1. SecondSetofReplies, OeuvresdeDescartes, 12vols., eds. CharlesAdamandPaulTannery (Paris: J. Vrin, 197483), vol. 7, p. 153.2. Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinozas Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1984), 357. He goeson to say that I dont think that the nal three doctrines [of Part Five] can be rescued. The onlyattempts at complete salvage that I have encountered have been unintelligible to me and poorlyEternity and Immortality in Spinozas EthicsSTEVEN NADLERMidwest Studies in Philosophy, XXVI (2002)224IDescartes famously prided himself on the felicitous consequences of his philoso-phy for religion. In particular, he believed that by so separating the mind from thecorruptiblebody, hisradicalsubstancedualismofferedthebestpossibledefenseof and explanation for the immortality of the soul. Our natural knowledge tellsusthatthemindisdistinctfromthebody, andthatitisasubstance . . . Andthisentitlesustoconcludethatthemind, insofarasitcanbeknownbynaturalphi-losophy, is immortal.1 Though he cannot with certainty rule out the possibility thatGod has miraculously endowed the soul with such a nature that its duration willcometoanendsimultaneouslywiththeendofthebody, nonetheless, becausethe soul (unlike the human body, which is merely a collection of material parts) isasubstanceinitsownright, andisnotsubjecttothekindofdecompositiontowhichthebodyissubject, itisbyitsnatureimmortal. Whenthebodydies, thesoulwhich was only temporarily united with itis to enjoy a separate existence.By contrast, Spinozas views on the immortality of the soullike his viewsonmanyissuesare, atleastintheeyesofmostreaders, notoriouslydifculttofathom. Oneprominentscholar, inwhatseemstobeacryoffrustrationafterhaving wrestled with the relevant propositions in Part Five of Ethics, claims thatthispartoftheworkisan unmitigatedandseeminglyunmotivateddisaster . . .rubbish that causes others to write rubbish.2 Another more equaniminous scholarEternity and Immortality in Spinozas Ethics 225confesses that in spite of many years of study, I still do not feel that I understandthis part of Ethics at all. He adds, I feel the freedom to confess that, of course,because I also believe that no one else understands it adequately either.3 BecauseofthecomplexityandopacityofSpinozasaccountoftheeternityofthemind,which involves some of the most difcult and puzzling propositions of Ethics, therehas been, since the posthumous publication of his writings, a great deal of debateoverwhetherhedefendsorallowsforpersonalimmortalityorrejectsit; eventoday no consensus has emerged.4AnumberofscholarshavethoughtthatwhatSpinozaisupto, atleastinEthics,5is a denial of personal immortality, although there is very little agreementon just how he accomplishes this. Thus, Stuart Hampshire notes that, for Spinoza,while there is an eternal aspect of the mind, what survives the death of a personcannot possess any individuality. The possible eternity of the human mind cannot. . . be intended to mean that I literally survive, as a distinguishable individual, insofarasIattaingenuineknowledge; forinsofarasIdoattaingenuineknowl-edge, myindividualityasaparticularthingdisappearsandmymindbecomessofar united with God or Nature conceived under the attribute of thought.6 WhilehedoesnotnecessarilyndsuchanAverroist-typedoctrineinEthics, Curleyagrees with Hampshires general point. Despite the difculty he claims to have inunderstandingPartFive, hesaysthat Spinozadoesnothaveadoctrineofper-sonal immortality. What remains after the destruction of the body is not a person. . . whatever the doctrine of the eternity of the mind does mean, it does not meanthatI canentertainanyhopeofimmortality.7 JamesMorrison, too, isofthisopinion, although he insists that this is not because, as Hampshire claims, the mindis absorbed into the innite attribute of thought, but because the essential condi-tionofindividuationforSpinozathatis, theexistenceofthebodynolongerobtains.8 AlthoughYirmiyahuYovelseesyetotherreasonsfordenyingthatrelatedtowhatSpinozaactuallywrote . . . Afterthreecenturiesoffailuretoprotfromit, thetimehascometoadmitthatthispartofEthics hasnothingtoteachusandisprettycertainlyworthless . . . this material is valueless (372, 374). Either Bennett is intentionally overstating hiscase, or he fails to understand the import of the entire work.3. EdwinCurley, BehindtheGeometricalMethod (Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress,1988), 84.4. Theleadersofthe AmsterdamPortuguese-Jewishcongregation, ontheotherhand, hadno trouble understanding what Spinoza had to say on this matter. Among the heresies for whichhe is reported to have received his cherem, or ban, from the congregation was the denial of theimmortalityofthesoul; seeSpinoza: ALife (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1999),chapter 6. I examine the questions surrounding his ban, and especially the importance of the issueof immortality for that community, in Spinozas Heresy: Immortality and the Jewish Mind (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2002).5. Inthispaper, IconcentrateonlyonEthics. TheevidenceforSpinozasviewsonimmor-talityfromtheearlier, abortedShort TreatiseonGod, ManandHis Well-Being ismoredifcultto interpret. The nal chapter of the work is entitled On Immortality, but the upshot of the briefdiscussion is not immediately clear; see Spinozas Heresy, chapter 5.6. Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza (London: Penguin, 1951), 175.7. Curley, Behind the Geometric Method, 846.8. JamesMorrison, SpinozaontheSelf, PersonalIdentityandImmortality, inGraemeHunter (ed.), Spinoza: The Enduring Questions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 3147.226 Steven NadlerSpinozaheldarobustdoctrineofpostmortemsurvival, hesumsupthisgenerallineofinterpretationnicely: Thetranscendent-religiousideaofanafterlife, inwhich our existence will be modied in proportion to what we have done in thislife, is foreign to [Spinoza].9 There is, in other words, no personal immortality forSpinoza.Now this is indeed a very tempting reading of Spinoza. It is, in fact, the oneI shall argue for (although I shall offer different, more specic reasons as to whythereisandcanbenopersonalimmortalityinSpinozassystem). However, themore popular interpretation of Spinoza seems to be that which somehow nds inhis philosophy an account of personal immortality, in one or another of that doc-trines classical senses. Generally speaking, one can hold that the soul is immortaleitherbecauseasasubstance (or, soasnottoconictwithSpinozasown metaphysicalterminology, thing)initsownrightthatisontologicallydistinctfrom the mortal body, the entire soul persists after death (the so-called Platonicview); orbecausethereisatleastapart ofthesoulwhichisinfactnotaself-subsistingsubstancebuttheinseparable form ofthebody, mostofwhichdieswiththebodythatremainsafterdeath(thisistheAristotelian view).10 Oneitheraccount, thereisaspiritualelementofthepersoneitherthewholesoulitself or some part of itthat persists, disembodied, after that persons death; anelementthatisidentiablewiththatpersonsselfandthatbearssomerelation-shiptothelifeheled. Spinozaisusuallyallegedtohaveheldsomeversionoranother of one of these two positions.AlanDonagan, forexample, inmuchofhisworkonSpinoza, hasadoptedthis reading. He insists that Spinozas afrmation of personal immortality is notirreconciliable with the rest of his system, and that what remains of a person afterhis death is a particular, individuated, and personal essenceone, moreover, thatbears a strong sense of self. Immortality for Spinoza, he claims, is a personal andindividual affair; what persists postmortem is a part of the individuating primaryconstituent of each mind . . . a part that retains its individuality.11 I shall return tohis arguments for this position below. More recently, Tamar Rudavsky has claimedthat Spinozas theory of human immortality can in fact be rescued in a way thatpreservesindividuality. Withoutsayingwhyhisviewsonthemindneedsuch 9. Yirmiyahu Yovel, Spinoza and Other Heretics, vol. 1, The Marrano of Reason (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1989), 170. Yovel, however, goestoofarinlimitingtheeternityof themindtowhatcanbeexperiencedinthislife. SeealsoPierre-FranoisMoreau, Spinoza:Lexprience et lternit (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994): Il faut faire violence autexte pour y lire au premier plan une doctrine de limmortalit de lme. Cela nexlut pas une cer-taineformedimmortalitdanslesystmecellequicorrespondraitunesurviedelentende-ment sans imagination; mais elle a une signication limite et spcique, et il est impossible quellepuise le sens du mot ternit. En tout cas elle ne concerne pas le totalit de lme: elle ne peutdonc tre assimile la conception religieuse traditionelle (535).10. This form of the distinction between two views on the immortality of the soul comes fromHarry Wolfson, ThePhilosophyofSpinoza (Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1934),vol. 2, 28990.11. AlanDonagan, SpinozasProofofImmortality, inMarjorieGrene(ed.), Spinoza:A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City: Anchor, 1973), 252. See also his Spinoza (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1988), chapter 10.Eternity and Immortality in Spinozas Ethics 227rescuing,12sheinsiststhatwhatwecallimmortalityofsoul, characterizedas eternityofmind, forSpinozamustbepersonal. WithinthisunityofmindwithGod/Substance, there is still something of me that remains.13Perhaps the most extreme version of this reading of Spinoza, however, is alsothemostprominentone. Harry Wolfson, inhismagisterialandjustlycelebratedstudyofSpinozasphilosophy, seesinEthics asstrongadoctrineofpersonalimmortalityasonecouldhopefor. Infact, accordingtoWolfson, Spinozaismerelyreafrminganoldtraditionalbelief, namely, that theblissandhappi-ness of the immortal souls consist in the delight they take in the knowledge of theessenceofGod.14 ImmortalityforSpinozais, onhisaccount, entirelypersonal:theeternalpreservationofsomethingthatwaspeculiartoaparticularhumanbeing during his lifetime . . . the thought element of the mind that survives deathbearstheparticularcharacteristicsoftheindividualduringhislifetime . . . theimmortality of the soul, according to Spinoza, is personal and individual.15 Indeed,Wolfson insists, Spinozas goal is the entirely conservative project of defending thetraditionalrabbinicviewofimmortalityagainstitslatter-daycritics: [Spinozas]main object was to afrm the immortality of the soul against those of his own timewhodeniedit.16 Spinozaisalsoconcernedtoshowthatthereisnothingsuper-natural about immortality, that it is simply a part of the ordinary course of nature.(In what is the most astounding feature of his interpretation, Wolfson goes so faras to say that Spinoza retains the traditional vocabulary and speaks of the immor-talityofthesoul.17 Infact, nothingcouldbefurtherfromthetruth: Spinoza obviouslygoestogreatlengthstoavoidthetraditionalvocabulary. Thephraseimmortality of the soul [immortalitas animae] does not once appear in SpinozasownaccountinEthics. Heconsistentlyand, Iamsure, self-consciouslyusesinstead the phrase eternity of the mind [mentis aeternitas].18 Wolfsons constantuse of the words immortality of the soul to describe Spinozas view is thus verypuzzling indeed.)1912. AsIargueinthenalsection, thedesiretorescue adoctrineofimmortality forSpinoza is misguided and represents a fundamental misunderstanding of Spinozas major project.13. TamarRudavsky, TimeMatters: Time, CreationandCosmologyinMedievalJewish Philosophy (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000), 181, 186.14. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, vol. 2, 3101.15. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, vol. 2, 295.16. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, vol. 2, 323. Wolfson has in mind here, in particular,Uriel da Costa. But I believe that it is absolutely clear that Spinoza was, in fact, in agreement withda Costa on the question of immortality.17. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, vol. 2, 295.18. As Moreau notes, Spinoza distingue trs rigoureusement ces deux notions; see Spinoza:Lexprience et lternit, 5346.19. NumerousotherauthorsattributetoSpinoza, as Wolfsondoes, anaccountofpersonalimmortality. Some argue that Spinoza just worked hard to accommodate such a doctrine into hisown metaphysical schema and language, to give a Spinozistic spin to it. In his book The God ofSpinoza (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Richard Mason seems to take just thisposition (chapter 10). So does Seymour Feldman who, in his work on Gersonides, insists that forSpinoza immortality is individually differentiated (see the introduciton to his translation of TheWars of the Lord [Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1984], vol. 1, p. 76). Other schol-ars, whilenotingthatPartFiveofEthics speaksonlyoftheeternity ofthemind, insistthatfar228 Steven NadlerDespite the vigorous debate around this question, all hands would agree onat least one thing: the question of immortality was of concern to Spinoza from thebeginning to the end of his relatively brief philosophical career. It is an issue thatiscentralnotonlytohismetaphysicsoftheperson, butalsotohisviewson religion, morality, and the state. However, it is equally important to seeas a resultofbothaclosereadingofhiswritingsandabroaderunderstandingofhis philosophyasawholethatSpinozadid, withoutquestion, denythepersonalimmortalityofthesoul. Giveneverythinghebelievedaboutthenatureofthe soul, and more importantly about true virtue and the happiness of a human being,he had to deny that the soul is immortal. And he did so with absolute satisfaction.IIInEthics, thewordimmortality [immortalitas]occursonceandonlyonce. ItappearsinacontextinwhichSpinozaisdescribingthefoolishbeliefsofthe multitude, whoareoftenmotivatedtoactvirtuouslyonlybytheirhopeforaneternal reward and their fear of an eternal punishment. If they were not convincedthatthesoullivedonafterthebody, thenmoralitydifcultasitiswould, intheir eyes, not be a burden worth bearing. Such an opinion, he notes,seems no less absurd to me than if someone, because he does not believe hecan nourish his body with good food to eternity, should prefer to ll himselfwith poisons and other deadly things, or because he sees that the Mind is noteternal, or immortal, should prefer to be mindless, and to live without reason.(Vp41s, G II.307/C 61516)20The main point of his discussion here is the importance and value of virtue in thislife; thatvirtueis, inessence, itsownreward. Butthepassagemightalsoseemimportant with respect to the question of Spinozas views on immortality. Spinozadoes, as we shall see, argue for the eternity of the mind, and this text makes it lookasthoughheiswillingtoequatethethesisoftheeternityofthemindwiththefromwishingtodenythepersonalimmortalityofthesoul, Spinozajustwantedtostressits persistenceoutsideoftimeratherthanitsmereeverlastingnessintime(C. Hardin, Spinoza onImmortalityandTime, inSpinoza: NewPerspectives, eds. RobertW. ShahanandJ. I. Biro[Norman: UniversityofOklahomaPress, 1978], 12938); whilestillothers, agreeingthatforSpinozathereispersonalsurvivalafterdeath, argueonthecontrarythatinfacttheeternityofthe mind should be understood as a kind of sempiternity (Martha Kneale, Eternity and Sempi-ternity, in Grene, op. cit., 22740; Donagan, Spinozas Proof of Immortality). Finally, there arethose who argue that Spinoza did not want to deny the immortality of the personal soul, but onlythat these immortal souls would be individuated in the same way as they are individuated in thislife, that is, by way of their bodies (Erroll Harris, Spinozas Theory of Human Immortality, TheMonist 55 [1971]).20. AllcitationsofEthics incorporatepartnumber(IV), proposition(p), denition(d),scholium(s)andcorollary(c). ReferencestoSpinozaswritingsaretoSpinozaOpera, ed. CarlGebhardt, 5vols. (Heidelberg: Carl WintersUniversitatsverlag, 1972[vol. 5, 1987]), abbreviatedasG; andtothetranslationsbyEdwinCurley, TheCollectedWorksofSpinoza, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), abbreviated as C.Eternity and Immortality in Spinozas Ethics 229thesisoftheimmortalityofthesoul. However, heishereonlydescribing, inaratherderisiveway, thenaveandpotentiallyself-destructiveopinionsofthevulgarwhofeelthatalifeofvirtueisworthlivingonlyifitleadstotheallegedeternal rewards in the ctitious afterlife described by manipulative preachers. It isclearly a view that he holds in great contempt.21WhenSpinozadoesgetaroundtodiscussingthefateofthemindorsoulafterapersonsdeath, heisobviouslyverycarefultoavoidanytalkofimmor-talitas, lesthisreaderonthelookoutforindividualimmortalitymistakethewholemoralofhisstory. Therearepartsofthemindthatwillpersistafterthedemise of the body, Spinoza allows, but it is, as the phrase goes, nothing personal.Spinozadeneseternity simplyasthatwhichstandsoutsideofalldurationor time. Eternity can neither be dened by time nor have any relation to time(Vp23s, G II.96/C 607). Something is not eternal merely if its duration is withoutbeginning or end; this is nothing but sempiternity, or everlastingness in time. Trueeternity, which Spinoza explicitly contrasts with sempiternity (Id8), stands outsideofalltemporalcategorieswhatsoever. Before, after, now, later, andall such ascriptions are completely inapplicable to what is eternal.22 God, or substance,iseternal; soaretheattributesThoughtandExtension. Inacertainrespect,particular nite things are also eternalnot when they are considered in their tem-porally and spatially bound relationships to other nite things, that is, when whatisinquestionistheiractual, durationalexistence, butratherwhentheyare considered from a more abstract perspective as atemporal essenceswhat Spinozacalls sub specie aeternitatis. This way of looking at things will play a twofold rolein Spinozas account of the eternity of the mind.The human mind partakes of eternity in two distinct ways.23 First, there is theeternity that belongs to it because it is the ideaor the expression in the attributeof Thoughtof the material essencein the attribute of Extensionof the humanbody.Vp22: Nevertheless, inGodthereisnecessarilyanideathatexpressestheessenceofthisorthathumanbody, underaspeciesofeternity[subspecieaeternitatis].Demonstration: God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or thathumanbody, butalsoofitsessence, whichthereforemustbeconceived21. See Moreau, Spinoza: Lexprience et lternit, 535.22. Some commentators have argued that the eternity at stake here is just a sempiternity, orwhat Donagan calls omnitemporality; see Kneale, Eternity and Sempiternity, and Donagan,SpinozasProofofImmortality. Most, however, havecorrectly, IbelieveseenthatwhatSpinoza is talking about is a complete atemporality, or timelessness; see Harris, Spinozas Theoryof Human Immortality; Hampshire, Spinoza; Moreau, Spinoza: Lexprience et lternit, 536; andJoachim, A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901), 298.23. Itisabsolutelycrucialtoseethattherearetwodistinctkindsofeternity; see Moreau, Spinoza: Lexprienceetlternit, 5349. Afailuretodistinguishthemcanleadone into various kinds of misreadings of Spinozas views on the eternity of the mind (such as is foundin Harris, Spinozas Theory of Human Immortality; and Hardin, Spinoza on Immortality andTime).230 Steven NadlerthroughtheveryessenceofGod, byacertaineternalnecessity, andthisconcept must be in God. (G II.295/C 607)Anyactuallyexistinghumanbodypersistsdurationally, intimeandwithinthecausal nexus of other nite things that affect it and determine it. Toes stub againsttables; armsthrowballs; snowfortscomecrashingdownonus. Thissequenceofaffairs begins in time, pursues its course in time, and comes to an end in time. Theduration of the body as actually existing is limited; so are all the numerous modi-cationsofthebodythatcomeaboutthroughitsinteractionswithothernitemodes. But every human bodyin fact, every existing body of any typealso hasan aspect sub specie aeternitatis, under a form of eternity. There is an essence ofthat body in its extensional being, an extended nature abstracted from its tempo-ralduration. Whetheritisacaseofatable, abaseball, asnowfort, orahumanbody, itsessencewouldbeatypeofformulaicmathematicalordimensionalmapping of that body that identies it as the particular parcel of extension that itis. Any body is nothing but a specic ratio of motion and rest among a collectionofmaterialparts. Itsunityconsistsonlyinarelativeandstructuredstabilityofminutebodies.24 Andthisiswhatisreectedinitsessence, itseternalbeing. Atthis level, no question whatsoever is raised about whether the body actually existsinnatureornot. Becauseitisoutsideallduration, makingnoreferencetotime,this essence of the body is eternal.NowtheessenceofabodyasanextendedmodeisinGod(orSubstance)under the attribute of Extension. It is eminently contained within Extension asoneofitsinnitepotentialitiesorpossiblegenerations. Itis, inotherwords, justoneoutofaninnitelymanywaysofbeingextended. GivenSpinozasgeneralparallelismbetweentheattributesofExtensionandThoughtwherebyeverymodeofextension(everybodyandeverystateofabody)hasacorrespondingmodeinthought(anidea)andgiventheresultingandmoreparticularparal-lelism in a human being between what is true of the body and what is true of themind (which is nothing but the idea of the body),25there are, then, likewiseandnecessarilytwo aspects of the human mind. First, there is the aspect of the mindthatcorrespondstothedurationalexistenceofthebody. Thisisthepartofthemind that reects the bodys determinate relationships with the other bodies sur-rounding it. Sensations and feelingspain, pleasure, desire, revulsion, sadness, fear,andahostofothermentalstatesarealltheexpressioninthemindofwhatisconcurrently taking place in the body in its temporal interactions with the world.IfeelpainwhenIstubmytoe. Thesepassionsbelongtothemindtotheextentthatthehumanbeingisapartoftheorderofnature and, throughhisbody,subject to being affected by the world around him.26The parallelism also requires, however, that this part of the mind comes toan end when the duration of the body comes to an end, that is, at a persons death.24. See Ethics, Part II, G II.99100/C 460.25. IIp1113.26. ThedeterminatestudyofthevariousaffectsinahumanbeingisthesubjectofPart Three.Eternity and Immortality in Spinozas Ethics 231Whenthebodygoes, therearenomorepleasuresandpains, nomoresensorystates. Alloftheaffectionsofthebody, ofwhichthesesensations, images, andqualia are mental expressions, cease at death; the body is no longer in the worldrespondingtoitsdeterminations. Thus, theircorrelativeexpressionsinthemindcease as well. But there is another part of the mindnamely, that aspect of it thatcorresponds to the eternal aspect of the body. This is the expression in the attributeofThoughtofthebodysextendedessence. Likeitscorrelateinextension, thisaspect of the mind is eternal.27 It is a part of the mind that remains after a personsdeath.Vp23: Thehumanmindcannotbeabsolutelydestroyedwiththebody, butsomething of it remains which is eternal.Demonstration: InGodthereisnecessarilyaconcept, oridea, whichexpresses the essence of the human body (by Vp22), an idea, therefore, whichis necessarily something that pertains to the essence of the human mind. Butwe do not attribute to the human mind any duration that can be dened bytime, except insofar as it expresses the actual existence of the body, which isexplainedbydurationandcanbedenedbytime, i.e., wedonotattributedurationtoitexceptwhilethebodyendures. However, sincewhatis conceived, withacertaineternalnecessity, throughGodsessenceitselfisneverthelesssomething, thissomethingthatpertainstotheessenceofthemind will necessarily be eternal.Schol.: Thereis, then, thisideawhichexpressestheessenceofthebodyunder a species of eternity, a certain mode of thinking, which pertains to theessence of the mind, and which is necessarily eternal . . . (G II.295/C 607)The mind thus includes, as an essential and eternal component, an idea-correlatein Thought of the essence of the body in Extension. This idea-correlate is eternalbecauseit, liketheessenceofthebodyitrepresents, issituatednondurationallywithin one of Gods/Natures eternal attributes.Notice, however, that this is a very minimal kind of eternity. It is not some-thinginwhichhumanbeingscantakeanyprideorcomfort, foritisaneternitythat belongs to all things, human and otherwise. Given Spinozas metaphysics, andespecially the universal scope of the parallelism between Extension and Thought,orbodiesandideas, thereisnothingaboutthiseternityofthemindthatdistin-guishes the human being from any other nite beingor, more properly, there isnothing that distinguishes this eternity belonging to the human mind from the eter-nitybelongingtotheideaofanyothernitebody. WhatSpinozaclaimswithrespecttothegeneralparallelismbetweenmodesofextensionandmodesofthoughtappliesnecessarilyinthisparticularcaseaswell: Thethingswehaveshown . . . arecompletelygeneralanddonotpertainmoretomanthantootherindividuals . . . and so whatever we have said of the idea of the human body mustalsobesaidoftheideaofanything (IIp13s, GII.96/C458). Humanmindsare,27. In fact, this aspect of the mind is eternal because the mode of extension of which it is anexpression is eternal.232 Steven Nadlernaturally, signicantlydifferentfromthe Thought-modesorideascorrespondingtoother, non-humanbodiestheyhavemorefunctionsandgreatercapacities(includingmemoryandconsciousness), becausetheactuallyexistingbodiesofwhichtheyaretheideasarethemselvesmorecomplexandwell-endowedthanother bodies (such as trees).Inproportionasabodyismorecapablethanothersofdoingmanythingsat once, or being acted on in many ways at once, so its mind is more capablethanothersofperceivingmanythingsatonce. Andinproportionastheactionsofabodydependmoreonitselfalone, andasotherbodiesconcurwith it less in acting, so its mind is more capable of understanding distinctly.(IIp13s, G II.97/C 458)Butthismeansonlythatwhatremainsin Thoughtafterapersonsdeathis, liketheessenceofthebodyitexpresses, moreinternallycomplex, sotospeak, thanthe ideas that remain after the dissolution of some other kinds of bodies.28 It is not,however, more eternal.Norisitmore personal. Itisonlythecorrelatein Thoughtofaspecicratio of motion and rest in Extension. It expresses a particularly complex ratio, tobe sure, but it is generically no different from the idea of the essence of any otherbody.29 Andthereisnothingdistinctlypersonalaboutthiseternalideaofthebodynothing that would lead me to regard it as my self, identical to the self Icurrently am in this life. I shall return to this below.IIIThere is, however, another variety of eternity for the mind in Spinozas system. It,too, involvesthekindofatemporalbeingcharacteristicofideasofessences. Butit is, in fact, an eternity that is available only to human minds, since it is acquiredby rational agents alone.30AccordingtoSpinoza, allcreaturesareessentially(andnecessarily) moved by the pursuit of self-interest; they naturally strive for what will aid theirself-preservation.28. The intrinsic complexity of the body is reected in the variety and multiplicity of ideasthat make up the human mind; see IIp1113.29. See Moreau, Spinoza: Lexprience et lternit, 5378.30. Itishisfailuretorecognizethissecondvarietyofeternityforthemindthatisrespon-sible for Bennetts failure to make sense of Spinozas views here. Bennett is troubled by the factthatSpinozabelievesboththattheeternalmindisnothingbutthe(unchanging)ideaoftheeternal essense of the body and that how much of my mind is eternal depends upon some factsabout my conduct and my condition; in other words, that we can increase our share of eternity.Since Bennett recognizes only the eternity of the mind as the idea of the unchanging essence ofthe body, there is (he argues) no provision for my increasing how much of my mind is eternal,unless I can change my bodys essence, whatever that would mean. But now we are told that howmuch of my mind is eternal depends on what thinking I do, as though I could work at enlargingtheeternalpartofmymind (AStudyofSpinozasEthics, 3612). Infact, thatisexactly whatSpinoza thinks we can do, by increasing our share of adequate ideas, as I show.Eternity and Immortality in Spinozas Ethics 233IIIp6: Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in itsbeing.IIIp7: The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being isnothing but the actual essence of the thing. (G II.146/C 4989)This, infact, constitutes(formoralagents, atleast)virtue. Toactvirtuouslyistodo what will most effectively serve to preserve ones being.IVp20: The more each one strives, and is able, to seek his own advantage, i.e.to preserve his own being, the more he is endowed with virtue; conversely,insofar as each one neglects his own advantage, i.e. neglects to preserve hisbeing, he lacks power. (G II.224/C 557)Humanbeings, whentheyareactingrationally, strivenaturallyforknowledge.Sinceweare, amongallcreatures, uniquelyendowedwithreasonandthe capacity for understandingthat is, with intelligent mindswe recognize that ourownpropergood, ourultimateperfectionandwell-being, consistsinthepursuitofwhatbenetsthisourhighestpart. Butwhatelsecouldbenetourhighest intellectual faculties except knowledge? Thus, if virtue is the pursuit of what is inonesownself-interest, asSpinozainsists; andiftheacquisitionofknowledge iswhatisinourownself-interest, thenhumanvirtueconsistsinthepursuitofknowledge.31But Spinoza is concerned here not just with the pursuit of any ordinary kindofknowledge. Rather, whatismostbenecialtoarationalbeingisaparticularsortofdeepunderstandingthathecalls intuitiveknowledge, scientiaintuitiva,or the third kind of knowledge. This is an intuitive understanding of individualthingsintheirrelationstohighercauses, totheinniteandeternalaspectsofNature, and it represents the highest form of knowledge available to us.Thehumanmind, likeGodsattributeof Thought, containsideas. Someofthese ideassensory images, feels (like pains and pleasures), perceptual dataare imprecise qualitative phenomena. They are, as we have seen, nothing but theexpressioninthoughtofstatesofthebodyasitisaffectedbythebodiessur-rounding it. Such ideas do not convey adequate and true knowledge of the world,but only a relative, partial, and subjective picture of how things presently seem tobe to the perceiver given the perspectival limitations of his physical place. Thereisnosystematicordertotheseperceptions, noranycriticaloversightbyreason.As long as the human Mind perceives things from the common order of nature,itdoesnothaveanadequate, butonlyaconfusedandmutilatedknowledgeofitself, of its own Body, and of external bodies (IIp29c, G II.114/C 471). Under suchcircumstances, we are simply determined in our ideas by our fortuitous and hap-hazard encounter with things in the external world. This supercial acquaintancewill never provide us with knowledge of the essences of those things. In fact, it isan invariable source of falsehood and error. This knowledge from random expe-31. See IVp2026.234 Steven Nadlerrience is, for Spinoza, the rst kind of knowledge, and results in the accumula-tion of what he calls inadequate ideas.Adequateideas, ontheotherhand, areformedinarationalandorderlymanner. They are necessarily true and reveal certain essential natures. The secondkind of knowledge, Reason, is the apprehension of an essential truth through adiscursive, inferentialprocedure. Itissomewhatunclear, however, whetherforSpinoza what we apprehend through reason, in knowledge of the second kind, areonly general truths and principlescommon notions or universal notionsoralso truths about individuals.On the one hand, he insists that we can know adequately features that arecommon to a number of particulars (for example, certain truths about bodies gen-erally, suchasthelawsgoverningtheirmotionsandthepropertiesthatcharac-terizethemuniversally). Onewayinwhichwecanarriveatsuchknowledgeisthroughdeductivereasoningfromotheradequategeneralorcommonnotions,since whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas that are adequate in the mindarealsoadequate (IIp40, GII.120/C475). Italsoseemsthatwecanarriveatcommon notions inductively, through abstraction from sensory acquaintance withparticulars.32On the other hand, it sometimes seems to be the case that in the second kindofknowledgewhatisapprehendedincludestruthsaboutindividuals. Inparticu-lar, knowledgeofthesecondkindinvolvesgraspingathingscausalconnectionsnotjusttootherobjectsbut, moreimportantly, totheattributesofGodandtheinnitemodes(thelawsofnature)thatfollowimmediatelyfromthem. Thatis,what one sees in the second kind of knowledge but not in knowledge of the rstkindishowthethingisultimatelydeterminedbythenatureoressencethatitinstantiates. In the adequate idea of a particular body, for example, the body willbe embedded not only in its mechanistic relations to other bodies, but also withinthe laws of motion and rest and the nature of matter (extension) itself. (In fact, itisthesethatrenderthosemechanisticrelationslawlikeandnecessary.) Theade-quate idea of a thing thus clearly and distinctly situates its object in all of its causalnexusesandshowsnotjustthat itis, buthow andwhy itnecessarilyis. As Yovelputsit, inknowledgeofthesecondkind, we explicatetheobjectexternally, bytheintersectionofmechanisticcausallaws, untilweachieve apointofsatura-tion . . . when a network of lawlike explanations has, so to speak, closed in on theobjectfromallrelevantangles.33 Thepersonwhotrulyknowsathingseesthereasons why the thing was determined to be and could not have been otherwise.ItisofthenatureofReasontoregardthingsasnecessary, notascontingent(IIp44, G II.125/C 480). The belief that something is accidental or spontaneousthat is, causally undeterminedcan be based only on an inadequate grasp of thethings causal explanation, on a partial and mutilated familiarity with it. To per-ceivebywayofadequateideasistoperceivethenecessityinherentinNature.Sense experience alone could never provide the information conveyed by an ade-32. ThisreadingofwhatthesecondkindofknowledgeinvolvesisadoptedbyMargaretWilson, Spinozas Theory of Knowledge, 11619; and Henry Allison, Benedict de Spinoza, 117.33. Yovel, Spinoza and Other Heretics, vol. 1, The Marrano of Reason, 156.Eternity and Immortality in Spinozas Ethics 235quateidea. (Atonepoint, Spinozasuggeststhatthedifferencebetweenanade-quateideaofathingandaninadequateoneisnotunlikethecontrastbetweensimply knowing a conclusion versus seeing how the conclusion follows from spe-cic premises.)34The senses present things only as they happen to appear from agiven perspective at a given moment in time. An adequate idea, on the other hand,byshowinghowathingfollowsnecessarilyfromoneoranotherofGodsattri-butes, ultimatelypresentsitinits eternal aspectssubspecieaeternitatisandleads to a conception of the thing without any relation to time or nite and partialperspective. ItisofthenatureofReasontoregardthingsasnecessaryandnotascontingent. AndReasonperceivesthisnecessityofthingstruly, i.e., asitisinitself. ButthisnecessityofthingsistheverynecessityofGodseternalnature.Therefore, itisofthenatureofReasontoregardthingsunderthisspeciesof eternity.Ifknowledgeofthesecondkinddoesindeedprovidethisratiocinativeunderstandingofindividuals, thenthethirdkindofknowledge, intuition, takeswhat is known by Reason and grasps it in a single and comprehensive act of themind.35 Where the second kind of knowledge moves discursively through variousstages, from the initial starting point (causes) through intermediate steps to its nalconclusion (effect), in the third kind of knowledge there is an immediate percep-tion of the necessity of a thing and the way it depends on its ultimate, rst causes.This kind of knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essenceofcertainattributesofGodtotheadequateknowledgeoftheformalessences of things. (IIp40s2, G II.122/C 478)Thethirdkindofknowledgeproceedsfromanadequateideaofcertainattributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essences of things. (Vp25,G II.296/C 608)Intuition synthesizes what Reason knows only discursively. It thereby generates adeep causal understanding of a thing, that is, an internal knowledge of its essence(incontrastwithwhatYovelcallsexplicatingtheobjectexternally). SuchaninternalknowledgeoftheessencesituatesthethingimmediatelyandtimelesslyinrelationtotheeternalprinciplesofNaturethatgeneratedandgovernit. Thisconception of ultimate knowledge is already present early in Spinozas oeuvre, inTreatise on the Emendation of the Intellect from the late 1650s:The essences of singular, changeable things are not to be drawn from theirseries, ororderofexisting, sinceitoffersusnothingbutextrinsicdenomi-nations, relations, oratmost, circumstances, allofwhicharefarfromtheinmostessenceofthings. Thatessenceistobesoughtonlyfromthexedandeternalthings, andatthesametimefromthelawsinscribedinthese34. See IIp28.35. I thus agree with Yovel when he insists that with the third kind of knowledge nothingnew is added to the scientic information already possessed.Both express the same fundamentalinformation; see The Marrano of Reason, 156, 1656.236 Steven Nadlerthings, as in their true codes, according to which all singular things come tobe, and are ordered. Indeed these singular changeable things depend so inti-mately, and (so to speak) essentially, on the xed things that they can neitherbe nor be conceived without them. (G II.37/C 41)Westrive, then, toacquirethethirdkindofknowledge: anintuitiveunderstand-ingofthenaturesofthingsnotmerelyintheirnite, particularanductuatingcausalrelationstoothernitethings, notintheirmutable, durationalexistence,but through their unchanging essences. And to truly understand things essentiallyin this way is to relate them to their innite causes: substance (God) and its attri-butes. WhatweareafterisaknowledgeofbodiesnotthroughotherbodiesbutthroughExtensionanditslaws, andaknowledgeofideasthroughthenatureofThoughtanditslaws. Itisthepursuitofthiskindofknowledgethatconstituteshuman virtue and the project that represents our greatest self-interest as rationalbeings.Vp25: Thegreateststrivingofthemind, anditsgreatestvirtue, isunder-standing things by the third kind of knowledge.Demonstration: The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequateidea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essenceof things, and the more we understand things in this way, the more we under-stand God. Therefore, the greatest virtue of the mind, i.e., the minds poweror nature or its greatest striving, is to understand things by the third kind ofknowledge. (G II.296/C 608)Vp29scholium: We conceive things as actual in two ways: either insofar aswe conceive them to exist in relation to a certain time and place, or insofaras we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the neces-sityofthedivinenature. Butthethingsweconceiveinthissecondwayastrue, or real, we conceive under a species of eternity [sub specie aeternitatis],and to that extent they involve the eternal and innite essence of God. (GII.2989/C 610)Sub specie aeternitatis: when we understand things in this way, we see themfrom the innite and eternal perspective of God, without any relation to or indi-cation of time and place. When we perceive things in time, they appear in a con-tinuous state of change and becoming; when we perceive them under a form ofeternity, what we apprehend abides permanently. This kind of knowledge, becauseit is atemporal and because it is basically Gods knowledge, is eternal. It is, aboveall, not connected to the actual existence of any nite, particular thing, least of allthe existence in time of the human body.Now Spinoza suggests, rst of all, that the acquisition of true and adequateideasisbenecialtoapersoninthislifetime, asthesourceofanabidinghappi-nessandpeaceofmindthatisimmunetotheslingsandarrowsofoutrageousfortune. When a person sees the necessity of all things, and especially the fact thatthe objects that he or she values are, in their comings and goings, not under onesEternity and Immortality in Spinozas Ethics 237control, that person is less likely to be overwhelmed with emotions at their arrivaland passing away. The resulting life will be tranquil, and not given to sudden dis-turbances of the passions.36 But there is an additional reason why we should strivetoacquireandmaintainourstoreofadequateideas: theyrepresentforustheclosest thing available to what is usually called immortality.Becauseadequateideasarenothingbutaneternalknowledgeofthings, abodyofeternaltruthsthatwecanpossessortapintointhislifetime, itfollowsthat the more adequate ideas we acquire as a part of our mental makeup in thislifethe more we participate in eternity nowthe more of us remains after thedeath of the body and the end of the durational aspect of ourselves. Since the ade-quateideasthatonecomestopossessareeternal, theyarenotaffectedbythedemise of the body and the end of our (or any) temporal and durational existence.In other words, the more adequate knowledge we have, the greater is the degreeof the eternity of the mind.Vp38: The more the mind understands things by the second and third kindof knowledge, the less it is acted on by affects which are evil, and the less itfears death.Demonstration: The minds essence consists in knowledge; therefore, themore the mind knows things by the second and third kind of knowledge, thegreater the part of it that remains, and consequently the greater the part ofit that is not touched by affects which are contrary to our nature, i.e., whichare evil. (G II.304/C 613)Now, as we shall see, it is a bit misleading to say, as I have above, that this eternalknowledge is a part of me that remains after death. Rather, what remains is some-thing that, while I lived and used my reason, belonged to me and made up a partthe eternal partof the contents of my mind. The striving to increase my store ofadequateideasis, inthisway, astrivingtoincreasemyshareofeternity. Thus,Spinozaclaims, thegreaterthemindsintellectualachievementintermsoftheacquisition of adequate ideas, the less is death harmful to us. Indeed, he insists,the human mind can be of such a nature that the part of the mind which we haveshown perishes with the body is of no moment in relation to what remains (Vp38s,G II.304/C 614).However, ifwhatoneislookingforafterthistemporalexistenceisaper-sonal immortality in the world-to-come (to use the Jewish phrase that would havebeen familiar to Spinoza)a conscious, full-blooded (but, on many accounts, body-less) life after death in Gan Eden or olam ha-ba as described by the rabbis of theTalmudandthemidrashimthentheeternityofthemindheldoutbySpinozawill seem a very thin and disappointing recompense for having lived a life of good.It is hard to see Spinozas account of the eternity of the mind as a doctrine of per-sonal immortality of the soul. Indeed, I believe that he set out to deny, in his ownterms, that there is any such thing.36. See Vp6.238 Steven NadlerIVThe question of personal immortality involves two issues. The rst concerns thesurvival of the soul, in whole or in part, as a discrete, individual entity. Any robusttheory of personal immortality should hold the soul (or whatever aspect of it per-sists after death) to be, at the very minimum, quantitatively distinguishable fromany other soul-like entity after the demise of the body. Numerical individuality issurely a necessary condition for individuality tout court. Without quantitative iden-tity, a persons disembodied, postmortem soul would then have no individuality atall. The second issue concerns the recognizable continuity of specic (and not justgeneric) identity between the soul in this life and in the afterlife. It must be pos-sible to distinguish qualitatively one postmortem soul from another and identify itasthesoulthatbelongedtothis once-livingpersonandnotthatone. Itmustbepossible, that is, to take the soul after death and link it up somehow to the life thatwasapersonsdurationalexistence. Onlyinthiswaycanitbesaidthatitisthesoul of this person (as opposed to that person) that is immortal.The second question is, in the context of Spinozas thought, easier to address.One thing is, rst of all, perfectly clear. Spinoza will absolutely not allow it to besaid that a person is immortal. For Spinoza, my person or self is an actually exist-ing body together with the mind that is its expression. Or, more precisely, a personis the mode that expresses itself in time as an actually existing body in Extensionand as a corresponding mind (or idea) in Thought. A person is not a soul or mindthat just happens to be embodied, as many philosophers from Plato onward havepicturedit; norisitthebodyaloneitis, instead, theunityofthetwo. AmanconsistsofaMindandaBody (IIp13c, GII.96/C457).37 Because, asSpinozamakes clear, the bodily component of a person must be an actually existing humanbody,38therecanbenopersistenceofaperson afterhisdeath. Theendofdura-tional existence is the end of the person.But what about saying that the mind that does persist after ones death, whilenot the person, can nonetheless be identied as the mind of this or that person?Spinozamakesitverydifculttosustainthisclaimaswell. Onesolutiontothisquestionmustberuledoutfromthestart. Itcannotbethecasethattheeternalmind carries within itself any direct reference to what was the persons durationalexistencetotheexistingconstituentpartsandoccuringeventsthatmakeupapersons lifetime. As we have seen, what is eternal bears no reference to time what-soever. There will be, in the eternal mind, no traces of durational existence.Still, might it not be possible to nd some way of distinguishing one eternalmindfromanyotheranddrawingaconnectionfromittooneparticulardura-tionallifetime? Theproblemwiththisapproach, onSpinozasterms, isthatitishard to see how one eternal mindor, rather, the body of eternal adequate ideasthatoncebelongedtoapersonsmindcouldbequalitativelydifferentiatedorindividuated from another. Or, to put it more precisely, there is no reason why two37. Morrison offers a good defense of this point in Spinoza on the Self, Personal Identity,and Immortality.38. IIp13.Eternity and Immortality in Spinozas Ethics 239eternal minds should necessarily be distinguishable from one another. Wolfson, forone, believes that there is no problem here for Spinoza. He argues that one eternalmind is supposed to be distinguished, disembodied, and postmortem, from anothereternalmindthroughitscontents, thatis, throughthequantityandcharacterofthe knowledge belonging to each. As different people reach in their lifetimes dif-ferentlevelsofintellectualachievement, thiswillbereectedintheirrespectivestores of adequate ideas. In this way, Wolfson argues, for Spinoza it is the case thatthoughallsoulsareimmortalandallofthemareunitedwithGod, thereexistcertaindifferencesbetweentheindividualsoulswhichremainafterdeath . . .Immortality is in a sense personal and individual.39 But Wolfson does not see thatthis can be only a de facto distinction. These eternal minds are composed only ofabstract ideas or knowledge, and there is nothing in principle to keep them fromhavingidenticalcontents. Thelimitingcaseofsuchascenariowouldbeperfectknowledge, whereby a mind, having achieved comprehensive understanding of theentirety of Nature, would mirror Gods total and eternal understanding of thingsthatis, thetotalityofideasundertheattributeofThought. Twomindshavingattainedthisstatewould, becausetheircontentsarethesame, bequalitativelyindistinguishable. Ofcourse, nonitemindcanachievesuchaperfectstateofknowledge. Butevenwithlesserdegreesofunderstanding, whatistokeeptwomindsfromhavingacquiredinthislifeexactlythesamecollectionofadequateideas? Since adequate ideas reect reality sub specie aeternitatis, there would noteven be any difference of perspective on the objects so cognized. It may not be alikely event, but it is at least possible. (Spinoza suggests that it may even be a desir-ablestateofaffairs. Hemakesitfairlyclearthatthemoreadequateideastwomindshave, themoretheyagreewitheachother.40 Thisistheroadtosocialpeace and political well-being.) And this means that there is nothing in the natureof an eternal mind that guarantees that it will be qualitatively distinguishable fromanother.Individuating a postmortem eternal mind and distinguishing it from othersnot by its contents, by the knowledge it contains, but by connecting it with a par-ticular durational consciousness in this lifetime, and thus conferring upon it a trulypersonal dimension, is equally problematic. As long as a person lives, the eternalpart of his mindbeing simply his knowledge of adequate ideasis a part of thatpersonsconsciousness. Butitwouldseemthatatthemomentofdeath, thelinkbetweenthatbodyofknowledgeandtheconsciousnesstowhichitbelongedisnecessarily broken. For Spinoza, consciousness and memory (the latter, in essence,is nothing but that which gives unity to consciousness) seem to be intimately tiedtothe(full)person. AtonepointinEthics, Spinozasuggeststhatsomeonewhohasundergonearadicalchangeinconsciousnesshas, ipsofacto, undergonearadical change in personhood:Sometimes a man undergoes such changes that I should hardly have said hewas the same man. I have heard stories, for example, of a Spanish Poet who39. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, vol. 2, 318.40. I take this to be the import of IVp35.240 Steven Nadlersuffered an illness; though he recovered, he was left so oblivious to his pastlifethathedidnotbelievethetalesandtragedieshehadwrittenwerehisown. (IVp39s, G II.240/C 569)It would seem to be the case, as well, that a radical change in personhood throughextremealterationordestructionofthebodywould, throughtheparallelismofmind and body, entail a radical change in, or even loss of, consciousness.Now Spinoza explicitly links self-consciousness to the actual existence of thebody, and particularly to the way it interacts with other existing bodies. The minddoesnotknowitself, exceptinsofarasitperceivestheideasoftheaffectionsofthe body (IIp23, G II.110/C 468). This alone is enough to suggest that after deatha persons particular and personal consciousness comes to an end.41 But if, in addi-tion, consciousness and personhood are so closely connected, then it would seemthat as personhood goes (which, as we have seen, ends with the bodys demise) sogoes consciousness. A postmortem mind, then, would no longer be endowed withitslivingconsciousness. Evenifithada consciousnessandIseenoreasonforthinking that it couldit would certainly have no memory of the conscious life itled in its durational term, for memory itself also depends upon the actually exist-ing body: The mind can neither imagine anything, nor recollect past things, exceptwhile the body endures (Vp21, G II.294/C 607). Spinoza suggests, in fact, that thebeliefinaconsciousimmortalsoulthatislinkedviamemorytoitsdurational(lived)consciousnessissimplytofallpreytoapopularmisconceptionofwhat persistsafterapersonsdeath, amisconceptionthatinvolvesprojectingonto theeternalmindfeaturesthatproperlycharacterizeonlyaliving, embodied consciousness.If we attend to the common opinion of men, we shall see that they are indeedconsciousoftheeternityoftheirmind, butthattheyconfuseitwithdura-tion, andattributeittotheimagination, ormemory, whichtheybelieveremains after death. (Vp34s, G II.3012/C 61112)An eternal mind looks like nothing but a body of knowledge permanently cut offfromanykindofconsciousness(includingaccesstoanearlierconsciousness).There will thus be no connection, at least within consciousness, between the mindin duration and the mind sub specie aeternitatis.Sohowcananeternalmindbequalitativelyindividuatedandgivenaper-sonal dimension, a connection to the life led by a particular person? One nal pos-sibilitysuggestsitself, namely, throughthebody. Thisispreciselyhowamindisindividuated in this lifetimeby being the expression in Thought of a particular,actuallyexistingbody. Sowhyshouldnotasimilarapproachworkforthemindpostmortem? Since the eternal mind is eternal, it cannot bear any direct reference41. ItalsomakesithardtoseehowDonagancansustainhisclaimthatforSpinozatheeternalmindwillhaveaconscioussenseofself. Donaganinsists, aswell, thatmemorywhich,he agrees, ends with the demise of the bodyis not essential for this self-identity; see SpinozasArgument for Immortality.Eternity and Immortality in Spinozas Ethics 241either to an actually existing body or (more relevantly) to the historical (tempo-ral) existence that its own body once enjoyed. However, it is important to remem-ber that there are two eternal aspects to the human mind: in addition to the storeof adequate ideas that constitute one kind of eternity for the (rational) mind, thereisthateternity(commontoall modesof Thought)thatitacquiresbybeingtheidea of the eternal essence of the body (dened as a particular ratio of motion andrest between material particles). Therefore, belonging to an eternal mind there is,inadditiontoitsadequateideas, thatidealcomponentcorrespondingtotheeternal remnant (in Extension) of the particular body that once made up a person.In this way each eternal mind would seem, through its makeup, to pick out a par-ticular body that at one time belonged (durationally) to a person. To put it anotherway, if a person is an actually existing body (as a modal expression within Exten-sion) with its correlative durational mind (as a modal expression within Thought),then, since the eternal mind bears, as one of its constituents, an idea of the eternalessenceofthatbody, isnotthatmindsimplytheeternal, idealexpressionoftheperson? Will not this sufce to distinguish one eternal mind from another and giveitaconnectiontoahumanlife?Ifitcannotbedonebytheadequateideasthemindcontains, surelyitcanbedonebytheessenceoftheonce-existingbodytowhich the mind ideally and eternally refers?This is exactly the approach taken by Donagan. In duration, he insists, humanmindsarecomplexideasindividuatedbytheirprimaryconstituents: ideasofexisting human bodies.42 This is no less true of eternal minds, with the differencebeing that the body whose idea does the individuating is no longer existing.Spinozasproofthatsomethingofthemindremains, whichiseternal,conrmsWolfsonsemphaticstatementthatheconceivedimmortalityaspersonal and individual. For in it, he set out to show, not that ideas whicharecommontodifferentmindsremainafterdeath, butthatapartoftheindividuatingprimaryconstituentofeachminddoesso, apartthatretainsits individuality.That constituent of the eternal mind that accounts for its individuating is an ideaof the formal essence of its body.4342. Donagan, Spinozas Argument for Immortality, 251.43. Donagan, SpinozasArgumentforImmortality, 252. Rudavskytakesasimilartack.Eternal minds, she insists, are to be individuated by the ideas of the body that constitute them.On Spinozas theory of individuation, part of what makes me who I am is that I am affectedby other individuals; individuation on this model turns out to be relational, incorporatingboth material and formal elements . . . [it] is bodies that are the source of identication ofpersons: The ideas that make up an individual mind acquire their identity by being ideasof a particular body. This identication with both remains embedded in the mind after thedeath of the body. (Time Matters, 185)WhatRudavskydoesnottakenoteof, however, isthefactthatsuchrelationalelementsthebodys causal relations to external bodiesbelong to the body only in duration, in its spatial andtemporalrelationshipstootherbodies. Theynecessarilycometoanendwiththedemiseofthebodyandtheterminationofitsdurationalexistence. Thus, theyarenotavailabletoindividuate(the essences of) bodies postmortem.242 Steven NadlerHowever, there is a problem with this approach as well. It is potentially verytroublesome, given Spinozas conception of a body, to individuate bodies outsideof duration, that is, outside of their mutual spatial, temporal, and causal relationsas actually existing bodies. If a body sub specie aeternitatis is nothing but a generic,eternalmathematicalformulaspecifyingaparcelofextensionthrougharela-tively stable ratio of motion and rest between material partsand bearing no ref-erence to time and duration, then, like the collection of adequate ideas that persistsafter ones death, it, too, need not in principle be distinguishable from the mathe-matical, atemporalformulaconstitutingtheessenceofanother, qualitativelysimilar body. Two bodies may be precisely alike in all of their intrinsic qualitiesanddistinguishableonlythroughthedifferentrelationsinwhichtheystandtootherbodies(relativeplaceandtime, causalinteractions, etc.)and, thus, onlyaslongastheyactuallyexist.44 ThisisaproblemthatinfectstheCartesianaccountofbodilyindividualitygenerally. If, asDescartesclaims, abodyjustis extension,then it is nothing but geometrical gure; and, outside of time and physical place,twosimilargeometricalguresareindistinguishableonecirclelooksjustlikeanother of the same size; only context allows one to differentiate them. Thus, theabstractnessoftheeternalessenceofahumanbodymightprecludeonefrombeing able to distinguish it from the eternal essence of another human bodythiscouldbethecase, forexample, withballbearingsor(ifweconcentrate, forthesakeofargument, onlyonexternalappearance)withperfectlyidenticaltwinsand thus from being able to use that component of an eternal mind to distinguishit from another.So much for the question of the qualitative individuality of the eternal mind.Therstissueraisedabove, regardingthequantitative distinctionamongeternalmindsorwhatmightbecalledthemindsontologicalintegrity afterdeathismoredifculttoresolve. Isthepostmortemmindevenanidentiablething, onethat is at least numerically different from other eternal minds? Or, to put the ques-tionanotherway, isthereinfactapluralityofeternalmindsforSpinoza?Theanswertothisquestionisnotveryclear. Nevertheless, hereisatentativesug-gestion. The adequate ideas that remain after ones death are not bound togetherinanywayandthusseparatedfromanyothercollection ofadequateideas (say, thosethatbelongedtosomeoneelse). Bearinmindthatthereisno consciousness or memory to unite them, as there was during that persons lifetime;thesefeaturesofthemindendedwiththedeathoftheperson. Moroever, alloftheevidencepointstothemindsintegrityasathingbeingsolelyafunctionof,andthusdependentupon, theactualexistenceofthebody. Proposition Thirteenof Part Two states that the object of the idea constituting the human mind is thebody, oracertainmodeofExtensionthatactuallyexists, andnothingelse (GII.96/C 457).My suggestionand it is, I admit, only a suggestionis that for Spinoza, afterapersonsdeath, whatremainsofthemindeternallytheadequateideas, alongwiththeideaoftheessenceofthebodyalldispersesandrevertsbacktothe 44. This is the problem with Rudavskys attempted use of the idea of the essence of the bodyto individuate the eternal mind.Eternity and Immortality in Spinozas Ethics 243inniteintellectofGod(theattributeofThought), sincetheyarejustGods knowledge of things.Vp40s: Our mind, in so far as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking,which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this again byanother, andsoon, toinnity; sothattogether, theyallconstituteGodseternal and innite intellect (G II.306/C 615).45Thispassageseemstoimplythattheeternalmindisadiscreteandidentiablemode of Thought, distinguishable from any other eternal mind/mode of Thought.And yet, the adequate ideas themselves all are, always have been, and always willbenothingmorethanideasinGodsinniteintellect, modesoftheattributeThought. For an all-too-brief span of time they stand in a certain determinate rela-tionship with one another as they enter into the composition of an existing humanminda mind that, in truth, is nothing but an idea that is a collection of ideas. Andforthatdurationofapersonslifetime, Godsknowledgeoftheobjectsofthoseideas passesthrough thehumanmindinsofarastheideasformapartofthatspecic collection. When we say that the human mind perceives this or that, wearesayingnothingbutthatGod, notinsofarasheisinnite, butinsofarasheisexplained through the nature of the human mind, or insofar as he constitutes theessence of the human mind, has this or that idea (IIp11c, G II.945/C 456).This is, of course, all very vague, and I am genuinely puzzled about how toanswer the question of the integrity of the collection of adequate ideas consti-tuting an eternal mind. But if my proposed account is right, then there is just oneset of eternal, adequate ideas, a body of knowledge that each of us, in this lifetime,isabletotapinto. Tothisextent, weasknowerscan participate ineternity. Inknowing, in the pursuit of a rational understanding of nature and of ourselves, wecan transcend our own individuality and temporality. This is, in fact, something thatwe can be consciously aware of in this life, and it is a source of joy. As he says atonepoint, wefeelandknowbyexperiencethatweareeternal (Vp23s, GII.296/C 6078).VThings do not look good for those who want to nd a doctrine of personal immor-tality in Spinozas philosophy. In fact, anyone who even tries to do so fails to graspone of the essential, large-scale aspects of Spinozas philosophical project. Regard-less of what one thinks of my reading of Spinozas doctrine of the eternity of themind, andirrespectiveofthestrengthorweaknessoftheargumentsthatIofferfor that reading, there is one very good reasonindeed, to my mind the strongestpossible reasonfor thinking that Spinoza intended to deny the personal immor-talityofthesoul: suchareligiouslychargeddoctrinegoesagainsteverygrainof45. This seems to be Hampshires reading, when he notes that insofar as I do attain genuineknowledge, my individuality as a particular thing disappears and my mind becomes so far unitedwith God or Nature conceived under the attribute of Thought (Spinoza, 175).244 Steven Nadlerhis philosophical persuasions. Seeing how this is so requires standing back from aminuteanalysisofthepropositionsofEthics abittoconsiderhisentirephilo-sophical project, particularly its moral and political dimensions.ItisclearfromthelaterbooksofEthics andTheological-Political TreatisethatoneofthemajorgoalsofSpinozasworkistoliberateusfromthegripofirrational passions and lead us to an abiding state of eudaimonia, of psychologicaland moral well-being, in the life of reason. And the two passions that he is mostconcerned about are hope and fear.46 These are the passions that are most easilymanipulated by ecclesiastic authorities seeking to control our lives and commandour obedience. These preachers take advantage of our tendency toward supersti-tiousbehaviorbypersuadingusthatthereisaneternalrewardtohopeforandaneternalpunishmenttofearafterthislife. Thisconstitutesthecarrotandstickthattheywieldtomovepeopleintosubmission. Whatisessentialforthemtosucceedintheirappealtoourhopeandfearisour convictionthatthereissuchan afterlife, that my soul will continue to live after the death of my body and thatthereisapersonalimmortality. IbelievethatSpinozathoughtthatthebestwayto free us from a life of hope and fear, a life of superstitious behavior, was to killit at its roots and eliminate the foundational belief on which such hopes and fearsare grounded: the belief in the immortality of the soul. Maybe there is an eternalaspectortwoeternalaspectsofthemind. But, heissaying, itisnothinglikethepersonalimmortalityperniciouslyheldoutto, orover us, bytheleadersoforganized religions.Inthisway, thedenialofpersonalimmortalityisfundamentalnotonlytoSpinozas metaphysics, but also to his moral and political thought. To want to ndinSpinozasphilosophyarobustdoctrineofpersonalimmortalityisdeeplyto misunderstand Spinoza.46. 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