NAIIC Report Lo Res
Transcript of NAIIC Report Lo Res
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
1/88
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
2/88
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
3/88
MembersK Ib
Seismlgist; Prfessr Emeritus f Kbe University
Kz OAdvisr t the President f Japan Internatinal CperatinAgency; Frmer Ambassadr f Japan t the United Natins
H SyMedical Dctr; Frmer Chief f the Natinal Institute f
Radilgical Sciences
M SLawyer; Frmer Chief Prsecutr f the Nagya High Public
Prsecutrs Office; Frmer Inspectr General fr LegalCmpliance, Inspectr Generals Office, Defense Ministry
K TChemist; Fellw, Shimadzu Crpratin
M TScience jurnalist
Sy N
Prfessr, Chu Law Schl, Chu University; lawyer
R HChair, Sciety f Cmmerce and Industry, Okuma Twn,
Fukushima Prefecture
Y YyScial System Designer; Directr, University f Tky Executive
Management Prgram (Tdai EMP)
ChairmanKy Kw
Medical Dctr; Academic Fellw, Natinal Graduate Institute fr Plicy Studies;Frmer President f the Science Cuncil f Japan
Advisors to the CommissionI K
T K
T H
ReviewersT I
M S
J S
I Nj
T M
Office of AdministrationT Aj
Directr General
S UManaging Directr f Investigatin
The National Diet of JapanFukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission
l
l
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
4/88
P
T N D JT F N A I Ig C 2012, T N D JA g .
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
5/88
Contents
Message from the Chairman 9
Overview
The Commission's mandate 10The accident 12
Conclusions and Recommendations 16
Summary of Findings 25
1: Was the accident preventable? 262: Escalation of the accident 293: Emergency response to the accident 324: Spread of the damage 375: Organizational issues in accident prevention
and response 426: The legal system 45
Appendices 49
Survey of the evacuees 50Survey of the workers 62Commission meeting reports 71Glossary of terms 84
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
6/88
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
7/88
7NAIIC
To:Mr. Takahiro Yokomichi, Speaker of the House of RepresentativesMr. Kenji Hirata, President of the House of CouncillorsThe National Diet of Japan
THE UNPRECEDENTED NUCLEAR ACCIDENT g M 11, 2011
g , N D J . W A Rgg FN A I Ig C.
O g , x C M D 2011.
T g g g . A D J g, , J .
The National Diet of JapanFukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission
(NAIIC)
Kiyoshi Kurokawa
Members:
Chairman:
Kenzo Oshima
Yoshinori Yokoyama
Katsuhiko Ishibashi
Hisako Sakiyama
Mitsuhiko Tanaka
Reiko Hachisuka
Masafumi Sakurai
Koichi Tanaka
Shuya Nomura
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
8/88
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
9/88
9NAIIC
Message from the Chairman
THE EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI M 11, 2011 g . Ag gg , -q F D N P P g . I . A g .
H J, g g x gg g? T C J g , q.
O g gg F M 11. A x TEPCO, g g.
F x , g gg .
W M J.
I g J : x ; q ; g g; g; .
H J , .
Fg 1970 , J g . A , g g , g- J .
W , , . I g g . A J - g, g
g g g .T J ,
g.C x, g .
O gg J g g T M I C; g - .I F D N P.
T g g , g . T g , , .
M , J .
T q gg F , J. I gg , .
A g g , J .
A , g . T F, J g g .
Kiyoshi Kurokawa
Chairman:
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
10/88
10 N A I Ig C
Sendai
Mito
NaritaInternationalAirport
Nihonmatsu
FUKUSHIMA
PREFECTURE
Niigata
Iwaki
Tokyo
Fukushima
Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant
30 km20 km
Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant
Sendai
Iwaki
Tokyo
Fukushima
Overview
The Commissions Mandate
O O 30, 2011, NAIIC A (, A gg F N A- I Ig C) , g - g F q q g g q. T J g.
O D 8, 2011, , g
S P N D g , - A 10 NAIIC A:
1. T g T E P CF M 11, 2011 - G E J Eq.
2. T g g .
3. T g g -q g; q ; g .
4. T g gg xg .
5. T qg g g. T g.
6. T g .
Expectations of the CommissionB C g g, g J C C R A B H A F N P P T E P C:
l
T g g x g, , g .l W g g , g
g g
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
11/88
11NAIIC
.l A g ,
.l T g ,
.l T g g q
J.l T g ,
gg g .
What we didO g 900 g 1,167 .
W g F D, F- D, T E P C Og N P P, T JA P C T D P P, g -g .
T x g , 19 -
g (x ), J Eg, 800,000 . W , F , g 170,000 -. T g g , , - g x U.S, F, R, U B.
I Eg x , Eg.
W g, TEPCO g.
I , -g, 400 . W F, O, T, N, N, K,
H, K, M, T, I, K g , . W 10,633 , - 500 .
What we did not doT g , .
W g J, g .
W g .W g q -
g .W g -
, .W TEPCO g
- .W - q .W g J
.N g g -
.W g F
, g g
g. N g g F .A, , g g
g .
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
12/88
12 N A I Ig C
The accident
O M 11, 2011, G E J Eq gg x F D N P P, TE P C (TEPCO). T g L 7 (S A) I N E S (INES).
W q , U 1 F D g ; U 2 3 ; U 4 6 gg . T g - , SCRAM, U 1, 2 3 - .
T g TEPCOS T S F D N P
P, g - . T - 66V - T E P C, - U 1 - (M/C) U 1 - .
T q g g, g , g DC U 1, 2 4, g x x U 6 - g g. I , U 1, 2 4 ; U 3 AC , DC M 13, 2012. U 5 AC .
T g . T , , , g. I g,
q . S g x g g U 3 4, (C P Bg).A , g ,
Layout of the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant
Adapted from: INPO Special Report on
the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
Turbine buildings
Cooling water discharge
Cooling water discharge
Turbine buildings
Reactor 4
Reactor 3
Reactor 2
Reactor 1
Radiationwastetreatmentfacility
Extra-highvoltage switching yard
Extra-high voltage
switching yard
Admin oce
Anti-Earthquake building
Common Pool Building
South breakwater
North breakwater
500K
vtrans
miss
ionlin
e
275K
vtrans
miss
ionlin
e
275K
vtrans
miss
ionline
Service hall
Eastbreakwater
Reactor 5
Reactor 6
Emergency response center
Intake canals
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
13/88
13NAIIC
Timeline following the earthquake and tsunami
3.11
3.12
3.13
3.14
3.15
Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4
approx. 18:10 Start of reactor core
exposure (analysis)
approx. 18:50 Start of reactor core
damage
15:36 Hydogen explosion at
reactor building
approx. 9:10 Start of reactor core
exposure
approx. 10:40 Start of reactor core
damage
11:01 Hydrogen explosion
at reactor building
approx. 6:00 Hydrogen explosion
at reactor building
approx. 17:00 Start of reactor core
exposure
approx. 19:20 Start of reactor core
damage
approx. 6:00 Damage to
Suppression Chamber (S/C)
Mass discharge of radioactive
material
Operated at rated output
Loss of all electricity
Loss of external AC electricity
Automatic activation of emergency diesel generators
Under periodical inspection
5:46 Start of freshwater injection
approx. 14:30 Venting
19:04 Start of seawater injection
Interference with the recoveryoperation
Start of core cooling by isolation
condenser (IC)
Start of core cooling by Reactor Core
Isolation Cooling System (RCIC)
Start of core cooling by Reactor Core
Isolation Cooling System (RCIC)
Repetition of opening and closing
of IC valve
Station blackout (SBO)
11:36 Shutdown of RCIC
2:42 Shutdown of HPCI
9:25 Start of freshwater injection
approx. 9:20 Venting
Backward flow of hydrogen from
Unit 3 via Standby Gas
Treatment System (SGTS)
12:35 Start of high-pressure coolant
injection (HPCI)
13:12 Start of seawater injection
13:25 Diagnosis of RCIC shutdown
Interference with recovery operation
19:54 Start of seawater injection
SCRAM
Loss of all electricity
14:46 Earthquake
15:37 Tsunami (peak of waves)
*Start of reactor core exposure and start of reactor core damage times are both from TEPCO's MAAP analysis results.
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
14/88
14 N A I Ig C
g . M , g gg g. I , q , , g , x . R g - . T g q- , . Lgg . T , .
T . Cg g g- , g , , g g -. T , , g , - , g .
T - . T -g .
14 meters: inundation level
10 meters
4 meters
sea level
emergency dieselgenerator room
main
control
room
Cross section of the plant
showing the inundation level
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
15/88
15NAIIC
Conclusions and
recommendations
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
16/88
16 N A I Ig C
Conclusions
After a six-month investigation, the Commission has concluded the following:
In order to prevent future disasters, fundamental reforms must take place. These
reforms must cover both the structure of the electric power industry and the struc-ture of the related government and regulatory agencies as well as the operation
processes. They must cover both normal and emergency situations.
A manmade disasterThe TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident was the result of collusionbetween the government, the regulators and TEPCO, and the lack of governance by said
parties. They ef fectively betrayed the nations right to be safe from nuclear accidents.Therefore, we conclude that the accident was clearly manmade. We believe that theroot causes were the organizational and regulatory systems that supported faultyrationales for decisions and actions, rather than issues relating to the competency of
any specific individual. (see Recommendation 1)
T M 11, 2011. B F D N P P g q . T (TEPCO), g (NISA NSC) g g (METI), - q g g, g g g , g .
TEPCO N I S Ag (NISA) g, g , NISA -
. T C q U 1 g 3 . T NISA g g .I , g NISA g , g , TEPCO g .
S 2006, g TEPCO g - F D g . T g g J S C Eg. NISA TEPCO , .
W g g x
g . F x, NISA (SBO) . I g . I g , C x g g NISA, NISA q.
T g g g g . I NISA TEPCO B.5. U.S. 9/11 , TEPCO , .
T g M 11. T
TEPCO , NISA NS C (NSC) g. T g , g , .
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
17/88
17NAIIC
F TEPCO , g . T g TEPCO gg g g g F E P C (FEPC). T g g , . A , g. F xg NISA - M E, T & I (METI), g g .
Earthquake damageWe conclude that TEPCO was too quick to cite the tsunami as the cause of the nuclearaccident and deny that the earthquake caused any damage. We believe there is a pos-sibility that the earthquake damaged equipment necessary for ensuring safety, andthat there is also a possibility that a small-scale LOCA occured in Unit 1. We hope these
points will be examined further by a third party. (see Recommendation 7)
Ag q q
, g . T q , . A x .
TEPCO q, , g , q g q (g , x , TEPCO g IAEA). H, . T C g x ( ), , q.
Tg g,
q . F, g U 1 q, g : 1) g (SCRAM); 2) JNES - LOCA ( ); 3) U 1 g , 4) (SR) g.
A, x , q-: q- x , S-F q . (S S 2 S Fg)
.
Evaluation of operational problemsThe Commission concludes that there were organizational problems within TEPCO.
Had there been a higher level of knowledge, training, and equipment inspection relatedto severe accidents, and had there been specific instructions given to the on-site work-ers concerning the state of emergency within the necessary time frame, a more effec-tive accident response would have been possible. (see Recommendation 4)
T - g . E , - . R, g (IC) U 1, DC , . TEPCO IC , g g, g . Rgg , g
g g x g. O , g g. W g , , g -
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
18/88
18 N A I Ig C
g g . T K (P M O) TEPCOg x , g x .
M , . H RCIC U 2 g , - g g , gU 2 3 . W g - g , g , g .
Emergency response issuesThe Commission concludes that the situation continued to deteriorate because thecrisis management system of the Kantei, the regulators and other responsible agenciesdid not function correctly. The boundaries defining the roles and responsibilities of the
parties involved were problematic, due to their ambiguity. (see Recommendation 2)
T g, g, TEPCO g, K -
g . N, , g g q g.
NISA x g A S MCg N Eg P, - JCO T, I P 1999. H-, NISA , .
I , K g. T g g K , g K g. I, K TEPCO q F- , . A TEPCO-K TEPCO q M 15, g .
T K, g TEPCO U 1. TEPCO g NISA, , g.B g METI, K. T NISA TEPCO q K g TEPCO.
T P M g g . T K - - . WTEPCO q , K, g K . T TEPCO , , P S K - .
A , P M g TEPCO, , -: 1) TEPCO g g ; 2) T g TEPCO q; 3) T M. S K g g (g ); 4) T -g NISA S , ; 5) T - , g , - . C g g g g .
Evacuation issuesThe Commission concludes that the residents confusion over the evacuation stemmed
from the regulators negligence and failure over the years to implement adequate mea-
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
19/88
19NAIIC
sures against a nuclear disaster, as well as a lack of action by previous governmentsand regulators focused on crisis management. The crisis management system thatexisted for the Kantei and the regulators should protect the health and safety of the
public, but it failed in this function. (see Recommendation 2)
T g g g , .S, g -g . S, 20 g 3 21:23 g M 11. M 10 5:44 M 12, 12 A 15 x . M g .T g , g -- . S g g g . S -
g g, g A.
T C g gg g - x , g g- g g xg g .
Continuing public health and welfare issuesThe Commission recognizes that the residents in the affected area are still struggling
from the ef fects of the ac cident. They continue to face grave concerns, including thehealth effects of radiation exposure, displacement, the dissolution of families, disrup-tion of their lives and lifestyles and the contamination of vast areas of the environ-ment. There is no foreseeable end to the decontamination and restoration activities
that are essential for rebuilding communities. The Commission concludes that thegovernment and the regulators are not fully committed to protecting public health andsafety; that they have not acted to protect the health of the residents and to restoretheir welfare. (see Recommendation 3)
Ax 150,000 . A 167 x 100 g . I 1,800 q FP 5 g . I g g - x. O , g g g .
T g
q . T g , , , gg . I . T 10,000 , C M g g g .
W x g , g- g . T - , , . T g g, - , . A , g g gg
, g q : W x- g g- ? H ?H ?
T g g -
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
20/88
20 N A I Ig C
g g. T x, x-, x g , , xg , .
Reforming the regulatorsThe Commission has concluded that the safety of nuclear energy in Japan and the pub-
lic cannot be assured unless the regulators go through an essential transformationprocess. The entire organization needs to be transformed, not as a formality but in asubstantial way. Japans regulators need to shed the insular attitude of ignoring inter-national safety standards and transform themselves into a globally trusted entity. (seeRecommendation 5)
T g . T x g , g-. T g g . T , g g, . T , x . M, g-
. W g C, g g, g g g .
Reforming the operatorTEPCO did not fulfil its responsibilities as a private corporation, instead obeying andrelying upon the government bureaucracy of METI, the government agency drivingnuclear policy. At the same time, through the auspices of the FEPC, it manipulated thecozy relationship with the regulators to take the teeth out of regulations. (see Recom-mendation 4)
T g TEPCO . I
, x, TEPCO , xg -. T g . (S S 5)
P TEPCO g , g g , x g . I K g . TEPCO , g g x . (S S 3)
A , TEPCO g .I , . S x g g g , -- .
Reforming laws and regulationsThe Commission concludes that it is necessary to realign existing laws and regula-tions concerning nuclear energy. Mechanisms must be established to ensure that thelatest technological f indings from international sources are reflected in all existinglaws and regulations. (see Recommendation 6)
L g g g -, . T gg .A , .
T xg g g
, , . T g - . T g g. T -- .
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
21/88
21NAIIC
Cosmetic solutionsReplacing people or changing the names of institutions will not solve the problems.Unless these root causes are resolved, preventive measures against future similar acci-dents will never be complete. (see Recommendations 4, 5 and 6)
T C g . T g g , g, , g , , . A , C g- g g g . W g g g . W , g g. W g- - g x .
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
22/88
22 N A I Ig C
Recommendations
B g, C g . W g N D J g .
Recmmendatin 1:Monitoring of the nuclear regulatory body by the National DietA gg N D g . I :
1. T g g x g g g, - .
2. T , g x g -, g g g.
3. T g .4. T g -
.
Recmmendatin 2:Reform the crisis management systemA x g . T - g g . T :
1. A x g g. A g .
2. N g - . T .
3. T - , g g , g .
Recmmendatin 3:Government responsibility for public health and welfareRgg , g :
1. A g- , g- . M g g. I -, g . T , .
2. C g
. M .
3. T g g - , -g .
Recmmendatin 4:Monitoring the operatorsTEPCO g g, g gg g-, g g g , gg , g . I F E P C (FEPC) g
gg g g, g , .1. T g gg
.
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
23/88
23NAIIC
2. O -g g g .
3. TEPCO g , g g -g .
4. A g N D g , g g, g , g - g.
Recmmendatin 5:Criteria for the new regulatory bodyT g g g . I :
1. I: T , : () I g g () I () I .
2. T: () T -g x - . () D -g N D . () T g- g g,
g . () T N D g - .
3. P: () T g . Exg g g , xg . () A g g -g . () T - x.
4. C: T g, g -, -g , .
5. P: T g g -g, g D.
Recmmendatin 6:R w yL g g .
1. Exg g , .
2. T g g g .
3. Rg g , g g g .
4. N , .
Recmmendatin 7:
Develop a system of independent investigation commissionsA g g , g x g , , g, , g , g , g .
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
24/88
24 N A I Ig C
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
25/88
25NAIIC
Summary of findings
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
26/88
26 N A I Ig C
1
The Commission has verified that on March 11, 2011, the structure of the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant was not capable of withstanding the effectsof the earthquake and the tsunami. Nor was the Fukushima Daiichi NuclearPlant prepared to respond to a severe accident. In spite of the fact that TEPCOand the regulators were aware of the risk from such natural disasters, neitherhad taken steps to put preventive measures in place. It was this lack of
preparation that led to the severity of this accident.
Was the accident preventable?
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
27/88
27NAIIC
The yield strength of the Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1T F D U 1 g q M 11, 2011. T q -q - g : 1) g - g U 1 g 3 1960, 2) g x q g. B , x - g 265 g (.. g ), q .
I 1981, G A- Dg Rgg N R F E G NSC. I 2006, NSC - g. NISA q - g g - - . I M2008, TEPCO - U 5 FD, g - , g x 600 g. I 2009, NISA , g -
g q. IJ 2009, U 1 g 4 6 - .
N - TEPCO, g- . W J 2009,TEPCO J2016. TEPCO g - q g, g - TEPCO U 1 g 3 M 11 q. Ag NISA g , g g TEPCO g.
I , TEPCO NISA
g U 5 - q. TEPCO g , C g q g , , g -- , . T C U 1g 3, U 5. S 2 g F D x g. I - M 11 q.
The lack of tsunami countermeasuresT F D P g 1967 g g . A ,
g g - , g . TEPCO g, g x q g .
S 2006, g TEPCO - g g F D . T g g g g J S C Eg.
T g g . F,NISA - gg . N
NISA . A , .T g J S C Eg-
g . E g g
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
28/88
28 N A I Ig C
, ,NISA xg .
A .TEPCO , g g .TEPCO g g g g g , g- g .
A g g, NISA TEPCO g , . N - g.
T TEPCO g g g. I g , g - , . R g q- g , TEPCO g , g g.
Countermeasures not up to international standardsA g (SA) J - . T SA , , x q , g J q .
F , SA . I1991, C I D P NSC x -g, g x x g q , x, q g .
T - g g. I , q- g q g g q. C, g q q - g . A q g, SA J , g .
Ag SA g g F E P C (FEPC).T 2010, g g g g-g SA g , , FEPC, g gg g . T g
g : 1) 2) g g q xg. Ag, g - gg M 11 , g, .
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
29/88
29NAIIC
2
The Commission closely investigated the development of the accident.
We studied whether the accident could have been contained, and whetherit could have become even more serious. We also examined the role of theearthquake as a cause of the accident, and the validity of TEPCOs claim thatthe tsunami was the sole direct cause.
Escalation of the accident
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
30/88
30 N A I Ig C
How the accident developedT F D N P . T - , , .
Ag x , , q, g x . T g q,g , , . T (SBO) DC , x .
I g g , g . T , gg -, gg q g - , . T .
R - , g g g -g. E g g . T TEPCO .
U 1, 3 4 x, U 2. C -g U 5 6, . T C , , U 2 3, U 5 6 . I g , g .Dg U 4 , g -g . T gg .
Verification of eventsT : q g. Y g
, q g .
I , TEPCO g q -g g q, . I g x . T g I A Eg Ag (IAEA).
W g g , g - . T C g g TEPCO g g :
1. Sg g 30 SCRAM,
50 . T , , - g . I g g q g g g , g q g - .
2. T (LOCA) q .H J N Eg S Og(JNES) T Fg NISA LOCA, g q - , g . I LOCA 10 ,
g .3. T g- g , NISA TFg, TEPCO , g AC g
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
31/88
31NAIIC
g . TEPCO 15:27 15:35. H, gg 1.5 , . T gg g A U 1 g g. B ,
q g x g g .
4. S TEPCO g g U 1 q , g (IC) -g IC. T C g . H, g - , .
5. T (A B2 ) U 1 14:52, U 1 IC 11 -. TEPCO x - g - x
55 g (C), . T g- g , g IAEA, . H, g IC g-, IC g IC g . W x , TEPCO x .
6. T (SR) U 1, g . (S U 2 3.) W SR g U 2 C C R U 2, g U 1 U 1 SR g. I SR g U 1. I , LOCA
U 1.
Reactor 4 Reactor 3
Reactor 2
Reactor 1
Views of the reactor buildings
following the explosions
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
32/88
32 N A I Ig C
3
The Commission investigated the accident response of TEPCO, the regulatoryagencies, the government and the Kantei (Prime Ministers office)includingthe early stages of the response, the development of the accident, theemergency response system and the crisis management system.
Emergency response tothe accident
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
33/88
33NAIIC
TEPCOs accident responseA , C P TEPCO , . T C- P g g -, TEPCO .
TEPCO g , . T g , g F, g.
T g g. I ,TEPCO g N I S Ag (NISA) g - Eg R C (ERC), g - , - q g. T - U 1 NISA P M , TEPCO - g, g g PM . T P M q g g - ,
, g g, P M . H TEPCO - , x , .
N TEPCO . A U 2 , M Y, g g F , CEO VP S M , - , . TEPCO q Y qg K, NSC C M, g , .
F, TEPCO g
. T P S K . R g g g, TEPCO g g g. I P M g , , : 1) g ; 2) TEPCO , 3) , M.S K, g g ;4) D-G NISA, M. S , ; 5) - , g - , . I g K,
TEPCO g , , - .
The governments emergency response organizationsA , g . T - q. T g g K .
T g g PM N Eg R Hq, S N E-
g R Hq NISA Rg N Eg R. O, g .T P M N Eg R Hq S
g ,
Former TEPCO president
Masataka Shimizu at the
18th Commission meeting
Former prime minister
Naoto Kan at the 16th
Commission meeting
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
34/88
34 N A I Ig C
g , .
Ag K g , S N Eg R Hq g g g . A, Rg N Eg R T , g .T q, g , g, .
T C Mg C, K g, q , . T N S C g g. T M E .
A g , - . Ag g K g, , - g K g. TEPCO
g - F. H TEPCO g g, .
The Kanteis emergency responseA g , g K, P M- K g , NISA.T g x q g - .
T K . A g TEPCO
A 15 A S M Cg N E-g P, D N Eg S-, g g . I , P M K g D Eg S , .
T K g C Mg C, - , g q .T NISA NSC g .T , , q q, g . T U 1 x. F , P M- K .
Ag TEPCO g g
, K , , g . I g M 15, g g , P M K . I TEPCO g g U 2, P M- K P S , . S, g g-TEPCO q - TEPCO.
Tg , P M gg . Cg - -q g , g S N Eg R Hq - q . T x ;
S N Eg R Hq , K . T g: 1) , - g g; 2)
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
35/88
35NAIIC
; 3) x . T g.
Evaluating the government and Kantei emergency responseW g g x g , -q x g- . T
, q g g g g .B . F , g K
K . T g K TEPCO TEPCO . H, TEPCO . I , K , .
I K TEPCO g, , g P S . I -
, g g-TEPCO q TEPCO, q .A K, g P M
K F D , g . Sg P M F D , K F D TEPCO. T F D TEPCO NISA K ( P M N Eg RHq). T q TEPCO NISA K, g TEPCO - .
A , g -
. B K gg g . T K g TEPCO .
Kantei (Prime Ministers Oce) O-site Center
Cabinet Oce
Secretariat of the
Emergency Response HQ
NISA Emergency
Response Center
Secretariat of the Nuclear
Emergency Response HQ
Prime Ministers Emergency
Response HQ
Prime Ministers Nuclear
Emergency Response HQ
Crisis ManagementCenter
Nuclear Safety Commission Operators Related Institutions
Prefectural Emergency
Response HQ
Town Emergency
Response HQ
Council on
Nuclear Emergency
Measures
Local Government
Emergency Response Team
Regional Nuclear
Emergency Response Team
supports supports
reports
reports
delegates
authority
instructs
advises
instructs
commands
supervises
advises
dispatches sta
dispatches
sta
dispatches
Commission members
advises
Diagram of the emergency
communication protocol
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
36/88
36 N A I Ig C
Ag g , NISA - g N- Eg R Hq -g. H, K TEPCO, . T - g. I g , g x- , g g g g.
Fukushima Prefectures accident responseF P g q . A , .
T F P FP Rg D P P, . D g - , F
g g . Fg , F g - , g -g. T 30 g g - . H, q g g , .
F P g g. O 24 x g g; g . M g M 15 - . T q gq, .
Information disclosure by the central governmentD , x q gg . M. E, , , gg . I , , g q x , g- . T g x g . L , g - , g .
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
37/88
37NAIIC
4
The Commission made a number of findings regarding the spread of damages
from the accident at the nuclear plant. We studied how decisions weremade, and how the policies and defensive measures were communicated tothe public. We also investigated these matters from the perspective of theresidents affected by the accident damage.
Spread of the damage
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
38/88
38 N A I Ig C
Damage from the nuclear power plant accidentT , , g , . A , x 900PBq , 1/6 C . T 1,800 q F P- qg 5S/ .
R g x . H, . A x x g x 14,000 (xg -) g g, 0.7 x 10S , 42.3 x 10S, 57 x 1S .W g , g g .
Chaotic evacuation ordersT C g -
, g, g- .
A g g , . B, g , - , g.
A 146,520 g . H, -. U , . E x g 3- 10 , 20 , . E x,
q . S g . H g 20- gg ; 60 M . F g .
O M 15, 20 30 --. S , - g . A , -- . Ag, g g, g . T C g- .
T 30- g - S P E Eg D I-
(SPEEDI) M 23. B g g q q ; .
Lack of preparation for a nuclear disasterT g g - , . A , g g .
T N S C (NSC) g - g- 2006 . H, NSC g , g
g g - g. NSC x , . Ag -g 2007, g.
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
39/88
39NAIIC
A Ng Eq 2007, x . S, NISA g x . NISA - gg x .
M, g x . A x, , , .T g g g SPEEDI. Tg , .
T Eg R S S (ERSS) SPEEDI . T g g ERSS - , SPEEDI - ERSS. P ,g , .
I ERSS, SPEEDI g g . S , .
T g - .
T . T ERSS, g- SPEEDI g xg . A , NSC - . Tg NSC g- g , g g .T .
A , g g , g JCO 1999. N x
F. B , - , , .T g .
Current and future health damage from radiationO gg g . N-, g F P g gg g, , . W g -g.
T g x x, g . T g-
x , , . T g g g . T g , x, x x g , ,x , .
M C x,g g . Ag g g , g g q g g .
A x gg
- g-. Ag g , g :g , , , . Tg g
-
7/31/2019 NAIIC Report Lo Res
40/88
40 N A I Ig C
, g . N g F P x .
TEPCO , g . I x , g g .
A , x . P F
g , g C . T C - , g. S F -, q q g .M . U, g g g .
Prolonged environmental and decontamination issuesO , , . O , C - . A
C , - , . W, .
R g
Bq/m2
3000K