Nadvi, Khalid - Exploitaition and Labour Theory of Value. a Critique of Roemer's General Theory of...

8/12/2019 Nadvi, Khalid - Exploitaition and Labour Theory of Value. a Critique of Roemer's General Theory of Explotaition an

1/7

Exploitation and Labour Theory of Value: A Critique of Roemer's General Theory ofExploitation and ClassAuthor(s): Khalid NadviSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 20, No. 35 (Aug. 31, 1985), pp. 1479-1484Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4374775.

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2/7

SPECIAL

ARTICLES

xploitation

n d

abour

Theo r y

o

a l u e

A

Critique of Roemer's

General Theory

of

Exploitation

and

Class

Khalid Nadvi

The uniqueness n J Roemer'swork lies in his-attempt o put forward a model to deal with exploitation n

all modesofproduction. t is theauthor's

ontention, owever,hatRoemer'smethodand the model hat t

produces

are

highly lawed and reject certainaspects

of a Marxianapproachwhichare central

Roemer osits a modelof exploitation aseduponunequal wnership f human

skills)

and

non-human

roperty

(land,meansofproduction)and seeks to

prove the superiority f

this

property ights

model over

the

conventional

surplus

abour model of exploitation. n rejecting he labour theory of

value, however,

Roemer

oses the

core

of the

Marxist heoryof exploitation,namely, he social relationsof production

between

commodityproducers

and

the

exploitationof labour through he creationof surplus value

at the

point of production.

Thispaper

begins by presentinga briefoutline of the leading eatures of

Roemer'smodeL

This

is

followed

by the

author's

majorcriticisms f thesubstance nd methodology

f Roemer'sGeneralTheoryFinally, he

author

puts forward his argumentsor the need or

a surplus abour theory to understand xploitationand restates

his

position on the centralityof the labourtheory of value.

I

Introduction

OUT of the

celebrateddebate on

the

trans-

formation

problem

there has arisen

what

is

rather

fancifully termed as

a

neo-Marxian

approach,whose most renowned

exponent

Steedman

has utilised the

Sraffian

system

to

obtain

a

formulation for

prices. (See

Steedman1977

and

Steedman,

Sweezy,

t

al,

1981.)Such

neo-Ricardian

nalysis

has

con-

cerned

tself

primarily

with

value and

prices.

However

the recent

works

by

Roemer

(Roemer,

982a,

1982b)

whichwe

argue

have

to be seen as an extension of this school,

have aken

such

neo-Ricardian

nalysis

onto

an

altogether

different

dimension;

from

specific

price

formation

models to the

level

of

a

general

theory

of

exploitation.

His

writings

have

without a

doubt taken

Marxist

academia

by

storm,

a

reflection

of their

novelty as well

as

quality.

A

few

excellent

commentaries

nd

critiques

of Roemer

have

appeared

notablyAbell

1983;Eatwell

1982;

Przeworski

1982;

Elster

1982;Wright

1982);

however,

surprisingly,none

have

seriously

dealt

with

the

implications,

both

in

terms

of

theory

and

praxis,

of

Roemer's

rejection

of the

labour

theory

of value.

This

rather

simpleoversight on the partof these com-

mentators is

the focus

of our

arguments

against Roemer in

specific and the

neo-

Ricardian

school in

general.

The

uniqueness

n

Roemer'swork

lies in

his

attempt to

put

forwarda

model to

deal

with

exploitation n all

modes

of production.

The

aim of such

a general

theory

being to

lay

the; oundations

for

an

analysis of

the

laws of

motion of

socialism. Such

an aim is

an

achievement n

itself

and

deserves ap-

plause. There

s

without

a

doubt a

need for

Marxists

to

provide

critical

analysis of

the

socialist

mode of

production

which

goes

beyond

he

individual,

oncrete,

ase

specific

approach

put forward

within

the

format of

the Marxist

theories

of the

State.

Nevertheless,

it is our contention that

Roemer's method

and

the

model that

it

subsequently roduces

arehighly flawedand

rejectcertain

aspects

of a

Marxian

approach

whichwe

consider entral.Roemer,who pro-

fesses to be a concerned

Marxist,

somewhat

cheerfully,

acknowledges

he

'heresy'

n his

writing and

yet bravely carries on

not

so

much in

providing

a

critique

of

the

contra-

dictions

in

Marxist hought, but

in

putting

forward a

priori statements.

He

posits a

model of exploitation based upon

unequal

ownership

f human

skills)

and non-human

property (land, means of

production).

He

goes to great

engths o prove

he

superiority

of

this

propertyrights

model over

the

con-

ventionalsurplus abour model of

exploita-

tion.

In

rejecting he labour theory

of value

Roemer

oses what we believe o be the core

of the

Marxist

heory

of

exploitation,

name-

ly, the social

relations f production

between

commodity producers

and

the

exploitation

of labour

through the creation of

surplus

value at the

point of production.

In

the followingsectionwe presenta brief

outline

of the

leading features

of Roemer's

model. We

state at the outset that we shall

not

attempt to deal with the more detailed

mathematicalproofs of Roemer's heorems.

This is

followed by our major criticismsof

the

substance

of and methodology within

Roemer'sGeneralTheory. We are not con-

vincedby the arguments sed by

Roemer or

thesuitability f a gamestheoretic

approach

and

the need for

a synthesisbetween he neo-

classical

general equilibrium and Marxist

schools through the structureof

mathema-

tical

modelling. Such a noble task is in our

opinion doomed to failure due to

the quite

distinct

approachesand

contradictoryaims

of

the

two disciplines. Finally, we

put for-

ward our arguments or the need for

a sur-

plus labour theory in understanding

xploi-

tation,

we

restate our position on

the cen-

trality of the labour theory of

value.

II

Outline

of Roemer's

General

Theory

As has

been noted,

Roemer attempts

to

put

forward

a

theory

of exploitation

which

encompasses

eudal,

capitalist

andsocialist

modes

of production.

Exploitation

n

each

mode comes

about

asa

result

of an

unequal

distribution

f

property

ights.

Consequent-

ly

feudal

exploitation

is

derived

from

dif-

ferential access

to freedem

from

bondage,

wheresuch

freedom

to freely

rade)

s itself

a property right. Interestingly, Roemer

equates

feudal

exploitation

with what

he

terms

as "neo-classical"

xploitation

where

factors of

production

are no

longer

paid

their

marginal

product.

Capitalist

exploita-

tion results

from

unequal

ownership

of the

means

of

production,

i e, alienable

non-

human

assets.

Socialist

exploitation

s a

con-

sequence

of inequitable

distribution

of

in-

alienable,

human

property.

Differential

en-

dowments

of human

assets

taking

the

form

of skill and

status

exploitation

(and,

presumably,

ender

and race

exploitation).

Under

feudalism

all three

forms

co-exist.

The transition

rom

feudal o

capitalist

mode

of productionbringsabout the eradication

of feudal

exploitation

(the

removal

of

the

barriers

of free

trade).

Similarly,

he

transi-

tion fromcapitalism

o

socialism

entails

the

destruction

of capitalist

exploitation.

In

Roemer'swords,

"each

revolutionary

ran-

sition,has

the

historical

ask

of

eliminating

its characteristic

ssociated

orm

of

exploita-

tion" (Roemer,

1982a;p

21).

The test

for exploitation

put

forwardby

Roemer

ranks

as

one

of the most

novel

fea-

tures

of

his

model. Exploitation

is said

to

exist

if a

coalition

of

agents

could

withdraw

from

the given

social

and econonmic

ela-

tions,

with their per

capita

share

of the

in-

equitably

distributedproperty

ights assets)

and subsequently

raise

their

social welfare

Economic

and

Political

Weekly

1479

Vol

XX,

No

35,

August

31,

1985

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3/7

August 31,

1985

ECONOMIC

AND

POLITICAL

WEEKLY

levels

(whatever

hat social welfare

criterion

may be).

This concept of

'contingently feasible

alternatives' s not

a

purely

abstract

ool

to

ascertain

exploitation

by positing

an

alter-

nativestate

where he coalitionof

agents

can

be betteroff

by

not

facing

such

exploitation;

it is in fact conceivedasbeinghypothetically

feasible.

Consequently

he test for

exploita-

tion under feudalism

involves the

elimina-

tion of feudal

bonds,

where a coalition of

oppressed

agents

(serfs)

could

raise

their

standards f

living, income,

welfare

by

with-

drawing rom

the

master-serf

elations

with

the

land

they

operate

and

the

tools

they

utilise for

production.

Similarly, capitalist

exploitation

exists

if

a coalition of

workers

can

withdrawfrom

the

capitalist

economy

with

their per

capita

share

of

the

means of

production and raise their welfare levels.

Roemerarguesthat

this model of

exploi-

tation

based

upon

property ights

s

superior

to the orthodox Marxist

definition

based

upon extraction of

surplus

labour in

that

exploitation can be shown

to exist

in

the

absence of

employment

relations.

The

logical

proof of this

is provided n

the

model of a

subsistence

economy.

Roemer

shows

that

in

such

an

economy, agents

op-

timise

their

leisure (i e,

minimise

hours

worked)

while

maintaining

ubsistence eeds

on

the

basis of

their given

endowments.

If

a

labour

market with

uniform

technology

and

identical

subsistence

patternsexist,

then

agents

will

trade

in

labour

endowments in

order

to

satisfy

consumption

needs,

while

minimising the actual labour performed.

rhere will

be agents

who will

acquire heir

subsistence

needs

through the

purchase of

the

labour

power

of others,

and there

will

be

agents

who will

have to sell

all their

labour in

order to

meet their

subsistence

requirements.Those

who work

more than

is

socially

necessary to

satisfy subsistence

needs

are

considered

exploited while

those

who work

less than is

socially

necessaryare

exploiters.

Exploitation

is judged

on the

basis of

labour time.

From this Roemer

derives what he

calls

the

Class-Exploitation

Correspondence

Principle CECP).

Given he choice

of

hiring

labour, working for oneself and selling

labour

(or

a

combination of

these)

Roemer

constructs

five distinct

'class'

categories

on

the basis

of

given

endowments.

They

can be

described

as follows:

(i)

purecapitalists

who

only

hire

labour; (ii)

small

capitalists

who

both hire

others and

work for

themselves;

(iii) petit

bourgeois

who

only work for

then-

selves;(iv)

mixed

proletarian

who

work

for

themselves as well

as

selling part

of

their

labour

power;and(v)

proletarians

who only

sell their

labour.

Roetner's rank

ordering

puts

the

pure

capitalists nd

small

capitalists

at the

top

of

the

wealth

hierarchy

as the

richest

and

most

exploitative

members

of

society, while the mixed and pureproleta-

rians are

on

the

lowest

rungsof the

wealth

ladder,being

the poorestand most

exploited

strata.

Having constructed

he link between ex-

ploitationand class,

Roemer oes

on to show

that a

labourmarketneed

not

exist

for such

a link to

hold.

If

the labour

market s

replac-

ed by a

capital

marketwe findthat

the class

structure mbodied n the CECPstill holds.

Agents

attempt to satisfy their

subsistence

needs on the

basis of

their given

capital

endowments.

Con-sequently,

s

in

the labour

market

economy, an

agent faces

the choice

of

lending

capital to

others at a given

rate

of

interest, working one's own

capital

or

boriowing capital, or

some

combination

of

these. Thus a

producerwith

limitedcapital

endowments will

have to borrow

capital at

the given

rate of

interest

n

orderto

finance

his/her

production.

As above, at an

equili-

brium

solution

withgiven

equilibriumprice

vector, hose

agents who

work less than

the

socially

necessary labour time

are the ex-

ploitativeclass,while those who work more

than is

socially

necessary to

satisfy con-

sumption

needs form the

exploited class.

Thus, as

before, in the

rank ordering

of

classes, the

exploited are

the

borrowersof

capital while the

exploiters are the lenders

of

capital.

The significance of this

is out-

lined

by Roemer:

In

classand

exploitation

roperties

he

two

solutions are

isomorphic; he credit and

labour

markets re

functionally

quivalent.

Wecan thus

produce he

highly

articulated

class

structure

usually

associated with a

labour

market, with no institutions for

labour

exchange,

and

using just

a

credit

market.The heresy s complete.Not only

does

exploitation merge

ogicallyprior

to

accumulation nd

nstitutions

or

abour x-

change

but so does

the articulation f ex-

ploitation nto class

Roemer, 982b;

265).

Exploitation can

now be

explained

without

recourse to- any

understanding

of

wage relations

or analysis

of the labour

pro-

cess. The

conclusion

of Roemer's xercise s

that

the

inequality

of

wealth endowments

(property ights) s a sufficientcondition

for

exploitation

to

occur.

Within an

accumulating

economy,

the

analysis

s much

the

same.

As

agents

differ

in

their

endowmentsof

assets,

at an

equili-

briumsolution herewillexisttheconditions

for

exploitation

in contradiction o the

neo-

classical

gains

from

trade

arguments).

Ex-

ploitation occurs when

a

producer"cannot

possibly

command as

much labour

value,

through

the

purchase

of

goods

with

his

revenues,

as the

labour he

contributed

in

production,

and an

exploiter

s one

who

un-

ambiguously

commands more

labour time

throughgoods

purchased

no matter

how he

dispenses his revenues"

(Roemer,

1982b;

p

269).

This definition

narrows he

exploited

and

exploiter lasseswithin

he

CECP,

hence

widening the

'grey area' of

producerswho

are neither

exploited

nor

exploiting.

On exposing his model to production

technology

ets

more

general

han

the

simple

Leontief input-output matrix (where each

good is produced by precisely

one

process)

Roemer omes up with a surprise.

As he out-

lines, in order to explain exploitation

in

general echnology

models one has to

define

the concept of labour embodied

in

a com-

modity.However,when using the traditional

Morishima definition of labour embodied

(where labour embodied in a commodity

bundle

x

is the

minimum amount

of direct

labour used amongst all the

possible ways

of producingx)Roemer inds thatthe CECP

breaks down. In the face of the possible

destruction f his model, Roemer

onstructs

an ingenious,

f

somewhat

dishonest,escape

path from

the

problem.

He puts forwardan alternativedefinition

of labourembodied.Insteadof Morishima's

method

which

is to scan all

the

production

processes

n

order to find the

one with the

least direct abour used, Roemer

argues

hat

at the going equilibrium prices, one

must

scan those processes which are maximally

profitable.Thus the

labour

value

embodied

is

"

... the minimum amount of direct

labour used in producing

x

minimisedover

the set of maximally profitable processes.

This generates

a

definition of

exploitation

for which the

CECP is true

in

the

general

constant returns o scale model

of

produc-

tion"

(Roemer, 1982b; p 272).

In the

Morishimadefinition of lab.our

mbodied,

labourvalue s a function of the

technology

used and is independent

of prices.

For

Roemer'sdefinition,

however,.labour alues

are

purelydependent

n

price;priceprecedes

value. In Roemer's words, "equilibrium

prices must be known before labour value

can be said to

exist" Roemer,

1982a,p 150).

This new definition overthrows he

tradi-

tional

Marxist

view

that

values

precede

prices. It is, as Roemer is the

first to

acknolwedge,somewhat heretical.

There is

a hint of

determinism

in Roemer's

argui-

ments.

Before

we

can estimate

valuewe must

know the vector of all equilibrium,profit

maximising, prices.

Having inverted his aspect

of the labour

theory

of

value,

Roemer

goes

on

to

argue

for a labour

theory

of

exploitation.

In his

eyes

there

s

nothing intrinsicallyunique

in

labour

power that gives it the

property of

creating surplusvalue.

Indeed,

n

an

economycapable

of

produc-

ing

a

surplus, any commodity

has this

magicalproperty of creating

urplus]. f we

choose corn

as

the

value numeraire

nd

calculate

embodied

corn

values

of com-

modities

and the embodiedcorn value

of

corn,

we can

prove

that

the economy

is

capable

of

producing surplus

f

and

only

if

corn s

exploited,

n

the sense

hat he corn

valueof a unitof corn s lessthanone.There

is

absolutelynothing special about labour

power

nthis

regard Roemer,

982b; 273).

Nevertheless,

within

the

capitalist

mode

of production abourpower s the onryasset

uniformlydistributed;

o Roemer

argues f,

1480



4/7

as historical

materialists,

we

are

concerned

with a theory that deals

with

class struggle,

the conflict between the exploited

and

the

exploiter,

hen that

theory

can

only

be

the

labour theory

of

exploitation.

For Roemer

The accumulation of capital can ... be ex-

plained,as a technical act, by choosingany

commodity

as value numeraire.

But

class

struggle

etween

roleiarians ndcapitalists

can

only be explained y

choosing abour s

the valuenumeraireRoemer, 982b, 275).

To summarise,Roemer'sproperty

rights

model of exploitation and class presentsus

with a numberof interestingand novel fea-

tures. He

begins by explainingexploitation

in

the subsistenceeconomy as being based

upon an unequal endowmentof wealth. He

goes

on to

argue

that for

such exploitation

to exist there

is

no need to have a labour

market, a credit market

will

suffice

in

its

place (heresy

No

1?).

Differential initial

wealth endowments and the consequent

trading

elations

n

endowmentsbetweenex-

ploitersand exploited leads to the presence

of a class structure, he CECP.

The argument

s

muchthe

same for an

ac-

cumulating conomy,

with Leontieftechno-

logy.

While the subsistence

equirements

re

rejectedas

being subjective preferences,

a

differentiation

f

societyinto exploiters

and

exploitedalong

class lines akin to

the

CECP

is found. On

introducing

more

general

ech-

nology sets,

the CECP

falters

when faced

with Morishima'sdefinition of labour em-

bodied. Roemer'snew

definition

of

labour

embodied

leads

us to

the

consequence

of

equilibrium prices determining

values

(heresy

No

2?).

Another

argument

for the

rejection of the labour theory of value.

Wenow have the conditions for a general

theory

of

exploitation

which

ncorporates

x-

ploitation

under

feudal, capitalist

and

socialistmodes of

production.

Roemer's

n-

genious

test for

exploitation

uses

games

theory

to construct

"contingently

feasible

alternative

states" under which

exploited

agents

could

improve

heir

welfare

by

'with-

drawing'

with their share of

society's

alien-

able and inalienable assets.

Exploitation

on the basis of

inequitable

distribution of

property rights

leads to

feudal

exploitation, capitalist exploitation

and

socialist

exploitation.

t is the last which

is

the

unique

feature of

the

general theory

of exploitation.Exploitationundersocialism

results from an

inequitabledistribution of

human

endowments. t takes he form of ex-

ploitation

based

upon

skill

and

status

(and,

presumably, ender

and

race).

The historical

task

of

the socialist transformation is to

eliminate

capitalistexpl9itationby bringing

the

meansof

productionundersocial owner-

ship. Any

resultant

exploitation

such as

skill/wage

differentialsor race

and

gender

exploitation

are a feature of socialist

ex-

ploitation

and

hence

beyond

the

realms of

socialist transformation.Roemer

concedes

that at certain historical moments socialist

exploitation may be considered socially

necessary this is so when the welfareof the

withdrawing oalition s diminishedby with-

drawing

rom the economy,

orreasons uch

as lack

of pooling of skills

or loss of incen-

tives). A

crucial element within the

game

theory,

withdrawalanalysis states

that ex-

ploited agents

cannot improve heir

welfare

or their

class status by

remainingwithin the

exploitative

economy. An individual's

class

status and

degree of

exploitation is deter-

mined by his/her given

alienable and in-

alienable wealth

endowments.

He/she can-

not improvehis/her class positionexceptby

withdrawing as a member

of a coalition

from

that economy.

Consequently xploited

agents undersocialism

cannot mprove

heir

welfare

within socialism

(unless of course

such

exploitation

is

considered

socially

necessaryfor reasonsas described

above);

and

like

the

proletariat

withdrawing

rom

he

capitalistmode

of

production

and

initiating

the

socialist

transition,

so

exploited

coali-

tions

undersocialism must

withdraw rom

that state and

hence

initiate the transition

to

the next

(presumably

ommunist) mode

of

production.

Nowthat we have he

essenceof

Roemer's

model,albeitin a muchsimplifiedform, we

can move

to our own

criticismsof

Roemer's

work.

III

Criticisms of Roemer's Model

It is

probably

not

surprising

hat Roemer's

model

has been

more

favourably

eceived

by

neo-classical economists than

by

Marxist

theoreticians.

A

reflection not

only

of the

fact that

Roemer's

highly

technical method

is

immersed

n the

language

of neo-classical

economics,

but

furthermore,

hat

Roemer's

understanding

of Marxism has

strayed

ex-

tensively

from the traditional

discipline

of

dialectical historical materialism.

Our

major

criticismof Roemer ies

in

his

rejection

of

the labour

theory

of

value and

the

surplus

abour

approach

o

exploitation.

We shall leave the

discussion

of this issue

to

the

last when

we

shall

present

our

arguments

for the

centrality

of the labour

theory

of

value in Marxist thought.

Our initial criticism of

Roemer'smodel

lies in

its inherent static

nature;

a feature

determined

y

his

use of

Walrasian, ynamic

statics,

generalequilibrium

nalysis.Despite

a

taxonomy

of

exploitation

under

socialist,

capitalist

and feudal modes

of

production,

Roemer's

method deals

only

with static

equilibria n each case. He constructs deal

states of

each mode of

production

for the

purposes

of

comparisons

of

qualitatively

different forms of

exploitation.

He shows

limitedawareness f

historicallyprogressive

transition

from

mode

to mode. At most he

argues

that

the

historic

duty

of

any

revolu-

tionary

transition

s to eradicate hecharac-

teristic form of

exploitation

of the

mode

of

productionagainst which it is

in

struggle.

There s

little

understanding

f the

dynamics

of

transitionstatesand none

whatsoeverof

the

concept

of the

dialectic.Roemer'sMarx-

ism is bereft

of the dialectic

form.

There

is no analysis in his

argumentsof

the relative autonomy of political deter-

minism

n

clatss

ormationand

revolutionary

transition.In order

o explain

revolutionary

transitionone

has to explain

class

struggle

in

somewhatmore

detailthan

Roemer

does,

in

simplistically

reducing t to the

struggle

between

exploiters and

exploited.

In order

to

understand

class

struggle one

has to be

aware hat

thereare

political

actors hat

play

a part in the

determinationof

class

strug-

gle.

As Wright

has

pointed out class

cannot

be

defined n

purely

economic

terms. "Class

is an intrinsicallypolitical concept and for

it to

serve its

explanatory

purposes it

must

have its

political

dimensions

systematically

represented within

the

concept

itself"

(Wright,

1982).

While we may

disagree

with

Wrightas

to the

degreeof relative

utonomy

of

politics

from

economic determinants

within

the class formation

matrix;

Wright's

arguments,

nevertheless,point

to a

chronic

failureon the

part

of

Roemer o break

rom

the narrow confines

of his

economistic

method.

As a

consequence f a

dynamic tatics

ap-

proach

Roemer,

ike

his

neo-classical

riends,

takes

property relations in

ideal

states as

being givenahistorically.Given that power

relations, lass and

exploitation

re

all deriv-

ed

from

inequitable

property

endowments,

this has

serious

mplications.

There s

no ex-

planation

as to the

historical

accumulation

of

wealth.

Roemer discounts

the

orthodox

argument hat

surplus

abour

plays

a

role in

capital

accumulation.

"The

accumulation

f

capital

can ...

be

explained,

as

a

technical

fact, by

choosing

any

commodity

as value

numeraire"

Roemer,

1982b;p

275).

With

no

understandingof the

historical

process of

capital accumulation

here is no

way

to ex-

plain

the

inequitable

distributionof

wealth

endowments.

A further mplicationof this is that with

an

agent's class

position and

degree

of

ex-

ploitation

determined by

his or her

given

property

endowments, there is no

way

for

such an

agent

to

improve

his or her

welfare

within he

mode of

productionnwhich

such

exploitation

s

dominant. The

only

method

by

which

the

agent

can

break such

a

deter-

ministic

hold

is

by joining

a coalition

group

of

other

exploitedagents and

withdrawing

from

that state.This

argument

eems o

con-

tradict he

struggle

of

trade unions to

raise

the

welfare and

living

standards of

their

members,

suallyexploited

proletariat,

while

remainingwithin

the confines of the

capita-

list economy. (A struggle which Marxists

have

nvariably upported

despite

he

impli-

cations of economism

of such

labour

action.)

A

further result

of

given

property

rela-

tions

is

that optimal

technique paths

are

derivedfrom those

property

relations

prior

to the

determination f an

agent's

class

posi-

tion or the

existenceof

exploitation.

Produc-

tion

techniques

are

therefore

aken

as

given

and

are

constructed

y

neo-classical

esource

allocation

exercises.

Another

point

of

debate s Roemer's on-

cept of

'contingently

feasible

alternative'

states

to which

coalitions of

agents

can

withdraw. t is difficultto take this notion

of withdrawal

iterally

since, as

Przeworski

1481



5/7

points

out,

" ... the comparisons

of the

welfareof groups

within and without

a par-

ticular

economy

are based-exclusively

n the

properties

of static equilibria"

Przeworski:

1982;p 292).

Nevertheless

f, as we have

seen

above, agent's

class position and

degreeof

exploitation

is determinedby

their wealth

endowment,andthat the

only method

avail-

able

to

them

to transform heir

destiny

s

by

joining a

withdrawalcoalition

of agents,

thenthe conceptof withdrawal o longerre-

mains

a purely abstract,

hypothetical

for-

mulation for the

testing of exploitation;

it

acquires

a political reality

and becomes

a

form of concrete

action. Roemer

is some-

what confused

on this issue.

While the

task

of an

alternative

s to define exploitation

n

the state against which

the alternative

is

posited,

that alternative

becomes

somewhat

moreconcrete han

an abstract onstruct.

As

Roemer

outlines

... the device

for defining exploitation

con-

ceivesof agents

as exploited

at a particular

allocation,

with

respect

o a

particular

lter-

native. The formulation

ignores

...

[the]

sort

of problems suchas]:Is the realisation f

payoffs [to

coalition agents]

in

some

way

feasible?Whatare he

costsof coalition

or-

mation?

How

will

the

coalition arrange

o

distributeendowments]

mong

ts

members?

(Roemer,

1982a;p 199).

In his discussion

on

feudal,

capitalist

and

socialist

exploitation,

Roemer

s

fully

aware

that there

are costs

involved

for the with-

drawing

oalitions.

For

example,

a coalition

of

serfs

withdrawing

rom

feudalism ace

the

loss of military

protection raditionally

pro-

vided by their

lord. Roemer acknowledges

this as a veryreal cost;

but

he

argues,

unless

the coalition

can

provide

protection

for

themselvesand if the return romthe lord's

protection

s

greater

han loss of

welfare or

a serf

incurred

hrough bondage,

then

the

coalition

will be worse

off

by

withdrawing.

If this

is

so,

Roemer

argues,

then such

a

group

of agents

is not feudally exploited

n

the first

place.

The same

argument

an thus

be

applied

to

coalitions

withdrawing

rom

capitalism

or

socialism.

This leads

us

to

the

question

of how

one is to

quantify

the costs

of

withdrawal

or,

for

that

matter,

the costs

of

coalition

formation?Roemer

does not ex-

plain

howexploitedagents

can

actually orm

an

organised,

ohesive,

oalition

hrough

co-

operation,

and

furthermore,

n

what fashion

can they actually withdraw.As he implies

unless

one

is

aware

of

these costs

it

is

not

possible

to

judge

whether

a

withdrawing

coalition is

'properly

exploited'.

Another

point

of criticism

onnectedwith

the

different

forms of

exploitation

within

Roemer'smodel is that

nowhere does

he

mention the

existence,

r even

possibility

of,

race and

gender exploitation.

If

race and

gender

are seen

as

purely

inalienable,

human

property

hen

it

must be considered

a

featureof

socialist

exploitation

for

racism

and sexismdo exist in

many

socialist

states),

which co-exists

in other modes

of produc-

tion (although

manywould argue hat

socia-

list societies

have been

far more successful

at fighting racistand sexist

attitudesand

ex-

ploitation). It could be said, however, hat

raceand genderexploitationare fully realis-

edin the capitalistmodeof production, uch

as

in

low-wage emale sweat shop

labour

in

Hong Kong, or low-paid (relative to their

white colleagues) black miners in South

Africa. Roemer seems to be unaware hat

racismand sexism do not only act as forms

of social control and legitimation but are

very real methods of economic exploitation.

This leads us to Roemer'sexplanationof

the socialist exploitation.

As he outlines

in-

equalities

exist under socialism

due to skill

differentials, e, inequitable

distributionof

inalienable, human, property. Hence the

basis of socialist exploitation. Another

ex-

ploitative eatureundersocialism,

he

argues,

is status exploitation. Benefits derived

through membership of the party, fringe

benefits acquired by party and state-

bureaucratic lites. Although

such status

ex-

ploitation is anomolous to socialism, it is a

common feature

of

socialist

societies where

Stalinist

party

structures

predominate (it

should be noted that only the Chinese have

attempted to eradicate status exploitation

during their CulturalRevolution,

although

it would seem that the attitude of the pre-

sent leadership

s to

provide

acit

encourage-

ment to status

exploitation).

Under certain

conditions, capitalist exploitation may

also

be

a

feautre of

socialism, implementedby

the state

in

order to raise the level

of the

productive forces.'

Skill and

wage

differentials are

for

Roemer a necessary feature

of

socialism:

It is not

the

historical

ask

of

the socialist

transitiono eliminate ocialist

xploitation.

What nequalitiesxistbecause f differential

remunerationo

skills

should

be

expected

under ocialismRoemer, 982a; p 259-60).

Consequently

Roemercriticises he Chinese

Cultural

Revolution

or

attempting

o

com-

bat inequalities

that

lay beyond

the task of

socialist societies.

Their

efforts

at

"the

eliminationof skill

wage

differentials ed to

a

retardation

n

development, labour pro-

ductivity

and material welfare

...

these

egalitarian experiments

were

premature"

(Roemer, 1982a; p 241).

In Roemer's

eyes,

therefore,socialism's

concern

lies solely

in

raising he levels

of the

productive

orces

of

society,

and

not

in

transforming

he social

relations of production.

Despite

Roemer'sconcern

in

incorpora-

ting inequalitiesunder socialismwithin his

general theory of exploitation,

we

are not

entirely

convinced hat his

method

of-doing

so

provides

us

with

a

satisfactory

basis on

which to

analyse

the laws

of

motion

of

socialism.

In

our opinion

an

understanding

of a

given socialist society

must

incorporate

a

historical

analysis

of the

process

of

revolu-

tionary change,

of

the

class

structures

and

dynamics

hat

bring

about the

revolutionary

transformation.These are the forcesthat

in

*

Capitalistexploitation,

Roemer

argues,

s

apparent n Yugoslaviawhere there exists

unemployedabourwhichcould mprovets

welfare f it was given ts percapita hareof

the means of production.

many respects

work towards

he determina-

tion of the nature

of the

socialist

society.

Finally,

we believe hat

no analysis

of socia-

list societies

s complete

without

an account

of the stateand

the bureaucracy.

he mono-

lithic structure

of the state

and party under

socialism has to be

adequately

explained.

Roemer,

t seems, is

apparently ware

of the

monolithic

state and the relative

autonomy

that it and the

bureaucracy

njoy,yet he

does

not include this withinhis discourseon the

socialist

mode of production.

It is precisely

he role

of thebureaucracy

nd

the state

which obscures

he nature

of the

property'relations

etween

he

means f

pro-

duction

and the

workers Roemer,1982a;

p 253).

Consequently

it seems to

us that it is

far

more preferable

o

use Marxist

theories of

the

state

than Roemer's

heory

of exploita-

tion to analyse socialist societies.

Roemer

notes that

there is

a tendency

amongst

some

Marxistwritersof

confusing

alienationundersocialism

with

exploitation

under

capitalism

by placing

an undue

em-

phasisupon the analysisof the labourpro-

cess.

"A

misplaced

emphasis on

the labour

process",

he argues,

"can lead to

a faulty,

or at least non-materialist

analysis"

(Roemer,

1982b;

p 267). Study

of the labour

process

concerns tself

with the organisation

of the workplace,

and giventhat

Roemer e-

jects

the

surplus

labour value theory

for a

property

rights

model, such

wor,k s under-

taken

by

Braverman

nd

others

do not, for

Roemer,

hed any light

on exploitation.

For

him

exploitation

can

be logically

divorced

fromthe

point

of production.

A

directresult

of his

rejection

of the notion

that exploita-

tion is

necessarily

inked

o

a

market or the

exchangeof labour power.Roemer's histo-

rical materialism'

concetns

itself with

an

anlysis

of

property

relations

rather han

the

organisation

of work. In

response

to

the

tendency

to

equate

alienation

under

socia-

lism with

exploitation

undercapitalism

due

to similar

forms of organisation

at

the

workplace,

he argues

hat the distinguishing

features are

the

given

property

relations.

When

two

different

regimes

give

rise

to

similarorganisational

ork

forms,

t

is

the

property elations

hat define

the

nature

f

exploitation

nd

surplus

xtraction,

ot

the

organisational

ork

ormswhich

define

he

nature f

alienation

Roemer,

982b;

267).

Whilewe acknowledge

he distinctionto

be

made

between

alienation

and

exploita-

tion,

Roemer's

dismissal

of the labour

pro-

cess

analysis

as

having

little

significance

leads

us back

to our

first

and most

substan-

tive criticism

of

Roemer,namely

his

rejec-

tion of

the

labour

theory

of

value,

and

with

it the

idea

that

surplus

value is created

by

labour

at

the

point

of

production

and,

hence,

it

is

at

the

point

of

production,

i

e

within

the labour

process,

hat

exploitation

is

located

in

the

capitalist

mode of

produc-

tion. Roemer

argues

hat

. .. to characterise

arxian

xploitation,

i e

exploitation

withinthe capitalist

naode

of

production]

n termsof property

elations

s

1482



6/7

superior

o doing so

in

terms

of

surplus

value.The

idea of property

elationsmakes

clear

what

s

the ethical mperative

hen

one

speaksof

exploitation

n that t allowsus

to

conceive

of

an

alternativen which

he

pro-

letariat or

the exploited

coalition]has ac-

cess

to its

percapita

shareof

society'spro-

ductive

assets

(Roemer,

1982b;p 280).

We

now

turn to

our

defence

of the labour

theory

of value.

IV

Labour

Theory

of Value

and

Its

Ethical

Imperative

There s,

it seems,

a

misconception

on

the

part

of

many

writers nd Roemer

s

certainly

not the first,

as to the true

meaning

of the

labour theory

of value. There is a

tradition

amongst

some mathematically

inclined

economists

imbued

in

the

method of

neo-

classical economics,

and

yet identifying

themselves

with the

political

economy

school,

and herethe

names of

Morishima,

Catephores

and

Roemer

spring

to

mind,

to

conceive Marx as a proto-mathematical

economist

whose objective ay

in

construc-

ting

economic

models.

These writers have

been

concerned olely

with one

aspect

of

the

value

theory, hat

is the value magnitude

or

the

determination

f

commodityprices

and

have neglected

the

critical qualitative

features

of value

theory,

namely

the value

form and the

substance of

value.

This

betrays

a

very

odd,

to

say

the

least,

reading

of

Volume

I

of

Marx's

"Capital".

n

keep-

ing withthis

tradition

Morishima

ransforms

the

classical

Marxist

theory

of value

as

follows:

The classical

labour

theory

of

value is

rigorouslymathematisedn a familiarorm

parallel

o Leontief's

nter-sectoral

rice-cost

equations.

The hidden

assumptions

re

all

revealed nd, by

theuseof

the mathematics

of

the

nput-output

nalysis,

he

comparative

statistical

aws

concerning

he behaviour f

the

relative alues

f commodities

re

proved.

There

s

a dualitybetweenphysical

utputs

and

valuesof

commodities,

which

s

similar

to the

duality

between

physical utputs

and

competitive

rices.

t

is

seen hat

the

labour

theory

of

value

may

be

compatible

with

the

utility heory

of consumers' emandor

any

of

its

improved

ariations

Morishima,

973;

p

5).

The labour theory of value does serve a

purpose

n

determiningprices

of commodi-

ties,

under general commodity

production,

by aggregating

he

sociallynecessary

abour

time embodied

within

the

commodities.

This, as Marx

notes in Volume3

of

"Capital".

eads

to

first

approximations

or

commodity prices.

In other words those

commodities

with

identical

exchangevalues,

that

is

equal

amounts of

socially

necessary

labour time embodied within themwill

ex-

change

on a one-to-onebasis.

Consequently

prices

of commodities can be obtained

as

ratios of the

money commodity,

i e

the

representation

of general, social,

abstract

labour.Any distortionof the pricefromthe

socially necessary

labour time

embodied

within the commodity

is due to the short

term vagariesof supply

and demand;

never-

theless,

as a first approximation

labour

values and prices

will tend to be

equated.

But

there s more to

Marx'svalue theory

than purelya formation

o determineprices

on the basis

of social labour

embodied

within

commodities. That

takes us little

further

han the Ricardian

heory of

value.

Ricardo'sprime

concern lay

in

estimating

prices for which he picked labour as the

value numeraire.What sets

Ricardo'svalue

theory apart from

Marx's

was that

Ricardo

failed

to realise

hat labour

had

two

distinct

forms.

In order

to understand

his one

needs to

explain

Marx's

method.

Whereas

Ricardo

and more recently

he neo-Ricardians

on-

cern themselves

with

prices

at

the

level of

appearance,

and

hence

fall

into

the

trap

of

vulgareconomy

whichMarxdescribes

"feels

especially

at home

in

the alienated

external

appearances

f

economic

relations"

Marx,

1959;p 796);

Marx abstracts rom

value at

the level of superficial

appearances

o

pre-

sent the real process underlying it, the

essence

or its inner

nature.

Havingseparated

the

essence

from

appearance

one

simply

retracesone's

steps back to

the

level

of ap-

pearance;

he

apparent

orm

is

consequently

realised.

Marx applied

this

method

of abstraction

to the

apparent

or

specific

commodity

form

to findthat property

which was common to

all

commodities,

namely simple

labour or

labour

in

its

social form. That

is, while

labour

produced

commodities

which bore

use-value

and thereforewere

he

productof

a

concrete

and specific

type of productive

labour activity,

once commodities

were

exchangedthey also began to embody ex-

change

value.

Thus

what

was common

amongst exchanged

commodities was not

only

use-values (without

which

of course

theycould

not be

traded)

but

exchange

alue.

They

were the product

of labour, general

social labour,

abstract

labour,

i

e,

sheer

physical human

energy.

It was the posses-

sion of this common

property

of commodi-

ties

that led to

their

exchange.

Thus under

exchange

relations

all

concrete

or

specific

productive

abour activity

could be

reduced

to

abstract

or social

labour.

Ricardo's

value numeraire

of

concrete,

specific

and

heterogeneous

abour

is hence

inadequate n estimatingthe value magni-

tude or the ratio

or basis of

exchange

bet-

ween two commodities.

As Marx

noted

Ricardo's

istake

s that

he

is concerned

nly

with

the

magnitude

of value ...

But

the

labourembodied

n

[commodities]

must

be

represented

s social

labour

(Marx,

1971;

p

131).

Roemer,

like Ricardo

and

the neo-

Ricardian

writers

n the transformation

ro-

blem debate

has,

it

seems,

failedto

grasp

he

dual character

f labour; he

distinctionbet-

ween ndividualconcrete abourand

general

social

labour. Under general

commodity

productiona tradedcommodity

is a bearer

of exchangevalue, and the exchange value

of the commodity

is the aggregate

of the

abstract abour

embodied

within

it,

in

other

words socially

necessary abour

time. With

abstract abour

as

the

property

or

characte-

ristic

commonto all

traded ommodities

and

the measure

of exchangevalue

it

is,

there-

fore, also

the essential money

commodity.

The significance

of this finding that

all

commodities earing

xchange

alueembody

abstract ocial

labour

s not

simply

to assist

in the

purely accounting

task of price

esti-

mation, but to understandhat all commo-

dities

are the bearers

of social

relations

of

production

between

commodity producers.

Withinbourgeois

ociety he directproducers

of commodities

are

increasingly

detached

from heirexchange

orum, he

market

place.

Consequently

he

social relations

of

produc-

tion between producers

are

represented

s

social

relations

between

products.

The

com-

modity

akeson a

social form

and thus gains

a relative independence

from

its

producer.

It

becomes

reified and henceboth mystifies

and

dominates

ts

producer.

The

phenomena

of commodity

etishism

s no

illusion,

rather

its form is real,

but

it

obscures

he

underly-

ing relationshipbetween commodity pro-

ducers such

that they are expressed

as

material elations

between abour

and social

relations

between

commodities.

The

pro-

ducersof commodities

or

exchange

do

not

perceive

their

products

as social

objective

forms embodyinggeneral

abour

but rather

as havingmystical

and

sensuous

characteris-

tics,

consequently

he social

aspect

of

labour

is shrouded

from their view.

This is

the

'natural' outcome

when

commodities

are

transformed

nto exchange

alues.

n the con-

tradictory

nature

of

capitalist production

It

was solely the

analysisof

the

prices

of

commodities

which ed

to

the determination

of the magnitudeof value,and solelythe

common expression

f all commodities

n

money

which

ed

to theestablishmentf

their

character

s values.

It

is howeverprecisely

this finished

ormof

the

world

of

commodi-

ties-the money

form-which

conceals he

social character f

private abour and

the

social relations between

the individual

workers, y

making hose relations

appear

as relations

etweenmaterial

bjects, nstead

of

revealing

them plainly (Marx, 1976;

pp 168-69).

The

consequence

f

this

for commodity

pro-

ducers

s

that "their

own movementwithin

society

has for them

the

the form of

a move-

ment made by things, and these things far

from

being

under their control,

in

fact

con-

trol them"

(Marx,

1976; pp

167-68).

Thus

we

arriveat what

may

be

called the

'ethical

mperative'

f

historicalmaterialist

study, praxis.

The

lifting of

the veil of

false

consciousness,

which shrouds

the minds of

direct

commodity producers

through

the

fetishism

of

commodities,

is the

political

imperative

o which Marx directs us.

Roemer

argues hat the superiority

of the

propertyrights

approach ies

in

its explicit

statement

f the ethical

mperatives

f histo-

rical

materialiststudy by positing

'feasible

alternatives'

o exploitations

within a given

modeof production.While t is undoubtedly

true that the

labourtheoryof value s of

use

1483



7/7

August

31,

1985

ECONOMICAND POLITICAL

WEEKLY

to

us purely or the purpose

of analysing

he

capitalistmode

of productionand

no other;

yet it is within

the labour theory

of value

that the 'ethical

imperatives'

lie. If, as

Roemer argues, our taks

is to explain

and

direct class struggle,

the only

fashion

by

which this can

be done is by understanding

the process of valorisation. Labourcreates

surplus

va)ue,

capital

utilised

n the

produc-

tive process can itself

be reduced

to em-

bodied dead abour,

he labQur

f a

previous

production

process. It

is by way of this

method

that

we

can

understand he history

of

capital

accumulation.

The labour

theory

of

value,by

explaining

he

process

of

surplus

value creation

at the point of production,

i

e,

within the labour process,

brings to us

the

proof

of

the existence

f

capitalist

xploi-

tation.

The false consciousness that arises

through ommodity

etishism, e, the

domi-

nation and

mystification of

the producers

by

the product

n commodityexchange

eads

naturally o the imperative f politicalaction

in

raising

he veil

from

the true

and

contra-

dictory

nature of

capitalist

production.

The

beauty

of

the labour

theory

of value

is that

it provides

the links between com-

modity exchange,

the

labour

process

and

capitalistexploitation.

By encapsulating

all

three

within

one

unified

structure,

Marx

is

able to

put

forward

he true'ethical

mpera-

tive' of

political

action. Elson

summarises

it as follows:

WhatMarx's

heoryof valuedoes

s provide

a basis for showing

a

link

betweenmoney

relations commodity

xchange] nd labour

process

e'ations

n

the process

of

exploita-

tion.Theprocessof exploitations actually

a

unity

... Neither

money

relations nor

labourprocess

relations n themselves

on-

stitute

apitalist

xploitation;

ndneither ne

can

be

changed

very

much

without

accom-

panying

hanges

n

the other.

Marx's

heory

of

value

s able to show his

unity

of

money

and abour

process

because

t

does not

pose

production

nd

circulation

s two

separate,

discretelydistinct spheres,

does

not

pose

value

andpriceas discretely

istinct ariables

...

The

key

to understanding

his contradic-

toryprocess of

capitalist xploitation]

s that

although

money

elations nd abourprocess

are

aspects

of

the

same unity,

internally

dependenton other, they are nevertheless

relatively utonomous

romone another. n

that

relative

utonomy

ie

the

seed

of

poten-

tial crisis.

This

is important olitically,

not

because

uch

a

crisis

n

itself

constitutes

he

breakdown f capitalism-it clearly

does

not-but

because

it

indicates

a

potential

space

for

political

action

(Elson, 1979,

pp

172-73).

This is the

true 'ethical

imperative'

of

dialectical

historical

materialism,

not

Roemer's

'alternatively

easible states'.

In

rejecting

he

labour

theory

of

valueRoemer

rejects

the Marxianmethod.

Consequently

his

anslysis

of

the

capitalist

mode whichcan

only be applied at the level of circulation,

concerns

itself

solely

with

superficial

phenomena

and fails to grasp he

innercon-

tent of generalised

commodity production.

V

Conclusion

John Roemer'sproperty

rights model

of

exploitation is undoubtedlyunique; never-

theless,

as we have shown

in our

discussion

on the labour theory

of

value,

it is devoid

of

a

crucial aspect

of Marxian political

economy, namely,an explanation

of social

relations

of production

betweencommodity

producers

as embodied

within the commo-

dity

form.

His failure o

grasp he dialectical

method

reflects his concern

with the superficial

aspects

of economic

modelling,consequent-

ly the essence

of commodity

production

escapes

him. Roemer's attempt

at putting

forwarda taxonomyof

exploitation

which

incorporates

eudaland

socialistexploitation

with capitalistexploitationwithin a single,

highly technical,

model has been described

by

some commentatorsas

a 'tour de force'

(a

reflection possibly of the mathematical

fetishism that

such

commentators

suffer

from). It is certainly audatory

hat Roemer

has attempted o tackle

the thorny question

of the nature of the socialist mode

of

pro-

duction. As

we areall fully aware,

socialist

societies are

presently

undergoing

a crisis of

immenseproportions.

A crisis of the legiti-

macy

of the

state and

the crisis of aliena-

tion

in

the

workplace.

The sole

attempt by

a

socialist

tateto

comprehensively

eal with

such

crisis,

namely, the Chinese

Cultural

Revolution, s under ridicule.Marxistshave

to focus

their thoughts

on these questions,

for it is

only

by presenting

a clear picture

of the

socialist

mode can they muster

the

progressive

orces or political

action against

the

capitalist

mode

of

production

and its

resultant orm of social relatiQns.

n order

to do

so one needs

the labour theory

of

value.

It is far from

being

iconoclastic

to

sug-

gest

that

if

there

s

a centralconcept

within

the

Marxian

method,

t lies

within

he

labour

theory

of

value.

Without

it there

cannot be

a

Marxian

analysis

of

bourgeois

economy

nor an

understanding

of the

political

im-

perativefacing those who desireto change

such societies.

Roemercannot

have it both

ways, rejecting

the labour theory

of value

and still

proclaiming

himself

as

a

concern-

ed

Marxist.

The

question

then

that has

to be faced

is

where

does

Roemer

really

lie. We have

argued

that

his

analysis

cannot be seen as

Marxist; nor, despite

the

extensive

use

of

general equilibrium

models,

can

it be con-

sidered

as neo-classical.

His

concern

with the

apparent,

phenomenal,

form

of economic

relations,

his failure to

recognise

abstract

labour

as the

common

denominator

of all

commodities

and his

arguments

on

price

preceding aluewouldsuggest hat Roemer's

true

company

lies

amongst

the neo-

Ricardianswho occupy the expansive

and

ill-defined grey area separating the polar

campsof the Marxists

nd the neo-classicals.

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