applications is given as an example of a follow-on effort that capitalizes on the resources available through the Apollo program. The background, operational capabilities, objectives, and specific Applications operations are reviewed.MISSION OPERATIONS

The development of mission operations for Gemini and Apollo is noted. Operations for early unmanned and manned Apollo missions are described. Launch crew, flight controller, and flight crew training is discussed.ADVANCED MANNED MISSIONS STUDIES

The background of Advanced Manned Missions studies is reviewed. The evolution of future program planning is discussed, and program evolution alternatives are listed. The status of Earth-orbital, lunar, planetary, and vehicle program studies is noted.FISCAL YEAR 1967 BUDGET REQUEST

Funding requirements to continue the Manned Space Flight program for the next fiscal year are given. In fiscal year 1967 Manned Space Flight will require a total of $3,405.4 million for research and development, administrative operations, and construction of facilities. Research and deVelopment requirements are identified in the three Manned Space Flight programH-nemini, Apollo, and Advanced Manned Missions-for a total of $3,022.S million. Gemini program requests for the next fiscal year are $40.6 million. Total Apollo program requirements for fiscal year 1967 are


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$2,974.2 million. The fiscal year 1967 request for Advanced Manned Missions, to examine advanced manned space flight mission concepts, is $8 million. The total Manned Space Flight Administrative Operations requirements for fiscal year 1967 is $328.2 million. These funds will provide for the operation of the three Manned Space Flight Centers. The John F. Kennedy Space Center at Kennedy Space Center, Fla., requires $98.1 million; the Manned Spacecraft Center at Houston, Tex., requires $98.2 million; the Marshall Space Flia:ht Center at Huntsville, Ala., requires $131.9 million. Construction of facilities funding requested for fiscal year 1967 totals $54.4 million. This amount covers continuation of the outfitting of launch complex 39 at Cape Kennedy; a lunar sample receiving laboratory and astronaut training simulator facilities at Manned Spacecraft Center; a hazardous operations laboratory at Marshall Space Flight Center; utilities at Michoud Assembly Facility; modifications and additions to test facilities at Mississippi Test Facility and Sacramento Test Facility.SUMMARY

This presentation reports on the excellent progress and the major problems during the past year in meeting Manned Space Flight program objectives. Plans for the coming fiscal year are discussed.STATEMENT OF GEORGE E. MUELLER, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION INTRODUCTION STATUS OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, in appearing before this committee today, I wish to present an annual report of the Manned Space Flight programs and outline our plans for the next fiscal year. We have maintained an excellent rate of progress during the year just passed. The Gemini program, which was beginning to accelerate at the time of my appearance a year ago, has since sIij>ped forward enough to recover all the schedule loss we reported to you then. We have maintained our scheduled progress in the Apollo program which has brought us up to the first of five major program Inilestones. This committee is well aware of the problems in development, testing, and manufacturing which may be expected to occur in a program of Apollo's unprecedented size. Thus far we have been able to solve the problems encountered without appreciable schedule impact. At the same time we have progressed in defining the next major manned space flight activity through applications of Apollo program capability, and we have continued to study potential manned flight programs farther in the future. The experience of working together during the past year has highlighted the need for a close relationship between the Manned Space Flight organization and other elements of the NASA team. Thus, we are working in close coordination in the development of future manned and unmanned missions in a balanced and interrelated NASA program. One of the anomalies of the space program is that we must begin to go out of business before we fly our first operational vehicle. Our experience in the program to develop the uprated Saturn I (Saturn IB) launch vehicle illustrates this situation. Although the first Apollo Saturn I manned flight is still a year away, the decline in manpower employed on this phase of the program has been taking place for some time. The employment level at the time of the first manned flight will be quite low in comparison with the peak, which occurred in 1965. The same anomaly characterizes the overall program. The flights of the Apollo Saturn V will begin next year after the program has begun its decline and the manned flights will begin in 1968 after this decline has been under way for some time. We have been cognizant of the concern of this committee with respect to NASA's plans for the period after the decline of the effort applied to the Apollo program. The committee's hearings on the subject of post-Apollo planning, conducted in August 1965, underscored this concern. In accordance with national and NASA policies, and with the resources available, we are working to formulate our future prograIDS.

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The budget request for the coming fiscal year permits NASA to hold open the option for a program to procure long leadtime items for additional flight vehicles beyond those now programed, so as to employ the Apollo hardware and capabilities at least through 1971. If we do not exercise this option, in the decision for the 1968 budget, we will have to begin a phasedown of the Manned Space Flight activities and the "mothballing" of some of our facilities. We also have been cognizant of the fact that the attention of the Nation is focused on the Vietnam confl

NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1967

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