Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet · 2016-09-09 · 1 Naryad-V Space Chronicle, Vol. 69,...

1

Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite FleetSpace Chronicle, Vol. 69, pp.?-?, 2016

Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet

BART HENDRICKXMinervastraat 39, 2640 Mortsel, Belgium.

This paper was presented at the British Interplanetary Society Soviet/Chinese Technical Forum held on 19-21 June 2015.

Introduction

A rocket that Russia occasionally launches from the Plesetsk cosmodrome these days is the Rokot booster, a converted ICBM topped by the Briz-KM upper stage. This is used to place relatively small satellites into low Earth orbits. What few people realize, however, is that the Rokot/Briz-KM has its roots in a ground-based Soviet anti-satellite (ASAT) system developed in the 1980s. Called Naryad-V, this was only one component of a much larger Soviet ASAT effort initiated in the 1960s and later bolstered by the announcement of the American Strategic Defence Initiative in 1983. The Naryad-V programme saw two suborbital test flights in 1990 and 1991 and there is evidence to suggest that an orbital mission launched by the Rokot booster in late 1994 included an attempted covert test of the system in orbit.

The IS Programme

By the time work on Naryad-V got underway in the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union already possessed an operational anti-satellite system. Called IS (for istrebitel’ sputnikov or “satellite destroyer”), it had been conceived in the early 1960s at the OKB-52 design bureau headed by Vladimir Chelomei. At the time Chelomei enjoyed almost unconditional support from Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchov, whose son worked at Chelomei’s bureau. Brimming with ambition, Chelomei proposed a wide array of military space projects, some more realistic than others. One of those was to develop a piloted anti-satellite vehicle, but eventually he had to settle for a more modest unmanned system. The IS programme was officially approved by a government decree on 16 March 1961. It was a so-called “co-orbital” ASAT system, in which a weapon with conventional explosives is launched into the same orbit as the target and then moves near enough to destroy it.

Two test flights of the IS system were performed in November 1963 and April 1964 using a booster of Sergei Korolyov’s OKB-1

This paper discusses various anti-satellite projects initiated by the Soviet Union in the 1980s, mainly in response to the Strategic Defence Initiative announced by US President Ronald Reagan in 1983. Most attention is focused on Naryad-V, which reached the flight testing stage in the early 1990s and later evolved into the Rokot/Briz-KM launch vehicle programme.

Keywords: Soviet anti-satellite programme, Naryad-V, Rokot, Briz, IS, Skif, Kaskad, Kamin, Kontakt, Strategic Defence Initiative

design bureau based on the R-7 missile. The Soviet TASS news agency announced these missions to the world as Polyot-1 and Polyot-2 (polyot meaning “flight”) and described them as the first manoeuvrable satellites, not giving away anything about their true purpose. Polyot-1 used its on-board engine system to change both altitude and inclination, but Polyot-2 barely manoeuvred at all and recently declassified documents suggest that it may not have been as successful as the Russians claimed at the time [1].

In October 1964 Chelomei lost much of his political support when Khrushchov was ousted by Leonid Brezhnev. The change of power in the Kremlin had two immediate implications for the IS programme. Chelomei was forced to relinquish control of the programme to the KB-1 design bureau (more particularly, a division of KB-1 called OKB-41, which in 1973 became independent under the name TsNII Kometa). This had earlier acted as a subcontractor to develop the satellites’ guidance and control systems. Now the roles switched, with KB-1 becoming the lead design bureau and OKB-52 relegated to the role of subcontractor, being responsible only for the development of the satellite bus. Another consequence was that Chelomei had to abandon plans to launch the IS satellites with his own UR-200 rocket. The UR-200 was cancelled in 1965 and replaced as IS launch vehicle by a rocket based on the R-36 ICBM of the OKB-586 Yangel design bureau (the rocket was retrospectively called Tsiklon-2). This had two launch pads in Area 90 of the Baikonur cosmodrome.

The IS satellites were built around a drum-shaped bus that contained the main power and control systems (Fig. 1). Attached to one side of the bus was a radar antenna to locate the target. An alternative infrared homing system was also developed, but it failed on all its four missions [2]. Mounted on the other side of the bus were spherical propellant tanks and a truss structure carrying the main engine. The satellite also had a variety of attitude control thrusters. Extending from either

2

Bart Hendrickx

side of the satellite were short extendable booms that carried explosive charges. The shrapnel resulting from the explosion was supposed to knock out the target satellite. The first target satellites were also manoeuvrable and apparently based on the IS design. In 1971 they were replaced by lighter, non-manoeuvrable target satellites (designated DS-P1-M) built by the Yangel bureau that were launched by the Kosmos-3M booster from Plesetsk.

Test flights of the IS system began in 1967 and the first successful intercept took place on 1 November 1968. Two basic mission scenarios were observed in the following years. In one of them, the target satellite was placed into a relatively low orbit (usually around 500 km high) and the interceptor into a highly elliptical orbit, intercepting the target at perigee. In another pattern, the target satellite entered a higher orbit (about 1,000 km up) and the interceptor rendezvoused with it during the apogee of its elliptical orbit. Most intercepts occurred at altitudes around 500 km or 1,000 km, but there were exceptions. The lowest intercept altitude observed was a mere 150 km and the highest 1,575 km. All interceptors were inserted into orbits co-planar with their targets, with inclinations ranging from 62° to 66°. The rendezvous usually took place during the 2nd revolution, but in some instances the intercept was carried out near the end of the 1st revolution, less than two hours after launch.

Initially, the purpose of the tests was to actually destroy the targets, but later the focus shifted to demonstrating the ability to approach the target close enough for the explosive charges to do their job and the interceptors either self-destructed or de-orbited themselves after the intercept. Several Tsiklon-2 boosters were reportedly on standby at Baikonur, ready to be

rolled out the pad at very short notice if the need arose. It would have taken only about 1.5 hours to prepare the rocket for launch in case the command was given [3].

An early operational capability was achieved in February 1973. That same year work got underway on a slightly modified interceptor called IS-M that began test flights in 1976 and achieved operational status in November 1979. In all, 41 objects were placed into orbit in the framework of the IS programme (including the Polyots). The last mission (Kosmos-1375/1379) was flown in June 1982 and was part of a large-scale military exercise that also included ICBM, IRBM and SLBM test launches. The exercise, which tested the Soviet command, control and communications networks in a simulated wartime environment, became known in the West as the “seven-hour nuclear war” [4].

Just over a year later, on 18 August 1983, Soviet leader Yuriy Andropov, who had replaced the deceased Leonid Brezhnev in November 1982, announced a unilateral moratorium on anti-satellite tests. What drove Andropov to declare the moratorium is open to speculation, but the decision may well have been prompted by a genuine concern over the escalation of the arms race into space. Having said that, the Soviet Union was in an advantageous position, because unlike the US it had an operational ASAT system that could be re-activated at any time if needed. Moreover, the moratorium didn’t stop the Russians from continuing extensive research on more advanced ASAT systems.

The Soviet Response to SDI

On 23 March 1983 President Ronald Reagan unveiled plans for a multi-layered defence system capable of intercepting incoming Soviet missiles and warheads throughout their flight (boost, post-boost, midcourse and terminal), thus creating a shield against a massive Soviet nuclear attack. Formally called the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), the programme became popularly known as “Star Wars”, since it would include a significant amount of space-based components. The prime goal of the space-based components was to negate Soviet missiles during the boost or post-boost phase, before they had a chance to deploy their multiple warheads and decoys.

Early plans called for the use of directed energy weapons (DEW) such as lasers and neutral particle beam accelerators, but DEW technology was still immature and the costs associated with fielding such weapons in the short term were prohibitive. Therefore the focus soon shifted to more conventional kinetic weapons. In 1987 the Department of Defence approved a Phase 1 Architecture that envisaged the launch of big “garage satellites” (officially called Carrier Vehicles) housing multiple kinetic kill vehicles called Space-Based Interceptors (SBI). Also part of the space-based tier of SDI were early warning satellites equipped with infrared sensors to detect Soviet missile launches. The Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS) was a constellation of satellites in geostationary orbit to detect

Fig. 1 The IS satellite. Key: 1. Radar antenna; 2. Guidance and control systems; 3. Thrusters; 4. Propellant tanks; 5. Explosive charges; 6. Guidance and control systems; 7. Main engine. (A. Lobanov/I. Afanasyev/A. Suvorov/A. Novichkov)

3


missiles in the boost phase and the Space Surveillance and Tracking System (SSTS) was to be deployed in medium Earth orbits (MEO) to spot missiles in the midcourse phase.

Reagan’s speech immediately spawned negative reactions from the Soviet Union, which claimed that the missile shield undermined the delicate strategic balance between the two superpowers. It was widely believed that it was aimed at giving the United States a first-strike capability and significantly downgrading the retaliatory potential of Soviet strategic forces. Nevertheless, Reagan’s speech does not seem to have immediately set in motion a major Soviet initiative to counter SDI. After all, the true scale of the programme did not really become clear until February 1984 with the official establishment of the Strategic Defence Initiative Organization (SDIO). Andropov’s announcement of the ASAT moratorium in August 1983 was most likely not directly linked to Reagan’s “Star Wars” speech, but the culmination of earlier efforts to ban space-based weapons and a reaction to appeals by the international scientific community to prohibit the deployment of ASAT weapons [5].

One step undertaken in response to SDI under Andropov was the formation of a commission to study the feasibility of the missile shield and, in particular, the use of directed energy weapons, which were a key component of the earliest “Star Wars” proposals. Appointed by the Military Industrial Commission (VPK), a powerful body under the Council of Ministers that managed the entire defence industry, the commission was headed by nuclear physicist Yevgeniy Velikhov (Fig. 2), the vice-president of the Academy of Sciences. It was a multidisciplinary group that included representatives of the scientific community, the military and the defence industry [6].

In making its assessment, the commission had more to go on than the information available on the American programme. The Soviet Union itself had done some limited research on space-based missile defences since at least the late 1960s, but none of it had led to any concrete results [7]. The latest proposal had been put forward in the late 1970s by Vladimir Chelomei. Inspired by Anatoliy Basistov, the head of the NPO Vympel design bureau, Chelomei had proposed a network of space-based interceptors to destroy US ICBMs, apparently involving the use of Proton-launched spaceplanes called LKS. However, a commission appointed by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev came to the conclusion that the shield would be unable to stop a massive US nuclear attack. One of the members of the commission had been Velikhov [8].

Not surprisingly, after several months of work, the Velikhov commission came to the conclusion that SDI was unrealistic and that even prototypes of space-based directed energy weapons were unlikely to be orbited before 2000 [9]. While the commission set up by the VPK worked in secret, Velikhov also launched a public attack on SDI in close co-operation with equally skeptical American scientists. Shortly after Reagan’s speech, he took the initiative to set up the Committee of Soviet

Scientists for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat (CSS), which together with the Federation of American Scientists published several reports throughout the 1980s that questioned the technological feasibility of SDI and underlined its negative impact on strategic stability.

Despite these developments, the almighty Soviet military industrial complex, eager to obtain lucrative new subsidies for the design bureaus and production facilities, managed to secure a top-level decision on a response to SDI. On 15 July 1985 the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers passed a decree that approved two major “umbrella” programmes that together comprised nearly 300 projects ranging from fundamental research to development of specific systems. The first, called D-20, concentrated on ground-based missile defences and was assigned to the Ministry of the Radio Industry, which traditionally had managed missile defence programmes. The second, dubbed SK-1000, focused on space-based elements and was entrusted to the Ministry of General Machine Building, which oversaw most of the design bureaus involved in space and missile programmes. More specifically, SK-1000 encompassed space-based missile defence, anti-satellite systems (both ground-based and space-based) and systems designed to strike targets on the ground from space. However, it also included almost all launch vehicle and satellite programmes already underway at the time (including manned programmes such as Buran and the Mir space station). In fact, many of the projects under D-20 and SK-1000 had already been under development prior to the July 1985 decree and were now brought together under a common denominator, probably in an attempt to obtain stable funding. D-20 and SK-1000 were expected to cost tens of billions of rubles, keeping the design bureaus and production facilities occupied into the late 1980s.

Fig. 2 Yevgeniy Velikhov. (IPPI)

4

Bart Hendrickx

However, at the same time no commitment was made to actually deploy most of these systems. Rather the goal was “to create by 1995 a technical and technological base in case the deployment of a multi-layered missile defence system would be necessary” [10]. Another government decree specifically focusing on space-based elements to counter SDI is known to have been issued in January 1986 [11].

The July 1985 decision came despite the rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachov, who had been appointed the new Soviet leader in March 1985 after the death of Andropov’s successor Konstantin Chernenko. Gorbachov was wary of pouring more money into the Soviet Union’s vast military industrial complex, but having been in office for only several months, there was little he could do at this point to keep the influential Soviet defence industry from imposing its wishes. However, as his political influence grew and US-Soviet relations evolved, the focus of the anti-SDI effort gradually shifted to an asymmetric response. Accounts suggest that a prominent role in this change of direction was played by Velikhov, who became one of Gorbachov’s key science advisors [12].

Rather than deploy a Soviet missile shield, something that would place a heavy burden on the country’s ailing economy, it made more sense to concentrate on developing countermeasures against America’s space-based missile defences. This could be achieved by improving the ability of missiles to penetrate the shield, but also by neutralizing the space-based elements of the missile shield. The big orbiting garages housing the Space Based Interceptors were essentially sitting ducks in orbit and a single Soviet ASAT could easily destroy an entire garage and its suite of interceptors. The aim was not to destroy the entire US missile shield, but breach it sufficiently for the Soviet Union to launch a successful retaliatory strike [13]. The asymmetric response programmes were grouped under new umbrella programmes called “Protivodeistviye” (“Counteraction”) and “Kontseptsiya-R” (“Conception-R”), approved in the second half of 1987 [14]. While ASAT weapons had already been an important part of the SK-1000 programme, they now became one of the most critical components of the asymmetric response to SDI.

A Plethora of ASAT Systems

The existing IS anti-satellite system was clearly deemed insufficient to counter the perceived US threat, forcing the Russians to significantly upgrade their ASAT capability. Not only was it necessary to initiate the development of several new systems, but also to speed up work on two ASAT projects that had already been conceived in the 1970s.

In 1976 the Soviet government had issued a decree that placed NPO Energiya (the former Korolyov bureau) in charge of a space weapons programme that according to the company’s official history was a response to similar work “begun by the United States in the late 1960s-early 1970s”. It envisaged the use of space-based weapons not only to destroy incoming US

missiles, but also to destroy enemy satellites as well as targets on the ground, in the air and on the sea. In fact, the objectives were very similar to those of the later SK-1000 programme.

The ASAT tier of the NPO Energiya programme consisted of two types of “battle stations” based on the civilian Salyut space stations (Longterm Orbital Stations or DOS). One was called Kaskad (“Cascade”) and would be equipped with a large amount of self-guided missiles developed by the KB Tochmash design bureau of Aleksandr Nudelman to nullify targets in medium and high Earth orbits. The other was called Skif (“Scythian”) and would use laser systems to destroy targets in low Earth orbits (Fig. 3). The stations would be periodically visited for maintenance and refuelling. Experimental versions would be launched by the Proton rocket and operational versions by the Buran space shuttle. Also initiated in 1976, Buran was mainly seen by the Russians as a project to counter the perceived military threat of the US Space Shuttle [15].

In 1981 NPO Energiya transferred its ASAT work to a newly acquired branch that received the name “Salyut Design Bureau” (KB Salyut). Headed by Dmitriy Polukhin, this had formerly been “Branch nr. 1” of the rival Chelomei design bureau (known at the time as the Central Design Bureau for Machine Building or TsKBM) and had been responsible (among other things) for the development of the Proton rocket and the cargo sections

Fig. 3 The original NPO Energiya design of Skif (above) and Kaskad. (RKK Energiya)

5


(“Functional Cargo Blocks” or FGB) of the 20-ton Transport Supply Ships (TKS) that were to launch cosmonauts and supplies to Chelomei’s military Salyut space stations (Almaz). The transfer of the design bureau from TsKBM to NPO Energiya in June 1981 took place only months before a government decree banned Chelomei’s bureau from any involvement in space-related projects. However, it should be noted that the branch enjoyed a great deal of independence from its central design bureau. Even while it had been subordinate to Chelomei’s bureau, Branch nr. 1 had acted as a subcontractor to NPO Energiya for the development of the civilian Salyut space stations. Similarly, when KB Salyut became part of NPO Energiya, it retained much of its independence and seems to have had only loose ties with the new central design bureau in Kaliningrad. KB Salyut was based in the Moscow suburb of Fili and located on the same territory as the Khrunichev Machine Building Factory. Although Khrunichev manufactured the hardware designed or co-designed by KB Salyut (like the Proton rockets and the Salyut space stations), it was an independent entity. In June 1988 KB Salyut split off from NPO Energiya to become part of a newly formed organization called NPOEM (Scientific Production Association of Experimental Machine Building). In 1991 KB Salyut acquired independent status before being merged with the Khrunichev factory in 1993 to form the Khrunichev State Space Scientific Production Centre (GKNPTs imeni Khrunicheva). After the transfer to KB Salyut, both Skif and Kaskad underwent significant changes. Because the gas dynamic laser system needed for Skif turned out to be much heavier than projected, the spacecraft was transformed into a 100-tonne class vehicle to be launched by the Energiya heavy lift launch vehicle. An experimental version (called Skif-DM or Polyus) not equipped with a laser system was flown on the maiden mission of Energiya on 15 May 1987, but failed to reach orbit due to a problem with the spacecraft’s navigation system following separation from Energiya (Fig. 4). Kaskad remained within the 20-tonne launch capacity of the Proton rocket, but instead of being built on the basis of the DOS space stations would now use a bus derived from the propulsion section that delivered the Kvant astrophysics module to the Mir space station in 1987. This propulsion section, known as Functional Service Block (FSB) or 77K, in turn was a stripped-down version of the FGB cargo sections of the TKS transport vehicles designed by KB Salyut in the 1970s. Attached to the bus would be three small space tugs each carrying one or more missiles of the Tochmash design bureau (the exact amount is unknown). After separating from Kaskad in low Earth orbit, the space tugs would use their own propulsion and guidance and control systems to get as close as possible to their targets in higher orbits and then launch the missiles at them [16]. Incidentally, the FSB also served as the bus for an offensive space-to-ground system called Bolid that KB Salyut worked on in the second half of the 1980s [17].

Fig. 4 The Energiya rocket with the Skif-DM/Polyus payload.(V. Lukashevich)

Although Skif and Kaskad pre-dated SDI, indications are that prior to SDI NPO Energiya’s space weapons programme had been a relatively poorly funded research effort that took a backseat to NPO Energiya’s ongoing manned programmes (Soyuz/Salyut and Buran) [18]. When they were incorporated into the SK-1000 anti-SDI programme in July 1985, they are likely to have received a boost in funding. In addition to Skif and Kaskad, KB Salyut began work on three new ASAT systems that were also part of SK-1000:

• Naryad-V[19]: a ground-based kinetic kill vehicle using a silo-based ICBM (the UR-100N UTTKh) and a new upper stage to reach targets from low Earth orbits (LEO) to geostationary orbits (GEO).

• Kamin (literally “Fireplace”, but in fact a compound of the words kosmicheskaya mina or “space mine”): a constellation of small ASAT weapons deployed in orbits close to potential target satellites for very quick intercepts. Using a new lightweight bus, several of them could have been launched in one go by launch vehicles such as Zenit or Buran.

• Lider (“Leader”): an ASAT vehicle using particle beam weapons to disable electronic systems of enemy satellites.

Like Kaskad, Naryad-V and Kamin were to be outfitted with space-to-space missiles of the KB Tochmash design bureau for a hit-to-kill intercept of target satellites. In order to save costs,

6

Bart Hendrickx

the initial hope was that the three systems could employ a common space tug that would be loaded with different amounts of propellant depending on the mission. However, that plan was abandoned by late 1987 because the distances to be covered by the tugs were too different. Instead, Kaskad would be equipped with tailor-made tugs and Kamin, flying very close to its target, could do without a tug and instead carry more space-to-space missiles or perform the intercept itself through a direct collision with the target (with or without the use of explosive devices). The ground-based Naryad-V would rely on a more powerful propulsion unit that would act both as a third stage and a space tug. It would first be ignited to place itself into a parking orbit and then be re-ignited one or several times to approach the target and then deploy its missile(s) [20]. In addition to the aforementioned ASAT projects, the Soviet Union began working on an air-launched ASAT system very similar to one that had been under development in the United States for several years. The US ASAT programme had been much smaller in scope than the Soviet programme, possibly because Soviet military satellites were not considered as much of a threat to US strategic forces. Apparently, the main driving force behind US ASAT programmes (at least in the 1970s and 1980s) was not so much to disable Soviet satellites, but to deter the Russians from using their ASAT weapons against US satellites [21].

Plans for an Air Force co-orbital ASAT system called SAINT were cancelled in 1962 in favour of two ground-based direct ascent systems that would use nuclear warheads to knock out enemy satellites in orbit. One was an Army project (Program 505) using Nike Zeus missiles from the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands chain in the Pacific. The other was an Air Force project (Program 437) relying on Thor missiles stationed on Johnston Island in the Pacific. Although both programmes saw a number of test launches in the 1960s, they had many operational drawbacks. Program 505 was cancelled in 1966 and Program 437 in 1975, among other things because it was found to offer little or no protection against the Soviet Fractional Orbit Bombardment System (FOBS), a single-orbit nuclear weapon delivery system that was considered to be the main Soviet space-based threat against the US [22]. One of the disadvantages of the ground-based ASAT missiles was that they had to wait for a target satellite to overfly their launch sites. In the late 1970s the Air Force initiated the development of an air-launched hit-to-kill ASAT system that would provide more flexibility in engaging satellites. The programme became known as the Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle (ALMV) and involved the use of ASM-135 missiles that would be launched from an F-15 fighter jet. The ASM-135 was a two-stage solid-fuel missile carrying a kinetic energy warhead.

After two test flights on 21 January and 13 November 1984, the ASM-135 successfully destroyed a partially operational US scientific satellite called Solwind on 13 September 1985 (Fig. 5).

Although the US Congress banned further tests of the ASM-135 on targets in space in December 1985, there were two more successful test flights using simulated targets in August and September 1986. However, in 1988 the Reagan administration cancelled the project due to its ballooning cost and a variety of technical problems. In what clearly was a direct response to ALMV, the Russians started the development of a similar air-launched ASAT system called Kontakt (also named 30P6). The formal go-ahead was given by a government decree on 27 November 1984, barely two weeks after the second US ASM-135 test. Indications are that Kontakt was not billed by the defence industry as an anti-SDI project, but justified by the proven argument that any new American weapons system needed to be matched by a Soviet counterpart. An initial order to start work on the project is said to have come in January 1983, two months before Reagan unveiled SDI. The lead design bureau was TsKB Almaz (the former KB-1), which like TsNII Kometa (the bureau in charge of IS) was also under the Ministry of the Radio Industry. The carrier aircraft was a modified MiG-31 fighter jet (designated MiG-31D) outfitted with a three-stage solid-fuel missile named 79M6 developed by the MKB Fakel design bureau (Fig. 6). Two of the aircraft were built. Test flights from the Flight Research Institute (LII) in Zhukovskiy (near Moscow) began on 17 January 1987 and were later transferred to the Sary-Shagan test range in Kazakhstan. The system was reportedly capable of engaging targets up to an altitude of 600 km with inclinations ranging from 50° to 104° [23].

Fig. 5 American ASAT test on 13 September 1985.(P. Reynolds/USAF)

7


Finally, it should be noted that the A-35 and A-135 nuclear-tipped anti-missile defence systems deployed around Moscow are also said to have had a limited capability to destroy targets in LEO [24]. Around the mid-1980s the TsNPO Vympel design bureau reportedly also began work on a non-nuclear satellite interceptor for the A-135 system that was known as Amulet [25]. Putting it all together, by the mid-1980s four different Soviet design bureaus were working simultaneously on at least eight ASAT systems:

• Ground-based/Air-based kinetic systems: IS-M (TsNII Kometa), Kontakt (TsKB Almaz), Naryad-V (KB Salyut), Amulet (TsNPO Vympel)

• Space-based kinetic systems: Kamin, Kaskad (both KB Salyut)

• Space-based directed-energy weapons: Skif, Lider (both KB Salyut)

Complementary Capabilities The multiple ASAT systems were supposed to complement each other and compensate for some of the shortcomings of IS, the only operational ASAT system. First, IS was limited to relatively low orbits (with a demonstrated ceiling of 1,500 km), implying that many critical American military satellites remained out of its reach. These were the Navstar/GPS navigation satellites in 20,000 km circular orbits and a variety of geostationary satellites for early warning, communications and signals intelligence. On the other hand, virtually all low-orbiting US military satellites would have been vulnerable to an IS attack (inclinations attainable from Baikonur were between 45° and 135°, assuming range-safety restrictions would have been lifted in a wartime situation) [26]. Second, the IS interceptors were co-planar, meaning they had to wait for a target’s orbital plane to pass over the launch site. Therefore they could be launched at a target only twice each day from any given launch site. A launch into the same orbital plane as the target was also a dead give-away of intent and this, combined with the relatively long intercept time, would have given the target satellite enough time to make evasive manoeuvres or take other countermeasures to prevent destruction [27].

Third, the IS system relied on just two launch pads at Baikonur, making it vulnerable to attack. Two Tsiklon pads were also available at the northern Plesetsk launch site, but these were only used for the three-stage version of the rocket (Tsiklon-3) and there is no evidence that IS interceptors were ever deployed at Plesetsk.

The air-launched Kometa system offered the advantage that it was not tied to a specific launch site and therefore had more flexibility in reaching its targets, but it was also restricted to LEO targets and had a ceiling even lower than IS (600 km). Both Naryad-V and Kaskad addressed the altitude problem. They were primarily designed to attack satellites in MEO and GEO, although they could also have been aimed at targets in LEO. Deployed in orbit, Kaskad theoretically had a quicker intercept time than Naryad-V, but Naryad-V had the advantage of being stationed in hardened ground-based silos that were less vulnerable to attack. The estimated intercept time for Naryad-V was from 30 minutes (for LEO targets) to 7 hours (for GEO targets) [28]. The Kamin interceptors would have been the quickest-response kinetic ASAT weapons, possibly needing only minutes to sneak in on their targets. Kamin was originally conceived to engage targets in LEO, but later it was decided to deploy the system in higher orbits as well. The low-altitude version became known as Kamin-N (“N” standing for nizkiy, “low”) and the high-altitude version as Kamin-V (“V” standing for vysotnyy, “high”) [29].

The laser-equipped Skif was also targeted at objects in LEO. Whereas the American space-based laser systems proposed under SDI had to be accurately aimed at ballistic missiles or warheads flying at large distances and high speeds, Skif needed less power-hungry lasers to hit orbiting satellites at much closer range and lower relative speeds [30]. Advantages over the kinetic systems were the shorter intercept times and the ability to destroy multiple targets with a single vehicle. However, Skif was a cumbersome vehicle that was dependent on the expensive Energiya rocket and, like the carrier vehicles

Fig. 6 The MiG-31D jet and the 79M6 ASAT missile. (www.airwar.ru)

8

Bart Hendrickx

of the US Space Based Interceptors, would have been an easy target for enemy ASATs. Moreover, even the development of a short-range space-based laser was a challenging task that was continuously running far behind schedule. The Skif-DM mission in 1987 was not part of a carefully devised step-by-step test programme, but a stopgap mission thrown together relatively quickly to test the Energiya rocket until the much-delayed Buran space shuttle was ready for flight. The Soviet Union also studied ground-based laser systems for satellite negation, but the research never advanced as far as some alarming Pentagon reports in the 1980s suggested [31].

Lider, the space-based particle-beam weapon, was also a huge vehicle requiring the Energiya rocket [32]. The development of a space-based particle-beam weapon was in an even more immature stage than that of a laser system and the project probably never advanced beyond the drawing board.

War Scenarios

The simultaneous existence of so many ASAT projects can only be explained by the fact that each of them would have been assigned specific tasks in a given wartime situation. Some insight into the objectives of the various ASAT systems has been provided by a KB Salyut veteran who worked for the design bureau’s so-called “systems analysis department” (Department 117). The department’s task was to assess how feasible the technical specifications issued by the military “customers” were from the standpoint of spacecraft designers. In order to do that, the department also needed to know what kind of targets the ASAT systems were aimed at, but since the military community was not prepared to share that sensitive information with the civilian design bureaus, the systems analysis department had to draw up potential scenarios for the use of such ASAT systems itself, essentially duplicating the work already done by the military customers. Although little information is available on the actual scenarios modelled by the military R&D institutes, KB Salyut’s systems analysts were able to deduce from the rare contacts with their military colleagues that they were thinking along the same lines. KB Salyut’s analysis (performed in the 1987-1988 timeframe) centred mainly on Naryad-V, Kaskad and Kamin, because Skif and Lider were expected to be fielded much later and IS and Kontakt were developed by other design bureaus [33]. The basis for KB Salyut’s analysis were three possible war scenarios. In the first scenario (considered the most likely from the Soviet standpoint) the United States would launch a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union and then activate its SDI missile shield to defend itself against a Soviet retaliatory strike. In the second scenario a large-scale conventional war would break out between the two superpowers. In the third scenario (considered the least likely) the Soviet Union itself would be forced to mount a nuclear attack on the United States. In the first scenario, the main objective of the Soviet ASAT

constellation would have been to destroy the low-orbiting carrier vehicles of the Space Based Interceptors, allowing as many Soviet missiles as possible to penetrate the US missile shield in a retaliatory strike. The response time was estimated to be no more than 15 minutes (the time needed for American submarine launched ballistic missiles to reach Soviet territory minus the time needed to detect the US launches and send the necessary commands to the ASATs). This was too short for ground-based systems as Naryad-V and IS (and, presumably, Kontakt) to reach their targets. Although Naryad-V could reach LEO in a matter of minutes, its upper stage would still have needed to make manoeuvres (possibly plane-changing burns) to reach its target and therefore would not have been much more efficient than the co-orbital IS system. The Kaskad platforms, although having the advantage of already being in orbit, would not necessarily be positioned correctly for their tugs to reach the US battle stations in time. Naryad-V and Kaskad would only be useful in this scenario if they were deployed in huge quantities, outnumbering their targets. The most effective weapons in such a scenario were considered to be the Kamin-N space mines, circling the Earth very close to their targets. An additional way to ensure the success of a Soviet retaliatory strike would have been the quick destruction of geostationary DSP early warning satellites (or the BSTS and SSTS early warning systems developed in the framework of SDI), limiting America’s capability to detect Soviet missiles launched in response to the US attack. Since Naryad-V and Kaskad would have needed hours to reach GEO, Kamin-V was seen as the primary ASAT system for that task (and that seems to have been its very raison d’être). In short, the Kamin vehicles were to become the core element of the Soviet anti-SDI ASAT response. Nonetheless, the development of Kamin seems to have proceeded without a sense of urgency. When the programme was initiated in 1985, the preliminary design was to be finished in 1989, with test flights not getting underway until 1992, another indication that the Soviets did not expect SDI to become a reality in the immediate future [34].

Systems such as Kaskad and Naryad-V were primarily needed in the second scenario, a non-nuclear conflict between the USSR and the US. In such a conflict the prime targets would have been the GPS/Navstar navigation satellites in MEO and communications satellites in GEO. Here the response time was less critical and ample time was available for Kaskad and Naryad-V to reach their targets in high orbits. Although not part of the KB Salyut analysis, one can assume that IS and Kontakt were also best suited for use in a non-nuclear conflict, targeting US reconnaissance satellites in LEO and possibly also the Transit navigation satellites that orbited the Earth in roughly circular 1,000 km orbits with an inclination of 90°. Although Transit was being phased out in the 1980s in favour of the higher orbiting GPS/Navstar satellites, the final IS mission in 1982 (flown at an altitude of 1,000 km) is said to have simulated the intercept of a Transit satellite (despite the lower 65° inclination used by the mission) [35].

9


KB Salyut’s analysts also considered scenarios in which a conventional war between the US and USSR would escalate into a nuclear conflict. In case the Americans were on the brink of losing the conventional war, the analysts reasoned, they might be tempted to launch a desperate nuclear strike against the USSR. This would lead to the first scenario, the only difference being that a considerable portion of the ASAT assets would have been exhausted during the conventional war. Alternately, if the Soviet Union threatened to lose the conventional war, it might be forced to unleash its nuclear arsenal, resulting in the third scenario. One option considered was to use only the Kaskad platforms in a conventional war, leaving the Naryad-V interceptors on stand-by in their hardened silos in case the war turned into a nuclear conflict. All these scenarios assumed that the Soviet ASATs themselves would not be targeted by American ASAT systems. However, the Russian also worked out scenarios that took into account the capabilities of the US air-launched ASM-135 interceptors. The 20-tonne Kaskad satellites were considered to be most vulnerable to US ASAT attacks and one way of avoiding their destruction would have been to deploy decoys or quickly change their orbits. The small Kamin interceptors would circle the Earth so close to their targets that any attempts to disable them with the ASM-135 missiles were expected to fatally damage the targets themselves. Nevertheless, the TsNII-50 military research institute did devise plans for stealthy Kamin vehicles that would have been difficult to detect by optical, radar and infrared means [36].

Scaling Down the ASAT Programme Of course, American SDI architects were equally aware of the potential threat posed by Soviet ASAT systems. Realizing that the big orbiting garages were easy targets for Soviet ASATs, SDI planners shifted their attention to smaller interceptors that would be highly autonomous through the use of miniaturized sensors and computers, giving them the capability to operate without the sensors and communications equipment of the garages. Called Brilliant Pebbles, they would be housed in protective cocoons (“life-jackets”) to provide housekeeping support. When a Soviet missile attack was detected, the Pebbles would be armed for combat, shed their life jackets and be sent on a collision course with the attacking Soviet missiles (Fig. 7). The Brilliant Pebbles concept was publicly revealed in early 1988 and integrated into the SDI architecture in 1989/1990. For the Soviet ASAT planners, Brilliant Pebbles presented a nightmare. Not only would they be launched in huge numbers, they would also be scattered around the Earth in a wide variety

Fig. 7 Brilliant Pebbles. (SDIO)

of inclinations, making an efficient ASAT response extremely challenging, if not impossible. One crazy idea was to launch a huge quantity of solid particles into orbit that essentially would have formed a ring around the Earth and destroyed the Pebbles upon impact. However, the ring would, of course, also have been lethal to Soviet satellites, basically ending satellite operations in low Earth orbit. Another idea was to shoot down American launch vehicles before they could deploy the Pebbles, but it would have been very difficult to distinguish between launches related and unrelated to SDI, not to mention the fact that any such action would undoubtedly have given rise to a further escalation of tensions. The only way out for the Russians was to deploy their own constellation of Brilliant Pebbles, but that would have forced them to abandon the concept of an “asymmetric response” to SDI. NPO Energiya did conduct some studies of a Soviet equivalent to Brilliant Pebbles, but it is unclear whether this research ever progressed beyond the paper stage [37] (Fig. 8).

As the decade drew to a close and warming relations between the two superpowers diminished the threat of a nuclear war, the Russians scaled down their ASAT programme. The appearance of

10

Bart Hendrickx

Brilliant Pebbles probably sounded the death knell for the Kamin-N interceptors. Before that the military had already lost most of their interest in Kaskad (presumably because of its vulnerability) and the high-orbiting Kamin-V space mines [38]. Apparently, the objective of quickly neutralizing satellites in MEO and GEO had gradually lost priority. Meanwhile, the Skif project was suspended in September 1987 because of its high cost [39]. The only programmes that survived into the 1990s were Kontakt, IS and Naryad-V. This very fact adds further weight to the assumption that their main goal was not to attack elements of the SDI constellation. In early 1991 President George Bush shifted the focus of SDI to theatre missile defence. Responding to the growing threat of nuclear proliferation, the shield was now supposed to provide protection against accidental, unauthorized or limited missile attacks from what later would become known as “rogue states”. The Kontakt test programme may have been much broader in scope than initially believed. Some of the MiG-31D test pilots involved in the project later revealed that numerous test flights were carried out from the Sary-Shagan range with “live” missiles being shot at targets in space, albeit it only with the intention of passing close to them rather than actually hitting them [40]. One source claims the tests continued until 1995 [41]. The IS programme was resumed after the death of Yuriy Andropov in early 1984. In 1978 work had already begun on a further modification called IS-MU capable of intercepting manoeuvrable targets. In the late 1980s TsNII Kometa is said to have initiated the development of yet another modification called IS-MD to reach targets in geostationary orbits, but details on this are sketchy. Despite attempts by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1989-1990 to terminate the project, the IS-MU system was declared operational in April 1991 after a series of ground-based simulations. Sixteen of the interceptors were reportedly kept in storage at the Baikonur cosmodrome. It wasn’t until April 1993 that President Boris Yeltsin signed an order to dismantle the IS-MU system [42]. With Kontakt and IS-MU constrained to LEO and IS-MD in the very early stages of development, Naryad-V was the sole

ASAT system with MEO/GEO capability that stood a chance of becoming available in the short run. Relying on an existing ICBM, Naryad-V was much cheaper than the Proton-launched Kaskad. When the project was initiated in 1985, it was expected to reach flight status as soon as 1987 [43]. Indeed, it would become one of the few elements of the SK-1000 umbrella programme to reach the flight testing stage, but later than planned. Naryad-V Design

Naryad-V was developed at the KB Salyut design bureau under the leadership of Lev Kiselyov [44]. Its launch vehicle was an ICBM designated UR-100N UTTKh (also known as 15A35, RS-18B and by the NATO code SS-19 mod 2 (Stiletto)) [45]. This was the last modification of the Chelomei bureau’s UR-100 ICBM conceived in the 1960s (earlier modifications having been the UR-100K, UR-100U and UR-100N). Actually, the idea of using UR-100 type missiles for an ASAT role was not entirely new. In the early 1960s Chelomei had proposed the development of a missile shield called Taran that would have seen the deployment of nuclear-tipped UR-100 missiles to destroy incoming American ICBMs in space. Although the prime purpose of Taran was anti-missile defence, an additional goal was to destroy enemy satellites in low orbits. The preliminary design of Taran was finished in July 1964, but the system was deemed too expensive and cancelled in the wake of Khrushchov’s overthrow in late 1964 [46].

Development of the UR-100N UTTKh was approved by a government decree on 16 August 1976. Like its predecessors, it consisted of two lower stages and a post-boost stage to place its six multiple warheads on the proper trajectory for re-entry. All engines burned storable propellants (unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4)). Improvements included a modernized post-boost stage, upgraded engines, an increased range and better protection against nuclear blasts. Test flights from the Baikonur cosmodrome began on 26 October 1977 and were finished on 26 June 1979. The missile was officially declared operational

Fig. 8 Soviet equivalent of Brilliant Pebbles. (RKK Energiya)

11


on 17 December 1980. In all, about 360 of the missiles were deployed in silos in four locations in the western Soviet Union (Tatishchevo (Saratov region), Kozyolsk (Kaluga region), Pervomaisk and Khmelnetskiy (Ukraine)). The missile was manufactured by the Khrunichev factory [47]. Turning the UR-100N UTTKh into an ASAT booster was a relatively straightforward affair. The two lower stages essentially remained unchanged. The main change required was to replace the post-boost stage by a more powerful, restartable upper stage equipped with one or more space-to-space missiles of Nudelman’s KB Tochmash design bureau (Fig. 9). KB Salyut designers did struggle to keep the mass of the upper stage and

Fig. 9 The UR-100N UTTKh missile with the Briz upper stage. Key: 1. Fairing; 2. Briz upper stage; 3. Interstage; 4. Second stage oxidizer tank; 5. Second stage fuel tank; 6. Second stage engine; 7. First stage oxidizer tank; 8. First stage fuel tank; 9. Tail section.

(Yu. Pavutnitskiy)

its payload within the same parameters as that of the post-boost stage and its multiple warheads. Lacking the power to place itself into MEO or GEO, the upper stage would first insert itself into a parking orbit in LEO. Once positioned correctly, it would re-ignite its engine one or more times and approach its target as closely as possible, subsequently releasing the missile(s) for a high-speed intercept [48].

The new upper stage was called “Briz” (“Breeze”) [49] (Fig. 10). Briz had the shape of a truncated cone that fitted under the existing payload shroud of the UR-100N UTTK and was attached to the second stage via a short, newly developed interstage. It consisted of an equipment bay (in the upper part) and a propulsion section. The fuel tank (UDMH) and oxidizer tank (N2O4) were separated by a common bulkhead and the lower oxidizer tank surrounded the main engine. Each tank contained baffles, feed pipes and ullage control devices to facilitate main engine restarts in weightlessness. Development of the main engine was assigned to KB KhimMash (the former Isayev bureau) in Kaliningrad (near Moscow), which specialized in spacecraft and upper stage engines. The engine was designated S5.98M (14D30) and was derived from the S5.92 engine of the Phobos interplanetary probes (launched in 1988) (and later also used on the Fregat upper stage). This in turn was based on the 11D417 engine used by the third-generation Luna probes and the 11D425 engine of the Mars-2/3 probes. It was a pump-fed engine that could be gimballed and restarted at least eight times (compared to five times for

Fig. 10 The Briz upper stage at the 1995 Paris Air Show.(C. Lardier/Air et Cosmos)

12

Bart Hendrickx

the S5.92). The Briz also had four low-thrust engine units used for propellant settling and attitude control. Each unit consisted of one 11D458 propellant settling thruster and three 17D58E attitude control thrusters. All these thrusters were developed by the NiiMash design bureau in Nizhnyaya Salda. The 11D458 was originally developed for an unmanned radar-equipped version of the Almaz space station and later also flew together with the 17D58E on the Mir modules Kvant-2, Kristall, Spektr and Priroda and on the Zarya module of the International Space Station. Briz had a dry mass of 1,500 kg and a maximum fuel and oxidizer mass of 1,665 kg and 3,300 kg respectively, giving a maximum total mass of 6.465 tonnes. Standing 24.6 m high, the UR-100N UTTKh/Briz combination had a launch mass of 106.7 tonnes. More details on the rocket’s dimensions and engine systems are given in Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4.

The Briz required a significantly modified guidance and control system. Developed by the NPO Elektropribor design bureau in Kharkov (Ukraine), this was not only supposed to control the lower two stages, but also had to ensure the proper functioning of the upper stage itself and control the complex manoeuvres needed to get it close to the target satellites. The new guidance and control system necessitated significant modifications to the launch control equipment in the silos. This had important implications for the number of Naryad-V

TABLE 3: UR-100N UTTKh Second Stage Engine Data.Name RD-0235 (15D113) (main engine) (1x) RD-0236 (15D114) (vernier) (1x)Manufacturer KBKhA (Voronezh) KBKhA (Voronezh)Type fixed/pump fed/closed cycle fixed/pump fed (single pump and four combustion chambers)/open cyclePropellants UDMH/ N2O4 UDMH/ N2O4

Vacuum thrust 240 kN 15.76 kN (total)Vacuum Isp 320 s 293 sBurn time 183 s 200 s

TABLE 1: UR-100N UTTKh Dimensions.

Length DiameterStage 1 17.2 m 2.5 mStage 2 3.9 m 2.5 mBriz 3.38 m 2.28 m

interceptors that could be deployed. Any UR-100N UTTKh silo converted for Naryad-V could no longer be used by the ICBM (at least in the short run). Building dedicated silos for Naryad-V was not an option because the START agreement being negotiated at the time between the US and the Soviet Union limited the number of ICBMs that could be deployed, irrespective of whether they carried nuclear weapons or ASAT weapons. This meant that the Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN), the branch of the armed forces overseeing missile programmes, would have been forced to sacrifice a certain number of its UR-100N UTTKh silos for Naryad-V. It is not clear if any deal on this was ever reached between the RVSN and the Missile and Space Defence Forces (Voiska PRO i PKO), the branch of the armed forces that had operational control over ASAT programmes. Even KB Salyut seems to have been kept in the dark about the number of silos that would be converted for Naryad-V, although internally specialists of the design bureau estimated that the best they could hope for was about ten [50]. However, declassified documents indicate that as many as one hundred were discussed at one point, which would have been about a third of the total amount available [51]. Very little is known about the space-to-space missiles of the KB Tochmash design bureau, not even how many were supposed to be installed on the Briz upper stage (probably one or two) [52]. Once the Briz had reached the vicinity of its target, the missile would have been released upon a command of the Briz guidance and control system. The interceptor was capable of adjusting its trajectory with small bursts from four liquid-fuel thrusters installed at 90° angles to one another in the vehicle’s centre of mass perpendicular to the flight path. The thrusters reportedly used a “specially developed fuel”, which was injected into the combustion chamber in small portions by a mechanism that worked according to the same principle as a rapid-firing cannon. The interceptor would home in on its target with the help of a self-guided seeker head (developed by the KB Geofizika design bureau) that had its own miniature computer [53]. The missiles have been described as being very similar to the Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV), the final stage of the American air-launched ASM-135 ASAT missile [54]. This used a cryogenically cooled infrared sensor to detect its target, but unlike the Soviet missiles had solid-propellant motors for manoeuvring and attitude control. The infrared sensor maintained track of the satellite and reported the satellite’s position to the guidance computer, which then calculated the manoeuvres needed to keep

TABLE 2: UR-100N UTTKh First Stage Engine Data.Name RD-0233 (15D95) (3x)

RD-0234 (15D96) (1x)Manufacturer KBKhA (Voronezh)Type cardan gimballed/pump fed/closed cyclePropellants UDMH/N2O4

Sea-level thrust 1870 kN (each engine 470 kN)Vacuum thrust 2070 kN (each engine 520 kN)Sea-level Isp 285 sVacuum Isp 310 sBurn time 121 s

13


the satellite in the cross hairs of the sensor. This process was continued repetitively until the MHV collided with its target [55].

It is known that the space-to-space missiles intended for Kaskad were supposed to have been tested in space from modified Progress cargo ships. The NPO Energiya design bureau even started the construction of five such vehicles for missions in 1986-1988. When those plans were abandoned, the vehicles were rebuilt as standard resupply ships for the Mir space station [56]. The space-to-space missiles intended for Naryad-V, Kaskad and Kamin are likely to have been very similar and therefore the Progress-based tests would undoubtedly have been applicable to Naryad-V as well.

One declassified document has revealed that at one point consideration was given to outfitting both Naryad-V and the A-135 Moscow ABM system with warheads generating X-rays [57]. A similar warhead called W-71 was developed in the 1960s for the US Spartan ABM system and was designed for intercepts of re-entry vehicles at high altitudes comparable to low Earth orbit. It had the advantage of being capable of disabling incoming re-entry vehicles at much greater distances than traditional warheads (up to 16 km), making guidance less challenging. Why such a warhead was envisaged for an ASAT system as Naryad-V is unclear.

Naryad-V Suborbital Test Flights

The Naryad-V test programme envisaged several suborbital missions and also at least one orbital mission. The test flights were to be performed from the Baikonur cosmodrome, where two UR-100N UTTKh silos were modified for test flights of the Naryad-V system (Fig. 11). These silos were located in Areas 131 and 175 in the western part of the cosmodrome in the same general area as the Proton and Tsiklon-2 pads. A new military unit (Military Unit 55056, also known as the 326th Independent Engineering and Testing Unit) was formed to

perform the test missions. The establishment of this unit began with an order from the commander of the Baikonur cosmodrome in October 1985 and was completed on 22 September 1987. Military Unit 55056 was subordinate to a new directorate established at the cosmodrome on that very same day. Known as the 7th Scientific and Testing Directorate for Special Space Systems (7 NIU), this directorate also absorbed the unit in charge of Tsiklon-2 launches (Military Unit 46180), which earlier had been part of the directorate that oversaw Proton launches (4 IU). Apparently, the purpose of the new directorate was to integrate launch operations in the interests of the Soviet Missile and Space Defence Forces and the Navy. The Tsiklon-2 launched not only the IS interceptors, but also radar and electronic ocean reconnaissance satellites (known as US-A and US-P). However, as part of cutbacks in military spending, the 7 NIU and 4 IU directorates were merged in November 1989 to form the 2nd Centre for Tests and Applications of Space Assets (TsIP KS 2). Military Unit 55056 consisted of two groups and a so-called “independent brigade”. Group 1 was in charge of transporting the missile to the silo and fuelling it. Group 2 was responsible

TABLE 4: Briz Engine Data.Name S5.98M (14D30) (main

engine) (1x)11D458 (settling thruster) (4x) 17D58E (attitude control

thruster) (12x)Manufacturer KB KhimMash (Kaliningrad) NIIMash (Nizhnyaya Salda) NIIMash (Nizhnyaya Salda)Type cardan gimballed/pump fed/

closed cyclefixed/pressure fed fixed/pressure fed

Propellants UDMH/N2O4 UDMH/ N2O4 UDMH/ N2O4

Vacuum thrust 20 kN 400 N 13 NVacuum Isp 325.5 s 275 s 270 sMode Steady state with up to 8

ignitionsPulse mode with up to 33,000

ignitionsPulse mode with up to

450,000 ignitionsTotal available impulse 2 x 107 Ns 14112 Ns -Minimum impulse bit 25000 Ns 40 Ns 0.068 NsMinimum/maximum burn time 1 s/1000 s 0.1 s/3000 s 0.03 s/10000 sOff time 15 s to 1 h - -

Fig. 11 UR-100N UTTKh missile being installed into a silo at Baikonur. (www.leninsk.ru)

14

Bart Hendrickx

for integrated tests of the launch vehicle and its payload and the independent brigade for preparing the Briz upper stage and its payload (which the Russians called “the space head unit” (KGCh), freely translated as “upper composite”). The first commander of the unit was Leonid Baranov (25 November 1987 - 1 November 1989), later followed by Vladimir Faikov (1 November 1989 - 8 November 1992) and Vladislav Kazantsev (28 November 1992-1 October 1994) [58]. In mid-May 1987 General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachov paid a visit to the Baikonur cosmodrome, just days before the maiden launch of the Energiya heavy-lift launch vehicle. While touring one of the facilities at the cosmodrome, he was shown a mock-up of the Naryad-V ASAT system, with Anatoliy Zavalishin, deputy commander of the Baikonur cosmodrome, giving him the necessary explanations. As Zavalishin later recounted, he pointed out the shortcomings of the IS interceptors to Gorbachov, not forgetting to mention Margaret Thatcher’s negative attitude to the Soviet anti-satellite tests. Reminding Gorbachov of the American ASAT test in 1985, Zavalishin proposed a similar experiment using the Naryad-V system, promising they would find some kind of cover story for such a test. Gorbachov, however, displayed little enthusiasm for the idea and basically forbade to perform an ASAT test in space [59].

Despite the changing political climate, preparations for Naryad-V suborbital test flights continued. By early 1988 the first test flight was planned for 1989. Clearly, the best way of testing the system would have been to destroy an actual target in space, but there were not only political, but also technical obstacles to performing such a test. The guidance system used by Briz to precisely home in on the target was not yet ready, nor were the space-to-space missiles. Therefore the objective of the first flight was scaled down to simulating an attack on an imaginary target in space, which required less precision. One alternative idea floated within KB Salyut’s Department 117 was to target Naryad-V onto an orbiting satellite that had exceeded its guaranteed lifetime but was still able to transmit signals. Those signals could then be used by Naryad-V to home in on its target. However, the idea was not passed on to KB Salyut’s leadership because it was not the department’s task to formulate such mission proposals [60]. Eventually the first suborbital mission slipped to the end of 1990. By that time ground-based tests of the KB Tochmash missiles had been suspended, although only several months earlier the goal had been to finish the tests by the end of the year and fly them on the second suborbital mission in 1991 [61]. The launch took place on 20 November 1990 at 7.02 Moscow time (4.02 GMT) from silo nr. 29 in Area 131 of the Baikonur cosmodrome. A second suborbital mission was planned for 1991, but the rocket originally earmarked for the test had to be returned to the manufacturer when it turned out that its transport and launch container had become damaged during installation in the silo [62]. A replacement missile was fired from silo nr. 58 in Area 175 on 20 December 1991 at 23.30 Moscow time (20.30 GMT) (Fig. 12).

The main objective of the flights was to test the Briz upper stage and its new guidance and control system [63]. According to information later provided by the Eurockot company, the Briz was fired several times, demonstrating that it could be re-ignited in zero-g conditions. Aiming for an inclination of 65°, the upper stage reached a maximum altitude of 900 km. Another aim of the test flights was to study the vibrations and acoustic loads that the payload experienced during launch. The upper stage reportedly carried “scientific equipment”, although the exact nature of that has never been identified [64]. One source says that on the second mission the Briz was restarted more often than on its maiden mission the year before [65].

The missions were not officially announced by the Soviet Union at the time. The first reports about the flights surfaced in the Russian press in late January 1992 and sparked angry reactions from Kazakhstan, which complained that it had not been notified in advance of the second flight, which took place from its territory four days after the former Soviet republic had declared its independence. Just one day after the test, on 21 December 1991, the heads of 11 former Soviet republics (including Russia and Kazakhstan) had gathered in the Kazakh capital of Alma-Ata to proclaim the end of the Soviet Union and its replacement by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The reports about the tests also stirred controversy in the US, where some considered they had represented a breach

Fig. 12 UR-100N UTTKh test launch from Baikonur.(www.leninsk.ru)

15


of the yet-to-be ratified START treaty. However, the US had reportedly been informed in advance of the second launch exactly to avoid such criticism [66].

Naryad-V Goes Commercial

The two suborbital missions were carried out with funds already allocated for the Naryad-V programme [67]. They demonstrated the potential of using the Briz upper stage and its guidance and control systems for ASAT missions, although not at the kind of altitude that Naryad-V had been primarily designed for. Meanwhile, with the military interest in ASAT missions gradually fading, KB Salyut was setting its sights on turning the UR-100N UTTKh/Briz combination into a commercial satellite launcher and the suborbital missions (certainly the second one) had clearly been geared to that end as well. International strategic arms reduction talks underway at the time offered the prospect of converting a significant number of ICBMs into satellite launch vehicles. Under the START II agreement, signed by the US and Russia on 3 January 1993, Russia was allowed to retain 105 UR-100N UTTKh missiles provided they were downgraded to carry one instead of six warheads. The 65 other missiles remaining on operational duty at the time were to be decommissioned and many of them became available to serve as satellite launchers.

Studies performed by KB Salyut in early 1991 showed that there was a growing demand for such boosters from companies aspiring to place constellations of small communications satellites into LEO (such as Iridium and Globalstar). The main modification needed was to enlarge the payload shroud, which was too small to house the satellites that were potential customers for the rocket. Another problem was that the silo launches placed high acoustic loads on the payloads, but it was hoped that most foreign payloads could handle those and that the existing silos at Baikonur could host commercial launches. Building a dedicated conventional pad for the rocket was considered too expensive at the time [68]. KB Salyut first advertised the possible commercial use of the rocket at an international space exhibition in Moscow in April 1991 [69]. With little experience in marketing rockets, KB Salyut began looking for a foreign partner to put the rocket on the commercial market. An initial overture seems to have been made to the German company Daimler-Benz Aerospace (DASA) during a visit by a KB Salyut delegation in December 1991, just days before the second suborbital mission. The main purpose of the visit was to discuss the joint development of a communications satellite, but the commercial prospects of the UR-100N UTTKh/Briz were mentioned to the Germans in passing [70]. As was to be expected, KB Salyut officials did not mention the ASAT roots of the Briz upper stage in their negotiations with the Germans and instead of using the name Naryad-V referred

to the rocket as Rokot (meaning “roar” as in the roar of a rocket engine). The name first appeared in the press in early 1992. The upper stage was now referred to as Briz-K (the “K” standing for “kosmicheskiy”, “space”). In its Naryad-V configuration it had apparently been known simply as Briz [71]. On 16 December 1992 the Russian government gave the official go-ahead for the commercial use of the Rokot booster and on 16 May 1994 the newly formed Khrunichev Centre (resulting from the merger of KB Salyut and the Khrunichev factory) and DASA signed an agreement on the creation of a joint venture called Eurockot Launch Services GmbH to market the rocket and carry out launch services. The new company was officially registered on 22 March 1995, with DASA holding 51 % of the shares and Khrunichev 49 %. Undoubtedly, the Germans had been impressed by the rocket’s almost flawless track record. By 1994 the UR-100N UTTKh and its predecessor (UR-100N) had accumulated 148 launches (68 for the UR-100N and 80 for the UR-100N UTTKh) and only three of those had failed [72]. Test launches of the ICBM continued to be performed from Baikonur on a regular basis to guarantee the reliability of the ageing launch system and provide training for the military launch teams. Khrunichev officials found themselves in an awkward situation in early 1997 when they were obliged to provide information on the origins of the Rokot booster during a session of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, a body that regularly met in Geneva to oversee the implementation of the START I treaty. In its advertising campaign for Rokot, Eurockot had made no secret of the two silo-launched suborbital missions in 1990 and 1991, saying that these had carried the Briz upper stage. Since the missions had taken place before the commercialization of Rokot, the question naturally arose what the purpose of the test flights had been. Instead of acknowledging that the Rokot project had evolved from an ASAT programme, the Russians concocted a cover story, claiming the rocket had been developed to quickly replenish constellations of low-orbiting military satellites after the outbreak of a nuclear war. That also explained the need to launch them from silos, which were hardened to protect them from nuclear blasts [73]. Although the ASAT roots of Rokot/Briz are no longer a secret, even in today’s Eurockot commercial literature any mention of its true origins is carefully avoided.

Shortly after the formation of the joint venture the German side agreed to finance work needed to modify an existing Kosmos-3M launch pad at the Plesetsk cosmodrome for launches of the Rokot. In fact, in its December 1992 decision on the commercial use of Rokot, the Russian government had already called for operating the rocket from Plesetsk, no doubt because of the political problems associated with flying it from Kazakh territory. The decision to use Plesetsk made it possible to launch the rocket above ground from a conventional pad in a much more benign acoustic environment. However, it would still be ensconced in the transport and launch container used

16

Bart Hendrickx

for the silo launches in order to maintain commonality with the basic ICBM and carry out launch preparations under climatically controlled conditions. Plans to fly the rocket from Baikonur silos were definitively shelved in 1999.

Another possibility studied was to fly Rokot from the new Svobodnyyy launch site, a decommissioned ICBM base in the Far East of Russia. However, the Svobodnyy silos had housed only the original version of the UR-100 and the modifications needed for Rokot were considered too costly. Work to modify the silos did continue for another launch vehicle based on the UR-100N UTTKh, namely the Strela rocket of NPO Mashinostroyeniya, the former Chelomei bureau. Strela was a virtually unchanged version of the UR-100N UTTKh that retained the ICBM’s post-boost stage and therefore had less payload capacity than Rokot (Fig. 13). In the end, even the plans to fly Strela from Svobodnyy did not materialize and Strela would only fly from the Baikonur cosmodrome. The first launch of Rokot from the converted Kosmos-3M pad at Plesetsk was slated for early 2000 with a small military satellite called RVSN-40. Unfortunately, during launch pad tests in late December 1999 the payload shroud was accidentally jettisoned from the rocket and the mission was cancelled. This was the last planned flight of the Briz-K upper stage.

Although an enlarged payload shroud had been designed by the mid-1990s for the Briz-K and its satellite payloads, it was found to be inadequate for launches of Iridium satellites, which were to become the first commercial payloads for Rokot. In order to accommodate larger payloads and reduce dynamic loads, a bigger composite payload shroud was developed and the Briz-K itself also underwent structural changes. The equipment bay was widened and shortened by redistributing the control equipment and its walls were stiffened to provide more structural rigidity. The interstage between the Briz and the second stage was lengthened, making it possible to suspend the upper stage inside the interstage, which thereby replaced the upper stage as the main load bearing structure. The payload volume under the shroud was increased by 8.8 m³, allowing the Rokot to carry a wide diversity of payloads, ranging from single to multiple payloads positioned either on a single level or on two or more levels using a customized dispenser. The modified upper stage became known as Briz-KM (Fig. 14). Rokot/Briz-KM flew its maiden mission from Plesetsk on 16 May 2000, carrying two mass simulators of the Iridium satellites (Simsat 1 and Simsat 2). At the time of writing, the booster has flown 24 missions, with both commercial and government payloads. One mission ended in complete failure and one failed to place its satellite into the proper orbit.

Yet another modification of the Briz, called Briz-M, flies as an upper stage on the Khrunichev Centre’s Proton rocket. It was conceived around 1994, several years before Briz-KM. An early idea to increase the MEO/GEO launch capacity of the Proton was to equip it with a dual upper stage consisting of a LOX/

Fig. 13 Comparative view of the UR-100N UTTKh/Strela (left), Rokot/Briz-K (middle) and Rokot/Briz-KM (right). (Eurockot)

kerosene Blok-DМ in the lower position and a Briz-K on top of that [74]. However, the Blok-DM upper stage was a product of RKK Energiya and the Khrunichev Centre was not eager to share the profits it expected to earn from commercial Proton missions with a rival design bureau. The basic Briz was too small and not powerful enough to fly on Proton, but Khrunichev elegantly solved the problem by mounting a toroidal, jettisonable propellant tank around a shortened and widened version of the basic Briz stage. This ensured that the upper stage fitted atop the Proton and had enough propellant to place payloads into high orbits. The Briz-KM was an outgrowth of Briz-M (essentially the Briz-M without the toroidal fuel tank). Briz-M made its maiden

17


mission on 5 July 1999. It will also be used as an upper stage on the Angara-5 rocket and flew on that rocket’s maiden mission in December 2014. Naryad-V’s Swan Song Before Rokot definitively entered the commercial market in the mid-1990s, the rocket flew one final mission from Baikonur in December 1994, this time using the Briz-K to put a payload into orbit. Remarkably enough, the flight took place only weeks after Military Unit 55056, which was in charge of Rokot launches at Baikonur, had been formally disbanded. The order to do that had already come in early 1994, but it wasn’t until 1 November that the unit officially ceased to exist. Much of its staff was transferred to the Far East of the country in anticipation of Rokot launches from the new Svobodnyy launch site. As a result, preparations for the launch were made by a remaining skeleton crew that was 10 times smaller than for the two suborbital launches [75]. The mission was launched on 26 December 1994 at 6.01 Moscow time (3.01 GMT) from silo nr. 58 in Area 175 and inserted a small amateur radio satellite called Radio-ROSTO (RS-15) into a 1,885x2,165 km orbit with an inclination of 64.6° (Fig. 15). When the mission came within range of the US Naval Space Surveillance System (NAVSPASUR) several hours later, it detected not only Radio-ROSTO and the Briz upper stage, but also 32 other objects associated with this launch (which received the international designator 1994-085). Backtracking the orbit, it turned out that some kind of fragmentation event had occurred at around 6.27 GMT, about 3.5 hours after launch [76].

At the time not much attention was given to this event, but the

hindsight knowledge of Rokot’s ASAT roots raises the question if it may have been the result of an ASAT-related test and if the orbiting of the Radio-ROSTO satellite merely served as a cover to mask the true purpose of the launch. It is known that in 1990 KB Salyut was hoping to follow up the two suborbital missions with an orbital mission of Naryad-V involving the destruction of a target in space. The plan was to deploy a small target from the Briz, after which the upper stage would home in on the target

Fig. 14 Comparative view of Briz-K and Briz-KM. (Eurockot)

Fig. 15 The Radio-ROSTO satellite. (G. Krebs)

18

Bart Hendrickx

and release one or more space-to-space missiles to destroy it [77]. The question is how much of that plan, if anything, remained intact four years later.

The most obvious argument against an ASAT-related experiment on this mission is that by the end of 1994 the political climate was hardly conducive to conducting an ASAT test. The flight took place several years after the end the Cold War and one and a half year after President Yeltsin had reportedly shut down the IS-MU anti-satellite project. Even during the final years of the Cold War the Soviet Union had observed its self-declared ASAT moratorium by testing IS-MU on the ground rather than in space. Moreover, by the time of the 1994 mission Khrunichev had already signed its deal with DASA on the formation of Eurockot and there can be little doubt that the December 1994 mission served to demonstrate the potential of the Rokot as a commercial launch vehicle.

Still, there are some tantalizing clues that there may have been more to this mission than just the deployment of an amateur radio satellite. First, the Radio-ROSTO satellite weighed just 72 kg, which was way below the maximum payload capacity of the Rokot to the observed orbit (over 1 tonne). Second, the fragmentation event was unusual in that it happened so shortly after launch. Upper stages have been known to explode in orbit, but this usually happens months or years after launch due to leakage of residual propellants (the Briz-M, for instance, suffered several such break-ups after Proton launches).

Third, a handful of publications in recent years point to an additional objective for this launch. In a book about the history of the Baikonur cosmodrome, Leonid Baranov, the first commander of Military Unit 55056, said the Rokot carried Radio-ROSTO and what he calls a “Kosmos” satellite [78]. Although no Kosmos satellite was officially announced for this mission, Baranov may have been trying to say there was more to this mission than meets the eye. Another clue comes from an authoritative list of Baikonur launches which lists Naryad-V as the main payload for this mission and Radio-ROSTO as a “subsatellite” [79]. Another source says that the military teams in charge of Rokot at Baikonur performed three launches of Naryad-V (the two suborbital missions plus the orbital mission) [80].

The best evidence for an ASAT-related test on this mission comes from the memoirs of a KB Salyut veteran. He says that although the prime purpose of the mission was to demonstrate the Rokot as a satellite launch vehicle, it also involved an experiment related to Naryad-V in which the Briz would test equipment “for initial homing on a space target”. However, he claims that the test failed, adding that it was “the last test in the framework of this project, after which Naryad-V definitively turned into Rokot” [81].

So what could such an ASAT test have been all about? Since work on the space-to-space missiles had been suspended four

years earlier, it is safe to conclude that the originally planned all-up test of Naryad-V with the destruction of a target had been cancelled. Instead, the idea seems to have been to deploy a target from the Briz and subsequently use the guidance and control systems of Briz to approach it without actually destroying it. The Briz guidance systems lacked the precision to carry out an actual intercept (which was the task of the KB Tochmash missiles) and an ASAT-related test would have to be kept secret, which could hardly be achieved by creating a cloud of debris in orbit. Therefore, if an ASAT-related test was carried out, the fragmentation event was probably accidental rather than the result of a pre-conceived intercept. What may have gone wrong, though, remains a mystery. One possibility is that the Briz was supposed to release one or several inflatable balloon type targets (similar to the ones carried by the ill-fated Skif-DM vehicle in 1987) that somehow burst during deployment [82]. Whatever went wrong, any Briz homing test would likely have been timed to take place before the objects came within range of US tracking assets, which would explain why the fragmentation event occurred so early in the mission.

One possible motive for such a test may have been the continued US interest in ASAT systems. In the late 1980s, shortly after the cancellation of the Air Force’s air-launched ASAT system, the US Army was ordered to develop a ground-launched system called KE-ASAT (KE standing for “Kinetic Energy”). Consisting of a tried-and-tested ICBM and a kinetic kill vehicle, this was quite similar in concept to Naryad-V. The booster was a Minuteman-class solid-fuel ICBM that would fly in the general direction of the target and then release the kill vehicle for terminal homing and intercept. The project suffered severe budget cuts after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but continued as a technology effort. This culminated with a ground-based test on 11 September 1994, just 2.5 months before the Rokot launch. In the test, a strapped-down prototype of the kill vehicle tracked a moving light source as it fired its thrusters in response to commands from its avionics/seeker subsystem. The closed-loop demonstration simulated an actual anti-satellite mission, including launch, target acquisition and intercept [83]. Despite strong opposition from the Clinton administration, the KE-ASAT programme managed to survive on shoe-string budgets until after the turn of the century.

After the end of the Cold War the US ASAT programme was mainly aimed at preserving the monopoly of the United States on satellite reconnaissance imagery in future wars. The emergence of relatively low-cost imaging satellites increased the likelihood that the US would one day face an enemy having access to high-quality reconnaissance information. By continuing ASAT development, the US military hoped to discourage other nations from relying on high-resolution satellites to obtain reconnaissance data for their own needs or sell that imagery to potential adversaries of the US.

19


It is hard to say if a possible orbital Naryad-V test was driven by similar motives or merely part of an effort to try and keep up pace with the US ASAT programme. At any rate, all indications are that it was not intended to be followed by more in-orbit tests. The end of the Cold War and the near-collapse of the Russian economy in the 1990s relegated ASATs to the bottom of the military space programme’s priority list. The plummeting space budgets made it hard to maintain even a basic constellation of military satellites, let alone deploy a fleet of ASATs. Renewed Interest in ASAT Systems

It wasn’t until after the turn of the century, with the Russian economy showing signs of recovery and Vladimir Putin rising to power, that there was renewed interest in ASATs. During a visit to the Khrunichev Centre in January 2002 Putin was reportedly told that the Naryad-V programme could be reinstated (with some modifications) if the need arose. The visit came just about a month after US President George W. Bush had announced America’s intention to withdraw from the 1972 ABM treaty in six months. Although Naryad-V was not an anti-missile defence system, Putin reportedly ordered the Ministry of Defence to study the need for the resurrection of Naryad-V and estimate the costs associated with that [84].

In March 2009 the then Deputy Minister of Defence Vladimir Popovkin stated that Russia was continuing to develop anti-satellite systems, saying that “we can’t just sit and watch while others are doing this”. Popovkin was reacting to a journalist’s question about the first Chinese ASAT test in January 2007 and a US operation in February 2008 in which a standard ship-based anti-ballistic missile system had been used to destroy a decaying out-of-control American reconnaissance satellite that might have posed a health hazard if it survived re-entry [85]. Commenting on Popovkin’s statement the same day, the state-run RIA Novosti news agency noted that Russia had retained hardware of its old ASAT systems that “like LEGO bricks” could be assembled into a combat system if there was a clear threat to the nation’s security. The report singled out the IS-MU and IS-MD systems, the Kontakt air-launched system and what it referred to as Naryad-VN and Naryad-VR . In addition to that, the possibility was being studied of adding ASAT capability to the S-400 and S-500 surface-to-air missiles and the former Almaz design bureau (now called GSKB Almaz-Antei) was said to be working on an airborne infrared laser system to counter ground-based, sea-based and space-based enemy reconnaissance assets [86].

In January 2010 the commander of the Russian space forces Oleg Ostapenko repeated that Russia was ready to respond to threats from space. “Our policy is that there should be no war in space, but we are military people and should be ready for everything. Our activities in this direction will depend on others, but, trust me, we will be able to react quickly and adequately” [87].

Twenty years after the suspension of the Naryad programme, it was again the Rokot and the Briz upper stage that were involved in a series of tests that may ultimately pave the way for restoring Russia’s satellite negation capability. During routine launches of communications satellites in December 2013, May 2014 and March 2015, the Rokot carried a mysterious piggyback payload that performed puzzling manoeuvres in space. The last two of these payloads surprised observers by rendezvousing with the Briz-KM upper stage that had deployed them in orbit. On one occasion, one of the payloads even seems to have nudged the Briz-KM into a slightly higher orbit. No official explanation was given by Russia for these orbital manoeuvres, but they do demonstrate Russia’s renewed capability to perform close inspections of satellites in orbit and, if necessary, to disable them. Despite alarming reactions in the West, similar rendezvous experiments had been carried out by the US and China. Interestingly, the suspected inspection missions used a flight profile that was almost opposite to that of Naryad, with the Briz now acting as the target rather than the chase vehicle [88]. One other indication of renewed Russian interest in ASAT systems came in early December 2015, when a US source reported that Russia had tested a direct-ascent anti-satellite missile as part of a research programme known as Nudol that is apparently aimed at upgrading the ABM network around Moscow. The test, which came after two unsuccessful attempts, was reportedly carried out from a mobile transporter on 18 November. The report did say that the system may be limited to hitting satellites that pass over Moscow since it appears to use a stationary rather than a mobile radar [89].

Whatever ASAT system(s) Russia may intend to deploy in the future, the old Naryad hardware is unlikely to play any role in this. The UR-100N UTTKh missiles are reaching the end of their guaranteed service life. Only about thirty are believed to remain in service and they are expected to be retired in 2019 [90]. One final role for the missile appears to be its involvement in Project 4202, a top-secret programme to develop a hypersonic glide vehicle (Yu-71) that would be hard to counter by enemy missile defences. For that purpose, one of the R-36M silos at the Dombarovskiy missile base near Yasnyy has reportedly been modified to launch the UR-100N UTTKh, but the test flights performed so far are believed to have failed. If the hypersonic glide vehicle is ever declared operational, it will almost certainly be installed on a new-generation ICBM [91].

The Rokot launch vehicle is also being phased out, not only because of its age, but also because there are said to be problems with the delivery of components for its Ukrainian-built guidance and navigation system (Fig. 16). At the time of writing only five more Rokot launches were planned, two for domestic missions and three to launch European Sentinel Earth observation satellites. Rokot will be replaced by the Angara 1.2 and Soyuz-2.1v launch vehicles, which have already made their first test flights.

20

Bart Hendrickx

Conclusion

Despite a unilateral moratorium on ASAT testing declared in August 1983, the Soviet continued work on a variety of ASAT systems throughout the decade. Improvements were made to the IS satellites that began flying in the 1960s, development continued of the Skif and Kaskad projects started as part of a space weapons programme in the 1970s and the air-launched Kontakt system was conceived in the early 1980s in direct response to the equivalent American ALMV project. In addition to that, two new projects (Naryad-V and Kamin) got underway around 1985. Although this considerable ASAT effort may have been justified as being a critical part of the Soviet Union’s asymmetric response to the US Strategic Defence Initiative, evidence suggests that most of these systems would have been more effective against conventional US military satellites than elements of America’s missile shield. In the end, funding for these projects gradually dried up as the Cold War drew to a close. A handful did manage to survive into the early 1990s, the most significant being Naryad-V, which left the Rokot/Briz-KM launch vehicle and the Proton rocket’s Briz-M upper stage as an important legacy.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank O. Zamyatin for his help in preparing this article.

1. V. Polyachenko, “Na more i v kosmose”, Morsar AV, St. Petersburg, p.93, 2008; S. Kudryashov (ed.), “Sovetskiy kosmos”, Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Moscow, pp.590-593, 2011.

2. K. Vlasko-Vlasov, “Ot Komety do Oko”, Izdatel’stvo Ol’ga, pp.127-128, 2002

3. A. Perminov (ed.), “Baikonuru – 50 (istoriya kosmodroma v vospominaniyakh veteranov)”, Novosti, Moscow, p.482, 2005.

4. The most up-to-date history of the IS programme can be found in: A. Siddiqi, “The Soviet Co-Orbital Anti-Satellite System: A Synopsis”, JBIS, 50, pp.225-240, 1997. A good overview of the various missions is given in: N. Johnson, “Soviet Military Strategy in Space”, Jane’s Publishing Company, London, pp.125-161, 1987.

5. P. Podvig, “Did Star Wars Help End the Cold War? Soviet Response to the SDI Program”, Russian Nuclear Forces Project, Working Paper, March 2013, pp. 3-4. (Podvig’s paper is largely based on the archival collection of Vitaliy Katayev, a senior advisor to the Secretary for the Defence Industry of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party from 1974 to 1990). Online at http://russianforces.org/podvig/2013/03/did_star_wars_help_end_the_col.shtml (Last Accessed 13 January 2016); Ye. Velikhov, “Ya na valenkakh poyedu v 35-i god… Vospominaniya”, Astrel, Moscow, p.52, 2010.

6. According to the memoirs of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, the commission was set up in the very first days after Reagan’s announcement. O. Grinyovskiy, “Perelom. Ot Brezhneva k Gorbachovu”, Olma Press, Moscow, 2004.

7. In the late 1960s there was a joint effort between TsKBEM (the former Korolyov bureau) and the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Novosibirsk to develop space-based particle beam weapons to shoot down US missiles. See: R. Sagdeyev, “The Making of a Soviet Scientist”, John Wiley, New York, pp.123-125, 1994. In 1976 NPO Energiya was placed in charge of a space weapons programme

Fig. 16 Rokot launch. (Eurockot)

References

that also included missile defence. See: Yu. Semyonov, “Raketno-kosmicheskaya korporatsiya Energiya 1946-1996”, RKK Energiya, Moscow, pp.419-420, 1996.

8. Ye. Velikhov, op. cit., pp.44-45; V. Gubarev, “Academician Yevgeniy Velikhov: ‘Science is not like playing hide and seek’” (in Russian), (interview with Velikhov), Pravda, 1 April 2014, online at http://www.pravda.ru/science/academy/01-04-2014/1202663-akademik_velikhov-0/. (Last Accessed 13 January 2016); N. Bodrikhin, “Chelomei”, Molodaya Gvardia, Moscow, pp.173-176, 2014.

9. P. Podvig, op. cit., p.7. 10. P. Podvig, op. cit., p.8; D. Hoffman, “The Dead Hand: The Untold

Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy”, Doubleday, New York, pp.214-215, 2009. The former chief of the Missile and Space Defence Forces Yuriy Votintsev claims that the Ministry of the Radio Industry had already been in charge of two other major umbrella programmes (Fon-1 and Fon-2) for ground-based and space-based missile defence in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Fon-1, which mainly focused on theoretical research, was reportedly started in the late 1970s but cancelled shortly afterwards. Fon-2, said to be “closer to practice” and to require “serious state funding”, was initiated in response to SDI in 1983. See: D. Likhanov, “What if there is war tomorrow?” (in Russian) (interview with Votintsev), “Sovershenno Sekretno”, nr. 2, 1993. It has been speculated that the space-based missile shield proposed by Chelomei in the late 1970s was part of Fon-1. See: A. Siddiqi, “Cold War in Space: A Look Back at the Soviet Union”, Spaceflight, 40, p.66, 1998. The existence of Fon-1 and Fon-2 has not been confirmed by other sources.

11. V. Favorskiy and I. Meshcheryakov, “Voyenno-kosmicheskiye sily. Stanovleniye Voyenno-kosmicheskikh sil. Kniga II, Voyenno-kosmicheskiye sily”, Moscow, pp.106-108, 147-148, 1998. According to this source, the Ministry of Defence and the ministries

21


involved in the defence industry received an order in mid-1985 to prepare a government decree on a space-based anti-SDI programme. The leading role was assigned to the NPO Energiya design bureau. In order to co-ordinate this work with ongoing efforts to create a multi-layered missile defence system, the Military Industrial Commission set up a special commission headed by Yevgeniy Velikhov, which appears to have been unrelated to the Velikhov commission established by Andropov in 1983. The final draft of the decree was drawn up on the basis of recommendations made by the commission in December 1985. The estimated cost of the programme between 1986 and 1990 was 30.7 billion rubles. Possibly, the January 1986 decree outlined a more detailed plan for the SK-1000 programme approved in July 1985. The Skif space-based laser system is known to have been mentioned in a government decree (nr. 135-45) issued on 27 January 1986, but it is unclear if this was the “big” decree of January 1986 or another one devoted specifically to Skif.

12. D. Hoffman, op. cit., pp.217-220. 13. P. Podvig, op. cit., pp.13-16; S. Oznobishchev, et al., “Kak

gotovilsya asimmetrichnyy otvet na Strategicheskuyu Oboronnuyu Initsiativu R. Reagana”, Lenand, Moscow, 2008.

14. P. Podvig, op. cit., pp.15-16. “Kontseptsiya-R” was managed by the Ministry of the Radio Industry and its main goal apparently was to consolidate the ASAT projects run by that ministry (IS-M, Kontakt, Amulet). “Protivodeistviye” was managed by the Ministry of General Machine Building and was mainly focused on improving the capabilities of ballistic missiles to defeat or penetrate space-based defences. It may have been a follow-on to a much broader programme known as SP-2000 aimed at modernizing strategic offensive forces.

15. Yu. Semyonov, op. cit., pp.419-420, 1996. Several sources say the decree was called “On the study of the possibility to create weapons for combat operations in and from space”. See for instance: K. Lantratov, “The Star Wars that never happened”, Quest, 14, p.6, 2007. One source claims NPO Energiya was assigned to the space weapons programme by a government decree as early as the summer of 1974 and that it was headed by Igor Sadovskiy. See: V. Zavyalov, “O rabote v KBKhM im. A.I. Isayeva i ne tol’ko ob etom”, chapter 10, http://zavjalov.okis.ru/glava6-10.html. (Last Accessed 13 January 2016)

16. O. Zamyatin, “My stremilis’ k nebu. Vospominaniya rossiyskogo aerokosmicheskogo inzhenera. Kniga vtoraya”, Alkor Publishers, Moscow, p.24, 2015.

17. Ibid, p.46, 81.18. V. Zavyalov, op. cit.19. Since Naryad was mainly aimed at targets in high orbits, the “V”

presumably stands for vysotnyy (“high altitude”). The word “naryad” has several meanings in Russian, the most commonly used being “outfit” (in the meaning “a set of clothes worn together”). The others are “order, warrant” and “detail” (in the meaning “a specific duty in the army or the person or group who have that duty”). Since none of these meanings bear any clear relation to the purpose of the system, Naryad (like Kamin) may be a compound of two or more words where “na” stands for nazemnyy (“ground-based”). Private e-mail correspondence with O. Zamyatin.

20. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., pp.24-25, 33-34; Private e-mail correspondence with O. Zamyatin.

21. P. Stares, “The Militarization of Space: US Policy, 1945-1984”, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1985; D. Day, “Arming for the High Frontier”, Spaceflight, 46, pp.467-471, 2004.

22. C. Chun, “Shooting Down A Star: Program 437, the US Nuclear ASAT System and Present-Day Copycat Killers”, CADRE Paper No. 6, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 2000.

23. “The 30P6 Kontakt/MiG-31D/79M6 Complex (in Russian)”, online at http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-699.html (Last Accessed 13 January 2016); P. Podvig, op. cit., p.6; V. Lukashevich and I. Afanasyev, “Kosmicheskiye kryl’ya”, OOO LenTa Stranstviy, Moscow, pp.445-446, 2009.

24. V. Kavelkina et. al., “Poligon Kapustin Yar. 60 let v stroyu”, 2006.25. P. Podvig, op. cit., p. 5.

26. N. Johnson, op. cit., pp.155-156.27. N. Johnson, op. cit., p.146, 155.28. P. Podvig, op. cit., p.18.29. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., p.34.30. A. Andryushkov, “Polyoty, Almazy i Skify”, Vestnik aviatsii i

kosmonavtiki, 1/2002, p.149.31. P. Podvig, op. cit., p.7.32. Private e-mail correspondence with O. Zamyatin.33. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., p.21, 27, 34.34. P. Podvig, op. cit., p.10.35. M. Tarasenko, “Voennye aspekty sovetskoi kosmonavtiki”, Nikol,

Moscow, p.40, 1992. 36. The various war scenarios analyzed by KB Salyut are described in:

O. Zamyatin, op. cit., pp.27-36.37. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., pp.128-132; Yu. Semyonov, op. cit., p.420.

Research on the cloud of solid particles was reportedly led by Nikolai Vetchinkin. The cloud would have extended to an altitude of 3,000 km. See: V. Lukashevich, “Applications of Buran” (in Russian), online at http://www.buran.ru/htm/spirit.htm. (Last Accessed 13 January 2016)

38. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., p.41.39. K. Lantratov, “The Star Wars that never happened”, Quest, 14,

p.16, 2007.40. V. Lukashevich, I. Afanasyev, op. cit., pp.445-447.41. V. Kavelkina, op. cit.42. K. Vlasko-Vlasov, op. cit., p.130; M. Pervov, “Sistemy raketno-

kosmicheskoi oborony Rossii sozdavalis’ tak”, Aviarus XXI, Moscow, pp.408-409, 2004; V. Misnik, “Kometa – 35 let”, Oruzhiye i tekhnologii, Moscow, pp.58-60, 2008; RIA Novosti report, 5 March 2009.

43. P. Podvig, op. cit., p.10.44. Personal e-mail correspondence with O. Zamyatin.45. UTTKh stands for “Improved Tactical-Technical Characteristics”.

15A35 was the designator given by the GRAU (the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of Defence) and RS-18B was the designator given to the missile in the START agreements.

46. A. Barsukov, I. Obukhov (ed.), “60 let samootverzhennogo truda vo imya mira”, Oruzhiye i tekhnologii, Moscow, pp.166-167, 2004; N. Pervov, op. cit., p.177.

47. Some sources say 360 missiles were manufactured, but only about 300 actually deployed.

48. Private e-mail correspondence with O. Zamyatin.49. In its capacity as an upper stage, Briz had the GRAU designator

14S12. Several online sources also give either 14F10 or 14F11 as the GRAU designator for Naryad-V. The 14F designators are satellite designators and therefore 14F10/14F11 would seem to refer to Briz in its capacity as an anti-satellite vehicle outfitted with space-to-space missiles. The GRAU designator for Rokot with the original Briz upper stage is given as 14A01 or 14A01R. Rokot with the modified Briz-KM upper stage is designated 14A05.

50. O.Zamyatin, op. cit., pp.43-44, 158. 51. Based on the archives of Vitaliy Katayev, this number was

discussed in meetings on 28 February and 3 March 1990. See: P. Podvig, op. cit., p.18.

52. Private e-mail correspondence with O. Zamyatin.53. V. Zavyalov, op. cit.54. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., p.162.55. “Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle (ALMV)”, online at http://www.

globalsecurity.org/space/systems/almv.htm. (Last Accessed 13 January 2016)

56. K. Lantratov, “The Star Wars that never happened”, Quest, 14, p.7, 2007.

57. S. Drell, G. Shultz, “Implications of the Reykjavik Summit on Its Twentieth Anniversary”, Conference Report, Hoover Institution, Stanford, p.55, 2006. This is from a document in the Katayev papers that was written in preparation for the US-Soviet summit between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachov in Reykjavik, Iceland in October 1986. It was presumably prepared by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and discussed among other things the implications of a proposed ban on nuclear weapon testing for the Soviet Union’s strategic arms. One of the consequences would

22

Bart Hendrickx

be that “X-ray warheads will not be created for the Nariad-V anti-space system and the A-135 Moscow ABM system”.

58. A. Perminov, op. cit., pp.492-493; L. Baranov (ed.), “Kosmodrom Baikonur: 50 kosmicheskikh let”, PK Rekslaid, Karaganda, 2005; “The 326th Independent Engineering and Testing Unit (Military Unit 55056)” (in Russian), online at http://chast-26360.narod.ru/olderfiles/2/55056_broshura.pdf (Last Accessed 13 January 2016); Online forum of Military Unit 55056 veterans at http://www.slusili-baikonuru.ru/index.php?topic=7679.0. (Last Accessed 13 January 2016).

59. A. Zavalishin, “Baikonurskiye universitety”, Mashinostroyeniye, Moscow, 1999.

60. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., pp.38-39.61. Ibid., pp.158-159, 162-163.62. V. Mokhov, “Rokot starts from Plesetsk” (in Russian), Novosti

kosmonavtiki, 7/2000, p.42.63. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., p.163.64. Rokot User’s Guide, Eurockot Launch Services GmbH, pp.2-7 ,

2011.65. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., p.198.66. N. Kidger, “New Russian Space Launcher Tested”, Spaceflight, 34,

p.146, 1992. The suborbital launches were first reported in the 20 January 1992 evening edition of the Izvestiya newspaper and were the subject of a TASS announcement the following day.

67. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., p.198.68. Ibid, pp.169-171.69. I. Chornyy, V. Mokhov, “15th anniversary of the first Rokot launch

from Plesetsk” (in Russian), Novosti kosmonavtiki, 7/2015, p.64.70. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., p.198.71. Personal e-mail correspondence with O. Zamyatin.72. I. Chornyy, V. Mokhov, op. cit., p.65.73. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., pp.308-309.74. I. Yevteyev, Zolotoi fond akademika Chelomeia, Bioinformservis,

Moscow, p.194, 2004.75. L. Baranov, op. cit.; Online forum of Military Unit 55056 veterans

at http://www.slusili-baikonuru.ru/index.php?topic=7679.0. (Last Accessed 13 January 2016)

76. D. Whitlock, “History of On-Orbit Satellite Fragmentations”, 13th

Edition, NASA, Houston, p. 342, 2004.77. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., p.163; Private e-mail correspondence with O.

Zamyatin.78. L. Baranov, op. cit., p.224.79. V. Poroshkov, “Raketno-kosmicheskiy podvig Baikonura”, Patriot,

Moscow, p.224, 2007. Also see an article by Poroshkov on the website of the Cosmonautics Federation of Russia: V. Poroshkov, “60th anniversary of Baikonur” (in Russian), p.18, 20, 31, online at http://www.fkrus.ru/images/b60a2.pdf. (Last Accessed 13 January 2016)

80. V. Yasyukevich, “50th anniversary of Baikonur’s Proton directorate” (in Russian), Novosti kosmonavtiki, 4/2013, p.67.

81. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., p.249, 252.82. Private e-mail correspondence with O. Zamyatin.83. J. Lenorovitz, “Satellite Kill Vehicle Validated in Test Firing”,

Aviation Week & Space Technology, p.23, 26 September 1994.84. I. Sarfonov, “President Putin has been given advice at Fili” (in

Russian), Kommersant, 22 January 2002; A. Garavskiy, “Space council at Fili” (in Russian), Krasnaya zvezda, 23 January 2002.

85. Interfax report, 5 March 2009.86. RIA Novosti report, 5 March 2009. It is not clear what the difference

is between Naryad-VN and Naryad-VR. The RIA Novosti report was the first to use these designators.

87. ITAR-TASS report, 14 January 2010.88. The suspected inspection satellites were Kosmos-2491,

Kosmos-2499 and Kosmos-2504. Only the last of these was announced by the Russians shortly after launch.

89. B. Gertz, “Russia Flight Tests Anti-Satellite Missile”, online at http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-conducts-successful-flight-test-of-anti-satellite-missile/. (Last Accessed 13 January 2016)

90. H. Kristensen, R. Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2015”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, p.88, May/June 2015.

91. B. Gertz, “Russia Tested Hypersonic Glide Vehicle in February”, online at http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-tested-hypersonic-glide-vehicle-in-february/. (Last Accessed 13 January 2016)

* * *

Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet · 2016-09-09 · 1 Naryad-V Space Chronicle, Vol. 69,...

Documents

Transcript of Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet · 2016-09-09 · 1 Naryad-V Space Chronicle, Vol. 69,...