Naples, 18 February 2009Donor Committee Meeting0 International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq...

Naples, 18 February 2009Donor Committee Meeting 1

International Reconstruction Fund

Facility for Iraq (IRFFI)

Stocktaking Review

Presentation of Main Findings


Objectives of the Review

Independent assessment to determine whether:

• IRFFI projects on track to achieve results

• Implemented in efficient & effective manner

• Providing value for money

• Effective mechanism Iraqi donor dialogue

• Compare UNDG ITF and World Bank ITF • Identify lessons learned


Methodology

• Selection of projects; document review; interviews with UN, World Bank, donors and Iraqi Officials at various stages

• Field work conducted by Iraqi consultants/ academics on sub-contract with Scanteam

• Presentation of initial findings at 7th Donor Committee Meeting, Baghdad June 2008

• Circulation of drafts and finalisation of report

Main Report + Project Annexes Volume

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Main Findings• Important point of engagement donors and Iraq• Rapid and effective mobilization of funding and

political support• Most projects showed progress towards

objectives and meaningful impact on lives of beneficiaries

• Some projects strengthening GOI capacity, policy • No evidence of systematic corruption. Best

practice for transparency • Accomplishments realized under extreme security

conditions, unprecedented for an MDTF• Negative perceptions dominate/reporting

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Project Findings: OverviewPortfolio Ratings

UNDG ITF WB ITF

Efficiency Acceptable Moderately Satisfactory

Effectiveness Moderately Satisfactory

Moderately Satisfactory

Value for Money Moderately Satisfactory


National Ownership


Satisfactory

On Track to Meet Objectives

Partially On Track Partially On Track

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Efficiency: UNDG ITF

• Technical quality of project design and planning uneven, improving over time

• Value-added of Clusters to project design unclear• “Remote” management systems of varying

quality, better with time; all projects used DEX• Monitoring systems at project-level: uneven

quality • Individual project reporting: uneven, narrative • Average implementation delay 130%, affected by

both conditions and agency management

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Efficiency: World Bank ITF

• Technical quality of Project Document good to robust

• Quality of project planning good • Project management structures good (PMU,

WB supervision); implementation difficulties in GOI

• Project monitoring systems robust; independent monitoring agent

• Quality of project reporting good• Average implementation delay 70%

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Effectiveness: UNDG ITF-1• High activity levels despite poor field

conditions: 141 projects, USD 850 million disbursed

• Most projects delivered tangible and quality goods and services to beneficiaries

• Evidence of strengthening system/capacity and policy

• Effectiveness undermined by implementation delays, mixed counterpart performance, reductions in scope and sustainability problems

• Relevance uneven. ISRB not able to play robust priority setting/coordinating role to strengthen relevance with DEX modality

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Effectiveness: UNDG ITF-2

• Portfolio had broad scope. In portfolio reviewed, three project types:

– Two Quick Impact projects experienced significant delays.

– Six short‐term “gap filling” or emergency service delivery projects contributed to basic service delivery

– Five medium‐term recovery‐oriented projects delivered services, with stronger capacity development/policy focus

• Limited “quick impact” effectiveness. Stronger outcomes with recovery-oriented projects.

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Effectiveness: World Bank ITF

• Delivered tangible goods of high quality and valued by beneficiaries

• Important contribution to strengthening capacity of Iraqi institutions and systems

• Single project type: support to Iraqi ministries for implementation of medium term recovery projects

• Effectiveness eroded by implementation delays and changes in project scope, often related to situation inside of counterpart Ministries

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IRFFI National Ownership

• UNDG ITF meets all technical requirements of ownership, strengthening over time with changes to the decision-making process

• Quality of ownership affected by capacity of GOI systems and UNDG ITF implementation pressure

• Negative perception of ownership by some in GOI

• WB ITF projects fully owned by GOI

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IRFFI Performance: Overview

• IRFFI: system linking ownership (recovery priorities), strategic direction and oversight, coordination, and implementation into an integrated system with broad implementation capacity, supported by significant financial and political resources.

• Performance of individual projects influenced by performance of overall system

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Performance: Start-up PhaseSignificant achievements during start-up phase: • Effective and rapid mechanism for mobilizing

broad-based international support for recovery

• Two Facilities established and operational in timely manner, with high activity levels during early operational period

• Broad scope of operations for addressing recovery issues

• IRFFI delivers important political good: participation and inclusiveness in polarized situation

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Operational Phase• Deteriorating conditions 2004-2007/8, with

inaccurate assumptions and expectations• Increased risk, complexity. Administrators

adjust systems, but objectives, strategy and expectations remain same.

• GOI unable to fully exercise ownership of IRFFI • DC did not provide adequate strategic

guidance, oversight during 2004‐2007 period • Reporting does not provide adequate situation

analysis negative perceptions of performance

• Accountability concerns within UNDG model: lack central point of authority for oversight, QA

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Lessons Learned I

• MDTFs “best practice” in post-crisis situations:– Rapidly mobilize financial and political resources– Create dialogue space authorities donors– Impartial platform in politicized environment– Multilateral Administrator with staff, systems in

place for handling high-risk situation– Pools political, implementation risks,

information costs across actors– May reduce overall transaction costs of imple-

mentation, especially for national authorities (time wastage of particular importance)

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Lessons Learned II

• Strong fiduciary management, transparency, accountability (vs. bilateral: poor insight, inefficiencies, vulnerable to corruption)

• Potential for common donor approach spill-over from MDTF to bilateral activities key value-added for national authorities

• “Hit the ground running”: exploit own capacities, relations to stakeholders, political access

• Ensures stable, predictable, flexible funding to recovery priorities; supports stronger local voice; enhances “big picture” planning for all parties

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Lessons Learned III• MDTFs high-risk, high-cost environment: QA

should be intensive overheads higher • MDTFs are integrated systems, consensus

built. Performance dependent on/vulnerable to – Ownership and leadership by authorities– Donor involvement – policy/decision making +

substantive inputs (conflict analyses, poverty studies, gender & environment assessments…)

– Built on trust hostage to least flexible time cost to find acceptable solutions can be high

• Donor funding not always consistent with principles of MDTF (earmarking and visibility)

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Lessons Learned IV

• “Two window” MDTF potential: broader scope of needs than single administrator. IRFFI model not exploited: comparative advantages not identified, no division of labor

• More focus on quality-reporting on higher-level results (Outcome) better results frameworks, indicator systems, achievement verifications

• UN model needs change: (i) remove conflicts of interest w/ independent project appraisal, (ii) create independent management point for accountability for quality and performance

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